

FOR A QUICK REVIEW OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT POINTS IN THE COMMENTS, JUST DO “FIND #” AND ALL THE SPOTS INTERESTING FOR ANALYSIS WILL BE LISTED

VOLUME I

I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE ACCUSED AND THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM

1. This case relates to events alleged to have occurred from October 1991 to November 1995 in various locations in BiH, including Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and 20 municipalities of the ARK, the Sarajevo region, and eastern BiH (“Municipalities”).

2. The Accused was born on 19 June 1945 in the municipality of Šavnik, Republic of Montenegro. He was a founding member of the SDS and served as its President from 12 July 1990 to 19 July 1996.¹ The Accused also acted as President of the National Security Council of SerBiH, which was created on 27 March 1992 and held sessions until around May 1992.² On 12 May 1992, the Accused was elected as the President of the three-member Presidency of SerBiH.³ At the beginning of June 1992, the Presidency increased to five members, and the Accused continued as President of that Presidency.⁴ **(This is not entirely correct, since those over the three members were present from time to time, depending on the subject. Formally, there was no a “War Presidency” without a state of war declared. So, any conviction on the basis of membership in the “War Presidency” would be an error in facts, since such a present officials didn’t vote nor had decided about anything, except informing the Presidency from their domain!)** From 17 December 1992, he was sole President of the RS and Supreme Commander of the RS armed forces.⁵

¹ - 225 Patrick Treanor, T. 14000–14002 (1 June 2011); P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990–1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 7; D255 (Radovan Karadžić’s speech at the constituent SDS Assembly), p. 2; D269 (Article from NIN entitled “Serbs in Bosnia”, 20 July 1990), p. 1; D4424 (Written agreement between Radovan Karadžić, Momčilo Krajišnik, Biljana Plavšić and Aleksa Buha, 18 July 1996). *See also* Section II.B.1: Serbian Democratic Party (SDS).

² P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990–1992”, 30 July 2002), paras. 236, 255–256; Patrick Treanor, T. 14060 (1 June 2011) (erroneously referring to 27 March 1991); Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 8743. *See* paras. 89, 95. The Chamber notes that when it refers to a paragraph or a footnote number without specifying the source, it refers to a paragraph or footnote in this Judgement.

³ P3032 (Minutes of 1st constitutive session of “SerBiH” Presidency, 12 May 1992); Patrick Treanor, T. 14060 (1 June 2011); P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990–1992”, 30 July 2002), paras. 236, 260; Momčilo Mandić, T. 5000 (13 July 2010). *See* para. 96.

⁴ Patrick Treanor, T. 14060–14061 (1 June 2011); P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990–1992”, 30 July 2002), paras. 236, 261–264; D428 (Minutes of 4th expanded meeting of SerBiH War Presidency, 9 June 1992). *See* para. 97.

⁵ Patrick Treanor, T. 14060–14061 (1 June 2011); P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990–1992”, 30 July 2002), paras. 236, 265–267; Dušan Kovačević, T. 39657, 39659–39660 (11 June 2013); Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 8618, 8633–8634, 9107–9110.

3. In the Indictment, the Accused is charged under Article 7(1) of the Statute for his alleged participation in four related JCEs in BiH. The Prosecution alleges the following:

- a. From at least October 1991 to 30 November 1995, the Accused participated in an “overarching” JCE, the objective of which was to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb claimed territory in BiH through the crimes charged therein (“Overarching JCE”);⁶
- b. Between April 1992 and November 1995, the Accused participated in a JCE to establish and carry out a campaign of sniping and shelling against the civilian population of Sarajevo, the primary purpose of which was to spread terror among the civilian population (“Sarajevo JCE”);⁷
- c. Between the days preceding 11 July 1995 and 1 November 1995, the Accused participated in a JCE to eliminate the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica by killing the men and boys of Srebrenica and forcibly removing the women, young children and some elderly men from Srebrenica (“Srebrenica JCE”);⁸ and
- d. Between approximately 26 May and 19 June 1995, the Accused participated in a JCE to take hostage over 200 UN peacekeepers and military observers in order to compel NATO to abstain from conducting air strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets (“Hostages JCE”).⁹

4. In addition, the Accused is charged for having planned, instigated, ordered, and/or aided and abetted the crimes in the Indictment.¹⁰ He is also charged as a superior pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute for these crimes.¹¹

5. The Indictment charges the Accused with 11 Counts as follows:

- i. Count 1: genocide (in relation to the Municipalities);
- ii. Count 2: genocide (in relation to Srebrenica);
- iii. Count 3: persecution, a crime against humanity (in relation to the Municipalities and Srebrenica);
- iv. Count 4: extermination, a crime against humanity (in relation to the Municipalities and Srebrenica);
- v. Count 5: murder, a crime against humanity (in relation to the Municipalities, Sarajevo, and Srebrenica);

⁶ Indictment, paras. 9–14, 30–31. The Prosecution charges the Accused with the first and the third form of JCE in relation to the Overarching JCE. *See* Indictment, paras. 9–10.

⁷ Indictment, paras. 15–19. The Prosecution charges the Accused only with the first form of JCE in relation to the Sarajevo JCE. *See* Indictment, paras. 15–16.

⁸ Indictment, paras. 20–24. The Prosecution charges the Accused only with the first form of JCE in relation to the Srebrenica JCE. *See* Indictment, paras. 20–21.

⁹ Indictment, paras. 25–29. The Prosecution charges the Accused only with the first form of JCE in relation to the Hostages JCE. *See* Indictment, paras. 25–26.

¹⁰ Indictment, paras. 30–31.

¹¹ Indictment, paras. 32–35.

- vi. Count 6: murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war (in relation the Municipalities, Sarajevo, and Srebrenica);
- vii. Count 7: deportation, a crime against humanity (in relation to the Municipalities);¹²
- viii. Count 8: inhumane acts (forcible transfer), a crime against humanity (in relation to the Municipalities and Srebrenica);
- ix. Count 9: acts of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population, a violation of the laws or customs of war (in relation to Sarajevo);
- x. Count 10: unlawful attacks on civilians, a violation of the laws or customs of war (in relation to Sarajevo); and
- xi. Count 11: taking of hostages, a violation of the laws or customs of war.¹³

6. The prodigious amount of evidence in this case included the testimony of 434 witnesses who appeared before the Chamber, the evidence in writing of 152 other witnesses and a total of 11,469 exhibits representing 191,040 pages. A total of 48,121 transcript pages recorded the daily proceedings and 94,917 pages of filings were submitted to the Chamber. The scope of the Indictment and the high profile of the Accused conjointly contributed to the unprecedented nature of this case.

7. This Judgement is divided into four volumes. This Judgement starts by the Chamber's approach to evidence and its findings on contextual aspects of the case, it then sets out the Chamber's analysis of the evidence in relation to the crimes charged in the Indictment, its factual and legal findings in relation thereto, and its assessment of the Accused's alleged responsibility. The Chamber has divided the presentation of this analysis according to the four components identified in the Indictment: (i) the Municipalities component; (ii) the Sarajevo component; (iii) the Srebrenica component; and (iv) the Hostages component. Finally, the Judgement addresses matters related to cumulative convictions and sentencing.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE EVIDENCE

1. General evidentiary principles

8. The Chamber assessed the evidence adduced at trial in light of the entire trial record and in accordance with the Statute and the Rules. As provided for in Rule 89(B), where no guidance was given by the Rules, the evidence was evaluated in a way that would best favour a fair determination of the case and that is consistent with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law, including the principle of *in dubio pro reo*.¹⁴ **(How then was it possible to infer on the basis of a "belief" of the Chamber, and on the basis of # "believes" thoughts,**

¹² During closing arguments, the Prosecution specified that it does not seek a finding that the Accused is responsible for deportation, under Count 7, in relation to Srebrenica. See Closing arguments, T. 48034 (7 October 2014).

¹³ The Chamber notes that the Indictment used, in numerous instances, the open-ended term "including" in relation to the charges therein. As the Accused is entitled to be clearly informed of the charges against him, the Chamber has taken a restrictive approach of the term "including". For instance, in paragraph 60(a) and 60(k) of the Indictment, the Chamber has confined its analysis, respectively, to the Scheduled Killing Incidents listed in the Indictment and to the five specific restrictive and discriminatory measures identified. The same is true for instance for the acts of murder charged in relation to Sarajevo in paragraph 65 of the Indictment and the Chamber limited its findings to the Scheduled Sniping and Shelling Incidents. See Hearing, T. 5480 (19 July 2010). The Chamber further notes the Prosecution's statement that "it will not present evidence in order to secure a conviction in respect of any crime sties or incidents not listed in the Schedules to the Indictment". Rule 73 *bis* Submission, para. 16(b).

impressions and convictions# of many witnesses that were supposed to testify only on the facts#? (A - believes, thoughts, impressions, A1, A2, A3) A “belief” is a very fluid and extremely personal feature, completely influenced by prejudices and propaganda. Also, when one does not know a fact, his belief is dependant of his will to believe. In such a serious case the principle “in dubio pro reo” had been implemented extremely rarely. In a very few occasions!)

9. At the outset of the proceedings, for the benefit of the smooth conduct of the trial, the Chamber issued orders which provided the parties with guidelines on the conduct of trial and the rules that would govern the admission or exclusion of evidence.¹⁵ In accordance with the Rules, the Chamber adopted an approach that favoured the admissibility of evidence, provided it was relevant and had probative value,¹⁶ and assessed the weight to be ascribed to each piece of evidence in its overall consideration of the entire trial record.¹⁷ **(In spite of this orientation, there had happened that the Chamber paid more credit to the jokes, gossips, informal telephone conversations of a midd ranking and non-competent people, (B - The Chamber paid more credit to the jokes, gossips, informal telephone conversations of a midd ranking and non-competent people, B1, B2, B3, B4...) and to a testimonies of a completely incompetent foreign witnesses, (C - testimonies of a completely incompetent foreign witnesses, C1, C2, C3, C4...)or a “guilt plea” domestic witnesses – rather than to the genuine documents of the Republic of Srpska, or even of the United Nations! This Trial accepted and valued a #mere academic considerations, constatations, reminiscences and other remarks about the cours of events as a decisions or wishess of President Karadzic, or any other interlocutors (#Words of others#, always allocating anyone’s opinion as a President’s “mens rea”!)**

10. Article 21(3) of the Statute provides that the Accused shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty. **(How possibly this could have been respected after the thirty years of a fierce propaganda and demonisation of the President and his associates, and the Serb people generally?)** The Prosecution bears the burden of establishing each element of the alleged crimes and of the mode of individual criminal responsibility with which the Accused is charged, as well as any fact which is indispensable for a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.¹⁸ The Chamber has therefore determined whether the ultimate weight of all of the evidence is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the crimes charged in the Indictment, and ultimately, the responsibility of the Accused. When the Prosecution relied upon proof of a certain fact such as, for example, the state of mind of an Accused by inference, the Chamber considered whether that

¹⁴ According to the principle of *in dubio pro reo*, any doubt as to the evidence must be resolved in favour of the accused. The Appeals Chamber stated in the *Limaj* case that the principle of *in dubio pro reo* “applies to findings required for conviction, such as those which make up the elements of the crime charged”, but “is not applied to individual pieces of evidence and findings of fact on which the judgement does not rely”. *Limaj et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 21.

¹⁵ First Order on Conduct of Trial; Further Order on Conduct of Trial; Guidelines for Admission of Evidence.

¹⁶ Hearing, T. 1953 (6 May 2010) (the Chamber holding: “In addition to relevance and authenticity, the Chamber must be satisfied as to the probative value of a piece of proposed evidence, and this requires that the witness to whom it is shown is able to confirm its content or make some other positive comment about it”), as reaffirmed in Guidelines for Admission of Evidence, para. 11 (specifying that “it is desirable that a witness speak to the origins and/or content of a document to be tendered into evidence, to allow the Chamber to properly assess the relevance, authenticity, and reliability of that document, and thus its probative value, and, ultimately, be able to make use of that document in a meaningful way in its overall consideration of the evidence in the case”).

¹⁷ Hearing, T. 10070 (13 January 2011), T. 17934 (25 August 2011). The Chamber notes that in the footnotes to this Judgement, it did not refer to all of the evidence it reviewed and considered in entering its findings but only to the most important pieces of evidence.

¹⁸ *Šainović et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 132; *Martić* Appeal Judgement, para. 55; *Halilović* Appeal Judgement, para. 125. See also *Ntagerura* Appeal Judgement, para. 174, fn. 356 (holding that “[e]ven if some of the material facts pleaded in the indictment are not established beyond reasonable doubt, a Chamber might enter a conviction provided that having applied the law to those material facts it accepted beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements of the crime charged and of the mode of responsibility are established by those facts” and considering that “the ‘material facts’ which have to be pleaded in the indictment to provide the accused with the information necessary to prepare his defence have to be distinguished from the facts which have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt”).

inference was the only reasonable inference that could have been made based on that evidence.¹⁹ Where that inference was not the only reasonable inference, it found that the Prosecution had not proved its case. **(This hadn't been as expected! There had been many – not only alternative, but many more reasonable inferences offered by the Defence, which hadn't been even commented by the Chamber!)** The Chamber further notes that while it has not always reiterated the phrase “beyond reasonable doubt” in all of its findings, this standard of proof was applied throughout the Judgement. The Chamber also notes that when it has made a negative finding in respect of the evidence of a witness it did not deem reliable, this does not entail that the Chamber made a positive finding to the contrary. **(Since it never happened to the Prosecutor's witnesses, one can conclude that it was detrimental for the Defence. Rejecting testimonies of the Defense on such a shaky basis is equal to making a “positive finding to the contrary!”)**

11. In its evaluation of witnesses testifying *viva voce* or pursuant to Rule 92 *ter*, the Chamber had regard to, *inter alia*, the demeanour of witnesses, as well as to the passage of time since the events charged in the Indictment and its possible impact on the reliability of the evidence. **(First, it was difficult, if not impossible, for the judges speaking another language, to accurately estimate a non-verbal expressions of the Balkans witnesses. A many witnesses testifying on the basis of a “guilt plea agreement” hadn't been consistent at all, flagrantly lying for the sake of their agreement with the Prosecution, but were trusted, except in a cases they inadvertently said something favourable for the President. (# a “guilt plea agreement” witnesses: [D1](#), [D2](#), [D3](#)...) In such a cases, as Momir Nikolic is a case, the witness had been unreliable! On the other side, so many Defence witnesses, a distinguished people, had been discredited and labeled as trying to “distant” themselves from the events, although majority of them hadn't ever been mentioned in connection with crimes, and some of them had served their sentences and were impossible to be affected by their testimony. Such a massive and baseless carnage of the Defence witnesses is not seen so far! (E - Defence witnesses, a distinguished people, had been discredited and labeled: [E1](#), [E2](#), [E3](#)...)** With regard to all witnesses, the Chamber also assessed the probability and the consistency of their evidence as well as the circumstances of the case and corroboration from other evidence.

12. The Appeals Chamber has held that the testimony of a single witness on a material fact does not, as a matter of law, require corroboration.²⁰ When such a situation occurred, the Chamber examined the evidence of the Prosecution witness with the utmost caution before accepting it as a sufficient basis for a finding of guilt. Insignificant discrepancies between the evidence of different witnesses, or between the evidence of a particular witness in court and his prior statements, in general have not been regarded as discrediting such evidence.²¹ **(Why would it be “discredited”, since such a discrepancy should have been considered as an “in dubio pro reo” example? On what a basis there had been dismissed the old Roman Law principle #“Testis Unus, Testis Nul#us”, i.e. one witness – no witness? In a process in which all the Prosecutor witnesses on facts are members of the adversary Army or population, such a “lessai fair” – comfortable attitude of the Chamber is not any contribution to justice, but rather contrary! Further, how possibly a lying witness could have been trusted, i.e. not discredited? Even in the situations when the parts of the testimony of such a lying witness had been dismissed as a lie, such a witness hadn't been discredited when lying in favour of**

¹⁹ Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, para. 120.

²⁰ Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 506 (“[T]here is no legal requirement that the testimony of a single witness on a material fact be corroborated before it can be accepted as evidence. What matters is the reliability and credibility accorded to the testimony.”). *But see* para. 24.

²¹ See for instance *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 49.

the Prosecution? However, the Defence witnesses had been discredited for the much lesser reasons, i.e. for no reason, but only on a basis of impression! Whoever wanted to see the examples of such a duplicitous practice, could find it easily among the “reasons” of discrediting over two hundreds of the Defence witnesses! (CONSTITUTE #“TESTIS UNUS – TESTIS NULUS”#))

13. Hearsay evidence is any statement other than one made by a witness while giving evidence in the proceedings and which is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.²² It is admissible under the case law of the Tribunal. **(Is it admissible in the domestic judicial systems of the countries which support this Tribunal? Constitutte JURISPRUDENCE IN OTHER COUNTRIES)** The weight to be attributed to that evidence depends upon the specific circumstances and as such, the Chamber assessed hearsay evidence on a case-by-case basis.²³ The Appeals Chamber has held that

Trial Chambers have a broad discretion under Rule 89(C) to admit relevant hearsay evidence. Since such evidence is admitted to prove the truth of its contents, a Trial Chamber must be satisfied that it is reliable for that purpose, in the sense of being voluntary, truthful and trustworthy, as appropriate; and for this purpose may consider both the content of the hearsay statement and the circumstances under which the evidence arose; or, as Judge Stephen described it, the probative value of a hearsay statement will depend upon the context and character of the evidence in question. The absence of the opportunity to cross-examine the person who made the statements, and whether the hearsay is “first-hand” or more removed, are also relevant to the probative value of the evidence. The fact that the evidence is hearsay does not necessarily deprive it of probative value, but it is acknowledged that the weight or probative value to be afforded to that evidence will usually be less than that given to the testimony of a witness who has given it under a form of oath and who has been cross-examined, although even this will depend upon the infinitely variable circumstances which surround hearsay evidence.²⁴

BRAVO!!! STALIN MUST BE ANGRY FOR NOT HAVE IT ON HIS MENU. THIS IS ALL THAT ANY POLITICAL COURT NEEDED, TO BE SO FREE TO CONCLUDE WITHOUT FIRM EVIDENCE. THIS WAR WAS CLOSELY MONITORED AND DOCUMENTED BY THE U N INSTITUTIONS, AND STILL THE UN DOCUMENTS HADN'T BEEN SUFFICIENT ENOUGH TO ESTABLISH THE TRUTH, AND JUDGES NEEDED THE HEAR-SAY EVIDENCE!

HOWEVER, IN SUCH A CASE WHERE ALMOST EVERY SINGLE WITNESS WAS A MEMBER OF ONE OF THE SIDES, SOME OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES EVEN A VERY HIGH OFFICIALS OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICS OF THE OTHER SIDE, AND THEREFORE COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IMPARTIAL, A “HERESAY EVIDENCE” SHOULD BE COTIOUSLY CONSIDERED OR EVEN DISMISSED AS SUCH. HOW WOULD THIS ISSUE LOOK LIKE IN THE JUDICIARIES OF THE COUNTRIES SUPPORTING THIS TRIBUNAL?)

²² See Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence & Practice § 11-1 (2010); Black’s Law Dictionary 739 (8th ed. 2004); Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); Criminal Justice Act 2003 Ch. 2, Sec. 114(1). See also *Aleksovski* Appeal Decision on Admissibility, para. 15.

²³ See *Aleksovski* Appeal Decision on Admissibility, para. 15. See for instance Hearing, T. 24908 (21 February 2012) (stating that the fact that evidence may be triple hearsay is a factor to consider when assessing the weight of the evidence).

²⁴ *Aleksovski* Appeal Decision on Admissibility, para. 15 (footnotes omitted).

14. Circumstantial evidence is evidence of a number of different circumstances surrounding an event from which a fact at issue may be reasonably inferred.²⁵ Where an inference is drawn from circumstantial evidence to establish a fact on which a conviction relies, that inference must be the only reasonable one that could be drawn from the evidence presented.²⁶

(# THE ONLY INFERENCE!)

(AND THIS IS WHAT WE HAD TO QUOTE ALWAYS WHEN WE FIND MORE THAN ONE POSSIBLE INFERENCE. AS IT WILL BE SEEN, THE TRIAL CHAMBER DIDN'T FOLLOW THIS RULE IN MANY OCCASIONS. WASN'T IT TOO IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE CASE TO RELY UPON INFERENCES? SO FAR THERE WAS NO ANY SIMILAR CASE AND JUDGEMENT THAT WAS #FOUNDED ALMOST ENTIRELY ON A CIRCUMSTENTIAL EVIDENCE AND INFERENCES!#)

2. Specific evidentiary considerations

Certain categories of witnesses

Persons associated with the parties to the proceedings

15. The Chamber heard the evidence of a number of investigators associated with either the Prosecution or the Accused's defence team.²⁷ Their status as current or former investigators for one of the parties in this case does not in itself render their evidence unreliable. In determining the weight to be attributed to each witness of this category, the Chamber has taken into consideration, *inter alia*, their expertise and knowledge of the investigation that they were involved in, as well as other relevant evidence. It has, however, been mindful to exercise caution in evaluating their evidence in view of their association with a party to the proceedings. **(Who WERE The "parties of the proceedings? On one side it was Karadzic and his Defence, and on the other it was not only Prosecution, but also the Muslim side, waging the same war through the proceedings, and sometimes it was the Chamber itself! Constitute PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS!)**

(THE DEFENCE DIDN'T SEE ANY CAUTION PERTAINING TO THE PROSECUTION EXPERTS, WHO BY THE WAY HAD BEEN EMPLOYEES OF THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, #WHILE THE DEFENCE EXPERTS, ALL UNKNOWN TO THE DEFENCE PRIOR TO THEIR EXPERTISE, HAD BEEN DISCREDITED AND UNDERMINED!#)

Individuals convicted of crimes arising from events charged in the Indictment

16. A large number of individuals who were convicted either by the Tribunal or by domestic courts for crimes arising from events which are alleged in the Indictment have testified

²⁵ See *Čelebići* Appeal Judgement, para. 458.

²⁶ *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 237, as recalled in *Šainović et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 995.

²⁷ The Chamber heard the following Prosecution's investigators, either former or current: Jean-René Ruez, Dean Manning, Tomasz Blaszczyk, Dušan Janc, and Stefanie Frease. The Chamber also heard from Milomir Savčić who is an investigator on the Accused's defence team. The Chamber refers to its detailed analysis of Janc's evidence in the section on forensic, demographic, and DNA evidence in relation to the Srebrenica component of the case. See Section IV.C.1.h.F: Dušan Janc.

as witnesses before the Chamber both for the Prosecution and the Defence.²⁸ In approaching the evidence of these witnesses, the Chamber considered the following guidance from the Appeals Chamber:

[I]t is well established in the jurisprudence of both *ad hoc* Tribunals that nothing prohibits a Trial Chamber from relying on evidence given by a convicted person, including evidence of a partner in crime of the person being tried before the Trial Chamber. Indeed, accomplice evidence, and, more broadly, evidence of witnesses who might have motives or incentives to implicate the accused is not *per se* unreliable, especially where such a witness may be thoroughly cross-examined; therefore, reliance upon this evidence does not, as such, constitute a legal error. However, “considering that accomplice witnesses may have motives or incentives to implicate the accused person before the Tribunal, a Chamber, when weighing the probative value of such evidence, is bound to carefully consider the totality of the circumstances in which it was tendered”. As a corollary, a Trial Chamber should at least briefly explain why it accepted the evidence of witnesses who may have had motives or incentives to implicate the accused; in this way, a Trial Chamber shows its cautious assessment of this evidence.²⁹ **(First of all, the Chamber accepted a “chief criminal” to testify as if he was an accomplice. That was the case with KDZ530, who was the main villain in the “Korićanske Stijene incident”)**

(HOWEVER, THIS CHAMBER WASN'T EVEN CLOSE AS CAUTIOUS AS THIS PARAGRAPH SAID. NAMELY THEY RELIED ON THE REBUTED EVIDENCE OF THE TWO “GUILT PLEA” CONVICTS (DERONJIC AND NIKOLIC) IN THE MAIN AND THE MOST SENSITIVE MATTER AS THE SREBRENICA GENOCIDE WAS. IT WAS EXPECT THAT THIS KIND OF A HUGE ERROR WOULD BE JUSTIFIED BY AS SAME HUGE EXPLANATION, AND WE WILL SEE WHAT EXPLANATION THEY GAVE. A WITNESS THAT PLEADED GUILTY FALSLY, IMPLIED HIMSELF JUST TO BE SURE THAT HIS ARGEEMENT WITH THE PROSECUTION SURVIVE. SUCH A WITNESS WOULD CERTAINLY LIE IMPLYING ANOTHER PERSON. BUT THE CHAMBER DIDN'T DISQUALIFY HIM!)

17. With the exception of Milan Babić, Miroslav Krnojelac, and Radislav Krstić, whose testimonies in prior proceedings were admitted pursuant to Rule 92 *bis* or *quater*, all of the witnesses in this category testified before the Chamber either live or pursuant to Rule 92 *ter*. The Chamber was thus able to observe their demeanour on direct and cross-examination. As with all witnesses, the Chamber ultimately weighed their evidence against the totality of the evidence. In conducting this individual assessment, it kept in mind the possibility that they may have had motives to implicate the Accused and thus reviewed their evidence with close scrutiny. The credibility of witnesses in this category will be explained further below in this Judgement where relevant.

²⁸ The following such witnesses appeared for the Prosecution: KDZ523, Momir Nikolić, Dražen Erdemović, KDZ122. In addition, the Chamber granted the Prosecution's request to admit the evidence of Milan Babić in writing pursuant to Rule 92 *quater*. The following such witnesses appeared for the Defence: Dragomir Milošević, Stanislav Galić, Milan Martić, Branko Grujić, Mendeljev Đurić, Franc Kos, Momčilo Krajišnik, Radoslav Brđanin, Željko Mejakić, KW679, Vidoje Blagojević, Milomir Stakić, Miroslav Kvočka, and Momčilo Gruban. In addition, the Chamber granted the Accused's request to admit the evidence of Milorad Krnojelac and Radislav Krstić in writing pursuant to Rule 92 *quater*.

²⁹ *Krajišnik* Appeal Judgement, para. 146 (quoting *Niyitegeka* Appeal Judgement, para. 98) (footnotes omitted).

WE WILL SEE IT. THEY HAD NOT BEEN INTERESTED IN IMPLICATING OR EXCLUDING THIS ACCUSED, BUT WERE INTERESTED TO CONTINUE WITH LIES, AS THEY HAD TO, BECAUSE OF THE “GUILT PLEA AGREEMENT”. THE CROSS EXAMINATIONS IN OTHER CASES COULDN’T BE VALIDE IN THIS CASE, BECAUSE THESE DEFENCES WERE, MOST RIGHTFULLY, NOT INTERESTED TO TEST THE ELEMENTS OF THESE TESTIMONIES THAT DIDN’T PERTAIN TO THEIR DEFENDANTS, BUT DID TO THIS ACCUSES. CERTAINLY, SUCH A MASSIVE CREDIT TO THIS KIND OF WITNESSES MAY BE AN ABUSE OF THE CHAMBER’S DISCRETION RIGHTS

Individuals whose trial is currently ongoing, at trial or on appeal

18. A number of individuals whose proceedings before the Tribunal were currently ongoing, either at trial or on appeal, testified before the Chamber, including some who were subpoenaed to testify.³⁰ The issue of “whether an accused or appellant compelled by subpoena to testify in another case before the Tribunal is in effect exposed, in relation to his own case, to the possibility of compelled self-incrimination”³¹ was highly litigated in this case.³² The Appeals Chamber held that “an accused or appellant may be compelled to testify in other cases before the Tribunal due to the fact that any self-incriminating information elicited in those proceedings cannot be directly or derivatively used against him in his own case”.³³ Since these witnesses testified before the Chamber, it was able to observe their demeanour while they were on the stand. In weighing their evidence against the totality of the evidence on the record, the Chamber reminded itself of the possibility that these witnesses may have had motives to distance themselves from the events in relation to which they were testifying. **(The Chamber widely erred in discrediting such a witnesses of the Defence, alleging that they wanted to distant themselves from the events in the Indictment, while many of them had already been convicted finally, some of them had ended their serving the fine, and many of them had never been suspected or indicted for any crime. It wasn’t the same case with the Prosecutor’s witnesses, not even close! # BASIS FOR REJECTING AND DISCREDITING WITNESSES#!)**

IT IS WORTHWHILE TO NOTICE THAT PRESIDENT KARADZIC SUMMONED ALL THE RELEVANT PARTICIPANTS IN THE INCIDENTS INCLUDED IN THE INDICTMENT. HE DIDN’T HAVE ANYTHING TO HIDE, NOR HE FEARED THAT SOME OF THOSE WITNESSES COULD HAVE INCRIMINATED HIM!)

Expert witnesses

19. The Chamber heard the testimony of a large number of witnesses as experts called pursuant to Rule 94 *bis* both by the Prosecution and the Accused.³⁴ In weighing this evidence, the

³⁰ Ljubomir Borovčanin, Vojislav Šešelj, and Vujadin Popović testified voluntarily. Zdravko Tolimir, Ljubiša Beara, Ratko Mladić, and Mićo Stanišić were subpoenaed to testify. See para. 6163, fn. 20799.

³¹ Appeal Decision on Tolimir Subpoena, para. 34.

³² See Appeal Decision on Tolimir Subpoena. See also para. 6164.

³³ Appeal Decision on Tolimir Subpoena, para. 50. This Chamber later noted that it considered that “[t]he terminology used by the Appeals Chamber indicates that the applicability of the [Appeal Decision on Tolimir Subpoena] is broader than Tolimir himself”. Decision on Mladić Motion for Reconsideration, para. 15.

³⁴ The following witnesses were called by the Prosecution under Rule 94 *bis*: Robert Donia, Richard Philipps, Patrick van der Weijden, Berko Zečević, Dorothea Hanson, András Riedlmayer, Richard Butler, Ewa Tabeau, Patrick Treanor, Christian Nielsen, Reynaud Theunens, Ewan Brown, Jose Baraybar, Christopher Lawrence, John Clark, Freddy Peccerelli, William Haglund, Thomas Parsons, Richard Wright, and Richard Philipps. The following witnesses were called by the Accused under Rule 94 *bis*: Mirjana Lukić-Andeljković, Stevo Pašalić, Derek Allsop, Kosta Cavoški, Zorica Subotić, Mile Poparić, Dragomir Kešerović, Radovan Radinović, and

Chamber considered factors such as the professional competence of the expert, the methodologies used, and the reliability of the findings made in light of these factors and other evidence accepted by the Chamber.³⁵ The Chamber did not rely on the evidence given by witnesses called pursuant to Rule 94 *bis* which pertained to topics falling outside the realm of their expertise.

???? WHO? WAS RIEDELMAYER COMPETENT? A JOURNALIST WHO VISITED SOME PLACES DUE TO HIS CHOICE AND MADE SOME OBSERVATIONS WITHOUT ANY SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY OR EXPERIENCE, DEPICTING RESULTS OF HIS “VISITS” IN A SCIENTIFIC MANNER AND IN A STATISTIC TERMS? On the other side, the Chamber dismissed all the evidence and discredited all the Defence expert witnesses. At the same time the Chamber valued “opinions” “believes” and “thoughts” of many Prosecutor’s factual witnesses that weren’t either qualified or invited to express their sentiments!

b. Certain categories of exhibits

Source documents

20. The Chamber did not admit the sources used by an expert in compiling his report as a matter of course.³⁶ It considered that the purpose of having an expert report is to assist the Chamber by providing an understandable compilation and analysis of technical material and, as such, should be complete and understandable in itself, such that there is no need to tender for admission the sources used by the expert. The Chamber allowed, however, the presenting party to request the admission of certain sources upon providing clear reasons as to why these sources should be admitted in addition to the expert report itself.³⁷ As the purpose of admitting source material was to enable the Chamber to verify, if necessary, the basis upon which the expert reached his conclusions as well as how the relevant analysis was conducted, source documents so accepted were thus not admitted for their substantive content.³⁸ However, if at a later date, a witness discussed the content of a document previously admitted as a source document in such a way that rendered that document admissible for its content, its status was changed to reflect its admission for all purposes.³⁹ **(How many crucial Defence documents had been rejected on that basis? Closely as many as had been offered by the Defence expert witnesses. A transcript of the meeting of President Tudjman and Ambassador Holbrooke, in which is an evidence that Izetbegovic planned to expel all the Serbs from Bosnia wasn’t accepted because there was no an ERN number on this transcription, which the defence found later with this number. That was the most explicit evidence that the other side, not the Serbs, planned to expel the entire population. There are other similar examples.)**

Dušan Dunjić. The Chamber refers in particular to the detailed section on the forensic, demographic, and DNA evidence in relation to the Srebrenica component of the case. See Section IV.C.1.h: Forensic, demographic, and DNA evidence.

³⁵ *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 40. See also *Martić* Trial Judgement, para. 29; *Blagojević and Jokić* Trial Judgement, para. 27; *Vasiljević* Trial Judgement, para. 20. In weighing the evidence from expert witnesses, the Chamber has, in particular, considered corroboratory evidence of a different nature.

³⁶ First Order on Conduct of Trial, Appendix A, para. P.

³⁷ Further Order on Conduct of Trial, para. 5.

³⁸ Philipps Decision, para. 10, as applied in Hanson Bar Table Decision, paras. 15, 17–19.

³⁹ Philipps Decision, para. 10. See P2913 (Letter from Zvornik’s Interim Government, 6 June 1992); P2915 (Summary of conclusions of Prijedor’s Executive Committee, 29 April–17 August 1992).

Third-party statements

21. Throughout these proceedings, the Chamber considered that third-party statements produced for the purpose of current criminal proceedings may only be admitted pursuant to the modalities of Rules 92 *bis*, *ter*, *quater*, and *quinquies*. It held that the strict requirements of these rules, which are *lex specialis*, may not be circumvented by tendering such material pursuant to the more general Rule 89.⁴⁰ In relation to any other third-party statement not prepared for the purposes of criminal proceedings, the Chamber followed the practice that they may only be admitted if they are commented upon, confirmed, or adopted by the witness on the stand.⁴¹ A number of such statements were admitted in this manner and, as any evidence on the record, were attributed the appropriate weight in light of the totality of the trial record at the end of the proceedings.⁴²

Media reports

22. The Chamber considered that written media reports, whether they be reports, articles or interviews, were not admissible from the bar table as they would not meet the reliability and probative value requirements; they were admitted only when a witness testified to the accuracy of the information contained therein and attested that they had not been manipulated in any way. A number of such media reports were admitted in this manner and, as any evidence on the record, were attributed the appropriate weight in light of the totality of the trial record.

Intercepts

23. Throughout the case, the Chamber treated intercepts as a “special category of evidence” given that they bear no indicia of authenticity or reliability on their face and accordingly, they may only be admitted into evidence after the Chamber has heard from the relevant intercept operators or the participants in the intercepted conversation.⁴³ Towards the end of the Defence case, however, it found that, based on the agreement between the parties as to the authenticity of some intercepts, its past admission of a number of intercepts through intercept operators and numerous interlocutors, and the Prosecution’s possible authentication of those intercepts based upon its “evidence collection”, it had a basis to establish the authenticity of these intercepted conversations and proceeded to admit them.⁴⁴ Once admitted, however, the Chamber treated intercepts as any other evidence and assessed their respective weight in light of the entire trial record. **(First, there is a #huge amount of the intercepts collected before the war and on an illegal basis#, because the court and other competent institutions didn’t approve it. These were the intercept that collected one of the sides, the Muslim side, abusing the state institutions against one third of population, as well as one third of Government. Second, the Chamber paid more credit to the unofficial chatting of a low or mid rank officials than to the official documents of the Republica Srpska. Third, the most important intercepts, such as Deronjic – Karadzic conversation on 13th July 1995, didn’t have an audio, and everything relied upon the transcripts made by the Muslim operators.)**

⁴⁰ Hearing, T. 31199–31200 (11 December 2012).

⁴¹ Hearing, T. 31199–31200 (11 December 2012), as recalled in Defence Municipality Bar Table Decision, para. 59.

⁴² See D130 (Video footage of Mirko Šošić, with transcript); D3120 (Statement of Behadil Hodžić to Milići SJB, 11 May 1992).

⁴³ Decision on the Prosecution’s First Motion for Judicial Notice of Documentary Evidence Related to the Sarajevo Component, 31 March 2010, para. 9.

⁴⁴ Hearing, T. 47255–47259 (18 February 2014). See also Decision on Accused’s Motion to Admit Intercepts from Bosnia and Herzegovina Previously Marked for Identification or as Not Admitted, 26 February 2014, para. 1; Decision on Accused’s Bar Table Motion for Admission of Intercepts, 7 April 2014, para. 16.

Evidence admitted in writing and the issue of corroboration.

24. On many occasions, the Chamber reminded the parties that it could not base a conviction on the uncorroborated evidence of a witness whose evidence was admitted pursuant to Rule 92 *quater*.⁴⁵ The Appeals Chamber in *Popović et al.* reaffirmed that “findings that are indispensable for a conviction must not rest solely or decisively on untested evidence” and that such findings must be sufficiently corroborated.⁴⁶ **(#Deadly combination#! Then, why this convicting Judgement relied so much on the 92bis and on thousands of Adjudicated Facts, which this Defence couldn’t test in any way? It is more than clear that in many other cases the defences didn’t contest anything that didn’t pertain to their defendants! So, all of those Adjudicated Facts are “untested”!)**

d. Judicial notice of adjudicated facts

25. In the present case, the Chamber took judicial notice pursuant to Rule 94(B) of 2,379 adjudicated facts proposed by the Prosecution.⁴⁷ The Appeals Chamber has held that “by taking judicial notice of an adjudicated fact, a Chamber establishes a well-founded presumption for the accuracy of this fact, which therefore does not have to be proven again at trial, but which, subject to that presumption, may be challenged at that trial”.⁴⁸ **(How to challenge almost three thousands of Adjudicated Facts by questioning other witnesses, while many of these witnesses weren’t privy of so many situations? So, the Prosecution counted on the quantity that turns into “quality”!)**

26. As the Appeals Chamber has stated, adjudicated facts are “facts that have been established in a proceeding between other parties on the basis of the evidence the parties to that proceeding chose to introduce, in the particular context of that proceeding”.⁴⁹ They are therefore

⁴⁵ Babić Rule 92 *quater* Decision, paras. 30, 42.

⁴⁶ *Popović et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 1222 (“in order for a statement admitted pursuant to Rule 92 *quater* of the Rules to support a conviction, it must be corroborated”). See also *Popović et al.* Appeal Judgement, paras. 103, 104 (observing that evidence that demonstrates a pattern of conduct may be used as corroborative evidence), 1226, 1264; *Dordević* Appeal Judgement, para. 807; *Lukić and Lukić* Appeal Judgement, para. 570; *Haradinaj et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 101, fn. 252; *Haraqiya and Morina* Appeal Judgement, paras. 61–62, 64; *Blagojević and Jokić* Appeal Judgement, para. 316; *Prosecutor v. Prlić et al.*, Case No. IT-04-74-AR73.6, Decision on Appeals against Decision Admitting Transcript of Jadranko Prlić’s Questioning into Evidence, 23 November 2007, paras. 53, 57–59; *Prosecutor v. Martić*, Case No. IT-95-11-AR73.2, Decision on Appeal against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Evidence of Witness Milan Babić, 14 September 2006, para. 20; *Prosecutor v. Galić*, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Rule 92bis(C), 7 June 2002, fn. 34. In *Popović et al.*, two appellants challenged their convictions on the grounds that untested and uncorroborated evidence admitted pursuant to former Rule 92 bis(D) of the Rules was the only evidence in relation to a charge, *i.e.*: the Kravica Supermarket killings. *Popović et al.* Appeal Judgement, paras. 97–102. The Appeals Chamber examined whether the appellants’ convictions rested solely, or in a decisive manner, on the evidence at issue—the transcript of a witness’s testimony in the *Krstić* case—and found that no conviction for “opportunistic” killings was based on the Kravica Supermarket events alone. *Popović et al.* Appeal Judgement, paras. 101–103. Thus, the Appeals Chamber concluded, the allegations related to Kravica Supermarket were not indispensable for any of the appellants’ convictions and that these would stand even without the findings on the Kravica Supermarket killings. *Popović et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 103. The Appeals Chamber also noted that “the Trial Chamber’s approach is consistent with the reasoning in *Stakić*, where the conviction on the charge of killing 77 Croats was upheld, despite highlighting that the only evidence supporting the relevant finding was admitted under Rule 92 bis of the Rules and was untested”. *Popović et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 104. See also *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 201(8). Addressing another challenge to findings in which the Trial Chamber relied upon a transcript of testimony admitted pursuant to Rule 92 *quater*, the *Popović et al.* Appeals Chamber found that these findings did not rest decisively on untested evidence, but rather, on “a body of mutually corroborating evidence”. *Popović et al.* Appeal Judgement, paras. 1218–1229.

⁴⁷ See Section VIII.A.3.d: Judicial Notice. The Chamber notes that it denied the Accused’s motion for judicial notice of 26 facts relating to Count 1. Decision on Accused’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts Related to Count One, 21 January 2014.

⁴⁸ *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.5, Decision on the Prosecution’s Interlocutory Appeal against the Trial Chamber’s 10 April 2003 Decision on Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 28 October 2003, p. 4, cited in Decision on First Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 5 June 2009, para. 8. See also *Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić*, Case No. IT-09-92-AR73.1, Decision on Ratko Mladić’s Appeal against the Trial Chamber’s Decisions on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 12 November 2013, para. 24 (“adjudicated facts of which judicial notice is taken are admitted as rebuttable presumptions that may be disproved by the opposing party through the presentation of evidence at trial”); *Karemera* Appeal Decision on Judicial Notice, para. 42.

⁴⁹ *Karemera* Appeal Decision on Judicial Notice, para. 40.

not conclusive in other proceedings wherein judicial notice is taken of them, and parties have the opportunity to contest them.⁵⁰ **(So many? An #“opportunity” without possibility#! All together, with so many Adjudicated Facts and “opportunities” without possibilities to rebut it, the Court switched the burden of proving to the Defence!)**

27. The Chamber assessed the weight and relevance of the adjudicated facts, taking into consideration the totality of the trial record and, in particular, any evidence submitted by the Accused to rebut the adjudicated fact.⁵¹ Where an unchallenged adjudicated fact was the only evidence in support of a finding and there was no evidence contradicting it, the Chamber considered the judicially noticed fact sufficient to support the finding. **This explains the benefit from the extremely wide scope of the Indictment, and why the Prosecution didn’t accept the Chamber’s suggestion to narrow this scope. #No defence would be able to “contradict” so many inherited findings, deliberations and adjudicate facts, that hadnt been contested by anyone!#)**

28. Where adjudicated facts and other evidence addressed the same subject matter, the Chamber assessed whether the other evidence was consistent with the adjudicated facts or rebutted them.⁵² Where the Chamber has accepted evidence that contradicts an adjudicated fact, it has considered the presumption of accuracy of the adjudicated fact to have been rebutted.⁵³ The Chamber applied this principle where the Accused challenged an adjudicated fact and presented credible evidence to rebut or bring into question the accuracy of the adjudicated fact and where the evidence presented by the Prosecution on the point addressed by the adjudicated fact was internally contradictory or inconsistent with the adjudicated fact. **(So, the #Prosecution was free to plant as many false “facts” and evidence as they wanted, no defence could catch up and rebut everything.# This is closer to a #“presumption of guilt”# than to a presumption of innocence, and burden of poofing is shifted to defences. This must be condemned and forbidden forever, because the possibility of perpetuation of the previous errors of chambers is endless!)**

29. In relation to the evidence adduced by the Prosecution, the Chamber recalls that in its decision of 31 March 2010, the Chamber did not find it to be in the interests of justice to preclude the Prosecution from bringing witnesses to give evidence that overlaps with the content of adjudicated facts that have been the subject of judicial notice in this case.⁵⁴ The Chamber reasoned that at that stage of the case it was open to the Accused to challenge any or all of the

⁵⁰ See *Karemera* Appeal Decision on Judicial Notice, paras. 40, 42; *Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik*, Case No. IT-00-39-PT, Decision on Prosecution Motions for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts and for Admission of Written Statements of Witnesses Pursuant to Rule 92bis, 28 February 2003, para. 16.

⁵¹ This was the approach adopted by other chambers. See *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 77; *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 71; *Krajišnik* Trial Judgement, para. 1197; *Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik*, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Decision on Third and Fourth Prosecution Motions for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 24 March 2005, para. 17; *Prlić et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 385; *Prosecutor v. Prlić et al.*, Case No. IT-04-74-PT, Decision on Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts Pursuant to Rule 94(B), 14 March 2006, para. 11.

⁵² See *Stanišić and Simatović* Trial Judgement, para. 37 (“When assessing the evidence before it, the Trial Chamber was often faced with situations where evidence duplicated adjudicated facts of which the Trial Chamber had taken judicial notice. The Trial Chamber, in executing its obligation to review all evidence presented, analysed such evidence and then determined whether it was consistent with the Adjudicated Facts or rose to such a level so as to rebut them.”); *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 77 (“Where the Chamber has accepted evidence that contradicts an Adjudicated Fact, the presumption of the accuracy of the Adjudicated Fact will have been rebutted. The Chamber has made numerous factual findings in which Adjudicated Facts have been supported or amplified by other evidence that has been admitted.”).

⁵³ See *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 77 (“Where the Chamber has accepted evidence that contradicts an Adjudicated Fact, the presumption of the accuracy of the Adjudicated Fact will have been rebutted.”).

⁵⁴ Decision on Accused’s Motion to Preclude Evidence or To Withdraw Adjudicated Facts, 31 March 2010, para. 18.

judicially-noticed facts in this case and that the Prosecution was at that time not in possession of specific information as to those aspects of its case or what particular evidence the Accused intended to rebut, including adjudicated facts admitted prior to the submission of the Defence Pre-Trial Brief, and therefore a considerable extension in the length of the case might result from the presentation of evidence in rebuttal following the hearing of the defence case.⁵⁵

30. The Chamber also recalls its previous statement in the aforementioned decision of 31 March 2010 that the Chamber may base its final conclusions as to the individual criminal responsibility of the Accused on the evidence presented to it along with any adjudicated facts from prior proceedings which have been the subject of judicial notice. This will not mean, however, that witness evidence led at trial is to be considered corroborated by adjudicated facts from prior proceedings which are based on evidence from the same witness.⁵⁶

Put another way, “adjudicated facts based on evidence from a witness may not be considered corroborative of that witness’s evidence”.⁵⁷ The Chamber reiterates its approach, outlined above and in accordance with other chambers’ approaches, to assess adjudicated facts in light of the totality of the evidence adduced at trial and more particularly to analyse whether other evidence in the record is consistent with or contradicts the adjudicated facts.⁵⁸ Other evidence in the record was assessed for inconsistency with the adjudicated facts, and where reliable evidence contradicted an adjudicated fact, be it presented by the Accused or the Prosecution, the adjudicated fact was not used as the basis of a finding in this case.

31. In a number of instances, the adjudicated fact in the source judgement cited the same witness who gave evidence in this case on the same point and this latter evidence was the only evidence in this case on the point, other than the adjudicated fact. In these situations, again, the Chamber did not consider the adjudicated fact to corroborate the witness’s evidence in this case.⁵⁹

II. GENERAL OVERVIEW

A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

32. BiH, which was known as the SRBiH prior to the conflict, was one of the six republics that once constituted the SFRY. Before the conflict, the situation of the SRBiH was unique in that, unlike the other republics, it possessed no single majority ethnic grouping and thus there was no recognition of a distinct “Bosnian nation”.⁶⁰ **(This is a simplistic conception. Even if there was a majority ethnic group, it would mean nothing, since**

⁵⁵ Decision on Accused’s Motion to Preclude Evidence or To Withdraw Adjudicated Facts, 31 March 2010, paras. 16–18.

⁵⁶ Decision on Accused’s Motion to Preclude Evidence or To Withdraw Adjudicated Facts, 31 March 2010, para. 12.

⁵⁷ Decision on Accused’s Motion to Preclude Evidence or To Withdraw Adjudicated Facts, 31 March 2010, para. 14.

⁵⁸ See *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 77; *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 71; *Prlić et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 385. See also *Prosecutor v. Karemera et al.*, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73.17, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Appeal of Decision on Admission of Evidence Rebutting Adjudicated Facts, 29 May 2009, para. 21 (“adjudicated facts that are judicially noticed by way of Rule 94(B) of the Rules remain to be assessed by the Trial Chamber to determine what conclusions, if any, can be drawn from them when considered together with all the evidence brought at trial”).

⁵⁹ - 225 In such situations, the Chamber used the phrase “See also”. This does not indicate that the Chamber considered the adjudicated fact to corroborate the evidence in this case of the witness cited to in the original judgement.

⁶⁰ See Adjudicated Fact 363. The Chamber acknowledges that the term “ethnic” or “ethnicity” may not comprehensively describe the distinguishing features of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs, since other facts such as religion and nationality, are also relevant to the definition of those groups. However, for the sake of brevity and following other Chambers of the Tribunal, the Chamber will use the terms “ethnic” or “ethnicity” throughout this Judgement where it considers appropriate to do so.

there were three genuine constituent nations, Serbs, Croats and Muslims, with the equal rights regardless of their numerous participation in population. See: ##Izetbegovic in the Hague, IN 1991!#)

33. Throughout the SFRY during the 1980s, opposition between the various national movements steadily grew, fuelled by a growing economic crisis and an increasingly dysfunctional political system in the wake of the death of Marshal Josip Broz Tito in 1980.⁶¹ **SEE: Eagleburger! ##** The JNA was the only military formation with an integrated command structure and large numbers of heavy weapons and aircraft, and was constitutionally mandated to “defend the homeland” and preserve the SFRY.⁶² The JNA was an entirely federal force, with its headquarters in Belgrade,⁶³ and with the SFRY Presidency as its “supreme command and control organ”.⁶⁴

Fn 62: NOT ENTIRELY CORRECT. THE JNA WAS SUPPOSED TO PRESERVE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, WHICH MEANT THAT IT WAS SUPPOSED TO OPPOSE ANY ANTI-CONSTITUTIONAL ATTEMPT TO CHANGE THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE BY FORCE. THAT WAS IT'S LEGITIMACY TO INTERVENE IN THE ENTIRE SFRJ TERRITORY. THAT WAS THE SAME OBLIGATION AND LEGITIMACY THAT ENABLED PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ACTION AGAINST THE CONFEDERATION ##.

34. On 23 January 1990, upon the departure of the Slovene delegation, the Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was postponed indefinitely, paving the way for the organisation of multi-party elections in each of the six republics.⁶⁵

1. The first multi-party elections

35. On 21 February 1990, the Assembly of the SRBiH adopted a law that permitted political parties to organise but forbade this organisation to be based on nationality or religion. Political parties nonetheless formed on such bases although they were careful not to openly contravene the law. On 11 June 1990, the Constitutional Court of SRBiH declared this prohibition unconstitutional,⁶⁶ and ethnic parties began to form.⁶⁷

36. The most prominent political parties in SRBiH were the SDA, the SDS,⁶⁸ and the HDZ.⁶⁹ They were formed in 1990 in the lead-up to the election and initially co-operated to defeat their common opponents, the former League of Communists of SRBiH, which had been

⁶¹ Herbert Okun, T. 1559–1560 (23 April 2010).

⁶² P3033 (Reynaud Theunens's expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court p. 50. See Adjudicated Fact 415.

⁶³ See D1358 (SFRY Law on All People's Defence), arts. 99–101; Adjudicated Fact 417.

⁶⁴ D1358 (SFRY Law on All People's Defence), art. 106.

⁶⁵ Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 393. See also Vitimir Žepinić, T. 33622 (13 February 2013).

⁶⁶ P971 (Robert Donia's Expert Report entitled “The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992, 30 July 2002), e-court p. 18.

⁶⁷ Robert Donia, T. 3226 (2 June 2010).

⁶⁸ See Section II.B.1: Serbian Democratic Party (SDS).

⁶⁹ See Adjudicated Fact 404.

newly renamed as the League of Communists-Social Democratic Party, and the Alliance of Reformist Forces of Yugoslavia.⁷⁰

37. On 31 July 1990, amendments to the 1974 Constitution were adopted to determine the structure of governing institutions for which elections would be held. The new legislation provided for a seven-member Presidency, composed of two Serbs, two Croats, two Muslims, and one representative of “others”.⁷¹ It also provided that the legislature would consist of a 130-member Chamber of Citizens and a Chamber of Municipalities⁷² with 110 deputies.⁷³ The legislation further provided for elections to assemblies in each of SRBiH’s 109 municipalities.⁷⁴

38. On 18 November 1990, the first free, multi-party elections were held for both municipal assemblies and for the legislative body at the republican level.⁷⁵ The SDA won 86 of the total 240 seats in both chambers, the SDS won 72 seats, and the HDZ won 44 seats. Eight different parties shared the remaining 38 seats.⁷⁶ In effect, the outcome of the elections generally reflected the ethnic census of the population with each ethnic group voting for its own national party.⁷⁷

39. After the elections in SRBiH, a coalition government was formed according to an inter-party agreement and headed by a seven member Presidency, with the leader of the SDA, Alija Izetbegović, as the first President.⁷⁸ The SDS selected Momčilo Krajišnik to be President of the Assembly and Jure Pelivan was named by the HDZ to be Prime Minister.⁷⁹ In each municipality, executive positions were apportioned according to the national composition of the municipality in question.⁸⁰ **(What was the basis for the coalition?##)**

2. BiH regionalisation

40. The regionalisation process began with the establishment of communities of municipalities, which led to the creation of autonomous districts and regions.⁸¹ In 21 January 1991, SDS presidents of 21 municipal assemblies in the northwestern BiH region of Bosnian Krajina began preparations for the formation of the ZOBK.⁸² The SDS regional board formally

⁷⁰ P971 (Robert Donia’s Expert Report entitled “The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992, 30 July 2002), e-court p. 20; Robert Donia, T. 3160–3162 (1 June 2010), T. 3284, 3301–3302 (3 June 2010). See also Nenad Kecmanović, T. 39088–39089 (31 May 2013). Both the SK-SDP and the SRSJ pledged allegiance to ideals of a multi-ethnic BiH. P971 (Robert Donia’s Expert Report entitled “The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992, 30 July 2002), e-court p. 20.

⁷¹ P971 (Robert Donia’s Expert Report entitled “The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992, 30 July 2002), e-court p. 19 (specifying that each voter was allowed to vote for seven candidates for the Presidency: two Bosnian Serbs, two Bosnian Croats, two Bosnian Muslims, and one in the category identified as “Other”).

⁷² The Chamber shall hereinafter refer collectively to the Chamber of Citizens and the Chamber of Municipalities as the SRBiH Assembly.

⁷³ D1263 (Amendments to the Constitution of SRBiH, 31 July 1990), amendment LXX (5); P971 (Robert Donia’s Expert Report entitled “The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992, 30 July 2002), e-court p. 19. The Chamber of Municipalities would consist of one deputy for each of the 109 municipalities of SRBiH and one for the city of Sarajevo.

⁷⁴ D1263 (Amendments to the Constitution of SRBiH, 31 July 1990), amendment LXX (6).

⁷⁵ P971 (Robert Donia’s Expert Report entitled “The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992, 30 July 2002), e-court pp. 19, 23; Momčilo Mandić, C3 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Župljanin*), T. 9586; see Adjudicated Fact 403.

⁷⁶ P971 (Robert Donia’s Expert Report entitled “The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992, 30 July 2002), e-court p. 23; Robert Donia, T. 3252 (2 June 2010). See also Adjudicated Fact 405.

⁷⁷ See Adjudicated Fact 406.

⁷⁸ See Adjudicated Fact 408; D356 (Inter-party agreement regarding BiH Ministries, January 1991).

⁷⁹ Momčilo Mandić, T. 4770 (7 July 2010); Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43153–43154 (7 November 2013). See Adjudicated Fact 1897.

⁸⁰ See Adjudicated Fact 1905; D257 (SDA, HDZ, and SDS Criteria for Joint Government in Municipalities, 22 December 1990).

⁸¹ P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990–1992”, 30 July 2002), paras. 100, 113–161. For a more detailed description of this process, see Section II.B.7: Regional and municipal bodies.

⁸² P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990–1992”, 30 July 2002), paras. 117–118.

approved the initiative to create the ZOBK on 7 April 1991.⁸³ **(#Wrong chronology. This was their right!#)**

(fn 81. NOT TOTALLY CORRECT: #THE COMMUNITIES OF MUNICIPALITIES EXISTED ALREADY, FAR BEFORE THE ELECTIONS#, but were created rather for the political than economic reasons. Anyway, this was a sovereign right of the local authorities and their people to decide how to agregate! But, this kind of #“criminalisation of the Serb political life# is a basis for a prevalent part of the Indictment and consequently of the Judgment!#)

41. Soon thereafter, the ZOBK initiative faced opposition and criticism. **(So what?)** The SRBiH Assembly passed a resolution requesting that regionalisation be suspended until a political agreement could be reached.⁸⁴ On 21 April 1991, the SDA organised a rally in Banja Luka to protest the “national regionalisation” of BiH.⁸⁵ **(The #illegal secession of BIH, led by the SDA was based on the Muslim “national regionalisation” only!#)** In the wake of these criticisms, the Accused, as President of the SDS, denounced the concentration of power in Sarajevo and called to defend regionalisation as the solution to the economic crisis.⁸⁶

(Fn. 84. WRONG! IT WAS NOT A RESOLUTION, WHICH IS A MORE BINDING ACT, THAT WAS A “RECCOMENDATION” WHICH IS NOT OBLIGATORY AT ALL. BUT, EVEN MORE IMPORTANT IS THE FACT THAT THE SDA HAD ALREADY ANNOUNCED THEIR INTENTION TO SECEEDE FROM THE SFRY, AND STARTED A FIRECE CAMPAIGN TOWARDS IT, #WHILE MR. IZETBEGOVIC PUBLICLY CLAIMED THAT BIH WILL BE EITHER A CIVIL STATE, OR THERE WILL BE A CIVIL WAR#. THE PROSECUTION DISCLOSED AN UNUSABLE FORM OF THIS STATEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME IN CROATIA IT WAS EVEN MORE DRAMATIC. BUT THIS “OMISSION” IS THE RESULT OF THE OBSTRUCTION IMPOSED TO THE DEFENSE TO ESTABLISH A CONTEXT, CLAIMING IT WOULD BE “TU QUOQUE”

42. By the time the founding assembly of the ZOBK was held on 25 April 1991, assemblies of 14 municipalities with large Serb majorities had voted to affiliate with the ZOBK, including Ključ.⁸⁷ Following the lead of the Bosnian Krajina, two other communities of municipalities were created in May 1991 in Romanija and in Eastern and Old Herzegovina.⁸⁸ Communities of municipalities were renamed SAOs in September, including the ZOBK which was renamed ARK on 16 September 1991.⁸⁹

⁸³ P971 (Robert Donia’s Expert Report entitled “The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992, 30 July 2002), e-court p. 25. Vojislav Kuprešanin was elected President of the ZOBK. D4011 (Witness statement of Vojislav Kuprešanin dated 11 November 2013), para. 1.

⁸⁴ D284 (SRBiH Assembly recommendation on regionalisation, 11-12 April 1991).

⁸⁵ P971 (Robert Donia’s Expert Report entitled “The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992, 30 July 2002), e-court p. 26 (citing Izetbegović: “Those who say that there are 51% of Serbs here and that therefore this is a Serbian municipality are not well-intentioned. [...] What about the 49% who are Muslims and Croats; to what do they belong? Bosnia is nationally mixed and no one can divide it, except if someone wishes disorder and blood. And we won’t do that”).

⁸⁶ P971 (Robert Donia’s Expert Report entitled “The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992”, 30 July 2003), e-court p. 26. See also Robert Donia, T. 3544–3545 (9 June 2010).

⁸⁷ P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990–1992”, 30 July 2002), paras. 117, 122.

⁸⁸ P971 (Robert Donia’s Expert Report entitled “The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992”, 30 July 2003), e-court pp. 26–27; P6284 (Announcement of Assembly of the Community of Eastern and Old Herzegovina municipalities, 28 May 1991).

⁸⁹ P971 (Robert Donia’s Expert Report entitled “The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992, 30 July 2002), e-court pp. 26–27. See para. 130.

IT IS THE BEST EXAMPLE OF A DAMAGE MADE TO THE DEFENSE BY EVADING TO ESTABLISH THE CONTEXT. ALL OF THOSE MOVES HAD BEEN FORCED BY THE SDA CAMPAIGN TO SECEDE. IT WASN'T ONLY "IN SEPTEMBER" IT WAS AFTER A #CHAIN OF EVENTS#, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE HISTORIC SERB-MUSLIM AGREEMENT HAD BEEN DENOUNCED BY THE SDA. ALL OF THE SERB MOVES ARE TO BE SITUATED IN THE CONTEXT, OTHERWISE IT IS NOTHING BUT FORGERY. AND NOBODY CAN SAY THAT IT WASN'T IMPORTANT. IF IT WASN'T IMPORTANT, THEN WHY IT IS IN THE INDICTMENT AND IN THE JUDGEMENT? IN NO CRIMINAL COURT ALL OVER THE WORLD IT WOULD BE FORBIDDEN TO DEFENCE TO DEPICT A CHAIN OF EVENTS, POINTING TO THE CAUSE-CONSEQUENCE COMPLEX, BUT IN THIS COURT IT WAS PREVENTED. (#CONTEXT!#)

43. In June 1991, a number of SDS members from Croatia and the Bosnian Krajina, led by Milan Babić, undertook plans to declare the unity of the Croatian and Bosnian Kraljinas and signed an "Agreement on Co-operation".⁹⁰ On 27 June 1991, delegates unanimously endorsed this agreement and passed a "Declaration of Unification", the purpose of which was described as the "integration of Serbian people as a whole, all in the aim of creating a united state in which all Serbs in the Balkans will live".⁹¹ Despite further efforts by Babić in October 1991, the Accused and other BiH SDS members remained opposed to the idea, which never materialised.⁹²

(#EXCULPATORY!!! THERE IS A QUITE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE ACCUSED OPPOSED TO THIS MOVE FOR THE SAKE OF PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER!)

3. Towards disintegration of the SFRY

44. In the SRBiH Assembly, co-operation between the political parties proved increasingly difficult.⁹³ What was initially a coalition government broke down in October 1991.⁹⁴ The disintegration of multi-ethnic SFRY was swiftly followed by the disintegration of multi-ethnic BiH, and the prospect of war in BiH increased.⁹⁵

(If so, i.e. if the disintegration of multiethnic SFRY was followed by the disintegration of the #“muslimethnic BiH, and the prospect of war in BiH increased” # – which, wasn't it, was the same case with SFRY, why Slovenia, Croatia and BiH were not accused for anything, but the RSK and particularly the RS is accused for everything, although did many efforts to preserve the peace, unlike all others? And from the numbering of the political moves of Serbs in BH we see that they had been denied any political rights and political life?# Preserving PEACE!#)

⁹⁰ P971 (Robert Donia's Expert Report entitled "The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992", 30 July 2003), e-court pp. 27–28.

⁹¹ P746 (Declaration on Unification of SAO Krajina and Bosanska Krajina), 27 June 1991, p. 3; Milan Babić, P741 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 13806; P971 (Robert Donia's Expert Report entitled "The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992, 30 July 2002), e-court pp. 28–29.

⁹² P2555 (Intercept of conversations between Radovan Karadžić, Anđelko Vukić and Boro Sendić, 16 October 1991); Milan Martić, T. 38105–38106 (13 May 2013).

⁹³ See Adjudicated Fact 409. See also D264 (Radovan Karadžić's letter to Presidents of SDS municipal and regional boards, 27 August 1991); D266 (SDA instructions on full readiness of communications and monitoring, 26 September 1991).

⁹⁴ Adjudicated Fact 409; Robert Donia, T. 3557–3558 (9 June 2010).

⁹⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 410. The BiH Presidency established a Crisis Staff in September 1991, with Ejup Ganić in charge. Robert Donia, T. 3440 (8 June 2010); Nedeljko Prstojević, T. 13614–13615 (17 March 2011).

45. Due to the manpower shortages resulting from the defection of non-Serbs from the JNA during the conflict in Croatia, the JNA ordered reservists in SRBiH to active duty during the summer of 1991.⁹⁶ The Presidency of SRBiH then denounced the JNA's mobilisation order as illegal, asked for the withdrawal of the reservists who had entered the territory of SRBiH from Serbia, and exhorted citizens of SRBiH "to exercise patience, avoid all potential provocations and allow these units to return in peace".⁹⁷ Most Croat and Muslim reservists did not answer the mobilisation order while a majority of the Serb reservists responded and were mobilised to locations in SRBiH or Croatia.⁹⁸

(THIS IS ALSO WRONG, IN SEVERAL TERMS. FIRST OF ALL, THE ANTI-ARMY MOVES OF THE BH PRESIDENCY WERE ILLEGAL AND ULAWFUL, WHILE IT IS PRESENTED HERE AS A PACIFIST MOVE. EVEN MR. IZETBEGOVIC ADMITTED IT WAS A VIOLATION OF THE LAW. SECOND, THE JNA RESERVIST AND SOLDIERS DIDN'T ENTER BH ONLY FROM SERBIA, BUT MUCH MORE FROM SLOVBENIA AND CROATIA. THE USA SUED CASIUS KLAY FOR AVOIDING THE MOBILISATION, BUT THE MUSLIMS AND CROATS WERE ENCOURAGED BY THEIR LEADERS IN VIOLATING THE LAW? #VIOLATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS AND LAWS#)?

46. At a meeting of the SRBiH Assembly held during the night of 14 to 15 October 1991, the Accused gave a speech, at the end of which he stated: "Don't think you won't take Bosnia and Herzegovina to hell and slim people in possible extinction. Because, Muslim people will not be able to defend itself if it comes to war here!"⁹⁹ After Krajišnik, as President of the SRBiH Assembly, had adjourned the SRBiH Assembly session for the day, HDZ and SDA delegates reconvened without Serb delegates and passed a declaration of sovereignty.¹⁰⁰ Shortly thereafter, the SDS leadership demanded that the declaration be repealed before 24 October 1991.¹⁰¹

(No matter it was an illegal and anticonstitutional move!! This speech of the President is widely quatted and misinterpreted, and even the Chamber didn't pay a reasonable attention to it, nor have understood it properly! The President was #trying to dissuade the Muslim leadership from their anti-constitutional moves towards the unilateral secession#. However, this speech was qualified to the contrary, as if the President wanted the Muslim leaders to continue towards the war! Constitute: #mis-interpretation!#)

Yet, both the Prosecution and the Chamber keep that the so called #Overarching Joint Criminal Enterprize was born on 15th October#, although between this date and the war (April 6, 1992) the Serb side made so many concessions for the sake of a peaceful political solution of the crisis. During this period the Serb side gave up it's consisutional right to keep the entire BiH in Yugoslavia, or to stay in this country as a

⁹⁶ P973 (Robert Donia's Expert Report entitled "Bosnian Serb Leadership and the Siege of Sarajevo, 1990-1995", January 2010), p. 41; D2665 (Witness statement of Izo Golić dated 15 December 2012), paras. 4, 6; D2376 (Report of 4th Corps, 21 August 1991), pp. 1-2.

⁹⁷ D368 (Minutes of 35th Session of SRBiH Presidency, 21 September 1991), p. 1.

⁹⁸ P973 (Robert Donia's Expert Report entitled "Bosnian Serb Leadership and the Siege of Sarajevo, 1990-1995", January 2010), p. 41; KDZ072, P68 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelj*), T. 8691-8692 (under seal); D3065 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević dated 16 February 2013), para. 213.

⁹⁹ D267 (Video Footage and Transcript of Radovan Karadžić's speech at the 8th Session of SRBiH Assembly, 15 October 1991), pp. 3-4; P971 (Robert Donia's Expert Report entitled "The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992, 30 July 2002), e-court p. 34.

¹⁰⁰ P971 (Robert Donia's Expert Report entitled "The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992, 30 July 2002), e-court p. 35; Robert Donia, T. 3101-3102 (1 June 2010); Robert Donia, T. 3372 (7 June 2010); P974 (SRBiH Assembly Platform on the Position of BiH, 14 October 1991), pp. 1-2; see Adjudicated Fact 393.

¹⁰¹ Robert Donia, T. 3570 (9 June 2010); D294 (Minutes of SDS Council Meeting, 15 October 1991), pp. 1-3; D295 (Article from *Politika* entitled "Demand for Withdrawal of Illegal Acts", 25 October 1991).

Serb territory (as West Virginia, or Northern Ireland did) and accepted the Lisbon Agreement, which would exclude the war and any criminal enterprise!

There is no, in the entire judicial history such a flagrant distortion of the basic facts! #DISTORTION#

47. On 24 October 1991, the Bosnian Serb deputies of the SRBiH Assembly met separately and decided to establish the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH.¹⁰² Opening the session, Krajišnik explained that the main reason for doing so lay “in a serious attempt to compromise the national sovereignty of the Serbian people in BiH and their constitutional and legal position in Yugoslavia, which in turn compromises their survival in the territory of BiH, where they have lived from time immemorial”.¹⁰³ On 9 and 10 November 1991, a plebiscite was held to determine whether Serbs in BiH wished to remain in a joint state of Yugoslavia, together with Serbia, Montenegro, the SAOs of Krajina, Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, and “any others who decide in favour of such a survival”.¹⁰⁴ The overwhelming majority of Serbs voted in favour of remaining in Yugoslavia.¹⁰⁵ By that time, in the wake of Croatia’s declaration of independence,¹⁰⁶ JNA forces were withdrawing from Croatia into SRBiH.¹⁰⁷ **(Not entirely correct! Prior to this “withdrawal” there was several months of a bloody war between the Federal Army (JNA) and an illegal Croatian Army, formed as a Party force. The Serbs in Bosnia felt this war very painfully, participating in the JNA, witnessing bestialities of the Croatian troops, accepting many thousands of the Serb refugees from Croatia to the end of 1991!)** On 11 December 1991, Krajišnik, on behalf of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, formally requested the JNA “to protect, with all available means the territories of [BiH]”.¹⁰⁸ **(#Legal and obligatory# In the absence of an external enemy, this was the main JNA’s constitutional obligation!)**

48. On 17 December 1991, foreign ministers in the EC created a commission composed of EC judges, known as the Badinter Commission, to assess applications for independence from the republics of the SFRY based on their adherence to certain guidelines. On 20 December 1991, the SRBiH Presidency, Nikola Koljević and Biljana Plavšić dissenting, voted to apply to the Badinter Commission for the recognition of SRBiH as an independent state.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰² P1343 (Transcript of 1st Session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 October 1991), p. 2. See also Robert Donia, T. 3107 (1 June 2010); see Adjudicated Fact 413. See para. 77.

¹⁰³ P1343 (Transcript of 1st Session of SERBiH Assembly, 24 October 1991), p. 6; P6245 (SerBiH Assembly Ballot for Serbs); P6246 (SerBiH Assembly Ballot for non-Serbs).

¹⁰⁴ P1343 (Transcript of 1st Session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 October 1991), p. 25; P6244 (Minutes of 4th session of SDS Executive Board, 25 October 1991); D83 (Shorthand Record of 2nd Session of SerBiH Assembly, 21 November 1991), p. 4. See also P5473 (Instructions on Implementation of Plebiscite of Serbian People in BiH, 28 October 1991).

¹⁰⁵ D83 (Shorthand Record of 2nd Session of SERBiH Assembly, 21 November 1991), pp. 19–23.

¹⁰⁶ P971 (Robert Donia’s Expert Report entitled “The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990–1992, 30 July 2002), e-court p. 15.

¹⁰⁷ P946 (ECMM report re meeting with Prime Minister Pelivan, 27 November 1991); P5805 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Momčilo Krajišnik, 6 December 1991), p. 2.

¹⁰⁸ P5556 (Request of the Serb People of BiH to the JNA, 11 December 1991). See Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4408–4409. See also Herbert Okun, T. 1638 (22 April 2010).

¹⁰⁹ P971 (Robert Donia’s Expert Report entitled “The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990–1992, 30 July 2002), e-court p. 36. See also Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4142, 4310–4312. **(On 11 January 1992, the Badinter Commission issued its Opinion No. 4 and assessed “that the will of the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina to constitute the SRBH as a sovereign and independent State cannot be held to have been fully established”. D1279 (Opinion No. 4 on international recognition of SRBiH by the European Community and its members states, 11 January 1992).** On 11 January 1992, the Badinter Commission issued its Opinion No. 4 and assessed “that the will of the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina to constitute the SRBH as a sovereign and independent State cannot be held to have been fully established”. D1279 (Opinion No. 4 on international recognition of SRBiH by the European Community and its members states, 11 January 1992), p. 3. The Chamber notes that while it is only in 1993 that the European Economic

#THIS “DISSENTING” WAS EQUAL TO “VETO!”# NEITHER THE PRESIDENCY COULD DECIDE ON THE ISSUE WITHOUT THE ASSEMBLY TWO THIRD MAJORITY VOTE, NOR THE MUSLIM SIDE WAS ENTITLED TO VIOLATE ALL LAWS AND RULES!# That was so huge violation of the Constitution that it was a miracle that a massive riots had been avoided!

49. On 19 December 1991, the Main Board of the SDS issued a document entitled “Instructions for the Organisation and Activity of Organs of Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Extraordinary Circumstances” (“Variant A/B Instructions”).¹¹⁰ The stated purpose was to carry out the results of the plebiscite at which the Serbian people in BiH decided to live in a single state and to “enhance mobility and readiness to protect the interests of the Serbian people”.¹¹¹ The Chamber will address the creation, contents, and dissemination of the Variant A/B Instructions later in this judgement.¹¹² **(All # legal and even obligatory# for any organization!)**

50. The members of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH met on 21 December 1991, expressed their strong opposition to the Badinter Commission process, and approved preparations for the formation of a Serb Republic.¹¹³ On 9 January 1992, the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH proclaimed the SerBiH, which on 12 August 1992 was renamed RS.¹¹⁴

51. International efforts to achieve a comprehensive diplomatic solution to the situation in Yugoslavia were initially formalised throughout the second half of 1991 and continued in different forms and in various fora throughout the conflict. These efforts will be discussed in detail in another section of this Judgement.¹¹⁵ **(We will comment it then, just to mention that the Serb side never made anything that hadn’t #been envisaged by this Conference in the Hague!#)**

52. By early 1992, and partly due to the refusal of non-Serbs to mobilise for the war in Croatia as discussed above, the JNA units in BiH were progressively becoming “all-Serb units”, and the JNA openly favoured Serbs in its personnel policy.¹¹⁶ **(This #wording is not correct, and implies a sort of the JNA – Serb guilt#. See this footnote 116, and it will be clear that the JNA didn’t have any other ethnicity to rely on!)** By early 1992, there were some 100,000 JNA troops in SRBiH with over 700 tanks, 1,000 armoured personnel carriers, heavy weaponry, 100 planes and 500 helicopters, all under the command of the General Staff of the JNA in Belgrade.¹¹⁷

53. On 15 January 1992, the Badinter Commission recommended that SRBiH be required to hold a referendum to determine the will of its people regarding independence. On 20

Community was officially re-named European Community (“EC”), for ease of reference, the Chamber shall refer to the EC even when referring to the period before 1993.

¹¹⁰ P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991).

¹¹¹ P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), p. 2.

¹¹² See paras. 132–136; Section IV.A.3.a.ii.D: Variants A/B Instructions and take-over of power.

¹¹³ D86 (Shorthand Record of 4th Session of SERBiH Assembly, 21 December 1991), pp. 4, 9–10, 29.

¹¹⁴ Robert Donia, T. 3564 (9 June 2010); P1346 (Minutes of 5th Session of SerBiH Assembly, 9 January 1992), pp. 2–3. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 394.

¹¹⁵ *See* Section II.E: International peace negotiations.

¹¹⁶ P5433 (1st Krajina Corps document analysing combat readiness in 1992, February 1993), p. 17; P3914 (Ewan Brown’s expert report entitled “Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992”, 27 November 2002), para. 1.8; Adjudicated Fact 2096. By April 1992, more than 90 per cent of all JNA officers were Serbs or Montenegrins. Adjudicated Fact 2097. In early April 1992, Izetbegović ordered a general mobilisation in BiH and ordered that Bosnian Muslims block roads and JNA barracks all across BiH. D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 23; *see also* Martin Bell, T. 9942–9943 (15 December 2010).

¹¹⁷ Adjudicated Fact 486.

January, the SRBiH Assembly voted to hold such a referendum on 29 February and 1 March 1992.¹¹⁸ At its 26 January 1992 session, members of the SerBiH Assembly denounced the decision as illegal.¹¹⁹ On 28 February 1992, the SerBiH Assembly unanimously adopted the Constitution of the SerBiH.¹²⁰

(Fn.119, 120 THE CHAMBER JUST MENTIONS THAT THE SERBS DENOUNCED IT AS ILLEGAL, BUT WAS IT ILLEGAL? AND IF IT WAS, IS IT OF ANY IMPORTANCE FOR THIS CASE? HOW COME EVERY SINGLE SENTENCE OF THE SERB MP-s, UNOFFICIAL AND IN PRIVATE TALKS IS IMPORTANT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MENS REA, AND SUCH A HUGE POLITICAL MOVES FROM THE MUSLIM SIDE ARE NOT EVEN CONSIDERED ONLY IN ITS RELATION TO THE SERB CONDUCT.

THIS IS NOT SUFFICIENT ABOUT THE BADINTER COMMISSION, SINCE IT SAID THAT THE BIH WAS SOMETHING DIFFERENT IN COMPARISON TO OTHER REPUBLICS, CLEARLY MENTIONING THE ALREADY ESTABLISHED REPUBLICA SRPSKA, THE FACT WHICH LED THEM TO ASK FOR MORE FROM BIH, MORE THAN FROM ANY OTHER YU REPUBLIC. BUT THE CHAMBER EVENT DIDN'T QUOTE THE BADINTER COMMISSION, BUT RATHER ONLY THE SerBiH ASSEMBLY! Constitute: ILLEGALITY OF REFERENDUM!)

54. The referendum on the question of independence was held on 29 February and 1 March 1992. It was largely boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs and yielded an overwhelming majority of votes in favour of independence.¹²¹

(BUT, #THIS MAJORITY WASN'T SUFFICIENT! NOR IT ENDED IN THE ASSEMBLY, AS HAD TO. TO THAT SENSE, IT WAS AS SAME AS THE SERB PLEBISCITE, AN OPINION OF PEOPLE, NOR BOUNDING OVERALL REFERENDUM.# At least, why the chamber didn't take into account the opinions of the very prominent people from the world countries! #DISTORTION OF ILLEGAL TO LEGAL#))

55. On 28 March 1992, the SDS sponsored a congress in Sarajevo on the "Yugoslav Crisis and the Serbian Question".¹²² The congress was attended by 500 participants who were greeted by the Accused and focused on sacrifices and losses suffered by the Serbs during WWII.¹²³ In evoking fears of a "Serbian genocide", Bosnian Serb leaders suggested that territorial claims beyond Serb-inhabited areas were justified.¹²⁴

¹¹⁸ P971 (Robert Donia's Expert Report entitled "The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992, 30 July 2002), e-court p. 36. *See also* P1349 (Transcript of 6th Session of SerBiH Assembly, 26 January 1992), p. 16.

¹¹⁹ P1349 (Transcript of 6th Session of SerBiH Assembly, 26 January 1992), pp. 16-19.

¹²⁰ D89 (Shorthand Record of 9th Session of SerBiH Assembly, 28 February 1992), p. 14. *See also* P1351 (Transcript of 7th Session of SerBiH Assembly, 15 February 1992) (containing lengthy discussions on the draft constitution); *see* Adjudicated Fact 414.

¹²¹ *See* Adjudicated Fact 395; P5427 (Proclamation of the SDS Executive Board, undated); P5530 (Proclamation of the SDS Executive Board, 20 February 1992), p. 3.

¹²² D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th Session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), p. 48.

¹²³ P971 (Robert Donia's Expert Report entitled "The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992, 30 July 2002), e-court p. 38.

¹²⁴ P971 (Robert Donia's Expert Report entitled "The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992, 30 July 2002), e-court pp. 41-42 (referring to Article 2 of the 28 February 1992 SerBiH Constitution: "The territory of the Republic consists of autonomous regions, municipalities and other Serbian ethnic entities, including territory on which genocide was committed against Serbs in the Second World War.").

(THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS SECOND OR THIRD CONGRESS OF THE SERBIAN INTELLECTUALS, WERE THE MOST PROMINENT SERBS OF THE TIME. THAT WAS A HABIT TO HAVE THE SERB ELITE GATHER AND DISCUSS IN AN ACADEMIC MANNER THE ISSUES OF THE TIME. THE SDS WASN'T AS IMPORTANT, BUT SIMPLY IT HAPPENED IN SARAJEVO. #CRIMINALISATION OF CULTURAL AND POLITICAL LIFE# (Congres of the Serb intellectuals as a felony)

56. The EC and the USA recognised the independence of BiH in April 1992.¹²⁵ BiH was admitted as a State member of the UN, following decisions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly on 22 May 1992.¹²⁶ **(A SEVERAL HOURS PRIOR TO THE RECOGNITION, THE SerBIH ASSEMBLY SEPARATED THE RS FROM THAT KIND OF BOSNIA, SO NOT BEING A MINUTE IN THE INDEPENDENT BIH.)**

57. During the 16th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly on 12 May 1992, the Accused presented the Strategic Goals. These were: (i) the creation of a border separation with the other two national communities; (ii) the creation of a corridor between Semberija and Krajina; (iii) the creation of a corridor in the Drina Valley, namely elimination of the Drina as a border between Serbian states; **(iii) ???# DESPITE OF THE ORIGINAL AVAILABLE, THEY REPEAT #“BETWEEN THE SERBIAN STATES, ALTHOUGH WE PRESENTED THEM THE ORIGINAL WORDS OF THE PRESIDENT, SAYING “BETWEEN THE WORLDS.”# ARE THEY ALLOWED TO FORGE THIS EVIDENCE? Fn. 128) AGAIN, WRONG, THERE WAS NO ANY VOTING, OR ANY ADOPTION. IT WAS AN INFORMATION ABOUT THE SERB POSITION IN THE ALREADY ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS. Constitute: distortion).** (iv) the creation of a border on the Una and Neretva rivers; (v) division of the city of Sarajevo into Serbian and Muslim parts and implementation of an effective state government in each of these parts; (vi) and access of the SerBiH to the sea.¹²⁷ The Strategic Goals were adopted by the Bosnian Serb Assembly at the same session.¹²⁸

B. BOSNIAN SERB POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES

1. Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)

a. Establishment

58. The SDS was established on 12 July 1990 at a founding assembly in Sarajevo.¹²⁹ It was founded in advance of the first multi-party elections in the SRBiH which were to be held in November 1990.¹³⁰ The assembly elected the Accused as president of the party,¹³¹ and he

¹²⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 396; P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 15.

¹²⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 397.

¹²⁷ P956 (Transcript of 16th Session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court pp. 8–10; P955 (SerBiH Assembly Decision on Strategic Goals of Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992).

¹²⁸ P955 (SerBiH Assembly Decision on Strategic Goals of Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992).

¹²⁹ P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 7; Patrick Treanor, T. 14000 (1 June 2011). See also D4650 (Statute of the BiH SDS, 12 July 1990), p. 2. The assembly adopted a statute that outlined the organisation and operations of the party. Patrick Treanor, T. 14000 (1 June 2011); D4650 (Statute of the BiH SDS, 12 July 1990). For a list of members in 1990 and 1991, see P6626 (List of the SDS Main Committee members during 1990 and 1991).

¹³⁰ P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 7; Patrick Treanor, T. 14000 (1 June 2011).

¹³¹ P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 7; Patrick Treanor, T. 14000 (1 June 2011).

remained the president through 1995.¹³² The Accused gave a speech in which he stated the objectives of the party, which included “a federative Yugoslavia, and in it an equal federal Bosnia and Herzegovina”.¹³³ The Accused also stated that the party would be organised along republic, regional, subregional, municipal, and communal levels with regional and lower-level boards making “completely autonomous [...] local and political assessments and personnel decisions”.¹³⁴

59. In 1990 and 1991, the SDS was funded by voluntary contributions and enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of Bosnian Serbs.¹³⁵

1. Components and their functions

60. The main organs of the SDS included the party Assembly, formally the supreme body; the SDS Main Board, the highest party organ at times when the Assembly was not in session; the SDS Executive Board, the executive arm of the Main Board; the President of the party, who was also the President of the Main Board; and several advisory bodies, such as the SDS Political Council.¹³⁶

61. The party Assembly was responsible for adopting and amending the party programme and statutes and for electing, *inter alios*, the President of the party and the members of the Main Board.¹³⁷

62. The Main Board’s responsibilities included the election of members of the Executive Board and the preparation of drafts of all acts and decisions adopted by the party Assembly.¹³⁸ The Main Board made SDS policy and important political decisions.¹³⁹ The Accused was *ex officio* president of the Main Board of the SDS.¹⁴⁰ Krajišnik became a member of the Main Board in July 1991.¹⁴¹ Under a new party statute provision approved on 12 July 1991, the party president could nominate and effectively select up to one-third of the members of the Main Board.¹⁴²

63. Duties of the Executive Board included preparing materials for the use of the Main Board and implementing its decisions.¹⁴³ On 31 July 1991, Rajko Dukić, who was nominated by

¹³² P2537 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1993-1995 – Addendum to the Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 1 May 2009), para. 5.

¹³³ D255 (Radovan Karadžić’s speech at the constituent SDS Assembly), p. 2; P971 (Robert Donia’s expert report entitled “The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), p. 20; Patrick Treanor, T. 14001 (1 June 2011).

¹³⁴ D255 (Radovan Karadžić’s speech at the constituent SDS Assembly), p. 2.

¹³⁵ Adjudicated Fact 1892.

¹³⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 1893; D4650 (Statute of the BiH SDS, 12 July 1990), arts. 12–13; Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16599–16600; Nedeljko Prstojević, T. 12935 (3 March 2011).

¹³⁷ P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 20; D4650 (Statute of the BiH SDS, 12 July 1990), art. 15; P761 (Statute and platform of SDS, 17 February 1990), art. 9.

¹³⁸ D4650 (Statute of the BiH SDS, 12 July 1990), art. 19; P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 28. See, e.g., D3989 (Minutes of the SDS Main Board, 21 November 1991).

¹³⁹ Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 7365; D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 7.

¹⁴⁰ P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 14; P6558 (List of SDS Main Board members).

¹⁴¹ P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 14.

¹⁴² Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16590–16591, 16601.

¹⁴³ P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), paras. 32–34; D4650 (Statute of the BiH SDS, 12 July 1990), art. 21; P761 (Statute and platform of SDS, 17 February 1990), art. 12. See also P6243 (Notes of SDS Assembly session, 12 July 1991), p. 7.

the Accused, was unanimously elected President of the Executive Board.¹⁴⁴ As such, Dukić was to carry out the establishment and operation of the party staff apparatus.¹⁴⁵ Radomir Nešković was elected as the Deputy President of the Executive Board on the same day.¹⁴⁶ The Accused attended some meetings of the Executive Board.¹⁴⁷

64. The President of the SDS had statutory powers that included, by 1991, representing the SDS, convoking the SDS Assembly, Main Board, and Executive Board, and co-ordinating the work of organs and bodies of the SDS.¹⁴⁸ The President was the central, most important party organ.¹⁴⁹

65. Another body that stemmed from the SDS was the Serbian Deputies' Club, a parliamentary caucus of the SDS in the SRBiH Assembly.¹⁵⁰ The Deputies' Club was headed by Vojo Maksimović.¹⁵¹ The Accused, as the party leader, attended meetings of the Deputies' Club.¹⁵² Members of the Deputies' Club formed the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 24 October 1991.¹⁵³ Radomir Nešković described the Deputies' Club as "a constituent organ which passed all constituent acts and documents which lay the grounds for Republika Srpska".¹⁵⁴ **(The SDS had 72 seats in the Assembly, while in the other parties there was another 14 Serbian MP-s. When deciding to form the "Bosnian Serb Assembly" out of totality of 86 MP-s in all the parties, 83 of them decided to join the Serb Assembly. Eleven of the non-SDS MP-s after a while became a separate opposition deputy club.)**

c. Organisation and structure

66. In 1991 and into 1992, "expanded" meetings of the members of the formal and *ad hoc* bodies of the party played an important role in policy-setting, decision-making, and communications from the top to the grassroots level.¹⁵⁵ The SDS also utilised "expanded" meetings of different groups of middle-level government leaders and lower-level party officials to convey instructions or information to the grassroots level and to reach broader party consensus on policy or strategy.¹⁵⁶ **(#EXCULPATORY#! Strongly opposing the Prosecution/Chamber allegation about an authoritarian nature of the SDS Party.#Authoritarian#!)** These meetings often included SDS-nominated ministerial-level SRBiH government officials, and many of them would later become part of the Bosnian Serb Government.¹⁵⁷

¹⁴⁴ D1274 (Minutes of 1st session of SDS Executive Board, 31 July 1991); P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 35.

¹⁴⁵ D1274 (Minutes of 1st session of SDS Executive Board, 31 July 1991).

¹⁴⁶ Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16589; Radomir Nešković, T. 14221 (6 June 2011).

¹⁴⁷ D1274 (Minutes of 1st session of SDS Executive Board, 31 July 1991), p. 1; D1275 (Minutes of 2nd session of SDS Executive Board, 6 September 1991), p. 2; P2585 (Minutes of 5th meeting of SDS Executive Board, 7 November 1991), p. 2.

¹⁴⁸ P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 23; D4650 (Statute of the BiH SDS, 12 July 1990), art. 17; P761 (Statute and platform of SDS, 17 February 1990), art. 11.

¹⁴⁹ P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), paras. 24, 41, 67; Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16600.

¹⁵⁰ P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 44.

¹⁵¹ Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16605.

¹⁵² Patrick Treanor, T. 14012 (1 June 2011). See P2543 (Minutes of meeting of SDS Deputies' Club, 30 September 1991); P2581 (Minutes of meeting of SDS Deputies' Club, 18 October 1991).

¹⁵³ P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), paras. 47, 165. See para. 77.

¹⁵⁴ Radomir Nešković, T. 14242 (6 June 2011).

¹⁵⁵ P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), paras. 41, 56, 64, 67.

¹⁵⁶ P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 49.

¹⁵⁷ P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 50.

67. Another key feature of SDS organisation in late 1991 into 1992 was collective leadership in the form of decision-making in small groups, most importantly, collaboration by four core leaders, the Accused, Krajišnik, Plavšić, and Koljević.¹⁵⁸ **(It was only on the operational convey of already democratically created decisions. #Authoritarian!)**

68. The party was a hierarchical structure, organised into municipal assemblies and boards resembling the republican organs.¹⁵⁹ Larger towns had both municipal boards and local boards corresponding to the local communes.¹⁶⁰ Local boards were the basic units of party organisation.¹⁶¹ Each member of the local board represented 15 to 20 households and informed the local board, which in turn informed the municipal board; the municipal board then informed the President of the party, the Main Board, or the Executive Board.¹⁶² Municipal boards comprised presidents of local boards.¹⁶³ Members of the Main and Executive Boards were to be involved in the work of the municipal boards in the area where they lived.¹⁶⁴

69. Decisions were implemented in accordance with the hierarchy by all bodies, including regional, municipal, and local boards,¹⁶⁵ and by lower-level officials.¹⁶⁶ Local boards received tasks from and answered to the municipal boards.¹⁶⁷ Municipal boards were obligated to implement the instructions issued by the Main Board or Executive Board.¹⁶⁸ The Main Board had the power to dismiss municipal bodies if it considered them to not be functioning well or not implementing the party's policies.¹⁶⁹ The municipal boards sent delegates to the RS Assembly.¹⁷⁰

70. From 1990 to 1995, the Accused was at the head of the hierarchical structure of the SDS.¹⁷¹

¹⁵⁸ P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), paras. 18, 68–75. *See also* Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16605; Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 8618.

¹⁵⁹ Adjudicated Fact 1894; P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 22; Milorad Dodik, T. 36872–36875 (9 April 2013); P2526 (Witness Statement of Radomir Kezunović dated 21 May 2011), para. 21; Nedeljko Prstojević, T. 12935 (3 March 2011); D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 3.

¹⁶⁰ Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 7386; Nedeljko Prstojević, T. 12935 (3 March 2011).

¹⁶¹ Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16600, 16749–16750; Radomir Nešković, T. 14216, 14252–14253 (6 June 2011). *See also* P2529 (Letter from Radovan Karadžić to SDS Municipal Boards, 15 August 1991), p. 1.

¹⁶² Radomir Nešković, T. 14216–14217 (6 June 2011); Dževad Gušić, T. 17802–17804 (24 August 2011); Nedeljko Prstojević, T. 12936–12937 (3 March 2011). *See also* P2539 (Radovan Karadžić's interview in NIN, 9 November 1990), p. 1; P2529 (Letter from Radovan Karadžić to SDS Municipal Boards, 15 August 1991); P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), p. 9.

¹⁶³ P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), para. 51.

¹⁶⁴ P2573 (Minutes of 6th session of SDS Executive Board, November 1991), p. 3; *see* Adjudicated Fact 1895.

¹⁶⁵ Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16602, 16751; Radomir Nešković, T. 14235 (6 June 2011).

¹⁶⁶ Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16623–16627. *See also* Dževad Gušić, T. 17793 (24 August 2011).

¹⁶⁷ Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 7386.

¹⁶⁸ Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 7386; Nedeljko Prstojević, T. 12936–12939 (3 March 2011); Milorad Dodik, T. 36873 (9 April 2013). *See, e.g.*, P6121 (Decision of Vlasenica's SDS Municipal Board, 4 April 1992).

¹⁶⁹ Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16602.

¹⁷⁰ Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16620. For example, Srđo Srdić was the Assembly deputy from Prijedor. P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), pp. 151, 153. He was also for a time president of the SDS municipal board of Prijedor, replaced by Simo Mišković. Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16621–16622. Milenko Vojinović was the president of the SDS in Brčko and a deputy of the Bosnian Serb Assembly. P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), para. 13.

¹⁷¹ Patrick Treanor, T. 14001 (1 June 2011); Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16602, 16841; Milorad Dodik, T. 36872 (9 April 2013). *See also* P2529 (Letter from Radovan Karadžić to SDS Municipal Boards, 15 August 1991); P6238 (Radovan Karadžić's Decision, 18 October 1991) (the Chamber notes that although the date on the document is partly illegible, the date of 18 October 1991 was not contested by the parties when the document was tendered into evidence, *see* Rodoljub Đukanović, T. 36179,

71. The party strove to develop and put into place an efficient system of communications to convey instructions from the top down and to receive reports from the bottom up.¹⁷² The evidence shows communication in both directions between the top and local levels. Members of the Main Board or Executive Board were designated by the Main Board, Executive Board, or the Accused to go to specific municipalities to communicate with lower-level bodies and address municipal-level problems and to report back.¹⁷³ Members of the Main Board were obligated to regularly attend sessions of the municipal board of their respective municipalities.¹⁷⁴ The Main Board informed municipal boards about its decisions and work.¹⁷⁵ SDS municipal leaders met and communicated with SDS leaders at the republic level, including the Accused and the Main Board.¹⁷⁶ The Accused stated at the SerBiH Assembly session on 15 February 1992 that he would establish teams composed of Main Board members and deputies from the respective region to attend meetings of Deputies' Clubs in municipalities.¹⁷⁷ **(The "two way communications" were successful only before the war, while immediately after the war broke out, all the communication centres remained in the Muslim control and the Serbs couldn't communicate the entire 1992 almost at all. #Criminalisation#)**

2. Initial actions

72. During the first months of 1991 the SDS began to organise Serb-majority municipalities in BiH into communities of municipalities, in some cases severing ties with pre-existing communities of municipalities.¹⁷⁸ SDS party leaders justified the associations of municipalities in terms of economic necessity.¹⁷⁹

73. A confidential SDS document, dated 23 February 1991, considered specific actions to be taken should BiH move towards independence.¹⁸⁰ In such a case municipal authorities were to ensure that only Yugoslav (federal) law would apply, suspending the implementation of republican regulations.¹⁸¹ This policy was adopted by the SDS Deputies' Club and was made public in a document dated 10 June 1991.¹⁸² **(A #legal and legitimate move#! If the BIH violated both the Federal and BH Constitutions and made an illegal move towards independence, those whose rights were violated were entitled to oppose it on behalf of the Constitution! Constitute: #LEGAL – ILLEGAL#)**

36204 (27 March 2013); P2548 (Telex entitled "The Sarajevo SDS Order", 29 October 1991); Patrick Treanor, T. 14023–14024 (1 June 2011).

¹⁷² Patrick Treanor, T. 14001 (1 June 2011).

¹⁷³ Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*, T. 16619, 16627, 16760–16763, 16783–16784; Radomir Nešković, T. 14217–14218 (6 June 2011); P2526 (Witness Statement of Radomir Kezunović dated 21 May 2011), para. 21. *See also* Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43862–43863 (20 November 2013); P6516 (Excerpt from Momčilo Krajišnik's testimony from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*, T. 25069–25070).

¹⁷⁴ Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*, T. 16630–16632; Radomir Nešković, T. 14216 (6 June 2011).

¹⁷⁵ P6369 (Excerpts from KW317's statement to OTP, 14 June 2002) (under seal), e-court p. 2; KW317, T. 39327 (5 June 2013).

¹⁷⁶ Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*, T. 16632, 16752, 16758, 16759; P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 25; Nebojša Ristić, T. 15391–15392 (24 June 2011); P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Đerić dated 5 April 2012), para. 41; KW317, T. 39328 (5 June 2013); Radomir Kezunović, T. 13886–13887 (31 May 2011).

¹⁷⁷ P1351 (Transcript of 7th session of SerBiH Assembly, 15 February 1992), p. 58.

¹⁷⁸ Adjudicated Fact 1913. *But see* Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43244–43246 (7 November 2013) (stating that the joining of or separating from communities of municipalities by a municipality was at the will of the citizens, required the consent of the municipal assembly, and was not initiated by the SDS).

¹⁷⁹ Adjudicated Fact 1914.

¹⁸⁰ Adjudicated Fact 1917.

¹⁸¹ *See* Adjudicated Fact 1918.

¹⁸² *See* Adjudicated Fact 1919; D4654 (Report of SDS Deputies Club, 10 June 1991).

74. In late 1991, the SDS started implementing a policy of “regionalisation”.¹⁸³ This consisted in taking steps towards the creation of “regions” in which Serbs were the relative majority.¹⁸⁴ In the fall of 1991, the SDS also made preparations for the establishment of Serb municipalities and Serb municipal Crisis Staffs, at the municipal level.¹⁸⁵ **(So what??? Would this court try and sentence so many European regions, such as Flandria, Valona, Katalonia, Bavaria... and many others for organizing separately, #on the basis of their collective interests#? All of it was envisaged and guaranteed by the Federal and BH constitutions. Moreover, all of it had been established on the Hague Conference of Yugoslav crisis, and Mr. Izetbegovic #accepted the obligation that the Serbs and Croats would have a high territorial autonomies#, see the Hague Conference documents! Constitute: #THE ICFY ENVISAGED#!)** 20.09.91 R0414824-R0414832

Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Bosnia-Hercegovina suggested that the Conference should devote itself to the principle of self-determination of republics and not self-determination of peoples or nations. Bosnia-Hercegovina was nevertheless ready to give a large autonomy to components of its population. Bosnia-Hercegovina proposes a five-year arrangement which could be reconsidered after this period. If there is no agreement on a minimum of common functions, Bosnia-Hercegovina will hold another referendum.

Bosnia-Hercegovina is in favour of a union of sovereign states in which sovereignty would proceed from the republics.

(This was also in accordance with the Declaration which Mr. Izetbegovic signed with a Karadzic’s plenipotentiary, Mr. Krajisnik on 16 September 1993, according to which the Republic of Srpska could secede from BIH had wished so. And also at the same Conference, later, on November 1, 1991:

Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ

I would like to say a few words about what has been said – about the specific situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to the fact that it is a state of three constituent peoples.

Yes, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a state of the Serbian people. Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not an ethnic minority. Representatives of the Serbian people, that is, the party which aspires to represent the Serbian people, present ideas about the possibility of a special status of sorts, that is, autonomy, political autonomy within Bosnia and Herzegovina in areas inhabited by the Serbian people.

All such options are possible and it appears that they are not in contradiction with the text of the document you submitted.

Therefore, even Mr. Izetbegovic proposed and committed to a decentralised BIH,

¹⁸³ See Adjudicated Fact 1921; P2584 (Minutes of 3rd meeting of SDS Executive Board, 16 September 1991), p. 1; P2530 (SDS decision on appointment of staff, 25 September 1991); P2585 (Minutes of 5th meeting of SDS Executive Board, 7 November 1991), p. 5; P2586 (Minutes of session of SDS Deputies’ Club, 3 December 1991), pp. 1–3; Radomir Nešković, T. 14357–14361 (7 June 2011).

¹⁸⁴ See Adjudicated Fact 1922. See also Patrick Treanor, T. 14016 (1 June 2011); Robert Donia, T. 3100–3101 (1 June 2010).

¹⁸⁵ P2589 (Dorothea Hanson’s expert report entitled “Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War Commissions 1991-1995”, 10 September 2009), paras. 16, 19. See Section IV.A.1: Municipalities component (Facts) for a discussion on the establishment of Serb municipalities and Crisis Staffs in each of the Municipalities.

particularly pointing out that the Serbs will have what they proposed, a “special status, an autonomy .. in areas inhabited by the Serbian people”. This orientation of Mr. Izetbegovic was declared at least on 20 September, and maintained until 25 March 1992, when he reneged on the already agreed Lisbon arrangement! How come the Chamber didn’t even noticed this fact? At the same session of the ICFY Mr. Izetbergovic said:

Naturally, I believe that the Serbian people should have their say in the matter and be a constituent part of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in view of its status as a pillar of the state. This is the case now. I would like to point out that the President of the National Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a Serb; nine of the 23 ministers are Serbs and some of them head key ministries; either 72 or 75 members of parliament are Serbs; in more than 50 municipalities, in 46 or 47 municipalities, the Municipality Presidents are Serbs, and so on.

In spite of the fact confirmed even by Izetbegovic, the Serbs had an absolute majority in almost 50 municipalities – and in a dozen of municipalities a relative majority. In spite of the fact, the Chamber accepted the unfounded Prosecutor allegations on a “taking-over” powers by the Serbs! Further, at its session on 20 December 1991, the ICFY concluded:

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4. President Izetbegovic made it clear that in the light of the EC decisions of 16th December, he had no choice but to apply for the recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina’s independence, even though he was fearful of the consequences. All other interlocutors also expressed concern that President Izetbegovic’s application for recognition would prompt an eruption of violence in the republic. The leaders of the Serbian communities in Bosnia-Hercegovina stressed that they were strongly opposed to independence and would challenge any move by Izetbegovic in that direction. Milosevic also argued that such action by Izetbegovic would be unconstitutional. President Tudjman proposed the partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina as the only solution.

Thus, Mr. Izetbegovic marked the EC and it’s decision of 16th December as a critical move forcing him to apply for the recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina independence”, even though he was fearful, as all other interlocutors, that his application would prompt an eruption of violence... How possibly any chamber could have found president Karadzic liable for the outycome of these chain of mistakes of the international community. Also, “President Tudjman proposed the partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina as the only solution” – and where is Karadzic’s responsibility in that?

Not need to mention that all the results of the ICFY in the Hague had been closely followed by the Serb leadership, and the Serb Assembly decisions got along with these results, see: ## ICFY documents)

75. On 16 September 1991 the SDS Executive Board approved the appointment of a Regionalisation Staff.¹⁸⁶ At least three communities of municipalities—Eastern and Old Herzegovina, ARK, and Romanija—became SAOs in September 1991.¹⁸⁷ More SAOs were

¹⁸⁶ Adjudicated Fact 1923; P2584 (Minutes of 3rd meeting of SDS Executive Board, 16 September 1991), p. 1.

¹⁸⁷ Adjudicated Fact 1923.

formed between September and November 1991: Semberija-Majevisa, Northern Bosnia, and Birač.¹⁸⁸ On 24 February 1992, the SDS Executive Board assigned “coordinators” for the SAOs.¹⁸⁹ For instance, the SDS Executive Board appointed Radislav Vukić, a member of the SDS Executive Board, as co-ordinator for SAO Krajina.¹⁹⁰

ii. Bosnian Serb Assembly

76. As described above,¹⁹¹ by October 1991 the three-party coalition of the SDA, HDZ, and SDS was falling apart over the question of an independent BiH. During the night of 14 and 15 October 1991, the President of the SRBiH Assembly adjourned the session but a vote proceeded in the absence of the Serb deputies and a declaration of sovereignty was adopted.¹⁹² **(Distortion!)** On 15 October 1991, the SDS Political Council met to assess the situation.¹⁹³ During this and other meetings, the idea emerged that the SDS should form its own institutions, which would function in parallel to those of BiH.¹⁹⁴ **(Adjudicated fact, and Distortion: not SDS institutions, but institutions of the Serb people in BiH)**

THE #WRONGNESS OF THIS INTERPRETATION (distortion#) IS MAKING THAT THE INTERPRETED PART LOOKS REALLY WRONG.

(a) AFTER BEING ADJURNED BY THE PRESIDENT, THE ASSEMBLY LEFT AND ONLY AFTER SOME TIME THE VICE PRESIDENT UNAUTHORIZED BY THE PRESIDENT SUMONNED THE MUSLIM-CROAT DEPUTIES.

(b) THEY COULDN'T VOTE, BECAUSE IT WOULD BE ENTIRELY NEW SESSION.

(c) THEY DIDN'T HAVE A TWO THIRD SCORE IN FAVOUR OF INDEPENDENCE! THIS KIND OF DECISIONS COULDN'T BE MADE WITHOUT CONSENT OF THE THIRD NATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE SERBS, BECAUSE IT CONCERNS THEIR DESTINY TO THE HIGHEST DEGREE. HOW COME THE “INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY” SUPPORTED SUCH A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE BASIC INDIVIDUAL AND COLECTIVE RIGHTS? (#LEGAL-ILEGAL#)

77. The Bosnian Serb deputies of the SRBiH Assembly proclaimed a separate Assembly of the Serbian People on 24 October 1991¹⁹⁵ and elected Krajišnik as President of the Assembly.¹⁹⁶ The newly established Assembly was essentially a new form of the SDS Deputies'

¹⁸⁸ Adjudicated Fact 1924.

¹⁸⁹ See Adjudicated Fact 2181.

¹⁹⁰ P6530 (Decision of SDS Executive Board, 24 February 1992). See also Adjudicated Fact 2181. His duties were, *inter alia*, to co-ordinate the activities of SDS municipal boards in SAO Krajina, to work in co-operation with the Assembly president and the SAO Krajina prime minister to implement the decisions of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and Council of Ministers, and to take part in the work of the SAO Krajina Crisis Staff. P6530 (Decision of SDS Executive Board, 24 February 1992).

¹⁹¹ See paras. 44–46.

¹⁹² See Adjudicated Facts 1929–1936.

¹⁹³ Adjudicated Fact 1937; D294 (Minutes of SDS Council meeting, 15 October 1991); Robert Donia, T. 3107 (1 June 2010).

¹⁹⁴ Adjudicated Fact 1938; P2581 (Minutes of meeting of SDS Deputies' Club, 18 October 1991); P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 164.

¹⁹⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 413; P1343 (Transcript of 1st session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 October 1991), pp. 12–15; P3121 (Session of the Club of Deputies from the SDS, 24 October 1991); P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 163.

¹⁹⁶ P2538 (Patrick Treanor's research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 80.

Club, with the minutes and transcript of the Assembly's first session indicating it as a session of the Deputies' Club.¹⁹⁷

It wasn't "a new form of the SDS Deputies' Club" but much wider, the Assembly of all the Serb MP-s, all but three out of 86 MP-s from all the party lists. It couldn't be appointed as the Assembly session, since the Assembly had been formed only in the course the session of the Club.

NOT EVEN MENTIONING THE SERB CLAIMS FOR THE HOME OF ETHNICITIES IN THE PARLIAMENT. HAD THIS BEEN ACCEPTED, THERE WOULDN'T BE THE SERB ASSEMBLY. THE SDS SPECIFIED IT IN ITS LETTER TO THE ASSEMBLY OF BIH ON 8 OCTOBER 1990, BEFORE THE ELECTIONS, IN THE OCCASION OF ADOPTION OF AMENDMENTS OF THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION. EVEN THEN THE SDS ASSERTED THAT THE HOME OF THE THREE ETHNIC COMMUNITIES IS NECESSARY, AND AN ALTERNATIVE IS A SEPARATE NATIONAL COUNCILS FOR EACH OF THE COMMUNITIES, SEE D250.

78. In 1991 into 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly¹⁹⁸ was composed of 78 deputies and all but six were SDS members.¹⁹⁹ **(It is correct only for the moment of formation of the Assembly, while finally the Assembly was composed of 83 MP-s from all the parties.)** Twenty-three sessions of the Bosnian Serb Assembly were held between October 1991 and December 1992.²⁰⁰ On 12 August 1992, the Assembly voted to change the name of the Republic from the SerBiH to RS.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁷ P1342 (Minutes of 1st session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 October 1991), p. 3; P1343 (Transcript of 1st session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 October 1991), p. 3; P3121 (Session of the Club of Deputies from the SDS, 24 October 1991), p. 3; P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), paras. 47, 165.

¹⁹⁸ The term "Bosnian Serb Assembly" will be used henceforth to collectively refer to the body that was called at different points in time the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, SerBiH Assembly, and RS National Assembly.

¹⁹⁹ P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), pp. 151-152, para. 165. The Bosnian Serb Constitution of 17 December 1992 states that the Assembly has 120 deputies. P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 71 (p. 15).

²⁰⁰ Adjudicated Fact 1941. See also P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 186, pp. 184-185. See P1342 (Minutes of 1st session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 October 1991); P1343 (Transcript of 1st session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 October 1991); P1344 (Minutes of 2nd session of SerBiH Assembly, 21 November 1991); D83 (Shorthand Record of 2nd session of SerBiH Assembly, 21 November 1991); D85 (Minutes of 3rd session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 December 1991); D84 (Shorthand Record of 3rd session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 December 1991); P1345 (Minutes of 4th session of SerBiH Assembly, 21 December 1991); D86 (Shorthand Record of 4th session of SerBiH Assembly, 21 December 1991); P1346 (Minutes of 5th session of SerBiH Assembly, 9 January 1992); P1347 (Shorthand record of 5th session of SerBiH Assembly, 9 January 1992); P1348 (Minutes of 6th session of SerBiH Assembly, 26 January 1992); P1349 (Transcript of 6th session of SerBiH Assembly, 26 January 1992); P1350 (Shorthand record of 7th session of SerBiH Assembly, 15 February 1992); P1351 (Transcript of 7th session of SerBiH Assembly, 15 February 1992); P1352 (Minutes of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25 February 1992); D88 (Shorthand Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25 February 1992); D89 (Shorthand Record of 9th session of SerBiH Assembly, 28 February 1992); P1353 (Shorthand record of 10th session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 March 1992); D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992); P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992); P1354 (Minutes of 13th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992); P1634 (Minutes of 14th session of SerBiH Assembly, 27 March 1992); D304 (Shorthand Record of 14th session of RS Assembly, 27 March 1992); P1355 (Minutes of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992); P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992); P1356 (Minutes of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24-26 July 1992); D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24-26 July 1992); P1357 (18th session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 August 1992); P1358 (Minutes of 19th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 August 1992); D422 (19th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 August 1992); P1359 (Minutes of 20th session of SerBiH Assembly, 14-15 September 1992); D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14-15 September 1992); P1468 (Minutes of 21st session of RS Assembly, 30 October-1 November 1992); P1360 (Transcript from Joint session (21st session) of RS Assembly and Assembly of Serbian Krajina, 31 October 1992); P1361 (Minutes of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23-24 November 1992); P1362 (Shorthand Record of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23-24 November 1992); P1363 (Minutes of 23rd session of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992); P1364 (Transcript of 23rd session of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992).

²⁰¹ P1358 (Minutes of 19th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 August 1992), p. 3; D422 (19th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 August 1992), p. 34.

79. Chaired by a President (Speaker) and two vice-presidents, this legislative body could adopt laws and determine the budget and territorial organisation of the Republic.²⁰² It could also call referendums and elections.²⁰³

80. Proposals for legislation could be launched by the deputies, the Government, the President of the Republic, municipal assemblies, or a minimum of 3,000 voters.²⁰⁴ Thereafter, a draft would be prepared by the relevant Ministry, adopted by the Government, and then forwarded to the Assembly.²⁰⁵ This meant that, regardless of who initiated the legislation, the body officially proposing would always be the Government.²⁰⁶ In the event of war or immediate threat of war, deputies could, in accordance with the evaluation of the political and security situation, propose to the Assembly that a law be passed without the draft being discussed.²⁰⁷

81. The Bosnian Serb Assembly was to exercise control over matters within the competence of the Bosnian Serb Government.²⁰⁸ It elected the Prime Minister and voted to appoint the Government Ministers.²⁰⁹ In addition, the Assembly debated matters related to the work of the Supreme Court, the Public Prosecutor, and the constitutionality of the laws of the Republic upon advice given to it by the Constitutional Court.²¹⁰ It was also tasked with co-operating with the assemblies of other republics, autonomous provinces, and municipalities, through information exchange and visits by Assembly deputies.²¹¹

82. The President of the Assembly had the power to propose the agenda of Assembly sessions and to convene the Assembly at his initiative, or upon demand of the Bosnian Serb Government or one-third of the deputies of the Assembly.²¹²

83. Sessions of the Bosnian Serb Assembly were sometimes preceded by meetings of the SDS Deputies' Club, which proposed conclusions for adoption by the Assembly.²¹³

84. The Assembly was an important avenue for deputies to be informed of policies, plans, and instructions, including for purposes of dissemination to the field.²¹⁴ **(#Wrong and**

²⁰² Adjudicated Fact 2014; P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), arts. 70, 74, 79 (pp. 15, 16).

²⁰³ See Adjudicated Fact 2015; P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 70 (p. 15).

²⁰⁴ See Adjudicated Fact 2016; P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), arts. 76, 90 (pp. 16, 18), arts. 118–119 (p. 53).

²⁰⁵ Adjudicated Fact 2017; P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 119–121 (p. 53).

²⁰⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 2018.

²⁰⁷ P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 241 (p. 76).

²⁰⁸ Adjudicated Fact 2019; P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 70 (p. 15).

²⁰⁹ Adjudicated Fact 2020; P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 176 (p. 62).

²¹⁰ Adjudicated Fact 2021; P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 228–232 (pp. 72–74).

²¹¹ See Adjudicated Fact 2022; P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), arts. 233–237 (pp. 74–75).

²¹² See Adjudicated Fact 2024; P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 74 (p. 16), arts. 26, 82, 89 (pp. 36, 47, 48).

²¹³ See, e.g., D115 (Transcript of 25th session of RS Assembly, 19–20 January 1993), p. 69; P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 2; P1405 (Transcript of 48th session of RS Assembly, 29–30 December 1994), pp. 35–40, 40–41.

²¹⁴ See P1369 (Transcript of 27th session of RS Assembly, 3 April 1993), p. 7; P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), p. 22; P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), pp. 13–14; P988 (Transcript of 53rd session of RS Assembly, 28 August 1995), p. 68.

distorted# the Assembly created and approved the entire policy of the Serb constituency#)

Municipal bodies were briefed on Assembly sessions and the decisions reached therein.²¹⁵ For instance, at the 7th Assembly session, the Accused requested that the Krajina deputies “work a lot with our people there, with party membership, to explain our strategic goals and to explain our tactics on a daily basis” and stated that “[a] deputy is a representative and is vested with the highest representative authority” and “[a]t the same time, he will report to the Assembly here”.²¹⁶

85. At Assembly sessions, deputies reported on events in the municipalities.²¹⁷ The Accused stated at the 12th Assembly session on 24 March 1992:

If the Assembly agrees, [...] it is my opinion and request that in this period when the State is being created and getting on its feet, deputies will have to be the pillars of our power in the areas where they are located. They must, therefore, remain in permanent contact with presidents of municipalities and work on the establishment of local government.²¹⁸ **(So what? The President advocated the wider possible range of democracy!)**

86. Statements by deputies indicate that they ascribed to the Assembly a degree of authority over municipal bodies. At the 8th Assembly session, amid remarks on the “discord” in Bosnian Krajina, Vojo Kuprešanin spoke of the Assembly as “our supreme authority because it can annul all our decisions”.²¹⁹ The Accused stated earlier in the same session: “This Assembly is the supreme power of the Serbian people in [BiH]. [...] This Assembly has the authority to cancel all decisions of any Serbian Assembly in [BiH], and of the Regional Assembly.”²²⁰

87. The Assembly established many of the Bosnian Serb state political organs, including the SNB, the three and five-member Presidency and sole President, the Council of Ministers, and the Government, as well as the judicial system.²²¹

*** there was no any decision pertaining to “five” members of Presidency. For what purpose the Chamber needs that forgery, unless to justify some previous judgements.**

iii. National Security Council (SNB)

88. On 27 March 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly established the SNB.²²² It was to be an advisory organ to the Assembly, on political, legal, constitutional, and other issues relevant to the security of “the Serbian people in [BiH]”, and it was to be responsible to the Assembly.²²³ It

²¹⁵ See P3439 (Minutes of meeting of Ključ Crisis Staff, 13-14 May 1992), p. 2; Rajko Kalabić, T. 44577-44578; P6589 (Minutes of Prijedor Municipal Board meeting, 18 May 1992), p. 1; P3590 (Minutes of meeting of presidents of municipalities in the zone of responsibility of the 1st Partisan Brigade, 14 May 1992), p. 3.

²¹⁶ P1351 (Transcript of 7th session of SerBiH Assembly, 15 February 1992), p. 58.

²¹⁷ See D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24-26 July 1992), pp. 66-67, 71-75.

²¹⁸ P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), p. 15.

²¹⁹ D88 (Shorthand Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25 February 1992), pp. 60-61.

²²⁰ D88 (Shorthand Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25 February 1992), p. 45.

²²¹ See paras. 88, 96-98, 103, 107. See also Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16779; P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), paras. 168-188.

²²² P1634 (Minutes of 14th session of SerBiH Assembly, 27 March 1992), p. 14; D304 (Shorthand Record of 14th session of RS Assembly, 27 March 1992), p. 10; P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 185. See also Adjudicated Fact 2028. Its decisions were sometimes published in the Official Gazette of the SerBiH. See Adjudicated Fact 2030.

²²³ Adjudicated Fact 2029; P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), pp. 10-15; P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 185.

was also envisioned as being able to issue binding decisions on executive organs, including the Ministries of Interior and of National Defence.²²⁴

AGAIN, #INVALID INFORMATION FOR MISSING TO QUOTE THE ONLY REASON FOR THE ESTABLISHING OF THIS BODY. ON 25 AND 27 MARCH A CARNAGE OF THE SERB CIVILIANS IN BOSANSKI BROD AND THE NEARBY VILLAGE SIJEKOVAC TOOK PLACE#, AND WHAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT, THERE WAS NO EVEN ATTEMPT OF THE SECURITY SERVICES OBLIGED TO STOP IT, LET ALONE TO PREVENT IT. THE FOUNDATION OF THE "SNB" WAS AN ALSO ANTI-WAR PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE. Otherwise, the people would organise their own resistance. #criminalisation (of a legal and defensive actions!)

89. The Accused was President of the SNB.²²⁵ *Ex officio* members of the SNB also included the President of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, the SerBiH Prime Minister, and the Ministers of Defence and Interior.²²⁶

90. The SNB was one of the interim bodies that served as the *de facto* Presidency of the SerBiH in 1992.²²⁷ Plavšić and Koljević, who were members of the SRBiH Presidency, functioned as acting presidents of the SerBiH.²²⁸ The SNB, usually in joint sessions with the Government, made decisions relating to, *inter alia*, security, defence, the military, and political strategy,²²⁹ and charged various ministries with tasks²³⁰. Decisions of joint sessions were then formalised through Plavšić and Koljević, who were members of the SNB, or a decision of the relevant Government organ.²³¹

91. The SNB and Government made a number of decisions regarding the TO²³² in April 1992: On 15 April 1992, the SNB and Government decided that the Minister of Defence shall organise and supervise the TO until the appointment of the commander.²³³ On 22 April 1992, the SNB and Government decided that the President of the SNB should co-ordinate matters relating

²²⁴ P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), pp. 14–15.

²²⁵ Patrick Treanor, T. 14060 (1 June 2011); P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 256; P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Đerić dated 5 April 2012), para. 28. The Accused signed minutes of meetings of the SNB (often joint sessions with the Government) as President of the Council. *See, e.g.*, P3050 (Minutes of joint meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 15 April 1992); D405 (Minutes of extended session of the NSC, 16 April 1992); P1087 (Minutes of meeting between SNB and SerBiH Government, 24 April 1992). Some of the minutes are signed by the Accused and the Prime Minister. *See, e.g.*, P3078 (Minutes of meeting of the National Security Council and the SerBiH Government, 8 May 1992); P3079 (Minutes of joint session of the National Security Council and the SerBiH Government, 14 May 1992).

²²⁶ *See* Adjudicated Fact 2079.

²²⁷ P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), paras. 236, 255, 258.

²²⁸ P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), paras. 236, 254; D89 (Shorthand Record of 9th session of SerBiH Assembly, 28 February 1992), pp. 9–10, 15; P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), p. 24.

²²⁹ *See, e.g.*, P3050 (Minutes of joint meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 15 April 1992); P3077 (Minutes of expanded session of the National Security Council and the SerBiH Government, 20 April 1992); P3051 (Minutes of expanded meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 22 April 1992); P1087 (Minutes of meeting between SNB and SerBiH Government, 24 April 1992); D406 (Minutes of meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 27 April 1992) D409 (Minutes of SNB and the Government of the SerBiH session, 10 May 1992); P3080 (Minutes of unified session of the National Security Council and the SerBiH Government, 15 May 1992).

²³⁰ *See, e.g.*, D405 (Minutes of extended session of the SNB, 16 April 1992), paras. 3–4, 7, 12; P3051 (Minutes of expanded meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 22 April 1992), p. 2; D406 (Minutes of meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 27 April 1992), p. 1.

²³¹ P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 259. For instance, at one of its first sessions, on 15 April 1992, the SNB in a joint meeting with the Government determined that the conditions had been met to propose that the Presidency of the Republic declare a state of imminent threat of war. P3050 (Minutes of joint meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 15 April 1992), p. 1. This was effected through a decision of Plavšić and Koljević, as the Presidency. P3922 (Decision of SerBiH Presidency, 15 April 1992).

²³² *See* paras. 212–214.

²³³ P3050 (Minutes of joint meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 15 April 1992), p. 2.

to the commanding of TO forces.²³⁴ They also adopted the conclusion that the SerBiH TO Staff appoint staff commanders in regions, municipalities, and towns.²³⁵ On 24 April 1992, the SNB decided to form a Town TO Staff composed of municipal TO commanders, with the Accused responsible for “its realisation”.²³⁶ On 27 April 1992, a joint session decided that salaries for members of the TO would be secured with the help of municipal assemblies.²³⁷

What are the connotations of those numberings out of the interim Serbian bodies and it's functions? Was anything of it illegal? Unlawful? Mean? And against whom? The Serbs were entitled and obliged to self organisation, after the joint BiH Government collapsed, and the Muslim leadership re-constituted the TO without Serbs? What law or convention, or any other norm banned this kind of activities? Which act made by these bodies is # criminalisation?

92. In April 1992, the SNB was issuing instructions to, and receiving reports from, municipal crisis staffs and TOs.²³⁸

93. On 24 April 1992, at a meeting with the SerBiH Government, the SNB decided that “the Ministry of Justice shall take over the exchange of prisoners once the organs of the interior have completed their work”.²³⁹ **(So what? This is regular! #Criminalisation OF EVERYTHING Serbian#!)** At the same meeting, the SNB decided to establish a state commission for war crimes and to compile instructions for the work of the commission.²⁴⁰ On 8 May 1992, a joint session of the SNB and SerBiH Government decided to set up a state commission for assistance to refugees.²⁴¹

94. With respect to communication structures, in April 1992 the SNB and Government ordered that the ministers of the MUP and Ministry of National Defence “submit daily reports on the situation in the field, on the establishment of possible accountability and the measures taken” and that the MUP minister “submit a daily report on the security situation in the territory of the [SerBiH]”.²⁴²

95. The SNB effectively ceased convening sessions or fulfilling a central role around May 1992, when the Presidency was established.²⁴³

(It is obvious that the Chamber as well as the OTP is numbering data, bodies, information and so on, on the Serb side, with the connotation of felony. And that must be so, since the other side is protected. #Criminalisation of everything Serbian#!.)

²³⁴ P3051 (Minutes of expanded meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 22 April 1992), p. 1. *See also* Reynaud Theunens, T. 16888–16889 (19 July 2011).

²³⁵ P3051 (Minutes of expanded meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 22 April 1992), p. 2.

²³⁶ P1087 (Minutes of meeting between SNB and SerBiH Government, 24 April 1992), p. 1.

²³⁷ D406 (Minutes of meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 27 April 1992).

²³⁸ *See* Adjudicated Fact 2080. *See, e.g.*, D394 (Announcement of SNB, 4 April 1992), p. 2; P2615 (Decision of Birač Crisis Staff, 29 April 1992); P3051 (Minutes of expanded meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 22 April 1992), p. 2; P2627 (Minutes of meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 28 April 1992), p. 1.

²³⁹ P1087 (Minutes of meeting between SNB and SerBiH Government, 24 April 1992), p. 1.

²⁴⁰ P1087 (Minutes of meeting between SNB and SerBiH Government, 24 April 1992), p. 1; P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 275.

²⁴¹ P3078 (Minutes of meeting of the National Security Council and the SerBiH Government, 8 May 1992), p. 1.

²⁴² P3051 (Minutes of expanded meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 22 April 1992), p. 2.

²⁴³ P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), paras. 260–261, fn. 723.

iv. Presidency, War Presidency, President

a. Establishment

96. On 12 May 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly established a three-member Presidency and elected the Accused, Plavšić, and Koljević to the Presidency.²⁴⁴ The Presidency then elected the Accused as President of the Presidency.²⁴⁵ The President of the Presidency was to issue orders, adopt and present decisions, and command the VRS²⁴⁶ on behalf of the Presidency.²⁴⁷

97. On or around 2 June 1992, the Presidency was enlarged to five members to include the Prime Minister, Branko Đerić, and the President of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, Krajišnik.²⁴⁸

FN. 248, NOT CORRECT, AND WE KEPT SAYING AND PROVING THAT THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS. THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY TO HAVE AN EXPANDED PRESIDENCY WITHOUT A STATUS OF WAR OFFICIALLY PROCLAIMED. BUT, THE SESSIONS COULD BE EXPANDED, SINCE ANY OF THE THREE MEMBERS COULD INVITE SOME MINISTERS WHOSE INFORMATION OR MERE ATTENDANCE WAS NEEDED.

On 6 July 1992, the five-member Presidency allocated tasks among themselves: military issues to the Accused; international relations as well as information and propaganda-related questions to Koljević; contacts with UNPROFOR, except for military issues, and questions related to refugees and humanitarian aid, *inter alia*, to Plavšić; questions related to commissioners and the economy to Krajišnik; and questions related to supplies to Đerić.²⁴⁹ The Presidency that met from 2 June until 17 December 1992 is sometimes referred to as the “War Presidency”, because it was considered to be “held during an imminent threat of war”, as indicated in some of the meeting minutes from this period.²⁵⁰ On 17 December 1992 the Bosnian Serb Assembly adopted a “Declaration on the End of the War,” proclaiming the war in the former BiH over for the RS.²⁵¹

98. On 17 December 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly replaced the structures of the Presidency by establishing a single president and two vice-presidents of the Republic.²⁵² The

²⁴⁴ P956 (Transcript of 16th Session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), p. 58; P1355 (Minutes of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), p. 2; Patrick Treanor, T. 14051, 14060 (1 June 2011); P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), paras. 180, 260.

²⁴⁵ P3032 (Minutes of 1st constitutive session of SerBiH Presidency, 12 May 1992). *See also* Patrick Treanor, T. 14060 (1 June 2011); P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), paras. 180, 260; P956 (Transcript of 16th Session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), p. 58.

²⁴⁶ For ease of reference the acronym “VRS” will be used throughout this section to also cover the period prior to 12 August 1992, when the Army of SerBiH was renamed the VRS. *See* fn. 422.

²⁴⁷ P956 (Transcript of 16th Session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), p. 58.

²⁴⁸ Patrick Treanor, T. 14060–14061 (1 June 2011); P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), paras. 236, 261–265.

²⁴⁹ D440 (Minutes of 15th session of SerBiH Presidency, 6 July 1992), p. 3.

²⁵⁰ *See, e.g.*, P3061 (Minutes of the 3rd session of the SerBiH Presidency, 8 June 1992); P1093 (Minutes of 5th session of SerBiH Presidency, 10 June 1992); D440 (Minutes of 15th session of SerBiH Presidency, 6 July 1992); P1465 (Minutes of 19th session of SerBiH Presidency, 13 July 1992).

²⁵¹ P1363 (Minutes of 23rd session of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), p. 3; P1364 (Transcript of 23rd session of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), e-court pp. 7–16.

²⁵² P1364 (Transcript of 23rd session of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), e-court pp. 57–58; Patrick Treanor, T. 14061 (1 June 2011).

Assembly elected the Accused to the position of President of the RS and elected Plavšić and Koljević as Vice-Presidents.²⁵³

1. Functions

99. Under the Bosnian Serb Constitution, the President's duties were to represent the Republic, propose to the National Assembly candidates for the posts of Prime Minister and the posts of president and judges of the Constitutional Court, pronounce laws by decree,²⁵⁴ give amnesty, award decorations and commendations determined by the law, and perform other duties in accordance with the Constitution.²⁵⁵

100. The President also possessed contingent powers such as the authority, when the Assembly was unable to meet due to a state of emergency, to pronounce such a state and "order measures for its elimination, in accordance to the Constitution and the law", "in co-ordination with the opinion of the Government".²⁵⁶ The President also had the power, during a state of war or imminent threat of war, on his own initiative or at the Government's suggestion, to establish enactments on issues within the authority of the Assembly and forward them to the Assembly for confirmation as soon as the Assembly could meet.²⁵⁷ In exercise of this contingent power, the Presidency passed the Law on Defence and the Law on the Army on 1 June 1992.²⁵⁸ The Presidency also elected ministers to the Government when the Assembly was unable to convene, with subsequent confirmation by the Assembly.²⁵⁹

101. The President of the Republic served as the Commander in Chief, or Supreme Commander, of the VRS.²⁶⁰

102. Under the Bosnian Serb Constitution, the President could ask the Government to give its position on issues important to the Republic.²⁶¹ The Presidency "regularly received

²⁵³ P1364 (Transcript of 23rd session of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), e-court pp. 114–115; Patrick Treanor, T. 14061 (1 June 2011); P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), paras. 188, 266.

²⁵⁴ The President's authority to pronounce laws by decree under article 80 of the Bosnian Serb Constitution refers to the authority to promulgate laws adopted by the Assembly. P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 80 (p. 17). *See, e.g.*, P2315 (Law on Establishment of Rajlovac Municipality, 11 May 1992 and corresponding Decree on promulgation, 15 May 1992); P2964 (SerBiH Decree on the promulgation on the Law of Internal Affairs, 23 March 1992). This authority is distinct from the authority of the President, under paragraph 2 of article 81, during a state of war or imminent threat of war, to enact laws, which would later be confirmed by the Assembly. *See* para. 100.

²⁵⁵ P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), arts. 69, 80 (pp. 14, 16–17).

²⁵⁶ P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 81 (p. 17); P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 240.

²⁵⁷ P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 81 (p. 17); P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 240. At its 16th, 17th, and 20th sessions, the Assembly verified a number of decisions adopted by the SerBiH Presidency. P1355 (Minutes of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), p. 2; P1356 (Minutes of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24-26 July 1992), pp. 8–9; D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14-15 September 1992), pp. 107–117; P1359 (Minutes of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14-15 September 1992), pp. 2–3, 10.

²⁵⁸ P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 241; P2602 (SerBiH Defence Act, 1 June 1992); P2603 (SerBiH Law on the Army, 1 June 1992). The Assembly verified the Law on Defence and Law on the Army at its 17th session. P1356 (Minutes of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24-26 July 1992), p. 8.

²⁵⁹ *See* P1355 (Minutes of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), p. 3.

²⁶⁰ P2603 (SerBiH Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), art. 174; P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 106 (p. 22); P5416 (Decision of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992), Amendment III; Patrick Treanor, T. 14061–14062 (1 June 2011); P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 246. For a description of the duties of the President as Supreme Commander, *see* paras. 167–168.

²⁶¹ P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 82; P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 277.

reports through the Government, which was in regular contact with municipalities, Crisis Staffs and Serbian Autonomous Regions”.²⁶² The Presidency and President also received reports from the MUP²⁶³ and the Main Staff of the VRS.²⁶⁴

(And was it clear to the Chamber that those #official sources of informing the top of the RS were the only ones to count, and that a rumors, gosips or tabloid media and propaganda media should not be considered as sources which the Presidency should trust to? Constitute: legal institutions information!#)

v. Council of Ministers

103. On 21 December 1991, the Bosnian Serb Assembly named a Council of Ministers.²⁶⁵ The Council of Ministers was composed of a president, 18 ministers, and the five presidents of the Governments of the SAOs, the latter designated as *ex officio* members.²⁶⁶ Many of the members named on 21 December 1991 held positions in ministries of the joint government of BiH.²⁶⁷ The Council of Ministers was to function as the executive organ of the Bosnian Serb Assembly.²⁶⁸

104. On 11 January 1992, the Council of Ministers held its first session, where it established interim commissions on economic and development policy, public services, domestic policy, justice, and administration.²⁶⁹ According to the minutes of the meeting, the Council of Ministers also discussed the “[e]xecution of tasks resulting from the Declaration of the Promulgation of the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina” and identified priorities in relation to the Declaration as “the defining of ethnic territory, establishment of government organs in the territory and the economic disempowerment of the current authorities in the [SRBiH]”.²⁷⁰ The Accused as the President of the SDS, Krajišnik as the President of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, the Secretary of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, the President of the SDS Executive Board, the President of the Chamber of Municipalities of the SRBiH Assembly, and Plavšić—a member of the SRBiH Presidency—attended the meeting.²⁷¹

²⁶² P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 274.

²⁶³ Christian Nielsen, T. 16270–16271 (7 July 2011); P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), para. 389; P2761 (RS MUP report on work for period April to December 1992), p. 23.

²⁶⁴ See, e.g., P4206 (VRS Main Staff Report to RS President and Drina Corps re talks with General Morillon, 15 March 1993); P4449 (VRS Main Staff Report, 10 July 1995); P3054 (VRS Main Staff Report, 12 July 1995); P4464 (VRS Main Staff Report 13 July 1995); P4457 (VRS Main Staff Report, 14 July 1995). See also P1478 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 27 May 31-31 July 1992), e-court p. 126; P1467 (Minutes of 21st session of SerBiH Presidency, 2 August 1992), p. 2; Richard Butler, T. 27505 (17 April 2012); P3033 (Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), pp. 308–313.

²⁶⁵ P1345 (Minutes of 4th session of SerBiH Assembly, 21 December 1991), pp. 6–8; D86 (Shorthand Record of 4th session of SerBiH Assembly, 21 December 1991, pp. 35–37; D296 (Decision of SDS and SPO deputies on the establishment of the Assembly of the SerBiH, 24 October 1991), pp. 23–25; Patrick Treanor, T. 14030 (1 June 2011); P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 176.

²⁶⁶ D296 (Decision of SDS and SPO deputies on the establishment of the Assembly of the SerBiH, 24 October 1991), pp. 23–25; P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), paras. 149, 221, p. 162.

²⁶⁷ See P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 51.

²⁶⁸ P1082 (Minutes of 1st meeting of Ministerial Council of SerBiH Assembly, 13 January 1992), p. 3; D86 (Shorthand Record of 4th session of SerBiH Assembly, 21 December 1991), p. 36.

²⁶⁹ P1082 (Minutes of 1st meeting of Ministerial Council of SerBiH Assembly, 13 January 1992), p. 2; P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 227.

²⁷⁰ P1082 (Minutes of 1st meeting of Ministerial Council of SerBiH Assembly, 13 January 1992), pp. 2–3; P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 227.

²⁷¹ P1082 (Minutes of 1st meeting of Ministerial Council of SerBiH Assembly, 13 January 1992), p. 1; P3111 (Minutes of the 2nd meeting of the Ministerial Council of SerBiH Assembly, 17 January 1992), pp. 2–3.

105. At its second meeting, held on 17 January 1992, the Council of Ministers addressed the Draft Work Programme of the Council and discussed the need to adopt the Constitution of the Republic as soon as possible and to consolidate and organise the territory of the regions, including through the formation of new municipalities.²⁷²

106. The Council of Ministers, under the Constitutional Law passed by the Bosnian Serb Assembly on 28 February 1992,²⁷³ was to carry out the rights and duties of the Government until the Government was elected and operative and effectively served as a precursor to the Bosnian Serb Government.²⁷⁴

107. At its 13th session held on 24 March 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly adopted a decision relieving from duty the Council of Ministers of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and elected members of the first Bosnian Serb Government.²⁷⁵ **(#Criminalisation of a normal political life, and #Context: 24 March was still the Lisbon Agreement alive!#)**

vi. Bosnian Serb Government

a. Establishment

108. While he was a member of the BiH Government, Đerić was nominated by Plavšić for the post of Prime Minister in the Bosnian Serb Government.²⁷⁶ Serbs who had been serving in ministerial posts in the Government of BiH were appointed by the Bosnian Serb Assembly as Ministers to equivalent positions in the Bosnian Serb Government.²⁷⁷ Where no Serb sat as Minister or deputy Minister in the BiH Government, the Prime Minister was to propose candidates for ministerial posts in the Bosnian Serb Government to the Bosnian Serb Assembly.²⁷⁸

109. On 24 March 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly elected Đerić as the Prime Minister, Aleksa Buha as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mićo Stanišić as Minister of Internal Affairs in the SerBiH Government.²⁷⁹ At the same session, the Assembly instructed the Government to prepare and submit to the Assembly for adoption an operational plan “of assuming power and rendering operational the authorities in the territory of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.²⁸⁰

110. In the first days of April 1992, following international recognition of BiH as an independent state and the beginning of the conflict, the Bosnian Serb leadership relocated to Pale, about 20 kilometres from Sarajevo.²⁸¹ From 15 April 1992, the Government held regular

²⁷² P3111 (Minutes of the 2nd meeting of the Ministerial Council of SerBiH Assembly, 17 January 1992), p. 5.

²⁷³ D89 (Shorthand Record of 9th session of SerBiH Assembly, 28 February 1992), pp. 15–16.

²⁷⁴ P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), paras. 210, 222; D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), p. 7. See Adjudicated Fact 2044.

²⁷⁵ P1354 (Minutes of 13th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), pp. 3–7; P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 223. The term “Bosnian Serb Government” will be used henceforth to refer to the Government of the SerBiH and, after 12 August 1992, of the RS.

²⁷⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 2045; P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), pp. 24–25.

²⁷⁷ P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Đerić dated 5 April 2012), para. 7. See also Adjudicated Fact 2046.

²⁷⁸ P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Đerić dated 5 April 2012), para. 7. See also Adjudicated Fact 2047.

²⁷⁹ P1354 (Minutes of 13th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), pp. 4–7; P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 223.

²⁸⁰ P1354 (Minutes of 13th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), pp. 8–9; P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 223.

²⁸¹ Adjudicated Fact 2052.

meetings in Pale in joint sessions with the new SNB.²⁸² The Kikinda Hotel functioned as the seat of the Bosnian Serb institutions, namely the Assembly, the Presidency, and the Government, until June 1992.²⁸³

111. The Government met in several joint sessions with the SNB in April and May 1992.²⁸⁴ From around 18 May 1992, the Government began convening by itself.²⁸⁵ **(#Regardless of ethnicity#! On April 24 the SNB and Government made a decision on forming the Commission for war crimes and ordered that the rules be established. And this is the Commission in a criminal term, and regardless of ethnicity of victims and perpetrators. See P01087 and subsequent Governmental and Ministerial orders. A later formed Documentation Center for to crimes against the Serbian people, led by a writer, had nothing to do with crimes on the territories under the Serb control but only with the crimes on the Muslim/Croat controlled areas. However, the Prosecution neglected their own document and pretended as if the later Documentation Center was the only one, and that it was on a discriminatory basis. And the Chamber accepted it! #Distortion#)**

1. Functions

112. The Bosnian Serb Constitution vested the Bosnian Serb Government with executive authority, under the formal control of the Assembly.²⁸⁶ Under the Bosnian Serb Constitution, the Government's functions were, *inter alia*, to propose and ensure the implementation of laws and regulations, to give its opinion regarding laws and regulations proposed to the National Assembly by other persons, to establish principles for the internal organisation of ministries and other bodies of the republic, and to coordinate and supervise the work of ministries and other bodies of the republic.²⁸⁷

113. The Government was headed by the Prime Minister, two deputy Prime Ministers, and 13 Ministers.²⁸⁸

114. Aleksandar Buha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was in charge of contacts with international representatives.²⁸⁹ The Ministry of Information, under Velibor Ostojić, dealt with general public information, and would distribute and report on the statements from Government sessions, press briefings, and news conferences.²⁹⁰ Dragan Kalinić, Minister of Health and Social Affairs, was in charge of co-operation with international humanitarian organisations.²⁹¹

²⁸² P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 229.

²⁸³ See Adjudicated Fact 2053.

²⁸⁴ See, e.g., P3050 (Minutes of joint meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 15 April 1992); P3077 (Minutes of expanded session of the National Security Council and the SerBiH Government, 20 April 1992); P3079 (Minutes of joint session of the National Security Council and the SerBiH Government, 14 May 1992).

²⁸⁵ See P2625 (Minutes of 11th session of SerBiH Government, 18 May 1992).

²⁸⁶ Adjudicated Fact 2038; P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), arts. 69, 70, 94 (pp. 14, 15 19).

²⁸⁷ P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 90 (pp. 18-19). See, e.g., P2625 (Minutes of 11th session of SerBiH Government, 18 May 1992); P3081 (Minutes of the 12th session of SerBiH Government, 21 May 1992).

²⁸⁸ Adjudicated Fact 2039; P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 211.

²⁸⁹ See Adjudicated Fact 2048.

²⁹⁰ Adjudicated Fact 2049.

²⁹¹ Adjudicated Fact 2050.

115. In April 1992, Koljević proposed to JNA colonel Bogdan Subotić that he set up a Ministry of Defence.²⁹² Subotić accepted the assignment, moved to Pale, and with the assistance of the SFRY Ministry of Defence, started organising the Ministry and preparing drafts of the Law on Defence and Law on the Army.²⁹³ These drafts were eventually adopted by the Government and submitted to the Bosnian Serb Assembly.²⁹⁴

2. Structure and relationship to other entities

116. Under the Bosnian Serb Constitution, the Government was responsible to the Assembly.²⁹⁵ The Bosnian Serb Government was to report to the Assembly on its progress in policy implementation and law enforcement.²⁹⁶ Based on an evaluation of the Government's work, the Assembly could hold a vote of no-confidence.²⁹⁷ The Government could propose the convening of sessions of the Assembly.²⁹⁸

117. In a letter to the Government, the Chairman of the SDS Executive Board stated that the Government was to implement the policy of the party and that at all levels from the municipality to the Republic, appointments were not possible without the party's approval.²⁹⁹ While the Bosnian Serb Constitution provided that the prime minister propose candidates for ministerial positions to the Assembly,³⁰⁰ in fact it was the SDS and the SDS President that chose the nominees.³⁰¹ For instance, the Accused, as President of the SDS, asked that Đerić nominate Mićo Stanišić and Buha.³⁰² **(Not entirely correct: #there was the Commission for cadres# and other representatives in governmental bodies, led by Mr. Rajko Dukic, at the same time the Chairman of the SDS Executive Board. The President was obliged to propose those elected by this Commission, unless there were a serious political or legal obstacles! #Distortion!#)**

118. The Government was to take decisions by a simple majority vote, in sessions with a majority of the members attending.³⁰³ It was to co-operate with municipal executive organs by having their representatives participate in Government sessions, as well as by having Ministers participate in sessions of the municipal organs.³⁰⁴

²⁹² See Adjudicated Fact 2054.

²⁹³ Adjudicated Fact 2055.

²⁹⁴ Adjudicated Fact 2056.

²⁹⁵ P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), arts. 70, 94 (pp. 15, 19); P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 212. See also Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43358 (13 November 2013).

²⁹⁶ Adjudicated Fact 2040; P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 217 (pp. 69–70).

²⁹⁷ Adjudicated Fact 2041; P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 94 (p. 19), art. 221 (pp. 70–71).

²⁹⁸ P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 74 (p. 16), art. 82 (p. 47); P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 212.

²⁹⁹ P6337 (Letter from SDS Executive Board to RS Government, 12 April 1993).

³⁰⁰ P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 93.

³⁰¹ P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Đerić dated 5 April 2012), paras. 7–9; P1105 (Transcript of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23–24 November 1992), p. 12. The SDS and the Accused exercised control over personnel appointments more generally, including to assistant minister positions and public enterprises, though the Government could propose candidates. See Vladimir Lukić, T. 38760–38764 (23 May 2013); P6338 (Letter from RS Government to SDS Executive Board, 29 August 1993); P6339 (Letter from SDS Executive Board to RS Government, 28 December 1993); P6340 (Letter from RS Government to SDS Executive Board, 12 March 1994).

³⁰² Branko Đerić, T. 27943 (24 April 2012); P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Đerić dated 5 April 2012), para. 9.

³⁰³ See Adjudicated Fact 2042.

³⁰⁴ Adjudicated Fact 2043. But see D3321 (Witness statement of Milorad Skoko dated 1 April 2013), para. 31 (stating that this was not the case while he was deputy minister of the economy during 1992). The Chamber does not consider the evidence of this witness to be reliable on this point.

119. A new “Law on the Government of the Republika Srpska” was passed by the Bosnian Serb Assembly on 15 September 1992.³⁰⁵ Under the new Law on the Government, the Bosnian Serb Government could propose to the President of the Republic the declaration of a state of emergency as well as adequate measures and decisions could be made by a majority of the Government members present at a Government session.³⁰⁶

120. The Government was in regular contact with municipalities and SAOs.³⁰⁷ The Government regularly received letters, reports, and requests from Government organs and requested or received reports from individual ministries;³⁰⁸ some reports were conveyed to the Presidency³⁰⁹ or submitted to the Assembly.³¹⁰ Minutes of Government sessions also indicate that ministries were assigned tasks with direction from the Presidency.³¹¹ The Ministry of Justice and municipalities or municipal-level bodies had communications about matters relating to detained persons.³¹²

3. Initial actions

121. In the course of 1992, the Bosnian Serb Government held around 90 sessions.³¹³ Legislative proposals were forwarded to the Assembly, while decisions within the competence of the Government were published in the Official Gazette.³¹⁴

122. The Government was also concerned with the issue of deserted houses and apartments in the municipalities, as well as the issue of Muslim-owned property in general.³¹⁵ It would send individual Ministers to visit municipal assemblies in order to be kept up to date on the situation.³¹⁶

123. By early May 1992, the Government had at its disposal in Pale a Republican Information Centre which connected with regional communication centres in the Bosnian-Serb territory.³¹⁷ It operated 24 hours per day and had five employees.³¹⁸ By June 1992, written

³⁰⁵ P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 217.

³⁰⁶ P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), paras. 218–219.

³⁰⁷ P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 233.

³⁰⁸ P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 233. *See, e.g.*, P3086 (Minutes of the 21st session of SerBiH Government, 5 June 1992), p. 2; P3089 (Minutes of the 31st session of SerBiH Government, 19 June 1992), pp. 3–4; P3098 (Minutes of the 48th session of SerBiH Government, 28 July 1992), p. 10; P3099 (Minutes of the 49th session of RS Government, 7 September 1992), pp. 5–6; P3100 (Minutes of the 53rd session of RS Government, 1 October 1992), pp. 7–9; P3102 (Minutes of the 57th session of RS Government, 27 October 1992), pp. 6–7; P3103 (Minutes of the 58th session of RS Government, 27 October 1992), pp. 9–11.

³⁰⁹ P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 233. *See, e.g.*, P1092 (Minutes of 25th session of Government SerBiH, 10 June 1992), p. 3; P1093 (Minutes of 5th session of SerBiH Presidency, 10 June 1992), p. 2; P3088 (Minutes of the 27th session of SerBiH Government, 13 June 1992), p. 2.

³¹⁰ *See, e.g.*, P3101 (Minutes of the 56th session of RS Government, 21 October 1992), p. 3; P3103 (Minutes of the 58th session of RS Government, 27 October 1992), p. 9.

³¹¹ *See* P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 234. *See, e.g.*, P1095 (Minutes of 28th session of SerBiH Government, 15 June 1992), p. 4; P3090 (Minutes of the 32nd session of SerBiH Government, 24 June 1992), p. 9; P3100 (Minutes of the 53rd session of RS Government, 1 October 1992), p. 8.

³¹² P1142 (Letter from Ministry of Justice of SerBiH to Vogošća War Presidency, 10 August 1992); P1606 (Request from Vogošća Municipality to Ministry of Justice of SerBiH, 6 August 1992); P1130 (Letter from Ministry of Justice of SerBiH to Municipality of Ilidža, 4 July 1992); P1151 (Letter from SJB Novi Grad to the Ministry of Justice of SerBiH, 25 May 1992).

³¹³ *See* Adjudicated Fact 2057.

³¹⁴ Adjudicated Fact 2059.

³¹⁵ Adjudicated Fact 2061.

³¹⁶ Adjudicated Fact 2062. *But see* D3321 (Witness statement of Milorad Skoko dated 1 April 2013), para. 32 (stating that this only occurred in particular circumstances and that communications with the field were irregular and extremely difficult). The Chamber does not consider the evidence of this witness to be reliable on this point.

³¹⁷ Adjudicated Fact 2063. *But see* D3321 (Witness statement of Milorad Skoko dated 1 April 2013), para. 33 (disputing that the centre functioned as described). The Chamber does not consider the evidence of this witness to be reliable on this point. *See* para. 120.

reports, as well as dozens of telegrams, were received daily by the Centre and sent on to the intended recipients.³¹⁹

4. Exchange Commission

124. Pursuant to a decision at the 24 April 1992 SNB-Government meeting, after the MUP had conducted an investigation of prisoners, the Ministry of Justice was to conduct their exchange.³²⁰ The latter work was done through the state-level Exchange Commission formed after the April meeting.³²¹

125. On 8 May 1992, the Bosnian Serb Government established a Central Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners of War and Arrested Persons.³²² The Commission's jurisdiction was to extend over the entire territory of the SerBiH and cover "all cases of negotiating and exchanging prisoners-of-war, arrested persons and the bodies of those killed".³²³ If the Commission was unable to do its work throughout the territory of the Republic, presidents of Serb districts, in co-operation with the commanders of TO staffs and chiefs of CSBs, were to form a commission for the area of the district.³²⁴ The commissions for districts were to "submit reports on measures taken to the Central Commission".³²⁵ The Commission worked through local commissions.³²⁶

126. On 10 May 1992, the SNB and the Government appointed the members of the Commission, who included representatives from the Bosnian Serb Ministry of Defence, the MUP, and the Ministry of Justice.³²⁷ The Commission was initially headed by Rajko Čolović,³²⁸ who was replaced as president of the Commission by Slobodan Avlijaš by a decision of the SerBiH Government;³²⁹ however, Avlijaš asked to be relieved of the position and Nenad Vanovac was appointed president of the Commission.³³⁰ Instructions on the Treatment of Captured Persons

³¹⁸ Adjudicated Fact 2064. *But see* D3321 (Witness statement of Milorad Skoko dated 1 April 2013), para. 33 (disputing that the centre functioned as described). The Chamber does not consider the evidence of this witness to be reliable on this point.

³¹⁹ Adjudicated Fact 2065.

³²⁰ P1087 (Minutes of meeting between SNB and SerBiH Government, 24 April 1992), p. 1; Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 8743–8745; Momčilo Mandić, T. 4529–4537 (1 July 2010). Mandić specified that the prisoners included detained persons of civilian status. Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 8758; Momčilo Mandić, T. 4552–4553 (5 July 2010).

³²¹ Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 8744–8746, 8749–8750.

³²² Adjudicated Fact 2075; P1088 (Decision of SerBiH, 8 May 1992); Momčilo Mandić, T. 4537–4538 (1 July 2010). The Chamber notes that the Commission was dissolved in March 1993 and that a new commission was formed immediately thereafter. *See* para. 2935.

³²³ P1088 (Decision of SerBiH, 8 May 1992), p. 1.

³²⁴ P1088 (Decision of SerBiH, 8 May 1992), p. 1.

³²⁵ P1088 (Decision of SerBiH, 8 May 1992), p. 2.

³²⁶ P1088 (Decision of SerBiH, 8 May 1992); P1090 (Order of Central Commission for Exchange of Detained Persons, 6 June 1992), p. 1; Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 8754; P4850 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), para. 14.

³²⁷ Adjudicated Fact 2076; D409 (Minutes of SNB and the Government of the SerBiH session, 10 May 1992), p. 2; P1088 (Decision of SerBiH, 8 May 1992), p. 1. *See also* Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 8746, 8770; Momčilo Mandić, T. 4536–4538 (1 July 2010).

³²⁸ Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 8752, 8770; Momčilo Mandić, T. 4537–4538 (1 July 2010); P1088 (Decision of SerBiH, 8 May 1992), p. 1; D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 6.

³²⁹ P3091 (Minutes of the 33rd session of SerBiH Government, 26 June 1992), p. 5; D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), paras. 6, 49.

³³⁰ P1130 (Letter from Ministry of Justice of SerBiH to Municipality of Ilidža, 4 July 1992); D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), paras. 6, 49.

published in the Official Gazette on 13 June 1992 and signed by the Minister of Defence Bogdan Subotić stated that the Commission operates under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice.³³¹

127. The Commission's official role was to co-ordinate exchanges and to provide information on captured persons.³³² As part of that role the Commission was to differentiate between civilians and prisoners of war, with a view to releasing the former and preventing crisis staffs or paramilitary formations from committing crimes against the latter.³³³ The report on the activities of the Ministry of Justice and Administration in the period May-October 1992 indicates that the Ministry "urged the Presidency to establish a Central Commission for the exchange of prisoners of war, incarcerated and wounded persons, and dead bodies" to address "the increased influx of incarcerated persons".³³⁴ According to Mandić, the impetus for establishing the Commission was to provide "rule of law and legal security" for people detained, many of whom were civilians from conflict areas.³³⁵

128. On 6 June 1992, the Commission issued an order signed by the Commission President Čolović that stated that SJBs "engaged in safeguarding of facilities where prisoners of war, or detainees are located, shall keep evidence of all the persons who have been brought in" and "shall submit lists of detainees or persons deprived of liberty to municipal commissions for exchange of prisoners of war on regular basis".³³⁶ The order further stated that municipal commissions were to submit the lists to regional commissions or to the Central Commission.³³⁷ According to the order, detainees or persons deprived of liberty could not be released or exchanged without a prior order of the Commission.³³⁸

vii. Regional and municipal bodies

129. During the first half of 1991, several municipalities in BiH having a Serb majority or plurality formed new communities of municipalities.³³⁹ Among these were the Community of Municipalities of the Bosnian Krajina (ZOBK), established on 25 April 1991, Community of Municipalities of Romanija, established on 8 May 1991, and Community of Municipalities of Eastern and Old Herzegovina, established on 27 May 1991.³⁴⁰ For instance, the ZOBK had an assembly, a president and two vice presidents, and a secretary.³⁴¹ The ZOBK Assembly was authorised to enact decisions, conclusions, positions, and other acts.³⁴²

130. Around the fall of 1991, several areas declared themselves SAOs.³⁴³ These included the SAO Herzegovina (formerly, Community of Municipalities of Eastern and Old Herzegovina),

³³¹ P1134 (SerBiH Ministry of Defence of Instructions on the Treatment of Captured Persons, 13 June 1992), para. 19. *But see* Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 8746, 8750 (stating that the Commission was at the state level and not solely under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice).

³³² Adjudicated Fact 2077. *See also* Momčilo Mandić, T. 4604 (5 July 2010).

³³³ Adjudicated Fact 2078. *See also* Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 8761–8764.

³³⁴ P1089 (Ministry of Justice Report on the Ministry's Activities in May-October 1992 Period, 16 November 1992), p. 2.

³³⁵ Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 8750.

³³⁶ P1090 (Order of Central Commission for Exchange of Detained Persons, 6 June 1992), pp. 1, 4.

³³⁷ P1090 (Order of Central Commission for Exchange of Detained Persons, 6 June 1992), p. 1.

³³⁸ P1090 (Order of Central Commission for Exchange of Detained Persons, 6 June 1992), p. 1.

³³⁹ P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 117; Robert Donia, T. 3100–3101 (1 June 2010). *See paras.* 40–42.

³⁴⁰ P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 117; Radomir Nešković, T. 14355 (7 June 2011); Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4642.

³⁴¹ P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 124.

³⁴² P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 125.

³⁴³ P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled "The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992", 30 July 2002), para. 136; Radomir Nešković, T. 14355–14356 (7 June 2011).

Autonomous Region of Krajina (formerly, ZOBK), SAO Northeastern Bosnia, SAO Romanija, SAO Northern Bosnia, and SAO Birač.³⁴⁴ The Bosnian Serb Assembly approved on 21 December 1991 the appointment of Jovan Čizmović as the co-ordinator of activities of the executive bodies of the SAOs.³⁴⁵

131. On 11 December 1991, the Bosnian Serb Assembly adopted a recommendation that SDS deputies in municipal assemblies in BiH in which the SDS did not have a majority establish “municipal assemblies of the Serbian people”.³⁴⁶ The recommendation was directed to groups of SDS deputies in municipal assemblies in BiH “on whom decisions contrary to the interests of the Serbian people are imposed”.³⁴⁷ The recommendation stated that the assemblies would be composed of SDS deputies and “other deputies of Serb nationality who make a statement on joining the Assembly”.³⁴⁸ Attached to the recommendation was a model decision on the establishment of an assembly of the Serbian people to be adopted by individual municipalities.³⁴⁹ These decisions were to be verified by the Bosnian Serb Assembly.³⁵⁰

132. Instructions dated 19 December 1991 were issued by the Main Board of the SDS regarding Serb-dominated municipalities, designated Variant A, and Serb-minority municipalities, designated Variant B.³⁵¹ The Variant A/B Instructions directed SDS municipal officials to form Serb municipal institutions in municipalities where Serbs were a minority.³⁵² The instructions were communicated from SDS leaders to municipal SDS leaders and boards.³⁵³ Copies of the document itself were distributed by the Accused for viewing only by high-ranking municipal officials, such as presidents of municipalities or other municipal authorities, at a meeting on or around 20 December 1991³⁵⁴ attended by all members of the Main Board and Executive Board, deputies, municipal representatives, and members of the government.³⁵⁵

³⁴⁴ P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 136.

³⁴⁵ D86 (Shorthand Record of 4th session of SerBiH Assembly, 21 December 1991), p. 34.

³⁴⁶ D84 (Shorthand Record of 3rd session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 December 1991), pp. 10–30; D1183 (SerBiH Assembly recommendation on establishment of municipal assemblies, 11 December 1991); P2589 (Dorothea Hanson’s expert report entitled “Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War Commissions 1991-1995”, 10 September 2009), para. 19; Robert Donia, T. 3108 (1 June 2010).

³⁴⁷ D84 (Shorthand Record of 3rd session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 December 1991), p. 29; D1183 (SerBiH Assembly recommendation on establishment of municipal assemblies, 11 December 1991).

³⁴⁸ D84 (Shorthand Record of 3rd session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 December 1991), p. 11.

³⁴⁹ D84 (Shorthand Record of 3rd session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 December 1991), pp. 11, 18–20.

³⁵⁰ D84 (Shorthand Record of 3rd session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 December 1991), p. 29.

³⁵¹ P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991); Patrick Treanor, T. 14027–14028 (1 June 2011); P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), paras. 61–63; P2589 (Dorothea Hanson’s expert report entitled “Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War Commissions 1991-1995”, 10 September 2009), paras. 20–21; P973 (Robert Donia’s expert report entitled “Bosnian Serb Leadership and the Siege of Sarajevo, 1990–1995”, January 2010), pp. 19–20. Radomir Nešković testified that the Variant A/B Instructions were not produced through regular SDS party procedures, and he believed that the document was written by a group of officers outside the SDS and wrote “Crisis Staff of the SDS”, a non-existing entity, as the header. Radomir Nešković, T. 14262–14264 (6 June 2011), T. 14325, 14365–14366 (7 June 2011). However, the Chamber does not place any weight on Nešković’s belief and speculation in this regard.

³⁵² P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 2, 6–7; P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 63; Patrick Treanor, T. 14027–14028 (1 June 2011); Robert Donia, T. 3109–3113 (1 June 2010); P2589 (Dorothea Hanson’s expert report entitled “Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War Commissions 1991-1995”, 10 September 2009), para. 21.

³⁵³ Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*, T. 7385; Nedeljko Prstojević, T. 12940 (3 March 2011); P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 15; P6369 (Excerpts from KW317’s statement to OTP, 14 June 2002) (under seal), p. 11; Branko Grujić, T. 40367 (25 June 2013). See also P2592 (Minutes of 6th Session of the Executive Board of the Ključ SDS Municipal Board, 23 December 1991), p. 1; P6661 (Minutes of 3rd session of Bosanska Krupa SSO Executive Board, 24 December 1991), p. 1; P2595 (Minutes of meeting of Prijedor’s SDS Municipal Board, 27 December 1991), p. 1; P2598 (Minutes of meeting of Bratunac’s SDS Municipal Board, 23 December 1991), p. 1.

³⁵⁴ Radomir Nešković refers to 19 December 1991 as the date of the meeting. Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*, T. 16647, 16783–16784. However, other evidence indicates that the meeting likely took place the next day, on 20 December 1991. See D215 (Excerpts from Ljubo Grčković’s diary), p. 59; P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 62; P2550 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Momčilo Krajišnik, 21 December 1991), p. 3, Patrick Treanor, T. 14029–14030 (1 June 2011); P5792 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and

133. The Variant A/B Instructions called for, in the first phase in Variant A and B municipalities, convening and proclaiming an assembly of the Serbian people and carrying out preparations for the establishment of municipal state or government organs.³⁵⁶ According to the instructions, the tasks laid out therein were to be implemented over the entire territory of the SRBiH or in every municipality where the Serbian people live, in their entirety in Variant A municipalities and partially in Variant B municipalities.³⁵⁷ The instructions addressed the formation of Crisis Staffs in Variant A and B municipalities as part of the first phase.³⁵⁸

134. In the second phase in Variant A and B municipalities, the Variant A/B Instructions called for, *inter alia*, convening a session of the Serb municipal assembly, establishing a municipal executive board and municipal state or government organs, mobilising and resubordinating all Serb police forces in co-ordination with JNA command and staff, and ensuring the implementation of the order for mobilisation of JNA reserve and territorial defence units.³⁵⁹

135. On 14 February 1992, at an extended session of the SDS Main and Executive Boards, the Accused referred to the implementation of phase two of the Variant A/B Instructions.³⁶⁰ The presidents of SDS municipal boards, presidents and members of regional boards, presidents of assemblies, and executive boards of municipalities were invited to this meeting.³⁶¹ This discussion and a directive to implement phase two were conveyed to municipal boards.³⁶²

136. On 24 March 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly verified the decisions of numerous municipal assemblies on the proclamation of newly established Serbian municipalities, including Vogošća, Srebrenica, Bratunac, Prijedor, Višegrad, Foča, Brčko, and Zvornik.³⁶³ Earlier in the Assembly session, the Accused stated: “Newly established municipalities must establish their organs as soon as possible, have their stamps made and start to work. The police, that is, our organs must be positioned at the border.”³⁶⁴

(THIS IS A STRONG EVIDENCE THAT #THERE WAS NO PLANS TO “TAKE OVER” THE MUNICIPALITIES#, BUT ONLY TO POLITICALLY AND ADMINISTRATIVELY ORGANIZE #THE SERB PARTS# IN EXISTING MUNICIPALITIES. #EVERY SINGLE MOVE WAS LEGAL AND DONE BY THE LEGITIMATE ORGANS, PUBLICLY AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE

Milan Novaković, 19 December 1991), pp. 1–2; Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43856–43857 (20 November 2013). The Chamber does not consider the date discrepancy to affect the reliability of Nešković’s evidence on the substance of the meeting. Miroslav Toholj stated that the Variant A/B Instructions were not presented during this meeting. D3981 (Witness statement of Miroslav Toholj dated 31 October 2013), para. 92. Having considered the weight of evidence which demonstrates that the Variant A/B Instructions were presented at this meeting, the Chamber does not find Toholj’s evidence to be reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber also had regard to the evasiveness, contradictions and indicators of partiality in his testimony.

³⁵⁵ Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16647–16650, 16655–16657, 16788–16790; D1278 (Transcript of Radomir Nešković’s interview with Karadžić’s legal associate, 8 October 2009), pp. 27–28.

³⁵⁶ P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 3–4, 7.

³⁵⁷ P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), p. 2.

³⁵⁸ P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 3, 6–7.

³⁵⁹ P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 5–6, 9–10.

³⁶⁰ P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), pp. 5–7, 17, 24.

³⁶¹ P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), p. 1.

³⁶² P5516 (Minutes of Meeting of SDS Prijedor Municipal Board, 17 February 1992); P6587 (Excerpts from Simo Mišković’s testimony from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 15184–15188; P2597 (Minutes of meeting of Bratunac’s SDS Municipal Board, 24 February 1992), p. 1; P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 18; KW317, T. 39337 (5 June 2013). [REDACTED].

³⁶³ P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), pp. 23–24.

³⁶⁴ P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), p. 17.

CONSTITUTION, LAWS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RESULTS OF ICFY!#. PARTICULARLY WHEN A COMPOSITE SOVEREIGNTY FALLS APART, THE MEMBERS ARE BOTH ENTITLED AND OBLIGED TO ESTABLISH THEIR RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES ON THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF SUCH A KRIMINALISATION OF THE LEGAL ACTS, BASED ON THE DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEM? #DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEM; # TAKING-OVER MUNICIPALITIES#)

137. Municipalities had an SDS municipal board and president thereof,³⁶⁵ a municipal assembly and president thereof,³⁶⁶ and a municipal executive board and chairman or president thereof.³⁶⁷ From late 1991 on, municipalities had a Crisis Staff (some were re-established or re-formed around April or May 1992)³⁶⁸, a War Presidency, a War Commission, and/or a republican commissioner.³⁶⁹ Municipal Crisis Staffs were headed by the municipal executive board or assembly president or SDS municipal board president.³⁷⁰ The president of the municipality was usually the executive board president, assembly president, or president of the SDS in the municipality.³⁷¹

³⁶⁵ See P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 13, 62; Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4746; P3454 (Decision of Ključ Crisis Staff, 13 July 1992); P2595 (Minutes of meeting of Prijedor's SDS Municipal Board, 27 December 1991), pp. 1–2; P2632 (Report of Bosanski Novi's Crisis Staff, undated), p. 1; P2590 (Conclusions of Zvornik's SDS Municipal Board, 22 December 1991); P2450 (Ilidža SDS Declaration for working in wartime, 6 February 1993), pp. 1, 4; P5515 (Letter from SDS Municipal Board of Foča to SDS Crisis Staff in Sarajevo, 2 March 1992); P6121 (Decision of Vlasenica's SDS Municipal Board, 4 April 1992); P2598 (Minutes of meeting of Bratunac's SDS Municipal Board, 23 December 1991); P6542 (Report of Sanski Most SDS Municipal Board, 10 September 1993); P2576 (Minutes of 13th session of Novo Sarajevo's SDS Municipal Board, 28 February 1992); P5249 (Letter from Milan Tupajić to Sokolac SDS Municipal Board, 9 October 1992).

³⁶⁶ See P5411 (Minutes of the 13th session of the Ključ Municipal Assembly, 31 July 1992); P3536 (Decision of Prijedor Municipal Assembly dated 20 May 1992, published in Prijedor Official Gazette on 25 June 1992), pp. 1, 7; P975 (Decision of Serbian Municipal Assembly of Ilidža, 3 January 1992); P5481 (Request of Foča Municipal Assembly, 17 March 1992); P6139 (Decision of Vlasenica Municipal Assembly, 30 March 1992); P3199 (Minutes of 1st meeting of Bratunac Municipal Assembly, 30 December 1991); P3407 (Report on the work of the Rogatica Municipal Assembly and Executive Board from July 1992 to September 1993); P2297 (Minutes of meeting of Hadžići Municipal Assembly, 11 April 1992); P3325 (Decision of Sanski Most Municipal Assembly, 3 April 1992); P5523 (14th session of Pale Municipal Assembly, 18 June 1992); P5511 (Minutes of the 3rd meeting of the Vogošća Municipal Assembly, 14 November 1992); P6524 (Excerpt of Minutes of the 19th Banja Luka Municipal Assembly Session, 23 June 1992); P6236 (Letter from Sokolac Municipal Assembly to Radovan Karadžić, 15 July 1992).

³⁶⁷ See P3589 (Decision of Ključ Executive Board, 12 May 1992); P3484 (Decision of Prijedor Executive Board, 21 July 1992); D4727 (Decisions of Zvornik Executive Board, September 1992); P3340 (Decision of Foča Executive Board, 26 April 1992); P3271 (Report of Rogatica's Executive Board, 24 March 1992); P3309 (Minutes of meeting of Sanski Most's Executive Board, 5 March 1992); P6034 (Report of Pale Executive Board, 7 July 1992). Ključ had an executive board of its SDS municipal board, as well as an executive board of the municipality or municipal assembly as in the other municipalities. See P3438 (Minutes of 8th session of Ključ SDS Municipal Board Executive Board, 29 April 1992); P3589 (Decision of Ključ Executive Board, 12 May 1992).

³⁶⁸ See, e.g., Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16683–16685, 16706; Radomir Nešković, T. 14282–14283 (6 June 2011); P2643 (Ključ Crisis Staff Report, 15 May – 29 July 1992), p. 2; P2605 (Prijedor Assembly's decision on the organization and work of Prijedor Crisis Staff, May 1992); P2632 (Report of Bosanski Novi's Crisis Staff, undated), p. 7; P2835 (Report of Rogatica Crisis Staff, April – June 1992), p. 1.

³⁶⁹ See paras. 388, 403, 410.

³⁷⁰ See para. 139, Section IV.A.1: Municipalities component (Facts). For instance, Žarko Đurović, the president of the municipal executive board, was the head of the Crisis Staff formed in Novo Sarajevo, a Variant A municipality, in December 1991. See Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16684; Radomir Nešković, T. 14275–14276 (6 June 2011); T. 14352–14354 (7 June 2011); P2575 (Excerpt from session of Novo Sarajevo's Crisis Staff, 23 December 1991). In Ključ, the president of the municipal assembly, Jovo Banjac, was the president of the Crisis Staff. See Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4643; P3442 (Proposed work schedule of Ključ Crisis Staff, May 1992), p. 5; P3454 (Decision of Ključ Crisis Staff, 13 July 1992). In Hadžići and Zvornik, the president of the Crisis Staff was the president of the SDS in the municipality. See P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), paras. 23–25; P2590 (Conclusions of Zvornik's SDS Municipal Board, 22 December 1991), pp. 1–2.

³⁷¹ For instance, in Novo Sarajevo, the president of the executive board of the municipality, who was the president of the municipal government, was Žarko Đurović. Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16641; Radomir Nešković, T. 14276 (6 June 2011). In Ključ, the president of the municipal assembly and the president of the municipality was Jovo Banjac. Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4637, 4643; P3454 (Decision of Ključ Crisis Staff, 13 July 1992). Similarly, in Zvornik, the president of the Serb municipal assembly, Jovo Mijatović, was the president of the municipality. P2591 (Decision regarding the formation of the Serbian Municipality of Zvornik, 27 December 1991), p. 4; P2590 (Conclusions of Zvornik's SDS Municipal Board, 22 December 1991), p. 2. In Hadžići, Ratko Radić was the president of the SDS and the president of the municipality. P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), paras. 23–25.

138. The exact setting up and transformation from Crisis Staff to War Presidency to War Commission varied from municipality to municipality. Some of the factors determining this variation were location, time, and personalities.³⁷² **But in any case, all of those interim or temporary bodies had been the same as the regular bodies as far as it was concerned with the personal composition and duties. If some of the bodies, consisted of the same people ex officio, changed its name, it only shows what kind of emergency is at stake. The only difference is in a time needed to appoint meetings and executions of decisions. #All envisaged by the law! #Constitution and Law!#)**

Crisis Staffs

139. The Variant A/B Instructions ordered SDS municipal boards in Variant A and B municipalities in the first phase to “establish immediately Crisis Staffs of the Serbian People in the municipality”, comprising all members of the SDS municipal board secretariat, SDS candidates in certain municipal organs (Variant A) or SDS candidates in every municipal organ (Variant B), deputies of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, and members of the SDS Main Board from the municipality.³⁷³ The Commander of the Crisis Staff was, in Variant A municipalities, the president of the municipal assembly or the chairman of the municipal executive board and, in Variant B municipalities, the president of the SDS municipal board.³⁷⁴ This composition and leadership of the Crisis Staffs provided for close links between the Crisis Staffs and the SDS and its leadership.³⁷⁵ **(It wasn’t necessarily the “SDS” but any ruling party, and it was codified much before the SDS was formed, by the then ruling Communist league. #Law! #Distortion#!)**

140. On 27 March 1992, at a session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, the Accused reiterated the instructions to “urgently establish” Crisis Staffs in the municipalities and for the presidents of municipalities and executive boards to “hold the highest ranks in the crisis staffs”.³⁷⁶ The Accused stated: “I urge you to undertake, with the full authorisation of the Assembly, the task of introducing discipline and organising crisis staffs, headed by reserve and retired officers in order to organise the people for defensive purposes. Exclusively for defensive purposes”.³⁷⁷ **#Domestic Law!**

#The above paragraph, depicted as such, out of the context, is a manoeuvre aimed to suggest a violation of the law by the Serb side. However, there were both, general and specific reason.# The general pertains to any general danger for the peace and security, and the law provides for birth, rights and obligation to be ready. Specific pertains to what happened on 26 and 27 March in Brod-Sijekovac. There is nobody all over the world entitled to prevent a jeopardized community to take such a precautionary measures. #Domestic Law!.

³⁷² Adjudicated Fact 2204.

³⁷³ P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 3, 7.

³⁷⁴ P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 3, 7.

³⁷⁵ P2589 (Dorothea Hanson’s expert report entitled “Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War Commissions 1991-1995”, 10 September 2009), para. 24. See also Adjudicated Fact 2188.

³⁷⁶ P1634 (Minutes of 14th session of SerBiH Assembly, 27 March 1992), pp. 23–24; P2589 (Dorothea Hanson’s expert report entitled “Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War Commissions 1991-1995”, 10 September 2009), para. 34.

³⁷⁷ P1634 (Minutes of 14th session of SerBiH Assembly, 27 March 1992), p. 24; P2589 (Dorothea Hanson’s expert report entitled “Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War Commissions 1991-1995”, 10 September 2009), para. 34.

141. On 4 April 1992, the Accused, as President of the SNB, ordered the activation of Crisis Staffs.³⁷⁸ Obviously, #all previous decisions were only a precautionary and preparatory decision just in case that a crisis appear#. Since the Muslim side proclaimed a general mobilisation against the opposing opinion of the Serb members of Presidency, the Crisis Staffs were activated, #rightfully and legally #Domestic law#!.

142. On 26 April 1992, the Bosnian Serb Government under Prime Minister Đerić issued “Instructions for the Work of Crisis Staffs of the Serbian People in Municipalities”, which stated: “In wartime conditions, the Crisis Staff shall take over all the prerogatives and functions of municipal assemblies, when they are not in a position to meet.”³⁷⁹ This move is the most regular and ordinary measure in any emergency circumstance in the domestic system, and it doesn’t come from A-B Variante, but was included in the A-B Variante from the system# Domestic law.) The record of the session of the SNB and Government on 27 April 1992 states that “[i]t was concluded that comprehensive instructions for crisis staffs should be drafted in which the manner of political work on the ground and organisation of the functioning of the authorities will be presented”.³⁸⁰

One should wonder, and differentiate:

- a) why the Chamber is spending so much time on description of the Serb state bodies, since all the bodies had been provided by # the laws and constitutions#?;
- b) do they see these bodies and its functioning as something #illegal, and thus being a fundament or precondition for felonies?;
- c) Should any chamber require an explanation of #difference between the domestic political system and the one they have in mind#?
- d) Simingly, the #Chamber is following chronology of events, but even then, it is following the chronology of only Serbian moves#, even very markant and unusual, but without a word of context or explanation of motives. Thus the Chamber created and supporte a # general impression of the Serb culpability#!
- e) On 25 and 26 March there started butchering of the Serbian civilians (Brod, Sijekovac) unimpeded and free as if it was a fishing, while it was a hunting the human beings. And that was the reason to establish the SNB (National Security Council) while the common BH Government still existed and was responsible for security of citizens. #Time-frame shifted!)
- f) On 31 March 1992 the Commander of the secret Muslim Army (The Patriotic league) ordered capt. Hasan Tiric to take a unit and conquer Bijeljina, a dominantly Serbian city, while the common Government was still in charge, but the Chamber allocated responsibiliy to the Republic of Srpska and Karadzic! #Shifted Time-frame, shifted responsibility, distorted facts!

³⁷⁸ D394 (Announcement of SNB, 4 April 1992); P2589 (Dorothea Hanson’s expert report entitled “Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War Commissions 1991-1995”, 10 September 2009), para. 36.

³⁷⁹ P2717 (SerBiH Government instructions for Crisis Staffs, 26 April 1992); P2589 (Dorothea Hanson’s expert report entitled “Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War Commissions 1991-1995”, 10 September 2009), para. 38.

³⁸⁰ D406 (Minutes of meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 27 April 1992), p. 2.

- g) Exactly a month later, (27 Apr.) there had been issued a special order and instruction for an overall attack on the JNA (and thus on the Serbs too) at the same time negotiating the withdrawal of JNA with gen. Adzic. (#Drastic facts neglected!).
- h) The Police in Prijedor intercepted this order, notified the JNA and prevented the attack, taking the control over the Serb part of Prijedor, recommending the same to the Muslims to form their municipal authorities and prevent a war. #False “take-over” – only the Serb part of Prijedor.
- i) Who is the one who denies the Serbs rights to watch the situation and to take a precautionary measures? Does the UN do that? That kind of questions, should be directed to the UN and the “International Community” every week if necessary.
- j) But still, no moves showing the Serbian efforts to avoid the war. For instance, 22 April there was issued a famous Declaration of president Karadzic for a political solution of the crisis, which guaranteed peace, not acceptance of the fait accompli and so on. Every single move of the Serb side after the 6 April and the Muslim declaration of status of emerging war must be seen in this aspect! This way the Chamber is creating a fake history of this region, with a long-lasting consequences! # FAKE HISTORY, #skipping facts#)

143. The 26 April 1992 Instructions provided that the Crisis Staff “shall co-ordinate governmental functions for the purpose of the defence of territory, safety of the population and its property, establishment of authority and organisation of all other aspects of life and work”.³⁸¹ The instructions further stated that the Crisis Staff would, through these “co-ordination efforts”, “create the conditions for the municipal executive board to exercise legal executive power, manage the economy and other aspects of life”.³⁸² The instructions stated that “[t]he work of the Crisis Staff shall be based on the provisions of the Constitution and the law, and on the decisions of the Assembly, the Presidency and the Government of the [SerBiH]”.³⁸³ **Exactly! #And entirely legal. The way Great Britain and USA organized during the WWII was a model for the Tito’s All People’s Defence doctrine. Every single citizen was obliged to act against an enemy without waiting any order. Unfortunately, this part of the Doctrine and the Law equalized civilians and combatants and probably caused some civilian casualties. #Domestic LAW on control territory.**

144. According to the 26 April 1992 Instructions, the Crisis Staffs were “obliged to gather information on the situation in the field and notify and consult the competent authorities in [SerBiH], i.e. commissioners of the Government appointed for the areas and regions especially threatened by war”.³⁸⁴ **(Just as in Great Britain during the WWII! All of that was provided by the Constitution and by the All-Peoples Defence Law, and any skipping this obligation would be tried as a “high treason”! #Domestic LAW on control territory)**

³⁸¹ P2717 (SerBiH Government instructions for Crisis Staffs, 26 April 1992), para. 3. In the same 26 April 1992 Instructions, the Government of SerBiH mandated that all Crisis Staffs include the commander of the TO Staff. P2717 (SerBiH Government instructions for Crisis Staffs, 26 April 1992), para. 2. The Instructions also stated that the Crisis Staffs were to “create all the conditions for the life and work of members of the JNA”. P2717 (SerBiH Government instructions for Crisis Staffs, 26 April 1992), para. 8.

³⁸² P2717 (SerBiH Government instructions for Crisis Staffs, 26 April 1992), para. 3.

³⁸³ P2717 (SerBiH Government instructions for Crisis Staffs, 26 April 1992), para. 6.

³⁸⁴ P2717 (SerBiH Government instructions for Crisis Staffs, 26 April 1992), para. 11.

145. The relationship between Crisis Staffs and the various military forces present in the municipalities (JNA units, the TO, paramilitary units, and the VRS) differed from municipality to municipality.³⁸⁵ **(Therefore, the President didn't prescribe it, but it was dictated by necessities on the terrain, and envisaged in the legal system! #Domestic LAW on control territory)** At a minimum, however, the relationship involved a co-ordinating and supporting role for the Crisis Staffs. In at least one municipality, Zvornik, the local JNA commander was listed as a member of the Crisis Staff.³⁸⁶ Crisis Staffs also provided various forms of general assistance to the TO, such as calling for mobilisation within their municipalities and providing financial assistance.³⁸⁷ **(So what?)**

146. As will be further discussed later in this judgement, Crisis Staffs were formed and in existence between 1991 and 1993 in municipalities relevant to the charges in the Indictment.³⁸⁸ There were also Crisis Staffs of SAOs, including for SAO Semberija and Majevica,³⁸⁹ ARK,³⁹⁰ and SAO Birac.³⁹¹

So what? Although not correct, because the Crisis Staffs had been abandoned in early June 92, all of this was an #obligation and deserves a decoration for that, not criticism, or accusation#. It must be qualified by the UN SC, and all other relevant bodies. Always looking in the situations as well as in the laws and constitutions. At the same time, all the entities in the area of war, Croatia, the Muslim and Croatian parts of BiH had their Crisis Staffs. #Domestic LAW on control of territory#

b. War Presidencies

147. The Bosnian Serb Government decided on 23 May 1992 to abolish the Crisis Staffs.³⁹² The Government concluded that “the conditions for functioning of the regular governing organs should be created as soon as possible” and War Presidencies established in municipalities.³⁹³ A preceding joint session of the SNB and Government, on 22 April 1992,

³⁸⁵ Adjudicated Fact 2205.

³⁸⁶ Adjudicated Fact 2206.

³⁸⁷ Adjudicated Fact 2215.

³⁸⁸ See P2590 (Conclusions of Zvornik's SDS Municipal Board, 22 December 1991); P3154 (Decision of Zvornik's Crisis Staff, 6 April 1992); P2592 (Minutes of 6th Session of the Executive Board of the Ključ SDS Municipal Board, 23 December 1991); P2606 (Minutes from sessions of Ključ's Crisis Staff, 27 May – 10 July 1992); P2575 (Excerpt from session of Novo Sarajevo's Crisis Staff, 23 December 1991); D885 (Letter from Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff to Radovan Karadžić, 5 June 1992); P6055 (Minutes of the Crisis Staff meeting, 25 December 1991); Nedeljko Prstojević, T. 12951–12953, 12955, 12957–12959 (8 March 2011); P2410 (Ilidža Crisis Staff Order on implementation of general mobilisation, 6 April 1992); P2595 (Minutes of meeting of Prijedor's SDS Municipal Board, 27 December 1991); P2741 (Decision of Prijedor Crisis Staff, 2 June 1992); P2835 (Report of Rogatica Crisis Staff, April – June 1992); P3407 (Report on the work of the Rogatica Municipal Assembly and Executive Board from July 1992 to September 1993), e-court p. 5; P5250 (Minutes of meeting of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 10 April 1992); P5240 (Sokolac Crisis Staff conclusions, 20 April 1992); P6121 (Decision of Vlasenica's SDS Municipal Board, 4 April 1992); P3214 (Decision of Vlasenica Crisis Staff, 19 April 1992); P2598 (Minutes of meeting of Bratunac's SDS Municipal Board, 23 December 1991); P3202 (Decision of Bratunac Crisis Staff, 1992); D2061 (List of decisions and orders issued by the Crisis Staff, War Staff, and Wartime Presidency of Bratunac Municipality, 29 August 1992), p. 2; D3116 (Bratunac Crisis Staff decision, 6 May 1992); P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), paras. 15–16; Milenko Katanić, T. 24526–24527 (10 February 2012); P734 (Order of Pale Crisis Staff, 7 May 1992); P2364 (Vogošća Crisis Staff Order, 14 May 1992); P2635 (Conclusions of Vogošća's Crisis Staff, 16 May 1992); P2613 (Conclusions of Sanski Most's Crisis Staff, 22 May 1992); P2626 (Report of Bijeljina Crisis Staff, 1 April 1992); P2632 (Report of Bosanski Novi's Crisis Staff, undated); P2918 (Order of Bosanski Novi's Crisis Staff, 8 June 1992); P3346 (Order of Foča Crisis Staff, 9 May 1992); D1084 (Hadžići Crisis Staff Decision, 26 May 1992).

³⁸⁹ See P2875 (Freedom of movement pass issued by Semberija & Majevica Crisis Staff).

³⁹⁰ P6 (Decision on the formation of ARK Crisis Staff, 5 May 1992). See Section IV.A.1.b.ii.A: Establishment of ARK Crisis Staff.

³⁹¹ P2615 (Decision of Birac Crisis Staff, 29 April 1992).

³⁹² P3082 (Minutes of the 13th session of SerBiH Government, 23 May 1992), para. 4; P2589 (Dorothea Hanson's expert report entitled “Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War Commissions 1991-1995”, 10 September 2009), para. 46.

³⁹³ P3082 (Minutes of the 13th session of SerBiH Government, 23 May 1992), para. 4; P2589 (Dorothea Hanson's expert report entitled “Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War Commissions 1991-1995”, 10 September 2009), para. 46. See also D3715 (Article from Glas entitled “Crisis Staffs Abolished”, 7 July 1992), p. 1.

concluded that the Government was to appoint a war presidency and war executive boards in all municipalities where executive boards “are not functioning”.³⁹⁴ **All #prescribed by the laws#. The mere fact that in some municipalities executive boards “are not functioning” sufficiently proves what difficulties had the Government in controlling the processes on terrain! #Domestic LAW on control of territory#!**

148. On 31 May 1992, the Presidency issued, pursuant to Article 5 of the Constitutional Law on the Implementation of the Constitution of the SerBiH, a decision constituting War Presidencies “in the municipalities of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina where the assembly and the executive organ are unable to exercise authority”.³⁹⁵ The War Presidencies were to be composed of a republican commissioner and the president of the municipal assembly or his deputy, the chairman of the executive board or his deputy, or citizens who are deputies or assemblymen.³⁹⁶

149. The 31 May 1992 Decision stated that the War Presidency “shall organise, coordinate and adjust activities for the defence of the Serbian people and the establishment of legal organs of authority in the municipality”; “shall perform all the functions of the assembly and the executive organ until there is a possibility for these organs to convene and work”; and “shall create and secure conditions for the work of military organs and units on the defence of the Serbian people”, *inter alia*.³⁹⁷

150. The republican commissioner, who would be a member of the War Presidencies, was to be appointed by the SerBiH Presidency and have the “right and duty [...] to ensure permanent coordination and implementation of the policies and measures that are established and adopted by the republican state organs and the Main Staff of the [VRS]”.³⁹⁸

151. According to the 31 May 1992 decision, the Crisis Staffs in the municipalities were to cease operating on the date the War Presidencies were constituted.³⁹⁹ On 31 May 1992, the Secretary of the SDS Executive Board sent a notice to SAOs Herzegovina, Romanija–Birač, and Semberija stating that the Crisis Staffs whose structure and method of work were established by the 26 April 1992 Instructions have been abolished under the 31 May 1992 decision and that War Commissions/Presidencies instead were being established in the municipalities at a time of imminent threat of war or state of war.⁴⁰⁰ This communication stated that it was the duty of the recipients, hitherto presidents of regional Crisis Staffs and now war commissioners,⁴⁰¹ to ensure

³⁹⁴ P3051 (Minutes of expanded meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 22 April 1992), p. 2.

³⁹⁵ P2607 (SerBiH Presidency decision on constituting war presidencies in municipalities at a time of imminent threat of war or state of war, 31 May 1992), p. 1 (art. 1); P3060 (Minutes of the 2nd session of the SerBiH Presidency, 31 May 1992); P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 262.

³⁹⁶ P2607 (SerBiH Presidency decision on constituting war presidencies in municipalities at a time of imminent threat of war or state of war, 31 May 1992), p. 1 (art. 2).

³⁹⁷ P2607 (SerBiH Presidency decision on constituting war presidencies in municipalities at a time of imminent threat of war or state of war, 31 May 1992), p. 1 (art. 3).

³⁹⁸ P2607 (SerBiH Presidency decision on constituting war presidencies in municipalities at a time of imminent threat of war or state of war, 31 May 1992), p. 1 (art. 4).

³⁹⁹ P2607 (SerBiH Presidency decision on constituting war presidencies in municipalities at a time of imminent threat of war or state of war, 31 May 1992), p. 2 (art. 5). *See also* P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 268.

⁴⁰⁰ P2608 (Report of the SDS Executive Board on the formation of war presidencies, 31 May 1992).

⁴⁰¹ The communication makes reference, in relation to war commissioners, to the duties set out in article 4 of the 31 May 1992 decision, which discusses the Presidency-appointed republican commissioners. *See* para. 150.

the implementation of the 31 May 1992 decision and instructed them to contact the Presidency directly with any remarks or suggestions related thereto.⁴⁰²

Anyway, the CS-s existed only about 5 – 7 weeks, in the period of chaos. Certainly, it was a period without any central control.

152. Records such as reports, orders, and meeting minutes indicate the existence of War Presidencies including in the following municipalities: Vogošća, Brčko, Ključ, Zvornik, Sanski Most, Ilidža, and Prijedor.⁴⁰³

1. War Commissions

153. On 10 June 1992, the Presidency issued, pursuant to Article 5 of the Constitutional Law on the Implementation of the Constitution of the SerBiH, a decision establishing War Commissions in SerBiH municipalities “which are either affected by war or are facing imminent threat of war”.⁴⁰⁴ The War Commissions were to be composed of “a state commissioner and four members from the ranks of the most influential citizens within the crisis staff, the economy and the ruling party”.⁴⁰⁵ The decision stated that the SerBiH Presidency would “appoint state commissioners to provide expert and other assistance to the war presidencies”.⁴⁰⁶ The state commissioners could appoint and dissolve War Commissions in consultation with the War Presidency at the Republic level.⁴⁰⁷

154. The War Commissions were to “maintain the closest possible cooperation with the legal authorities”, “convey directives issued by the War Presidency of the Republic”, “convey information about the problems, needs and work of the municipal bodies via their commissioners”, and “cooperate with the authorities with a view to creating conditions for the work of military organs and units engaged in defending the Serbian people”.⁴⁰⁸

155. The War Commissions, once constituted, were to supersede the Crisis Staffs, and the decision itself was to supersede the 31 May 1992 decision establishing War Presidencies in municipalities in time of imminent threat of war or during a state of war.⁴⁰⁹

156. Records such as confirmations of appointments, orders, reports, or meeting minutes indicate the existence of War Commissions including in Foča, Pale, Zvornik, Vlasenica, Bratunac,

⁴⁰² P2608 (Report of the SDS Executive Board on the formation of war presidencies, 31 May 1992). See also Dorothea Hanson, T. 14538–14539 (9 June 2011).

⁴⁰³ P1142 (Letter from Ministry of Justice of SerBiH to Vogošća War Presidency, 10 August 1992); P2391 (Vogošća War Presidency order, 6 November 1992); P2874 (Freedom of movement pass issued by Brčko War Presidency, 7 May 1992); P3025 (Travel permit issued by Brčko’s War Presidency, 9 May 1992); P2888 (Brčko War Presidency Summary of events in Brčko Municipality); P3452 (Extract from Minutes of Ključ War Presidency, 10 July 1992); P3453 (Decision of Ključ War Presidency, 13 July 1992); P3462 (Decision of Ključ War Presidency, 30 July 1992); D4365 (Report from Ključ War Presidency to Banja Luka SJB dated 22 August 1992); P5205 (Minutes from 3rd session of the Zvornik Municipality War Presidency, 2 August 1995); P5536 (Decision of the War Presidency of Sanski Most Municipality, 14 July 1992); D2563 (Radovan Karadžić’s Decision on appointment of Ilidža War Presidency, 20 June 1995); D4472 (Conclusions of Prijedor War Presidency, 6 August 1995).

⁴⁰⁴ P2611 (SerBiH Presidency Decision on the establishment of War Commissions in municipalities, 10 June 1992), p. 1 (art. 1); P1093 (Minutes of 5th session of SerBiH Presidency, 10 June 1992); P2536 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992”, 30 July 2002), para. 262.

⁴⁰⁵ P2611 (SerBiH Presidency Decision on the establishment of War Commissions in municipalities, 10 June 1992), p. 1 (art. 2).

⁴⁰⁶ P2611 (SerBiH Presidency Decision on the establishment of War Commissions in municipalities, 10 June 1992), p. 1 (art. 4).

⁴⁰⁷ P2611 (SerBiH Presidency Decision on the establishment of War Commissions in municipalities, 10 June 1992), p. 1 (art. 4).

⁴⁰⁸ P2611 (SerBiH Presidency Decision on the establishment of War Commissions in municipalities, 10 June 1992), p. 1 (art. 3).

⁴⁰⁹ P2611 (SerBiH Presidency Decision on the establishment of War Commissions in municipalities, 10 June 1992), p. 1 (arts. 5, 6).

Novo Sarajevo, Vogošća, and Ilidža.⁴¹⁰ For instance, a decision of the Vogošća war commission states that it worked with civilian and military, municipal and republic-level authorities and it was to ensure that municipal civilian and military organs carried out their duties in accordance with laws and regulations.⁴¹¹

157. State commissioners were appointed by the Presidency in June 1992, including Nikola Poplašen for Vogošća,⁴¹² Vojislav Maksimović for Foča,⁴¹³ and Dragan Đokanović for Zvornik,⁴¹⁴ Bratunac,⁴¹⁵ and Vlasenica.⁴¹⁶

158. On 17 December 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly decided that the decision on forming War Commissions in the municipalities during an imminent threat of war or a state of war ceased to be valid.⁴¹⁷ **(Both, the forming and abolishing the Crisis Staffs and War Presidencies, used here to depict as if the central authorities had all the opportunities to control the processes, show exactly opposite. The most prominent Serbian intellectuals, professors of University, leaders of other parties, such as those named in para 157, were asked to help to the terrain. The mere fact that after a while both temporary institutions were abolished confirms that it didn't provide a sufficient leverage on the terrain, and that the central authorities were not satisfied by this accomplishment! #Domestic law!)**

C. BOSNIAN SERB MILITARY AND POLICE STRUCTURES

159. During the time period relevant to the Indictment, the armed forces in the RS consisted of the VRS and Bosnian Serb MUP personnel.⁴¹⁸ **(# This document, P5416, is the only documents to identify the "Serb Forces", including the TO, but once the VRS was formed, TO became tha part of it. However, the Chamber used to udrstand the "Serb forces" as the Prosecution suggested, which is unacceptable!# See: P5416, see: D93, see: D434 – no possibility for any confusion#!)** The Prosecution defines the "Serb Forces" as "members of the MUP, VRS, JNA, VJ, TO, the Serbian MUP, Serbian and Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces and volunteer units, and local Bosnian Serbs".⁴¹⁹ The Prosecution further defines the "Bosnian Serb forces" as

⁴¹⁰ P2642 (Report of Foča's War Commission, 18 June 1992); P5417 (Confirmation of a decision of the Pale SDS, 25 June 1992); P5479 (Radovan Karadžić's confirmation of appointment of Zvornik War Commission members, 17 June 1992); D1623 (Order of Zvornik War Commission, 1 July 1992); P5486 (RS Presidency Confirmation of Appointment of Members of the War Commission in Vlasenica, 17 June 1992); P5491 (RS Presidency Confirmation of Appointment of Members of the War Commission in Bratunac, 17 June 1992); P5543 (Decision of Radovan Karadžić appointing a War Commission in Novo Sarajevo, 21 July 1992); D4031 (Decision of Vogošća War Commission, 18 June 1992); P6001 (Request of Vogošća Municipality War Commission, 27 June 1992); P6059 (Order of Vogošća War Commission, 29 July 1992); P2390 (Vogošća War Commission order, 6 November 1992); D1244 (Ilidža War Commission Decision, 4 April 1993).

⁴¹¹ See D4029 (Decision of Vogošća War Commission, 1 July 1992).

⁴¹² D4027 (Witness statement of Nikola Poplašen dated 11 November 2013), para. 1; Nikola Poplašen, T. 43585–43586 (15 November 2013).

⁴¹³ P3339 (Certificate of appointment signed by Radovan Karadžić, 4 June 1992).

⁴¹⁴ P5479 (Radovan Karadžić's confirmation of appointment of Zvornik War Commission members, 17 June 1992).

⁴¹⁵ P5491 (RS Presidency Confirmation of Appointment of Members of the War Commission in Bratunac, 17 June 1992).

⁴¹⁶ P5486 (RS Presidency Confirmation of Appointment of Members of the War Commission in Vlasenica, 17 June 1992).

⁴¹⁷ P1364 (Transcript of 23rd session of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), e-court pp. 83–84; D1229 (RS National Assembly Decision, 17 December 1992).

⁴¹⁸ P5416 (Decision of the SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), amendment II, art. 110; P2602 (SerBiH Defence Act, 1 June 1992), art. 7.

⁴¹⁹ Indictment, para. 13. See also Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix I.

members of “the VRS, the TO, the MUP and Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces and volunteer units”.⁴²⁰ For ease of reference, the Chamber adopts these definitions. The structure of the respective components of these forces will be addressed in turn in this section. **(During the time period relevant”...is not true: #there was no any “Bosnian Serb Forces” from 15 October 91, until 6 April 92, and after 6 April 92 til 20 Maj 92, there was only the Serb MUP (police forces) while the Serb TO was obliged to submit to the JNA if present, otherwise the TO acted as a municipal defence!#!!!)**

(# “Bosnian Serb Forces”- This part is the most damaging for the President and the Serb side. Such a conception of the “Serb Forces” is the source of all the confusion, and it should be forbidden in the judicial practice once and for all. The Prosecution was free from the obligation of proving it’s allegations and charges, since every single Serb, even those “local Bosnian Serbs” who may be outlaws for the Serb authorities, or being attacked and in necessity to defend, were included in the “Serb Forces”. Thus, for the first time after Hitler’s and Stalin’s court practice, a fluid formula such as “Some Serbs killed some Muslims”, was effective. At the same time this is the weakest part of the Indictment and consequently of the Judgement. Why:

- 1. Neither the Prosecution nor the Chamber #should or could justifiably associate this President with “the MUP” because the MUP in BH was common until the end of March 1992, and the Serb side didn’t have any influence on it#. As a matter of fact, the most numerous and the most dangerous abuses of the state organs by the Muslim SDA Party happened in the MUP. The Serb side didn’t get what belonged to it by the law, constitution and agreements within the coalition.**
- 2. The #same is with the JNA, which was under the command and control of the Federal institutions, Ministry for Defence and the SFRY Presidency#, and in addition to that, the JNA was under the strongest influence of the new Communist Party – Movement for Yugoslavia, which disliked all the ethnic parties, including the SDS. That stayed that way until the JNA was attacked by all except by the SDS members.**
- 3. #The same pertains to the VJ (Vojska Jugoslavije) and the TO#, up until the Republic of Srpska established and consolidated it’s own Army (VRS) which took the entire rest of 1992. All the time JNA was present in the area, it had an exclusive competence over the Territorial Defence (TO) and all other military and armed groups, such as volunteer units.**
- 4. The #paramilitaries had been forbidden by both the JNA, the federal laws, and in particular by the orders of the President and other state institutions of the RS.# The RS Police and the Army (VRS) had arrested many of those groups, and it is well known fact.**
- 5. The Chamber erred most when adopted the last Prosecution’s definition of the “Serb Forces” depicted in the para 159 of this Judgement, as is said: *The Prosecution further defines the “Bosnian Serb forces” as members of “the VRS, the TO, the MUP and Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces and volunteer units”* – since the #President and any other commander can not be liable for the “members”# of the VRS, the TO, the MUP, and particularly for the members of the Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces and volunteer units. Why:**

⁴²⁰ Indictment, para. 14(b). See also Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix I.

- a. The paramilitary forces had been banned as early as in April 1992 by the Prime Minister Djerić, in May 1992 by General Mladić, and on 13 June 1992 by the President, who repeated this order many times, which resulted in many arrests. Therefore, the paramilitary units weren't under anyone's control and command, and as banned, had been arrested wherever it was possible.
- b. A very cunning formulation of "members" of the different forces frees the Prosecution from establishing who by name, and in particular what unit and under whose command committed crimes. Again, "some Serbs killed some Muslims"!!!!
- c. The Chamber got an insight in the domestic laws on defence, and was able to differentiate a peoples Army, composed of the ordinary people, who lived and worked as usual except in term of their shifts in tranches. All the rest time they were living at homes, without any barracks and permanent control of the commands.
- d. The Army and the MUP (Police) act in accordance with the rules, planning, deciding, ordering preparatory orders, executive orders, tasking a specific units and controlling the execution. The Prosecution wasn't able to submit an evidence with a name of individuals, single units or a commanders who acted criminally on behalf of the VRS and the RS state institutions. The Accused kept asserting that "neither the VRS nor the MUP committed any crime" having in mind that a solitary "member" of such a forces could have commit a crime, but on his own and hiding it from the command. Domestic LAW on all-Peoples defense!) Bosnian Serb Forces!)

viii. VRS

1. Establishment and composition of the VRS

160. On 12 May 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly decided to establish the Army of SerBiH.⁴²¹ On 12 August 1992, when SerBiH was renamed RS, the denomination of the army also changed from Army of SerBiH to the VRS.⁴²² The Accused, in his capacity as President of the RS, was also the Supreme Commander of the VRS.⁴²³ Ratko Mladić was appointed the Commander of the Main Staff.⁴²⁴ Manojlo Milovanović was appointed as both the Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of the Main Staff.⁴²⁵

⁴²¹ Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25431 (28 February 2012); P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), pp. 6, 57–58. See also Adjudicated Facts 17, 501 (referring to 19 May 1992 as the date of the "formal" establishment of the Army of SerBiH).

⁴²² P1358 (Minutes of 19th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 August 1992), pp. 2–3; D422 (19th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 August 1992), pp. 32–34, 37. For ease of reference the acronym "VRS" will be used throughout this section to also cover the period prior to 12 August 1992. On 18 August 1992, the Presidency adopted provisional service regulations for the VRS. D3834 (1st Krajina Corps dispatch, 25 August 1992; VRS Main Staff dispatch to 1st Krajina Corps, 18 August 1992; Provisional Service Regulations of VRS, 18 August 1992); Dragomir Keserović, T. 40966–40967 (8 July 2013).

⁴²³ P2603 (SerBiH Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), art. 174; Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25441 (28 February 2012); Mićo Stanišić, T. 46360 (3 February 2014), T. 46577 (5 February 2014); Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 9108. See also P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens's expert report entitled "Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)", e-court pp. 287–288).

⁴²⁴ Ewan Brown, T. 21504–21505 (17 November 2011); P3914 (Ewan Brown's expert report entitled "Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992", 27 November 2002), para. 1.64; P956 (Transcript of 16th Session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), p. 57; Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25439 (28 February 2012); Dušan Kovačević, T. 39707 (11 June 2013). See also Adjudicated Fact 510. Prior to this, on 25 April 1992, Mladić was appointed by the Presidency of the SFRY as the Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of the JNA 2nd Military District. As of 10 May 1992, Mladić had taken over command of the JNA 2nd Military District. D3680 (30th Partisan Division dispatch, 16 May 1992); Dušan Kovačević, T. 39707–39708 (11 June 2013); Milosav Gagović, T. 31865 (15 January 2013).

⁴²⁵ Manojlo Milovanović T. 25431–25432 (28 February 2012); Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*), T. 11935–11936, 12017–12021; P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff Structure for July 1995).

161. The VRS was formed from parts of the JNA, TO, and volunteer units.⁴²⁶ Each of the former JNA corps in BiH retained most of its personnel and weaponry.⁴²⁷ The VRS inherited both officers and other ranks from the JNA, many of whom were of Bosnian Serb origin, **(Not “many of whom were of Bosnian Serb origin,” but at least 98% of them had been the Serbs from Bosnia)** as well as a substantial amount of weaponry and equipment.⁴²⁸ **(It was necessary, for the sake of truth to say that all the newly formed armies, like Slovenian, Croatian, Muslim, had been formed the same way, from the officers and experts of the JNA, as well as the JNA armament belonged to all the sides. It is not correct to suggest that it had been the case only with the Bosnian Serbs. Much earlier that the Serbs, all others formed their secret armies, imploing the former JNA officers of their origin.** In places where there were no former JNA infantry units, the VRS created units.⁴²⁹ Weapons from the former JNA were distributed to the infantry units by officers and SDS members.⁴³⁰ The official withdrawal of the JNA was announced on 5 May 1992 and by 19 May 1992 it was said to be nearly completed.⁴³¹ On 21 May 1992, the Accused, in his capacity as President of the Presidency, issued an order on general mobilisation.⁴³² **(Therefore, at least until this date the Accused didn’t have any forces under his command and control. Coordinating the TO units also wasn’t any command and control, since the #JNA had priority over any local authority#. #RK Commanding role!)**

162. According to the Defence Act, the Accused, as the President, had the power to organise and implement plans for defence, order mobilisation, command and control the army, and define the basis for the organisation and size of the police force.⁴³³ The Accused, as President, also had the power to issue orders for the deployment of the police during the war.⁴³⁴

163. On 15 June 1992, the Accused, in his capacity as President of the Presidency, established a system of command and control in the VRS.⁴³⁵ **(By the same document the**

⁴²⁶ Adjudicated Fact 2803. **NO PARAMILITARIES MENTIONED. WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE THAT CHANGED THIS AF?**

⁴²⁷ Mirsad Mujadžić, P3702 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stakić*, T. 3716 (under seal); D1218 (Ilidža National Security Service report, 17 May 1992), p. 2; P1505 (SRK Order, 22 May 1992); D1839 (Combat report of JNA 5th Corps, 17 May 1992). *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2805.

⁴²⁸ D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), pp. 14, 69; P4913 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “VRS Corps Command Responsibility Report”, 5 April 2000), paras. 1.0–1.1; P3914 (Ewan Brown’s expert report entitled “Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992”, 27 November 2002), paras. 1.65, 3.10; Ewan Brown, T. 21536 (17 November 2011); Colm Doyle, T. 2738–2741 (26 May 2010); P3921 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 21 May 1992), pp. 1–2; P4915 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “VRS Brigade Command Responsibility Report”, 31 October 2002), para. 1.2; Radovan M. Karadžić, T. 41378–41379 (17 July 2013). *See, e.g.*, D1218 (Ilidža National Security Service report, 17 May 1992), p. 2; D1838 (Regular Combat Report from JNA 5th Corps Command to 2nd Military District Command dated 1 May 1992); D1839 (Combat report of JNA 5th Corps, 17 May 1992); P1505 (SRK Order, 22 May 1992); Richard Philipps, T. 3772–3775 (15 June 2010), T. 3896–3897 (16 June 2010); Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*, T. 20664–20665; KDZ166, T. 8350–8351 (26 October 2010); Dragomir Milošević, T. 32559–32560 (23 January 2013). *See also* Adjudicated Facts 504, 506, 2092, 2099; Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 12123–12124.

⁴²⁹ D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 13.

⁴³⁰ D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 14.

⁴³¹ P4917 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility Report”, 9 June 2006), paras. 1.10, 1.12; P3914 (Ewan Brown’s expert report entitled “Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992”, 27 November 2002), para. 1.63. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 502; P950 (Agreement on withdrawal of JNA from BiH); Colm Doyle, P918 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*, T. 25295–25296. On 27 April 1992, Izetbegović issued a decision ordering the withdrawal of the JNA from BiH. Members of the JNA were given the choice to join the “newly formed forces” of the TO of BiH or to leave the territory. D224 (Alija Izetbegović’s decision re JNA withdrawal from BiH, 27 April 1992).

⁴³² P3919 (Radovan Karadžić’s Decision, 20 May 1992); D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), pp. 69–70. *See also* P3920 (Order of 1st Krajina Corps, 21 May 1992), p. 1.

⁴³³ P2602 (SerBiH Defence Act, 1 June 1992), art. 7.

⁴³⁴ P2602 (SerBiH Defence Act, 1 June 1992), art. 7.

⁴³⁵ P3035 (Decision on Army of SerBiH, 15 June 1992). Soldiers were required to take an oath when joining the VRS. D4004 (Amendment on the Law of the Army, as published in Official Gazette, 25 June 1992); Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43369–43370 (13 November 2013). **THIS IS INSUFFICIENT TITLE OF THE DOCUMENT. IT SHOULD BE: “DECISION ON THE FORMING, ORGANISATION, ESTABLISHMENT AND COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE ARMY OF THE SERBIAN REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA**

President handed over the operational control and command over the Army to the Main Staff. This is the crucial moment, since “control” means a complete responsibility, for which President is no more liable, unless ordered something wrong. Control means that any soldier has to be liable to his immediate superior, and that every commander is responsible to his immediate superior, not to the President. Why it was so difficult to understand, since the same is in all and every state armed forces in the world?#Neglecting competences#) It consisted of a Main Staff and operative groups, including Corps of land forces consisting of brigades, regiments, and units.⁴³⁶ The Main Staff had command and control over the operative groups.⁴³⁷ **(The# entire command and control in terms of professional handling the Army, which meant all the operational and tactical commands, while the Presidency kept only strategic level of command.# The same is in almost all the countries with democracies, and thus presidents are responsible for their strategic orders. Not even lower commanders are directly responsible for a mis-conduct of individuals in their leisure time #committed clandestinely#. #Neglecting competences!)** The Main Staff was also directly subordinated to the President, as the Supreme Commander.⁴³⁸ The operative groups initially consisted of (i) the 1st Krajina Corps with headquarters in Banja Luka; (ii) the 2nd Krajina Corps with headquarters in Drvar; (iii) the Eastern Bosnia Corps with headquarters in Bijeljina; (iv) the SRK with headquarters in Pale; (v) the Herzegovina Corps with headquarters in Bileća; and (vi) the Air Force and Air Defence Corps with headquarters in Banja Luka.⁴³⁹ On 1 November 1992, the Drina Corps was formed.⁴⁴⁰

164. The basic structure and principles of the VRS, including the warfare doctrine, command and control principles, operational and tactical methods, and regulations followed those of the JNA.⁴⁴¹ Organs and branches of the VRS were specifically directed to comply with the existing regulations of the SFRY, including the SFRY Law on All People’s Defence, until regulations for the VRS were published.⁴⁴²

⁴³⁶ P3035 (Decision on Army of SerBiH, 15 June 1992), p. 1; D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 70. See also P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court pp. 315–317.

⁴³⁷ P3035 (Decision on Army of SerBiH, 15 June 1992), p. 3.

⁴³⁸ P3035 (Decision on Army of SerBiH, 15 June 1992), p. 3; P4917 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility Report”, 9 June 2006), paras. 2.0–2.1. In 1992, the Main Staff was subordinated to the Presidency. The Chamber recalls that on 17 December 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly replaced the structures of the Presidency by establishing a single President and two vice-Presidents; from then on the VRS Main Staff was subordinated to the President of the RS. See paras. 97–98.

⁴³⁹ P3035 (Decision on Army of SerBiH, 15 June 1992), pp. 2–3; Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*), T. 11963–11965; D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), pp. 11, 70–71; Petar Škrbić, P4523 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 15466. See also P3914 (Ewan Brown’s expert report entitled “Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992”, 27 November 2002), para. 1.63; P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court pp. 315–317; P4913 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “VRS Corps Command Responsibility Report”, 5 April 2000), para. 1.0; P4917 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility Report”, 9 June 2006), para. 1.0; D3864 (Radovan Radinović’s expert report entitled “The Control Authority of Dr. Radovan Karadžić in the Strategic Command System of the VRS”, 2012), para. 83; D3688 (Excerpt from the Directive for use of the VRS, December 1993), pp. 8–10. See also Adjudicated Fact 2094.

⁴⁴⁰ P3914 (Ewan Brown’s expert report entitled “Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992”, 27 November 2002), para. 1.63; Richard Butler, T. 27442–27433 (17 April 2012); P976 (Directive 4, 19 November 1992), pp. 2, 5; P3037 (VRS Main Staff Order, 20 November 1992). See also D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 11; Adjudicated Fact 1442.

⁴⁴¹ P4913 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “VRS Corps Command Responsibility Report”, 5 April 2000), paras. 1.0–1.7; P4915 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “VRS Brigade Command Responsibility Report”, 31 October 2002), paras. 1.0–1.9; P3914 (Ewan Brown’s expert report entitled “Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992”, 27 November 2002), paras. 1.66, 3.6–3.9, 3.11; Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*), T. 11958, 12183–12191; Richard Philipps, T. 3746–3747 (15 June 2010); P990 (JNA 4th Corps Instructions, 29 August 1991); P3033 (Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court pp. 13–14, 310–315.

⁴⁴² D436 (1st Krajina Corps information on political and security situation, 20 June 1992), p. 3; P4913 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “VRS Corps Command Responsibility Report”, 5 April 2000), paras. 1.0–1.7; P3914 (Ewan Brown’s expert report entitled “Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992”, 27 November 2002), paras. 1.66, 3.6–3.9, 3.11.

2. Supreme Command

165. On 30 November 1992, the Accused, in his capacity as the President of the Presidency, established the Supreme Command for the purpose of co-ordinating and improving the efficiency of the command system of the VRS.⁴⁴³ **(By definition, this meant that until that time “the efficiency of the command system” was not satisfactory. Therefore, this decision is implicitly #EXCULPATORY for the previous period#)** The Supreme Command consisted of the Supreme Commander who was the President of the Presidency, the RS Assembly President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, and the Minister of the Interior.⁴⁴⁴ The Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS, his assistants and other members of the Main Staff, and Commanders of the Corps were also allowed to attend meetings of the Supreme Command by invitation.⁴⁴⁵

166. The Supreme Command held both regular and extraordinary sessions in which various strategic issues were discussed and conclusions and tasks were adopted.⁴⁴⁶ When military decisions had to be made, members of the Main Staff attended meetings of the Supreme Command as observers without voting rights.⁴⁴⁷ The Supreme Command’s decisions were adopted by the Supreme Commander.⁴⁴⁸ The Supreme Commander also periodically issued directives, which assigned tasks to subordinate units in order to carry out the planning and execution of combat operations.⁴⁴⁹ **(The strategic level, which contained what was to be achieved, not how, which was a matter of profession!)**

⁴⁴³ P3036 (Radovan Karadžić’s Decision on the establishment of the VRS Supreme Command, 30 November 1992), art. 1. *See also* P3149 (Minutes of the 14th session of Supreme Command, 31 March 1995), p. 7; Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25467 (28 February 2012); P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court p. 288; P2537 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1993–1995 - Addendum to the Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990–1992”, 1 May 2009), para. 140.

⁴⁴⁴ P3036 (Radovan Karadžić’s Decision on the establishment of the VRS Supreme Command, 30 November 1992), art. 2; P192 (Decree on the Promulgation of Law on Implementation of Law of the Army during Threat of War, 29 November 1994), art. 3 (specifying that the President, as commander-in-chief, shall establish the Supreme Command, consisting of the Vice-President, President of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and Minister of Interior); Petar Škrbić, P4523 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 15544–15545. *See also* P3149 (Minutes of 14th session of Supreme Command, 31 March 1995), p. 2.

⁴⁴⁵ P3036 (Radovan Karadžić’s Decision on the establishment of the VRS Supreme Command, 30 November 1992), art. 3; Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25126–25127 (23 February 2012); P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court p. 288.

⁴⁴⁶ Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25526–25532, 25545 (29 February 2012); Dušan Kovačević, T. 39653–39654 (10 June 2013), 39656–39657 (11 June 1993). *See, e.g.*, P1469 (Minutes of VRS Supreme Command meeting, 20 December 1992); P3148 (Handwritten notes of Supreme Command meeting, 8 May 1994); P3149 (Minutes of 14th session of Supreme Command, 31 March 1995).

⁴⁴⁷ Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25470 (28 February 2012); P3036 (Radovan Karadžić’s Decision on the establishment of the VRS Supreme Command, 30 November 1992), art. 3; P2537 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1993–1995 - Addendum to the Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990–1992”, 1 May 2009), paras. 141–142. *See, e.g.*, the meeting of 20 December 1992 attended by the commander of the VRS Main Staff and his deputy, Mladić and Milovanović. P1469 (Minutes of VRS Supreme Command meeting, 20 December 1992); Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25467–25470 (28 February 2012); P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court p. 543; P2537 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1993–1995 - Addendum to the Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990–1992”, 1 May 2009), para. 141. *See, e.g.*, the meeting of 31 March 1995 attended by several members of the Main Staff including Mladić, Milovanović, Tolimir, and Gvero. P3149 (Minutes of the 14th session of Supreme Command, 31 March 1995), p. 1.

⁴⁴⁸ P3036 (Radovan Karadžić’s Decision on the establishment of the VRS Supreme Command, 30 November 1992), art. 5. *See also* P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court pp. 304–306; P2537 (Patrick Treanor’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1993–1995 - Addendum to the Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990–1992”, 1 May 2009), para. 140; Petar Škrbić, P4523 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 15544–15545. During the 29th Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, held on 24 to 25 March 1994, the Accused stated that the Supreme Command had been established so that he did not make decisions by himself. P1388 (Transcript of 39th Session of RS Assembly, 24–25 March 1994), p. 85.

⁴⁴⁹ Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*), T. 11992–12000; Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25493–25494 (29 February 2012). *See, e.g.*, P3039 (Directive 6, 11 November 1993); P838 (Directive 7, 8 March 1995). For further detail on Directive 7 specifically, *see* Section IV.C.1.b.ii: Issuance of Directives 7 and 7/1.

3. Supreme Commander

167. According to the Law on the Army and the Amended RS Constitution, the President of the Republic was the Supreme Commander and thus the Commander-in-Chief of the VRS.⁴⁵⁰ Accordingly, the Accused, as Supreme Commander, held the highest authority in respect of the VRS.⁴⁵¹ The Accused remained the Supreme Commander until July 1996.⁴⁵² The powers of the Supreme Commander included defining the organisation of the VRS, establishing a system of command, monitoring the implementation of orders, establishing a plan for deployment and mobilisation, and issuing regulations.⁴⁵³ The Supreme Commander also had the authority to appoint, promote, and dismiss officers of the VRS.⁴⁵⁴

168. The Supreme Commander exercised authority at the strategic level.⁴⁵⁵ He had the power to issue decrees, instructions, orders, and requests related to the general planning for the preparation of the army,⁴⁵⁶ the mobilisation of the army,⁴⁵⁷ and its deployment;⁴⁵⁸ he could delegate certain command duties to the Commander of the Main Staff.⁴⁵⁹ **(But, this is #not underlined and understood properly#. It is not that “he could” – but he did it on a permanent basis as of 15. june 92, with the only two attempts to return the command ih his hands, once in the occasion of riots in BL, and in the occasion of establishing peace in Gorazde. The last try in August 95. was denied by the GHQ. A# Presidential duty ends at the first subordinate, not at the last effector#.)** Occasionally, the Accused sent direct orders to corps and brigade commanders to answer directly to him.⁴⁶⁰ **(#Distortion! But it was always in the occasion of the negotiations and due to requests by the International community**

⁴⁵⁰ P2603 (SerBiH Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), art. 174; D422 (19th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 August 1992), pp. 63–64; P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of the RS, 17 December 1992), art. 106, p. 22; Patrick Treanor, T. 14061 (1 June 2011); Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 9108; KDZ088, T. 6357 (8 September 2010) (private session); Jovan Šarac, T. 47162–47163 (14 February 2014).

⁴⁵¹ See P3036 (Radovan Karadžić’s Decision on the establishment of the VRS Supreme Command, 30 November 1992); P1388 (Transcript of 39th session of RS Assembly, 24–25 March 1994), pp. 85–86; Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25108–25109 (22 February 2012). See, e.g., P3041 (VRS Main Staff Report, 31 March 1994), p. 5; P4493 (VRS Main Staff Order, 7 February 1994); P4447 (Order of Radovan Karadžić, 24 April 1994); P4495 (Radovan Karadžić’s Order to VRS Main Staff and RS MUP, 29 March 1995); Rupert Smith, T. 11326–11328 (8 February 2011); Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25444–25445 (28 February 2012), T. 25484–25486 (29 February 2012); Dusan Kovačević, T. 39657 (11 June 2013); Jovan Šarac, T. 47162–47163 (14 February 2014); P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992–1995)”), e-court pp. 501–503; Reynaud Theunens, T. 16841, 16844–16845 (19 July 2011), T. 17171–17172 (22 July 2011); P3037 (VRS Main Staff Order, 20 November 1992); P4913 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “VRS Corps Command Responsibility Report”, 5 April 2000), para. 5.3; Petar Škrbić, T. 26024–26026 (8 March 2012); Richard Butler, T. 27430–27431 (17 April 2012).

⁴⁵² P3036 (Decision on the Establishment of the Supreme Command of the Army of Republika Srpska, 30 November 1992); P1469 (Minutes of VRS Supreme Command meeting, 20 December 1992); P3148 (Handwritten notes of Supreme Command meeting, 8 May 1994); P3149 (Minutes of 14th session of Supreme Command, 31 March 1995); Milan Ninković, T. 40505 (26 June 2013).

⁴⁵³ P2603 (SerBiH Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), art. 174.

⁴⁵⁴ P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of the RS, 17 December 1992), art. 106, p. 22; P2603 (SerBiH Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), art. 11, 369. See also P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992–1995)”), e-court pp. 332–333; Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25530 (29 February 2012); P3149 (Minutes of 14th session of Supreme Command, 31 March 1995), p. 9; P4913 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “VRS Corps Command Responsibility Report”, 5 April 2000), paras. 4.0–4.4; P3914 (Ewan Brown’s expert report entitled “Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992”, 27 November 2002), paras. 3.1–3.4; Radovan Radinović, T. 41533–41534 (19 July 2013).

⁴⁵⁵ D3864 (Radovan Radinović’s expert report entitled “The Control Authority of Dr. Radovan Karadžić in the Strategic Command System of the VRS”, 2012), paras. 2, 121–129; KDZ088, T. 6357–6359 (8 September 2010) (closed session).

⁴⁵⁶ See, e.g., P3037 (VRS Main Staff Order, 20 November 1992), p. 1. The Chamber notes that the “request” by the Supreme Command referred to in this document dates from 20 November 1992, which is before the official creation of the Supreme Command on 30 November 1992.

⁴⁵⁷ See, e.g., P5482 (Order from Radovan Karadžić to Municipal Assembly Presidents and VRS Main Staff, 26 March 1995); P2248 (Radovan Karadžić’s Order to RS Government, VRS Main Staff, and Presidents of Municipalities, 26 March 1995); P2249 (VRS Main Staff Order, 26 March 1995). See also P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992–1995)”), e-court pp. 507–509.

⁴⁵⁸ See, e.g., P856 (VRS Main Staff Order, 20 April 1994); P5580 (VRS Main Staff Order, 20 April 1994); P3045 (VRS Main Staff Order, 20 April 1994); P2252 (Radovan Karadžić’s Order to VRS Main Staff and RS MUP, 29 March 1995).

⁴⁵⁹ P2603 (SerBiH Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), art. 175.

⁴⁶⁰ P846 (Radovan Karadžić’s Order to VRS, 7 February 1994); P4493 (VRS Main Staff Order, 7 February 1994).

representatives. In the regular functioning there was no any direct “answer of the Corps Commanders to the President, only about ceasefires and humanitarian convoys!“No good deeds...unpunished#!)

4. VRS Main Staff

169. Commanded by Mladić,⁴⁶¹ the Main Staff was the highest operative body of the VRS.⁴⁶² The Main Staff directed and planned the conduct of army operations.⁴⁶³ It was responsible for the mobilisation, training, and deployment of troops; co-ordination between the Corps;⁴⁶⁴ the drafting of military documents;⁴⁶⁵ the engagement of armed forces;⁴⁶⁶ the relationship with UNPROFOR regarding military activities and cease-fires;⁴⁶⁷ and the implementation of discipline and control over subordinate units.⁴⁶⁸ The headquarters of the Main Staff was located at Crna Rijeka and the logistics (rear) command post was at Han Pijesak.⁴⁶⁹ The code name for the Main Staff command post was “Panorama”.⁴⁷⁰

170. As the Commander of the Main Staff, Mladić commanded the VRS in compliance with the authority that the President delegated to him.⁴⁷¹ He issued regulations, orders, and instructions relating to the implementation of orders that the President had issued.⁴⁷² **(But not only that! The Commander of the Main Staff issued all other operational commands and orders to the Corps Commanders, who were responsible to him.# #Distortion, Responsibility#!)**

⁴⁶¹ See para. 160. On 15 December 1992, the Accused reaffirmed the appointment of Mladić as Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS. P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court pp. 287, 293. Mladić was given an exceptional promotion to the rank of Colonel-General on 28 June 1994. P3046 (Radovan Karadžić’s Decree on promotion of Ratko Mladić, 28 June 1994), Reynaud Theunens, T. 16863 (19 July 2011). Mladić remained in that position until 8 November 1996. P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court pp. 287, 293; Ewan Brown, T. 21504–21505 (17 November 2011); P3914 (Ewan Brown’s expert report entitled “Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992”, 27 November 2002), para. 1.64; P1355 (Minutes of 16th Session of Assembly of SerBiH), 12 May 1992, p. 2; Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25439 (28 February 2012); P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff Structure for July 1995).

⁴⁶² D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 158; P4917 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility Report”, 9 June 2006), para. 2.0.

⁴⁶³ See, e.g., D2143 (VRS Main Staff Order, 18 April 1993); D2144 (VRS Main Staff Order, 18 April 1993); D2145 (VRS Main Staff Order, 8 May 1993).

⁴⁶⁴ See, e.g., P3037 (VRS Main Staff Order, 20 November 1992); P4475 (VRS Main Staff Order, 21 July 1995); P4498 (Report of 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade, 3 September 1992).

⁴⁶⁵ Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25495 (29 February 2012).

⁴⁶⁶ D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), pp. 7–13. See also P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court pp. 313–314.

⁴⁶⁷ D1019 (Ratko Mladić letter to UNPROFOR, 11 February 1995); D1020 (Ratko Mladić letter to UNPROFOR, 13 February 1995); P2273 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Ratko Mladić, 4 June 1995); P2278 (UNPROFOR report re aftermath of fall of Srebrenica, 13 July 1995); P2280 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Ratko Mladić, 19 July 1995); P2281 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Ratko Mladić, 26 July 1995); D1023 (Ratko Mladić letter to UNPROFOR, 24 February 1995); D1024 (Ratko Mladić letter to UNPROFOR, 3 March 1995); D1028 (UNPROFOR report re agreement on demilitarisation of Srebrenica, 18 April 1993); D2143 (VRS Main Staff Order, 18 April 1993). See also D2169 (Letter from Manojlo Milovanović to UNPROFOR Command, 30 March 1993).

⁴⁶⁸ D2161 (VRS Main Staff Order, 22 November 1992).

⁴⁶⁹ Petar Škrbić, T. 25988, 25998 (8 March 2012); Petar Škrbić, P4523 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 15468; D3688 (Excerpt from the Directive for use of the VRS, December 1993), p. 13. Crna Rijeka’s facility housed the VRS Main Staff Communications Centre, the 67th Communication Regiment, parts of the 65th Motorised Protection Regiment (“65th Protection Regiment”), the Staff Sector as well as the Administration for Planning, Development, and Finance and the Administration for Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence. The logistics sector and the sector for moral guidance, religious, and legal affairs was housed in Han Pijesak. Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25079–25081 (22 February 2012); P2794 (Witness statement of Ranko Vuković dated 24 May 2011), paras. 21–23.

⁴⁷⁰ Ranko Vuković, T. 15098–15099 (21 June 2011); Richard Butler, T. 27437–27438, 27518 (17 April 2012).

⁴⁷¹ P2603 (SerBiH Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), art. 175. See also P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court p. 299.

⁴⁷² P2603 (SerBiH Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), art. 175.

171. The Staff Sector, headed by Milovanović, who served as both Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander,⁴⁷³ consisted of several branches, including the Administration for Operations and Training headed by General Radivoje Miletić.⁴⁷⁴ The Chief of Staff and units subordinated to him were tasked with operative duties in relation to the services of the army, including planning and monitoring the situation on the ground.⁴⁷⁵

172. The Main Staff consisted of sectors and administrations, each providing specific technical expertise to the Main Staff Commander.⁴⁷⁶ The sectors and administrations headed by assistant commanders included (i) the Sector for Morale, Religious, and Legal Affairs, which included a Civil Affairs Administration, and was headed by General Milan Gvero;⁴⁷⁷ (ii) the Sector for Logistics, also called the Sector for Rear Services, headed by General Đordje Đukić;⁴⁷⁸ (iii) the Sector for Intelligence and Security Affairs headed by General Zdravko Tolimir,⁴⁷⁹ which was comprised of the Intelligence Administration headed by Colonel Petar Salapura and the Security Administration headed by Colonel Ljubiša Beara;⁴⁸⁰ (iv) the Sector for Organisation, Mobilisation, and Personnel Affairs headed by General Petar Škrbić;⁴⁸¹ (v) the Administration for Planning, Development, and Finance headed by General Stevo Tomić;⁴⁸² and (vi) the Administration for Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence headed by General Jovo Marić.⁴⁸³

⁴⁷³ Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25431–25432, 25442 (28 February 2012); Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 11929, 11935–11939, 12017–12021, 12138–12139, 12185; Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25106 (22 February 2012). See also P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff Structure for July 1995); P4917 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility Report”, 9 June 2006), paras. 2.6–2.9; P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 1.

⁴⁷⁴ Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25442 (28 February 2012); Petar Škrbić, P4523 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*, T. 15495–15503; Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 11929, 11931–11932, 11935, 11938, 11941–11944, 12091–12092, 12138–12139, 12185. See also P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff Structure for July 1995); P4917 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility Report”, 9 June 2006), paras. 2.6–2.9; P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 1. Ljubomir Obradović was the Chief of Staff of the operative detachment in the Administration for Operations and Training. Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 11929; P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff Structure for July 1995).

⁴⁷⁵ Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 11936.

⁴⁷⁶ Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25441–25442 (28 February 2012); Petar Škrbić, P4523 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*, T. 15495–15503; Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 11940, 12039–12040, 12134–12136; P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff Structure for July 1995). See also P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992–1995)”, e-court p. 311; P4917 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility Report”, 9 June 2006), para. 2.6.

⁴⁷⁷ Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25442 (28 February 2012); Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 11937, 11948; Petar Škrbić, P4523 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*, pp. 15495–15503. See, e.g., P4545 (VRS Main Staff document regarding the treatment of journalists and representatives of international organisations, 20 June 1992). See also P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff Structure for July 1995).

⁴⁷⁸ Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25442 (28 February 2012); Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 11937; Petar Škrbić, P4523 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*, pp. 15495–15503. See also P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff Structure for July 1995).

⁴⁷⁹ Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25442 (28 February 2012); Petar Škrbić, P4523 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*, T. 15495–15503; Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 11937–11949, 11962; D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), pp. 83–93. See also P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff Structure for July 1995).

⁴⁸⁰ Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 11949, 12191–12197; Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25124–25125 (23 February 2012); P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff Structure for July 1995); Ljubisa Beara, T. 45202–45203 (17 December 2013); Momir Nikolić, T. 24570 (13 February 2012); P4917 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility Report”, 9 June 2006), paras. 2.13–2.15; Adjudicated Fact 1461.

⁴⁸¹ Petar Škrbić, P4523 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*, T. 15467–15469; Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 11937; Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25442 (28 February 2012). See also Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25442 (28 February 2012); P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff Structure for July 1995).

⁴⁸² Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25442 (28 February 2012); Petar Škrbić, P4523 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*, T. 15495–15503. See also P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff Structure for July 1995).

⁴⁸³ Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25442 (28 February 2012); Petar Škrbić, P4523 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*, T. 15495–15503; Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 11937–11940. See also P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff Structure for July 1995); P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 1.

173. Directly linked to the Commander was the Department for Civilian Affairs headed by Colonel Miloš Đurđić.⁴⁸⁴ It was responsible for liaising with foreign military representatives and other organisations, and for co-ordinating between the VRS and international organisations regarding humanitarian aid.⁴⁸⁵ On 14 March 1995, the Accused issued a decision to form a State Committee for Co-operation with the United Nations and International Humanitarian Organs.⁴⁸⁶ **(Again, implicitly # EXCULPATORY#, since it indicated that the President felt a need to improve this co-operation, which meant he wasn't satisfied with it)** Koljević was appointed as its President, and Đurđić was appointed as the co-ordinator for the committee's relations with the Ministry of Defence and the VRS.⁴⁸⁷ Notwithstanding the formation of this committee, the Main Staff retained control of processing the authorisation for UNPROFOR re-supply convoys.⁴⁸⁸

174. On 2 August 1995, pursuant to a decision issued by the Accused, in his capacity as President and Supreme Commander, the Main Staff was renamed as the VRS General Staff and would be called the Supreme Command Staff in "times of war".⁴⁸⁹ According to this decision, which provided for Mladić's appointment as Special Advisor to the Supreme Commander, the Supreme Command Staff was to be under the direct command and control of the Supreme Commander.⁴⁹⁰ Mladić and the VRS Generals criticised and challenged the decision, which was annulled by the Accused on 27 August 1995.⁴⁹¹ **More than clear that it wasn't the case prior to this attempt!!!**

175. There were various units that were directly subordinated to the Main Staff. They included the 65th Protection Regiment, the 10th Sabotage Detachment, and the 67th Communication Regiment.⁴⁹²

⁴⁸⁴ Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*), T. 11963; Petar Škrbić, P4523 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 15539; Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25110–25112 (22 February 2012),

⁴⁸⁵ Slavko Kralj, D3245 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 29228, 29256; Petar Škrbić, P4523 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 15539; Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*), T. 11963; Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25110–25112 (22 February 2012).

⁴⁸⁶ P4543 (Decision of Radovan Karadžić, 14 March 1995), p. 1. *See also* Slavko Kralj, D3245 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 29233–29234.

⁴⁸⁷ P4543 (Decision of Radovan Karadžić, 14 March 1995), p. 3; Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25443 (28 February 2012); Slavko Kralj, D3245 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 29233–29244; Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25110–25112 (22 February 2012).

⁴⁸⁸ Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25110–25112 (22 February 2012), T. 25133–25134 (23 February 2012); P4447 (Order of Radovan Karadžić, 24 April 1994); P839 (VRS Report regarding UN convoys, 7 April 1995); Slavko Kralj, D3245 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 29233–29244, 29258. *See also* D4842 (VRS Main Staff notification, 28 March 1995). Prior to the establishment of that committee, the Main Staff issued decisions regarding humanitarian convoys, and the VRS was charged with monitoring the convoys, ensuring their safe passage, and allowing their entry where aid was needed. Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25443–25444 (28 February 2012); Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25110–25115 (22 February 2012), T. 25139–25140 (23 February 2012); D2172 (Letter from Radovan Karadžić to VRS Main Staff, 8 January 1994); P4448 (VRS Main Staff Report, 6 March 1995). *See, e.g.,* for the period of October 1993: D2109 (VRS Main Staff Notification, 25 September 1993); D2110 (VRS Main Staff Notification, 2 October 1993); D2111 (VRS Main Staff Notification, 8 October 1993); D2112 (VRS Main Staff Notification, 15 October 1993).

⁴⁸⁹ D3879 (Radovan Karadžić's Decision, 2 August 1995); P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens's expert report entitled "Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)"), e-court pp. 569–571.

⁴⁹⁰ D3879 (Radovan Karadžić's Decision, 2 August 1995); D2157 (Radovan Karadžić's Decree, 4 August 1995). *See also* Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25669–25670 (1 March 2012); Petar Škrbić, T. 26027–26028 (8 March 2012); P5156 (Fax from UNPROFOR, attaching a press release from Radovan Karadžić, 4 August 1995), p. 2.

⁴⁹¹ D4861 (Letter from Radovan Karadžić to VRS Main Staff, 27 August 1995); P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens's expert report entitled "Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)"), e-court pp. 572–579.

⁴⁹² Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25119–25125 (23 February 2012); Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*), T. 11934, 11960–11961; P4487 (VRS Main Staff Order, 4 December 1994); P4524 (VRS Main Staff Order, 25 December 1994); Petar Škrbić, T. 25969–25970 (7 March 2012); Dragan Todorović, P4350 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 13991–13992 (under seal); P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens's expert report entitled "Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)"), e-court pp. 315–317. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 1462; P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff Structure for July 1995). The 67th Communication Regiment was in charge of organising and providing the communication needs of the Main Staff. Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*), T. 11934; Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25119–25121 (23 February 2012). This regiment trained the VRS and MUP units in all aspects of communications. Ranko Vuković, T. 15085–15086 (21 June 2011).

176. The 65th Protection Regiment was commanded by Colonel Milomir Savčić.⁴⁹³ The main tasks of the 65th Protection Regiment included providing security to the Main Staff and carrying out its orders.⁴⁹⁴ It was also tasked with carrying out “counter-sabotage and anti-terrorist tasks”.⁴⁹⁵ Its headquarters was in Crna Rijeka.⁴⁹⁶ The MP Battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment was commanded by Major Zoran Malinić.⁴⁹⁷ Along the professional chain of command, it reported to the Security Administration headed by Colonel Ljubiša Beara.⁴⁹⁸ The MP headquarters was in Nova Kasaba.⁴⁹⁹

177. As a special unit of the Main Staff and directly subordinated to the Intelligence Administration,⁵⁰⁰ the 10th Sabotage Detachment consisted of to approximately 50 to 60 men divided into two platoons.⁵⁰¹ It was commanded by Milorad Pelemiš.⁵⁰² The 1st platoon was based in Vlasenica, commanded by Franc Kos, and the 2nd platoon was based in Bijeljina, commanded by Luka Jokić.⁵⁰³ The detachment was primarily used for wartime sabotage activities.⁵⁰⁴ It also engaged in reconnaissance missions because it was subordinated to the Intelligence Administration.⁵⁰⁵ The members of the 10th Sabotage Detachment had several uniforms in July 1995, including a black uniform, a VRS uniform, a uniform of the US Army, a uniform of the ABiH, and a uniform of the HVO.⁵⁰⁶ **(#Not to forget the multi-ethnic composition#! There can not be excluded the possibility that this multi-ethnicity was a decisive for picking up some members of this unit, without approval of their commander Pelemis, to do this criminal act, and thus secure the secret to be concealed for some time, and revealed when convenient to those who ordered it. #a “Dark room”, obscure responsibility!#)**

⁴⁹³ D3918 (Witness statement of Milomir Savčić, undated), para. 24; Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25442 (28 February 2012); Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25123 (23 February 2012); Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*), T. 11962–11963; P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff Structure for July 1995); P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 1; P4917 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility Report”, 9 June 2006), para. 4.0.

⁴⁹⁴ Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25442 (28 February 2012); Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*), T. 11962–11963; Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25123 (23 February 2012); P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff Structure for July 1995); P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 1; P4917 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility Report”, 9 June 2006), para. 4.0; D3918 (Witness statement of Milomir Savčić, undated), para. 25. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 1462.

⁴⁹⁵ D3918 (Witness statement of Milomir Savčić, undated), para. 25.

⁴⁹⁶ D3918 (Witness statement of Milomir Savčić, undated), para. 27.

⁴⁹⁷ D3918 (Witness statement of Milomir Savčić, undated), para. 26.

⁴⁹⁸ P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff Structure for July 1995).

⁴⁹⁹ D3918 (Witness statement of Milomir Savčić, undated), para. 26.

⁵⁰⁰ Dražen Erdemović, P332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 10931–10935; Petar Salapura, T. 40236 (24 June 2013); P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 1; Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*), T. 11960.

⁵⁰¹ Dražen Erdemović, P332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 10931–10932; Dragan Todorović, P4353 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 13991–13993.

⁵⁰² Dražen Erdemović, P332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 10935; D3927 (Witness statement of Franc Kos dated 26 July 2013), pp. 3, 5; Dragan Todorović, P4353 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 13994.

⁵⁰³ D3927 (Witness statement of Franc Kos dated 26 July 2013), pp. 3–4; Dražen Erdemović, P332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 10931–10932; Dragan Todorović, P4353 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 13991–13993.

⁵⁰⁴ Dragan Todorović, P4353 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 13991–13993; Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25121–25123 (23 February 2012).

⁵⁰⁵ Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*), T. 11960–11961; Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25121–25123 (23 February 2012). *See also* Dražen Erdemović, P332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 10934–10935, 10950.

⁵⁰⁶ Dražen Erdemović, P332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 10939.

5. VRS Corps

178. While the Main Staff would provide general guidance to the Corps on the various objectives, it was the responsibility of the Corps to plan the details of combat operations and to conduct them on the ground within their designated zone.⁵⁰⁷

a. 1st Krajina Corps

179. The 1st Krajina Corps was commanded by General Major Talić from 17 March 1992 and he remained the Commander during the Indictment period.⁵⁰⁸ Its headquarters was in Banja Luka.⁵⁰⁹ The 1st Krajina Corps consisted of various brigades (motorised and light infantry), regiments, and battalions.⁵¹⁰

180. The area of responsibility of the 1st Krajina Corps, which was initially identical to the area of responsibility of the 5th JNA Corps,⁵¹¹ included Bosanska Krupa, Banja Luka, Gradiska, Prijedor, Kotor Varoš, Ključ, and Sanski Most.⁵¹² The corps was strengthened by light infantry brigades, which were created from both Serb TO units and newly mobilised personnel.⁵¹³ The corps was also supplemented by volunteers who were assigned to units and to the headquarters.⁵¹⁴

b. Eastern Bosnia Corps

181. Headquartered in Bijeljina,⁵¹⁵ the Eastern Bosnia Corps' area of responsibility was in northeast BiH, with the Sava River to the north and Drina River to the east.⁵¹⁶ However, before the creation of the Drina Corps in November 1992, it also extended as far south as Zvornik and Vlasenica.⁵¹⁷ In May 1992, the Corps Commander was Colonel Nikola Denčić, who was replaced

⁵⁰⁷ Richard Butler, T. 27452 (17 April 2012), T. 3765, 3770–3771 (15 June 2010); P4913 (Richard Butler's expert report entitled "VRS Corps Command Responsibility Report", 5 April 2000), para. 1.6. The Corps command would brief the details of an operation to the Main Staff. The Main staff would then review the operation and give its approval. Richard Butler, T. 27452 (7 April 2012).

⁵⁰⁸ Ewan Brown, T. 21536 (17 November 2011); P3914 (Ewan Brown's expert report entitled "Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992", 27 November 2002), paras. 1.72–1.73, 3.5; Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*), T. 11963–11964. See also Adjudicated Fact 511.

⁵⁰⁹ P3914 (Ewan Brown's expert report entitled "Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992", 27 November 2002), para. 1.72.

⁵¹⁰ P3920 (Order of 1st Krajina Corps, 21 May 1992), p. 4. See also Ewan Brown, T. 21536 (17 November 2011); P3914 (Ewan Brown's expert report entitled "Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992", 27 November 2002), paras. 1.76, 1.81.

⁵¹¹ P3914 (Ewan Brown's expert report entitled "Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992", 27 November 2002), para. 1.85; P5433 (1st Krajina Corps document analysing combat readiness in 1992, February 1993), pp. 2–4; P3656 (1st Krajina Corps report, 1 June 1992).

⁵¹² P3914 (Ewan Brown's expert report entitled "Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992", 27 November 2002), paras. 1.85–1.97; P5433 (1st Krajina Corps document analysing combat readiness in 1992, February 1993), pp. 2–4; P3656 (1st Krajina Corps report, 1 June 1992); KDZ163, P3716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 5365 (under seal). The Corps began its operations with 1,650 men, but by June 1992 it had approximately 25,000 men, and by April 1993, 72,330 men. P5433 (1st Krajina Corps document analysing combat readiness in 1992, February 1993), p. 2; D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 76.

⁵¹³ P3914 (Ewan Brown's expert report entitled "Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992", 27 November 2002), para. 1.81.

⁵¹⁴ P5433 (1st Krajina Corps document analysing combat readiness in 1992, February 1993), pp. 18–19; P3914 (Ewan Brown's expert report entitled "Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992", 27 November 2002), para. 1.82.

⁵¹⁵ P3035 (Decision of Army of SerBiH, 15 June 1992), p. 2.

⁵¹⁶ Momčilo Mandić, T. 5103–5104 (14 July 2010); P4919 (Map of BiH marked by Richard Butler); Richard Butler, T. 27434 (17 April 2012); P2796 (Map showing communications plan of Drina Corps).

⁵¹⁷ P5400 (Order of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 7 June 1992), p. 1.

by Colonel Dragutin Ilić on 7 June 1992.⁵¹⁸ In July 1995, General Novica Simić was the Corps Commander.⁵¹⁹ The Chief of Security was Dušan Tanasković.⁵²⁰

182. The Eastern Bosnia Corps was a small corps in terms of troop numbers.⁵²¹ By 7 June 1992, it consisted of eight brigades, namely, the Posavina Brigade, the Brčko Brigade, the 1st Semberija Brigade, the 2nd Semberija Brigade, the 1st Majevisa Brigade, the 2nd Majevisa Brigade, the Zvornik Brigade, and the Birač Brigade.⁵²²

c. **SRK**

183. The area of responsibility of the SRK was the greater Sarajevo area between Višegrad, Kladanj, and Igman, which was the former zone of responsibility of the 4th JNA Corps.⁵²³ The SRK's main forces were positioned around the inner ring of Sarajevo, in the areas of Ilidža, Nedarići, and Grbavica.⁵²⁴ The rear command post of the SRK was immediately northwest of Pale town while the main command post was at the Lukavica barracks.⁵²⁵

184. Colonel Tomislav Šipčić was the Commander of the SRK from 8 July to early August 1992.⁵²⁶ General Stanislav Galić was the Commander from 10 September 1992 until August 1994.⁵²⁷ Thereafter, Dragomir Milošević, the SRK Chief of Staff, assumed command.⁵²⁸

⁵¹⁸ KDZ531, T. 15847–15848 (1 July 2011) (closed session); Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21676–21677; D1457 (Order of Eastern Bosnia Corps Command, 6 June 1992); P3384 (Report of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 7 June 1992).

⁵¹⁹ Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*), T. 11964; P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff Structure for July 1995). *See also* Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21676–21677.

⁵²⁰ KDZ531, T. 15847–15848 (1 July 2011) (closed session).

⁵²¹ Momčilo Mandić, T. 5103–5104 (14 July 2010); P4919 (Map of BiH marked by Richard Butler); Richard Butler, T. 27434 (17 April 2012); P2796 (Map showing communications plan of Drina Corps).

⁵²² P5400 (Order of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 7 June 1992), pp. 3–6; P3172 (Report of Birač Brigade, 6 July 1992); P3171 (Combat Report of the Eastern Bosnia Corps, 6 July 1992), p. 2. In addition to the brigades, the Eastern Bosnia Corps had an engineering detachment, an anti-aircraft light artillery regiment, the Smoluce infantry battalion, the Okresanice infantry battalion, and the Bijeljina mixed artillery regiment, as well as a combat security and a logistics security section. P5400 (Order of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 7 June 1992), pp. 3–6; P3171 (Combat Report of the Eastern Bosnia Corps, 6 July 1992), p. 2.

⁵²³ *See* Adjudicated Facts 20, 2823; P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens's expert report entitled "Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)"), pp. 444–445; Richard Philipps, T. 3747 (15 June 2010), T. 3897–3899 (16 June 2010); C1 (Map of Sarajevo, Marked by Richard Philipps).

⁵²⁴ *See* Adjudicated Fact 21. From August 1994 to November 1995, the SRK's areas of responsibility included Ilidža, Osijek, Butila, Blažuj, Lukavica, Ilijaš, Vrace, Grbavica, Zlatište, parts of Dobrinja, the area up to Mount Trebević, the hills south and southwest of Sarajevo, Rajlovac, Špicasta Stijena, the northeast of Sarajevo, Nedžarići (north of the airport), and Vogošća. Most of Grbavica was controlled by the SRK but it was surrounded on three sides by the ABiH. On the eastern confrontation line in Grbavica, the area from the Vrbanja Bridge towards the Jewish cemetery up to Debelo Brdo was controlled by the SRK. There were two confrontations lines and control over areas of Dobrinja was divided between the SRK and ABiH. *See* Adjudicated Facts 2824, 2826, 2828, 2832, 2833, 2835, 2840, 2841. For more detail, *see* Section IV.B.1: Sarajevo component (Facts).

⁵²⁵ P989 (Witness statement of Richard Philipps dated 25 May 2010), pp. 11, 17; KDZ088, T. 6277–6278 (7 September 2010) (closed session).

⁵²⁶ P1510 (Radovan Karadžić's Order, 8 July 1992) (under seal); [REDACTED]. *See also* P993 (Organisation chart of SRK, 1992-1994); P989 (Witness statement of Richard Philipps dated 25 May 2010), p. 11. Šipčić took over command of the SRK on 19 May 1992 but his official appointment came on 8 July 1992 and he left the SRK in early August 1992. [REDACTED]; Stanislav Galić, T. 37154–37155 (15 April 2013); P1478 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 279–280.

⁵²⁷ Stanislav Galić, T. 37155 (15 April 2013); P993 (Organisation chart of SRK, 1992-1994); P994 (Organisation chart of SRK, 1994-1995); P989 (Witness statement of Richard Philipps dated 25 May 2010), p. 11. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 27. On 16 December 1992, the Accused awarded Galić an exceptional promotion to the rank of Major-General. P2650 (Radovan Karadžić's decree on exceptional promotion, 16 December 1992). He was awarded an early promotion to the rank of Lieutenant-General on 7 August 1994 by the Accused. P2649 (Radovan Karadžić's decree on early promotion, 7 August 1994).

⁵²⁸ Dragomir Milošević, T. 32503 (23 January 2013) (testifying that he was commander until early 1996); P2678 (Radovan Karadžić's decree on appointment of Dragomir Milošević as SRK Commander, 8 August 1994), p. 2 (appointing Dragomir Milošević as SRK Commander effective as of 15 August 1994); P994 (Organisation chart of SRK, 1994-1995); P989 (Witness statement of Richard Philipps dated 25 May 2010), pp. 11–12. On 24 March 1994, Dragomir Milošević was awarded an exceptional promotion to the rank of Major-General by the Accused. P2677 (Radovan Karadžić's decree on Dragomir Milošević's promotion, 24 March 1994). *See also* Adjudicated Fact 27; P2676 (Radovan Karadžić's decree on appointment of Dragomir Milošević as SRK Chief of Staff, 10 July 1993) (appointing Dragomir Milošević as Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of the SRK).

Dragomir Milošević remained Corps Commander until 1996.⁵²⁹ During the period covered by the Indictment, the Chiefs of Staff were Dragan Marčetić,⁵³⁰ Dragomir Milošević,⁵³¹ and Čedo Sladoje,⁵³² successively.

185. There were four staff divisions and a liaison division within the Corps headquarters.⁵³³ The operational division was headed by the Assistant Corps Commander for Organisation and Mobilisation.⁵³⁴ Its main responsibility was ensuring the operations and training of the troops.⁵³⁵ The morale division was headed by the Assistant Corps Commander for Morale, Legal, and Religious Affairs and responsible for informing the Corps Commander about the status of morale within the corps.⁵³⁶ The security division was headed by the Assistant Corps Commander for Intelligence and Security and responsible for disseminating intelligence information.⁵³⁷ The logistics division was headed by the Assistant Commander for Logistics and Corps Rear Services.⁵³⁸ Finally, the liaison division was responsible for liaising with UNPROFOR.⁵³⁹

186. The SRK had approximately 18,000 troops.⁵⁴⁰ The number of operative units, in particular brigades and battalions, varied between 1992 and 1995.⁵⁴¹ The brigades included the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade, the 2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade, the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised (Motorised) Brigade, the Koševo Light Infantry Brigade, the 3rd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade,⁵⁴² the 4th Srpska Light Infantry Brigade, the Rogatica Brigade, the Igman Infantry Brigade, the Ilidža Light Infantry Brigade, the Ilijaš Light Infantry Brigade, the Vogošća Light Infantry Brigade, and the Rajlovac Light Infantry Brigade.⁵⁴³ Brigades were supported by

⁵²⁹ Dragomir Milošević, T. 32503 (23 January 2013); P989 (Witness statement of Richard Philipps dated 25 May 2010), pp. 11–12.

⁵³⁰ From 29 September 1992 to 20 June 1993. P997 (List of SRK personnel), p. 11; P994 (Organisation chart of SRK, 1994-1995).

⁵³¹ From 6 July 1993 to August 1994. P997 (List of SRK personnel), p. 13; P994 (Organisation chart of SRK, 1994-1995).

⁵³² From August 1994 to September 1995. P994 (Organisation chart of SRK, 1994-1995).

⁵³³ P989 (Witness statement of Richard Philipps dated 25 May 2010), pp. 12–14.

⁵³⁴ P989 (Witness statement of Richard Philipps dated 25 May 2010), p. 13.

⁵³⁵ P989 (Witness statement of Richard Philipps dated 25 May 2010), p. 13.

⁵³⁶ P989 (Witness statement of Richard Philipps dated 25 May 2010), p. 13.

⁵³⁷ P989 (Witness statement of Richard Philipps dated 25 May 2010), p. 14.

⁵³⁸ P989 (Witness statement of Richard Philipps dated 25 May 2010), p. 14.

⁵³⁹ P989 (Witness statement of Richard Philipps dated 25 May 2010), p. 14.

⁵⁴⁰ Dragomir Milošević, T. 32744 (28 January 2013). KDZ304 estimated that the SRK had between 13,000 to 15,000 soldiers. P2407 (Witness statement of KDZ304), e-court p. 7. David Harland testified that the UN estimate was approximately 20,000 troops in the SRK. David Harland, T. 2106 (7 May 2010).

⁵⁴¹ Stanislav Galić, T. 37157 (15 April 2013); D3864 (Radovan Radinović's expert report entitled "The Control Authority of Dr. Radovan Karadžić in the Strategic Command System of the VRS", 2012), para. 249. See also P1505 (SRK Order, 22 May 1992); P1509 (Order of JNA 4th Corps, 17 May 1992). [REDACTED]. Galić testified that when he arrived at the SRK (in September 1992), there were "nine light brigades [...] a mixed anti-armour regiment, a mixed armour artillery regiment [...] a light artillery regiment [...] a battalion, communications battalion, medical battalion, and transport battalion". Stanislav Galić, T. 37157 (15 April 2013). The areas of responsibility of each brigade were discussed by Stanislav Galić, T. 37157–37168, 37178–37185 (15 April 2013); D3381 (Map of Sarajevo marked by Stanislav Galić). KDZ304 stated that the SRK had 11 brigades "deployed within and outside the exclusion zone". P2407 (Witness statement of KDZ304), e-court p. 7. See also P1021 (VRS map of Sarajevo); P6295 (VRS map of Sarajevo); D718 (Map of Sarajevo and surrounding areas); D311 (VRS map of Sarajevo); P842 (VRS map of Sarajevo, 31 August 1995); P1494 (ABiH map of Sarajevo, 15 June–20 July 1992); D2788 (Map of Sarajevo marked by Dragomir Milošević).

⁵⁴² In late 1993, the Vogošća Light Infantry Brigade was renamed the 3rd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade and both the Rajlovac Brigade and Koševo Brigade were incorporated into the 3rd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade. P989 (Witness statement of Richard Philipps dated 25 May 2010), pp. 9, 15; P993 (Organisation chart of SRK, 1992-1994); Stanislav Galić, T. 37182–37183 (15 April 2013) (testifying that the Vogošća Brigade merged with the Rajlovac and Centar Brigades to make the 3rd Sarajevo Brigade), T. 37539 (22 April 2013) (testifying that it was the Koševo or Centar Brigade, "depending on what we called it at which point"), T. 37969 (8 May 2013); D2774 (Witness statement of Milenko Indić dated 19 January 2013), para. 21 (stating that the Koševo and Rajlovac Brigades merged to become the 3rd Sarajevo Brigade).

⁵⁴³ P993 (Organisation chart of SRK, 1992-1994); P994 (Organisation chart of SRK, 1994-1995); P989 (Witness statement of Richard Philipps dated 25 May 2010), pp. 9–10; D2774 (Witness statement of Milenko Indić dated 19 January 2013), para. 21.

an artillery group, an anti-aircraft defence light artillery regiment, an engineering battalion, and a medical battalion.⁵⁴⁴ The SRK also had an MP company.⁵⁴⁵

187. When the Drina Corps was established in November 1992, the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade and the Rogatica Brigade became part of the Drina Corps.⁵⁴⁶

188. In general, the names and areas of responsibility for the SRK brigades were based on the locations of the brigades.⁵⁴⁷ For example, the Ilidža Light Infantry Brigade was deployed in Ilidža and held positions in Nedžarići towards Dobrinja, Alipašino Polje and the Stup Junction, as well as Golo Brdo in the southwest area of Sarajevo.⁵⁴⁸

189. The Igman Infantry Brigade controlled the areas of Blazuj and Hadžići.⁵⁴⁹ The 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade held positions east of Mojmiro Brdo, near eastern Dobrinja, Zlatište, and Grbavica through the Jewish cemetery until Debelo Brdo.⁵⁵⁰ The 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade controlled the areas of Grbavica to Vraca, the area below Mount Trebević and the Jewish cemetery.⁵⁵¹ The 2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade held positions in the southern area of Sarajevo, in Dobrinja, Grlinca, and Vojkovići towards Lukavica.⁵⁵² The Famos factory separated the 2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade from the ABiH's 104th Motorised Brigade in Hrasnica.⁵⁵³ The 3rd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade was deployed in the southeastern area of Sarajevo and its zone of responsibility included Rajlovac, Vogosča, and an area towards Hresa.⁵⁵⁴

⁵⁴⁴ P998 (SRK instructions, 7 June 1992); Stanislav Galić, T. 37156–37157 (15 April 2013); D3864 (Radovan Radinović's expert report entitled "The Control Authority of Dr. Radovan Karadžić in the Strategic Command System of the VRS", 2012), para. 249 (support units also included engineering, atomic/biological/chemical, transport, communications, etc.). See also P989 (Witness statement of Richard Philipps dated 25 May 2010), pp. 10, 19; P996 (List of SRK entities); P1002 (SRK report on deployments of artillery units, 14 June 1992); P1009 (Order of Chief of Artillery of SRK, 11 October 1992).

⁵⁴⁵ P2645 (Radovan Karadžić's order to VRS Main Staff, MUP and Ministry of Defence, 20 May 1992); P996 (List of SRK entities), pp. 8, 24–25.

⁵⁴⁶ Stanislav Galić, T. 37156–37158 (15 April 2013). See also P976 (Directive 4, 19 November 1992), p. 2 (noting the establishment of the Drina Corps).

⁵⁴⁷ Stanislav Galić, T. 37159 (15 April 2013).

⁵⁴⁸ Stanislav Galić, T. 37159, 37161–37168, 37179 (15 April 2013); D3381 (Map of Sarajevo marked by Stanislav Galić); D3382 (Map of Sarajevo). See also Dragomir Milošević, T. 32512 (23 January 2013), T. 32781 (28 January 2013), T. 32803 (29 January 2013); D2819 (SRK combat report, 10 July 1992); D2828 (SRK combat report, 10 August 1994); D3429 (SRK combat report, 4 September 1993), para. 5. On 10 December 1992, having taken control of the Stup junction, the Ilidža Brigade controlled the area of Oteš and Energoinvest in the west. Stanislav Galić, T. 37161–37163 (15 April 2013); D3381 (Map of Sarajevo marked by Stanislav Galić).

⁵⁴⁹ Stanislav Galić, T. 37180 (15 April 2013); Dragomir Milošević, T. 32512–32513 (23 January 2013).

⁵⁵⁰ Stanislav Galić, T. 37184 (15 April 2013), T. 37339–37340 (16 April 2013), T. 37369 (18 April 2013), T. 37540–37541 (22 April 2013); D340 (SRK combat report, 1 June 1993); D2823 (SRK combat report, 6 November 1994), para. 1; D2828 (SRK combat report, 10 August 1994); D3403 (SRK combat report, 12 February 1993), para. 2; D3456 (SRK combat report, 22 July 1994), para. 1; D3864 (Radovan Radinović's expert report entitled "The Control Authority of Dr. Radovan Karadžić in the Strategic Command System of the VRS", 2012), para. 256. Galić testified both that the SRK did and did not have control of the Sucuri settlement, an area near Mojmiro Brdo and Dobrinja. See Stanislav Galić, T. 37408 (18 April 2013), T. 37542 (22 April 2013). See also Blagoje Kovačević, T. 29041–29044 (18 October 2012).

⁵⁵¹ Dragomir Milošević, T. 32499–32501 (23 January 2013); Stanislav Galić, T. 37184 (15 April 2013), T. 37360 (18 April 2013); D3412 (SRK combat report, 19 May 1993), p. 1. Stevan Veljović stated that the zone of responsibility was "Zlatište on the right, Đukića Potok on the left, and as far back as Tilava-Tvrđinići". D2351 (Witness statement of Stevan Veljović dated 19 October 2012), para. 12. Veljović testified that Zlatište became part of the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade's area of responsibility later and that the composition of a brigade would change and the zone would change slightly too. Stevan Veljović, T. 29249–29250 (23 October 2012).

⁵⁵² Dragomir Milošević, T. 32523 (23 January 2013), T. 32743–32744, 32784 (28 January 2013); D3445 (SRK combat report, 7 June 1993), para. 1(c). In total, the 2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade had about 1,200 persons registered. However, Dragomir Milošević testified that he could only depend on approximately 800 to 1,000 to be ready for combat. Dragomir Milošević, T. 32523 (23 January 2013), T. 32743–32744, 32784 (28 January 2013). The 2nd Sarajevo Brigade was also referred to as the 2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade. D2809 (SRK combat report, 13 September 1993).

⁵⁵³ The confrontation line was a single wall in the factory. Dragomir Milošević, T. 32787–32789 (29 January 2013), T. 33179–33180 (5 February 2013); D2903 (SRK combat report, 25 May 1995).

⁵⁵⁴ Stanislav Galić, T. 37538–37539 (22 April 2013), T. 37969 (8 May 2013); Dragomir Milošević, T. 32513 (23 January 2013).

(So far, concerning the SRK, the #Judgement did not care about whose the settlements under the SRK control were, who lived there, although it is crucial to determine for any civil war#. In a criminal case it is a fundamental fact in establishing nature of skirmish, whether it was offensive or defensive one. Naturally, defensive actions are always reactive, and no one could start defensive action unless attacked. #Obscure picture! #Offensive-defensive!)

d. Drina Corps

190. The Drina Corps' area of responsibility was the Podrinje region, which included the municipalities of Srebrenica, Bratunac, Vlasenica, Milići, Šekovići, and Zvornik.⁵⁵⁵ The Drina Corps headquarters was first based in Han Pijesak and later moved to Vlasenica.⁵⁵⁶ The specific objective of the Drina Corps was to secure the middle Podrinje region, including the municipalities of Srebrenica, Bratunac, and Zvornik.⁵⁵⁷

191. General Milenko Živanović assumed the role of Drina Corps Commander at the time of its formation in November 1992.⁵⁵⁸ Colonel Radislav Krstić was the Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of the Drina Corps from 29 September 1994.⁵⁵⁹ He became the Corps Commander on 13 July 1995.⁵⁶⁰

192. The Security Department of the Drina Corps was headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Vujadin Popović in April 1995, and it was responsible for issues of security in the corps, including the arrest and detention of prisoners of war and other persons.⁵⁶¹ The MP battalion was commanded by Lieutenant Ratko Vujović.⁵⁶²

193. By July 1995, the Drina Corps was composed of the following subordinate units, including the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade ("Bratunac Brigade"), 1st Zvornik Light Infantry Brigade ("Zvornik Brigade"), 1st Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade, 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade, 1st Birač Infantry Brigade, 1st Milići Light Infantry Brigade, 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, 5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, and Skelani Independent Battalion.⁵⁶³ These units were supported by the 5th Mixed Artillery Regiment, 5th Engineer Battalion, 5th Communications Battalion, and 5th MP Battalion.⁵⁶⁴

⁵⁵⁵ P4917 (Richard Butler's expert report entitled "VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility Report", 9 June 2006), paras. 3.0–3.3; P4941 (Srebrenica court binder containing maps), p. 5. See also P976 (Directive 4, 19 November 1992), p. 2; Adjudicated Facts 1421, 1442.

⁵⁵⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 1444. See also P6566 (Order of VRS Main Staff, 20 October 1992).

⁵⁵⁷ Richard Butler, T. 27423–27434 (17 April 2012); P976 (Directive 4, 19 November 1992), pp. 2, 5. See also D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 73; P4941 (Srebrenica court binder containing maps), p. 5.

⁵⁵⁸ Adjudicated Fact 1450.

⁵⁵⁹ Radislav Krstić, D4136 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krstić*) T. 5972. See also Adjudicated Fact 1451. Krstić was promoted to Major-General on 2 May 1995. D3951 (Order of Drina Corps, 2 May 1995).

⁵⁶⁰ P4485 (Drina Corps information, 13 July 1995).

⁵⁶¹ D3993 (Witness Statement of Vujadin Popović dated 2 November 2013), para. 3; Momir Nikolić, T. 24569–24570 (13 February 2012). See also Adjudicated Fact 1453; D2243 (Instructions from the Drina Corps, 15 April 1995); P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 2.

⁵⁶² P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 2; KDZ391, P4761 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 32567–32568, 32599–32600 (under seal).

⁵⁶³ P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 2. See also Adjudicated Fact 1448.

⁵⁶⁴ See Adjudicated Fact 1448.

194. Code names were used to refer to the corps commands and other operative units, such as “Palma” for the Zvornik Brigade, “Badem” for the Bratunac Brigade and “Zlata” for the Command of the Drina Corps.⁵⁶⁵

i. Bratunac Brigade

195. In July 1995, the Bratunac Brigade was headquartered in Bratunac town and commanded by Colonel Vidoje Blagojević.⁵⁶⁶ Major Novica Pajić was the Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander.⁵⁶⁷ The Bratunac Brigade branches consisted of three branches: Rear Service commanded by Major Dragoslav Trišić; Morale, Legal and Religious Affairs commanded by Major Ratimir Jevtić; and the Security and Intelligence Organ commanded by Captain Momir Nikolić, with Dragiša Jovanović as his deputy.⁵⁶⁸

196. The Bratunac Brigade had four infantry battalions;⁵⁶⁹ an MP platoon commanded by Mirko Janković;⁵⁷⁰ an Artillery Company; and a Logistics Company.⁵⁷¹

197. Momir Nikolić was the Chief of the Security and Intelligence Organ from November 1992 until the end of the conflict.⁵⁷² The responsibilities of the Security and Intelligence Organ included collecting, processing, analysing, and forwarding intelligence data to commanding personnel, assessing counter-intelligence threats, and taking measures to repel sabotage of the unit’s arsenal, personnel and equipment.⁵⁷³ Nikolić reported to the Drina Corps Intelligence and Security Organ.⁵⁷⁴ Nikolić also acted as liaison officer to UNMOs, UNPROFOR, and other international organisations in the Srebrenica area in 1995.⁵⁷⁵

⁵⁶⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 1460.

⁵⁶⁶ P4914 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation ‘Krivaja 95’”, 1 November 2002), paras. 2.8, 3.6, 13.2; Momir Nikolić, T. 24568–24569 (13 February 2012); Mile Janjić, P1194 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić*), T. 9781; KW582, D4291 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić*), T. 3627; D4189 (Witness statement of Vidoje Blagojević dated 8 October 2013), pp. 1–2; P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 4. See also Adjudicated Facts 1458, 1459, 1636.

⁵⁶⁷ P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 4; P4914 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation ‘Krivaja 95’”, 1 November 2002), para. 2.8.

⁵⁶⁸ P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 4; P4914 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation ‘Krivaja 95’”, 1 November 2002), para. 2.8; Momir Nikolić, T. 24715 (14 February 2012); D4189 (Witness statement of Vidoje Blagojević dated 8 October 2013), p. 4; KW582, D4291 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić*), T. 3662. See also Adjudicated Facts 1520, 1868.

⁵⁶⁹ P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 4; P4914 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation ‘Krivaja 95’”, 1 November 2002), para. 2.8. The battalions included: the 1st Battalion, commanded by Lazar Ostojić; the 2nd Battalion, commanded by Goran Stakić; the 3rd Battalion, commanded by Dragomir Zekić; and the 4th Battalion, commanded by Radika Petrović. P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 4; P4914 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation ‘Krivaja 95’”, 1 November 2002), para. 2.8. The 4th Battalion operated on the Bratunac-Konjević Polje Road area since September 1993 and was assigned to the Zvornik Brigade. However, it was commanded by the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade who had operational control over combat related activities and controlled this unit until 19 July 1995. P4914 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation ‘Krivaja 95’”, 1 November 2002), para. 6.15–6.16. See also Momir Nikolić, T. 24563 (13 February 2013). The 3rd Infantry Battalion had an intervention platoon called the “Red Berets”. P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 4; P4914 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation ‘Krivaja 95’”, 1 November 2002), para. 2.8.

⁵⁷⁰ Momir Nikolić, T. 24570 (13 February 2012), T. 24651, 24681, 24721 (14 February 2012), T. 24864 (16 February 2012); KW582, D4290 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić*), T. 3499–3500 (under seal); Mile Janjić, P372 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 17951, 17968; P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 4; P4914 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation ‘Krivaja 95’”, 1 November 2002), para. 2.8.

⁵⁷¹ P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 4.

⁵⁷² Momir Nikolić, T. 24558 (13 February 2012).

⁵⁷³ Momir Nikolić, T. 24565, 24567–24569 (13 February 2012); D4189 (Witness statement of Vidoje Blagojević dated 8 October 2013), p. 4.

⁵⁷⁴ Momir Nikolić, T. 24569 (13 February 2012).

⁵⁷⁵ Momir Nikolić, T. 24572–24578 (13 February 2012).

ii. Zvornik Brigade

198. In July 1995, the Zvornik Brigade was headquartered at the Standard Barracks in Karakaj on the Konjević Polje-Zvornik-Bijeljina road.⁵⁷⁶

199. It was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Vinko Pandurević.⁵⁷⁷ Major Dragan Obrenović served as Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander.⁵⁷⁸ The brigade staff included the Intelligence Section, with Duško Vukotić as the Assistant Chief.⁵⁷⁹ The organs of the Zvornik Brigade were headed by three Assistant Commanders subordinated to Pandurević.⁵⁸⁰ Sreten Milošević was the head of the Logistics Organ.⁵⁸¹ Drago Nikolić was the head of the Security Organ, with Milorad Trbić as his deputy.⁵⁸² Nikolić's immediate superior at the brigade level was Pandurević but his professional superior was Popović.⁵⁸³ Nenad Simić was the head of the Morale, Religious, and Legal Affairs Organ.⁵⁸⁴

2000. The infantry battalions subordinated to the Zvornik Brigade in 1995 were the following: 1st Battalion,⁵⁸⁵ 2nd Battalion,⁵⁸⁶ 3rd Battalion,⁵⁸⁷ 4th Battalion,⁵⁸⁸ 5th

⁵⁷⁶ Ljubo Bojanović, P116 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Blagojević*), T. 11688, 11722; KDZ407, P378 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 6440 (under seal); Milorad Birčaković, P360 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 11011.

⁵⁷⁷ Pandurević assumed the role of the Zvornik Brigade Commander on 12 December 1992, and remained in this position until November 1996. Ljubo Bojanović, P116 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Blagojević*), T. 11674; Ostoja Stanišić, P382 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 11703; D3720 (Witness statement of Petar Salapura dated 17 June 2013), p. 19; P4914 (Richard Butler's expert report entitled "Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation 'Krivaja 95'", 1 November 2002), para. 2.8; *see* Adjudicated Fact 1454.

⁵⁷⁸ Srećko Aćimović, P343 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 12939; Ljubo Bojanović, P116 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Blagojević*), T. 11674–11675; Ostoja Stanišić, P382 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 11703; P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 3; P4914 (Richard Butler's expert report entitled "Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation 'Krivaja 95'", 1 November 2002), para. 2.8. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 1455.

⁵⁷⁹ KDZ122, T. 26149 (13 March 2012) (closed session); P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 3; P4914 (Richard Butler's expert report entitled "Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation 'Krivaja 95'", 1 November 2002), para. 2.8.

⁵⁸⁰ Ljubo Bojanović, P116 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Blagojević*), T. 11674; Ostoja Stanišić, P382 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 11703; KDZ122, T. 26106 (12 March 2012) (closed session), T. 26152 (13 March 2012) (closed session); D3720 (Witness statement of Petar Salapura dated 17 June 2013), p. 19; P4914 (Richard Butler's expert report entitled "Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation 'Krivaja 95'", 1 November 2002), para. 2.8; P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 3.

⁵⁸¹ Ljubo Bojanović, P116 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Blagojević*), T. 11675, 11739; Vujadin Popović, T. 43105 (6 November 2013); KDZ122, T. 26129 (12 March 2012) (closed session); P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 3.

⁵⁸² Ljubo Bojanović, P116 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Blagojević*), T. 11675, 11682–11683; Tanacko Tanić, P369 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 10338; Srećko Aćimović, P343 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 12931–12932; Milorad Birčaković, P360 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 11011–11012, 11116; KDZ122, T. 26109–26110, 26120, 26130 (12 March 2012) (closed session), T. 26155 (13 March 2012) (closed session); P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 3; P4914 (Richard Butler's expert report entitled "Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation 'Krivaja 95'", 1 November 2002), para. 2.8; Nebojša Jeremić, P348 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 10418, 1042; *see* Adjudicated Fact 1457. Drago Nikolić had the authority to carry out tasks without the permission of the Zvornik Brigade Commander. The security organs had the right to use vehicles without the knowledge of the Zvornik Brigade Commander, as provided for in the book of regulations. Military police officers fell under the security organ's chain of command, separate from the command of the Zvornik Brigade. Radislav Krstić, D4136 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krstić*) T. 6477–6478.

⁵⁸³ KDZ122, T. 26109–26110 (12 March 2012) (closed session).

⁵⁸⁴ Ljubo Bojanović, P116 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Blagojević*), T. 11716; KDZ122, T. 26130 (12 March 2012) (closed session); P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 3.

⁵⁸⁵ P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 3; P4914 (Richard Butler's expert report entitled "Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation 'Krivaja 95'", 1 November 2002), para. 2.8.

⁵⁸⁶ Srećko Aćimović, P343 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 12930–12931; Veljko Ivanović, P384 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 18174; Mitar Lazarević, P363 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 13362; P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 3; P4914 (Richard Butler's expert report entitled "Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation 'Krivaja 95'", 1 November 2002), para. 2.8.

⁵⁸⁷ P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 3; P4914 (Richard Butler's expert report entitled "Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation 'Krivaja 95'", 1 November 2002), para. 2.8.

⁵⁸⁸ P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 3; P4914 (Richard Butler's expert report entitled "Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation 'Krivaja 95'", 1 November 2002), para. 2.8.

Battalion,⁵⁸⁹ 6th Battalion,⁵⁹⁰ 7th Battalion⁵⁹¹ 8th Battalion,⁵⁹² Logistics Battalion,⁵⁹³ Light Anti-Aircraft Rocket Artillery Battalion,⁵⁹⁴ and the Rear Battalion (also called the “R” battalion).⁵⁹⁵

2001. The Zvornik Brigade had other units including an MP company commanded by Milomir Jasikovac; the Engineering Company, commanded by Dragan Jevtić; the Communications Company, commanded by Dragisa Radić; the Mixed Artillery Division, commanded by Miloš Maksimović; and the 1st Battalion’s Work Platoon, commanded by Radivoje Lakić.⁵⁹⁶ (596)

2002. The so-called “Drina Wolves” was a special unit of the Zvornik Brigade housed in Kiseljak.⁵⁹⁷ It could be deployed when necessary in order to defend certain territories.⁵⁹⁸ The unit was commanded by Dragan Jolović, also referred to as “Legenda”.⁵⁹⁹ Members of the Drina Wolves were identified by a patch of a wolf head on the left shoulder of their uniforms.⁶⁰⁰

1. Command and control principles

2003. The VRS system of command and control had three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical.⁶⁰¹ Applying the same definition and principles of command and control as the JNA,⁶⁰² the VRS organised unified and centralised command according to the following: (i) a “corps-brigade-battalion” model directly subordinated to a corps command;⁶⁰³ (ii) a subordinate-commander relationship in which every superior had the

⁵⁸⁹ P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 3; P4914 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation ‘Krivaja 95’”, 1 November 2002), para. 2.8.

⁵⁹⁰ Ostoja Stanišić, P382 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 11594; P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 3; P4914 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation ‘Krivaja 95’”, 1 November 2002), para. 2.8.

⁵⁹¹ P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 3; P4914 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation ‘Krivaja 95’”, 1 November 2002), para. 2.8.

⁵⁹² P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 3; P4914 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation ‘Krivaja 95’”, 1 November 2002), para. 2.8.

⁵⁹³ P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 3.

⁵⁹⁴ P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 3.

⁵⁹⁵ Damjan Lazarević, P352 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 14462; Milenko Tomić, P390 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 20998–20999.

⁵⁹⁶ Cvijetin Ristanović, P652 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić*), T. 5363; KDZ122, T. 26112, 26142–36144 (12 March 2012) (closed session), T. 26174 (13 March 2012) (closed session); Jevto Bogdanović, P385 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 11314; Milorad Birčaković, P360 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 11012, 11115–11116, 11171; Srećko Aćimović, P343 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 12987; D2266 (Nada Stojanović’s interview with OTP), pp. 5–6; Nebojša Jeremić, P348 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 10418; P4920 (Diagrams of various VRS Military Command structures), p. 3; P4914 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation ‘Krivaja 95’”, 1 November 2002), paras. 2.8, 7.7. See also Adjudicated Fact 1775 (the Chamber notes that Milomir Jasikovac’s name is misspelled in the Adjudicated Fact).

⁵⁹⁷ KDZ407, P378 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 6437 (under seal); Dražen Erdemović, P332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 10944–10945; Milorad Birčaković, P360 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 11170.

⁵⁹⁸ KDZ407, P378 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 6437; Dražen Erdemović, P332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 10944–10945.

⁵⁹⁹ KDZ340, T. 17551–17552 (19 August 2011) (private session); KDZ508, P388 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 8876–8877 (under seal); Momir Nikolić, T. 24626 (13 February 2012). See also Dražen Erdemović, P332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 10944–10945; D3927 (Witness statement of Franc Kos dated 26 July 2013), p. 7.

⁶⁰⁰ KDZ084, P4904 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 14811 (under seal).

⁶⁰¹ D3864 (Radovan Radinović’s expert report entitled “The Control Authority of Dr. Radovan Karadžić in the Strategic Command System of the VRS”, 2012), para. 2.

⁶⁰² P034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”, e-court pp. 310–311; D3864 (Radovan Radinović’s expert report entitled “The Control Authority of Dr. Radovan Karadžić in the Strategic Command System of the VRS”, 2012), paras. 57–66.

⁶⁰³ P4915 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “VRS Brigade Command Responsibility Report”, 31 October 2002), para. 1.1.

responsibility to monitor and assess the work of their subordinates and subordinates had to follow strict procedures of reporting and actions;⁶⁰⁴ and (iii) centralised decisions that followed a unified chain of command.⁶⁰⁵ For example, based on directives from the Main Staff, the SRK Commander would issue and/or approve orders to the subordinate commands.⁶⁰⁶ Subordinate commands would report back to the SRK command.⁶⁰⁷ On occasion, the SRK Commander would receive information and directives directly from the Supreme Command and the Accused.⁶⁰⁸

(WHICH WAS #IN THE OCCASIONS WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDED THE PRESIDENT TO INTERVENE, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, OR A CONVOY PASSAGE#, WHEN AN USUAL PATH THROUGH THE HQ WOULD TAKE TIME. THE CHAMBER DIDN'T NAME A SINGLE WRONG "INFORMATION AND DIRECTIVE" ISSUED BY THE SUPREME COMMAND OR THE COMMANDER! #Distortion!).

2004. On 1 June 1992, the Law on the Army was issued by the SerBiH Presidency; it provided that the command in the VRS "shall be founded on principles of a unified command regarding the use of forces and means, single authority, obligations to enforce decisions, command and orders issued by superior commanders".⁶⁰⁹ It vested the President, as Commander-in-Chief, with the authority to command the army, establish plans for its development and deployment, establish the system of command, and issue a variety of regulations.⁶¹⁰ The Main Staff Commander would command the VRS in compliance with the authority that the President delegated to him.⁶¹¹

2005. There were two parallel chains of command in the VRS: the regular chain of command and the professional chain of command.⁶¹² With regard to the security and intelligence organs, for instance, their chain of command was largely based on the work of the organs, the majority of which included intelligence and counter-intelligence activities and a smaller portion of military police tasks and criminal investigative

⁶⁰⁴ Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*), T. 11945–11946.

⁶⁰⁵ P3914 (Ewan Brown's expert report entitled "Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina - 1992", 27 November 2002), para. 1.62. See also Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25477–25478, (29 February 2012), T. 25632 (1 March 2012). See also Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25106–25107 (22 February 2012) (specifying that he did not know of any specific instances in which such bypassing the normal chain of command occurred but that this possibility was envisaged within the rules).

⁶⁰⁶ Stanislav Galić, T. 37429, 37432 (18 April 2013). See, e.g., D3430 (Letter from Stanislav Galić to SRK members, undated); D2800 (SRK Order, 18 February 1994) (an order issued by Galić based on the cease-fire agreement reached by the Accused and Akashi on 18 February 1994); D2567 (SRK Order, 22 May 1993); D2813 (VRS Main Staff Order, 8 August 1995); D2814 (SRK Order, 19 August 1995); (while Dragomir Milošević was on sick leave from mid-August until 9 or 10 September 1995, his Chief of Staff Čedomir Sladoje issued the order); Dragomir Milošević, T. 32750, 32755 (28 January 2013)); D2815 (SRK report, 30 August 1995); P1201 (SRK Order, 6 April 1995) (written by Chief of Artillery Tadija Manojlović, approved by Dragomir Milošević); D2840 (SRK request for information, 15 July 1993) (request for information, based on order from VRS Main Staff, sent to all brigades); Dragomir Milošević, T. 32876 (29 January 2013); P1309 (SRK Order, 21 April 1995); P1201 (SRK Order, 6 April 1995); P1670 (SRK Order, 21 August 1994). See also D2812 (Warning of SRK, 27 October 1994); D232 (VRS Main Staff Order, 6 June 1992) (a directive for further action issued by Mladić of the Main Staff to his commanders); P998 (SRK instructions, 7 June 1992) (instructions for further activities issued by SRK command); P1498 (Order of 2nd Motorised Brigade, 8 June 1992) (order, based on the SRK command instructions, issued by the commander of the 2nd Motorised Brigade to his units).

⁶⁰⁷ See, e.g., P4498 (Report of 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade, 3 September 1992); D2795 (1st Romanija Brigade report, 1 October 1992).

⁶⁰⁸ Stanislav Galić, T. 38033 (9 May 2013). See, e.g., P4925 (Supplement to Directive 6, 12 December 1993).

⁶⁰⁹ P2603 (SerBiH Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), art. 173. The Law on the Army was verified by the Bosnian Serb Assembly at its 17th session. P1356 (Minutes of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 8.

⁶¹⁰ P2603 (SerBiH Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), art. 174.

⁶¹¹ P2603 (SerBiH Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), art. 175. See also KDZ088, T. 6299–6302 (7 September 2010) (closed session); Stanislav Galić, T. 38033 (9 May 2013).

⁶¹² P4480 (VRS Main Staff Order, 24 October 1994); Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*), T. 11960–11962.

tasks.⁶¹³ Along the regular chain of command, the security and intelligence organs were directly subordinated to the commander of the VRS unit or institution of which they formed a part.⁶¹⁴ However, with regards to their professional activities, they were controlled by the security and intelligence organs of the superior command authorised to command it.⁶¹⁵ Intelligence and counter-intelligence tasks were part of the security organs specialised work and professional competence.⁶¹⁶

2. Communication and reporting in the VRS

2006. The military reporting chain in the VRS followed a hierarchical structure with the information originating from the lower military units being reported up to the intermediate military units, then to the Main Staff, and finally to the Supreme Commander.⁶¹⁷ The VRS used the *vojni post*, military post. numbers to identify operative units and these numbers also indicated the command and control relationship between units.⁶¹⁸

2007. For daily combat and situations reports, all the brigade reports were integrated into one report at the corps level that provided an overview of the situation on the ground as well as an overview of the situation within the corps, *i.e.*, combat readiness, operations, and other relevant information at approximately 4 or 5 p.m.⁶¹⁹ The corps would integrate the brigade reports into a corps report which would be sent to the Main Staff at approximately 6 p.m.⁶²⁰ Similarly, the Main Staff would integrate reports from the

⁶¹³ P4480 (VRS Main Staff Order, 24 October 1994) (for the security and intelligence organs), p. 1; Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 12191–12194; Petar Salapura, T. 40236–40237 (24 June 2013) (testifying about the 10th Sabotage Detachment).

⁶¹⁴ P4480 (VRS Main Staff Order, 24 October 1994), p. 1; Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 12194–12195. See also P4478 (SFRY Rules of Service of Security Organs in the Armed Forces, 1994), para. 16 (rules which were adopted by the VRS); Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 12163–12165).

⁶¹⁵ P4480 (VRS Main Staff Order, 24 October 1994), p. 1; Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 12195–12201. See also P4478 (SFRY Rules of Service of Security Organs in the Armed Forces, 1994), para. 16.

⁶¹⁶ See P4478 (SFRY Rules of Service of Security Organs in the Armed Forces, 1994), para. 18.

⁶¹⁷ Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 11973–11974; KDZ088, T. 6299–6302 (7 September 2010) (closed session); D232 (Directive 1, 6 June 1992); [REDACTED]; P998 (SRK instructions, 7 June 1992); P1498 (Order of 2nd Motorised Brigade, 8 June 1992); Stanislav Galić, T. 38033–38034 (9 May 2013) (testifying that sometimes directives came directly from the Supreme Command and the Accused, as the President, however most of the information, orders, and directives went through the Main Staff); Stevan Veljović, T. 29241 (23 October 2012). See also D2774 (Witness statement of Milenko Indić dated 19 January 2013), para. 33; P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff Structure for July 1995); Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25092–25093 (22 February 2012).

⁶¹⁸ Richard Philipps, T. 3750 (15 June 2010). Each corps, brigade, battalion and sub-unit had a specific VP number that consisted of four numbers, a stroke and then two other numbers in order to be identified by others notably in written documents. Richard Philipps, T. 3750 (15 June 2010).

⁶¹⁹ Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 11973–11974; Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25093–25096 (22 February 2012). See also Ewan Brown, T. 21542–21543 (17 November 2011); Momir Nikolić, T. 24605–24607 (13 February 2012); Stevan Veljović, T. 29239–29243 (23 October 2012). See *e.g.* P3042 (Report of VRS Main Staff, 11 April 1994); D1940 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 6 May 1992); D1942 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 14 July 1992); P3931 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 16 December 1992); P3043 (VRS Main Staff Report, 12 April 1994); P3054 (VRS Main Staff Report, 12 July 1995); P4930 (Combat Report of Drina Corps, 8 July 1995); P4456 (Drina Corps report, 14 July 1995); P2256 (SRK combat report, 12 March 1995); P4500 (VRS Zvornik Brigade report to Main Staff, 4 March 1993); D2838 (SRK Order, 16 September 1992). Stevan Veljović testified that the latest the reports would be sent was 8 p.m. Stevan Veljović, T. 29242 (23 October 2012); D2774 (Witness statement of Milenko Indić dated 19 January 2013), para. 30. Reports to the SRK Command were to include, “(i) situation and activities of the enemy, (ii) combat readiness of units, (iii) security and morale, (iv) decision for further action, (v) situation in the territory of the zone of responsibility, (vi) situation and problems in the rear, (vii) unusual incidents and casualties, and (viii) proposals and requests”. D2838 (SRK Order, 16 September 1992). See also Stevan Veljović, T. 29242–29243 (23 October 2012).

⁶²⁰ Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 11973. See, *e.g.*, D1970 (Drina Corps report, 13 July 1995). IKMs were required to write daily operations and combat reports, just like all other units for the area for which they had been established; this information was sent in encrypted form to the operations centre of the Main Staff, which was a third body within the administration for operations and training of the Main Staff. Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25093–25095 (22 February 2012). As regulated, daily combat reports from the SRK command would go to the Main Staff every evening. See, *e.g.*, D3396 (SRK combat report, 15 January 1993); D3403 (SRK combat report, 12 February 1993); D3404 (SRK combat report, 14 February 1993); D3405 (SRK combat report, 15 March 1993). As Chief of Staff, Dragomir Milošević occasionally sent the combat reports to the VRS Main Staff. Dragomir Milošević, T.

corps into its daily combat reports, which were sent to the Supreme Commander and Corps Commanders.⁶²¹ Extraordinary and interim reports, often in relation to a specific area or event, were also sent, when necessary, by the corps to the Main Staff or by the Main Staff to the Supreme Commander.⁶²² Intelligence reports were also used to share information within the VRS.⁶²³ In particular, the Accused received both military intelligence reports and state security intelligence reports on a daily basis.⁶²⁴

2008. By the end of 1992 there was regular phone and radio communication within the VRS, and in particular between the corps or other operative units and the Main Staff; within the corps; and between the Main Staff and the Supreme Commander.⁶²⁵ Meetings and briefings within the corps and between the corps and the Main Staff were held to share information.⁶²⁶

2009. In general, after the establishment of the Republican Communications Centre in Pale in April 1992, there was communication between the municipalities, the MUP, and the VRS.⁶²⁷ The three main types of communications existed: (i) the telephone system (“PTT”); (ii) radio and radio relay communications; and (iii) coded communications.⁶²⁸ The PTT was the civilian telephone system.⁶²⁹ The VRS could protect certain PTT lines for their own use.⁶³⁰ Radio was used for both encrypted and unprotected

32723–32724 (28 January 2013); D2811 (SRK combat report, 20 October 1993); D2796 (SRK combat report, 14 August 1993); D2797 (SRK combat report, November 1994); D2798 (SRK combat report, July 1993); D2799 (SRK combat report, 30 September 1993); D2805 (SRK combat report, 9 January 1994); D2806 (SRK combat report, 23 January 1994); D2808 (SRK combat report, 1 July 1994). When Dragomir Milošević was the Chief of Staff for the SRK, he would occasionally sign the combat reports on behalf of Galić. Dragomir Milošević, T. 32719 (28 January 2013); D2809 (SRK combat report, 13 September 1993); D2823 (SRK combat report, 6 November 1994); D2819 (SRK combat report, 10 July 1993); D2820 (SRK combat report, 16 July 1993); D2821 (SRK combat report, 3 August 1993); D2822 (SRK combat report, 10 August 1993); D2827 (SRK combat report, 19 August 1993); D2831 (SRK combat report, 10 November 1994); D2903 (SRK combat report, 25 May 1995). Interim reports would go to the Main Staff daily, usually around 2 p.m. Stanislav Galić, T. 37216 (15 April 2013). See, e.g., D3393 (SRK combat report, 25 December 1992); D3394 (SRK combat report, 31 December 1992). Dragomir Milošević testified that he believed that the reporting system in 1995 “functioned meticulously”. Dragomir Milošević, T. 32879 (29 January 2013).

⁶²¹ Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 11973–11974; Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25100 (22 February 2012); Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25646 (1 March 2012). See e.g., P4449 (VRS Main Staff Report, 10 July 1995); P4450 (VRS Main Staff Report, 11 July 1995); P4464 (VRS Main Staff Report 13 July 1995); P4457 (VRS Main Staff Report, 14 July 1995); P4460 (VRS Main Staff Report, 15 July 1995); D2101 (VRS Main Staff Report, 16 July 1995); D2102 (VRS Main Staff Report, 17 July 1995); P4459 (VRS Main Staff Report, 18 July 1995); P4461 (VRS Main Staff Report, 19 July 1995); D3453 (VRS Main Staff report, 25 May 1994). Obradović testified that the Main Staff reports would be sent to Milovanović, who would review and forward them to the Accused. Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 11974, 11979. These reports contained information about the possible intentions and situation of the enemy, as well as information about the grouping intentions and task of the VRS, along with losses in materiel and personnel and any new corps commanders’ decisions. Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25144–25145 (23 February 2012). See, e.g., P4455 (VRS Main Staff Report, 5 July 1995).

⁶²² Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25100–25102 (22 February 2012). See, e.g., P5943 (VRS Main Staff Report, 7 April 1995).

⁶²³ KDZ122, T. 26154–26156 (13 March 2012) (closed session). See, e.g., D2168 (Drina Corps Intelligence Report, 13 December 1993); D2171 (VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report, 8 November 1994).

⁶²⁴ John Zarnetka, T. 42443 (29 October 2013); D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 2, 51, 82 (Subotić also served as the Chief of the Military Office of the President and the Accused’s military advisor). When asked whether the Accused would have had direct communication with an assistant commander of the Main Staff deployed to an IKM, Obradović replied that IKMs had established means of communication with the Main Staff. Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25105–25106 (22 February 2012).

⁶²⁵ Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, T. 11966–11967, 11973–11974; Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25095–25097 (22 February 2012); Richard Butler, T. 27537–27538 (18 April 2012); D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), pp. 30–35; Dragan Kezunović, T. 14967–14968 (20 June 2011); P4445 (1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade Report, 14 July 1995); P4568 (Zvornik Brigade telephone booklet); Ranko Vuković, T. 15091–15098 (21 June 2011) in connection with P2796 (Map showing communications plan of Drina Corps); Richard Philipps, T. 3860–3865 (16 June 2010).

⁶²⁶ Mile Sladoje, T. 30565–30566 (28 November 2012); Stevan Veljović, T. 29245–29248 (23 October 2012).

⁶²⁷ P2794 (Witness statement of Ranko Vuković dated 24 May 2011), pp. 3–4. The communications systems included use of telephone, short wave and ultra-short wave radio, fax machines, teleprinters, radio relay communications, wire communications, and a courier system. P2794 (Witness statement of Ranko Vuković dated 24 May 2011), pp. 4–5.

⁶²⁸ P2794 (Witness statement of Ranko Vuković dated 24 May 2011), pp. 5–6; D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), pp. 28–38.

⁶²⁹ P2794 (Witness statement of Ranko Vuković dated 24 May 2011), p. 5.

⁶³⁰ P2794 (Witness statement of Ranko Vuković dated 24 May 2011), p. 5.

communication.⁶³¹ When the radio system was not working, the radio relay system was used.⁶³² Coded communication was used for confidential information sent over the radio on unprotected lines and it was a back-up system for communication for both the VRS and MUP.⁶³³ At the Republican Communications Centre, the Accused used a direct secure telephone line to communicate to the Main Staff Communications Centre at Crna Rijeka.⁶³⁴ Additionally, Mladić had permanent direct and encrypted communication with the Corps Commands, as well as relay communication with the IKMs.⁶³⁵

ii. Territorial Defence

2010. As part of the SFRY military doctrine known as the “All People’s Defence”, the TO was comprised of organised armed formations that were not part of the JNA or the police.⁶³⁶ The TO was comprised of units, institutions, staff, and other organisations of individuals “for a general popular armed resistance” that could be mobilised during times of war.⁶³⁷ The TO was organised with staff at both the republic level and the municipal level.⁶³⁸

2011. On 27 March 1992, before the Bosnian Serb Assembly, the Accused gave instructions to the newly-formed municipalities to “organise the people so that they can defend themselves” as a TO and place them under the command of the JNA present at that time.⁶³⁹ **(As always, a #context is very important#: on 25 and 26 March there was an intrusion of the ZNG from Croatia in the Bosanski Brod area, where they killed many people without any resistance. Sijekovac, a village that had undergone similar carnage during the WWII, again sustained a horrible carnage, and no reaction from the “international community” #Context)**

2012. On 15 April 1992, an imminent threat of war was declared by the SerBiH Presidency and the following day, the mobilisation of the TO was ordered.⁶⁴⁰ **(Of course, without knowing that the #M-C part of BiH fe-formed the existing TO without Serbs#, and declared the imminent threat of war on 8 April, this Serb**

⁶³¹ P2794 (Witness statement of Ranko Vuković dated 24 May 2011), p. 5. *See also* P2794 (Witness statement of Ranko Vuković dated 24 May 2011), e-court pp. 36, 45; P2823 (Dispatch of SerBiH Ministry of Defence to SAOs and ARK, undated).

⁶³² P2794 (Witness statement of Ranko Vuković dated 24 May 2011), p. 5.

⁶³³ P2794 (Witness statement of Ranko Vuković dated 24 May 2011), p. 6.

⁶³⁴ P2794 (Witness statement of Ranko Vuković dated 24 May 2011), pp. 7–8. *See also* P2795 (Diagram of the VRS radio relay communications); P2796 (Map showing communications plan of Drina Corps); P2797 (Diagram of radio-relay and wire communications of Drina Corps); P2798 (Map showing VRS radio-relay lines and command posts).

⁶³⁵ Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25095–25097 (22 February 2012) (explaining that once established, the communications lines to the corps commands were permanent and contrasting that with the IKMs which were by definition mobile). Obradović estimated that Mladić spoke to the corps commanders approximately every afternoon. Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25097 (22 February 2012).

⁶³⁶ D1358 (SFRY Law on All People's Defence); Gojko Kličković, T. 46925–46926 (12 February 2014); P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens's expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court pp. 51–53. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 415; KDZ088, T. 6352–6353 (closed session) (8 September 2010); Ranko Vuković, T. 15118–15119 (21 June 2011); Bogdan Subotić, T. 40019–40020 (19 June 2013). There was a distinct TO in each Republic, funded by that Republic and under the control of the Minister of Defence of that Republic. Adjudicated Fact 419.

⁶³⁷ D1358 (SFRY Law on All People's Defence), art. 102.

⁶³⁸ Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25450–25451 (28 February 2012); D1358 (SFRY Law on All People's Defence), art. 102; P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens's expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court pp. 51–53.

⁶³⁹ P1634 (Minutes of 14th Session of SerBiH Assembly, 27 March 1992), p. 23; P3914 (Ewan Brown's expert report entitled “Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992”, 27 November 2002), para. 2.26.

⁶⁴⁰ P3922 (Decision of SerBiH Presidency, 15 April 1992); P2412 (SerBiH Ministry of Defence Decision, 16 April 1992); P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens's expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court pp. 274–277; Ewan Brown, T. 21570–21571 (17 November 2011); Ranko Vuković, T. 15119 (21 June 2011).

move looks aggressive.#Context, Cause-consequence, obscurity!) The TO was declared to be part of the armed forces.⁶⁴¹ **This was the case with the SFRY armed forces, which consisted of the TO too.** Accordingly, all military conscripts were to put themselves at the disposal of the municipal TO staffs in the territory of the RS, and the newly formed TO units were to “cooperate with the JNA units, and where possible, put them under single command”.⁶⁴² Colonel Vidoje Lukić was appointed as Chief of the SerBiH TO.⁶⁴³ In April 1992, it was decided that the Accused, as President of the SNB, was to co-ordinate command over the TO forces.⁶⁴⁴ The SerBiH TO was composed of reserve men who carried out their regular jobs and who, in case of war, were called up to defend a certain territory.⁶⁴⁵

(According to the law of All-People’s Defence, #in a case of a threat to peace, anyone able bodied must act immediately, not waiting any command#. So, nothing depended on any leader at all!#Lawful, context#)

2013. Until the TO was integrated into the VRS, all defence activities were under the competence of the TO and organised by the Crisis Staffs in the municipalities.⁶⁴⁶ The TO units were equipped with infantry weapons, rifles, light machine-guns, some small calibre artillery, mortars, and anti-personnel mines.⁶⁴⁷ The uniforms worn by the SerBiH TO were similar to JNA uniforms.⁶⁴⁸
2014. On 12 May 1992, after the formal establishment of the VRS, the SerBiH TO was directly integrated into the VRS.⁶⁴⁹ The Accused, as the President, would determine the organisation of the integrated SerBiH TO units and staff.⁶⁵⁰

⁶⁴¹ P2412 (SerBiH Ministry of Defence Decision, 16 April 1992), p. 1.

⁶⁴² P2412 (SerBiH Ministry of Defence Decision, 16 April 1992), p. 2.

⁶⁴³ D3709 (Decision of SerBiH Government, 15 April 1992).

⁶⁴⁴ P3051 (Minutes of expanded meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 22 April 1992), p. 1; P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court p. 279. *See also* para. 91.

⁶⁴⁵ KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Brđanin*), T. 11710–11711 (under seal); Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 9110–9111.

⁶⁴⁶ Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25451–25453 (28 February 2012); Momir Nikolić, T. 24703–24704 (14 February 2012); Milimir Šoja, T. 7209–7210 (30 September 2010); Ranko Vuković, T. 15118–15119 (21 June 2011); Bogdan Subotić, T. 40021–40022 (19 June 2013); Branko Davidović, T. 45929–45930 (23 January 2014); Richard Philipps, T. 3828 (16 June 2010); Ranko Vuković, T. 15118–15119 (21 June 2011). *See, e.g.*, D1195 (Ilidža Crisis Staff order, 10 April 1992). *See also* D1358, (SFRY Law on All People’s Defence), art. 102. *See also* para. 145.

⁶⁴⁷ Adjudicated Fact 420. The TOs did not have tanks and TO weapons were stored locally, within each municipality. *See* Adjudicated Facts 421, 422.

⁶⁴⁸ Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 548–549.

⁶⁴⁹ P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), pp. 53–56; P3914 (Ewan Brown’s expert report entitled “Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992”, 27 November 2002), para. 2.32; P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court pp. 289, 316–318. *See, e.g.*, P5548 (Decision of Prijedor Crisis Staff, 29 May 1992). For example, on 22 May 1992, the SRK Commander Šipčić issued an order requesting that the existing TO units be restructured into discrete TO brigades, formed from locals of distinct territories. P1505 (SRK Order, 22 May 1992). On 28 May 1992, the Birač Brigade commander ordered the subordination of the local Bosnian Serb TOs into the VRS. P3055 (Order of Birač Brigade, 28 May 1992). In the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps, men were mobilised from the summer 1992 to join the TO and after 1992, the TO was divided into units that were integrated into the Drina Corps battalions and companies. Mile Simanić, P355 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 14621.

⁶⁵⁰ P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), pp. 53. *See also* D3864 (Radovan Radinović’s expert report entitled “The Control Authority of Dr. Radovan Karadžić in the Strategic Command System of the VRS”, 2012), paras. 79–80.

(It took almost entire year to integrate the two components.)

3. Bosnian Serb MUP

a. Establishment and structure

215. On 28 February 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly passed the Law on Internal Affairs, which established the MUP, effective 31 March 1992.⁶⁵¹ On 24 March 1992, Mićo Stanišić was appointed Minister of the MUP and he was in this position until the end of 1992 and again from January 1994 until July 1994.⁶⁵² Momčilo Mandić was the Assistant Minister of the MUP from April until May 1992.⁶⁵³ Tomislav Kovač was the Assistant Minister of the MUP in August 1992 and again from 1994 to September 1995, and he was acting Minister from September 1993 until January 1994.⁶⁵⁴

216. The location of the MUP was moved four times in 1992.⁶⁵⁵ First it was located in Vraca, near Sarajevo, then moved to Mount Jahorina, Pale, and finally to Bijeljina.⁶⁵⁶

217. The Law on Internal Affairs, which was largely based on the April 1990 SerBiH Law on Internal Affairs,⁶⁵⁷ established a network of Security Services Centres (“CSB”) to carry out the work of the MUP and set out the structure and functions of the Public Security Stations (“SJB”) and the National Security Service.⁶⁵⁸

218. The CSBs were considered important as they united both the SJBs and the National Security Service while directing and co-ordinating the functions relating to the SJBs.⁶⁵⁹ There were five locations for the CSBs: Banja Luka (for the ARK), Trebinje (for the SAO Herzegovina), Doboj (for the SAO of Northern BiH), Sarajevo (for the SAO of Romanija-Birač), and Bijeljina (for the SAO of Semberija).⁶⁶⁰ Each CSB covered a certain territory and each

⁶⁵¹ P2964 (SerBiH Decree on the promulgation on the Law of Internal Affairs, 23 March 1992); P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), para. 95. *See also* Adjudicated Facts 514, 2147. According to Article 130, the law would enter into effect eight days after its publication but Nielsen notes that in practice the Bosnian Serb MUP began functioning on 1 April 1992. P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), para. 172. This new Law on Internal Affairs was almost identical to the law on internal affairs of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), paras. 96, 98.

⁶⁵² Mićo Stanišić, T. 46327, 46353 (3 February 2014), T. 46440 (4 February 2014); P1354 (Minutes of 13th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992). *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2146.

⁶⁵³ Momčilo Mandić, T. 4426–4427 (30 June 2010). *See also* P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 101; Mandić informed all security centres and all public security stations that the SerBiH established a MUP on 27 March 1992. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 515.

⁶⁵⁴ D3960 (Witness Statement of Tomislav Kovač dated 28 October 2013), paras. 4–5; Christian Nielsen, T. 16300 (7 July 2011). *See also* Ljubomir Borovčanin, T. 39435–39437 (6 June 2013); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 101.

⁶⁵⁵ Mićo Stanišić, T. 46359 (3 February 2014). *See* Adjudicated Fact 2153.

⁶⁵⁶ Mićo Stanišić, T. 46359 (3 February 2014).

⁶⁵⁷ P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), paras. 96–98. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2125.

⁶⁵⁸ P2964 (SerBiH Decree on the promulgation on the Law of Internal Affairs, 23 March 1992); P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), paras. 112, 115; *see* Adjudicated Fact 518. The National Security Service was previously known as the State Security Service (“SDB”) and was renamed the National Security Service in the 1992 Law on Internal Affairs. P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), para. 112; P2964 (SerBiH Decree on the promulgation on the Law of Internal Affairs, 23 March 1992), Section II. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2126.

⁶⁵⁹ P2964 (SerBiH Decree on the promulgation on the Law of Internal Affairs, 23 March 1992); P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), para. 8; P2962 (Document entitled “Possible ways of decentralising Internal Affairs in BH”, undated), p. 1.

⁶⁶⁰ P2964 (SerBiH Decree on the promulgation on the Law of Internal Affairs, 23 March 1992), art. 28; P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May

municipality within that territory had a subordinate SJB.⁶⁶¹ Each CSB consisted of the following organisational units: (i) Sector of the National Security Service; (ii) Sector of the Public Security Service; (iii) Department for Communications; (iv) Department for Foreigners, Legal, Administrative and Personnel Affairs; (v) Department for Material-Financial and Technical Affairs; and (vi) Police Station.⁶⁶² Stojan Župljanin was the Chief of the CSB in Banja Luka from 1991 until 1994.⁶⁶³ In 1994, Župljanin left the MUP and was promoted as the advisor to the President, namely the Accused, on security matters.⁶⁶⁴

219. The SJBs were established within the territory of each municipality.⁶⁶⁵ The SJBs were tasked with dealing with all public security issues, including protecting citizens, preventing and detecting criminal acts, and maintaining law and order.⁶⁶⁶ Information gathered by the SJBs was reported to the Bosnian MUP officials.⁶⁶⁷

220. The National Security Service was organised into five Sectors which operated at each CSB, *i.e.*, in Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Doboj, Sarajevo, and Trebinje.⁶⁶⁸ It dealt with all issues of state security, including intelligence, such as gathering information on individuals or groups who conspire to violate the constitutional order and state security.⁶⁶⁹

221. In 1994, due to re-structuring of the MUP, the Public Security Service (“RJB”) and the State Security Service (“RDB”) were separated.⁶⁷⁰ Milenko Karišik was the head of the RJB.⁶⁷¹ Dragan Kijac was the head of the RDB.⁶⁷²

222. The civilian police were organised into two sections: the regular police force and the Special Police Brigade (“SBP”).⁶⁷³ The SBP functioned as a combat unit and was divided into five detachments located in Banja Luka, Trebinje, Doboj, Sarajevo, and Bijeljina.⁶⁷⁴ Goran Sarić was the Commander of the SBP.⁶⁷⁵ On 24 February 1994, Ljubomir Borovčanin was appointed to

2011), para. 116; P2965 (RS Rulebook on internal organisation of the MUP under the circumstances of immediate threat of war and war, September 1992), art. 3; Adjudicated Fact 2129.

⁶⁶¹ P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), paras. 115, 179.

⁶⁶² P2965 (RS Rulebook on internal organisation of the MUP under the circumstances of immediate threat of war and war, September 1992), art. 19.

⁶⁶³ Christian Nielsen, T. 16301 (7 July 2011).

⁶⁶⁴ Christian Nielsen, T. 16301, 16343 (7 July 2011).

⁶⁶⁵ P2964 (SerBiH Decree on the promulgation on the Law of Internal Affairs, 23 March 1992), art. 26.

⁶⁶⁶ P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), paras. 109–110.

⁶⁶⁷ P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), para. 236; P2964 (SerBiH Decree on the promulgation on the Law of Internal Affairs, 23 March 1992), art. 22.

⁶⁶⁸ P5557 (Report of the Bijeljina National Security Service, 30 April 1993), p. 3.

⁶⁶⁹ P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), para. 343.

⁶⁷⁰ Christian Nielsen, T. 16320 (7 July 2011). Nielsen explained that at the beginning of 1994, the CSBs were renamed as CJBs and that the Public Security Service was in the CJB at the regional level and the State Security Service was in the CRDB at the regional level. Christian Nielsen, T. 16320 (7 July 2011).

⁶⁷¹ D3749 (Witness statement of Milenko Karišik dated 23 June 2013), para. 5. Christian Nielsen, T. 16308 (7 July 2011).

⁶⁷² Christian Nielsen, T. 16308–16309 (7 July 2011).

⁶⁷³ See Adjudicated Fact 1464.

⁶⁷⁴ P2965 (RS Rulebook on internal organisation of the MUP under the circumstances of immediate threat of war and war, September 1992), arts. 10, 23; P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), paras. 183, 220. See also Adjudicated Fact 2158.

⁶⁷⁵ Ljubomir Borovčanin, T. 39436 (6 June 2013); Milenko Pepić, P373 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 13539, 13543.

the position of Deputy Commander of the SBP.⁶⁷⁶ Borovčanin remained Deputy Commander through June and July 1995.⁶⁷⁷

223. Beginning in April 1992, special police units (“PJP”) were organised by the CSBs at the regional level.⁶⁷⁸ These units were lightly armed and participated in combat activities.⁶⁷⁹ From 1992 until 1994, Milenko Karišik was the Commander.⁶⁸⁰ The PJPs had five detachments, one located at each of the five CSBs.⁶⁸¹ By 1995, the Zvornik CJB had six PJP companies subordinated to it.⁶⁸² Dragomir Vasić was the Chief of the Zvornik CJB and Mendeljev, a.k.a. “Mane”, Đurić was his deputy.⁶⁸³ The Commander of the PJP units was Danilo Zoljić.⁶⁸⁴

224. One of the SBP detachments was the 2nd Šekovići Detachment.⁶⁸⁵ From mid-June 1995, the Commander was Rade Čuturić, also known as “Oficir”.⁶⁸⁶ In July 1995, the 2nd Šekovići Detachment had three infantry platoons.⁶⁸⁷

225. The SBP had a training centre in Mount Jahorina, which catered for between 300 and 350 men (“Jahorina Recruits”).⁶⁸⁸ Duško Jević, a.k.a. “Stalin”, was the director of the Jahorina Training Centre.⁶⁸⁹ The Jahorina Recruits wore a two-piece camouflage uniform and a light blue bullet-proof vest.⁶⁹⁰ They were divided in two companies and each company was divided into four platoons; each of these four platoons was in turn divided into four smaller

⁶⁷⁶ Ljubomir Borovčanin, T. 39435–39436 (6 June 2013); D3660 (Decision of RS MUP, 24 February 1994).

⁶⁷⁷ Milenko Pepić, P373 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 13539–13540, 13543.

⁶⁷⁸ P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), para. 220; P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 56.

⁶⁷⁹ P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), paras. 218, 220–222.

⁶⁸⁰ D3749 (Witness statement of Milenko Karišik dated 23 June 2013), para. 33; P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), para. 219; P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 56.

⁶⁸¹ P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), para. 220.

⁶⁸² P4914 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation ‘Krivaja 95’”, 1 November 2002), paras. 2.16–2.17; P4970 (Report of Zvornik CJB, 28 July 1995). *See also* P4949 (Report of Zvornik CJB, 14 July 1995); Nenad Deronjić, D3760 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić*), T. 8201–8202.

⁶⁸³ P4914 (Richard Butler’s expert report entitled “Srebrenica Military Narrative (Revised): Operation ‘Krivaja 95’”, 1 November 2002), para. 2.16. *See also* Dušan Mičić, T. 36244–36245 (27 March 2013).

⁶⁸⁴ D3196 (Witness statement of Dušan Mičić dated 24 March 2013), para. 16; P4960 (Combat report signed by Ljubiša Borovčanin, 10–20 July 1995), p. 5.

⁶⁸⁵ Milenko Pepić, P373 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 13538. *See also* P4960 (Combat report signed by Ljubiša Borovčanin, 10–20 July 1995), p. 1.

⁶⁸⁶ Milenko Pepić, P373 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 13539.

⁶⁸⁷ Milenko Pepić, P373 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 13540. The 3rd platoon was based in Skelani and also referred to as the Skelani platoon. Milenko Pepić, P373 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 13541.

⁶⁸⁸ D3903 (Witness statement of Mendeljev Đurić dated 26 July 2013), para. 4; KDZ084, T. 27331 (11 April 2012) (closed session); KDZ084, P4904 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 14789–14790 (under seal). *See also* D3903 (Witness statement of Mendeljev Đurić dated 26 July 2013), para. 4; P4906 (RS MUP letter to Radovan Karadžić, 23 June 1995). The training facility was located at the Jahorina hotel. KDZ084, P4904 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 14788 (under seal). The Jahorina Recruits received fitness training, weapons training, and training in hostage situations. KDZ084, P4904 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 14797–14798 (under seal).

⁶⁸⁹ KDZ084, T. 27332 (11 April 2012) (closed session); KDZ084, P4904 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 14789, 14798–14800 (under seal). *See also* Ljubomir Borovčanin, T. 39459 (7 June 2013); D3903 (Witness statement of Mendeljev Đurić dated 26 July 2013), para. 7.

⁶⁹⁰ KDZ084, P4904 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 14790 (under seal).

units.⁶⁹¹ The 1st Company was commanded by Mendeljev Đurić, also called “Mane”.⁶⁹² The 2nd Company was commanded by Neđo Ikonić.⁶⁹³

226. On 11 July 1995, the Accused ordered the establishment of an SJB for “Serb Srebrenica after the [RS] control has been established in the municipality of Serb Srebrenica”.⁶⁹⁴ This SJB was to carry out its duties in accordance with the Law of Internal Affairs and establish close co-operation with Miroslav Deronjić, the Civilian Commissioner for the municipality of “Serb Srebrenica”.⁶⁹⁵

b. MUP communications

227. The MUP communication centre was established in Pale and Bijeljina.⁶⁹⁶ Methods of communication employed by the MUP included shortwave radio, ultra shortwave radio, telephone, telegraph, teleprinter, courier, and fax.⁶⁹⁷ Communications were sent and received through a network connecting the MUP headquarters in Pale to the CSBs and the SJBs.⁶⁹⁸ The MUP communications centre had a telephone connection to the Republican Communications Centre.⁶⁹⁹

228. The system of reporting within the MUP consisted of daily reports and other reports about more significant security information.⁷⁰⁰ Information was collected from the municipal level by the SJB, then sent to the regional level to the CSB, and finally sent to the MUP.⁷⁰¹ The information was also sent from the MUP to the RS government, including to the Presidency.⁷⁰² From February 1994, Gordan Milinić was appointed as the security advisor to the Accused for state security matters.⁷⁰³ He collected, processed, and reported information on military intelligence and state security intelligence to the Accused.⁷⁰⁴

⁶⁹¹ KDZ084, P4904 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 14791, 14794–14796 (under seal).

⁶⁹² Mendeljev Đurić, T. 42076–42077 (29 July 2013). *See also* Ljubomir Borovčanin, T. 39459 (7 June 2013); KDZ084, P4904 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 14791 (under seal); P4960 (Combat report signed by Ljubiša Borovčanin, 10–20 July 1995), p. 5.

⁶⁹³ KDZ084, P4904 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 14792 (under seal); Mendeljev Đurić, T. 42076–42078 (29 July 2013); Tomasz Blaszczyk, T. 23566 (25 January 2012). *See also* P4960 (Combat report signed by Ljubiša Borovčanin, 10–20 July 1995), p. 5.

⁶⁹⁴ P2994 (Radovan Karadžić's Order, 11 July 1995); P2995 (Radovan Karadžić's Order, 12 July 1995).

⁶⁹⁵ P2994 (Radovan Karadžić's Order, 11 July 1995); P2995 (Radovan Karadžić's Order, 12 July 1995).

⁶⁹⁶ P2743 (Witness statement of Dragan Kezunović dated 14 June 2011), pp. 2–3, 12, 28–29 (prior to April 1992, it was based at Vrača; P2760 (SerBiH MUP performance report, April to June 1992), p. 8. Dragan Kezunović was the chief of communications for the MUP and appointed by Mićo Stanišić. P2743 (Witness statement of Dragan Kezunović dated 14 June 2011), pp. 11–12.

⁶⁹⁷ P2743 (Witness statement of Dragan Kezunović dated 14 June 2011), pp. 3–4, pp. 20–21. Communications could be encrypted and decrypted. P2743 (Witness statement of Dragan Kezunović dated 14 June 2011), pp. 3, 5; P2769 (Telegram from Sanski Most SJB to Banja Luka CSB, 2 July 1992).

⁶⁹⁸ P2743 (Witness statement of Dragan Kezunović dated 14 June 2011), pp. 2–3, 5–6; P2760 (SerBiH MUP performance report, April to June 1992); P2771 (Order of SerBiH MUP, 23 July 1992); P2774 (Order of Banja Luka CSB to all SJBs, 27 August 1992).

⁶⁹⁹ P2794 (Witness statement of Ranko Vuković dated 24 May 2011), para. 13.

⁷⁰⁰ P2958 (Christian Nielsen's expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), paras. 236. *See, e.g.*, P2749 (SerBiH MUP daily report, 25 April 1992); P2753 (SerBiH MUP daily report, 22 May 1992); P2754 (SerBiH MUP daily report, 23 May 1992); P2755 (SerBiH MUP daily report, 25 May 1992); P2756 (SerBiH MUP daily report, 27 May 1992); P2762 (SerBiH MUP daily report, 18 May 1992); P2789 (SerBiH MUP daily report, 13 May 1992); P2790 (SerBiH MUP daily report, 12 May 1992); P2791 (SerBiH MUP daily report, 15 May 1992); P2792 (SerBiH MUP daily report, 16 May 1992); P2989 (Record of coded telegrams of the RS Republican Communications Centre, 1995); P2990 (Excerpt of logbook of telegrams received, 12-18 July 1995); P2991 (Excerpt of logbook of telegrams sent, 8-16 July 1995).

⁷⁰¹ Christian Nielsen, T. 16270 (7 July 2011).

⁷⁰² Christian Nielsen, T. 16271 (7 July 2011).

⁷⁰³ D3682 (Witness statement of Gordan Milinić dated 8 June 2013), paras. 1A, 9–10; John Zametica, T. 42443 (29 October 2013). Milinić stated that he did not have any connection to the MUP because Stojan Župljanin was the advisor to the President for the MUP. However, Milinić did receive regular reports from the state security department and submit this information to the Accused. D3682 (Witness statement of Gordan Milinić dated 8 June 2013), paras. 9–10.

⁷⁰⁴ Gordan Milinić, T. 39729–39730 (11 June 2013).

1. Re-subordination of MUP personnel to the VRS

229. On 22 April 1995, the Accused issued an order clarifying the MUP re-subordination to the VRS.⁷⁰⁵ He ordered that the Main Staff must precisely and concretely define their requests for engagement and employment of MUP units in combat.⁷⁰⁶ The order reiterated that police units shall participate in combat operations by order of the Supreme Commander and the MUP.⁷⁰⁷ While the police units are engaged in combat activities, they “shall be subordinated to the commander of the unit in whose area of responsibility they are conducting combat operations”.⁷⁰⁸

230. On 15 May 1992, Mićo Stanišić issued an order that the MUP personnel would be organised into “war units” for the purpose of defending the territory.⁷⁰⁹ It authorised all the chiefs of the CSBs to organise the MUP personnel in their territory accordingly.⁷¹⁰ This order formalised the co-operation of the MUP with the VRS.⁷¹¹ Stanišić further ordered that while participating in combat activities, the units of the MUP would be subordinated to the command of the VRS.⁷¹² However, these units would be directly commanded by MUP officials.⁷¹³ Reserve police officers were made available for transfer to the frontlines and assignment into the VRS.⁷¹⁴ In 1992, over 50% of policemen were engaged in combat activities through their re-subordination to the VRS.⁷¹⁵ Units of the MUP were engaged in specialist operative duties, such as “neutralising sabotage and terrorist groups, organised criminal activities of armed individuals” in co-operation with the VRS.⁷¹⁶

iii. Paramilitaries

231. In December 1991, it was reported that Serbian paramilitary groups were operating in the RS.⁷¹⁷ **(#At that time (Dec.91) there was no RS, there was no the Serb Police.# The President didn't have any influence on any armed formation. However, the basis for this Chamber's deliberation is a unilateral and biased report of an expert, who relied only on the Muslim documents. The Chamber had already known that by the end of 1991 the only formidable armed forces, organized and backed by the Muslim part of common authorities were Patriotic League, formed on 10 June 1991, and Green Berets. Sefer Halilovic confessed in his document (D00298...D03904.) that by the end of 1991 the Patriotic league had nine regional and 98 municipal headquarters. The Green Berets were more active and more wild**

⁷⁰⁵ P4923 (RS Presidential Order, 22 April 1995).

⁷⁰⁶ P4923 (RS Presidential Order, 22 April 1995), p. 1.

⁷⁰⁷ P4923 (RS Presidential Order, 22 April 1995), p. 1 (referring to article 13 of the Law on Application of the Law on Interior Affairs during imminent threat of war and state of war).

⁷⁰⁸ P4923 (RS Presidential Order, 22 April 1995), p. 2; Adjudicated Fact 1465.

⁷⁰⁹ P2966 (Order of SerBiH MUP, 15 May 1992), p. 1. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2162.

⁷¹⁰ P2966 (Order of SerBiH MUP, 15 May 1992); P6633 (Guidelines of SerBiH MUP, 6 July 1992); Christian Nielsen, T. 16268–16269 (7 July 2011); P2958 (Christian Nielsen's expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990–1992”, 19 May 2011), para. 215; Mićo Stanišić, T. 46481–46484 (4 February 2014).

⁷¹¹ P1096 (SerBiH MUP Report on Some Aspects of Work Done to Date and the Tasks Ahead, 17 July 1992); P2958 (Christian Nielsen's expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990–1992”, 19 May 2011), para. 215. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2163.

⁷¹² P2966 (Order of SerBiH MUP, 15 May 1992), para. 7.

⁷¹³ P2966 (Order of SerBiH MUP, 15 May 1992), para. 7; Mićo Stanišić, T. 46483–46484 (4 February 2014); P6633 (Guidelines of SerBiH MUP, 6 July 1992); Christian Nielsen, T. 16264 (7 July 2011); P2958 (Christian Nielsen's expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990–1992”, 19 May 2011), para. 216.

⁷¹⁴ D1532 (Order of RS MUP, 23 October 1992).

⁷¹⁵ Mićo Stanišić, T. 46360 (3 February 2014).

⁷¹⁶ P6633 (Guidelines of SerBiH MUP, 6 July 1992); Mićo Stanišić, T. 46482–46484 (4 February 2014).

⁷¹⁷ P2958 (Christian Nielsen's expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990–1992”, 19 May 2011), paras. 49–54.

formation that disseminated a horrible fear among the Serb citizens. Another official document of the international representatives named many SDA and HDZ armed militias, but couldn't name a single one of the SDS. On this kind of evidence and "expertises" relied both the Indictment and the Judgement, although Nielsen was among those a bit decent.@@@#)

According to a Main Staff report in July 1992, the paramilitaries lacked a cohesive unity, expressed hatred of non-Serbs, were motivated by war profiteering or looting, had links to corrupt political leaderships, and were not affiliated with the SDS but with opposition parties from Serbia (e.g., the Serbian Renewal Movement or Serbian Radical Party).⁷¹⁸ **Clearly #EXCULPATORY#!!! Both, for the VRS and the SDS. Had the SDS been interested in harming the non-Serbs, then the Party policy wouldn't be to quit with the existence of those forces.** It further reported that the paramilitaries did not partake in directly fighting with the enemy, but instead operated behind the lines of the regular VRS units, engaging in the killing of civilians as well as in looting and burning property.⁷¹⁹ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! Such a critical approach of the Army to this issue is clearly indicating that the VRS and state and political leaders of the Republic of Srpska opposed existence of any paramilitaries#. As early as on 13 June the Accused publicly and confidentially "disowned" all the paramilitaries and ordered that all the armed people either be submitted to the unique command of the Army, or be arrested and dismantled, and those who may be liable for a crime to be processed! #Paramilitaries, the RS attitude#)**

(Those data with a critical attitude and demands to quit the existence of these forces had been obtained by the official Serb forces, within the realm of their regular fight against crimes. How possibly could this had been used against this President?#Paramilitaries#)

232. Arkan's men were a Serbian paramilitary group named after their commander Željko Ražnatović, a.k.a. Arkan.⁷²⁰ According to Milorad Davidović, Arkan's men were controlled and subordinated to the Serbian MUP.⁷²¹ **This is pretty dubious assertion, but it should be clear that it meant the MUP of the Republic of Serbia, not the Republic of Srpska MUP, and this Accused wouldn't be liable for this formation. However, had the Prosecution done its job in respecting the obligation of the timely disclosure of exculpatory documents to the Defence, it would be clear that Arkan didn't do any crime in April 1992, as is clear from a lately disclosed document**

35. ARKAN'S INTERVIEW

THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET "ARKAN" IN THE REGION OF BJN COULD BE OFFERED TO TEAM B3. SINCE HE IS ON THE LIST OF "SUPPOSED WAR CRIMINALS", THIS ENCOUNTER COULD BE DAMAGING FOR THE ECM. HOWEVER, DURING OUR INVESTIGATIONS AT BJN, JANJA AND BATKOVIC, WE RECEIVED NUMEROUS TESTIMONIES OF MUSLIMS WHO SEE ARKAN AND HIS TIGERS AS A GUARANTEE FOR SECURITY IN THE REGION. OTHERS, SERBS AS WELL AS MUSLIMS, HAVE EXPLAINED TO US THAT THE TIGERS HAVE REDUCED THE LOSSES OF BELLIGERENT DURING COMBATS IN BRCKO AND BJN. THEY EVEN SEEM TO HAVE NEUTRALISED THE ACTIVITIES OF GANGS OF CRIMINALS FROM ANY ORIGIN WHO WERE LOOTING AND MURDERING THE INHABITANTS DURING THE BATTLE ITSELF.

THESE FACTS, WHETHER MYTH OR REALITY, DESERVE TO BE CHECKED WITH THE ONE WHO IS MAINLY INVOLVED - ARKAN HIMSELF.

....#) They referred to themselves as the "Serbian Tigers".⁷²² Arkan's men were also known as

⁷¹⁸ P2855 (VRS Main Staff report on paramilitary formations, 28 July 1992), pp. 1–2.

⁷¹⁹ P2855 (VRS Main Staff report on paramilitary formations, 28 July 1992), p. 2.

⁷²⁰ Svetozar Mihaljović, T. 35720–35721 (20 March 2013); P2858 (Video footage of Radovan Karadžić and Arkan at award ceremony in Bijeljina) at 00:28–03:00; KDZ446, P29 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*, T. 21055; P6211 (Four video clips of interviews with Arkan and others, with transcript); Cvijetin Simić, T. 35659–35660 (20 March 2013). See also Adjudicated Fact 2241.

⁷²¹ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 125.

⁷²² P2021 (BBC news report re interview with Arkan, with transcript).

the Serb Volunteer Guard.⁷²³ Marko Pejić was the deputy commander of Arkan's men.⁷²⁴ In the spring of 1992, they operated in Bijeljina⁷²⁵ and Zvornik;⁷²⁶ they wore camouflage uniforms bearing an emblem with a tiger and red berets.⁷²⁷ **(#This is not correct, accurate and precise#! Arkan's unit was in Bijeljina only from April 1 to April 2 or 3, i.e. in the period of the common Government, not the Government of the Sepublic of Srpska, which started to function after the war broke out, i.e. after April 6 1992. Bijeljina was visited by the members of common Presidency of BiH, not the RS. #Time-frame!3)**

233. Mauzer's Panthers, commanded by Ljubiša Savić, a.k.a. Mauzer, were a paramilitary formation operating in Bijeljina, Zvornik, and Brčko.⁷²⁸ They referred to themselves as the Serbian National Guard.⁷²⁹ Savić was an influential member of the SDS and a leader of the Bijeljina Crisis Staff.⁷³⁰ **(#Incorrect! Mauzer was a leader of the SAO Semberija and Majeveca Crisis Staff and the same Territorial Defence, which was their right to have organized. However, Mauzer himself have passed all the international certificates pertaining to his conduct during the war, and was a favourit of the Internationals, not of the President! To the contrary#!** The core of this unit were SDS members and close to the leadership of the Crisis Staff in Bijeljina and most of the members had been trained by Arkan on the border between the municipality and Serbia.⁷³¹ It was estimated that there were over 1,000 men in the Mauzer's Panthers.⁷³² In June 1992, an order of the Commander of the Eastern Bosnia Corps was issued that Mauzer's Panthers were to be integrated into the Corps.⁷³³ **That was issued after the President Orders of 13 June 1992, D00434, and D00093, Therefore, EXCULPATORY!! See D93 and D434, both of 13 june 1992:**

⁷²³ Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21652–21653.

⁷²⁴ KDZ446, P29 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21006.

⁷²⁵ P6209 (JNA 2nd Military District report, 1 April 1992), p. 3; Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25447 (28 February 2012); Aleksandar Vasiljević, T. 34700–34701 (4 March 2013); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 64, 66, 117–118. *See also* Cvijetin Simić, T. 35671–35672 (20 March 2013); D3065 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević dated 26 February 2013), para. 174. *See paras.* 611–616.

⁷²⁶ Čedomir Zelenović, T. 40341–40342 (25 June 2013); Branko Grujić, T. 40362–40365 (25 June 2013). *See paras.* 1242–1243, 1245–1246, 1249–1252.

⁷²⁷ KDZ446, P29 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21006; Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 468; KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 6990 (under seal); Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2878; Milorad Davidović, T. 15822 (1 July 2011); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 80; Suad Dzafić, T. 18187–18188 (1 September 2011).

⁷²⁸ Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21436–21438, 21652–21654; Milorad Davidović, T. 15479–15480 (28 June 2011); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 89, 93, 120–123; P2856 (Video footage of Radovan Karadžić at public ceremony); Pero Marković, T. 34737 (4 March 2013); Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 488–490; Dušan Spasojević, T. 35902–35903 (22 March 2013); Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25446–25447 (28 February 2012). *See paras.* 608, 611–612, 798, 824, 1244, fn. 2691.

⁷²⁹ Milorad Davidović, T. 15479–15480 (28 June 2011); Pero Marković, T. 34735 (4 March 2013); KDZ446, P29 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21055–21056; Zivan Filipović, T. 35815–35816 (21 March 2013); Dušan Spasojević, T. 35902–35903 (22 March 2013). *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2237.

⁷³⁰ Milorad Davidović, T. 15583–15584 (29 June 2011); Cvijetin Simić, T. 35698 (20 March 2013); KDZ446, P29 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21056.

⁷³¹ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 89; D1612 (Video footage of Arkan in “My Guest, His Truth”, July/August 1994), pp. 11–12; Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Župljanin*), T. 21817, 21563.

⁷³² Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21817.


⁷³³ D1458 (Order of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 3 June 1992); Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25454–25455 (28 February 2012). *But see* Milorad Davidović, T. 15812–15814 (1 July 2011) (testifying that although the order was issued, it was not carried out in practice). The Accused submits that Mauzer's unit acted independent of government command. Defence Final Brief, para. 1381 (referring to Cvijetin Simić, T. 35698–35699 (20 March 2013)). The Chamber does not consider that the evidence cited nor the other evidence received in this case supports this proposition. Dragomir Ljubojević testified that Mauzer's Panthers was a unit of the VRS and “never a party army” and consisted of people from all areas including from Bijeljina itself and it was not formed by the SDS but by the staff of the TO of the municipality. Dragomir Ljubojević, T. 35902–35903 (22 March 2013). The Chamber notes his evidence but does not accept that Mauzer's unit was initially formed as a unit of the VRS.

1. Formation and operations of all self-organized armed groups and individuals are banned on the territory of Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The existing groups and individuals are obliged to put themselves under the unique command of either the Army of Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, within three days.

2. The Presidency of Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina disowns the groups which would continue with their operations independently and will order the strictest sanctions provided by law for their existence and operations.

3. Their placing under the unique command of the Army or the Militia implies strict respect for the provisions of the International Military Law.



ORDER
ON THE APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
WAR IN THE ARMY OF THE SERBIAN REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA

1. In an armed conflict, the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter referred to as the Army) and the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs shall apply and respect the rules of the international law of war.

The rules of the international law of war referred to in paragraph 1 of the present item include:

- the international treaties signed, ratified or joined by the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
- the customary international law of war;
- the generally accepted principles of the international law of war.

2. Commanders of all units, as well as each member of the army or other armed formation who takes part in combat activities, are responsible for the application of the rules of the international law of war.

It is the duty of the competent superior officer to initiate proceedings for legal sanctions against individuals who violate the rules of the international law of war.

3. The Minister of Defence of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is authorised to prepare instructions on the treatment of captured persons.

4. The army should be regularly instructed in the rules of the international law of war.

5. This Order shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the *Official Gazette of the Serbian People in BH*. Instructions on the treatment of prisoners of war shall form an integral part of the Order.

Number 01-53/92
13 June 1992

President
of the Presidency of the Serbian Republic of
BH
Dr. Radovan Karadžić
/stamped and signed/

#All EXCULPATORY!!! What else presidents do in any country???

234. Men affiliated with Vojislav Šešelj, president of the SRS, operated throughout BiH and most notably with regard to the Municipalities, in Bijeljina, Zvornik, Brčko, Ilidža, and Novo Sarajevo.⁷³⁴ In Ilidža, a group of Šešelj's men was commanded by Branislav Gavrilović, also called Brne.⁷³⁵ In Vogošća, there was a group of "Šešelj's men" commanded by Vaske Vidović

⁷³⁴ See paras. 608, 611, 824, 1249, fn. 2691. See also P6388 (Excerpt from video of interview with Vojislav Šešelj for "Death of Yugoslavia" documentary, with transcript) (stating that his volunteers were in Zvornik); P5035 (Order of Vojislav Šešelj, 13 May 1993), pp. 1-2.

⁷³⁵ See paras. 2131, 2255. See also P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 74; Momčilo Mandić, T. 4644-4645 (5 July 2010); P6640 (Certificate of SerBiH MUP, 11 April 1992) (SerBiH MUP authorisation from Mićo Stanišić noting that Gavrilović is an active participant in the TO and issuing him weapons and ammunition); P2302 (Approval of the War Board of Commissioners of Ilidža Municipality, 9 July 1992) (authorisation from Nedeljko Prstojević in Ilidža to allow Gavrilović and his "Serbian volunteer units" the use of facilities for training); P5035 (Order of Vojislav Šešelj, 13 May 1993), p. 3; P2228 (Intercept of conversation between Vojislav Šešelj and Branislav Gavrilović, April 1992). See also D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013), para. 58.

and another group commanded by Jovo Ostojić called the “Šoša Detachment”.⁷³⁶ In Novo Sarajevo, Gavrilović and his group were also present and Slavko Aleksić led another group of Šešelj’s men.⁷³⁷

(All of them, except Brne, were under the command of the VRS, and thus weren’t “paramilitaries”. The adversaries hated them and made propaganda against them, so it happened that they got a bad reputation, but none of them had been prosecuted even after the war. A bad “reputation” was a very important tool in the hands of the Serb adversaries, including President Karadzic, which puts a big question mark on any legal procedure! #Bad reputation!)

235. The White Eagles operated in Ključ, Zvornik, Foča, and Ilidža.⁷³⁸ They were a paramilitary formation from Serbia.⁷³⁹ They were commanded by Desimir Dida.⁷⁴⁰ The members of the White Eagles wore uniforms with white ribbons on their sleeves and on their heads.⁷⁴¹ The insignia of the White Eagles was a symbol of a skull and cross bones.⁷⁴²

236. The Red Berets were a paramilitary group which operated in Brčko and Zvornik.⁷⁴³ They were commanded by Dragan Vasilković, a.k.a. Captain Dragan.⁷⁴⁴

237. The Yellow Wasps consisted of around 100 to 300 men.⁷⁴⁵ They were commanded by Vojin (Žučo) Vučković⁷⁴⁶ and operated in Zvornik from April to May 1992.⁷⁴⁷ They had close co-operation with the TO and were issued arms by the TO’s logistics staff.⁷⁴⁸ **This is all based upon an Adjudicated Fact and testimony of M. Davidovic, which is unfair and unsustainable, since it is obvious that they immediately after turned to be renegades, had been arrested by the Serb MUP. Therefore, the complete fact is #EXCULPATORY!)**

238. In the spring of 1992, some paramilitary formations worked in co-ordination with the TO and municipal Crisis Staffs.⁷⁴⁹ The Bosnian Serb leadership and military commanders

⁷³⁶ See para. 2382. See also P3033 (Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”, para. 56; P5035 (Order of Vojislav Šešelj, 13 May 1993), p. 5.

⁷³⁷ See para. 2255.

⁷³⁸ Asim Egrić, P3570 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4888–4889 (under seal); KDZ340, T. 17490 (19 August 2011) (private session); KDZ379, P3332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 3111; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 351; P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 73. See also paras. 855, 1244, 1249, 1498, 1511, 2142.

⁷³⁹ KDZ379, P3332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 3111; P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 73.

⁷⁴⁰ KDZ379, T. 18874–18875 (15 September 2011).

⁷⁴¹ KDZ041, T. 12104 (17 February 2011).

⁷⁴² Suad Džafić, T. 18188 (1 September 2011).

⁷⁴³ D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), pp. 7–8; P2888 (Brčko’s War Presidency Summary of events in Brčko Municipality), p. 3; Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21414–21415; P104 (Witness statements of Fadil Banjanović dated 30 March 2002), para. 19; Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2923. This unit arrived in Zvornik some time after 25 May 1992.

⁷⁴⁴ Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21414–21415, 21668; P4263 (Video footage of award ceremony of the Red Berets) at 00:43:20–00:43:50; Milan Martić, T. 38120 (13 May 2013); D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), pp. 7–8; P2888 (Brčko’s War Presidency Summary of events in Brčko Municipality), p. 3.

⁷⁴⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 2108. See also Reynaud Theunens, T. 17090–17092, 17093–17095 (21 July 2011). The MUP in Bijeljina reported, in July 1992, that the group had approximately 100 armed men. P36 (Report by CSB Bijeljina re security situation in the Zvornik Municipality, 20 July 1992) (under seal), p. 1, reference to the group commanded by “Žučo”. Milorad Davidović states that there were approximately 300 men in Zvornik. P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 126.

⁷⁴⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 2109. See also Milorad Davidović, T. 15491 (28 June 2011); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 126; D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 205.

⁷⁴⁷ Reynaud Theunens, T. 17090–17095 (21 July 2011); Aleksandar Vasiljević, T. 34700–34701 (4 March 2013); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 126–129. See also Adjudicated Fact 2108.

⁷⁴⁸ See Adjudicated Fact 2108. See also Reynaud Theunens, T. 17090–17092 (21 July 2011); Milorad Davidović, T. 15491 (28 June 2011).

⁷⁴⁹ See generally Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2887–2889; Milorad Davidović, T. 15492–15495 (28 June 2011); P2862 (Yellow Wasps payroll, 1 May 1992); P2863 (Yellow Wasps payroll, June 1992); P2865 (White Eagles’ payroll, June 1992). See also Adjudicated Facts 2107, 2108.

increasingly expressed opposition to having units that were outside of the command and control of the army.⁷⁵⁰ **#EXCULPATORY!** This led to various VRS and Bosnian Serb MUP leaders attempting to control paramilitary groups in the RS territory.⁷⁵¹ **(Not entirely correct, and not fair: “attempting to control paramilitaries” didn’t mean any tolerance, but what had been said in the next sentence, “disarmed with legal measures taken”, which happened all the time! EXCULPATORY, no matter it is mitigated by wording. This led to various VRS and Bosnian Serb MUP leaders attempting to control paramilitary groups... #Exculpatory, Mitigated and distorted!)** The Main Staff recommended that every armed Serb should be placed under the exclusive command of the VRS, or else be disarmed with “legal measures taken”.⁷⁵² The MUP also attempted to integrate paramilitaries into the existing police units where it was possible.⁷⁵³ **(Or to arrest them, which happened many times, whenever possible! That was another war of the legal Serb forces, VRS and MUP!)**

239. On 13 June 1992, the Accused banned the formation and operation of armed groups and individuals on the territory of the RS which were not under the control of the VRS.⁷⁵⁴ The Accused also stated that he disowned groups that continued independent operation and those groups would suffer the strictest sanctions for their operations.⁷⁵⁵ **EXCULPATORY!** Following this order, Arkan’s men left BiH, Captain Dragan’s unit was driven out by the VRS, and Mauzer’s Panthers were to be integrated into the Eastern Bosnia Corps.⁷⁵⁶ A group of individuals, referred to as “Chetniks”, remained around Sarajevo and according to Milovanović sometimes co-operated with the VRS but may have been under the control of the MUP.⁷⁵⁷ **Fn754. According to the domestic law of All-People’s Defense, nobody must prevent anyone to defend if endangered, or to get enacted if the country is attacked – except if the authorities of the local commune organizes for defense. So, had the Serbs hadn’t organize VRS, everyone would be entitled to organize and fight. Once there was an organized and legal Army, none were free to fight on their own. #Paramilitaries.**

⁷⁵⁰ Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43334–43335 (12 November 2013); P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), para. 362.

⁷⁵¹ P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), paras. 361–378; D1933 (Fax from Radovan Karadžić to Boutros Ghali, 13 June 1992); P3914 (Ewan Brown’s expert report entitled “Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina - 1992”, 27 November 2002), paras. 2.57–2.58, 2.62–2.64; Ewan Brown, T. 21699–21701 (22 November 2011); Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 9119; Momčilo Mandić, T. 4649–4650 (5 July 2010), T. 5147–5148, 5157–5158 (14 July 2010), T. 5179 (15 July 2010); Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43334–43335 (12 November 2013).

⁷⁵² P2855 (VRS Main Staff report on paramilitary formations, 28 July 1992), p. 6. P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), para. 363. For instance, at a meeting held on 18 May 1992, the Crisis Staff of the ARK concluded that all formations not in the VRS or in the Banja Luka Services Centre, but located in the ARK, would be considered paramilitary formations and would be disarmed. P3924 (Decision of ARK Executive Council, 5 May 1992; Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff, 8–18 May 1992), p. 5. On 21 May 1992, Talić issued an order to the 1st Krajina Corps with the instruction, “[d]o not allow the presence of any paramilitary formations or other special organisations within the zones of responsibility. Disperse individual members among various units as volunteers, but if they refuse that, break them up and, if necessary, destroy them”. P3920 (Order of 1st Krajina Corps, 21 May 1992), p. 3.

⁷⁵³ P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), para. 361. See also Nedeljko Prstojević, T. 12986, 12988 (8 March 2011); P2302 (Approval of the War Board of Commissioners of Ilidža Municipality, 9 July 1992); D3960 (Witness statement of Tomislav Kovač dated 28 October 2013), para. 74; Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11803–11805 (14 February 2011).

⁷⁵⁴ P3057 (Radovan Karadžić’s Decision, 13 June 1992), p. 2. See also D1933 (Fax from Radovan Karadžić to Boutros Ghali, 13 June 1992); P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court p. 321; P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), para. 362.

⁷⁵⁵ P3057 (Radovan Karadžić’s Decision, 13 June 1992), p. 2. See also P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court p. 321.

⁷⁵⁶ Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25454–25455 (28 February 2012). However, Arkan’s men returned to Bijeljina from time to time. See para. 616.

⁷⁵⁷ Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25455 (28 February 2012); John Hamill, P1994 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Galić*), T. 6218–6219.

240. On 28 July 1992, Mladić ordered the disarming of paramilitaries.⁷⁵⁸ **(EXCULPATORY! This was not his very first order, he did it even in May 1992, see: @)** He noted that paramilitaries engaged in looting were operating in all territories under Bosnian Serb control and ordered that all paramilitary formations with “honest” intentions be placed under the command of the VRS.⁷⁵⁹ No individual or group responsible for crimes was to be incorporated into the army, and any member of a paramilitary unit who refused to submit to the unified command of the VRS was to be disarmed and arrested.⁷⁶⁰ **EXCULPATORY# Paramilitaries!**

241. On 30 July 1992, the 1st Krajina Corps Commander Talić issued an instruction, ordering that all paramilitary formations be offered an opportunity to join the VRS except for individuals or groups involved in criminal activity.⁷⁶¹ **EXCULPATORY!** Talić further ordered co-operation with the Bosnian MUP to disarm or arrest those individuals or groups who refuse to come under the unified command of the VRS.⁷⁶² By the end of August 1992, the 1st Krajina Corps reported that paramilitary formations were either disarming or placing themselves under the control of the Corps’ units.⁷⁶³ **EXCULPATORY!**

242. In the other Corps there were serious attempts to control the paramilitary forces.⁷⁶⁴ For instance, Mauzer’s Panthers were initially placed under Main Staff command and then subsequently integrated into the Eastern Bosnia Corps.⁷⁶⁵ **(EXCULPATORY! sounds like the Accused was going to be acquitted)**

iv. Volunteers

243. The SFRY Law on All People’s Defence specifically provided that volunteers were “persons not subject to military service who have been accepted in and joined in the Armed Forces at their own request”.⁷⁶⁶ Article 9 of the Law on the Army provided that during a state of war, imminent threat of war, or state of emergency, the army may be replenished with volunteers who were defined as “persons joining the Army at their own request” and enjoying the same rights and duties as members of the military.⁷⁶⁷ **EXCULPATORY! And that was the basis for having their names on paylists all until they reneged from the unique command and control!**

⁷⁵⁸ P1500 (VRS Main Staff Order, 28 July 1992); P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court pp. 325–326. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2114.

⁷⁵⁹ P1500 (VRS Main Staff Order, 28 July 1992); P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court pp. 325–326. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2115.

⁷⁶⁰ P1500 (VRS Main Staff Order, 28 July 1992). *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2116.

⁷⁶¹ P3914 (Ewan Brown’s expert report entitled “Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992”, 27 November 2002), para. 2.63.

⁷⁶² P3914 (Ewan Brown’s expert report entitled “Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992”, 27 November 2002), para. 2.63.

⁷⁶³ P3914 (Ewan Brown’s expert report entitled “Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992”, 27 November 2002), para. 2.64. Nonetheless, in at least one case, the 1st Krajina Corps incorporated a group, led by Veljko Milanković, despite the VRS Main Staff Report on paramilitaries stating that the group had been engaging in “extensive looting”. P3914 (Ewan Brown’s expert report entitled “Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992”, 27 November 2002), para. 2.65–2.70; P2855 (VRS Main Staff report on paramilitary formations, 28 July 1992), p. 4.

⁷⁶⁴ Hussein Abdel-Razek, T. 5492–5493 (19 July 2010); P1006 (SRK Order, 12 September 1992); KDZ088, T. 6310 (7 September 2010) (closed session).

⁷⁶⁵ Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25454–25455 (28 February 2012).

⁷⁶⁶ D1358 (SFRY Law on All People’s Defence), art. 119; P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court pp. 53–54.

⁷⁶⁷ P2603 (SerBiH Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), art. 9. *See also* P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court p. 321.

244. The term “volunteers” was also used by individuals in paramilitary formations when referring to themselves.⁷⁶⁸ Nevertheless according to the Law on the Army, volunteers were individuals who placed themselves under the command of the army without a wartime assignment, while paramilitary formations were groups outside of anyone’s control at least in the early days of the war.⁷⁶⁹ VRS commanders used the concept of volunteers to integrate members of paramilitary formations into VRS operative units.⁷⁷⁰ **EXCULPATORY!**

b. JUSTICE SYSTEMS 16.JAN.19.

i. Civilian justice system

1. Functions and obligations under the Constitution

245. The Bosnian Serb Constitution provided for courts that are “independent and autonomous and are trying in accordance [with] the Constitution and the Law”.⁷⁷¹ The Constitution further stated: “Courts are protecting human rights and freedoms, determined rights and interests of legal subjects and legality.”⁷⁷² **EXCULPATORY#, particularly since there was no interfering of authorities in their job!**

246. Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court of the Republic, “as the highest court in the Republic”, was to “secure [...] the uniform application of the law”.⁷⁷³ Lower courts were to ensure that all coercive actions on behalf of the state authorities were conducted in accordance with the rule of law.⁷⁷⁴ No one could be deprived of his or her freedom without a valid court decision.⁷⁷⁵ Furthermore, the Constitution set forth the principle of fair trial in criminal proceedings.⁷⁷⁶ This included that accused persons had the right to be informed of the nature of the allegation against them in the shortest time provided by the law, and guilt could not be established except by pronouncement of a valid court verdict.⁷⁷⁷ An official could enter an apartment or other premises against the will of their owner and conduct a search only on the basis

⁷⁶⁸ KDZ072, P68 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelj*), T. 8717–8718 (under seal); P2958 (Christian Nielsen’s expert report entitled “The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992”, 19 May 2011), paras. 49–52.

⁷⁶⁹ P2603 (SerBiH Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), art. 9; Ratomir Maksimović, T. 31611 (17 December 2012); Tihomir Glavas, T. 11991–11992 (16 February 2011); KDZ555, T. 17387–17388 (17 August 2011). See also P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court p. 321.

⁷⁷⁰ D1076 (MUP Administration for the Police Duties and Affairs report, 3 August 1992), p. 2; Dragomir Milošević, T. 32864–32865 (29 January 2013); P3920 (Order of 1st Krajina Corps, 21 May 1992). For instance, on 21 May 1992, the Commander of the 1st Krajina Corps, Talić, issued an order forbidding the presence of any paramilitary formations and instructing that, instead, individual members be dispersed among various units as volunteers. P3920 (Order of 1st Krajina Corps, 21 May 1992).

⁷⁷¹ P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 121 (p. 25). See also Adjudicated Facts 2066, 2067.

⁷⁷² P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 121 (p. 25). See also Adjudicated Fact 2067.

⁷⁷³ P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 123 (p. 25). Below the Supreme Court, there were High Courts and Lower Courts. See P1358 (Minutes of 19th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 August 1992), pp. 1–2; D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), pp. 107–110, 112–115; P1468 (Minutes of 21st session of RS Assembly, 30 October–1 November 1992), pp. 14–21; P1361 (Minutes of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23–24 November 1992), p. 9; P1362 (Shorthand Record of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23–24 November 1992), pp. 96, 99.

⁷⁷⁴ See Adjudicated Fact 2070.

⁷⁷⁵ Adjudicated Fact 2072.

⁷⁷⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 2073. See also P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 18 (p. 5).

⁷⁷⁷ See Adjudicated Fact 2074. See also P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), arts. 18, 20 (p. 5).

of a court order, unless such entry and search were necessary to capture a criminal or save the lives of people and property.⁷⁷⁸

247. The Bosnian Serb Constitution defined the Public Prosecutor's Office as an "independent state body that prosecutes perpetrators of criminal and other activities punishable by law and applies legal means for the protection of legality".⁷⁷⁹

248. The Supreme Court and other courts, as well as the public prosecutors, submitted reports to the Bosnian Serb Assembly.⁷⁸⁰ **THIS SYSTEM DIDN'T DELIVER ANY ABERATION, AND WASN'T A SOURCE OF UNLAWFULNESS, WHICH COULD APPEAR ONLY AS A VIOLATION, RATHER THAN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS!# Constitute: DOCUMENTS NEVER ENABLED LAWFULNESS!)**

249. According to the Bosnian Serb Constitution, the Constitutional Court, comprising seven judges, was vested with the power to, *inter alia*, decide on the conformity of laws with the Constitution; resolve conflict of authority among the legislative, executive, and judicial bodies and among the republican, regional, and municipal bodies; and decide on the conformity of the program and statute of political organisations with the Constitution and the law.⁷⁸¹ Reports from the Constitutional Court about matters of constitutionality and legality were to be considered by the Constitutional Committee of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and then by the Bosnian Serb Assembly itself.⁷⁸²

250. Judges and public prosecutors were to be elected or appointed and dismissed by the Bosnian Serb Assembly.^{783 (783)}

2. Establishment

a. General judicial organs

251. Momčilo Mandić was appointed Minister of Justice and Administration at the meeting of the SNB and Government on 22 April 1992.⁷⁸⁴ He served as Minister of Justice until 23 November 1992.⁷⁸⁵ As Minister of Justice, Mandić carried out the organisation of the courts, prosecutor's offices, and correctional institutions of the civilian justice system.⁷⁸⁶ According to

⁷⁷⁸ See P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 24 (p. 6). See also Adjudicated Fact 2071.

⁷⁷⁹ P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 128 (p. 26).

⁷⁸⁰ P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 232 (pp. 73–74).

⁷⁸¹ P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), arts. 115–116 (p. 24). See also Adjudicated Fact 2066.

⁷⁸² P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), arts. 59–60, 228 (pp. 42–43, 72–73). The Assembly Chairman was to inform the Constitutional Court of the Assembly's position when the Assembly found it necessary to change or amend a law, regulation, or general legal document. P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 229 (p. 73).

⁷⁸³ Adjudicated Fact 2068; P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 130 (p. 27).

⁷⁸⁴ P3051 (Minutes of expanded meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 22 April 1992), p. 3. According to Mandić, he was appointed and took the oath at an Assembly meeting in Banja Luka on 12 May 1992. Momčilo Mandić, T. 4532, 4535 (1 July 2010), T. 4895–4896 (8 July 2010).

⁷⁸⁵ Momčilo Mandić, T. 4428 (30 June 2010). See also P1361 (Minutes of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23–24 November 1992), p. 5.

⁷⁸⁶ Momčilo Mandić, T. 4575–4576 (5 July 2010). However, on 8 August 1992, the Government tasked Deputy Prime Minister Milan Trbojević and Mandić with providing assistance in finding staff for military judicial organs. D453 (Minutes of 45th session of Government of SerBiH, 7 August 1992), p. 4. See also Momčilo Mandić, T. 5197 (15 July 2010).

Mandić, the military justice system was completely separate and located within the Ministry of Defence, with the Main Staff organising it.⁷⁸⁷

252. On 27 April 1992, a session of the SNB and Government adopted a decision “to organise the prosecutor’s office, judicial organs and prisons”.⁷⁸⁸ On 10 May 1992, another SNB-Government session decided “to take the necessary measures to gather professionals and ensure conditions for the work of the state and judicial organs”.⁷⁸⁹ **The war was already going on, and the Serb community didn’t have any infrastructure, and had to build it from zero level!**

253. A decision of the SerBiH Presidency dated 16 May 1992, signed by the Accused as the President of the Presidency, established a lower court in Vlasenica with jurisdiction over four Serbian municipalities, including Vlasenica, and a lower court in Sokolac for the areas of the Serbian municipalities of Pale, Rogatica, and Sokolac.⁷⁹⁰ A 20 May 1992 decision of the SerBiH Presidency stated that “[l]ower courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to conduct legal proceedings in the first instance for all criminal offences”.⁷⁹¹ The decision further stated that “[h]igh courts are obliged to conclude criminal proceedings in cases where indictments were submitted prior to the date when this decision takes effect”.⁷⁹²

254. Mandić tried to create a single justice system during 1992 and asked in July and August 1992 that the Assembly amend the law to form a single justice system, but he was not successful.⁷⁹³ In a letter dated 10 July 1992 signed by Mandić, the Ministry of Justice informed the President of the Presidency that it had organised and set up regular courts, public prosecutor’s offices, and municipal misdemeanour courts in the territory of the SerBiH, “except for the Northern Bosnia District (Doboj Region) where the work could not be done due to war activities”, though preparations were under way.⁷⁹⁴ The letter also stated that a large number of the criminal offences came under the subject-matter jurisdiction of the military judiciary, which had not yet been established.⁷⁹⁵ The Ministry proposed that, until the military judicial bodies were established, regular judicial bodies temporarily take over the role of the former, stating, “[t]his would to a considerable degree help prevent the commission of these criminal offences and help establish legal order and legal security throughout the [SerBiH]”.⁷⁹⁶ The Ministry also proposed that “the Law on the Enforcement of Criminal and Misdemeanour Sanctions should be amended so as to include the possibility of staying the enforcement of prison sentences until the end of the war, by means of assigning convicts to military units”.⁷⁹⁷ The Ministry requested that the Presidency examine these proposals and “communicate its position to the Ministry which would move for the adoption of appropriate decisions”.⁷⁹⁸

⁷⁸⁷ Momčilo Mandić, T. 4576 (5 July 2010).

⁷⁸⁸ D406 (Minutes of meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 27 April 1992), p. 1.

⁷⁸⁹ D409 (Minutes of SNB and the Government of the SerBiH session, 10 May 1992), p. 2.

⁷⁹⁰ P2617 (SerBiH Presidency Decision on subject-matter jurisdiction of regular courts, 8 June 1992), p. 2.

⁷⁹¹ P2617 (SerBiH Presidency Decision on subject-matter jurisdiction of regular courts, 8 June 1992), p. 1.

⁷⁹² P2617 (SerBiH Presidency Decision on subject-matter jurisdiction of regular courts, 8 June 1992), p. 1.

⁷⁹³ Momčilo Mandić, T. 4576–4577 (5 July 2010).

⁷⁹⁴ D442 (SerBiH Ministry of Justice letter to Radovan Karadžić, 10 July 1992), p. 1. *See also* Momčilo Mandić, T. 5115–5116 (14 July 2010).

⁷⁹⁵ D442 (SerBiH Ministry of Justice letter to Radovan Karadžić, 10 July 1992), p. 1. *See also* Momčilo Mandić, T. 5116 (14 July 2010).

⁷⁹⁶ D442 (SerBiH Ministry of Justice letter to Radovan Karadžić, 10 July 1992), p. 1. *See also* Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 8920; Momčilo Mandić, T. 5116–5117 (14 July 2010).

⁷⁹⁷ D442 (SerBiH Ministry of Justice letter to Radovan Karadžić, 10 July 1992), p. 1. *See also* Momčilo Mandić, T. 5117–5118 (14 July 2010).

⁷⁹⁸ D442 (SerBiH Ministry of Justice letter to Radovan Karadžić, 10 July 1992), p. 2.

255. In a 5 August 1992 letter to the SerBiH Presidency and the Accused in particular, signed by Mandić, the Ministry of Justice reiterated its proposal that regular courts and public prosecutor's offices take over the competence of military courts and military prosecutor's offices until the establishment of military legal organs, combining the military and civilian justice systems into one.⁷⁹⁹

256. Between August and November 1992, the Assembly discussed and voted on the appointment and dismissal of judges and prosecutors.⁸⁰⁰ The appointments included the republican Public Prosecutor; judges of the Supreme Court of the RS; judges of the Lower Court in Banja Luka, Prijedor, Vlasenica, Zvornik, Foča, Sokolac, Sarajevo, Brčko, and Bosanski Novi; judges of the High Court in Banja Luka and Bijeljina; public prosecutors in Zvornik, Sokolac, Vlasenica, Prijedor, Sarajevo, Bijeljina, Višegrad, and Bosanski Novi; deputy public prosecutors in Banja Luka, Zvornik, Foča, Sarajevo, Bosanski Novi, and Prijedor; and a senior public prosecutor and deputy senior public prosecutor in Sarajevo.⁸⁰¹ **(Prior to that, the Accused in his capacity of the President of Presidency, in the absence of regular meetings of the Assembly, appointed judges and prosecutors in several courts, strictly respecting the multi-ethnic composition, see.....#Multiethnicity@ But, the Chamber didn't mention it!)**

257. The appointment of judges and prosecutors proceeded by way of the Ministry of Justice asking SAOs to nominate candidates meeting the formal and legal requirements and inform the Ministry of the ethnic make-up of the municipality from which the candidates came.⁸⁰² The Ministry would then send the nominations to the Assembly, which would appoint the nominees; if the Assembly could not meet, nominations would be sent to the President, who would proceed with the appointments.⁸⁰³

b. Organs specific to war crimes and genocide

258. On 16 April 1992, the SNB decided to form a "Commission to Determine War Crimes".⁸⁰⁴ **(#EXCULPATORY! And that is clear that another Center for documentation of the crimes against the Serbian people, led by a distinguished writer, novelist and publisher Miroslav Toholj was not a discriminatory body, but only a documentation center for**

⁷⁹⁹ P1136 (Letter from Ministry of Justice of SerBiH to Radovan Karadžić, 5 August 1992). See also Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 8920–8923; Momčilo Mandić, T. 5118–5119, 5121 (14 July 2010).

⁸⁰⁰ See Adjudicated Fact 2069; P1357 (18th session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 August 1992), pp. 30–32; P1358 (Minutes of 19th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 August 1992), pp. 1–2; D422 (19th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 August 1992), pp. 10–29; P1359 (Minutes of 20th session of SerBiH Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), pp. 2–3; D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), pp. 107–117; P1468 (Minutes of 21st session of RS Assembly, 30 October–1 November 1992), pp. 2–4; P1361 (Minutes of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23–24 November 1992), pp. 8–9; P1362 (Shorthand Record of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23–24 November 1992), pp. 95–99.

⁸⁰¹ P1357 (18th session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 August 1992), p. 32; P1358 (Minutes of 19th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 August 1992), pp. 1–2; D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), pp. 107–110, 112–117; P1468 (Minutes of 21st session of RS Assembly, 30 October–1 November 1992), pp. 14–21; P1361 (Minutes of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23–24 November 1992), p. 9; P1362 (Shorthand Record of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23–24 November 1992), pp. 96–97, 99. Records in evidence indicate that there was also a lower court in Sanski Most. See P3518 (Report of Sanski Most's Lower Court Investigating Judge, 9 November 1992); D1785 (Banja Luka Military Court's Decision, 13 December 1993) (under seal), p. 1.

⁸⁰² See Momčilo Mandić, T. 5018 (13 July 2010). For an example of the proposal of candidates from the local level, see D417 (Proposal from Presidency of Bijeljina Municipal Assembly to the Ministry of Justice of the SerBiH, 5 June 1992). See also Momčilo Mandić, T. 5018–5019 (13 July 2010).

⁸⁰³ Momčilo Mandić, T. 5020 (13 July 2010); P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 130 (p. 27). The Assembly would have to verify the appointment decisions of the Presidency or President. See P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 81 (p. 17); Momčilo Mandić, T. 5020 (13 July 2010). For examples of the Presidency adopting decisions on the appointment of judges and prosecutors under article 81 of the Bosnian Serb Constitution, see D418 (Decisions on appointment of judges in Bijeljina and Banja Luka, 20 June 1992) and D419 (Decisions on appointment of prosecutors in Bijeljina, 20 June 1992). See also Momčilo Mandić, T. 5020–5025 (13 July 2010).

⁸⁰⁴ D405 (Minutes of extended session of the SNB, 16 April 1992), p. 2.

collecting data about crimes out of the reach of the regular organs of prosecution! #Anti-crime) On 24 April 1992, a session of the SNB and the Government adopted the decision to set up a state commission for war crimes and to compile instructions for the commission's work.⁸⁰⁵ On 3 June 1992, the Government concluded that "[a] procedure for determining war crimes should be initiated" and assigned the task to the MUP and the Commission for War Crimes formed by the Government.⁸⁰⁶ **EXCULPATORY! It had been formed prior to, and differed from the Mr. Toholj's Centre, in terms that it was an investigating body, while Mr. Toholj's Centre was only collecting the information on what happened out of the Serb MUP jurisdiction!)**

259. On 16 May 1992, Mićo Stanišić instructed the five CSBs to submit to the MUP daily fax reports containing, *inter alia*, information on measures and activities to document war crimes.⁸⁰⁷

260. On 17 June 1992, the SerBiH Presidency decided that the Government would draft a decision on the establishment of a State Documentation Centre "which will gather all genuine documents on crimes committed against the Serbian people during this war".⁸⁰⁸ On 17 June 1992, the Accused, as President of the Presidency, issued a decree forming the State Documentation Centre for Investigating War Crimes against Serb People.⁸⁰⁹ The State Documentation Centre was to, *inter alia*, "collect [...] and keep [...] evidence on preparation and encouragement of crimes against Serb people in the [SerBiH], committed shortly before, during, and after war clashes".⁸¹⁰ At its next session, on 21 June 1992, the SerBiH Presidency appointed Miroslav Toholj as the director of the State Documentation Centre of the SerBiH.⁸¹¹ According to Mandić, the documentation institute was not involved with investigations in the criminal or legal sense and its task was to document events in BiH at the time.⁸¹² **(Exactly! Although knowing that, the Chamber concluded opposite. #EXCULPATORY! No interference with the regular institutions such as Ministry for Interior and Ministry for Justice! If this Center was to replace the regular investigation organs, the first Commission formed in April would be abolished! The Chamber erred when accepted the Prosecution suggestions to that respect!)**

261. On 11 July 1992, the Presidency decided that the Commission for Investigating War Crimes Committed against the Serbian People in BiH should be established and appointed Mandić, Momir Tošić, and Jovan Šarac as deputy members of the Commission.⁸¹³

⁸⁰⁵ P1087 (Minutes of meeting between SNB and SerBiH Government, 24 April 1992), p. 1.

⁸⁰⁶ D415 (Minutes of 20th session of Government of SerBiH, 3 June 1992), p. 3. *See also* Momčilo Mandić, T. 5015 (13 July 2010).

⁸⁰⁷ P2715 (SerBiH MUP dispatch, 16 May 1992), pp. 1, 3. *See also* P6641 (Order of SerBiH MUP, 17 July 1992); P6642 (Dispatch from Banja Luka CSB to all SJBs, 14 December 1992). The 16 May 1992 dispatch further stated that "[t]hese activities must involve collection of information and documents on war crimes against the Serbs". P2715 (SerBiH MUP dispatch, 16 May 1992), p. 3.

⁸⁰⁸ P3064 (Minutes of the 8th session of the SerBiH Presidency, 17 June 1992), p. 1.

⁸⁰⁹ D3990 (Decree of Radovan Karadžić's, 17 June 1992), e-court pp. 2–3. *See also* D3981 (Witness statement of Miroslav Toholj dated 31 October 2013), para. 3.

⁸¹⁰ D3990 (Decree of Radovan Karadžić's, 17 June 1992), e-court p. 3.

⁸¹¹ P3065 (Minutes of the 9th session of the SerBiH Presidency, 21 June 1992). *See also* D3990 (Decree of Radovan Karadžić's, 17 June 1992), e-court pp. 1–2; D3981 (Witness statement of Miroslav Toholj dated 31 October 2013), paras. 3, 65.

⁸¹² Momčilo Mandić, T. 4967–4968 (8 July 2010), T. 5015 (13 July 2010). The decree of 17 June 1992 suggests a possible consultative role in legal proceedings, however; the Documentation Centre's enumerated duties include "engag[ing] experts and propos[ing] to the state institutions of the [SerBiH] bringing criminal proceedings and other sanctions against individuals, who have encouraged or participated in war crimes and violence against the Serb people". D3990 (Decree of Radovan Karadžić, 17 June 1992), e-court p. 3. Toholj's statement suggests that the Documentation Centre gathered and filed information on crimes but that it was the MUP which had the authority to conduct investigations of crimes. D3981 (Witness statement of Miroslav Toholj dated 31 October 2013), para. 72.

⁸¹³ D444 (Minutes of 17th session of SerBiH Presidency, 11 July 1992), pp. 1–2. *See also* Momčilo Mandić, T. 5132 (14 July 2010).

262. On 11 July 1992, senior MUP officials tasked the National Security Service and Crime Investigation Service with preventing and documenting war crimes and filing criminal reports.⁸¹⁴ The MUP report on the meeting to the President of the Presidency and Prime Minister several days later noted that “[d]ocuments are also provided for war crimes committed by Serbs”.⁸¹⁵

263. The Operative Programme of Measures to Prevent Social Disruption in Conditions of a State of War, issued by the Government on 17 July 1992, stated that the work of the State Commission for the Identification of Crimes and Genocide against the Civilian Population and of Victims of War was to be intensified, with the Ministry of Justice responsible for the action.⁸¹⁶ According to Mandić, the purpose of the state commission was to establish whether there were instances of such crime or genocide in the territory of the RS.⁸¹⁷

264. On 22 April 1993, the Government established a “Commission for War and Other Crimes related to war operations in the territory of [RS]” and appointed Dragan Dangubić as its president.⁸¹⁸ The Commission’s duties were the investigation of events that took place in the territory of the RS that could be classified as “war crimes and other war-related crimes” and the “collection of evidence on the aforementioned crimes, its analysis, legal qualification and safe-keeping”.⁸¹⁹

265. On 3 December 1993, the Government established a “Commission for Gathering Information on Crimes Committed against Humanity and International Law”, with the task of investigating and gathering documentation on events in the territory of the RS that could qualify as “war crimes related to war operations”.⁸²⁰

266. On 15 September 1994, the Bosnian Serb Government adopted a decision authorising the MUP and the Ministry of Justice “to collect information on crimes against humanity and international law that had been committed”.⁸²¹ According to Dušan Kozić, this decision related to victims of all nationalities and had the support of the Accused.⁸²²

EXCULPATORY!# One should differentiate the Centre for Documentation from the regular legal organs for investigation and prosecution!

3. Competence, structure, and procedures

267. When an incident involving a crime was reported, the police, usually civilian, would conduct an on-site investigation under the direction of the investigating judge.⁸²³ The police

⁸¹⁴ D447 (SerBiH MUP, Analysis of functioning of the MUP, July 1992), e-court p. 22; P1096 (SerBiH MUP Report on Some Aspects of Work Done to Date and the Tasks Ahead, 17 July 1992), pp. 3, 6.

⁸¹⁵ P1096 (SerBiH MUP Report on Some Aspects of Work Done to Date and the Tasks Ahead, 17 July 1992), p. 3.

⁸¹⁶ D448 (Government of SerBiH, Operative programme to prevent social disruption in conditions of a state of war, 17 June 1992), p. 15. *See also* Momčilo Mandić, T. 5170–5171 (14 July 2010).

⁸¹⁷ Momčilo Mandić, T. 5171 (14 July 2010).

⁸¹⁸ D3577 (Decision of RS Government, 22 April 1993), p. 1; D3563 (Witness statement of Vladimir Lukić dated 18 May 2013), para. 40 (stating that the Commission was to “determine war crimes regardless of the ethnicity of the victims and perpetrators”).

⁸¹⁹ D3577 (Decision of RS Government, 22 April 1993), p. 1.

⁸²⁰ D3595 (Second report on the work of RS Commission for Gathering Information on Crimes against Humanity and International Law, 15 May 1994), p. 1.

⁸²¹ D3373 (Excerpt from minutes of 4th session of RS Government, 15 September 1994), p. 2. *See also* D3364 (Witness statement of Dušan Kozić dated 7 April 2013), para. 18.

⁸²² D3364 (Witness statement of Dušan Kozić dated 7 April 2013), para. 18.

⁸²³ Momčilo Mandić, T. 5126–5127 (14 July 2010). *See also* Mićo Stanišić, T. 46354–46355 (3 February 2014). *See, e.g.*, D1733 (Investigation report of Ključ Lower Court, 28 April 1992); D1734 (Investigation report of Ključ Lower Court, 2 May 1992); D4680 (Ključ Lower Court on-site investigation report, 30 May 1992); D3784 (Investigation report of Bijeljina Lower Court, 2 June 1992);

would determine if the incident fell under the jurisdiction of the military or the civilian justice system.⁸²⁴ Investigating judges would then send a report of all the evidence collected to the prosecutor, who would determine whether the elements of crime were sufficiently met to initiate criminal proceedings.⁸²⁵ At this stage, the prosecutor could submit to the investigating judge of the lower court a request to open an investigation.⁸²⁶

268. The Operative Programme issued by the Government on 17 July 1992 tasked the Ministry of Justice with issuing instructions “to the organs of justice to intensify and decide cases by summary procedure”.⁸²⁷ The Programme stated under this task: “Priority shall be given to decisions on misdemeanours and criminal offences that weaken the Republic’s power of defence”.⁸²⁸

269. The Accused, as President of the Presidency, issued orders to MUP that investigations be conducted and perpetrators brought to account for specific incidents.⁸²⁹

270. According to Krajišnik, the Bosnian Serb MUP, the Ministry of Justice, and the military were the three main institutions, aside from separate commissions, responsible for investigating matters related to alleged crime, establishing the truth, and punishing the perpetrators.⁸³⁰ **EXCULPATORY!** He stated that the Presidency and the Assembly did not have any investigative instruments at their disposal and that no one outside of the three institutions could influence investigative and judicial work.⁸³¹ **EXCULPATORY!** He also stated that *ex officio* nobody was supposed to inform the Assembly President or Republic President about crimes and that crimes were to be reported to the competent institutions.⁸³² **EXCULPATORY!** He stated that only if the relevant institutions refused to take measures in response to the information, those reporting crimes would have the right to inform the prime minister, the government, and the president of the republic.⁸³³ **(# EXCULPATORY! WAS IT DIFFERENT IN ANY OTHER COUNTRY?)**

271. There are instances in which lower courts issued decisions releasing for military service people who had been detained on suspicion of crime.⁸³⁴

D3193 (Investigation report of Sokolac Lower Court, 20 July 1992); D1735 (Investigation report of Ključ Lower Court, 30 July 1992); D4366 (Report of Ključ Public Prosecutor’s Office, 1 February 1993; Ključ Lower Court’s on-site investigation report, 30 July 1992), pp. 2–4; D4381 (Prijedor Basic Court’s on-site investigation report, 29 August 1992); P3518 (Report of Sanski Most’s Lower Court Investigating Judge, 9 November 1992); D4355 (Sanski Most Lower Court’s on-site investigation report, 4 December 1992); D48 (Zvornik Lower Court’s on-site investigation report, 22 February 1993); D4386 (Prijedor Lower Court’s on-site investigation report, 3 March 1993). See also D4382 (Prijedor SJB record of on-site investigation, 29 October 1992); D4348 (Sanski Most SJB record of on-site investigation, 3 December 1992) (under seal); D2949 (Milići SJB record of on-site investigation, 26 May 1993); D4351 (Sanski Most SJB record of on-site investigation, 22 July 1993) (under seal); P2931 (Bijeljina Military Court indictment of Zoran Tomić and Dragan Matović, 24 June 1993), e-court pp. 3–6. As the on-site investigation reports indicate, usually members of SJBs and/or CSBs and lower court investigating judges and sometimes a member of the prosecutor’s office were present at on-site investigations.

⁸²⁴ Momčilo Mandić, T. 5126–5127 (14 July 2010).

⁸²⁵ Momčilo Mandić, T. 5128 (14 July 2010). See also Mićo Stanišić, T. 46355 (3 February 2014).

⁸²⁶ See P6597 (Request from Prijedor Prosecutor’s Office, 3 July 1992); D4236 (Report of Banja Luka Lower Court, 24 September 1992). See paras. 301–308 for a more detailed description of the criminal process and detention procedures.

⁸²⁷ D448 (Government of SerBiH, Operative programme to prevent social disruption in conditions of a state of war, 17 June 1992), p. 14.

⁸²⁸ D448 (Government of SerBiH, Operative programme to prevent social disruption in conditions of a state of war, 17 June 1992), p. 14.

⁸²⁹ See P3609 (Radovan Karadžić’s Order to RS MUP, 19 August 1992).

⁸³⁰ Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43316–43318 (12 November 2013).

⁸³¹ Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43317–43318 (12 November 2013).

⁸³² See Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43934 (20 November 2013).

⁸³³ Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43935 (20 November 2013).

⁸³⁴ See P6598 (Decision of Prijedor Lower Court, 9 July 1992).

272. Lower courts transferred cases to the military courts when the accused was a member of the military and the case therefore beyond their subject-matter jurisdiction.⁸³⁵

4. Policies and orders relating to the rule of law and crimes

273. In addition to evidence referred to in other sections of this Judgement in relation to specific municipalities, the Chamber makes the following findings below.

274. Mićo Stanišić issued an order on 15 April 1992 that “[i]ndividuals involved in seizure, robbery, [...] or in any other criminal activity aimed at acquiring property and proceeds by unlawful conduct, ought to be identified and most rigorously prosecuted, including arrest and detention”.⁸³⁶ On 26 May 1992, he instructed the five CSBs to send a report containing, *inter alia*, the total number of criminal offences against life and limb, crimes of degradation of personhood and property, and crimes against property, and the total number of such cases which were solved.⁸³⁷ **(#EXCULPATORY! This was the Karadzic’s Minister for Interior, the most vigorous in fighting any sort of crimes. From this order, it is clear that those crimes could have been committed mainly against minorities, and that it had been prosecuted with the strictest seriousness!)**

275. On 5 June 1992, Assistant Minister for Crime Prevention and Detection Planojević, in a document to the five CSBs, noted that in the previous two months after the outbreak of war in BiH, a sharp increase had been observed in the rate of property crimes, war profiteering, and especially war crimes.⁸³⁸ Planojević requested that “vigorous measures be taken against the perpetrators of all types of crimes, and in more extreme cases, orders should be issued on their detention”.⁸³⁹ **(EXCULPATORY! This was the President’s high police officer!#Constitute: conduct of the high officials of MUP#)** The document called for “establish[ing] maximum cooperation with judicial organs and the Military Police” and “[p]ay[ing] special attention to discovering the perpetrators of war crimes, documenting the criminal activities of individuals and groups, arresting them and bringing them to justice”.⁸⁴⁰ The document also stated that the CSBs would likely face obstacles to their work and directed them to make official notes of all information to allow criminal prosecution to be brought later.⁸⁴¹ Further, it told the CSBs that they were required to strictly observe the international laws of war in the treatment of civilians and prisoners of war.⁸⁴² **ALL EXCULPATORY.# It proves that the state organs under the Accused’s leadership did their jobs.# In such a case, there is no need of any superior, let alone President, to intervene. How possibly this could have been used against the Accused? No a single state regulation or other document allowed any crime, and beside that, all the President, Ministers, commanders of the VRS and the Police – repeatedly ordered**

⁸³⁵ See D1775 (Srbac Lower Court’s Ruling, 12 October 1992) (under seal); KDZ492, T. 20119 (18 October 2011) (closed session). Conversely, military courts transferred cases to the civilian courts when the accused was not a member of the military at the time the charged crime was committed. See D1489 (Bijeljina Military Court decision, April 1993), pp. 1–2 (under seal); D1785 (Banja Luka Military Court’s Decision, 13 December 1993) (under seal), pp. 1–2.

⁸³⁶ D404 (SerBiH MUP Order, 15 April 1992). On 17 April 1992, Mićo Stanišić sent to the CSBs and SJBs a related communication stating that cases of unlawful appropriation of property by members of MUP had been recorded in certain SJBs and that in the future “the most stringent measures”, including criminal prosecution, would be taken against such individuals. D1671 (Warning of SerBiH MUP, 17 April 1992); Mićo Stanišić, T. 46364–46365 (3 February 2014).

⁸³⁷ P6240 (SerBiH MUP request for information, 26 May 1992).

⁸³⁸ D1527 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 5 June 1992), pp. 1–2. Stojan Župljanin, Chief of the Banja Luka CSB, forwarded the communication to SJBs. D425 (CSB Banja Luka dispatch to all SJBs, 8 June 1992).

⁸³⁹ D1527 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 5 June 1992), p. 1.

⁸⁴⁰ D1527 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 5 June 1992), p. 1.

⁸⁴¹ D1527 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 5 June 1992), pp. 1–2.

⁸⁴² D1527 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 5 June 1992), p. 2.

adherence to the International law of war and other standards. For the first time in recent history of judiciary relevant official documents didn't mean anything, while gossips, jokes, sayings of unofficial individuals played a decisive role. #Constitute: jokes vs. Documents!)

276. On 5 July 1992, Mićo Stanišić asked the Command of the Eastern Bosnia Corps to use the authority of its organs and help prevent and detect crimes and their perpetrators, especially members of the VRS, after noting “the increasingly frequent and serious crimes committed by individuals and groups, usually armed” and the inability of the crime investigation service and police to carry out the duties within the competence of the internal affairs organs.⁸⁴³

(#EXCULPATORY TO THE MOST DEGREE! IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT IN SUCH A SITUATION OF SO MANY ARMED PEOPLE IT WASN'T POSSIBLE TO ACT AS IN A PEACE TIME, AND THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ARMY AND POLICE WAS NECESSARY!!!)

277. On 19 July 1992, Mićo Stanišić ordered that CSBs submit information on, *inter alia*, “[p]roblems related to activities of some paramilitary units, especially in cases where crimes have been committed or the public peace and order violated to a large extent, [...] [p]roblems related to the prevention and detection of crimes and perpetrators, and [...] [p]rocedures and jurisdiction in the treatment and custody of prisoners, persons evacuated from the combat-operation zones, collection camps into which the Army brings Muslim residents”.⁸⁴⁴

(All EXCULPATORY! These precautionary measures pertained to the minorities, since this kind of crimes were not likely to be committed against the domestic population of majority!. Certainly, “bringing the civilians” from a combat zones was legal and obligatory, and was aimed to protect these civilians! #Constitute: MUP conduct, #civilians)

On 27 July 1992, in an order addressed to, *inter alia*, CSBs, Stanišić instructed that individuals who had been held criminally responsible for officially prosecuted crimes and “individuals who committed crimes during the war in the former [BiH] but against whom, for known reasons, criminal proceedings [had] still not been initiated”, be removed from the MUP.⁸⁴⁵

#EXCULPATORY! He also ordered the removal of all groups and individuals not under VRS control from areas where they were active and the collection of information about anyone having committed a crime, as well as the handover of such individuals to the competent institutions and taking of measures in accordance with the Law on Criminal Procedure.⁸⁴⁶ (#EXCULPATORY!!! EVERY WEEK MINISTER STANISIC TOOK AN ACTION IN PREVENTION, INVESTIGATION AND PUNISHMENT OF CRIMES, ALTHOUGH IT WAS A REGULAR OBLIGATION WHICH SHOULD BE EXERCISED AUTOMATICALLY, BY THE FORCE OF LAW!)

278. In its session of 6 August 1992, the SerBiH Presidency noted, in the discussion of detainees in prisons in Serb territory, that the treatment of prisoners of war had to abide by international conventions and concluded that the MUP would be ordered to examine through its municipal branches the behaviour of all civilian authorities and individuals guarding prisoners of

⁸⁴³ D1408 (Request of SerBiH MUP, 5 July 1992), p. 1. See also Milorad Davidović, T. 15608–15609 (29 June 2011). According to Mandić, the MUP and the corps on whose territory the paramilitaries were, as well as the military police of that corps, had the competence to investigate their acts. See Momčilo Mandić, T. 5102–5103 (14 July 2010). On 3 July 1992, the Presidency issued an order, signed by the Accused as President of the Presidency, that the Bosnian Serb MUP conduct an investigation into paramilitary group activities in the area of the Gacko and Nevesinje municipalities and thereafter “submit an exhaustive report to the Presidency on the established state of facts in the area of the two municipalities”. D439 (Order of SerBiH Presidency, 3 July 1992). See also D438 (Minutes of 14th session of SerBiH Presidency, 3 July 1992), p. 1.

⁸⁴⁴ D450 (Letter from SerBiH MUP to CSB Chiefs in Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Doboj, Sarajevo, Trebinje, 19 July 1992), pp. 1–2.

⁸⁴⁵ D4273 (Order of SerBiH MUP, 27 July 1992), pp. 1–2.

⁸⁴⁶ D4273 (Order of SerBiH MUP, 27 July 1992), p. 2.

war.⁸⁴⁷ **#EXCULPATORY!** The information was to be passed to the MUP and then to the SerBiH Presidency.⁸⁴⁸ **This was the most adequate action of the Presidency to the allegations made by #media and internationals about improper treatment# of detainees! EXCULPATORY!**

279. On 8 August 1992, Deputy MUP Minister for Police Affairs and Tasks, Tomislav Kovač, wrote to the Accused and Đerić that a major problem in the field was that people were not “properly categorised in the facilities or collection centres” as civilians or prisoners of war, and among the latter, prisoners of war who have committed criminal acts.⁸⁴⁹ He stated that prisoners of war suspected of having committed criminal acts and war crimes were to be treated as detainees, held exclusively in prison facilities, and investigated by the judicial organs and the police.⁸⁵⁰ On 9 August 1992, the Government decided to establish #commissions for the inspection of collection centres and other facilities for prisoners in the SerBiH.⁸⁵¹ **#ALL EXCULPATORY!!!**

286. In August 1992, Mićo Stanišić issued other orders regarding the application and conditions of detention and the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians.⁸⁵² **EXCULPATORY! #MUP conduct, Almost as if the Minister for Interior didn’t do anything but preventing crimes. On a weekly basis the Minister issued the strongest, strictly confidential orders for the respect of laws, and he himself relocated more than six thousands of policemen to the Army, for not being satisfied with their conduct and competence. No other local army did anything similar!**

287. On 23 July 1992, the Accused issued an order which stated, *inter alia*: “The Serbian authorities must act in accordance with the law and the Geneva Convention towards the civilian population of any ethnicity who do not exert aggression and combat operations against our army and the civilian population.”⁸⁵³ **#PERFECTLY EXCULPATORY!!! IT WAS ALREADY A LEGAL OBLIGATION, BUT THE ACCUSED REITERATED IT MANY TIMES!** At the end of July 1992, before the Bosnian Serb Assembly, he criticised crimes such as robbery and unlawful acquisition of property.⁸⁵⁴ **EXCULPATORY!!!** At a session in September 1992, the Accused spoke of the need to abide by the Geneva Conventions with respect to captured persons.⁸⁵⁵ **EXCULPATORY!!!** At the 34th Assembly session in August to October 1993, the Accused stated that the courts

⁸⁴⁷ D465 (Minutes of 24th session of SerBiH Presidency, 6 August 1992), p. 2. See also D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 54; D3796 (SerBiH MUP instructions to CSBs, 8 August 1992); D3795 (Romanija-Birač CSB request to SJBs, 9 August 1992); D3817 (Bijeljina SJB dispatch to Eastern Bosnia Corps, 11 August 1992). Based on the decision by the SerBiH Presidency, the Government set up two commissions to examine the situation in the detention centres and prisons in Manjača and Bileća. D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 55.

⁸⁴⁸ D465 (Minutes of 24th session of SerBiH Presidency, 6 August 1992), p. 2.

⁸⁴⁹ P1100 (Letter from SerBiH MUP to Radovan Karadžić and Branko Đerić, 8 August 1992), p. 1. See also D3960 (Witness Statement of Tomislav Kovač dated 28 October 2013), para. 84.

⁸⁵⁰ P1100 (Letter from SerBiH MUP to Radovan Karadžić and Branko Đerić, 8 August 1992), p. 1.

⁸⁵¹ D466 (Decision of Government of SerBiH on establishment of Commission for Inspection of Collection Centres and Other Facilities for Prisoners, 9 August 1992). See also D3960 (Witness Statement of Tomislav Kovač dated 28 October 2013), para. 85.

⁸⁵² D467 (Order of SerBiH MUP to CSBs Sarajevo, Trebinje, Doboj, Bijeljina, Banja Luka, 10 August 1992); D469 (Order of SerBiH MUP, 17 August 1992); D4280 (Letter from RS MUP to all CSBs, 17 August 1992). See also D474 (CSB Banja Luka dispatch to all SJBs, 20 August 1992); D473 (SerBiH MUP, Summary from the MUP management meeting held on 20 August 1992), pp. 3, 15.

⁸⁵³ D96 (Radovan Karadžić’s Order to Serbian authorities, 23 July 1992). See also D94 (Radovan Karadžić’s letter to SDS members, 11 July 1992) (the Chamber refers to the date of 11 July 1992 appearing on the document in the original language as opposed to the date of 7 July 1992 appearing on the English version).

⁸⁵⁴ See D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 17.

⁸⁵⁵ See D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), p. 55.

and the legality of their work were to be monitored constantly.⁸⁵⁶ **EXCULPATORY!!!** He also stated that the work of the Bosnian Serb MUP was to be strengthened in all its departments and that all abuses of power and other criminal acts that were committed in the MUP were to be investigated and punished by law.⁸⁵⁷ **EXCULPATORY!!!** He stated: “Legal state exists when you don’t have to intervene in order for someone to be prosecuted. Legal state exists when one is not allowed to intervene when a person is to be prosecuted.”⁸⁵⁸ **EXCULPATORY!!!#Conduct of the President and other officials. Crime prevention, Crime persecution!**

ii. Military justice system

1. Establishment

288. On 8 May 1992, a session of the SNB and the Government decided to establish courts martial.⁸⁵⁹

289. On 12 May 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly adopted a decision promulgating an amendment to the SerBiH Constitution such that Article 112 read: “Military courts and military prosecutors are established by law. Military courts are independent courts and conduct trials on the basis of the law.”⁸⁶⁰ **EXCULPATORY!!! All of it at the very beginning of the war! #Military judiciary!**

290. On 31 May 1992, a decision signed by the Accused as President of the Presidency established three military courts of first instance and a Supreme Court in Sarajevo at the appeal level.⁸⁶¹ **EXCULPATORY!!!#The same as above!** The decision also established three regional military prosecutors’ offices,⁸⁶² one each for the 1st Krajina Corps Command seated in Banja Luka, the SRK Command seated in Sarajevo, and the Eastern Bosnia Corps Command seated in Bijeljina, as well as a Senior Military Prosecutor’s Office with the VRS⁸⁶³ Main Staff.⁸⁶⁴ The three military courts of first instance were to operate “[w]ithin the framework of their subject matter jurisdiction” in the territory of the Corps designated for the corresponding military prosecutor’s office: the Military Court in Banja Luka in the territory of the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps, the Military Court in Sarajevo in the territory of the SRK and Herzegovina Corps, and the Military Court in Bijeljina in the territory of the Eastern Bosnia Corps.⁸⁶⁵ A Presidency decision added the Drina Corps to the territorial

⁸⁵⁶ P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27-29 August, 9-11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 408.

⁸⁵⁷ P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27-29 August, 9-11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 408.

⁸⁵⁸ P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27-29 August, 9-11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 408.

⁸⁵⁹ P3078 (Minutes of meeting of the National Security Council and the SerBiH Government, 8 May 1992), p. 1.

⁸⁶⁰ P5416 (Decision of the Assembly of Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992), p. 1.

⁸⁶¹ P3602 (Radovan Karadžić’s Decision on the Establishment, Seat and Jurisdiction of Military Courts and Military Prosecutors’ Offices, 31 May 1992), p. 1. *See also* D1756 (The Law on Military Courts, published in the RS Official Gazette, 31 December 1993), art. 9.

⁸⁶² The Report on the Work of the VRS Military Prosecutor’s Offices for 1992 mentions a fourth lower military prosecutor’s office, that attached to the Command of the Herzegovina Corps and mandated to deal with persons under the jurisdiction of the Military Court in Bileća. P3629 (Report on the work of the VRS Military Prosecutor’s Office for 1992), p. 4. *See also* D1756 (The Law on Military Courts, published in the RS Official Gazette, 31 December 1993), art. 9.

⁸⁶³ For ease of reference the acronym “VRS” will be used throughout this section to also cover the period prior to 12 August 1992, when the Army of SerBiH was renamed the VRS. *See fn.* 422.

⁸⁶⁴ P3602 (Radovan Karadžić’s Decision on the Establishment, Seat and Jurisdiction of Military Courts and Military Prosecutors’ Offices, 31 May 1992), p. 1.

⁸⁶⁵ P3602 (Radovan Karadžić’s Decision on the Establishment, Seat and Jurisdiction of Military Courts and Military Prosecutors’ Offices, 31 May 1992), pp. 1–2. *See also* KDZ531, T. 15847–15848, 15862–15863 (1 July 2011) (closed session); Momčilo Mandić, T. 5007–5008 (13 July 2010), T. 5128 (14 July 2010); D3076 (Witness statement of Savo Bojanović dated 2 March 2013), para. 5; Dragomir Milošević,

jurisdiction of the Military Court in Sarajevo.⁸⁶⁶ On 5 August 1992, General Milan Gvero informed Prime Minister Đerić that the VRS had established these first-instance military courts and prosecutor's offices as well as the Supreme Military Court and Senior Military Prosecutor's Office with the VRS Main Staff.⁸⁶⁷ **EXCULPATORY!!! All of it! #The same as above!**

291. The 31 May 1992 decision provided that until the passing of the Criminal Code, Law on Criminal Procedure, Law on Military Courts, and Law on Military Prosecutors' Offices, *inter alia*, of the SerBiH, the Criminal Code, Law on Criminal Procedure, Law on Military Courts, and Law on Military Prosecutor's Offices, *inter alia*, of the FRY were to be applied in proceedings before military courts.⁸⁶⁸ On 30 December 1993, the Accused, as RS President, proclaimed the Law on Military Courts as approved by the RS Assembly.⁸⁶⁹ **EXCULPATORY!!!#**

292. Reports discussed at the Government session of 8 July 1992 indicate that the military judicial organs had not begun operating as of that time, resulting in "one of the greatest obstacles in establishing order, legality and a state ruled by law in present conditions".⁸⁷⁰ The Government concluded that "it be proposed to the authorised organs to form and qualify the Public Prosecutor's Office and the courts for work as soon as possible" and that, for emergency reasons, the possibility of delegating authority from the military to regular judicial organs would be examined.⁸⁷¹ The Government assigned this task to the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice.⁸⁷² As previously mentioned, on 10 July 1992 and again on 5 August 1992, Mandić proposed that the civilian and military justice systems be combined but this was not carried out.⁸⁷³ At a meeting on 11 July 1992, senior MUP officials discussed the fact that the military courts and prosecutor's offices were not functioning.⁸⁷⁴ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! IN THE MIDDLE OF A HORRIFYING BATTLE FOR SURVIVAL, THE SERB SIDE KEPT TAKING CARE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS#!)**

T. 32859 (29 January 2013). The Banja Luka Military Court's territorial jurisdiction included the municipalities Banja Luka, Prijedor, and the municipalities of Ključ and Sanski Most were within territory controlled by the 1st Krajina Corps. [REDACTED].

⁸⁶⁶ D412 (RS Presidency Amendment to the Decision on Establishment of Military Courts and Prosecutors, 31 May 1992). *See also* Momčilo Mandić, T. 5007 (13 July 2010). According to a 15 December 1994 order signed by the Accused as President of the Republic, the territorial jurisdiction of the military courts comprised: the Banja Luka Military Court responsible for the territory within the zone of responsibility of the First and Second Krajina Corps, the Bijeljina Military Court responsible for the same of the Eastern Bosnia and Drina Corps, the Sarajevo Military Court responsible for the same of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and the Bileća Military Court responsible for the same of the Herzegovina Corps. D1492 (Radovan Karadžić's order to VRS Military Prosecutor's Office, 15 December 1994).

⁸⁶⁷ D1752 (Request from VRS Main Staff, 5 August 1992). The Accused, at the proposal of the Minister of Defence, later moved the military courts to the authority of the Ministry of Defence while leaving the military prosecutor's offices within the army system. Momčilo Mandić, T. 5008 (13 July 2010); P3149 (Minutes of 14th session of Supreme Command, 31 March 1995), pp. 10–11.

⁸⁶⁸ P3602 (Radovan Karadžić's Decision on the Establishment, Seat and Jurisdiction of Military Courts and Military Prosecutors' Offices, 31 May 1992), p. 2. *See* P3603 (SFRY Law on Military Courts, published in SFRY's Official Gazette, 14 January 1977); P3604 (SFRY Law on the Office of Military Prosecution, published in SFRY's Official Gazette, 14 January 1977).

⁸⁶⁹ D1756 (The Law on Military Courts, published in the RS Official Gazette, 31 December 1993).

⁸⁷⁰ D441 (Minutes of 37th session of Government of SerBiH, 8 July 1992), p. 5.

⁸⁷¹ D441 (Minutes of 37th session of Government of SerBiH, 8 July 1992), p. 5.

⁸⁷² D441 (Minutes of 37th session of Government of SerBiH, 8 July 1992), p. 5.

⁸⁷³ *See paras.* 254–255.

⁸⁷⁴ D447 (SerBiH MUP, Analysis of functioning of the MUP, July 1992), e-court pp. 8, 9, 11, 14. *See also* Momčilo Mandić, T. 5140–5142 (14 July 2010).

293. The Operative Programme issued by the Government on 17 July 1992 ordered the military judicial organs⁸⁷⁵ and military police organs to “intensify activities of discovering and arresting perpetrators of misdemeanours and criminal offences, and especially in controlling theft, war profiteering and other crimes”, in co-operation with the state justice organs.⁸⁷⁶ The Programme made the MUP, in co-operation with the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Defence, responsible for this action.⁸⁷⁷ **#The same!!**

294. The Chamber received diverging evidence as to when the military courts were established and began operating. Savo Bojanović stated that military courts were established in June or July 1992 in the entire territory under Bosnian Serb control and that the Bijeljina Military Court was established in mid-July 1992 and began investigations in August 1992.⁸⁷⁸ There is also evidence that the Banja Luka Military Court was functioning from May to July 1992⁸⁷⁹ and that criminal proceedings took place from as early as September and October 1992.⁸⁸⁰ According to Novak Todorović, the president of the Supreme Military Court,⁸⁸¹ however, the establishment of the first military courts began in the autumn of 1992 and these courts were operating as of 1993.⁸⁸²

295. Records indicate that the Military Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Command of the 1st Krajina Corps issued requests for investigation and indictments⁸⁸³ and that the Banja Luka Military Court issued rulings and judgements.⁸⁸⁴ The Military Prosecutor’s Office in Banja Luka also submitted proposals to the Banja Luka Military Court to halt or resume investigative proceedings.⁸⁸⁵ During the course of 1992, the Military Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Command of the SRK also submitted requests to initiate investigations.⁸⁸⁶ Records further indicate that the Military Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Command of the Eastern Bosnia Corps issued requests for investigation and indictments⁸⁸⁷ and that the

⁸⁷⁵ These organs were not yet functioning in July 1992. *See* paras. 286, 288, 292.

⁸⁷⁶ D448 (Government of SerBiH, Operative programme to prevent social disruption in conditions of a state of war, 17 June 1992), p. 12.

⁸⁷⁷ D448 (Government of SerBiH, Operative programme to prevent social disruption in conditions of a state of war, 17 June 1992), pp. 12–13.

⁸⁷⁸ D3076 (Witness statement of Savo Bojanović dated 2 March 2013), paras. 4–5; Savo Bojanović, T. 34845–34846 (5 March 2013). *See also* [REDACTED].

⁸⁷⁹ *See* [REDACTED]. *But see* KDZ492, T. 20056–20058, 20061 (18 October 2011) (closed session) (stating that the military courts were not operational between May 1992 and the end of August 1992).

⁸⁸⁰ *See* [REDACTED]. *See also* P3605 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 2 September 1992), p. 2; D2999 (Article from Politika entitled “Serbs, Muslims and Croats are All before the Court”, 13 December 1992).

⁸⁸¹ D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 2.

⁸⁸² Novak Todorović, T. 34071 (20 February 2013); D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 3. *See also* D4226 (Witness statement of Dragan Radetić dated 17 January 2014), para. 8 (stating that no military court had been established until September or October 1992); KDZ492, T. 20057, 20061 (18 October 2011) (closed session) (stating that between May 1992 and the end of August 1992 the military courts were not operational and that the first military court judges were appointed in August 1992 and they became seised of cases only in early September).

⁸⁸³ *See, e.g.*, P3630 (Indictment of the Military Prosecutor of the 1st Krajina corps, 5 January 1993); P3513 (Request for investigation by the 1st Krajina Corps Military Prosecutor’s Office, 8 March 1993); P3519 (Indictment of the 1st Krajina Corps Military Prosecutor’s Office, 2 June 1993); D1757 (Indictment of the Military Prosecutor’s Office attached to the 1st Krajina Corps, 18 July 1993); P3623 (Excerpt of logbook of Banja Luka Military Prosecutor’s Office, 1992), p. 6. *See also* P3629 (Report on the work of the VRS Military Prosecutor’s Offices for 1992), p. 12; P6595 (Cover page of 1st Krajina Corps Military Prosecutor case, 24 August 1992).

⁸⁸⁴ *See, e.g.*, P6599 (Decision of Banja Luka Military Court, 29 August 1992); P6601 (Decision of Banja Luka Military Court, 8 October 1992); [REDACTED].

⁸⁸⁵ *See* P3616 (Proposal of the Military Prosecutor’s Office attached to the 1st Krajina Corps, 29 July 1993); P3774 (Order of Banja Luka Military Prosecutor’s Office, 31 May 1996).

⁸⁸⁶ P3629 (Report on the work of the VRS Military Prosecutor’s Offices for 1992, 10 February 1993), p. 6. *See* D2832 (1st Romanija Brigade combat report, 4 July 1992), p. 3 (stating that four criminal reports had been processed against soldiers who committed theft in the area of responsibility of the brigade and that the reports would be passed on to the military prosecutor for further action); Dragomir Milošević, T. 32860–32861 (29 January 2013).

⁸⁸⁷ *See, e.g.*, D1473 (Bijeljina Military Prosecutor request re Rade Mihajlović case, 30 September 1992); P6182 (Request for investigation by Bijeljina Military Prosecutor’s Office, 9 November 1992); P6183 (Request for investigation by Bijeljina Military Prosecutor’s Office, 17 November 1992); D1476 (Bijeljina Military Court indictment of Rade Mihajlović, 5 January 1993); D1465 (Bijeljina Military Court

Bijeljina Military Court issued decisions and rulings.⁸⁸⁸ Finally, records indicate that, in 1992, the Military Prosecutor's Office attached to the Command of the Herzegovina Corps submitted requests to carry out investigations and six indictments were issued against six soldiers.⁸⁸⁹ **EXCULPATORY!#!**

296. The Report on the Work of the VRS Military Prosecutor's Offices for 1992 indicates that, for the period from the beginning of the work of the military prosecutor's offices until 31 December 1992, criminal reports against 4,008 persons, including 3,228 soldiers, 37 non-commissioned officers, 49 officers, 688 civilians, and 6 unknown perpetrators, were submitted to all of the military prosecutor's offices.⁸⁹⁰ The Report states that in the specified period, military prosecutors submitted requests to carry out investigations against 1,983 persons and indictments were issued against 376 persons.⁸⁹¹ **(SO, IN 210 DAYS OF ACTIVITY, THERE WAS 4,008 CRIM. REPORTS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND ALREADY 376 INDICTMENTS. EXCULPATORY#!**

297. An order of 22 September 1993, signed by the Accused as President of the Republic and Supreme Commander of the VRS and sent to the VRS Main Staff Commander, the President of the VRS Supreme Military Court, and the VRS Prosecutor's Office, stated: "Until the final adoption and passing of legislation on the organisation and work of military disciplinary courts, I am placing the Supreme Military Court and the Prosecutor's Office attached to the [VRS] Main Staff under my direct authority."⁸⁹² The order made the Commander of the Main Staff and the President of the Supreme Military Court responsible for the implementation of the task.⁸⁹³ **(it was a temporary measure caused by the attempt of the military coup d'etat IN THE MIDDLE OF THE MILITARY RIOTS IN BANJALUKA, SO CALLED "SEPTEMBER '93" Any president would to the same in the same circumstances! #CONTEXT)**

298. The Chamber finds that the military courts were established between June and August 1992 and began functioning around August 1992.

1. Competence, structure, and procedures

299. The military courts had jurisdiction over any crime committed by a member of the military, namely, the VRS.⁸⁹⁴ The military courts also had jurisdiction over civilians

indictment of Radovan Mićanović, 17 August 1993). See also P3629 (Report on the work of the VRS Military Prosecutor's Offices for 1992), pp. 23–24.

⁸⁸⁸ See, e.g., D1485 (Bijeljina Military Court ruling in Cvjetković/Jurošević case, 20 November 1992); P6179 (Bijeljina Military Court's Decision, 30 December 1992); P6180 (Bijeljina Military Court's Decision, 5 January 1993); D1478 (Bijeljina Military Court order in Rade Mihajlović case, 21 February 1993); D3082 (Bijeljina Military Court's Verdict, 24 June 1993); D1466 (Bijeljina Military Court judgement in Radovan Mićanović case, 22 March 1995).

⁸⁸⁹ P3629 (Report on the work of the VRS Military Prosecutor's Offices for 1992), p. 19.

⁸⁹⁰ P3629 (Report on the work of the VRS Military Prosecutor's Offices for 1992), p. 5.

⁸⁹¹ P3629 (Report on the work of the VRS Military Prosecutor's Offices for 1992), p. 5.

⁸⁹² P3776 (Radovan Karadžić's order to VRS Commander and President of VRS Supreme Military Court, 22 September 1993), p. 2. See also P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 427.

⁸⁹³ P3776 (Radovan Karadžić's order to VRS Commander and President of VRS Supreme Military Court, 22 September 1993), p. 2.

⁸⁹⁴ P3773 (Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011), para. 10 (under seal); D1756 (Law on Military Courts, published in the RS Official Gazette, 31 December 1993), art. 10. KDZ532 stated that paramilitaries, as persons in uniform, were also under the jurisdiction of the military courts. P3773 (Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011), paras. 10, 24 (under seal). Mandić stated that paramilitaries, as "armed persons in wartime", fell under the jurisdiction of the military justice system. Momčilo Mandić, T. 5101 (14 July 2010). See also Mićo Stanišić, T. 46386–46387 (3 February 2014) (stating that paramilitaries' "affiliation with the military" excluded MUP jurisdiction over them). According to Mandić, the military justice system's jurisdiction extended to persons who committed a crime in a war zone, in combat operations, or related to war activities. Momčilo Mandić, T. 4579 (5 July 2010), T. 5125–

accused of committing particular crimes, including acts against a military installation or a member of the military⁸⁹⁵ and the crime of armed rebellion.⁸⁹⁶

300. According to some witnesses, military courts did not have jurisdiction over cases of war crimes, which the State Commission of the Investigation of Crimes against Serbs had authority to investigate.⁸⁹⁷ However, in at least one case, a military prosecutor's office submitted a request to open an investigation against individuals for a suspected crime under Article 142 of the adopted Criminal Code of the SFRY,⁸⁹⁸ war crimes against the civilian population, and a military court ordered detention of the said individuals.⁸⁹⁹

301. Under the Law on Military Courts, military courts were to "determine the status of prisoners-of-war and try them for criminal acts committed against humanity and international law as described in Articles 141 through 155 of the Criminal Code of [RS] as well as for criminal acts committed by them while prisoners-of-war".⁹⁰⁰ Military courts of first instance were to, *inter alia*, conduct investigations, hear indictment appeals, first-instance criminal cases and appeals against rulings by military court investigating judges, and handle certain matters concerning the execution of sentences.⁹⁰¹ The Supreme Military Court was to, *inter alia*, consider appeals against rulings by first-instance military courts in cases determined by law, rule against the enactments of military organs, resolve conflicts of jurisdiction among the first-instance military courts, and provide fundamental legal interpretations of issues significant to the uniform application of laws by the military courts.⁹⁰² **All EXCULPATORY!# As regular as in any country! Numbering out so many proper moves of the Serb authorities, without qualifying it as EXCULPATORY, and leaving it as that, to sound as a felony, is not fair!!**

302. A first-instance military court was composed of three to five judges.⁹⁰³ The corresponding prosecutor's office usually had one prosecutor and two deputy prosecutors.⁹⁰⁴ The Supreme Military Court had five judges by the end of the war.⁹⁰⁵ **All EXCULPATORY! #As regular as in any country!**

303. The Accused as President appointed all prosecutors and judges of the military courts.⁹⁰⁶ Under the Law on Military Courts, candidates for the posts of military court judges were to be proposed by the Ministry of Defence upon recommendations from the

5126 (14 July 2010). Mandić also stated that all military conscripts from age 16 to 50 or 60, during an imminent threat of war, fell under the jurisdiction of the military justice system. Momčilo Mandić, T. 4579 (5 July 2010).

⁸⁹⁵ D1756 (Law on Military Courts, published in the RS Official Gazette, 31 December 1993), art. 10.

⁸⁹⁶ See D1773 (Teslić Lower Court Ruling, 7 December 1992), p. 1. [REDACTED].

⁸⁹⁷ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 11 (under seal); Momčilo Mandić, T. 5015 (13 July 2010). See para. 258.

⁸⁹⁸ The RS utilised the SFRY Criminal Code. D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 27; Novak Todorović, T. 34080 (20 February 2013). See also KDZ492, T. 20059 (18 October 2011) (closed session) (stating that the judicial administration law of the RS allowed for the application of relevant SFRY and BiH legislation).

⁸⁹⁹ P6143 (Excerpt from ruling of Banja Luka Military Court, 29 July 1993), e-court pp. 1, 3–4. See also Novak Todorović, T. 34072–34073 (20 February 2013); D3002 (The Criminal Code of the SFRY, 1990).

⁹⁰⁰ D1756 (Law on Military Courts, published in the RS Official Gazette, 31 December 1993), art. 10.

⁹⁰¹ D1756 (Law on Military Courts, published in the RS Official Gazette, 31 December 1993), art. 14.

⁹⁰² D1756 (Law on Military Courts, published in the RS Official Gazette, 31 December 1993), art. 20.

⁹⁰³ D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 6.

⁹⁰⁴ D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 6.

⁹⁰⁵ D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 6.

⁹⁰⁶ P3773 (Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011), paras. 12 (under seal); KDZ532, T. 21009–21011 (8 November 2011) (closed session); D3076 (Witness statement of Savo Bojanović dated 2 March 2013), para. 5; D1756 (Law on Military Courts, published in the RS Official Gazette, 31 December 1993), art. 27. See D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 3; KDZ492, T. 20055 (18 October 2011) (closed session).

Supreme Military Court's president and the military court to which they would be appointed.⁹⁰⁷ Military court judges were to be dismissed by the President of the Republic.⁹⁰⁸ Proposals to dismiss military court judges were to be submitted by the Defence Minister.⁹⁰⁹ **All EXCULPATORY! #As regular as in any country!**

304. The military prosecutor's offices attached to the four corps commands were required to submit monthly reports on crime trends for the preceding period to the Senior Military Prosecutor's Office with the VRS Main Staff.⁹¹⁰ The reports were to include, *inter alia*, the number of criminal reports received by the prosecutor's office and against whom as well as the number rejected and the reason for such rejection.⁹¹¹ The three highest priority crimes, in order, were crimes against the state order, crimes against the armed forces, and crimes against humanity and violations of international law.⁹¹²

305. The Banja Luka Military Court sent monthly reports to the 1st Krajina Corps Command and the appellate military court, namely the Supreme Military Court.⁹¹³ The Military Court and Military Prosecutor's Office for Banja Luka had meetings with the Command of the 1st Krajina Corps in which they discussed how cases were proceeding and how the Court and Prosecutor's Office functioned.⁹¹⁴ In these meetings, the Corps Command asked that the cases of those not responding to mobilisation calls and those avoiding military service be prioritised.⁹¹⁵ The Military Court for Banja Luka also had meetings with the Supreme Military Court as needed and some meetings were attended by the other military courts as well.⁹¹⁶ Bogdan Subotić, an advisor of the President, the Accused, in the beginning of 1992 and later the Minister of Defence, made visits to the Military Prosecutor for the 1st Krajina Corps, Srboljub Jovićinac, a number of times.⁹¹⁷ At the Military Court in Bijeljina, the priority cases were those that involved non-response to mobilisation and desertion from the military, under articles 214 and 217.⁹¹⁸

306. The procedures for military courts were the same as those for civilian courts and the RS rules and regulations were taken from the Yugoslav rules and regulations.⁹¹⁹ (919) According to the Law on Military Courts, provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure

⁹⁰⁷ D1756 (Law on Military Courts, published in the RS Official Gazette, 31 December 1993), art. 27. The Chamber notes that KDZ532 described a different process ending in appointments by the President, wherein the corps commanders forwarded proposals for appointments, which went to the VRS Main Staff and then to the Accused. P3773 (Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011), paras. 12, 43 (under seal); KDZ532, T. 21009–21011 (8 November 2011) (closed session).

⁹⁰⁸ D1756 (Law on Military Courts, published in the RS Official Gazette, 31 December 1993), arts. 27, 36.

⁹⁰⁹ D1756 (Law on Military Courts, published in the RS Official Gazette, 31 December 1993), art. 36.

⁹¹⁰ P3627 (Report of the VRS Military Prosecutor's Office, 9 September 1992), p. 4. *See, e.g.*, P3628 (Monthly Report of the Military Prosecutor's Office attached to the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps, October 1992).

⁹¹¹ *See* P3627 (Report of the VRS Military Prosecutor's Office, 9 September 1992), p. 4.

⁹¹² P3627 (Report of the VRS Military Prosecutor's Office, 9 September 1992), p. 4.

⁹¹³ [REDACTED].

⁹¹⁴ [REDACTED].

⁹¹⁵ [REDACTED]. The applicable provisions for these offences were Articles 214 and 217 of the Criminal Code. P3606 (Guidelines for the Establishment of Criteria for Criminal Prosecution, VRS Military Prosecutor's Office, 1992), pp. 2–3. The Guidelines highlighted and addressed three types of crimes: the crime of failure to report in response to a call-up and evasion of military service, the crime of unauthorised departure and desertion from the armed forces, and crimes against humanity and international law. *See* P3606 (Guidelines for the Establishment of Criteria for Criminal Prosecution, VRS Military Prosecutor's Office, 1992). The Guidelines were to be implemented by all officers, military judicial organs, military police, security organs, and all organs required to detect and report perpetrators of crimes and authorised to conduct proceedings against them, for a consistent policy on prosecution. *See* D2833 (SRK instructions, 15 October 1992, with 1992 Guidelines for the Establishment of Criteria for Criminal Prosecution), p. 1; Dragomir Milošević, T. 32861–32862 (29 January 2013).

⁹¹⁶ [REDACTED].

⁹¹⁷ [REDACTED].

⁹¹⁸ [REDACTED].

⁹¹⁹ [REDACTED].

were to apply to military courts' criminal procedure if not otherwise stipulated by the Law on Military Courts.⁹²⁰ Todorović instructed the judges of the Supreme Military Court to prepare guidelines for criminal prosecution and the criteria for criminal prosecution.^{921 (921)}

All EXCULPATORY! #As regular as in any country!

307. With respect to VRS military justice system procedures, first, the prosecutor's office received the criminal report by the police^{922 (922)} and then the prosecutor determined whether there was sufficient evidence to initiate criminal proceedings.⁹²³ If so, the prosecutor would send a request for investigation to the investigating judge.⁹²⁴ If there was none, with the assistance of the police and other organs, the prosecutor collected all the information and forwarded it to the Court.⁹²⁵ Under the Law on Military Courts, the investigation was to be conducted by the military court investigating judge.⁹²⁶ After completing his investigation, the investigating judge sent the case back to the prosecutor, who could decide to discontinue the proceedings, bring an indictment, or request additional investigation.⁹²⁷

**ALL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW!
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT PRESIDENT KARADZIC EVER
INTERFERED IN THIS PROCESS# No interference!!**

308. In accordance with his legal responsibility to institute process against every person who committed a crime, the prosecutor could also initiate criminal proceedings once he became aware of a crime.⁹²⁸ A soldier of any rank or a civilian victim could inform the Prosecutor of a crime, but the investigation had to be initiated by the prosecutor.⁹²⁹ For cases of failure to respond to a call to military service, the Ministry of Defence would file a criminal report against the individual.⁹³⁰ The military court could not act without first a

⁹²⁰ D1756 (The Law on Military Courts, published in the RS Official Gazette, 31 December 1993), art. 56. The powers and regulations of organs of internal affairs under the Law on Criminal Procedure also applied to the security organs of the VRS and the military police. D1892 (Instruction re authorities of military police), p. 1.

⁹²¹ D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 7.

⁹²² If the civilian police investigated, it would, upon completion of its investigation, hand over the case to the relevant prosecutor's office, civilian or military. Momčilo Mandić, T. 5103–5104 (14 July 2010). See also D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 13 (stating that the military prosecutor could act upon a criminal report by the civilian or military police).

⁹²³ [REDACTED]; D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 13; Dragan Radetić, T. 45697 (21 January 2014); [REDACTED]. The military prosecutor had the authority to dismiss a criminal report without giving an explanation for the decision. D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 13; [REDACTED].

⁹²⁴ [REDACTED]; D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 13. See, e.g., D1473 (Bijeljina Military Prosecutor request re Rade Mihajlović case, 30 September 1992); P6182 (Request for investigation by Bijeljina Military Prosecutor's Office, 9 November 1992); P6183 (Request for investigation by Bijeljina Military Prosecutor's Office, 17 November 1992); P3513 (Request for investigation by the 1st Krajina Corps Military Prosecutor's Office, 8 March 1993); D1896 (Letter re Banja Luka Military Prosecution request to conduct investigation, 16 November 1993). A request for investigation by the military prosecutor followed an on-site investigation report compiled by the investigating judge of the military court, the filing of a criminal report by the military police with the military prosecutor, and a report of forensic documentation by the military police. See KDZ531, T. 15893–15896 (1 July 2011); D1470 (Bijeljina Military Court on-site investigation report, 28 September 1992); D1471 (Bijeljina Military Police criminal report in Rade Mihajlović case, 29 September 1992); D1472 (Bijeljina Military Police forensic-technical report, 30 September 1992).

⁹²⁵ [REDACTED].

⁹²⁶ D1756 (Law on Military Courts, published in the RS Official Gazette, 31 December 1993), art. 64. See also D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 13.

⁹²⁷ D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 13. For instances where the prosecutor decided to discontinue the prosecution after the investigating judge's investigation, see P2930 (Bijeljina Military Court file for Slavan Lukić et al., 8 September 1992), e-court pp. 6, 7; P6180 (Bijeljina Military Court's Decision, 5 January 1993).

⁹²⁸ P3773 (Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011), para. 9 (under seal); KDZ532, T. 21014 (8 November 2011) (closed session).

⁹²⁹ See P3773 (Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011), para. 9 (under seal); KDZ532, T. 21014–21015 (8 November 2011) (closed session).

⁹³⁰ P3773 (Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011), para. 7 (under seal).

request from the military prosecutor and an indictment issued by the prosecutor.⁹³¹ **All EXCULPATORY! #As regular as in any country!**

309. According to the Law on Military Courts, the military court's investigating judge or, under exceptional circumstances as prescribed by the Law of Criminal Procedure, authorised superior officers in the security organs of the VRS or those in the MP could require the detention of a member of the military, an employee of the VRS, or a civilian for a criminal offence falling under the jurisdiction of a military court.⁹³² In the latter case, the officers were to immediately inform a military prosecutor or the military court investigating judge of their detention decision.⁹³³

310. Under the Law on Criminal Proceedings, the duration of custody was to be "kept to the shortest necessary time" and throughout the proceedings custody was to be terminated as soon as the grounds on which it was ordered ceased to exist.⁹³⁴ **All EXCULPATORY! #As regular as in any country! And that explains why some detained had been released from custody, while the case wasn't terminated, which the Prosecution qualified as an illegal release!**

311. When a person was arrested by the MP and a criminal report was given to the Prosecutor's Office, the person could be initially detained by the MP for three days.⁹³⁵ The military prosecutor could then recommend to the investigative judge that the accused be detained for one month, during which an investigation would begin, and then a panel of judges could decide to extend detention for another two months.⁹³⁶ For alleged criminal acts for which more than five years' sentence or a more severe penalty was prescribed, the prosecutor could next propose, to the Supreme Military Court, another three months of detention.⁹³⁷ During this six-month pre-trial detention, the prosecutor could propose, to the investigative judge, the termination of detention.⁹³⁸ The prosecutor could also propose, to the judge, to drop the case during the investigative stage.⁹³⁹ If the prosecutor dropped the

⁹³¹ KDZ531, T. 15848 (1 July 2011) (closed session); P3773 (Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011), paras. 23, 30 (under seal); KDZ532, T. 20998–20999 (8 November 2011) (closed session); D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), paras. 12–13; Novak Todorović, T. 34077 (20 February 2013); KDZ492, T. 20091 (18 October 2011) (closed session).

⁹³² D1756 (Law on Military Courts, published in the RS Official Gazette, 31 December 1993), art. 67.

⁹³³ D1756 (Law on Military Courts, published in the RS Official Gazette, 31 December 1993), art. 67.

⁹³⁴ P6178 (Excerpt from SFRY Law on Criminal Proceedings), art. 190. Article 191(2) laid out specific conditions under which custody could be ordered against a person suspected of having committed a criminal act, where the conditions for mandatory custody did not exist. P6178 (Excerpt from SFRY Law on Criminal Proceedings), art. 191(2). *See also* KDZ532, T. 21019 (8 November 2011) (closed session). Custody was mandatory "if there is founded suspicion that he has committed a criminal act for which the law prescribes the death penalty". P6178 (Excerpt from SFRY Law on Criminal Proceedings), art. 191(1).

⁹³⁵ P3773 (Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011), para. 23 (under seal). *See also* KDZ492, T. 20063 (18 October 2011) (closed session). Likewise, the police could detain civilians for a period of three days before they had to be taken before an investigative judge. *See* Mladen Tolj, T. 34632, 34647 (1 March 2013). According to Tolj, the same procedure applied to "prisoners of war". Mladen Tolj, T. 34647 (1 March 2013).

⁹³⁶ *See* [REDACTED]; P6178 (Excerpt from SFRY Law on Criminal Proceedings), art. 197(1)–(2); [REDACTED]; D1485 (Bijeljina Military Court ruling in Cvjetković/Jurošević case, 20 November 1992); D1800 (Banja Luka Military Court's Ruling, 24 August 1995) (under seal). The same procedures appear to have been used in the civilian courts. *See, e.g.*, P2905 (Decision of Bijeljina Lower Court, 28 August 1992), p. 2.

⁹³⁷ P3773 (Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011), para. 23 (under seal); P6178 (Excerpt from SFRY Law on Criminal Proceedings), art. 197(2).

⁹³⁸ P3773 (Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011), para. 23 (under seal); KDZ492, T. 20064 (18 October 2011) (closed session). *See also* P6178 (Excerpt from SFRY Law on Criminal Proceedings), art. 198.

⁹³⁹ P3773 (Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011), para. 23 (under seal); D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 13. *See* P3616 (Proposal of the Military Prosecutor's Office attached to the 1st Krajina Corps, 29 July 1993); Novak Todorović, T. 34073–34074 (20 February 2013).

charges by withdrawing the indictment, the court could not reinstate proceedings for the charges without the prosecutor initiating proceedings.⁹⁴⁰

312. Todorović stated that release from custody was distinct from a discontinuation of proceedings and might occur, for example, after witnesses were questioned and the risk of the suspect influencing witnesses ceased to exist.⁹⁴¹ Persons accused of serious crimes such as murder were to remain in custody until the end of the trial.⁹⁴² According to Todorović, courts had the discretion to grant a prosecutor's request for release of a person from custody.⁹⁴³ **(All EXCULPATORY!!! # No IMPUNITY!)**

313. According to KDZ532, all military organs had an obligation to report every criminal act to the military prosecutor, and failure to report a crime for which more than five years' imprisonment was prescribed would itself constitute a criminal act.⁹⁴⁴ The Law on Military Courts stated:

Every superior officer is obligated to take steps to prevent the person who has committed an act which is subject to criminal prosecution from hiding or fleeing, to preserve the traces of the crime and items which may serve as evidence, and to collect all information which may prove useful for the proceedings. The superior officer is obliged to inform the military prosecutor, directly or through a higher-ranking officer, of the criminal offence.⁹⁴⁵

308. The 1992 Guidelines for the Establishment of Criteria for Criminal Prosecution of the Military Prosecutor's Office of the VRS Main Staff explained the specific provisions of the Criminal Code relevant to the category of crimes against humanity and violations of international law and specific acts which entailed criminal responsibility.⁹⁴⁶ The Guidelines spoke of the responsibility of VRS officers, as individuals in commanding positions and whose subordinates are capable of, or are, committing some of the crimes, to deal with and prevent such conduct.⁹⁴⁷ The Guidelines also discussed the corresponding duty of officers to write reports on all cases possibly qualifying as crimes against humanity and to submit them to the command.⁹⁴⁸ The commands would then be responsible for informing the military prosecutor's office, which would then "take the appropriate steps prescribed by law and the policy on prosecution".⁹⁴⁹ The Guidelines stated that all the commands must, *inter alia*, "work on uncovering all cases of war crimes against humanity and international law in the territories and zones of their responsibility", "inform the nearest military police, security and military judicial organs of the discovered crime", and secure the crime scene until the aforementioned organs arrived to conduct the on-site investigation.⁹⁵⁰ **(#All EXCULPATORY! As regular as in any country! And the system itself didn't provide**

⁹⁴⁰ [REDACTED]. See also D1894 (Ruling of RS Military Court, Banja Luka, 27 May 1993); [REDACTED].

⁹⁴¹ D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 14. See also KDZ532, T. 20997 (8 November 2011) (closed session) (stating that lower-ranking commanders would request that soldiers detained for alleged crimes be released and sent back to their units and their criminal liability be determined at a later point in time).

⁹⁴² D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 14.

⁹⁴³ Novak Todorović, T. 34074–34075 (20 February 2013); D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 14.

⁹⁴⁴ P3773 (Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011), paras. 9, 27 (under seal).

⁹⁴⁵ D1756 (Law on Military Courts, published in the RS Official Gazette, 31 December 1993), art. 65.

⁹⁴⁶ P3606 (Guidelines for the Establishment of Criteria for Criminal Prosecution, VRS Military Prosecutor's Office, 1992), p. 7.

⁹⁴⁷ P3606 (Guidelines for the Establishment of Criteria for Criminal Prosecution, VRS Military Prosecutor's Office, 1992), p. 8.

⁹⁴⁸ P3606 (Guidelines for the Establishment of Criteria for Criminal Prosecution, VRS Military Prosecutor's Office, 1992), p. 8.

⁹⁴⁹ P3606 (Guidelines for the Establishment of Criteria for Criminal Prosecution, VRS Military Prosecutor's Office, 1992), p. 8.

⁹⁵⁰ P3606 (Guidelines for the Establishment of Criteria for Criminal Prosecution, VRS Military Prosecutor's Office, 1992), p. 9.

for any opportunity for crimes, or for negligence. The only problem in the initial phase was a lack of professionals for judicial system, which had been overcome soon!#No IMPUNITY!

1. Policies and orders relating to the rule of law and crimes

309. On 13 June 1992, the Accused as President of the SerBiH Presidency issued an order that in an armed conflict the VRS and Bosnian Serb MUP “shall apply and respect the rules of the international law of war”.⁹⁵¹ **(A highly EXCULPATORY! #The President's conduct!)** The order stated that commanders of all units, as well as each member of the army or other armed formation who takes part in combat activities, were responsible for the application of the rules.⁹⁵² The order further stated that it was the duty of the competent superior officer to initiate proceedings for legal sanctions against individuals who violate the rules.⁹⁵³ In accordance with the 13 June 1992 order, Bogdan Subotić as Minister of Defence, prepared and issued instructions on the treatment of captured persons.⁹⁵⁴ Early in the summer of 1992, the Accused issued an order to all local civilian and police authorities regarding the authority of ICRC delegates to visit all prisons and included a statement that any soldier who did not comply with the instructions would be punished.⁹⁵⁵ **(#All EXCULPATORY! As regular as in any country!# Conduct of high officials!)**

310. On 19 August 1992, the Accused issued an order addressed to the VRS Main Staff, MUP, and all CSBs, and with reference to the 13 June 1992 order, that all actors carry out their obligation to observe international humanitarian law, especially the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.⁹⁵⁶ The order issued the general instruction that “[i]n case of any suspicion or sign that international humanitarian rights have been violated, all organs of the Army and Police shall conduct energetic investigation in the zone of responsibility”.⁹⁵⁷ **(#All EXCULPATORY! As regular as in any country! The Accused issued this order, he never withdrew it, on the contrary – he reinforced it several times. Once the President ordered something that is anyway obligatory, it had to be implemented. There is no a single hint, let alone evidence that the President intervened against this order. The Minister of Interior (M. Stanisic) had issued his own order much earlier and prescribed the methodology of handling such a cases, regardless of ethnicity of perpetrators and victims, see:....@. (So, the Prosecution's allegation that the Toholj's Commision for documentation was to replace the regular investigating instruments is far from correct. #No IMPUNITY!)**

311. On 4 January 1995, the Accused as RS President promulgated the Law on the Mandatory Submission of Information on Crimes against Humanity and International Law,

⁹⁵¹ D434 (Radovan Karadžić's Order on the application of laws of war, 13 June 1992).

⁹⁵² D434 (Radovan Karadžić's Order on the application of laws of war, 13 June 1992).

⁹⁵³ D434 (Radovan Karadžić's Order on the application of laws of war, 13 June 1992).

⁹⁵⁴ P1134 (Ministry of Defence of SerBiH Instructions on the Treatment of Captured Persons, 13 June 1992); D434 (Radovan Karadžić's Order on the application of laws of war, 13 June 1992). *See also* D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 191–192.

⁹⁵⁵ D477 (Order of SerBiH Presidency, undated); Momčilo Mandić, T. 5271–5273 (15 July 2010).

⁹⁵⁶ D101 (Radovan Karadžić's Order to VRS Main Staff and RS MUP, 19 August 1992), pp. 1–2.

⁹⁵⁷ D101 (Radovan Karadžić's Order to VRS Main Staff and RS MUP, 19 August 1992), p. 2.

which the Bosnian Serb Assembly had passed at its session on 29 to 30 December 1994.⁹⁵⁸ The law required that anyone in possession of information that could serve as evidence of “crimes against humanity and international law committed during the internal armed conflicts and civil war in [RS] and other parts of the former [BiH] which began in 1992” make the information available for inspection and, if necessary, submit them to the body in charge of gathering information on such crimes.⁹⁵⁹ (#EXCULPATORY! Once issued, those orders were to be obeyed without exception, and there is no evidence of any “double track” acts or hints. All the orders named those who were responsible for carrying out the tasks. That is what presidents do, and nothing else unless alarmed that some instance is not carrying out its duties, deliberately or by incompetence. Still, in any civil war no attempts will exclude crimes, and all the allegations are arguments against civil wars, not against those who undertook all necessary measures! #No IMPUNITY!)

b. INTERNATIONAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

312. From 1991 until the end of 1995, there were numerous attempts made by the international community to broker a negotiated peace settlement in BiH. Over the course of four years, talks were held in various cities across Europe and a number of cease-fires were agreed upon. However, it was only with the Dayton Agreement signed on 14 December 1995 that peace was formally established in BiH.

i. European Community Peace Conference on Yugoslavia

313. The EC Peace Conference on Yugoslavia began its work in the summer of 1991 under the chairmanship of Lord Peter Carrington, the former Foreign Minister of the UK.⁹⁶⁰ The conference included representatives from the six former Yugoslav republics and the government of the SFRY.⁹⁶¹ The conference met intermittently in The Hague, Brussels, Lisbon, and London.⁹⁶² Its mission was to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict, including the peaceful separation of the republics of the SFRY.⁹⁶³ **This is another false “memory” – because the Conference was not aimed to facilitate the “separation”, but only to give good services to the Yugoslav republics in handling the crisis. Had it been a declared objective of the Conference, some of the republics wouldn’t participate, and there wouldn’t be any conference without consensus. Had it been a “cunning strategy”, it would be said publicly, at least now, or at least in this process. Another problem was that the Chamber relied on the testimony of a witness who himself confessed that his notes were ambiguous and inaccurate! Again, ambiguities, personal**

⁹⁵⁸ D1424 (Radovan Karadžić’s Decree on promulgation of Law on mandatory submission of information on crimes against humanity and international law, 4 January 1995), p. 1; P1405 (Transcript of 48th session of RS Assembly, 29-30 December 1994), p. 129.

⁹⁵⁹ D1424 (Radovan Karadžić’s Decree on promulgation of Law on mandatory submission of information on crimes against humanity and international law, 4 January 1995), p. 2. The Law also stated that anyone who refused to do so or thwarted the delivery or availability for inspection of such information would be punished with either a fine or maximum one year’s imprisonment. D1424 (Radovan Karadžić’s Decree on promulgation of Law on mandatory submission of information on crimes against humanity and international law, 4 January 1995), p. 4.

⁹⁶⁰ Herbert Okun, T. 1470–1471 (22 April 2010); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4139; P919 (ECMM Brief on HOM’s visit to BiH, 20 February 1992), e-court pp. 10–15; P6513 (Press release on Yugoslavia Peace Conference, 7 September 1991).

⁹⁶¹ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4139.

⁹⁶² Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4140; P6513 (Press release on Yugoslavia Peace Conference, 7 September 1991); D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), paras. 26, 30.

⁹⁶³ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4139, 4141.

impressions, hear-say and inaccurate notes appeared to be more important than the official documents.

314. On 1 October 1991, as a result of the EC efforts, a multi-national monitoring mission in BiH, the ECMM, was established.⁹⁶⁴ The ECMM had the goal of securing a cease-fire between parties to the conflict by deploying teams of different nationalities to start a dialogue with the military commanders on both sides.⁹⁶⁵ **(Again, wrong, but useful since indicates how the domestic politicians were naïve. In October 1991 still there was no any armed conflict in BiH, but only in Croatia. The three sides in BiH, including the Serb side, accepted the ECMM to be present and to reside in BiH, to help a political settlement, but it seems that an armed conflict was “envisaged”, in spite of the fact that a political process could have been fully successful, as the Lisbon Agreement confirmed. #So, The EC envisaged the armed conflict at least two weeks prior to the President’s speech in the BH Parliament on 15 October!)**

315. October 1991, Carrington proposed a plan, developed by the conference, which allowed for the peaceful separation of all the republics of the SFRY.⁹⁶⁶ Slovenia, Croatia, SRBiH, Macedonia, and Montenegro agreed, but Serbia rejected the plan.⁹⁶⁷ Cyrus Vance, Special Envoy to the Secretary General, and Ambassador Herbert Okun, his special advisor, attended some of the meetings of the conference as representatives of the Secretary General.⁹⁶⁸ **(That makes this strategy so “cunning”, because the primary purpose of the Conference was not to “separate” the Republics, but to give a good services. Classical ambush! Beside that, the BiH didn’t agree validly, because there was no consensus of the three sides in BiH. However, although Mr. Izetbegovic wasn’t authorised to take stance on the issue, he himself made a commitment written in the Declaration that the “three different ethnic groups in BiH will have a high autonomies” which was the basis for all the Serb moves.**

ii. Vance Plan

316. In January 1992, a cease-fire with respect to the conflict in Croatia was signed by the parties under the authority of the UN.⁹⁶⁹ In accordance with the cease-fire, a plan was presented by Vance, which called for the creation of UN Protected Areas in Croatia and the establishment of UNPROFOR.⁹⁷⁰ The Vance Plan had three main points, namely (i) the establishment of UNPROFOR to facilitate the demobilisation and demilitarisation of the UN Protected Areas; (ii) the deployment of a local police force for the maintenance of law

⁹⁶⁴ P919 (ECMM Brief on HOM’s visit to BiH, 20 February 1992), e-court pp. 10–15.

⁹⁶⁵ Charles McLeod, P712 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Brđanin*) (specifying that once dialogue had been established, the goal was to enact confidence building measures and humanitarian actions), T. 7281; P919 (ECMM Brief on HOM’s visit to BiH, 20 February 1992), e-court pp. 10–15.

⁹⁶⁶ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4139, 4141.

⁹⁶⁷ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4141.

⁹⁶⁸ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4139. John Wilson, the former chief of the UNMOs, was appointed as military adviser to Vance and UNPROFOR liaison officer to the ICFY in December 1992. P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), paras. 6, 8; P1046 (John Wilson’s Report to Australian Army, 15 November 1992), p. 9.

⁹⁶⁹ P753 (Vance Plan), e-court p. 4; P4203 (Witness statement of Piers Tucker dated 12 May 2010), para. 9; P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), paras. 11, 13.

⁹⁷⁰ P753 (Vance Plan), e-court p. 4; P4203 (Witness statement of Piers Tucker dated 12 May 2010), para. 9; P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), paras. 11, 13.

and order in areas that had been demilitarised under the supervision of UNPROFOR; and (iii) the creation of safe conditions for the voluntary return of all displaced persons.⁹⁷¹

(Wasn't it of any significance that this Accused supported the UN coming to RSK, at least to be noticed by the Chamber?)

1. UNPROFOR

317. On 21 February 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 743 which established UNPROFOR.⁹⁷² Its mandate was to assist in the implementation of the Vance Plan.⁹⁷³ On 13 March 1992, UNPROFOR headquarters was established in Sarajevo because the city was perceived as a neutral location at that time.⁹⁷⁴ Teams of UNPROFOR personnel were tasked with monitoring the UN Protected Areas in Croatia, which were to be demilitarised in accordance with the Vance Plan.⁹⁷⁵ The duties of UNPROFOR also included protecting civilians residing in those areas and assisting humanitarian agencies in carrying out their functions.⁹⁷⁶ UNPROFOR members patrolling the UN Protected Areas were lightly armed; they established check-points on roads, searching vehicles and individuals entering the UN Protected Areas so that no weapons, ammunition, or military equipment would be brought in.⁹⁷⁷

318. Although UNPROFOR was initially established for Croatia, its mandate was expanded to include BiH in June 1992.⁹⁷⁸ **(Contrary to the Harland's testimony that the Serb side didn't have anything to do with the approval, the UN forces couldn't be deployed without the approval of all the three sides, see P937, pp. 5, 6 and 8. This fact heavily disqualified Harland as a witness, because he didn't know even the very basis of the UN mandate! This document unequivocally suggested the continuation of the EC talks, which didn't happen, because of the US support to the Muslim aggressive plan to conquer entire BH and dominate over the Christian majority (the Serbs and Croats))** UNPROFOR headquarters, initially established in Sarajevo, was moved to Zagreb, and in turn UNPROFOR BiH Command was established in Sarajevo.⁹⁷⁹ The Commanders

⁹⁷¹ P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 5–7.

⁹⁷² P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 14.

⁹⁷³ P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 14.

⁹⁷⁴ P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 14; P753 (Vance Plan), e-court p. 5; P4203 (Witness statement of Pyers Tucker dated 12 May 2010), para. 9; P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 21.

⁹⁷⁵ P753 (Vance Plan), e-court p. 5; P2538 (Patrick Treanor's research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990–1995”, 1 May 2009), paras. 84, 92.

⁹⁷⁶ P753 (Vance Plan), e-court p. 5; P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 20. On 8 June 1992, with Resolution 758, the Security Council enlarged the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR. *See* Adjudicated Fact 9. On 29 June 1992, Security Council Resolution 761 tasked UNPROFOR with protecting Sarajevo airport and assisting with its functioning. *See* Adjudicated Fact 10. In September 1992, UNPROFOR's mandate was broadened by Security Council Resolution 776 to include the protection of humanitarian aid convoys. *See* Adjudicated Fact 12.

⁹⁷⁷ P753 (Vance Plan), e-court p. 5.

⁹⁷⁸ John Wilson, T. 3913–3914 (21 June 2010); P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 9. *See also* P937 (UNSG Report re peacekeeping operation in BiH, 12 May 1992), p. 4. An initial deployment of “UNPROFOR military observers” went to four locations in 1 May 1992: Medjugorja, Mostar, Stolac, and Trebinje. P937 (UNSG Report re peacekeeping operation in BiH, 12 May 1992), p. 4.

⁹⁷⁹ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 7–9; P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 2, 21; P1258 (Witness statement of Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek dated 16 July 2002), e-court p. 3; P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 12; P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), para. 64. A UN report dated 12 May 1992 states that for “operational and security” reasons, UNPROFOR's headquarters should be relocated from Sarajevo. P937 (UNSG Report re peacekeeping operation in BiH, 12 May 1992), p. 13. From 18 May until 25 June 1992, UNPROFOR headquarters relocated to Belgrade. It was then relocated to Zagreb on 31 July 1992. P1046 (John Wilson's Report to Australian Army, 15 November 1992), p. 3; P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), paras. 7, 64. UNPROFOR BiH Command

of UNPROFOR BiH Command were Generals Philippe Morillon, Francis Briquemont, Michael Rose, and Rupert Smith, successively.⁹⁸⁰ BiH Command included Sector Sarajevo, Sector Northeast, and Sector Southwest.⁹⁸¹ There was a UN Civil Affairs component also posted with UNPROFOR BiH Command in Sarajevo.⁹⁸² In March 1995, the Security Council restructured UNPROFOR, placing its headquarters in Zagreb under the overall command and control of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Yasushi Akashi.⁹⁸³ UNPROFOR BiH Command remained headquartered in Sarajevo and reported to UNPROFOR Force Command in Zagreb.⁹⁸⁴

319. Sector Sarajevo included the city of Sarajevo, the DMZ, the TEZ of Mt. Igman, and Žepa.⁹⁸⁵ The Sector Sarajevo headquarters was located in the PTT Engineering Building in Alipašino Polje.⁹⁸⁶ The Commanders of UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo included Major-Generals Lewis MacKenzie and Hussein Abdel Razek, and Generals Andre Soubirou, Hervé Gobilliard, and Jean-René Bachelet successively.⁹⁸⁷ In Sector Sarajevo, UNPROFOR troops were mainly from France, Russia, Ukraine, and Egypt.⁹⁸⁸ In 1992, Sector Sarajevo had three battalions; by 1994, this was increased to six battalions and one

was directly subordinated to UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb. P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 9.

980 P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 9; P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), paras. 5, 13, 195; Rupert Smith, T. 11296–11298 (8 February 2011). *See also* P1762 (Witness statement of David Fraser dated 17 October 2010), p. 5; P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), para. 105.

981 P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 10; P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 12; Rupert Smith, T. 11298 (8 February 2011); P1649 (Map of BiH). Harland states that Bihac was added later to UNPROFOR BiH Command. P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 10. Commanders of each of the Sectors were directly subordinated to UNPROFOR BiH Command. P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 11.

982 P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 10–11; P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 15. From May 1993, David Harland was a Civil Affairs Officer at UNPROFOR BiH Command working under Victor Andreev, the Civil Affairs Co-ordinator. In January 1995, Harland became the head of Civil Affairs for UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo and in August 1995, he became the Political Adviser to UNPROFOR BiH Commander General Smith. P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 5, 12.

983 P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 182. UNPROFOR was restructured with three separate missions in Croatia, BiH, and Macedonia and collectively referred to as the United Nations Peace Force. P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 182. Akashi was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary General in January 1994. Yasushi Akashi, T. 37665 (24 April 2013). *See also* P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 44; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 8.

984 P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 182.

985 P2407 (Witness statement of KDZ304), p. 3; P2447 (Witness statement of KDZ182 dated 8 March 2011), p. 4; P2119 (Witness statement of KDZ450 dated 17 January 2011), p. 3 (under seal); P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 12; P1649 (Map of BiH).

986 P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 11; P1762 (Witness statement of David Fraser dated 17 October 2010), pp. 4–5; P5906 (Witness statement of KDZ450 dated 17 January 2011), para. 13; John Hamill, P1994 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Galić*), T. 6155. *See also* D2398 (Witness statement of Richard Gray dated 22 April 2012), para. 9; Adjudicated Fact 14.

987 P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 11; P1762 (Witness statement of David Fraser dated 17 October 2010), pp. 4–5; P1258 (Witness statement of Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek dated 16 July 2002), e-court pp. 2–3; P2119 (Witness statement of KDZ450 dated 17 January 2011), p. 3 (under seal); P2414 (Witness statement of KDZ182 dated 8 March 2011), pp. 3, 81 (under seal); P2106 (Witness statement of KDZ304 dated 13 January 2011), p. 3 (under seal). UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo Commanders served during the following periods: MacKenzie, from May to July 1992; Abdel Razek, August 1992 to February 1993; Soubirou, October 1993 to September 1994; Gobilliard, September 1994 to August 1995; and Bachelet from August 1995 onwards. P1258 (Witness statement of Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek dated 16 July 2002), e-court pp. 2–3; P2119 (Witness statement of KDZ450 dated 17 January 2011), p. 3 (under seal); D2398 (Witness statement of Richard Gray dated 22 April 2012), para. 30.

988 P2447 (Witness statement of KDZ182 dated 8 March 2011), para. 6; D2774 (Witness statement of Milenko Indić dated 19 January 2013), para. 78; P1046 (John Wilson’s Report to Australian Army, 15 November 1992), p. 8; P2106 (Witness statement of KDZ304 dated 13 January 2011), p. 4 (under seal); John Hamill, P1994 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Galić*), T. 6155. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 13. There were three FreBat units (one based at the airport, the second based inside Sarajevo, and the third on Mt. Igman), EgyptBat was also based inside the city, RusBat was located in Grbavica and south of Sarajevo, and UkrBat was stationed at the Maršal Tito Barracks, with some additional UkrBat personnel in Žepa. P2447 (Witness statement of KDZ182 dated 8 March 2011), p. 6; P4203 (Witness statement of Pyers Tucker dated 12 May 2010), para. 10 (specifying that Ukraine, France, and Egypt reflected the religious composition of the city); KDZ304, T. 10458–10460 (18 January 2011); P1258 (Witness statement of Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek dated 16 July 2002), e-court p. 3. In total, 17 nationalities were represented in Sector Sarajevo. P2447 (Witness statement of KDZ182 dated 8 March 2011), p. 5.

detachment in charge of the Sarajevo airport.⁹⁸⁹ UNPROFOR's responsibilities in Sarajevo included monitoring the DMZ and the TEZ, and reporting any incoming or outgoing fire.⁹⁹⁰ The UNPROFOR teams were also tasked with escorting UNHCR convoys into the city and overseeing the supply of water, gas, and electricity in Sarajevo.⁹⁹¹ Sector Sarajevo had liaison officers for both parties to the conflict; one liaison officer at the SRK and one at the 1st Corps of the ABiH, both of them would report directly to the Sector Sarajevo UNPROFOR Commander.⁹⁹² Milenko Indić was the VRS liaison officer to UNPROFOR.⁹⁹³ There was also an ABiH liaison officer posted at the PTT building.⁹⁹⁴

2. UNMO

320. The Vance Plan also established UNMOs for the purpose of monitoring the demilitarisation of the UN Protected Areas and reporting any cease-fire agreement violations.⁹⁹⁵ Generally, their tasks included patrolling areas, liaising with local authorities and parties to the conflict, as well as monitoring and reporting any disturbances.⁹⁹⁶ UNMOs were unarmed and mainly acted as mediators.⁹⁹⁷ They also provided support to humanitarian operations conducted by UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies.⁹⁹⁸ The UNMOs were deployed in BiH in early June 1992.⁹⁹⁹ In July 1992, the UNMO headquarters was moved to Zagreb.¹⁰⁰⁰

321. UNMO and UNPROFOR were two distinct organisations with different functions; however at each level within UNPROFOR, there was an UNMO office which was co-located.¹⁰⁰¹ For instance, the UNMO main headquarters was co-located with the UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb.¹⁰⁰² The UNMO reporting system utilised both daily

⁹⁸⁹ P1258 (Witness statement of Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek dated 16 July 2002), e-court p. 3; P2447 (Witness statement of KDZ182 dated 8 March 2011), p. 5; P2106 (Witness statement of KDZ304 dated 13 January 2011), p. 4 (under seal); John Hamill, P1994 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Galić*), T. 6155.

⁹⁹⁰ P50 (Witness statement of Hugh Nightingale dated 5 February 1996), e-court p. 4; P2447 (Witness statement of KDZ182 dated 8 March 2011), p. 4; P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 44; Michael Rose, T. 7256, 7260 (5 October 2010); P2447 (Witness statement of KDZ182 dated 8 March 2011), p. 4; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 79–80.

⁹⁹¹ P2447 (Witness statement of KDZ182 dated 8 March 2011), p. 4.

⁹⁹² P2447 (Witness statement of KDZ182 dated 8 March 2011), p. 10.

⁹⁹³ Milenko Indić, T. 32414–32415, 32428–32429 (22 January 2013), T. 32600–32601 (24 January 2013); D2774 (Witness statement of David Fraser dated 17 October 2010), p. 8; P2117 (Witness statement of Marcus Helgers dated 3 August 1995), p. 3. Indić stated that the liaison office moved from the PTT building to Lukavica barracks. D2774 (Witness statement of Milenko Indić dated 19 January 2013), paras. 46–51.

⁹⁹⁴ D2774 (Witness statement of Milenko Indić dated 19 January 2013), paras. 48–49.

⁹⁹⁵ P753 (Vance Plan), e-court p. 6; John Wilson, T. 3913 (21 June 2010); P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), para. 35; P4140 (Witness statement of Joseph Kingori dated 8 January 2002), para. 4. Security Council Resolution 743 provided for the UNMOs to patrol limited areas in BiH after the demilitarisation of the UN Protected Areas in Croatia. P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 14.

⁹⁹⁶ P753 (Vance Plan), e-court p. 5; John Wilson, T. 3913 (21 June 2010); P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), para. 35; P2170 (Witness statement of Patrick Rechner dated 31 January 2011), para. 7; P1558 (Witness statement of Francis Roy Thomas dated 13 May 2009), para. 29.

⁹⁹⁷ P753 (Vance Plan), e-court p. 5; P4140 (Witness statement of Joseph Kingori dated 8 January 2002), para. 5; P1558 (Witness statement of Francis Roy Thomas dated 13 May 2009), para. 27.

⁹⁹⁸ P1426 (Witness statement of Richard Mole dated 7 May 2010), p. 10; P4140 (Witness statement of Joseph Kingori dated 8 January 2002), para. 4; P1558 (Witness statement of Francis Roy Thomas dated 13 May 2009), para. 19.

⁹⁹⁹ P981 (UNSC Resolution 758, 8 June 1992). *See also* Adjudicated Fact 9.

¹⁰⁰⁰ P1046 (John Wilson's Report to Australian Army, 15 November 1992), para. 10; P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), para. 7. Prior to this, on 24 June 1992, UNMO headquarters was relocated from Sarajevo to Belgrade. P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), para. 93.

¹⁰⁰¹ Patrick Rechner, T. 11146 (2 February 2011). *See also* P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 18 (stating that UNMOs were independent of UNPROFOR and reported directly to the UN headquarters in New York via Zagreb).

¹⁰⁰² P1046 (John Wilson's Report to Australian Army, 15 November 1992), para. 10.

situation reports to headquarters and incident reports.¹⁰⁰³ Daily reports were sent to the Chief UNMO in Zagreb, copying UNPROFOR BiH Command.¹⁰⁰⁴ The UNMO senior military observer would attend the Sector Command briefing meetings with the UNPROFOR Sector Commander and other UNPROFOR staff.¹⁰⁰⁵

322. In Sector Sarajevo, the UNMOs were commanded by senior military observers, including Richard Gray, Richard Mole, and Francis Roy Thomas, successively.¹⁰⁰⁶ The UNMOs had accommodations provided to them by the Bosnian Muslims in the Presidency Building and by the SRK in the Lukavica barracks.¹⁰⁰⁷ The UNMOs also had an operations room and staff stationed at the PTT building with direct access to UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo Command and UNPROFOR BiH Command.¹⁰⁰⁸ The UNMOs in Sector Sarajevo were divided into two groups, positioned on opposite sides of the confrontation lines.¹⁰⁰⁹ One group of UNMOs was posted within the city, in the territory controlled by the Bosnian Muslims, which was designated as the “Papa” side.¹⁰¹⁰ The other group of UNMOs was stationed in the Bosnian Serb-controlled territory around the city, designated as the “Lima” side.¹⁰¹¹ The UNMOs’ tasks in Sarajevo included monitoring weapons sites, reporting heavy weapons activity to UN headquarters in New York, and facilitating in the delivery of humanitarian aid.¹⁰¹² The UNMOs at the OPs monitored weapons and conducted observation patrols around the area.¹⁰¹³

323. Following the established procedure described above, each UNMO team in Sector Sarajevo was required to submit a daily situation report to the “Papa” or “Lima” team

¹⁰⁰³ P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), paras. 18, 22. *See also* P1426 (Witness statement of Richard Mole dated 7 May 2010), paras. 24–27; P1558 (Witness statement of Francis Roy Thomas dated 13 May 2009), para. 36; John Hamill, P1994 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Galić*), T. 6127.

¹⁰⁰⁴ P1426 (Witness statement of Richard Mole dated 7 May 2010), para. 27. In addition to daily reports, a monthly report summarising the events of the month would also be prepared and sent accordingly. P1426 (Witness statement of Richard Mole dated 7 May 2010), paras. 27, 101. *See, e.g.*, P1433 (UNMO report for October 1992); P1434 (UNMO report for November 1992); P1429 (UNMO report for December 1992).

¹⁰⁰⁵ P1258 (Witness statement of Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek dated 16 July 2002), e-court p. 14.

¹⁰⁰⁶ P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), para. 4; P1558 (Witness statement of Francis Roy Thomas dated 13 May 2009), para. 13. Mole served from September to December 1992. P1426 (Witness statement of Richard Mole dated 7 May 2010), para. 3. Thomas served from October 1993 to July 1994. His predecessor was Lieutenant Colonel Kukkola (for four months) and his successor was Major Skov (for two months). P1558 (Witness statement of Francis Roy Thomas dated 13 May 2009), para. 13.

¹⁰⁰⁷ P1426 (Witness statement of Richard Mole dated 7 May 2010), para. 7; John Hamill, P1994 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Galić*), T. 6068–6069. UNMOs also had a liaison officer for the ABiH and SRK. John Hamill, P1994 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Galić*), T. 6066–6067.

¹⁰⁰⁸ P1426 (Witness statement of Richard Mole dated 7 May 2010), para. 7.

¹⁰⁰⁹ P1426 (Witness statement of Richard Mole dated 7 May 2010), para. 5. *See also* P1557 (UNMO map of confrontation line in Sarajevo, February 1994); P1567 (Map of Sarajevo marked by Francis Roy Thomas). In 1992, there were approximately 60 UNMOs in Sector Sarajevo. P1426 (Witness statement of Richard Mole dated 7 May 2010), para. 5. UNMOs within Sector Sarajevo also included those posted in Žepa and Goražde. P1558 (Witness statement of Francis Roy Thomas dated 13 May 2009), paras. 16–19.

¹⁰¹⁰ P1426 (Witness statement of Richard Mole dated 7 May 2010), para. 5. *See also* P1557 (UNMO map of confrontation line in Sarajevo, February 1994); P1431 (Map of Sarajevo showing UNMO positions). The number of OPs on the Papa and the Lima sides changed during the conflict. By October 1992, there were 10 OPs on the Lima side and four on the Papa side and by end of November 1992, there were 11 OPs on the Lima side and three on the Papa side. Richard Mole, T. 5805–5806 (17 August 2011). *See also* Adjudicated Fact 16. In October 1993, there were six OPs on the Papa side and seven OPs on the Lima side. The UNMO structure changed again by June and July 1994. P1558 (Witness statement of Francis Roy Thomas dated 13 May 2009), paras. 17–18, 21, 24–25; P1557 (UNMO map of confrontation line in Sarajevo, February 1994); P1565 (UNMO map of confrontation line in Sarajevo, 21 February 1994); P1566 (UNMO map of confrontation line in Sarajevo, 21 April 1994).

¹⁰¹¹ P1426 (Witness statement of Richard Mole dated 7 May 2010), para. 5; P1558 (Witness statement of Francis Roy Thomas dated 13 May 2009), para. 19. *See also* P1557 (UNMO map of confrontation line in Sarajevo, February 1994).

¹⁰¹² P1426 (Witness statement of Richard Mole dated 7 May 2010), para. 11; John Hamill, P1994 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Galić*), T. 6062. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2779. By 1993, UNMO teams were deployed to Goražde, Tuzla, Bihać, Žepa, and Srebrenica. P1558 (Witness statement of Francis Roy Thomas dated 13 May 2009), para. 16; P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 67; *see also* paras. 4966–4971. In addition to their regular activities, on the Papa side, UNMOs were responsible for investigating “activity”, when requested by Thomas. P1558 (Witness statement of Francis Roy Thomas dated 13 May 2009), para. 19.

¹⁰¹³ P1426 (Witness statement of Richard Mole dated 7 May 2010), para. 13.

leader.¹⁰¹⁴ This report was then consolidated into an “UNMO Sarajevo sitrep” sent at 6 p.m. to the UNMO chief military officer in Zagreb and copied to Sector Sarajevo.¹⁰¹⁵ In June 1994, the UNMOs in Sector Sarajevo were reorganised into 17 OPs and their areas of responsibility were divided into five districts, allowing each of the UNMO teams to work with both the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs within each district.¹⁰¹⁶

iii. Cutileiro and Sarajevo Plan

324. In January 1992, Portugal took over the EC Presidency and, the following month, Ambassador José Cutileiro was appointed as the chairman of the talks on the Future Constitutional Arrangements for BiH.¹⁰¹⁷ The talks were held in Sarajevo, Brussels, and Lisbon.¹⁰¹⁸

325. On 23 February 1992, the conference proposed a new plan, entitled the Statement of Principles for New Constitutional Arrangements for BiH, also known as the Lisbon Agreement or Cutileiro Plan.¹⁰¹⁹ The plan called for an independent and geographically continuous BiH, comprised of the three constituent units that represented the Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs.¹⁰²⁰ The plan set forth constitutional principles for BiH and proposed the structure of the Assembly and government of BiH.¹⁰²¹ The Cutileiro Plan did not grant territorial continuity to SerBiH nor did it establish a corridor linking Serbia to the Krajina region.¹⁰²² **(#But, anyway, the Serb side accepted it to have their state withing BiH consisted of more than one territory! The Strategic objectives were different before the war, and a territorial continuity was not necessary! EXCULPATORY! Before the war, and without a war, the Serbs didn't find the territorial continuity to be necessary. Only after the war broke out, the continuity become necessary, and thus it had been included in the new negotiating strategy, as another strategic objective, announced on 12 May 1992.)** Furthermore, the

¹⁰¹⁴ P1558 (Witness statement of Francis Roy Thomas dated 13 May 2009), para. 39. *See also* para. 321.

¹⁰¹⁵ P1558 (Witness statement of Francis Roy Thomas dated 13 May 2009), para. 40. Any information that came after the issuance of the “UNMO Sarajevo sitrep” would be in a supplemental situation report. P1558 (Witness statement of Francis Roy Thomas dated 13 May 2009), para. 39. An UNMO liaison officer was permanently attached to the UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo headquarters and provided information from the UNMO reports to UNPROFOR. P2119 (Witness statement of KDZ450 dated 17 January 2011), p. 7 (under seal).

¹⁰¹⁶ P1558 (Witness statement of Francis Roy Thomas dated 13 May 2009), paras. 24–25.

¹⁰¹⁷ D2968 (Witness statement of Jose Cutileiro dated 11 April 2012), para. 3; Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4318–4139; Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43218 (7 November 2013); D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), para. 37; P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 109.

¹⁰¹⁸ D2968 (Witness statement of Jose Cutileiro dated 11 April 2012), paras. 5–17; Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4320; Colm Doyle, P918 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 25259–25260; D4484 (Cryptofax from Cyrus Vance to de Soto, 5 March 1992), paras. 4, 8; P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 111.

¹⁰¹⁹ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4320–4321; P798 (Statement of Principles, Lisbon Agreement, 23 February 1992).

¹⁰²⁰ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4195; P798 (Statement of Principles, Lisbon Agreement, 23 February 1992), p. 1; D4484 (Cryptofax from Cyrus Vance to de Soto, 5 March 1992), p. 2; P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 111.

¹⁰²¹ P798 (Statement of Principles, Lisbon Agreement, 23 February 1992); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4195; D4484 (Cryptofax from Cyrus Vance to de Soto, 5 March 1992), p. 2.

¹⁰²² Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4195. According to Okun, the political objectives of the Bosnian Serbs were the following: (i) the establishment of a separate state called the RS, (ii) the RS would have continuous territory and be connected with Serbia, (iii) the RS would be ethnically homogeneous, (iv) the RS would have a special relationship with Serbia, (v) Sarajevo would be divided into a Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim section, and (vi) the RS would have veto power over any residual powers held by the central BiH government. Herbert Okun, T. 1474–1475 (22 April 2010); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4157–4158. Okun also testified that the Accused would make references to the genocide suffered by the Bosnian Serbs during the Second World War and that the Bosnian Serbs had a right to reclaim the land they lost during the war. Herbert Okun, T. 1489–1490 (22 April 2010); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4166–4167, 4370.

Cutileiro Plan did not call for the physical division of Sarajevo into Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb parts of the city.¹⁰²³ **(# A physical division of Sarajevo never was the Serb objective, but only an administrative allocation and grouping of the settlement with the high ethnic majority of each of the groups. See## Vance report##, probably the first meeting with RK)** On 25 February 1992, the Accused summarised the outcome of the talks at a session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and stated that the Bosnian Serbs had agreed to the three main principles, namely that BiH would (i) be an independent state, (ii) maintain its present borders; and (iii) consist of three constituent parts.¹⁰²⁴ **##(EXCULPATORY! There should be mentioned that the Serb side accepted discontinuity of territory!)**

326. On 18 March 1992, a Statement of Principles, referred to as the Sarajevo Plan, was agreed upon by the three parties as the basis for further negotiations.¹⁰²⁵ The agreement was a refinement of the Cutileiro Plan.¹⁰²⁶ It stated that BiH would be one state, “composed of three constituent units, based on national principles and taking into account economic, geographic, and other criteria”, and included the respect for human rights, religious freedom, and protection of minorities.¹⁰²⁷ **EXCULPATORY!** Further it stated that a working group would be established to define the territory of the constituent units.¹⁰²⁸ The map annexed to the Sarajevo Plan showed the division of BiH into the Bosnian Serb, Bosnian Muslim, and Bosnian Croat areas which represented the three constituent units.¹⁰²⁹ **EXCULPATORY!**

327. Following the agreement, the Bosnian Serb negotiators reported back to the Bosnian Serb Assembly.¹⁰³⁰ The new draft proposal, they explained to the deputies, aimed at a division of BiH into three constituent units based not only on nationality, but also on economic and geographic considerations.¹⁰³¹ The proposal was marked as “basis for further negotiations”.¹⁰³² **EXCULPATORY!**

¹⁰²³ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4196.

¹⁰²⁴ See D88 (Shorthand Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25 February 1992), pp. 5–12, 16–20; P798 (Statement of Principles, Lisbon Agreement, 23 February 1992). Krajišnik testified that the Strategic Goals, later presented by the Accused at the 16th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, were not military goals but were actually requests put by the Bosnian Serbs to Cutileiro. Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43768–43771 (19 November 2013).

¹⁰²⁵ P782 (Statement of Principles, Sarajevo Agreement, 18 March 1992); D2968 (Witness statement of Jose Cutileiro dated 11 April 2012), para. 10. Negotiations were held in Sarajevo on 27 February 1992, in Brussels on 7 March 1992, and again in Sarajevo on 16–18 March 1992. D2968 (Witness statement of Jose Cutileiro dated 11 April 2012), paras. 5, 7, 9; D4484 (Cryptofax from Cyrus Vance to de Soto, 5 March 1992), p. 2. See, e.g., P952 (Letter from Jose Cutileiro to Radovan Karadžić, 12 June 1992), D2975 (Letter from Radovan Karadžić to Jose Cutileiro, 13 June 1992), D2981 (Letter from Jose Cutileiro to The Economist, undated), D2980 (Article from International Herald Tribune entitled “Vance and Owen Got It Right”, 16 February 1993), referencing the fact that an agreement was reached on 18 March 1992.

¹⁰²⁶ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4320–4321.

¹⁰²⁷ P782 (Statement of Principles, Sarajevo Agreement, 18 March 1992), p. 1; D2968 (Witness statement of Jose Cutileiro dated 11 April 2012), paras. 11, 18. See also D486 (Cutileiro Plan map, March 1992).

¹⁰²⁸ P782 (Statement of Principles, Sarajevo Agreement, 18 March 1992), p. 3; D2968 (Witness statement of Jose Cutileiro dated 11 April 2012), paras. 13, 15.

¹⁰²⁹ P782 (Statement of Principles, Sarajevo Agreement, 18 March 1992), pp. 4, 9. The Bosnian Serb municipalities included Bosanski Novi, Bosanska Dubica, Bosanska Gradiška, Srbac, Derventa, Modriča, Banja Luka, Laktaši, Prnjavor, Bosanski Petrovac, Ključ, Mrkonjić Grad, Skender Vakuf, Čelinac, Kotor Varoš, Teslić, Drvar, Glamoč, Šipovac, Kupres, Lopare, Ugljevik, Bijeljina, Šekovići, Ilijaš, Sarajevo (not including the city of Sarajevo), Pale, Sokolac, Han Pijesak, Čajniče, Rudo, Kalinobik, Nevesinje, Gacko, Bileća, Ljubinje, and Trebinje. D486 (Cutileiro Plan map, March 1992).

¹⁰³⁰ D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), pp. 6–14; Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43252–43523 (27 November 2013). See also Adjudicated Fact 2005.

¹⁰³¹ D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), p. 6; Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43252–43523 (27 November 2013). See also Adjudicated Fact 2006.

¹⁰³² D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), pp. 6, 32, 44; Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43252–43523 (27 November 2013). See also Adjudicated Fact 2007.

328. On 3 April 1992, Krajišnik, as President of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, sent a letter to Cutileiro suggesting a continuation of negotiations based on the Statement of Principles as agreed to on 18 March 1992.¹⁰³³ **EXCULPATORY!**

329. As mentioned above, on 6 April 1992, the independence of BiH was recognised by the USA and the EC.¹⁰³⁴ **(However, many political and science authorities immediately criticised the recognition as prematured and dangerous for the maintaining of peace. Since the Judgement so far looks like a history of the conflict, it should have been mentioned. #PREMATURE RECOGNITION!)** The following day, the Security Council passed Resolution 749 authorising the full deployment of UNPROFOR generally into the SFRY.¹⁰³⁵ **(Certainly, not something to be bragged of. What kind of independence, agreement, or a settlement of any kind required deployment of the foreign troops?)** Five days later, a cease-fire agreement was signed by leaders of all three parties.¹⁰³⁶ It declared an immediate and total cease-fire in BiH, including in Sarajevo, starting at midnight on 12 April 1992.¹⁰³⁷ It stipulated that artillery should be removed and placed under the control of EC monitors.¹⁰³⁸ Six days later, the Sarajevo RTV building was hit by mortar fire.¹⁰³⁹ **(#Never established by whose mortar!!! What Doyle said was rebutted by several documents! Even he himself described tis period as a period of uncontrolled elements!)** On 23 April 1992, Carrington, Cutileiro, Doyle, Izetbegović, the Accused, and Koljević met at the Sarajevo airport and reaffirmed the 12 April cease-fire agreement.¹⁰⁴⁰ **#EXCULPATORY! But, the Chamber didn't mention the President's Platform for Peace, issued on 22 April 92, see D##)** Despite this, the UN reported that the cease-fire "has proved impossible to implement".¹⁰⁴¹ **(why was it "impossible to implement." Because of the fact that on a very same day, 12 April 92 colonel Hasan Efendic, the commander of the newly formed Muslim TO issued a very famous "Directive – combat readiness immediate... For what reasons the Chamber neglected this fact? Whenever it was possible to allocate some responsibility to the Serb side, no matter rightfully or wrongfully, the Chamber did it, but in other cases the Chamber used impersonal formula, and this doesn't look like a fair trial)**

330. On 1 May 1992, Cutileiro suspended the scheduled peace talks until 13 May because of the parties' failure to honour the cease-fire agreement.¹⁰⁴² **(#not "parties" but the**

¹⁰³³ D2971 (Letter from SerBiH Assembly to Jose Cutileiro, 3 April 1992); D2968 (Witness statement of Jose Cutileiro dated 11 April 2012), para. 20.

¹⁰³⁴ See para. 56; P2284 (UNSG report entitled "The Fall of Srebrenica", 15 November 1999), para. 15.

¹⁰³⁵ D227 (UNSC Resolution 749, 7 April 1992). See para. 317.

¹⁰³⁶ P947 (Cease-fire Agreement, 12 April 1992); Colm Doyle, P918 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 25283–25284.

¹⁰³⁷ P947 (Cease-fire Agreement, 12 April 1992); Colm Doyle, P918 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 25283–25284.

¹⁰³⁸ P947 (Cease-fire Agreement, 12 April 1992).

¹⁰³⁹ See para. 3542.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Colm Doyle, P918 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 25283–25284; P937 (UNSG Report re peacekeeping operation in BiH, 12 May 1992), p. 3. Others present at the meeting were the EU Council of Ministers President, Dr. Pinheiro, UNPROFOR Generals Morillon and MacKenzie, and the JNA Commander, Kukanjac. Colm Doyle, P918 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 25283. On 5 May 1992, Fikret Abdić, Stjepan Kljuić, and General Aksentijević for the JNA met with Carrington and Doyle in Sarajevo and agreed to an immediate cease-fire in Sarajevo and BiH. The Bosnian Serbs did not attend because, according to Doyle, the Bosnian Serbs thought it was dangerous to come to the PTT building in Sarajevo. Doyle testified cease-fires were broken fairly quickly. Colm Doyle, P918 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 25295–25296; P948 (Sarajevo Cease-fire Agreement, 5 May 1992).

¹⁰⁴¹ P937 (UNSG Report re peacekeeping operation in BiH, 12 May 1992), p. 3.

¹⁰⁴² P937 (UNSG Report re peacekeeping operation in BiH, 12 May 1992), p. 3; P948 (Sarajevo Cease-fire Agreement, 5 May 1992). Following the killing of an ECMM member in Mostar on 1 May 1992, the ECMM completely withdrew its monitors from BiH. P937 (UNSG Report re peacekeeping operation in BiH, 12 May 1992), p. 3. On 7 May 1992, the ECMM reported that the HDZ had reached an agreement with the SDS to end the armed conflict between the Serbs and Croats and had agreed to territorial delimitation and a cease-fire. D238 (ECMM letter to Ambassador Cutileiro, 7 May 1992). On 6 May 1992, Boban and the Accused signed an agreement for the "complete and permanent cease-fire" in BiH under the auspices of the EC beginning on 6 May 1992 at 12 a.m.. D4060 (Article from

Muslim party) On 11 May 1992, Cutileiro again suspended the talks due to the deteriorating situation in Sarajevo and the theft of 12 tons of ICRC supplies from the Sarajevo airport.¹⁰⁴³ On 15 May 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 752 demanding that all parties to the conflict stop the fighting immediately, respect the cease-fire agreement signed on 12 April 1992, and co-operate fully with UNPROFOR and the ECMM.¹⁰⁴⁴ On 17 May 1992, the Accused wrote a letter to Cutileiro stating that the Bosnian Serb Assembly had declared a unilateral cease-fire, **EXCULPATORY!** which expired the following day, and he blamed Izetbegović and the Bosnian Muslims for continuing the conflict.¹⁰⁴⁵

331. On 26 May 1992, Krajišnik informed Cutileiro that an agreement had been reached establishing a cease-fire in the area of the Sarajevo airport and opening the airport for humanitarian purposes.¹⁰⁴⁶ However, the following day, after a bread queue in Sarajevo was shelled, the Bosnian Muslim delegation walked out of the peace talks in Lisbon.¹⁰⁴⁷ The Accused told Cutileiro and Doyle that the Bosnian Serbs were not responsible for the shelling.¹⁰⁴⁸ **(It is now clear to everyone that it was staged for the purpose of breaking the peace talks. Even the Prosecution didn't charge this Accused with this incident. #See the UN document)** On 27 May 1992, the Accused and the SDS leadership "announced its readiness" to open the Sarajevo airport for humanitarian transports and its willingness to move heavy weapons under UNPROFOR supervision.¹⁰⁴⁹ **#EXCULPATORY! (there is no need for any Einstein mind to see from this sequences who was doing what, and why. But, as at the time the media and internationals spared the Muslim side to be exposed to criticism, this continue even in the judgements.**

332. On 30 May 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 757 which placed economic sanctions on the FRY **(#Following the fake accusations of the Serbs for the staged explosion in Vase Miskina street)** and demanded that all parties create the conditions for the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and other destinations in BiH.¹⁰⁵⁰ This resolution also established a security zone which encompassed Sarajevo and its airport.¹⁰⁵¹ As a result, from 2 to 4 June 1992, UN representatives, including John Wilson and Hussein Abdel-Razek, held negotiations with the Accused, Plavšić, Mladić, and Krajišnik on the Bosnian Serb side, and Ejup Ganić and Izetbegović on the Bosnian Muslim side, on the opening of Sarajevo airport for humanitarian purposes.¹⁰⁵²

Novi Vjesnik entitled "Agreement between Boban and Karadžić, 8 May 1992); D4061 (Public Announcement of Radovan Karadžić and Mate Boban, 06 May 1992); Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43972–43973 (21 November 2013).

¹⁰⁴³ P937 (UNSG Report re peacekeeping operation in BiH, 12 May 1992), pp. 3–4.

¹⁰⁴⁴ P980 (UNSC Resolution 752, 15 May 1992).

¹⁰⁴⁵ D233 (Letter from Radovan Karadžić to Jose Cutileiro, 17 May 1992).

¹⁰⁴⁶ D2974 (Letter from Momčilo Krajišnik to Jose Cutileiro and others, 28 May 1992), p. 1.

¹⁰⁴⁷ D230 (Report re humanitarian activity, 1 June 1992) (under seal), p.1; D2974 (Letter from Momčilo Krajišnik to Jose Cutileiro and others, 28 May 1992); Colm Doyle, P918 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 25299; P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), para. 61.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Colm Doyle, P918 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 25299–25300. See also D2973 (Letter from SerBiH Presidency to Jose Cutileiro and others, 27 May 1992); D2974 (Letter from Momčilo Krajišnik to Jose Cutileiro and others, 28 May 1992).

¹⁰⁴⁹ See para. 4026. P949 (Announcement of SDS leadership re Sarajevo airport and humanitarian supplies, 27 May 1992); Colm Doyle, P918 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 25299–25300; Stanislav Galic, T. 37552 (22 April 2013) (testifying that the main purpose in handing over the airport was to facilitate the supply of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and material and technical equipment to UNPROFOR); John Zamećica, T. 42462 (29 October 2013) (testifying that the handing over of the airport exemplified the Accused's cooperative approach to humanitarian issues); D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 286 (testifying that the Bosnian Serbs facilitated the use of the airport for the humanitarian needs of Sarajevo).

¹⁰⁵⁰ P1031 (UNSC Resolution 757, 30 May 1992); P2284 (UNSG report entitled "The Fall of Srebrenica", 15 November 1999), para. 27.

¹⁰⁵¹ P1031 (UNSC Resolution 757, 30 May 1992), p. 6; P2284 (UNSG report entitled "The Fall of Srebrenica", 15 November 1999), para. 27.

¹⁰⁵² P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), paras. 84, 85; John Wilson, T. 3925 (21 June 2010); P1039 (UNPROFOR report re airport meetings in Sarajevo, 3 June 1992); P1045 (UNPROFOR report re airport talks, 4 June 1992). On the

According to Wilson, the Bosnian Serbs were reluctant to hand over the airport to the UN but agreed to do so as their military position would not be substantially **#EXCULPATORY!** affected and doing so would help repair their “poor international image”.¹⁰⁵³ Thus, on 5 June, the Agreement on the Re-Opening of Sarajevo Airport for Humanitarian Purposes (“Airport Agreement”) was signed.¹⁰⁵⁴ It provided for the opening of Sarajevo airport for the purpose of delivering humanitarian aid to Sarajevo under the supervision of the UN.¹⁰⁵⁵ The parties undertook not to interfere in any way with the free movement of UNPROFOR-supervised air traffic into and out of Sarajevo airport.¹⁰⁵⁶

333. Although the parties had agreed to the Statement of Principles, in June 1992, Izetbegović withdrew his agreement to the Cutileiro Plan.¹⁰⁵⁷ **#EXCULPATORY, for the Serbs! But, the Chamber skipped to mention that the first withdrawal of Izetbegovic was in 24/25 March night! The Chamber also missed to mention that on June 20, 1992 the Muslim-Croat authorities had declared the war against the Serbs in BiH, their SAOs, their Territorial Defence, and against Serbia and Montenegro, but these republics, i.e. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, didn't respond to this declaration of war!#** The Secretary General urged parties to reconvene talks and the Accused offered an unconditional cease-fire starting on 15 June 1992, freedom of access to UNMOs, and the re-opening of the Sarajevo airport.¹⁰⁵⁸ **EXCULPATORY!** In the meantime, however, violence continued in Sarajevo and other parts of BiH.¹⁰⁵⁹ **(It is irresponsible just to say that, and not establish who continued the violence and why. The two is connected: the violence continued to stop the talks, and that was not in the Serb interest!# SABOTAGE OF PEACE!)**

334. On 4 June 1992, the Accused, Plavšić, and Mladić met with Cedric Thornberry and Wilson on behalf of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo regarding the Sarajevo airport.¹⁰⁶⁰ The Accused's explained that his position in Lisbon was that the UN supervision of Sarajevo involved the establishment of a “green line” between the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim sides of the city, each side being secured with their own police.¹⁰⁶¹ Only then, would the Bosnian Serbs agree to the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The UNPROFOR representatives commented that there was a disparity between the Bosnian Serbs' current position and what had been understood by Cutileiro and others in Lisbon.¹⁰⁶² **(Certainly, the war modified**

Bosnian Serb side, Plavšić was in charge of humanitarian issues and Koljević was head of the RS Committee on Co-operation with the UN. See para. 97; KDZ240, T. 16116 (5 July 2011); Milenko Indić, T. 32466 (22 January 2013); John Zametica, T. 42488 (29 October 2013); Velibor Ostojić, D2361 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 26670.

¹⁰⁵³ P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), paras. 88–89; P1045 (UNPROFOR report re airport talks, 4 June 1992), p. 3 (reporting that Plavšić told UNPROFOR representatives at the meeting that the Bosnian Serb leadership had “sworn an oath to the people not to give away an inch of their territory”); Colm Doyle, T. 2873 (27 May 2010).

¹⁰⁵⁴ P1032 (Agreement on opening of Sarajevo airport, 5 June 1992); P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 27; John Wilson, T. 3928–3929 (21 June 2010); P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), para. 98.

¹⁰⁵⁵ P1032 (Agreement on opening of Sarajevo airport, 5 June 1992), para. 8. See also Adjudicated Fact 10 (providing that Security Council Resolution 761 of 29 June 1992 tasked UNPROFOR with protecting the airport and helping it function so that humanitarian aid could reach the population).

¹⁰⁵⁶ P1032 (Agreement on opening of Sarajevo airport, 5 June 1992), paras. 2, 3, 8.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4177, 4196, 4324–4326, 4328; D2968 (Witness statement of Jose Cutileiro dated 11 April 2012), paras. 10–19.

¹⁰⁵⁸ D228 (Report re humanitarian activity, 12 June 1992), p. 2 (under seal).

¹⁰⁵⁹ D228 (Report re humanitarian activity, 12 June 1992), p. 1 (under seal). See, e.g., paras. 861, 967–970, 1610, 2131–2132, 3558–3559.

¹⁰⁶⁰ P1045 (UNPROFOR report re airport talks, 4 June 1992); P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), paras. 85, 89.

¹⁰⁶¹ P1045 (UNPROFOR report re airport talks, 4 June 1992), p. 2.

¹⁰⁶² P1045 (UNPROFOR report re airport talks, 4 June 1992), p. 2.

the Serb concerns and worries, and subsequently their demands! #sincerity in talks!)

Cutileiro's understanding was that UNPROFOR would have full control over Sarajevo airport.¹⁰⁶³ The Bosnian Serbs submitted a list of their proposed conditions concerning the re-opening of the airport.¹⁰⁶⁴

335. On 5 June 1992, the Accused signed an agreement with the Bosnian Muslims, who were represented by UNPROFOR, **(#Thus the UNPROFOR took the side!!!#UN BIASED!)** on the re-opening of the Sarajevo airport for humanitarian purposes.¹⁰⁶⁵ The cease-fire declared on 1 June 1992 in and around Sarajevo was reaffirmed by the parties and it was agreed that UNPROFOR would monitor its implementation.¹⁰⁶⁶ The agreement stipulated that anti-aircraft weapons, artillery, mortars, missile systems, and tanks would be moved to areas agreed by UNPROFOR and subject to observation by UNPROFOR.¹⁰⁶⁷ **(An observation, not control!)** The parties agreed to allow free movement of UNPROFOR-supervised air traffic in and out of the airport for humanitarian aid and UNPROFOR-related missions.¹⁰⁶⁸ **#EXCULPATORY!** The UN would supervise the delivery of humanitarian aid, with the parties facilitating such delivery and ensuring safe movement.¹⁰⁶⁹ **#EXCULPATORY!**

336. On 8 June 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 758 which noted the re-opening of the Sarajevo airport under the exclusive authority of the UN and the establishment of the security zone around Sarajevo and the airport.¹⁰⁷⁰ The Security Council enlarged the mandate of UNPROFOR troops in BiH, strengthened them, and also authorised the deployment of UNMOs to BiH.¹⁰⁷¹ This marked the beginning of UNPROFOR's formal mandate in BiH with its mission to keep the Sarajevo airport open for humanitarian purposes and to provide security for humanitarian convoys and UNHCR.¹⁰⁷² **The very same day the Muslim side started a great and fierce offensive against the Serb settlements in the zone of Sarajevo! See P01498 (without any consequence!)**

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1. The enemy launched general offensive engaging forces along the axes: Zenica – Visoko – Ilijaš, Kiseljak – Blažuj; Kiseljak – Hadžići, Pazarić – Hadžići and Igman – Ilidža. They are building up their troops in the region of Žepa from the Srebrenica, Višegrad and Rogatica regions.

This is an example how it was easy to distort crucial facts, and relocate the responsibility from the attacker to the attacked side #Disortion, #Mixing cause-consequence!)

¹⁰⁶³ P1045 (UNPROFOR report re airport talks, 4 June 1992), p. 2.

¹⁰⁶⁴ P1045 (UNPROFOR report re airport talks, 4 June 1992), pp. 8–9; D2968 (Witness statement of Jose Cutileiro dated 11 April 2012), para. 28;

¹⁰⁶⁵ P1032 (Agreement on opening of Sarajevo airport, 5 June 1992); P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 27; D2774 (Witness statement of Milenko Indić dated 19 January 2013), para. 5, Milenko Indić, T. 32418–32419 (22 January 2013). The Bosnian Muslim government would not meet directly with the Bosnian Serb leadership, therefore UNPROFOR had to use shuttle diplomacy and had the parties sign separate copies of the same document containing the airport agreement. John Wilson, T. 3928–3929 (21 June 2010).

¹⁰⁶⁶ P1032 (Agreement on opening of Sarajevo airport, 5 June 1992), p. 1.

¹⁰⁶⁷ P1032 (Agreement on opening of Sarajevo airport, 5 June 1992), p. 1.

¹⁰⁶⁸ P1032 (Agreement on opening of Sarajevo airport, 5 June 1992), pp. 1–2.

¹⁰⁶⁹ P1032 (Agreement on opening of Sarajevo airport, 5 June 1992), p. 3.

¹⁰⁷⁰ P981 (UNSC Resolution 758, 8 June 1992).

¹⁰⁷¹ P981 (UNSC Resolution 758, 8 June 1992). See also Adjudicated Fact 9.

¹⁰⁷² P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 28; P981 (UNSC Resolution 758, 8 June 1992); P1258 (Witness statement of Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek dated 16 July 2002), e-court p. 4. See para. 318.

337. On 12 June 1992, the Accused offered an unconditional cease-fire in BiH starting on 15 June 1992 and the re-opening of the Sarajevo airport.¹⁰⁷³ **EXCULPATORY!**

338. On 27 June 1992, another cease-fire went into effect in Sarajevo.¹⁰⁷⁴ On the same day, the Accused, in a letter to the EC, Cutileiro, and Carrington, informed them that the last phase of the opening of Sarajevo airport was underway and that the Bosnian Serbs were respecting the cease-fire.¹⁰⁷⁵ He further stated that the adherence to the cease-fire opened the possibility for the continuation of talks on the constitutional arrangements for BiH.¹⁰⁷⁶ **EXCULPATORY!**

339. On 29 June 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 761 and the Bosnian Serbs handed the airport over to UNPROFOR.¹⁰⁷⁷ The airport was only to be used by the UN.¹⁰⁷⁸ The airport opened the following day, however, as a convoy of UN vehicles accompanied by Bosnian Serbs left the airport, the convoy was fired upon, injuring four UN personnel.¹⁰⁷⁹ **Evidently, fired by the Muslim side. Why it is not said in this Judgement? None of established firing against the UN by the Muslim side was mentioned in the Judgment!** As a result, the UN decided to temporarily cease its operations at the airport.¹⁰⁸⁰

340. On 3 July 1992, Carrington made a statement following his visit to Sarajevo.¹⁰⁸¹ According to Carrington, Izetbegović set two conditions for the resumption of peace talks, namely a one-week cease-fire throughout BiH and that all heavy weapons formerly belonging to the JNA be placed under UN control.¹⁰⁸² Izetbegović further stated that he could not agree to certain elements of the Statement of Principles but that he would propose alternatives.¹⁰⁸³ The Accused, while he agreed with the Statement of Principles as agreed upon in March, stated that the proposal of BiH being a unitary state was not satisfactory.¹⁰⁸⁴ **(#A legal and legitimate position, already recognized by the Badinter's arbitrage and by the European Community!**

¹⁰⁷³ D4492 (Fax from UNPROFOR, 13 June 1992); D4642 (Memo from McKenzie to Nambiar, 13 June 1992), para. 5; D228 (Report re humanitarian activity, 12 June 1992) (under seal), paras. 1, 15; D2400 (Cease-fire agreement, 15 June 1992). *See also* D2398 (Witness statement of Richard Gray dated 22 April 2012), para. 24; D2405 (Cease-fire agreement, undated). The Accused, in a letter to Cutileiro dated 5 June 1992, stated that the Bosnian Serbs had been "cheated" and the peace process "jeopardised" by Izetbegović and the Bosnian Muslims. D234 (Letter from Radovan Karadžić to Ambassador Cutileiro, 5 June 1992). In response, Cutileiro stated that the EC had made no promises to the Bosnian Serbs and he intended to reconvene the talks as soon as "the questions of the airport, free passage of humanitarian relief, and Serbian artillery round Sarajevo are resolved through the mediation of UNPROFOR". P952 (Letter from Jose Cutileiro to Radovan Karadžić, 12 June 1992); Jose Cutileiro, T. 33954–33955 (19 February 2013); Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43914–43916 (20 November 2013).

¹⁰⁷⁴ D2977 (Letter from Radovan Karadžić to Jose Cutileiro and others, 27 June 1992); D4489 (TANJUG news report, 26 June 1992).

¹⁰⁷⁵ D2977 (Letter from Radovan Karadžić to Jose Cutileiro and others, 27 June 1992). *See also* D4564 (Fax from Radovan Karadžić to Milan Panić, 27 June 1992).

¹⁰⁷⁶ D2977 (Letter from Radovan Karadžić to Jose Cutileiro and others, 27 June 1992).

¹⁰⁷⁷ P1996 (Witness statement of Martin Bell dated 8 March 2010), para. 75; P2038 (BBC news report re Radovan Karadžić's press conference, with transcript). *See also* Adjudicated Facts 10, 11 (UNPROFOR was tasked with protecting the airport and helping with the delivery of humanitarian aid). *See* para. 3560.

¹⁰⁷⁸ *See* Adjudicated Fact 11.

¹⁰⁷⁹ D2409 (UNPROFOR memo re shooting at UN vehicles near the airport, 30 June 1992); D590 (UNPROFOR report, 30 June 1992); KDZ088, T. 6551–6556 (13 September 2010) (closed session). The UNMOs reported that the firing on the UN vehicles was quite deliberate, the fact that the Bosnian Serb vehicle was targeted first may indicate that the origin of fire came from the Presidency, and the fire was directed from the northern part of Dobrinja. D2409 (UNPROFOR memo re shooting at UN vehicles near the airport, 30 June 1992), paras. 5–6; D2398 (Witness statement of Richard Gray dated 22 April 2012), para. 25.

¹⁰⁸⁰ D590 (UNPROFOR report, 30 June 1992); KDZ088, T. 6551–6556 (13 September 2010) (closed session); D2409 (UNPROFOR memo re shooting at UN vehicles near the airport, 30 June 1992), para. 5.

¹⁰⁸¹ D4695 (Lord Carrington's statement, 3 July 1992).

¹⁰⁸² D4695 (Lord Carrington's statement, 3 July 1992), p. 2.

¹⁰⁸³ D4695 (Lord Carrington's statement, 3 July 1992), p. 2.

¹⁰⁸⁴ D4695 (Lord Carrington's statement, 3 July 1992), p. 2.

341. On 5 July 1992, UNPROFOR reported that the cease-fire was not holding but that humanitarian aid flights had been arriving at Sarajevo airport and that UNHCR convoys were distributing aid in the city.¹⁰⁸⁵ However, according to Nambiar, the airport remained “very vulnerable”.¹⁰⁸⁶ UNPROFOR’s assessment was that both sides have “agendas which have little to do with humanitarian concerns” and that both sides seemed “locked in a fight to the death over the future shape, character and even existence of the new state of [BiH]”.¹⁰⁸⁷
342. On 13 July 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 764 in response to continuing violations of the 5 June 1992 Sarajevo airport agreement.¹⁰⁸⁸ It authorised the UN Secretary-General to deploy additional UNPROFOR troops to ensure the security of the Sarajevo airport and delivery of humanitarian aid.¹⁰⁸⁹ On 14 July, UNPROFOR reported that aid continued to arrive in Sarajevo, but that the airport faced “an almost unacceptable degree of risk” and that the situation in Sarajevo continued to deteriorate.¹⁰⁹⁰
343. On 17 July 1992, in London, the parties agreed to a cease-fire throughout the entire territory of BiH, for a period of 14 days, effective beginning at 6 p.m. on 19 July 1992.¹⁰⁹¹ The next round of peace talks was scheduled to resume on 27 July 1992 in London.¹⁰⁹² However, on 23 July 1992, Carrington and Cutileiro noted that all parties to the conflict had violated the cease-fire agreement.¹⁰⁹³ **(That is not a correct approach: it must be clear which side initially violated the ceasefire, because the side that responded in defence did not violate any agreement! #Ceasefire violations, CFA violations)** Carrington called on the parties to respect and implement the cease-fire but noted that the violations cast a shadow over the resumption of talks scheduled in London for 27 July 1992.¹⁰⁹⁴ The talks did not resume again in July.¹⁰⁹⁵
344. On 25 July, the SRK reported that ABiH forces were focusing artillery fire on Dobrinja and the airport area with the “probable goal” of preventing the safe landing of planes.¹⁰⁹⁶ **#EXCULPATORY!** In response to the difficulties faced by UNPROFOR at the airport, the Security Council passed Resolution 770 on 13 August, in which it demanded that the parties take necessary measures to ensure the safety of UN and other personnel delivering humanitarian assistance.¹⁰⁹⁷ The Security Council demanded that the parties to

¹⁰⁸⁵ D4647 (Memo from Nambiar to Goulding, 7 July 1992), paras. 1–3, 5.

¹⁰⁸⁶ D4647 (Memo from Nambiar to Goulding, 7 July 1992), para. 12.

¹⁰⁸⁷ D4647 (Memo from Nambiar to Goulding, 7 July 1992), para. 8.

¹⁰⁸⁸ P982 (UNSC Resolution 764, 13 July 1992).

¹⁰⁸⁹ P982 (UNSC Resolution 764, 13 July 1992).

¹⁰⁹⁰ D2411 (UNPROFOR report, 14 July 1992), paras. 1–2 (reporting also that UNPROFOR was being subjected to a smear campaign by the BiH Presidency which led to a number of incidents of UN personnel being threatened in the performance of their duties).

¹⁰⁹¹ D4710 (Text of Agreement signed by Boban, Radovan Karadžić and Silajdžić at London on 17 July 1992), pp. 1–2 (the agreement provided that all heavy weapons were to be placed under international supervision and that all refugees be permitted to return to the places from which they had been expelled. The parties requested that the Security Council make arrangements for this supervision). *See also* D593 (VRS Main Staff Order, 22 July 1992), p. 2. Milovanović stated that the Accused signed this cease-fire without consultation with the Main Staff. D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 6.

¹⁰⁹² D4710 (Text of Agreement signed by Boban, Radovan Karadžić and Silajdžić at London on 17 July 1992), p. 1.

¹⁰⁹³ D2978 (Letter from Jose Cutileiro to Radovan Karadžić, 23 July 1992). *See also* D4710 (Text of Agreement signed by Boban, Radovan Karadžić and Silajdžić at London on 17 July 1992); D4711 (Letter from Biljana Plavšić to General McKenzie, 19 July 1992); D4713 (Letter from Radovan Karadžić to Boutros Boutros Ghali, Lord Carrington and Ambassador Cutileiro, 20 July 1992).

¹⁰⁹⁴ D2978 (Letter from Jose Cutileiro to Radovan Karadžić, 23 July 1992).

¹⁰⁹⁵ *See* D2968 (Witness statement of Jose Cutileiro dated 11 April 2012), para. 30.

¹⁰⁹⁶ D592 (SRK combat report, 25 July 1992), para. 1; D591 (SRK combat report, 25 July 1992), para. 1; KDZ088, T. 6558 (13 September 2010) (closed session) (testifying that it was the “routine position” of the ABiH to target the airport and then blame the Bosnian Serbs for it).

¹⁰⁹⁷ P983 (UNSC Resolution 770, 13 August 1992), pp. 1–2, para. 6.

the conflict cease fighting immediately, that the ICRC be allowed to access prisons and detention centres, and that necessary measures be taken to ensure the safety of UNPROFOR personnel.¹⁰⁹⁸

345. The work of the EC Peace Conference on Yugoslavia terminated in August 1992, when the UK, which held the Presidency of the EC at that time, convened a new international conference in London.¹⁰⁹⁹

iv. London Conference

346. The London Conference on the former SFRY was held on 26 and 27 August 1992.¹¹⁰⁰ On the eve of the conference, the Accused stated that on 19 August 1992, he had issued an order that the forced transfer of the civilian population must be prevented and any written statements by refugees that they would not return were considered legally invalid.¹¹⁰¹ **(#EXCULPATORY! Not only he stated, it was a public document! Nobody on the terrain could have any dilemma what was the policy of the leadership of the RS on this issue! #RIGHTS (to return))** He reiterated his hope that the conflict could end through negotiations.¹¹⁰²

347. On 26 August 1992, the Accused and Koljević met with Vance and Carrington.¹¹⁰³ The Accused stated that the Bosnian Serbs were willing to negotiate and even return some territory as part of an overall agreement, as long as Serb property rights in predominantly Croat and Muslim areas were protected.¹¹⁰⁴ **#EXCULPATORY!** The Accused stated that Bosnian Serb territory could be geographically continuous but Vance asked how this would be possible without causing a movement of the population.¹¹⁰⁵ With respect to Sarajevo, the Accused stated that he would accept the presence of UN monitors at all Serb artillery positions in and around Sarajevo.¹¹⁰⁶ **#EXCULPATORY!** Also on this day, the President of the ICRC appealed to the conference participants to resolve the conflict and to restore respect for international humanitarian law.¹¹⁰⁷

348. On the same day, the London Conference adopted a Statement of Principles as the basis for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict.¹¹⁰⁸ The principles included, *inter alia*, agreeing to a cease-fire, engaging in negotiations, implementing respect for human rights and protection of minorities, condemning forcible expulsion, complying with international humanitarian law and all Security Council resolutions, providing protection for the delivery

¹⁰⁹⁸ P983 (UNSC Resolution 770, 13 August 1992).

¹⁰⁹⁹ Herbert Okun, T. 1471 (22 April 2010); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4147; Charles McLeod, P712 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Brđanin*), T. 7287.

¹¹⁰⁰ Herbert Okun, T. 1471 (22 April 2010); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4147–4148, 4327; P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 29. See also D2980 (Article from International Herald Tribune entitled “Vance and Owen Got It Right”, 16 February 1993).

¹¹⁰¹ D4720 (Letter from Radovan Karadžić re London Peace Conference, 25 August 1992).

¹¹⁰² D4720 (Letter from Radovan Karadžić re London Peace Conference, 25 August 1992). The Accused stated in a Newsnight interview that he was not as optimistic about the London Conference, Izetbegović did not represent the interests of all of BiH, and that “ethnic cleansing was never part of our policy”. D4493 (Video footage of BBC interview with Radovan Karadžić).

¹¹⁰³ D2979 (Record of London Conference, 26 August 1992) (also present were Cutileiro, Okun, and Doyle).

¹¹⁰⁴ D2979 (Record of London Conference, 26 August 1992), p. 1.

¹¹⁰⁵ P941 (London Conference record of a meeting with Radovan Karadžić, 26 August 1992), pp. 1–2.

¹¹⁰⁶ P941 (London Conference record of a meeting with Radovan Karadžić, 26 August 1992), p. 2.

¹¹⁰⁷ P807 (Address by ICRC President at the London Conference, 26 August 1992); D2968 (Witness statement of Jose Cutileiro dated 11 April 2012), para. 32.

¹¹⁰⁸ D4722 (Statement of Principles approved by the London Conference, 26 August 1992).

of humanitarian aid, and agreeing that the settlement to the conflict would be through negotiation and consensus.¹¹⁰⁹

349. On 27 August 1992, the London Conference adopted a “Statement on Bosnia” condemning the continuing armed conflict in BiH, the attempts to gain territory by force, and the expulsion of civilians.¹¹¹⁰ **(#Left as that, it would look like the London Conference had in mind only the Serb side. However, until that moment there was no a single Serb settlement in the Muslim/Croat area that hadn’t been destroyed, many inhabitants killed or expelled! The Court is continuing the notorious policy of the international community towards the Serbs, so the then, so now!!! At the same time the Jerusalem Post counted and published that there was more Serb refugees that the Muslim and Croat together! #Darkened!!!)** It stated that a political settlement in BiH must include, *inter alia*, a permanent cessation of hostilities, recognition of BiH by all former SFRY republics, respect for current boundaries, guarantees for national community and minority rights protected by democratic and legal structures, and the right to return and compensation for civilians who were forcibly expelled.¹¹¹¹ It urged all parties to continue negotiations and discuss issues such as the grouping of heavy weapons under international control **(#Accepted by the Serbs only!)**, demilitarisation of major towns with international observers present **(Proposed by the Serbs only!)**, the provision of refugee relief and humanitarian aid, and the further deployment of UN peacekeeping forces to monitor BiH.¹¹¹² **(All accepted by the Serbs!)**

350. The parties and UNHCR agreed to a “Programme of Action on Humanitarian Issues Agreed Between the Co-Chairmen to the Conference and the Parties to the Conflict”.¹¹¹³ Under this agreement, the Accused and Izetbegović undertook to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid by road throughout BiH, and to take specific steps to develop a system of land convoys to that effect.¹¹¹⁴ On 9 September 1992, Nambiar sent a protest letter to Izetbegović over the shelling of a UN humanitarian convoy by the ABiH at the entrance to Sarajevo airport, which caused the death of two French soldiers.¹¹¹⁵ As a result of this incident, humanitarian flights were suspended for one month.¹¹¹⁶ On 14 September 1992, UNPROFOR’s mandate was broadened again by Security Council Resolution 776, to include protection of humanitarian aid convoys.¹¹¹⁷

351. The Accused and Koljević, representing the Bosnian Serbs, agreed to notify the UN, within 96 hours, of the grouping of all heavy weapons around Sarajevo, Bihać, Goražde, and Jajce.¹¹¹⁸ **EXCULPATORY!** They agreed to complete this process within seven days and for the weapons to be placed under the supervision of UN observers.¹¹¹⁹ They also

¹¹⁰⁹ D4722 (Statement of Principles approved by the London Conference, 26 August 1992).

¹¹¹⁰ D1604 (London Conference statement on BiH, 27 August 1992), p. 2. See also D4723 (Excerpt from book entitled “Yugoslavia Through Documents from its Creation to its Dissolution”).

¹¹¹¹ D1604 (London Conference statement on BiH, 27 August 1992), pp. 2–3.

¹¹¹² D1604 (London Conference statement on BiH, 27 August 1992), p. 4.

¹¹¹³ D4723 (Excerpt from book entitled “Yugoslavia Through Documents from its Creation to its Dissolution”).

¹¹¹⁴ D4723 (Excerpt from book entitled “Yugoslavia Through Documents from its Creation to its Dissolution”), paras. 1–2.

¹¹¹⁵ D2399 (UNPROFOR report, 9 September 1992), pp. 2, 4; D2398 (Witness statement of Richard Gray dated 22 April 2012), para. 41.

¹¹¹⁶ P1262 (UN report on Sarajevo, 8 October 1992), para. 3.

¹¹¹⁷ Adjudicated Fact 12.

¹¹¹⁸ D1604 (London Conference statement on BiH, 27 August 1992), p. 5. Milovanović stated that the Accused informed the Main Staff that he had “offered” that the Bosnian Serbs “cede 20% of its territory” for the sake of peace. D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 8.

¹¹¹⁹ D1604 (London Conference statement on BiH, 27 August 1992), p. 5.

agreed to “withdraw from a substantial portion of the territory now under the control of their forces”, **EXCULPATORY!** to secure the release of detained civilians, to repatriate them, and allow refugees and displaced persons to return to their place of origin.¹¹²⁰

EXCULPATORY! This is the guarantee against any “ethnic purity” and this is a document, a commitment of the state representatives, the only relevant evidence, which shouldn’t be suspended because of irresponsible jokes or other statements of people who were not in charge of anything! # ETHNIC PURITY! Finally, they agreed to support the initiative that “all units of armed forces across the entire territory of [BiH]- regardless of their allegiance- come under the supervision of competent UN officers”.¹¹²¹
EXCULPATORY! Originally, that was a proposal of the President prior to this date! #!

v. International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia

352. The London Conference proposed the creation of a new peace conference called the ICFY.¹¹²² Under the co-chairmanship of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and UK Prime Minister John Major, in his capacity as President of the EC Council of Ministers, the ICFY began its work in September 1992.¹¹²³ The activities of the ICFY were supervised by a steering committee and co-chaired by representatives from the Secretary General’s office and the EU Presidency’s office.¹¹²⁴ The ICFY had six working groups, including one on BiH.¹¹²⁵ The BiH working group had two objectives: establishing a cessation of hostilities and implementing a constitutional arrangement that would satisfy the three constituent units of BiH.¹¹²⁶ **(#Exculpatory!!! That had been agreed before the war, and the war could have been avoided! All the Serb political claims and actions were conciliatory and compromising, but the bottom line was this decentralisation into three constituent units! Then, how the Serb political actions could have been criminalised as it happened in this court?#)**

353. The ICFY recognised that there was no viable way to create three territorially distinct states based on ethnicity but that a centralised state was also not acceptable to the parties.¹¹²⁷ It concluded that the only viable solution was the establishment of a

¹¹²⁰ D1142 (Programme of Action of the London International Conference, 27 August 1992), pp. 1–2.

¹¹²¹ D4724 (Letter from Radovan Karadžić to Boutros Boutros Ghali, 27 August 1992).

¹¹²² Herbert Okun, T. 1471 (22 April 2010); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4147–4148, 4327; P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 29.

¹¹²³ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4327–4328. *See also* D4474 (Report on visit by Steering Committee to Zagreb, Sarajevo and Belgrade 9–12 September 1992) (Owen and Vance reported that all three parties agreed to resume peace talks in Geneva on 18 September 1992); P1046 (John Wilson’s Report to Australian Army, 15 November 1992), p. 9. The seat of the ICFY was at the UN in Geneva. D1144 (UN Secretary-General letter to UNSC with attached report, 8 July 1994), p. 2; P1046 (John Wilson’s Report to Australian Army, 15 November 1992), p. 9.

¹¹²⁴ D1144 (UN Secretary-General letter to UNSC with attached report, 8 July 1994), p. 2. The Steering Committee of the ICFY was initially co-chaired by David Lord Owen for the EC, the former British Foreign Secretary, and Vance as the UN SG’s representative. Herbert Okun, T. 1471 (22 April 2010). *See also* D4474 (Report on visit by Steering Committee to Zagreb, Sarajevo and Belgrade 9–12 September 1992) (listing Owen and Vance as Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee). Okun was the deputy co-chairman for the UN and Ambassador Peter Hall was the deputy co-chairman for the EU. Wilson received situation reports from UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb and would provide situation reports to the Co-Chairmen and other committee heads of the ICFY. *See* Herbert Okun, T. 1471–1472 (22 April 2010); P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), para. 109.

¹¹²⁵ P1046 (John Wilson’s Report to Australian Army, 15 November 1992), p. 9. The other working groups included: humanitarian matters; confidence building, security, and verification measures; economic issues; communities, ethnic, and national minorities issues; and succession matters. P1046 (John Wilson’s Report to Australian Army, 15 November 1992), p. 9.

¹¹²⁶ P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990–1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 130.

¹¹²⁷ P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 29.

decentralised state.¹¹²⁸ **(EXCULPATORY! But, it wasn't concluded all of a sudden, it was concluded during the Conference meetings in the Hague in 1991, which was a basis for all the actions of the Serb side and the European Community and the UN#.**

354. The ICFY held meetings mainly in Geneva with representatives from the parties to the conflict and also with representatives from the international community and non-governmental organisations.¹¹²⁹ Included in those meetings were representatives from the ICRC, UNHCR, and UNPROFOR.¹¹³⁰

355. During the negotiation process, the Bosnian Serbs pushed for an agenda consistent with the Strategic Goals.¹¹³¹ In turn, the Bosnian Muslims maintained their request to create a unitary state of BiH with centralised powers in which they possessed a majority.¹¹³² The Bosnian Croats wished to take BiH out of the FRY, to declare independence, and to establish their own state called the Community of Herceg-Bosna.¹¹³³ This new state would have territorial contiguity with Croatia and have a special relationship with Croatia, with the possibility of uniting with Croatia in the future.¹¹³⁴

356. The ICFY continued to engage in meetings with all three parties in BiH.¹¹³⁵ The Bosnian Serb leadership identified the areas of BiH they wanted to be under Bosnian Serb control.¹¹³⁶ The Accused stated that the Bosnian Serbs were firmly committed to the principles as agreed upon on 18 March 1992 and that a political settlement was absolutely essential.¹¹³⁷ As a result of negotiations, the Accused agreed that the Bosnian Serb heavy weapons in certain locations of BiH would be concentrated and monitored by UNMOs.¹¹³⁸ **(#ALL EXCULPATORY, NOT ONLY MITIGATING!**

357. During a meeting on 17 September 1992, when Owen expressed his concern to the Accused about the siege of Sarajevo, the Accused denied that it was a siege, stating rather that the Bosnian Serbs were “protecting” their suburbs.¹¹³⁹ **EXCULPATORY, because it was correct! The only Serb settlement that wasn't within the Serb lines of control, Pofalici, sustained about 250 casualties of innocent civilians already till 16 May 1992! Nobody from the “International community” payed any attention to that, not then, nor later. Not even this Court!** The Accused reiterated his position that the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Muslims could not live together in BiH and that Sarajevo should be divided into Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb entities.¹¹⁴⁰ **(#The original Serb**

¹¹²⁸ P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 29.

¹¹²⁹ Herbert Okun, T. 1472 (22 April 2010).

¹¹³⁰ Herbert Okun, T. 1472–1473 (22 April 2010).

¹¹³¹ Herbert Okun, T. 1474–1475 (22 April 2010); P781 (Decision on six strategic goals for Bosnian Serb people, 12 May 1992); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4157–4158.

¹¹³² Herbert Okun, T. 1476 (22 April 2010).

¹¹³³ Herbert Okun, T. 1476 (22 April 2010).

¹¹³⁴ Herbert Okun, T. 1476 (22 April 2010).

¹¹³⁵ Herbert Okun, T. 1477–1483 (22 April 2010).

¹¹³⁶ Herbert Okun, T. 1478–1483 (22 April 2010); P784 (First notebook of Herbert Okun's ICFY diary), e-court p. 45; P783 (Ethnic map of BiH).

¹¹³⁷ D2975 (Letter from Radovan Karadžić to Jose Cutileiro, 13 June 1992); D2968 (Witness statement of Jose Cutileiro dated 11 April 2012), para. 29. See, e.g., D2976 (Letter from Radovan Karadžić to Lord Carrington and Jose Cutileiro, 16 June 1992); D2968 (Witness statement of Jose Cutileiro dated 11 April 2012), para. 30. See also para. 326.

¹¹³⁸ P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), para. 106.

¹¹³⁹ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4203–4204; P785 (Second notebook of Herbert Okun's ICFY diary), e-court p. 24. See generally Section IV.B.1.f: Siege of Sarajevo.

¹¹⁴⁰ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4204–4205; P785 (Second notebook of Herbert Okun's ICFY diary), e-court pp. 24–25.

position was that the Serbs could not live with the Muslims in their unitary state, under the same political and judicial system, because the Bosnian Muslims adopted the Islamic fundamentalism. That was the original declaration, and if it was not repeated every time, those who attended knew perfectly what it meant. Had the Muslims and Bosnian Croats decided to stay in Yugoslavia, there would be a common life, because of the federal protection of human and ethnic rights!#Distortion of fact!).

During a meeting the following day, the Accused and Koljević stated again that the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats would not accept a unitary BiH state; a state based on one-man, one-vote.¹¹⁴¹ Koljević also stated that the Bosnian Serbs would not accept the internal borders of BiH without some form of cantonisation.¹¹⁴²

358. On 30 September 1992, the Accused and Koljević met with Vance, Owen, Okun and others in Geneva to further discuss the situation in Sarajevo.¹¹⁴³ The Accused stated that it was not the Bosnian Serbs who were “besieging” Sarajevo and that they could not take unilateral steps but needed reciprocal actions by the Bosnian Muslims.¹¹⁴⁴ **EXCULPATORY! No SIEGE!!** The Accused repeated that the Bosnian Serbs who wished to leave the city should be allowed to do so.¹¹⁴⁵ Okun noted that the Accused and Koljević were resistant to any agreements.¹¹⁴⁶ **(# A fake and contradicted with all the evidence! Why the Chamber would rely on memories of a witness, no matter who was he, and neglect the official documents of the EC and UN? Not only the President and Koljevic accepted many agreements, but they proposed many that had been accepted! What those documents serve for??? It is hard to believe in this kind of justice, which is fishing for any possibility to allocate liability on an accused!# Distortion, False testimony! Impression vs. documents)!** The meeting ended with an agreement to continue discussions and with Owen pressing for an overall cease-fire in BiH.¹¹⁴⁷

1. Vance-Owen Plan

359. The culmination of the work of the ICFY resulted in the Vance-Owen Plan which was formally introduced on 2 January 1993.¹¹⁴⁸ The plan consisted of three main parts: first, the constitutional arrangements for BiH, second, the military arrangements, and third, a map of the provincial structure.¹¹⁴⁹ Each part of the plan had to be signed separately by all three parties.¹¹⁵⁰
360. The constitutional arrangements of the Vance-Owen Plan stipulated that the laws of BiH that related directly to the vital interests of each of the three constituent populations

¹¹⁴¹ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4214–4215; P785 (Second notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 33. *See also* D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 9.

¹¹⁴² Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4215; P785 (Second notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court pp. 34.

¹¹⁴³ P786 (Third notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court pp. 6–8.

¹¹⁴⁴ P786 (Third notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 6. *See generally* Section IV.B.1.f: Siege of Sarajevo.

¹¹⁴⁵ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4225.

¹¹⁴⁶ P786 (Third notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 7.

¹¹⁴⁷ P786 (Third notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 7.

¹¹⁴⁸ Herbert Okun, T. 1518 (23 April 2010); P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 31.

¹¹⁴⁹ Herbert Okun, T. 1517 (22 April 2010); D1593 (BiH Map from Vance-Owen Peace Plan, 2 January 1993); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4237–4238; P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 31.

¹¹⁵⁰ Herbert Okun, T. 1517 (22 April 2010).

would be agreed upon by consensus.¹¹⁵¹ All other legislation would not be subject to a veto.¹¹⁵²

361. On 11 January 1993, there were bilateral discussions with the Bosnian Serbs and the ICFY.¹¹⁵³ The Accused asked the ICFY to look at the previous Bosnian Serb proposals.¹¹⁵⁴ Krajišnik stressed their desire for territorial continuity and named three conditions from the Bosnian Serb Assembly: (i) BiH must be a “composite state community”; (ii) the Bosnian Serbs must have relations with other “states”; and (iii) they must have territorial continuity.¹¹⁵⁵ Mladić told Okun and Owen that the Bosnian Serbs wanted “peace with justice” for all three peoples but that the Bosnian Muslims could not “beat”, “exterminate”, or “cause [the Serbs] to disappear”.¹¹⁵⁶ **EXCULPATORY!** The following day, at a plenary meeting, the Accused expressed his reservations about the ICFY’s constitutional principles and stated he could not accept them but he would convey the ICFY’s proposals to the Bosnian Serb Assembly.¹¹⁵⁷

362. On 15 January 1993, at a meeting with Okun and Vance, the representative for the Bosnian Serbs, Aleksa Buha, stated that the Bosnian Serbs needed the Posavina “corridor”, which was a road that connected Belgrade to Banja Luka via Bijeljina and Brčko.¹¹⁵⁸ For territories still under dispute, Buha noted the Accused’s request for a resolution by referendum.¹¹⁵⁹

363. On 23 January 1993, at a plenary summit meeting,¹¹⁶⁰ Izetbegović stated that he objected to the map on the basis that regions from which population had been removed could not come under the control of those who removed them, and that while the peace conference was ongoing, the “aggression” continued.¹¹⁶¹ The Accused stated that he finally agreed to accept the nine constitutional principles and in relation to the proposed map, he acknowledged that considerable success had been achieved but certain territories were still under dispute.¹¹⁶² **EXCULPATORY!** Later in the day, during a discussion on the proposed

¹¹⁵¹ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4238.

¹¹⁵² Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4238. Okun testified that one of the Bosnian Serb goals was to have veto power over anything that the central BiH government did and at a 6 January 1993 meeting with Slobodan Milošević in Belgrade, Milošević stated that he had spoken to the Accused and Krajišnik who wanted the consensus rule to apply to everything. Slobodan Milošević stated that he would do all he could to convince the Accused to accept the Vance-Owen Plan. Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4238; P789 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 26; P4221 (Excerpt from UNSC report, 16 November 1993). Momir Bulatović stated that beginning in 1993, a split began to develop between the Bosnian Serb leadership and the FRY resulting from a difference in opinion about the peace plans proposed. Bulatović stated that the FRY wanted the war to end at all costs and to accept the peace plans but the Bosnian Serb leadership opposed this. D3051 (Witness statement of Momir Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), para. 42.

¹¹⁵³ P789 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court pp. 42–43.

¹¹⁵⁴ P789 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 43.

¹¹⁵⁵ P789 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 43.

¹¹⁵⁶ P789 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 45.

¹¹⁵⁷ P789 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 48. According to Milovanović, in November 1992, the Accused issued a public statement that BiH should be made of its three constituent states with the RS as a “single whole” and rejecting the Vance-Owen proposal for a “centralised BiH with ten cantons”. D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 12.

¹¹⁵⁸ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4244–4245; P789 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 58.

¹¹⁵⁹ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4245 (opining that this system would benefit Bosnian Serbs in territories from which non-Serbs had been removed).

¹¹⁶⁰ The attendees at the meeting included the following: (i) Izetbegović, Silajdžić, Siber, Lazović, and Filipović for the Bosnian Muslims; (ii) Karadžić, Krajišnik, Buha, Mladić and Lukić for the Bosnian Serbs; (iii) Boban, Akmadžić, Petković, and Rudman for the Bosnian Croats; (iv) Tudman, Šušak, Radić, Tus, and Madej for Croatia; and (v) Čosić, Slobodan Milošević, Bulatović, Đokić, and Stojanović for the FRY. P790 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 9.

¹¹⁶¹ P790 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 9.

¹¹⁶² P790 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 9 (the Accused protested that Croatia had violated the January 1992 peace agreement with “brutal aggression” against the RS). The nine constitutional principles were proposed for the basis of the BiH

map, the Accused asked for a larger Bosnian Serb territory and proposed his own boundaries.¹¹⁶³

364. By 25 January 1993, after several additional meetings, Okun reported that Owen feared that the negotiations would break down.¹¹⁶⁴ The following day, at a bilateral meeting,¹¹⁶⁵ the Accused stated that he was prepared to make **concessions** and was willing to be more flexible.¹¹⁶⁶ **#EXCULPATORY!** On 27 January 1993, Owen outlined the new ICFY proposals that for an interim period there would be no change in the Sarajevo boundaries and there would be no constitutional changes, except by consensus.¹¹⁶⁷ Krajišnik maintained that the Bosnian Serb position was to divide Sarajevo.¹¹⁶⁸ **That is the result of neglecting a relevant documents and using only un-reliable notes from diaries. It had never been any proposal of a “division” of Sarajevo, but only of a new administrative organisation, so that the ethnically dominant areas could make their municipalities and be administered by the respective entity. That is how it looks like now. What is wrong with that? What is wrong with the ethnic organisation of the Brussels? The most relevant UN USA representative, Mr. Vance, reported that Karadzic proposed the Siutze model for Bosnia and the Brussels model for Sarajevo! Period! All other allegations are unacceptable before any court!##Division of Sarajevo!**

365. By 30 January 1993, the Bosnian Croats had signed all three arrangements, namely the constitutional arrangements, military arrangements, and the map of the provincial structure.¹¹⁶⁹ The Bosnian Muslims had only accepted the military arrangements.¹¹⁷⁰ The Bosnian Serbs had rejected all three arrangements.¹¹⁷¹ Meetings with the Bosnian Serbs continued in February and March to discuss details of the proposed arrangements, in particular the map of BiH.¹¹⁷²

Constitution. The principles included: (i) BiH would be a decentralised state with three constituent groups; (ii) the provinces would not have international legal personality; (iii) full freedom of movement would be allowed throughout BiH; (iv) matters of vital concern to any of the constituent units would be regulated in the Constitution, amended by consensus of the three constituent units, and there was no veto; **(#Opinion vs. document# A consensus by definition comprises veto. Otherwise, it is not consensus! But, the Chamber didn't want to see the original documents, but rather relied on a personal notes of a witness, or understanding of an expert witness. This is a unique example of negligence of a corps of official documents in judicial history)** (v) provinces and the central government would have democratically elected legislatures, the central Presidency would be composed of three elected representatives from each constituent group; (vi) a Constitutional Court would resolve disputes between the central government and provinces; (vii) BiH would be demilitarised under UN/EC supervision; (viii) the highest level of internationally-recognised human rights would be provided for in the Constitution; and (ix) international monitors would remain in BiH until the constituent groups agreed by consensus to dispense with them. P2538 (Patrick Treanor's research report entitled "Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995", 1 May 2009), para. 146.

¹¹⁶³ P790 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun's ICFY diary), e-court p. 12.

¹¹⁶⁴ P790 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun's ICFY diary), e-court p. 15.

¹¹⁶⁵ Okun testified that bilateral meetings with the Accused and Krajišnik were often conducted by Vance and Owen as part of the larger negotiations. Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4246.

¹¹⁶⁶ P790 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun's ICFY diary), e-court p. 22.

¹¹⁶⁷ P790 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun's ICFY diary), e-court p. 30.

¹¹⁶⁸ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4251; P790 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun's ICFY diary), e-court p. 30.

¹¹⁶⁹ Herbert Okun, T. 1518–1519 (23 April 2010).

¹¹⁷⁰ Herbert Okun, T. 1518–1519 (23 April 2010). Izetbegović stated publicly that with support from the USA, he would be able to accept an amended Vance-Owen Plan and there was no other solution but to negotiate the details. D1497 (UNPROFOR Assessment, 15 February 1993), p. 2.

¹¹⁷¹ Herbert Okun, T. 1519 (23 April 2010). See also Momir Bulatović, T. 34532–34535 (28 February 2013); P6159 (Excerpt from Momir Bulatović's book entitled "Rules of Silence").

¹¹⁷² P790 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun's ICFY diary), e-court p. 57; P791 (Eighth notebook of Herbert Okun's ICFY diary), e-court pp. 38–40; P2538 (Patrick Treanor's research report entitled "Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995", 1 May 2009), paras. 147–154.

366. Also in January 1993, the ICFY proposed an “Agreement for Peace in [BiH]” in the hopes of establishing a cessation of hostilities.¹¹⁷³ The agreement called for a cessation of hostilities and a subsequent demilitarisation of Sarajevo; monitoring by UNPROFOR of the confrontation lines and the removal of heavy weapons; and restoration of civil infrastructures and humanitarian aid, including through the establishment and opening of Blue Routes for the freedom of movement of people and humanitarian assistance.¹¹⁷⁴ It called for the creation of a Joint Commission to execute and implement the details of the plan.¹¹⁷⁵ The areas in which all heavy weapons were to be withdrawn included Mojmiro (the Muslim), Dobrinja (the Muslim), Lukavica the Serb, Gornji, Kotorac (the Muslim), Vojkovići (the Serb), Hrasnica (the Muslim), Sokolovići (the Muslim), Butmir (the Muslim), Ilidža (the Serb), Otes (the Serb), Stup (the Muslim/Croat), and Nedžarići (the Serb).¹¹⁷⁶ On 30 January 1993, the Accused and Boban signed the agreement, witnessed by Vance and Owen.¹¹⁷⁷ On 3 March 1993, with guarantees from the UN that heavy weapons would be placed under its control, Izetbegović also signed the agreement.¹¹⁷⁸ (Treanor was not accurate: that was only monitoring envisaged, not control#Inaccuracy!)

367. On 26 March 1993, Wahlgren, Morillon, and others met with Mladić in Belgrade.¹¹⁷⁹ Morillon criticised the recent attack on Srebrenica; Mladić stated that the ABiH began the offensive and the VRS had retaliated.¹¹⁸⁰ EXCULPATORY! There is more than sufficient evidence of the Muslim offensive in the area! On 6 April 1993, Wahlgren and Morillon met with Milovanović, Gvero, and others at the Sarajevo airport to discuss the offensive in Srebrenica.¹¹⁸¹ Wahlgren informed the participants that the Bosnian Muslims had set two conditions for this meeting, namely that the Bosnian Serbs should stop their attack on Srebrenica and that UN observers and one company of CanBat should be allowed into Srebrenica.¹¹⁸² Milovanović responded that the Bosnian Serbs were not attacking Srebrenica but that once Bosnian Muslims agreed to a cease-fire throughout BiH, the Bosnian Serbs would stop their offensive.¹¹⁸³

368. On 12 April 1993, Wahlgren met with Mladić in Sarajevo to discuss the offensive in Srebrenica; José Mendiluce of UNHCR was also present at the meeting.¹¹⁸⁴ Mladić told Mendiluce that there was no problem with Mendiluce assisting in the evacuation of the

¹¹⁷³ D924 (ICFY Agreement for Peace in BiH, 3 March 1993).

¹¹⁷⁴ D924 (ICFY Agreement for Peace in BiH, 3 March 1993). The concept of Blue Routes included the agreement by all parties to secure the routes, not interfere with them or with check-points and patrols by UNPROFOR/ECMM, to ensure freedom of passage for humanitarian aid, and to ensure the absolute freedom of movement for UN forces. A separate concept for Blue Routes in Sarajevo, specifically, was appended to the agreement. D924 (ICFY Agreement for Peace in BiH, 3 March 1993), pp. 9–14. It is only in February 1994 that there was an agreement to establish Blue Routes in Sarajevo. See para. 389.

¹¹⁷⁵ D924 (ICFY Agreement for Peace in BiH, 3 March 1993), p. 20.

¹¹⁷⁶ D924 (ICFY Agreement for Peace in BiH, 3 March 1993), p. 20.

¹¹⁷⁷ D924 (ICFY Agreement for Peace in BiH, 3 March 1993), p. 2.

¹¹⁷⁸ P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 155.

¹¹⁷⁹ D1500 (UNPROFOR report re. meeting with Ratko Mladić, 29 March 1993); P4203 (Witness statement of Pyers Tucker dated 12 May 2010), para. 243; P1474 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 29 January–31 March 1993), pp. 164–172.

¹¹⁸⁰ D1500 (UNPROFOR report re. meeting with Ratko Mladić, 29 March 1993), p. 3; P4203 (Witness statement of Pyers Tucker dated 12 May 2010), paras. 244–245; P1474 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 29 January–31 March 1993), p. 167.

¹¹⁸¹ D2779 (VRS Main Staff notes of meeting at Sarajevo airport, 7 April 1993); P4203 (Witness statement of Pyers Tucker dated 12 May 2010), para. 245; Milenko Indić, T. 32441–32443 (22 January 2013).

¹¹⁸² D2779 (VRS Main Staff notes of meeting at Sarajevo airport, 7 April 1993), p. 1.

¹¹⁸³ D2779 (VRS Main Staff notes of meeting at Sarajevo airport, 7 April 1993), p. 1.

¹¹⁸⁴ D2748 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Ratko Mladić, 13 April 1993); D2745 (Witness statement of Vere Hayes dated 14 January 2013), para. 10; P1483 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 2 April–24 October 1993), pp. 17–19. See also D328 (ICFY report re military talks in Sarajevo on 12 April 1993) (reporting that Halilović of the ABiH did not turn up for the talks because he believed that the VRS had attacked Srebrenica); D4481 (Memorandum from John Wilson to Lord Owen, 16 April 1993).

Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica.¹¹⁸⁵ However, Mladić stated that the RS had no respect for the “no fly zone” set forth in Security Council Resolution 781 and requested that no NATO planes fly over the RS.¹¹⁸⁶ In addition, he refused requests that UNPROFOR deploy extra troops in Srebrenica and the eastern enclaves.¹¹⁸⁷ Wahlgren reported that when Mladić was asked directly whether he intended to take Srebrenica by force, he did not answer the question, rather he stated that he was ready to discuss a political solution to the Srebrenica problem.¹¹⁸⁸ **EXCULPATORY! That was a sufficient answer, and this kind of “meticulous” remarks are not fair!** Wahlgren reported that Srebrenica had become a key issue and a test case for the future survival of the Vance-Owen Plan.¹¹⁸⁹

369. On 16 April 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 819 establishing Srebrenica as a safe area.¹¹⁹⁰ The resolution demanded the immediate cessation of armed attacks by “Bosnian Serb paramilitary units” against Srebrenica and their immediate withdrawal.¹¹⁹¹ **It is not fair to skip the crucial move of the Predsjednik prior to the Resolution. Namely, after the intense correspondence with General Morillon, the President banned the VRS to enter Srebrenica, see D43. It also wasn’t fair to speculate with the “Bosnian Serb paramilitary units” because it was a legal Army! #Skipping important fact#.**

370. On 18 April 1993, an Agreement for the Demilitarisation of Srebrenica was signed.¹¹⁹² It called for a total cease-fire in Srebrenica, the demilitarisation of Srebrenica within 72 hours, the deployment of an UNPROFOR company into Srebrenica, and the opening of a corridor between Tuzla and Srebrenica for the evacuation of the seriously wounded and ill.¹¹⁹³ All weapons were to be handed over to UNPROFOR.¹¹⁹⁴ CanBat was deployed to Srebrenica pursuant to this agreement.¹¹⁹⁵ The following day, a working group met to discuss how to implement the demilitarisation process.¹¹⁹⁶ The VRS and ABiH disagreed on the area to be demilitarised.¹¹⁹⁷ UNPROFOR reported that while the Bosnian Serbs seemed ready to adhere to the 18 April agreement, **EXCULPATORY#!** the Bosnian Muslims did not and were considering going to the Security Council.¹¹⁹⁸ The Bosnian

¹¹⁸⁵ D2748 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Ratko Mladić, 13 April 1993), p. 1.

¹¹⁸⁶ D2748 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Ratko Mladić, 13 April 1993), p. 2.

¹¹⁸⁷ D2748 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Ratko Mladić, 13 April 1993), p. 2.

¹¹⁸⁸ D2748 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Ratko Mladić, 13 April 1993), p. 3. *See also* P1483 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 2 April–24 October 1993), p. 19.

¹¹⁸⁹ D2748 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Ratko Mladić, 13 April 1993), p. 3.

¹¹⁹⁰ P4209 (UNSC Resolution 819, 16 April 1993); P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), paras. 55–58 Piers Tucker, T. 23211–23212 (17 January 2012).

¹¹⁹¹ P4209 (UNSC Resolution 819, 16 April 1993), p. 2; P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 55.

¹¹⁹² D1028 (UNPROFOR report re agreement on demilitarisation of Srebrenica, 18 April 1993); D2745 (Witness statement of Vere Hayes dated 14 January 2013), para. 15; P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 60.

¹¹⁹³ D1028 (UNPROFOR report re agreement on demilitarisation of Srebrenica, 18 April 1993), paras. 1–4; D2745 (Witness statement of Vere Hayes dated 14 January 2013), paras. 15–16.

¹¹⁹⁴ D1028 (UNPROFOR report re agreement on demilitarisation of Srebrenica, 18 April 1993), para. 4; D2745 (Witness statement of Vere Hayes dated 14 January 2013), para. 16.

¹¹⁹⁵ D2745 (Witness statement of Vere Hayes dated 14 January 2013), para. 18; P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 61.

¹¹⁹⁶ D2750 (UNPROFOR report, 20 April 1993) (present at the meeting were Gvero for the VRS, a colonel of the ABiH, and Brigadier Hayes of UNPROFOR).

¹¹⁹⁷ D2750 (UNPROFOR report, 20 April 1993), p. 1.

¹¹⁹⁸ D2750 (UNPROFOR report, 20 April 1993), p. 2.

Muslims expressed concern that the VRS would redeploy to Žepa and Goražde after withdrawing from Srebrenica.¹¹⁹⁹

371. On 24 April 1993, the Accused, Krajišnik, Mladić, Okun, Owen and others met in Belgrade to continue negotiations, in particular with respect to the proposed Vance-Owen Plan's map of BiH.¹²⁰⁰ The Accused was unhappy with the Vance-Owen Plan, particularly with the maps, and suggested that the Bosnian Serbs trade some land in BiH for land in Croatia, which Owen rejected.¹²⁰¹

372. On 2 May 1993, in Athens, the Accused signed the Vance-Owen Plan for the Bosnian Serbs but it was subject to ratification by the Bosnian Serb Assembly.¹²⁰² However, the Bosnian Serb Assembly rejected the plan.¹²⁰³ During this period there was never a complete cessation of hostilities and the armed conflict continued despite the peace efforts.¹²⁰⁴

373. On 6 May 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 824 which established the safe areas of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Žepa, Goražde, and Bihać.¹²⁰⁵ The resolution declared that these safe areas should be free from armed attack or any other hostile acts by all parties.¹²⁰⁶ In addition, the resolution provided for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of all Bosnian Serb military or paramilitary units from the areas.¹²⁰⁷ **Not correct, and not complete! The main characteristic of a safe area was to be demilitarized!!! How come the Chamber didn't point it out? Did it happen? How many Serb casualties, mainly civilian, had been sustained from these "demilitarised" areas? This casualties are the most direct responsibility of the "international community" and United Nations, at**

¹¹⁹⁹ D2750 (UNPROFOR report, 20 April 1993), p. 2.

¹²⁰⁰ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4273–4276; P792 (Ninth notebook of Herbert Okun's ICFY diary), e-court p. 46.

¹²⁰¹ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4274–4276; P792 (Ninth notebook of Herbert Okun's ICFY diary), e-court p. 47. According to Milovanović, on 26 April 1993, the Accused called a referendum to reject the Vance-Owen Plan which was, in their view, to "cantonise" BiH. The referendum was endorsed by the VRS. D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 22. **#This is all wrong and arbitrary, and the Chamber should stick to the documents rather to such an uncertain "memories".(#All arbitrary vs. documents#)The Accused was present in the Athens in Greece on 1 and 2 May, where he accepted this plan conditionally, if it would be confirmed by the Assembly. Anyway, any agreement would have to pass the Assembly. At the session on 5 and 6 May the Assembly rejected the plan, the Accused offered his resignation which wasn't accepted, and the Assembly, not the Accused, appointed the referendum. All this alterations and modifications of the facts is exclusively to the detriment of the Accused's interests)**

¹²⁰² Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4117, 4150, 4235, 4344; P792 (Ninth notebook of Herbert Okun's ICFY diary), e-court p. 74–77.

¹²⁰³ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4117, 4150, 4235–4236, 4344–4345; P2284 (UNSG report entitled "The Fall of Srebrenica", 15 November 1999), para. 67; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 45. For discussion of the Vance-Owen Plan in the Bosnian Serb Assembly, see generally P1371 (Transcript of 30th session of RS Assembly, 5–6 May 1993); P1373 (Transcript of 31st session of RS Assembly, 9 May 1993); P1375 (Transcript of 32nd session of RS Assembly, 19–20 May 1993). See also the Bosnian Serb city council in Sarajevo rejecting the Vance-Owen Plan. P5038 (Conclusions of meeting of the City Council of Sarajevo, 9 May 1993), p. 2. On 11 May 1993, the SDS Main Board had also rejected the plan. P2538 (Patrick Treanor's research report entitled "Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990–1995", 1 May 2009), para. 175. On 6 May 1993, at a joint meeting between the President (the Accused), President of the Assembly (Krajišnik), and Prime Minister (Lukić), and others, it was decided afterwards that a referendum would be held to vote on the plan. D3611 (Minutes of joint meeting of RS President, National Assembly President and RS Prime Minister, 6 May 1993).

¹²⁰⁴ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4150.

¹²⁰⁵ P984 (UNSC Resolution 824, 6 May 1993) (declaring that "Sarajevo and other such threatened areas, in particular the towns of Tuzla, Žepa, Goražde, Bihać, as well as Srebrenica, and their surroundings should be treated as safe areas"); P2284 (UNSG report entitled "The Fall of Srebrenica", 15 November 1999), para. 67. See also P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 102; David Harland, T. 2058 (7 May 2010); P897 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 15 July 1995), p. 3.

¹²⁰⁶ P984 (UNSC Resolution 824, 6 May 1993), p. 2.

¹²⁰⁷ P984 (UNSC Resolution 824, 6 May 1993), p. 2.

least for this tragic negligence, and implementation of such a forgeries in a judgments against the Serbs!) Further, it declared that all parties should respect the rights of UNPROFOR and international humanitarian agencies to free and unimpeded access and demanded full co-operation with UNPROFOR.¹²⁰⁸

374. On 8 May 1993, the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims came to an agreement concerning the status of Žepa and Srebrenica; the Bosnian Serbs “reconfirmed” Security Council Resolution 824, **EXCULPATORY!** and the Bosnian Muslims agreed to demilitarise the area.¹²⁰⁹ However, UNPROFOR reported that this agreement was not implemented by either party.¹²¹⁰ **How come? What the Serbs could do to tave the town demilitarized? This sort of equalizing the sides is only another evidence of a #bias of the UN!#)**

375. On 15 and 16 May 1993, a referendum held in the RS on whether to accept the Vance-Owen Plan resulted in a majority of votes against it.¹²¹¹ **Therefore, neither the President, nor the Assembly rejected the VOPP, it was the people by the referendum! #Inaccuracy#! VOPP was worse that the Cutileiro Plan as agreed on 18 March, in terms of leaving the “three republics” concept, while the next - Owen-Stoltenberg plan returned to this concept!)**

376. On 4 June 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 836 reaffirming the establishment of the safe areas and condemning military attacks.¹²¹² While commending the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats for signing the Vance-Owen Plan, it was gravely concerned that the Bosnian Serbs had not signed it.¹²¹³ This resolution extended the mandate of UNPROFOR to include participating in the delivery of humanitarian aid.¹²¹⁴ It authorised UNPROFOR to act in self-defence and take “necessary measures”, including the use of force in response to bombardments or incursions into the safe areas and obstruction in and around those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or humanitarian convoys.¹²¹⁵ It also decided that national or regional organisations, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close co-ordination with the Secretary General and UNPROFOR, may take all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate.¹²¹⁶

¹²⁰⁸ P984 (UNSC Resolution 824, 6 May 1993), p. 2.

¹²⁰⁹ P897 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 15 July 1995), p. 3; P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 65.

¹²¹⁰ P897 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 15 July 1995), p. 3.

¹²¹¹ P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 70; D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 24; P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 176.

¹²¹² P985 (UNSC Resolution 836, 4 June 1993); P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 78–79. *See also* P897 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 15 July 1995), p. 3; D3490 (UNPROFOR report, 15 January 1994), Yasushi Akashi, T. 37678–37679 (24 April 2013).

¹²¹³ P985 (UNSC Resolution 836, 4 June 1993).

¹²¹⁴ P985 (UNSC Resolution 836, 4 June 1993); D3490 (UNPROFOR report, 15 January 1994), p. 4.

¹²¹⁵ P985 (UNSC Resolution 836, 4 June 1993). *See also* David Harland, T. 2122–2123 (7 May 2010).

¹²¹⁶ P985 (UNSC Resolution 836, 4 June 1993). *See also* David Harland, T. 2122–2123 (7 May 2010), T. 2294 (11 May 2010).

2. Owen- Stoltenberg Plan

377. Following the failure of the Vance-Owen Plan, the ICFY continued working through September 1993, under the co-chairmanship of Owen for the EC and Thorvald Stoltenberg, who replaced Vance, for the UN.¹²¹⁷

378. A new round of talks was initiated by Owen and Stoltenberg.¹²¹⁸ On 23 June 1993, the Co-Chairmen met with representatives from the parties.¹²¹⁹ Nine “constitutional principles” were proposed by the close of this meeting.¹²²⁰ The Accused promised to do everything in his power to ensure the delivery of food, water, electricity, and gas to Sarajevo.¹²²¹ **EXCULPATORY#!Facilities!** As for the eastern enclaves, the Accused stated that the Bosnian Serbs were prepared to “desist from all attacks [...] provided that “the armed forces within them are disarmed”.¹²²² **EXCULPATORY#!** Another round of talks took place in Geneva on 27 July 1993, with representatives from all sides, including the Accused, Izetbegović, Tuđman, and Slobodan Milošević.¹²²³ On 30 July 1993, the parties agreed to the creation of three republics, representing the three constituencies in BiH, under a centralised and joint government authority.¹²²⁴ **EXCULPATORY#!** On the same day, a cessation of hostilities agreement was signed at the Sarajevo airport between Mladić and Delić.¹²²⁵

379. The Bosnian Serbs agreed in principle to a proposal to open the Sarajevo airport by 4 August 1993.¹²²⁶ The Accused informed the Co-Chairmen that Mladić was prepared to withdraw the VRS and allow the UN to take control of the area.¹²²⁷ **EXCULPATORY!** On 7 August 1993, the Accused wrote a letter to the Co-Chairmen stating that the Bosnian Serbs were prepared to hand over Mt. Bjelašnica and Mt. Igman to UNPROFOR.¹²²⁸ On 11 August 1993, the respective military commanders signed the Military Agreement for Peace

¹²¹⁷ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4295; P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 178.

¹²¹⁸ P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 178.

¹²¹⁹ P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 178.

¹²²⁰ P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 178. These nine constitutional principles were very similar to those proposed under the Vance-Owen Plan. Some changes included: binding arbitration for disputes between the republics, the re-organisation of BiH along confederal lines (three internal republics: Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim) instead of ten provinces, and the fact that Sarajevo would be an UN-administered city. P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 178.

¹²²¹ D4782 (Letter from Radovan Karadžić to Lord Carrington and Stoltenberg, 25 July 1993), p. 1.

¹²²² D4782 (Letter from Radovan Karadžić to Lord Carrington and Stoltenberg, 25 July 1993), p. 1.

¹²²³ D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 28; P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 180.

¹²²⁴ P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 182.

¹²²⁵ P5040 (Military Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities in BiH, 31 July 1993); P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 182.

¹²²⁶ P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 185.

¹²²⁷ P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 188. The Accused, Mladić, and Krajišnik, among others, met with UNPROFOR in Pale on 5 August 1993 to discuss a number of proposals “designed to unblock the talks in Geneva”. The Accused presented proposals on the VRS withdrawal from Mt. Igman, the establishment of safe routes in and out of Sarajevo, and the restoration of utilities. He agreed to the establishment of a Joint Commission to ensure the restoration of utilities and infrastructure. P824 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Radovan Karadžić, 5 August 1993); David Harland, T. 2031–2032 (6 May 2010).

¹²²⁸ D4645 (Letter from Radovan Karadžić to Boutros Boutros Ghali, Bill Clinton, Lord Owen and Stoltenberg, 7 August 1993) (the letter was also addressed to Boutros Boutros Ghali and Bill Clinton). On 11 August 1993, Milovanović wrote a letter to UNPROFOR stating that the VRS would withdraw from Mt. Bjelašnica and Mt. Igman and allow UNPROFOR to take over their positions. D4786 (Letter from VRS Main Staff to UNPROFOR, 11 August 1993).

in BiH.¹²²⁹ A few days later, the three parties met again and agreed to allow UNMOs to have freedom of movement throughout BiH and that the administration of Sarajevo, with the exclusion of Pale, would be organised by the UN.¹²³⁰ On 14 August 1993, a DMZ around Mt. Igman and the Sarajevo airport was established.¹²³¹ **ALL EXCULPATORY!**

380. At the 34th Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, the Accused voiced his support for the constitutional arrangements proposed earlier in the negotiations, noting that they recognised the sovereignty of the RS within the BiH confederation.¹²³² The plan was adopted by the Bosnian Serb Assembly with the constitutional agreement as a condition for peace.¹²³³ **EXCULPATORY!**

381. The ICFY continued to work on other arrangements for peace.¹²³⁴ The parties agreed to a “Joint Declaration on Peace” which included a cessation of hostilities effective 18 September 1993 and proposed the resumption of talks on 21 September at the Sarajevo airport.¹²³⁵ **EXCULPATORY!** On 20 September 1993, the ICFY met with the parties on a British Royal Navy aircraft carrier in the Adriatic Sea, and the plan that emerged was referred to as the “Invincible Plan”.¹²³⁶ The plan allocated 49% of the territory of BiH to the Bosnian Serbs, 33% to the Bosnian Muslims, and 17.5% to the Bosnian Croats.¹²³⁷ Sarajevo would remain undivided and administered by the UN for two years.¹²³⁸ **EXCULPATORY!**

382. The Bosnian Muslims rejected the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan at the end of September 1993.¹²³⁹ UNPROFOR reported that the Bosnian Serbs had invested heavily in the Owen-

¹²²⁹ P5041 (Military Agreement for Peace in BiH, 11 August 1993) (Mladić representing the Bosnian Serbs, Rasim Delić the Bosnian Muslims, and Milivoj Petkov the Bosnian Croats). See also P5051 (SRK forward of Military Peace Agreement for BiH, 12 August 1993) (wherein Galić orders all SRK units to pass on the Military Agreement for Peace in BiH to all subordinate units).

¹²³⁰ P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 191.

¹²³¹ P2414 (Witness statement of KDZ182 dated 8 March 2011), p. 57 (under seal); KDZ182, T. 13160 (10 March 2011); D1135 (Map of Sarajevo marked by KDZ182); P2447 (Witness statement of KDZ182 dated 8 March 2011), p. 4; D2753 (UNPROFOR report, 14 August 1993); D2745 (Witness statement of Vere Hayes dated 14 January 2013), para. 39. See also D722 (UNPROFOR report re letter from Ambassador Sacirbey, 19 October 1994); Adjudicated Fact 2783. KDZ182 stated that neither party respected the DMZ and it was not actually demilitarised until the beginning of 1995. P2414 (Witness statement of KDZ182 dated 8 March 2011), p. 57 (under seal); Milenko Indić, T. 32461–32462, 32464–32465 (22 January 2013) (testifying that the Bjelašnica and Igman areas were never fully demilitarised).

¹²³² P1378 (Minutes of 34th Session of RS Assembly, 27-29 August, 9-11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993); P1379 (Transcript of 34th Session of RS Assembly, 27-29 August, 9-11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993).

¹²³³ P1378 (Minutes of 34th Session of RS Assembly, 27-29 August, 9-11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993); P1379 (Transcript of 34th Session of RS Assembly, 27-29 August, 9-11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993).

¹²³⁴ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4295; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 56.

¹²³⁵ D4648 (Memo from Stoltenberg to UN Secretary-General, 16 September 1993); D4649 (Memo from Thorvald Stoltenberg to the UN Secretary-General, 16 September 1993).

¹²³⁶ P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 114. The name of the British naval ship was the HMS Invincible. Reynaud Theunens, T. 17056 (20 July 2011); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4295; David Harland, T. 2065 (7 May 2010); P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 202.

¹²³⁷ P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 202.

¹²³⁸ P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 202.

¹²³⁹ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 57–60; David Harland, T. 2146–2147 (10 May 2010). The Accused and Fikret Abdić signed a separate peace treaty on 22 October 1993 agreeing to, *inter alia*, the mutual recognition the RS and the “Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia” and freedom of movement. D4807 (Declaration of Radovan Karadžić and Fikret Abdić, 22 October 1993). Okun testified that the Accused was seeking to undermine the Bosnian government and exploit divisions within the Bosnian Muslims. Herbert Okun, T. 1608 (26 April 2010).

Stoltenberg Plan and since its failure, had become “more politically frustrated and increasingly volatile”.¹²⁴⁰

383. At the 35th Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, the Accused proposed the adoption of a declaration on the continuation of the peace process, expressing his commitment to negotiations despite the Bosnian Muslims’ rejection of the peace plan.¹²⁴¹

EXCULPATORY#! However, the Accused stipulated that the RS was forced to withdraw all of its prior concessions.¹²⁴²

384. On 18 November 1993, the ICFY issued a Joint Declaration on the provision of humanitarian relief in BiH signed by the Accused, Silajdžić, Boban, and Ogata in Geneva.¹²⁴³ The parties agreed to (i) ensure complete and secure freedom of movement for the personnel of the UN and humanitarian organisations; (ii) allow the UNHCR and ICRC to determine without any conditionality or linkage the content of humanitarian assistance; and (iii) ensure that such assistance reached the civilian population and was not diverted to the military.¹²⁴⁴

385. On 2 February 1994, Akashi met with the Accused in Belgrade to discuss the demilitarisation of Srebrenica, Žepa, and the opening of the Tuzla airport.¹²⁴⁵ **This happened 10 months after the agreement on demilitarisation. During these 300 days the Muslim forces protected by the UN forces from the town killed almost 400 Serb civilians and some soldiers, more than one per a day!**

386. Following the shelling of the Markale market in Sarajevo on 5 February 1994, Owen and Stoltenberg met with the Accused in Pale and agreed upon the UN administration of Sarajevo.¹²⁴⁶ **EXCULPATORY!** On 6 February 1994, Akashi, Rose, and others visited the Markale market in Sarajevo, one day after it was shelled.¹²⁴⁷ Following this visit, Akashi’s group met first with Izetbegović and then with the Accused in an attempt to secure an immediate cease-fire in Sarajevo.¹²⁴⁸ The Bosnian Muslims stated they were willing to sign a cease-fire agreement on the condition that the Bosnian Serbs moved their artillery and heavy weapons out of the range of Sarajevo and place them under UNPROFOR control.¹²⁴⁹ The Bosnian Serbs would not accept the weapons withdrawal but would accept

¹²⁴⁰ P823 (UNPROFOR Weekly Political Assessment, 3 November 1993), p. 6.

¹²⁴¹ P1380 (Minutes of 35th Session of RS Assembly, 2 October 1993); P1381 (Transcript of 35th Session of RS Assembly, 2 October 1993).

¹²⁴² P1380 (Minutes of 35th Session of RS Assembly, 2 October 1993); P1381 (Transcript of 35th Session of RS Assembly, 2 October 1993). On 22 October 1993 in Belgrade, the Accused signed an agreement with Fikret Abdić mutually recognising the RS and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia. D3587 (Joint declaration of Radovan Karadžić and Fikret Abdić, 22 October 1993; Joint statement of Jadranko Prlić, Vladimir Lukić and Zlatko Jušić, 7 November 1993).

¹²⁴³ P1462 (Joint declaration on humanitarian relief in BiH, 18 November 1993); Adrianus van Baal, T. 8412 (27 October 2010); P1484 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), pp. 35–40; Tomasz Blaszczyk, T. 6073–6074 (20 August 2010). See P5252 (Report of SRK, 20 March 1994), p. 2.

¹²⁴⁴ P1462 (Joint declaration on humanitarian relief in BiH, 18 November 1993), pp. 1–2. See also Tomasz Blaszczyk, T. 6073–6074 (20 August 2010) (testifying that the third item of the joint declaration addressed concerns raised by Mladić at the negotiations in Geneva); P1484 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), p. 37.

¹²⁴⁵ D3492 (UNPROFOR report, 2 February 1994), p. 3.

¹²⁴⁶ P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990–1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 209. According to Harland and UNPROFOR, the shelling of the Markale market in Sarajevo on 5 February 1994 and threat of NATO air strikes led to an overall stabilisation of the situation in Sarajevo and also led the Bosnian Serbs to make numerous concessions on both humanitarian and military issues. P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 76, 79; P827 (UNPROFOR Weekly Political Assessment, 17 February 1994), pp. 2, 6. See Scheduled Incident G.8.

¹²⁴⁷ D713 (UNPROFOR report re talks with Radovan Karadžić and Alija Izetbegović, 6 February 1994).

¹²⁴⁸ D713 (UNPROFOR report re talks with Radovan Karadžić and Alija Izetbegović, 6 February 1994).

¹²⁴⁹ D713 (UNPROFOR report re talks with Radovan Karadžić and Alija Izetbegović, 6 February 1994), p. 1.

“on-site monitoring”.¹²⁵⁰ A draft joint declaration was drawn up as a basis for further negotiations.¹²⁵¹

387. On 8 February 1994, Rose met with Milovanović at the Lukavica Barracks.¹²⁵² Milovanović stated that he had been given full authority from the Accused and Mladić to agree to the principles for the cease-fire, withdrawal of heavy weapons, and #demilitarisation of Sarajevo.¹²⁵³ **#EXCULPATORY! #Demilitar, Sarajevo!** An immediate cease-fire would be agreed upon the following day between the parties and a Joint Commission would be set up at the Sarajevo airport to work out the details of the agreement.¹²⁵⁴

388. A cessation of hostilities agreement was arrived at on 9 February 1994, effective 12 p.m. on the following day.¹²⁵⁵ As part of the agreement, a TEZ in Sarajevo was established which consisted of a 20 kilometre radius from the centre of the city in which all weapons of a 12.7 mm calibre or higher were to be removed or turned over to UNPROFOR at a designated WCP.¹²⁵⁶ In addition, a Joint Commission was created under the chairmanship of the UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo Commander in order to determine a timetable for the withdrawal of the heavy weapons.¹²⁵⁷ WCPs were also established.¹²⁵⁸ WCPs were locations where all the weapons systems for each party to the conflict were being held.¹²⁵⁹ In a subsequent agreement, the Accused and Akashi agreed upon the locations of the WCPs and that UNPROFOR would have unrestricted access throughout the TEZ.¹²⁶⁰

¹²⁵⁰ D713 (UNPROFOR report re talks with Radovan Karadžić and Alija Izetbegović, 6 February 1994), p. 1.

¹²⁵¹ D713 (UNPROFOR report re talks with Radovan Karadžić and Alija Izetbegović, 6 February 1994), pp. 1, 3–4. Rose met with ABiH representatives again on 8 February 1994. *See* para. 4187; D2772 (Redacted diary of KW570), pp. 3–4 (under seal).

¹²⁵² D830 (UNPROFOR report re cease fire negotiations in Sarajevo, 8 February 1994), p. 3; D2772 (Redacted diary of KW570), pp. 3–4 (under seal).

¹²⁵³ D830 (UNPROFOR report re cease fire negotiations in Sarajevo, 8 February 1994), p. 3; D2772 (Redacted diary of KW570), pp. 3–4 (under seal).

¹²⁵⁴ D830 (UNPROFOR report re cease fire negotiations in Sarajevo, 8 February 1994), p. 3. After this meeting with the Bosnian Serbs, Rose held a meeting with the Bosnian Muslims who agreed to the principles as laid out and agreed to by the Bosnian Serbs. D2770 (Witness statement of KW570 dated 21 November 2012), para. 13 (under seal); D2772 (Redacted diary of KW570), p. 4 (under seal).

¹²⁵⁵ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 79–80; P826 (UNPROFOR Weekly Political Assessment, 9 February 1994), p. 4; P827 (UNPROFOR Weekly Political Assessment, 17 February 1994), p. 2; D715 (UNPROFOR report re situation in BiH, 15 February 1994), p. 2; Michael Rose, T. 7256, 7260 (5 October 2010); D2772 (Redacted diary of KW570), p. 4 (under seal); Adjudicated Fact 2784. For more detailed evidence related to the cease-fire agreement, *see* para. 3582.

¹²⁵⁶ P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), paras. 44–45; Michael Rose, T. 7256, 7260 (5 October 2010); P2447 (Witness statement of KDZ182 dated 8 March 2011), p. 4; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 79–80; Michael Rose, T. 7260–7261 (5 October 2010); P1818 (Witness statement of Adrianus van Baal dated 26 October 2010), paras. 13–16 (stating that due to the winter weather conditions, it was impossible that all heavy weapons could physically be moved out and it was decided that the weapons in the TEZ should be brought under the control of UNPROFOR); Adjudicated Facts 2784, 2785. A proposal dated 10 February 1994 from Dragomir Milošević to the VRS Main Staff suggests that in order to comply with the agreement, the SRK could “use a diversionary tactic to set aside equipment that is out of order and for which we [SRK] do not have sufficient quantities of ammunition”. P1641 (SRK proposal re artillery, 10 February 1994). Rose testified that this proposal conformed to what UNPROFOR thought was happening on the ground. Michael Rose, T. 7262 (5 October 2010). Dragomir Milošević issued an order to the SRK to cease all fire at 12 p.m. on 10 February 1994 and to co-operate with UNPROFOR. P1642 (SRK Order, 10 February 1994).

¹²⁵⁷ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 79.

¹²⁵⁸ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 80. Harland stated that both parties to the conflict were disingenuous to an extent in complying with the agreements. P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 81. *See also* P847 (VRS Main Staff Order, 9 February 1994); P848 (Order of Drina Corps, 9 February 1994). There were nine WCPs in and around Sarajevo; two were in ABiH-controlled territory and seven were in SRK-held territory. Adjudicated Fact 2786. *See* para. 3582, fn. 11479.

¹²⁵⁹ P1762 (Witness statement of David Fraser dated 17 October 2010), p. 20.

¹²⁶⁰ P1654 (Agreement between Yasushi Akashi and Radovan Karadžić, 18 February 1994); KDZ450, T. 10558 (19 January 2011) (private session); P2118 (UNPROFOR report re weapon collection points in Sarajevo, 12 September 1994), p. 2; D717 (UNPROFOR report re weapons collection points in Sarajevo, 16 August 1994). *See also* Rupert Smith, T. 11365–11366 (8 February 2011); P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 49; D2800 (SRK Order, 18 February 1994); D2801 (SRK combat report, 19 February 1994); D2802 (SRK combat report, 20 February 1994); Stanislav Galić, T. 37957–37958 (8 May 2013); D717 (UNPROFOR report re weapons collection points in Sarajevo, 16 August 1994), pp. 4–5; P1820 (Agreement between Yasushi Akashi and Radovan

389. On 24 February 1994, the creation of Blue Routes within Sarajevo to ensure freedom of movement and delivery of humanitarian aid was agreed to in principle.¹²⁶¹ The routes included a Dobrinja-Butmir route for Bosnian Muslim civilians, a Lukavica-Ilidža route for Bosnian Serbs civilians, and a pedestrian crossing in downtown Sarajevo at the Bratstvo Jedinstvo Bridge.¹²⁶² However, on 27 February 1994, Milovanović stated in a meeting with Rose and Delić that the VRS would block UN convoys moving over Bosnian Serb territory regardless of the joint declaration signed on 18 November 1993, and would not allow the UN or anyone else to use the Bratstvo Jedinstvo Bridge.¹²⁶³ **(#This was a matter of security of the VRS, and since there was so many other bridges, the opinion of General Milovanovic should be respected as a security measure, not as a malice.**

390. UNPROFOR reported that the beginning of March 1994 was an encouraging time for Sarajevo and the cease-fire continued to hold.¹²⁶⁴ On 17 March 1994, the Agreement on Freedom of Movement in Sarajevo (“Blue Routes Agreement”) was signed by Krajišnik and Hasan Muratović and as a result a number of Blue Routes were established for civilians and humanitarian aid.¹²⁶⁵ The Blue Routes were, specifically (i) Sarajevo-Vogošća-Zenica; (ii) Lukavica-Ilidža and Dobrinja-Butimir, through the Sarajevo airport (“Airport Routes”); and (iii) Bratstvo Jedinstvo Bridge.¹²⁶⁶ UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations had unlimited freedom of movement along the Blue Routes.¹²⁶⁷ The Blue Routes were set to open on 23 March 1994.¹²⁶⁸ **EXCULPATORY! Whenever the Muslim side was interested in maintaining the truce, it was maintained!**

391. At the end of March and into the beginning of April 1994, attacks were launched on the safe area of Goražde.¹²⁶⁹ **#Incorrect! There is evidence that first the Muslim side**

Karadžić, 18 February 1994); P1818 (Witness statement of Adrianus van Baal dated 26 October 2010), para. 11; Milenko Indić, T. 32658–32662 (24 January 2013). Yasushi Akashi, T. 37755–37756 (25 April 2013). Five sites were agreed upon during negotiations on 16 February 1994, these sites included Lukavica barracks, Morko, Blagovac, Blazuj, and Radava. P2120 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Stanislav Galić, 16 February 1994). See para. 3582.

¹²⁶¹ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 89; Michael Rose, T. 7258 (5 October 2010); P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 54; D2774 (Witness statement of Milenko Indić dated 19 January 2013), para. 161. The concept of Blue Routes in Sarajevo was first proposed in January 1993, see para. 366. Harland testified that negotiations for the opening of Blue Routes went “nowhere” until the Bosnian Serbs felt an urgent need to forestall NATO air strikes through “bold and conciliatory gestures”. P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 89; Michael Rose, T. 7258 (5 October 2010); D2774 (Witness statement of Milenko Indić dated 19 January 2013), para. 161. Rose testified that the Blue Routes were designated as “being central to the re-supply of Sarajevo” and there was one such route that came down Mt. Igman. Michael Rose, T. 7258 (5 October 2010).

¹²⁶² P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 89. Milovanović stated that the Bosnian Serb forces would block UN convoys regardless of the agreement and would not allow the UN or anyone else to use the Bratstvo Jedinstvo Bridge. P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 92–93; P849 (UNPROFOR Weekly Political Assessment, 1 March 1994), p. 5.

¹²⁶³ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 92–93; P849 (UNPROFOR Weekly Political Assessment, 1 March 1994), p. 5; P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 54.

¹²⁶⁴ P849 (UNPROFOR Weekly Political Assessment, 1 March 1994), p. 1; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 91, 95, 97.

¹²⁶⁵ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 97; P5422 (UNPROFOR report, 8 May 1994), para. 21; P5252 (Report of SRK, 20 March 1994), p. 2 (stating that the basis of the agreement was the desire to implement the 18 November 1993 joint declaration); D2774 (Witness statement of Milenko Indić dated 19 January 2013), para. 161; P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), paras. 54, 56, 58; P1655 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Radovan Karadžić and Alija Izetbegović, 7 March 1994), para. 3; Michael Rose, T. 7258 (5 October 2010).

¹²⁶⁶ P5252 (Report of SRK, 20 March 1994), pp. 2–7; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 97; D2774 (Witness statement of Milenko Indić dated 19 January 2013), para. 161.

¹²⁶⁷ P5252 (Report of SRK, 20 March 1994), pp. 2–7.

¹²⁶⁸ P5252 (Report of SRK, 20 March 1994), p. 2; P2470 (UNPROFOR report, 1 September 1994), p. 2.

¹²⁶⁹ P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), paras. 132–135; KW570, T. 32242–32246 (18 January 2013). See also P2451 (Witness statement of Anthony Banbury dated 19 May 2009), para. 13; Anthony Banbury, T. 13417–13418 (16 March 2011); D687 (UNPROFOR report re Goražde, 18 April 1994); D704 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Radovan Karadžić, 19 August 1994); Yasushi Akashi, T. 37703–37706 (24 April 2013); P1818 (Witness statement of Adrianus van Baal dated 26 October 2010), para. 20. See generally P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), paras. 67–89.

attacked from Gorazde, and by some tricks involved the UN Forces, and then the VRS responded and decided that this “safe zone” be demilitarized! #“Offensive-defensive confusion#”! On 9 April 1994, a cease-fire agreement was discussed.¹²⁷⁰ It proposed a complete cease-fire in BiH for 14 days and the Bosnian Serbs’ withdrawal from Gorazde.¹²⁷¹ Mladić stated that he was “uninterested in signing anything other than a total agreement for the cessation of hostilities”.¹²⁷² The Bosnian Muslims stated that they would agree to a cessation of hostilities for a period of four months, on the condition that the Bosnian Serb withdraw from Gorazde.¹²⁷³ **(Why only four months? To regroup and strengthen their troupes for continuation of war against the Serbs? Why the “International Community” endorsed this attitude? And why the Serb side would accept it to it’s own damage?)**

392. On 10 and 11 April 1994, the Bosnian Serbs shelled the town of Gorazde.¹²⁷⁴ NATO responded with air strikes targeting a VRS artillery command post.¹²⁷⁵ In response, Bosnian Serbs detained UN personnel.¹²⁷⁶ In addition, the city of Sarajevo and the Tuzla airport were shelled.¹²⁷⁷ The Sarajevo airport remained closed.¹²⁷⁸ **(All of it is disputable, but even if it was true, the NATO involved in the conflict on the UNPROFOR invitation, and thus both became a warring factions. What country will in future accept this kind of arrangement with the UN? # “UN-NATO biased!”)**

393. On 17 April 1994, UNPROFOR representatives went to Pale to speak to the Accused, who declared that the “right bank of the Drina will be ours” and no agreement could be reached on a proposed three-kilometre TEZ around Gorazde.¹²⁷⁹ The negotiations only yielded the release of a few of the UN personnel who had been detained by the Bosnian Serb forces.¹²⁸⁰ **The Chamber saw the evidence that this “detention” was staged by the #Muslim trickery#: namely, the UN soldiers had been deployed within**

¹²⁷⁰ P851 (UNPROFOR report re meeting between Bosnian and Serb Army Commanders, 9 April 1994). Present at the meeting were Delić, Karavelić, Mladić, Gvero, Tolimir, Rose, Andreev, Charles Redman (US Special Envoy), and Victor Jackovich (US Ambassador to BiH). P851 (UNPROFOR report re meeting between Bosnian and Serb Army Commanders, 9 April 1994), p. 1. A few days earlier, on 4 April 1994, Rose met with the Accused and Milovanović in Pale to discuss the possibility of extending the scope of the cease-fire in Sarajevo to cover all of BiH. P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 66. Rose met again with the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, separately, on 7 and 8 April 1994 to try to come to a cease-fire agreement. P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 71.

¹²⁷¹ P851 (UNPROFOR report re meeting between Bosnian and Serb Army Commanders, 9 April 1994), pp. 1–2.

¹²⁷² P851 (UNPROFOR report re meeting between Bosnian and Serb Army Commanders, 9 April 1994), p. 2; P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 74.

¹²⁷³ P851 (UNPROFOR report re meeting between Bosnian and Serb Army Commanders, 9 April 1994), p. 2; P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 74.

¹²⁷⁴ P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), paras. 77–84; Michael Rose, T. 7272–7273 (5 October 2010); P1659 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Radovan Karadžić, 10 April 1994); P852 (UNPROFOR Update on Gorazde, 17 April 1994), p. 1; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 104; P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 136. On 15 April 1994, Gorazde was shelled again. D3496 (UNPROFOR report, 16 April 1994), p. 2. On 16 April 1994, UNPROFOR reported that the enclave of Gorazde had collapsed. P829 (UNPROFOR Weekly Political Assessment, 16 April 1994), pp. 1–2; P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 93; P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 138.

¹²⁷⁵ P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), paras. 81–83; P1660 (Order of Drina Corps, 10 April 1994); P829 (UNPROFOR Weekly Political Assessment, 16 April 1994), p. 2; P829 (UNPROFOR Weekly Political Assessment, 16 April 1994), p. 2; D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 43; KW570, T. 32254–32256 (18 January 2013).

¹²⁷⁶ P829 (UNPROFOR Weekly Political Assessment, 16 April 1994), pp. 1, 3; KW570, T. 32248–32250 (18 January 2013); P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 90.

¹²⁷⁷ P829 (UNPROFOR Weekly Political Assessment, 16 April 1994), p. 3; P882 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 14 April 1995).

¹²⁷⁸ P882 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 14 April 1995), p. 2.

¹²⁷⁹ P852 (UNPROFOR Update on Gorazde, 17 April 1994), p. 2.

¹²⁸⁰ P852 (UNPROFOR Update on Gorazde, 17 April 1994), p. 2. Only 14 Canadians and three UNMOs were released while 130 UN personnel remained in detention. P852 (UNPROFOR Update on Gorazde, 17 April 1994), p. 2.

the combat lines of the Muslim side, without any notification of the Serb side. The Muslim forces suddenly withdrew, and the UN forces found themselves in the Serb hands. It could have happened that some of them got killed, because the Serb side didn't know about their deployment, which was anyway illegal! UNPROFOR representatives reported that “no agreement was reached on the boundaries of the safe areas, the deployment of UNPROFOR and UNMO troops, or anything at all specific. [Nor] is there reason to believe that even the promises made will be kept. In the words of Russian envoy [Vitaly] Churkin, ‘I have heard more lies here in 24 hours than I’ve heard in my entire life’”.¹²⁸¹

394. On 22 April 1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 913 condemning the Bosnian Serbs for the attacks on Goražde.¹²⁸² The following day, an agreement was reached between Akashi and the Bosnian Serbs **(It was an Agreement of Mr. Akashi with this President, who risked further misunderstanding with his military people, because the militaries were right!)** for an immediate and total cease-fire around Goražde starting at 12 p.m.¹²⁸³ It established that UNPROFOR would monitor the three kilometre radius from the centre of Goražde and heavy weapons would be withdrawn from a 20 kilometre radius.¹²⁸⁴

395. On 21 May 1994, an agreement between the parties to demilitarise the Goražde TEZ was concluded.¹²⁸⁵ It included a cessation of all hostilities in and around Goražde effective 22 May 1994.¹²⁸⁶ UNPROFOR would monitor and maintain the security of the TEZ to ensure compliance by the parties.¹²⁸⁷ **EXCULPATORY! Why this didn't happen a year earlier, when the “safe zones” had been established? The international sponsors of the Muslim plans kept some time to facilitate the Muslim military successes! This is a very bad practice, and a new “crisis areas” must be aware of that! #UN-NATO biased)!**

vi. Contact Group

396. The Contact Group was comprised of representatives from France, Germany, the UK, the Russian Federation, and the USA.¹²⁸⁸ Talks were held in Geneva between 1 to 8 June 1994 in order to come to a political settlement of the conflict, the main issue being the

¹²⁸¹ P852 (UNPROFOR Update on Goražde, 17 April 1994), p. 2; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 112. On 23 April 1994, Akashi met with the Accused, Mladić, Gvero, Koljević, Krajišnik, and Buha in Belgrade at a meeting chaired by Slobodan Milošević. Topics discussed included the situation in Goražde, normalising relations between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serbs, and an agreement for an overall cessation of hostilities. D3498 (UNPROFOR report, 23 April 1994); Yasushi Akashi, T. 37709–37713 (24 April 2013).

¹²⁸² P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 142.

¹²⁸³ D3498 (UNPROFOR report, 23 April 1994), p. 7; P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 143.

¹²⁸⁴ D3498 (UNPROFOR report, 23 April 1994), p. 7.

¹²⁸⁵ P1664 (UNPROFOR report re meeting on Goražde, 21 May 1994); P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 105.

¹²⁸⁶ P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 105; P1664 (UNPROFOR report re meeting on Goražde, 21 May 1994), e-court p. 2; P2520 (UNPROFOR Weekly Political Assessment, 28 May 1994), p. 3. *See also* D4822 (Radovan Karadžić’s Order to VRS Main Staff, 26 April 1994) (wherein the Accused ordered the VRS Main Staff to allow an UkrBat convoy into Goražde and to withdraw all heavy weapons from a 20 kilometre radius from the centre of Goražde). Rose stated that a discussion for an agreement was brokered on 23 April 1994 in Belgrade between Akashi, the Accused, and Mladić, among others. The agreement included, *inter alia*, a cease-fire in and around Goražde and the creation of a three kilometre exclusion zone around Goražde. P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 99; Michael Rose, T. 7283 (5 October 2010).

¹²⁸⁷ P1664 (UNPROFOR report re meeting on Goražde, 21 May 1994), e-court p. 2.

¹²⁸⁸ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 121,

concept of a unified state.¹²⁸⁹ The situation in Goražde remained a problem as the Bosnian Muslims stipulated that the presence of armed VRS soldiers inside the Goražde TEZ violated one of their preconditions for the resumption of the cessation of hostilities talks.¹²⁹⁰ UNPROFOR dispatched additional soldiers to Goražde to patrol the TEZ.¹²⁹¹ According to UNPROFOR, the Accused made a commitment to Akashi that all armed VRS soldiers would leave the TEZ in Goražde by 6 p.m. on 2 June 1994.¹²⁹² However, UNPROFOR observed that VRS soldiers in the TEZ simply changed their uniforms into civilian attire and kept their weapons with them.¹²⁹³

397. On 8 June 1994, the parties signed an Agreement on the Cessation of Offensive Actions which would last for one month.¹²⁹⁴ They further agreed to release all prisoners of war and detainees and exchange information on missing persons.¹²⁹⁵ The ABiH launched an offensive in the Ozren mountain range in mid-June.¹²⁹⁶ However, by the end of June, the parties agreed to extend the 8 June agreement by one month.¹²⁹⁷

398. The Contact Group unveiled a revised peace plan on 7 July 1994 which contained a new set of territorial arrangements.¹²⁹⁸ The Contact Group plan proposed that 51% of BiH would be administered by a newly formed Bosnian-Croat Federation and that 49% be administered by the Bosnian Serbs.¹²⁹⁹ On 18 July 1994, the Bosnian Muslims accepted the plan.¹³⁰⁰

399. On 19 July 1994, at the Bosnian Serb Assembly, the Accused spoke about the Contact Group's proposed plan stating that the acceptance of the plan would not be a guarantee for peace.¹³⁰¹ On 21 July 1994, the Bosnian Serbs officially rejected the plan stating that the plan was unfair and their demands were not met.¹³⁰² The Contact Group met again in Geneva on 30 July 1994 to negotiate a new plan.¹³⁰³ A few days earlier, the Bosnian Serbs effectively closed access to the Sarajevo airport and the tunnel under it

¹²⁸⁹ P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 108; P1666 (UNPROFOR report re meetings with Radovan Karadžić, 4 June 1994); P2462 (UNPROFOR Weekly BiH Political Assessment, 3 June 1994), p. 2.

¹²⁹⁰ P2462 (UNPROFOR Weekly BiH Political Assessment, 3 June 1994), pp. 1–2; P2462 (UNPROFOR Weekly BiH Political Assessment, 3 June 1994), pp. 1–2.

¹²⁹¹ P2462 (UNPROFOR Weekly BiH Political Assessment, 3 June 1994), p. 2.

¹²⁹² P2462 (UNPROFOR Weekly BiH Political Assessment, 3 June 1994), pp. 1–2.

¹²⁹³ P2462 (UNPROFOR Weekly BiH Political Assessment, 3 June 1994), p. 2. *See, e.g.*, P2463 (Letter from Višegrad Tactical Group to Drina Tactical Group, 10 May 1994) (an order from the VRS Main Staff to the Drina Corps Tactical Group that soldiers within the three kilometre TEZ are to be dressed civilian clothing). *See also* P2451 (Witness statement of Anthony Banbury dated 19 May 2009), para. 24.

¹²⁹⁴ P2470 (UNPROFOR report, 1 September 1994), p. 3; D1147 (UNPROFOR report, 21 June 1994); P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 113; P1665 (Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities in BiH, June 1994); D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 44.

¹²⁹⁵ P2470 (UNPROFOR report, 1 September 1994), p. 3.

¹²⁹⁶ P2470 (UNPROFOR report, 1 September 1994), p. 3.

¹²⁹⁷ P2470 (UNPROFOR report, 1 September 1994), p. 3.

¹²⁹⁸ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 121; Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4295; P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 121; P2470 (UNPROFOR report, 1 September 1994), p. 5; P6160 (Excerpt from transcript of interview with Momir Bulatović, 7 October 1994), e-court p. 6.

¹²⁹⁹ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 121.

¹³⁰⁰ P2470 (UNPROFOR report, 1 September 1994), p. 5.

¹³⁰¹ P1394 (Transcript of 42nd Session of RS Assembly, 18–19 July 1994), pp. 15–18. *See also* D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 45–46.

¹³⁰² P2470 (UNPROFOR report, 1 September 1994), p. 5.

¹³⁰³ P2470 (UNPROFOR report, 1 September 1994), p. 5.

through Mt. Igman, which had been used for humanitarian aid.¹³⁰⁴ The Accused claimed this was done because of the smuggling of weapons into the city.¹³⁰⁵ Rose, due to security reasons, closed the Sarajevo airport to civilian traffic and the UN reported that without the airport, the situation in Sarajevo would be dire.¹³⁰⁶ Rose reported: “[F]or the first time in many months, we are moving backwards”.¹³⁰⁷

400. An anti-sniping agreement for Sarajevo was signed by the parties on 14 August 1994.¹³⁰⁸ It stipulated that each side would issue orders explicitly forbidding sniping activities against military, civilian, and UN personnel in Sarajevo.¹³⁰⁹ **EXCULPATORY!** They also agreed that UNPROFOR would take measures to identify and prevent sniping with both parties.¹³¹⁰ UNPROFOR reported that following this agreement, sniping activities ceased almost entirely for a six-week period.¹³¹¹ **EXCULPATORY! That was because the UN controlled both sides, and the Muslim side didn’t succeed to provoke the violation without being noticed! Borth the Prosecution and the Chamber erred in concluding that it depended on the Accused or any other Serb official!**

401. On 27 August 1994, in a referendum held in Bosnian Serb-held territory, 96% of the voters rejected the Contact Group plan.¹³¹² (1312) Despite this, the Contact Group continued its work throughout the remainder of year and into the following year.¹³¹³

402. On 20 September 1994, Rose, Andreev, and Harland met with the Accused, Koljević, Krajišnik, and Milovanović in Pale.¹³¹⁴ **(The very same document sais that Harland was not present, and when he was present, he was only takin notes, and didn’t participate in any talks! All the Harland testimonies significantly differed from even hios own official reports, no to mention the reports of his superiors!)** The

¹³⁰⁴ P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 127; P1668 (UNPROFOR report re negotiations in BiH, 2 August 1994), p. 1; P2124 (UNPROFOR report re negotiations with parties in BiH, 2 August 1994); P2470 (UNPROFOR report, 1 September 1994), p. 6. *See also* para. 3593.

¹³⁰⁵ P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 128; P1668 (UNPROFOR report re negotiations in BiH, 2 August 1994), p. 1. *See also* para. 3593.

¹³⁰⁶ P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 128. *See also* para. 3593.

¹³⁰⁷ P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 128.

¹³⁰⁸ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 64, 128–129; P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 139; P861 (UNPROFOR report re agreement on elimination of sniping in Sarajevo, 14 August 1994); P863 (Excerpt from SRK Order, 18 August 1994); Dragomir Milošević, T. 32839–32842 (29 January 2013); P2470 (UNPROFOR report, 1 September 1994), p. 9; D2782 (UNPROFOR Memo, 18 August 1994); Milenko Indić, T. 32460–32461 (22 January 2013); Adjudicated Fact 2789.

¹³⁰⁹ P861 (UNPROFOR report re agreement on elimination of sniping in Sarajevo, 14 August 1994), p. 4. *See also* D2782 (UNPROFOR Memo, 18 August 1994).

¹³¹⁰ P861 (UNPROFOR report re agreement on elimination of sniping in Sarajevo, 14 August 1994), p. 4.

¹³¹¹ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 133; P864 (UNPROFOR report re violations of anti-sniping agreement, 12 September 1994); P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 141.

¹³¹² P872 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report, 10 December 1994), p. 4; P2471 (UNPROFOR Weekly BiH Political Assessment, 3 September 1994), pp. 2, 4; P2470 (UNPROFOR report, 1 September 1994), p. 7; P2457 (UNPROFOR Weekly BiH Political Assessment, 28 August 1994), p. 4; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 121; Martin Bell, T. 9897 (15 December 2010). The Accused called the Contact Group plan a “devilish one”. P2563 (Minutes of meeting between Milan Martić and Radovan Karadžić, 20 August 1994), p. 5. *See also* P2451 (Witness statement of Anthony Banbury dated 19 May 2009), para. 56. On 21 September 1994, the Contact Group presented a new proposal for a territorial settlement outlined in a map. The proposal was accepted by all the parties with the exception of the Bosnian Serbs. D1594 (Letter from UNSC to UNSG, 21 September 1994).

¹³¹³ Anthony Banbury, T. 13354–13355 (15 March 2011). On 9 September 1994, Sergio Vieira de Mello met with the Accused in Pale and informed the Accused that the Contact Group intended to “sustain its policy of heavy pressure on the Bosnian Serbs”. D1136 (UNPROFOR report, 9 September 1994), p. 1. In May 1995, the Contact Group restated that its two main objectives were the continuation of the cessation of hostilities agreement of 31 December 1994 and mutual recognition of Serbia, Croatia, and BiH. D1151 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report, 8 May 1995), pp. 2–3.

¹³¹⁴ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 134–138; P834 (UNPROFOR report re meetings with Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim leadership, 20 September 1994); P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 150.

Accused was angry about a Bosnian Muslim attack in Sarajevo a few days prior and stated there could be no talks on demilitarisation after such an attack.¹³¹⁵ In reference to the possibility that the Security Council would tighten sanctions on Pale, the Accused responded, “if the international community treats us like a beast, then we will behave like a beast”.¹³¹⁶

This was a saying about a drunk: if a three man tell you that you are drunk, you start to swing and shake! A lack of knowledge of the local culture produced in this process a wrong and bad consequences! but, before that the President said clearly: retaliatory measures. They are also concerned about the possibility that the Security Council will soon tighten sanctions on Pale. Such a move, Karadzic stated, would put UNPROFOR in the position of having sided with the enemy. In his words, 'If the

No confusion: the UN forces were invited to be impartial, not to participate in fights and to side with one of warring factions. This experience from former Yugoslavia is quite damaging for the UN reputation. However, the Chamber misunderstood the negotiating tactics of the President. It shouldn't be so, to count only an initial negotiating atmosphere, but an overall result. The same document, P00834, further

5. On a positive note, the Serbs did agree to implement the agreement to clear the Sarajevo TEZ of rogue heavy weapons. They had agreed to move all these weapons some time ago. General Rose

said: However, in part on meeting with Mr. Izetbegovic there is a confirmation of the attacks that angered the Serbs:

7. President Izetbegovic was absolutely contrite about Sunday's attack, and promised, in front General Delic, that there would be no repetition of the incident. He stated that orders had been

Krajišnik demanded, *inter alia*, that UNPROFOR formally recognise the Bosnian Serb ownership of the Sarajevo airport and that UNPROFOR pay rent for the use of the airport.¹³¹⁷ Krajišnik stated that “it would be difficult to stop Serb soldiers from shooting at airplanes” if these demands were not met.¹³¹⁸ Milovanović agreed to move all of the heavy weapons out of the Sarajevo TEZ by midnight the following night.¹³¹⁹

403. On 23 September 1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 941 in which it noted that UNHCR and the ICRC had reported grave violations of international humanitarian law in Banja Luka, Bijeljina, and other areas of BiH under Bosnian Serb control which it described as ethnic cleansing.¹³²⁰ **(This kind of false assertions of those “humanitarian” organisations, (which totality undoubtedly was clean and honest, but some parts under an inappropriate political influence, were the worst experience) to publish all the misdeeds and irregular actions that they were conveying during the war in BiH. And this should happen, so that the clean parts of those institutions distant themselves)** It condemned these practices and demanded that the Bosnian Serb authorities immediately cease their “campaign of ethnic cleansing” and give immediate access to the Special Representative of the Secretary General, UNPROFOR, UNHCR, and ICRC to

¹³¹⁵ P834 (UNPROFOR report re meetings with Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim leadership, 20 September 1994), para. 1.

¹³¹⁶ P834 (UNPROFOR report re meetings with Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim leadership, 20 September 1994), paras. 1–2; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 135.

¹³¹⁷ P834 (UNPROFOR report re meetings with Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim leadership, 20 September 1994), para. 4.

¹³¹⁸ P834 (UNPROFOR report re meetings with Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim leadership, 20 September 1994), para. 4.

¹³¹⁹ P834 (UNPROFOR report re meetings with Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim leadership, 20 September 1994), para. 5.

¹³²⁰ P5424 (UNSC Resolution 941, 23 September 1994), p. 1. Rose testified that the cessation of hostilities agreed upon in February 1994 came to an end in September 1994 when the ABiH launched an attack against the VRS. Michael Rose, T. 7256 (5 October 2010).

Banja Luka, Bijeljina, and other areas.¹³²¹ On 5 October 1994, Akashi and UNPROFOR met with the Accused and others in Pale to continue negotiations.¹³²² Topics for discussion included, *inter alia*, the reopening of the Sarajevo airport, re-opening of land routes into Sarajevo, demilitarisation of Sarajevo, and freedom of movement for UNPROFOR, UNHCR, and civilians.¹³²³

404. On 10 October 1994, Rose, Gobilliard, and Harland met in Pale with Mladić and Tolimir to discuss a sniping incident on a tramway in Sarajevo and the freedom of movement of fuel convoys.¹³²⁴ On 19 October 1994, Rose reported to Akashi that Mladić was not allowing fuel convoys across Bosnian Serb-held territory until UNPROFOR guaranteed that ABiH forces were out of the DMZ around Mt. Igman or unless UNPROFOR hand over 50% of the convoys to the Bosnian Serbs.¹³²⁵ Accordingly, Rose recommended that a letter be written to the Accused informing him of this situation.¹³²⁶

That was a pattern: when the VRS officers tried to protect their units and security and interests of the Army, the internationals wrote to the President, and the President usually met their requests, trusting their reports, and thus deepening the rift between him and his Army officers! #UN bias!)

405. On 22 October 1994, Akashi and Rose met with the Accused, Koljević, Buha, Zametica, and Tolimir in Pale.¹³²⁷ The Bosnian Serbs stated that they had opened the Sarajevo airport and restored utilities to the city.¹³²⁸ Rose reported that this was untrue.¹³²⁹

406. On 19 November 1994, Gobilliard and Andreev met with the Accused and Tolimir in Pale to discuss the deteriorating situation in BiH, including the attacks around Sarajevo and Bihać in violation of Security Council Resolution 836.¹³³⁰ According to UNPROFOR, the Accused made it clear that the Bosnian Serbs would not respect any agreements until the Bosnian Muslims completely withdrew from the DMZ.¹³³¹ Akashi reported that he spoke to the Accused and urged him to accept the Contact Group plan but “to no avail”.¹³³² **Why it is important to note even in this Judgement? Is the job of this court to make a political assessments, or to establish a criminal deeds? The President accepted four out of five peace plans, while the Muslims rejected or sabotaged all of them, but this one is useful to #denigrate the President!#?**

¹³²¹ P5424 (UNSC Resolution 941, 23 September 1994), p. 2.

¹³²² D3500 (UNPROFOR report, 7 October 1994); Yasushi Akashi, T. 37717–37718 (24 April 2013); P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 154. Others present at the meeting included UNPROFOR Force Commander General de Lapresle, Viera de Mello (Head of Civil Affairs), Rose, Andreev, Koljević, Krajišnik, Buha, Mladić and Gvero. D3500 (UNPROFOR report, 7 October 1994), para. 1.

¹³²³ D3500 (UNPROFOR report, 7 October 1994), p. 3.

¹³²⁴ P867 (UNPROFOR report on meeting with Ratko Mladić, 10 October 1994); P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 156. *See* para. 3601.

¹³²⁵ P868 (UNPROFOR report on Serb fuel blockade, 19 October 1994), p. 1; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 144.

¹³²⁶ P868 (UNPROFOR report on Serb fuel blockade, 19 October 1994).

¹³²⁷ P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 159.

¹³²⁸ P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 159.

¹³²⁹ P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 159.

¹³³⁰ P1776 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Radovan Karadžić and General Tolimir, 20 November 1994).

¹³³¹ P1776 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Radovan Karadžić and General Tolimir, 20 November 1994).

¹³³² P3864 (UNPROFOR report, 24 November 1994), p. 1.

407. On 1 December 1994, Rose went to Pale to speak to the Accused about the deteriorating relationship between the Bosnian Serbs and UNPROFOR.¹³³³ The Accused was upset about NATO activity and Rose explained to him that NATO air support could be used (i) in support of UNPROFOR troops who are in danger, (ii) in support of the TEZ, and (iii) to deter attacks on the safe areas.¹³³⁴ Rose also told the Accused that approximately 500 UNPROFOR personnel were being detained in eastern BiH and the Accused promised that he would look into it but assured him that the detainees were being treated well.¹³³⁵ Rose told the Accused that unless minimum conditions were met, UNPROFOR would begin withdrawing from BiH as its mission had become almost impossible.¹³³⁶ Gvero told Rose that the Sarajevo airport could not be re-opened until the Bosnian Serbs received written guarantees from the UN that NATO would not attack Bosnian Serb targets and that the safe areas would be respected when they were demilitarised.¹³³⁷ **#Perfectly rightful! No army all over the world would participate in agreements that lead to their defeat! Or the Serbs were supposed to be fully and unconditionally obedient, no matter what!** However, within a few days, Koljević made assurances that UNPROFOR personnel would be released and by week's end, all UNPROFOR detainees were released and some convoys were moving through BiH again.¹³³⁸ **EXCULPATORY!#Convoys!** Buha issued a public statement that the Bosnian Serb Assembly should accept the Contact Group plan on the understanding that the acceptance of the plan would be immediately followed by "talks on territorial swaps".¹³³⁹

408. On 7 December 1994, the Accused made public statements on Serb television that he was willing to negotiate on the basis of the Contact Group plan but that the map was still unacceptable.¹³⁴⁰ Subsequent meetings took place in Pale over the issue of the restrictions on UNPROFOR's freedom of movement, the demilitarisation of Bihać, and the Mt. Igman DMZ.¹³⁴¹

409. On 14 December 1994, Akashi and Rose met with the Accused and others in Pale.¹³⁴² Akashi proposed a plan to implement further negotiations on the basis of the Contact Group plan and suggested, *inter alia*, a cease-fire and demilitarised zone for Bihać, a cease-fire for all of BiH, and a cessation of hostilities.¹³⁴³ The Accused expressed his opinion that the Bosnian Serbs had been treated unequally and that there would be no cease-

¹³³³ P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 177; P869 (UNPROFOR report on meeting with Radovan Karadžić, 1 December 1994); P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 148.

¹³³⁴ P869 (UNPROFOR report on meeting with Radovan Karadžić, 1 December 1994), p. 2. With respect to Bihać, Rose explained that NATO air support would only be used if the Bosnian Serbs "bombarded the civilian centre of town". P869 (UNPROFOR report on meeting with Radovan Karadžić, 1 December 1994), p. 2.

¹³³⁵ P869 (UNPROFOR report on meeting with Radovan Karadžić, 1 December 1994), p. 2.

¹³³⁶ P872 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report, 10 December 1994), p. 2. The minimum conditions included (i) re-opening of the Sarajevo airport which had been closed since 23 November 1994; (ii) free movement of UN convoys to eastern Bosnia "to a point where UNPROFOR has at least seven days of stocks" in Srebrenica, Žepa, and Goražde; (iii) access to Bihać for UNPROFOR and UNHRC; (iv) passage of UN vehicles through Bosnian Serb checkpoints in Sarajevo, which had been blocked for weeks; and (v) release of UNPROFOR hostages. P872 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report, 10 December 1994), p. 2.

¹³³⁷ P872 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report, 10 December 1994), p. 2.

¹³³⁸ P872 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report, 10 December 1994), p. 3.

¹³³⁹ P872 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report, 10 December 1994), p. 4.

¹³⁴⁰ P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 181; P872 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report, 10 December 1994), p. 4.

¹³⁴¹ Present at the meeting were Rose, Andreev, Koljević, Krajišnik, Gvero, and Tolimir. P1640 (UNPROFOR report, 12 December 1994); P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 182; Michael Rose, T. 7253–7256 (5 October 2010).

¹³⁴² Others present at the meeting were Andreev, General de Lapresle, Koljević, Krajišnik, Buha, and Tolimir. P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 184.

¹³⁴³ P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 184.

fire until an actual peace plan to end the conflict was proposed and that he would only consider the Bihać proposal once agreements on Srebrenica, Žepa, Goražde, and the Mt. Igman DMZ were fulfilled.¹³⁴⁴ **The Bihać #“safe zone# had an entire Corps, the 5th Corps of ABiH, which committed many horrifying crimes and atrocities against the Serbs in RS and RSK, and the entire “international community” watched what they were doing, but when the Serbs responded and threatened to defeat the 5th Corps, the entire International Community pressed the Serbs asking for a ceasefire around Bihać. (#Safe zones” compromised#) Or, as Harland testified, T2125, on 7 May 2010: “The Serbs said that either there is a war – no agreement or that there is no war, a complete cessation of hostilities.” The International Community was perfectly aware of the Muslim intentions, as Harland testified, commenting the Muslim rejection of an overall COHA and buying time, T 2147 of 10 May 2010: “Some had very maximalist goals and believing that one day the Bosniaks would control the entire country if they could just buy enough time. Others felt they should take an agreement that was on offer, and they, in fact, regretted that they had not accepted earlier agreements like Cutileiro or Owen-Stoltenberg or HMS Invincible agreements, And that was the plan that the internationals backed up, as well as the Muslim rejection was backed up by some powerful countries! This backing neither helped the Muslims, nor the Serbs, it only procrastinated the peace and caused all peoples in the region a great sufferings and casualties! #The buying time trickery#!**

410. On 31 December 1994, the parties signed an Agreement on Complete Cessation of Hostilities (“COHA”) following the cease-fire agreement signed on 23 December 1994.¹³⁴⁵ The complete cessation of hostilities was to go into effect from 12 p.m. on 1 January 1995 along all the confrontation lines.¹³⁴⁶ The COHA was signed by the Accused, Izetbegović, Rasim Delić, Mladić, Krešimir Zubak, Vladimir Soljić, and witnessed by Akashi and Rose.¹³⁴⁷ The COHA stipulated that the agreement would be in effect for an initial period of four months, subject to renewal by agreement of the parties.¹³⁴⁸ The COHA would be monitored by UNPROFOR through the establishment of a Central Joint Commission (“CJC”), which would have an initial meeting at the Sarajevo airport and a Regional Joint Commission would also be established in permanent session, “as needed and as determined” by the CJC.¹³⁴⁹ The COHA provided for (i) the separation of forces to mutually agreed upon positions and the positioning of UNPROFOR forces for observation and monitoring; (ii) the parties refraining from use of all explosive munitions, and (iii) the organisation of talks for the withdrawal of heavy weapons of calibre 12.7 mm and above and their monitoring by UNPROFOR.¹³⁵⁰ The parties agreed to full freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and other international agencies, in particular UNHCR, and to monitor

¹³⁴⁴ P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 185.

¹³⁴⁵ P1648 (Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, 31 December 1994), p. 1; P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 190; Yasushi Akashi, T. 37725–37726 (24 April 2013); D4835 (Fax from UNPROFOR re Draft Agreement on Complete Cessation of Hostilities, 25 December 1994); P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 158; D3505 (Letter from Yasushi Akashi to Radovan Karadžić, 24 December 1994); D2786 (VRS Main Staff Order, 1 January 1995), p. 1; Milenko Indić, T. 32469 (22 January 2013); Rupert Smith, T. 11298–11299 (8 February 2011); Adjudicated Fact 2790. A draft of the cease-fire agreement was agreed up on 19 December 1994. D3503 (UNPROFOR fax, 19 December 1994); Yasushi Akashi, T. 37721–37723 (24 April 2013); D3504 (UNPROFOR fax, 20 December 1994); P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 187.

¹³⁴⁶ P1648 (Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, 31 December 1994), p. 1.

¹³⁴⁷ P1648 (Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, 31 December 1994), p. 3.

¹³⁴⁸ P1648 (Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, 31 December 1994), p. 1.

¹³⁴⁹ P1648 (Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, 31 December 1994), p. 1; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 158.

¹³⁵⁰ P1648 (Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, 31 December 1994), p. 2.

human rights and the delivery of humanitarian aid.¹³⁵¹ **It would be fair to say that this COHA was facilitated by the former US President Carter, who was invited by the President and thanks to President Carter the President accepted this four months limited COHA.**

411. On 1 January 1995, the first meeting of CJC was convened at the Sarajevo airport.¹³⁵² Points of discussion included (i) the exchange of liaison officers; (ii) the implementation of the 5 June 1992 Sarajevo airport agreement; (iii) the 8 May 1993 Srebrenica and Žepa agreements; (iv) the 14 August 1994 anti-sniping agreement; (v) the 14 August 1993 Mt. Igman DMZ agreement; (vi) the confrontation lines and WCPs; (vii) the Blue Routes; and (viii) the withdrawal of foreign troops.¹³⁵³ Despite holding one or two additional meetings, the CJC did not function in an effective way.¹³⁵⁴
412. On 11 January 1995, an agreement on the military implementation of the COHA was signed by Mladić, Delić, and Blaškić, and witnessed by Rose.¹³⁵⁵
413. On 31 January 1995, an agreement for the reopening of the Airport Routes for official international humanitarian organisations within the protocol of the COHA was signed by Krajišnik, Hasan Muratović, UNPROFOR, and UNHCR.¹³⁵⁶ It went into effect at 1 p.m. on 1 February 1995.¹³⁵⁷
414. Despite the COHA, by March 1995 UNPROFOR reported that the situation in Sarajevo had deteriorated.¹³⁵⁸ The situation in BiH, generally, saw an upsurge in military activity with the shelling of Tuzla and Goražde.¹³⁵⁹ In addition, Mladić told Smith in early March 1995 that he anticipated that the ABiH would attack the eastern enclaves in a “Tuzla to Srebrenica and Žepa and Tronovo to Goražde” axis and that in response the Bosnian Serbs would attack into the enclaves.¹³⁶⁰ Smith responded that such an action would be interpreted as an attack on the safe areas.¹³⁶¹ UNPROFOR reported that the prospects for a political solution to the conflict remained “remote” as Slobodan Milošević rejected proposals by the Contact Group and the Bosnian Serbs were firmly maintaining their refusal to negotiate on the basis of the Contact Group plan.¹³⁶² **(Completely untrue! And that was widely known, the Serbs accepted to negotiate “on the basis of the Contact Group plan” but the internationals demanded that the wording be “on the basis of acceptance**

¹³⁵¹ P1648 (Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, 31 December 1994), p. 2.

¹³⁵² P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 158 (with Rose, Gobilliard, Tolimir, Indić, Hajrulahović, and Karavelić in attendance); P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 191.

¹³⁵³ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 158 (opining that the meeting did not achieve much).

¹³⁵⁴ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 159.

¹³⁵⁵ P873 (Cease-fire Agreement, 11 January 1995); P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 160; P874 (UNPROFOR report re cease-fire agreement, 11 January 1995).

¹³⁵⁶ P875 (Agreement re opening of Sarajevo airport, 31 January 1995); P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 163.

¹³⁵⁷ P875 (Agreement re opening of Sarajevo airport, 31 January 1995), p. 1; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 163. On 4 February 1995, Rupert Smith wrote to Koljević to indicate UNPROFOR's intention to open the Airport Routes to civilian traffic on 6 February 1995. See D1018 (UNPROFOR letter to Nikola Koljević, 4 February 1995).

¹³⁵⁸ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 171; P878 (UNPROFOR report re cease-fire agreement, 29 March 1995). See also P2257 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report, 18 March 1995); P2482 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 26 March 1995); Rupert Smith, T. 11341 (8 February 2011).

¹³⁵⁹ P878 (UNPROFOR report re cease-fire agreement, 29 March 1995), p. 1.

¹³⁶⁰ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 168; P877 (UNPROFOR Memo re meeting with Ratko Mladić, 7 March 1995), p. 2.

¹³⁶¹ P877 (UNPROFOR Memo re meeting with Ratko Mladić, 7 March 1995), p. 2.

¹³⁶² P2478 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 4 March 1995), p. 2.

of the Contact Group plan". This "on the basis of acceptance was prejudicing the outcome, and it wasn't a fair proposal, but a sort of trap. Who reads this Judgement as a history of this conflict should have known this too. Anyway, see para 346 of this Judgement! Further, both the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims complained about the other side's non-compliance with the COHA.¹³⁶³ On 31 March 1995, the Security Council extended UNPROFOR's mandate in BiH for an additional eight months, ending on 30 November 1995.¹³⁶⁴

415. On 7 April 1995, UNPROFOR reported that the Bosnian Serbs refused to allow the UN passage through the Blue Routes around the Sarajevo airport and that the Bosnian Muslims had refused to attend the CJC.¹³⁶⁵ The following day, the Bosnian Serbs closed the Sarajevo airport, including for humanitarian relief, alleging that UNPROFOR was violating the 5 June 1992 Sarajevo airport agreement.¹³⁶⁶ On 20 April 1995, Akashi and Smith met with the Accused, Koljević, Krajišnik, and Gvero in Pale.¹³⁶⁷ The Accused stated that the COHA had been "breached so massively by the Muslims that it does not exist".¹³⁶⁸ He also stated that the Bosnian Serbs would not accept any form of a cease-fire but only accept a complete cessation of hostilities.¹³⁶⁹ A visit of the Contact Group's representatives from the USA and Germany to Sarajevo on 21 April 1995 was blocked by the Bosnian Serbs.¹³⁷⁰ On 22 April 1995, the Accused held a press conference and stated that if peace was not possible through political means, the Bosnian Serbs would put an end to the war by military means.¹³⁷¹ **Which was perfectly legitimate. Any delay was in favour of the Muslim/Croat army, and the Serbs were risking to be defeated and expelled from Bosnia completely. At the same time, as Harland testified (see T2126 There, General Smith had a plan to end the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or at least a series of initiatives that would contribute to the end of the war. And central to those initiatives was the need to direct NATO air-strikes against the Bosnian Serbs on a massive scale." # (UN-NATO bias, and abuse of mandate!) General Smith was sent to Bosnia to end the war by a decisive military action against the Bosnian Serbs. That was the reason for a massive NATO bombardment of the Serb facilities at the end of May 1995, which resulted in the crisis between the UN and the RS. Asked whether the Security Council approved their robust "air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs on a massive scale" Harland responded, T2127: If we had gone to the Security Council, in advance of the operation we launched on the night of the 29th and 30th of August, and had explicitly asked for their legal imprimatur in advance, I don't know. Perhaps you are correct. The mandate was relatively obscure, and -- but it gave very broad goals and very broad authorities, and in the end, we felt we could only reach those broad goals by the extensive use of those authorities. That is how the international presence took part in this conflict, completely siding one of the warring faction and exhausting and jeopardizing the other! And all was done behind the SC backs, because the NATO**

¹³⁶³ P2478 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 4 March 1995), p. 3.

¹³⁶⁴ P2483 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 1 April 1995), p. 2.

¹³⁶⁵ D1124 (UNPROFOR report, 7 April 1995), para. 5.

¹³⁶⁶ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 173.

¹³⁶⁷ P2261 (UNPROFOR report re meetings with Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim leadership, 22 April 1995); D3511 (UNPROFOR report, 22 April 1995); Yasushi Akashi, T. 37733 (24 April 2013).

¹³⁶⁸ P2261 (UNPROFOR report re meetings with Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim leadership, 22 April 1995), p. 2.

¹³⁶⁹ P2261 (UNPROFOR report re meetings with Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim leadership, 22 April 1995), p. 2.

¹³⁷⁰ P2488 (UNPROFOR report, 22 April 1995).

¹³⁷¹ P883 (UNPROFOR report re Radovan Karadžić's press conference, 22 April 1995), p. 4; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 174.

prone UN Generals were not sure the SC would allow them to go such robust way!#UN-NATO abuses!#) .

416. The situation in Sarajevo and BiH deteriorated further in May 1995.¹³⁷² On 1 May 1995, the parties were unable to agree to a renewal of the COHA, thus resulting in its expiration.¹³⁷³ The Security Council expressed its deep concern about the failure of the parties to extend the COHA.¹³⁷⁴ The Contact Group restated its two main objectives, namely the extension of the COHA and the mutual recognition of Serbia, Croatia, and BiH.¹³⁷⁵ UNPROFOR reported that “unless the Contact Group somehow finds a way to initiate a viable negotiation process the parties will continue on a path of mutual destruction”.¹³⁷⁶ **Certainly, a “viable negotiating process” not only denigration, blackmail and anti-Serb position.** UNPROFOR also reported that on 7 May 1995, the VRS had shelled Butmir and the Igman road.¹³⁷⁷ The Sarajevo airport had remained closed to humanitarian flights since 8 April 1995.¹³⁷⁸
417. On 21 May 1995, Smith and the Accused met in Pale to discuss the future mandate of UNPROFOR, the eastern enclaves, Sarajevo, and the Contact Group peace process.¹³⁷⁹ The Accused complained to Smith about the “partial nature of UN Mandates” with respect to UNPROFOR but that the Bosnian Serbs wished for a negotiated settlement and that the UN should remain in BiH for a future political settlement.¹³⁸⁰ With respect to the eastern enclaves, the Accused stated that he could not respect the safe areas mandates because in his opinion, the safe areas were safe havens for the ABiH.¹³⁸¹ The Accused maintained his position that he would not accept the Contact Group plan but he would accept negotiations on the basis of the Contact Group plan.¹³⁸²
418. On 22 May 1995, the VRS removed two heavy weapons from the WCPs near Sarajevo.¹³⁸³ The ABiH removed their heavy weapons and the fighting escalated.¹³⁸⁴ The VRS removed more heavy weapons in response.¹³⁸⁵ On 24 May 1995, Smith issued an ultimatum to both parties that NATO air strikes would be called in unless all heavy weapons ceased firing by 12 p.m. the following day.¹³⁸⁶ A second deadline, 24 hours later, was established for the parties to either remove their heavy weapons from the exclusion

¹³⁷² P886 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 13 May 1995); P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 183. See paras. 3608–3609.

¹³⁷³ D1151 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report, 8 May 1995), p. 2.

¹³⁷⁴ D1151 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report, 8 May 1995), p. 3.

¹³⁷⁵ D1151 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report, 8 May 1995), p. 3.

¹³⁷⁶ D1151 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report, 8 May 1995), p. 3.

¹³⁷⁷ P886 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 13 May 1995), p. 2; D1151 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report, 8 May 1995), p. 8.

¹³⁷⁸ P886 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 13 May 1995), p. 2.

¹³⁷⁹ P2266 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Radovan Karadžić, 21 May 1995).

¹³⁸⁰ P2266 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Radovan Karadžić, 21 May 1995), pp. 1–2.

¹³⁸¹ P2266 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Radovan Karadžić, 21 May 1995), p. 2.

¹³⁸² P2266 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Radovan Karadžić, 21 May 1995), p. 3.

¹³⁸³ P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 188; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 183.

¹³⁸⁴ P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 188; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 183.

¹³⁸⁵ P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 188; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 183; P5012 (UNPROFOR report re Sarajevo heavy weapon exclusion zone, 25 May 1995). See also D987 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and General Milovanović, 25 May 1995); Dragomir Milošević, T. 33225–33226 (5 February 2013).

¹³⁸⁶ P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 188; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 183; P5012 (UNPROFOR report re Sarajevo heavy weapon exclusion zone, 25 May 1995). See para. 5855.

zone or to place them in the collection points.¹³⁸⁷ The Bosnian Serbs failed to comply with the deadlines **(As if the Muslim side complied???)** and Akashi authorised NATO to conduct air strikes.¹³⁸⁸

419. Following NATO air strikes on Bosnian Serb military targets on 25 and 26 May 1995, the Bosnian Serb forces detained UN personnel in BiH.¹³⁸⁹ The VRS shelled Sarajevo and the safe areas, including Tuzla.¹³⁹⁰ On 27 May 1995, in an order to all SRK units, Dragomir Milošević stated that the Bosnian Serbs would have full control of Sarajevo airport and “stand ready to take it over with complete UNPROFOR combat equipment”.¹³⁹¹ The Accused declared that all Security Council resolutions and NATO ultimatums were null and void.¹³⁹² The UN also reported that the food situation in Sarajevo was rapidly deteriorating due to the continued closure of the airport and of land routes.¹³⁹³ In addition the gas and electricity in Sarajevo had been cut off.¹³⁹⁴

420. In early June 1995, heavy fighting around Sarajevo broke out.¹³⁹⁵ **(A very known Muslim offensive!#Inaccuracy, obscurity, to imply the Serb guilt!#)** The Accused and Koljević agreed to re-open the land routes to Sarajevo for UNHCR convoys.¹³⁹⁶ By 3 June 1995, 120 UN personnel were released by the Bosnian Serbs but the UN estimated that 200 more were still in detention.¹³⁹⁷ On 9 June 1995, the Security Council approved the deployment of British and French rapid reaction forces equipped with heavy artillery to UNPROFOR in BiH.¹³⁹⁸ Also on this day, UNHCR, UNPROFOR, and the Bosnian Serbs came to an agreement to start the delivery of humanitarian aid by land routes to Sarajevo.¹³⁹⁹

421. On 16 June 1995, the Security Council passed Resolution 998 demanding the immediate and unconditional release of the remaining UN personnel.¹⁴⁰⁰ **(#Before this Resolution the Accused already managed to release the majority of the UN soldiers!# Skipping, obscurity!#)** It further demanded the unimpeded access for humanitarian aid, access to Sarajevo, and respecting the safe areas.¹⁴⁰¹ It also authorised the increase in UNPROFOR personnel by up to 12,500 additional troops.¹⁴⁰² Harland reported that there

¹³⁸⁷ P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 188; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 183.

¹³⁸⁸ P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), paras. 188–189; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 183; P5012 (UNPROFOR report re Sarajevo heavy weapon exclusion zone, 25 May 1995).

¹³⁸⁹ See Section IV.D: Hostages component.

¹³⁹⁰ P2284 (UNSG report entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica”, 15 November 1999), para. 189; P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 183.

¹³⁹¹ P2416 (SRK Order, 27 May 1995), p. 2.

¹³⁹² P887 (SRNA news report, 29 May 1995); P888 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 3 June 1995), p. 3.

¹³⁹³ P888 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 3 June 1995), p. 3.

¹³⁹⁴ P888 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 3 June 1995), p. 4.

¹³⁹⁵ P890 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 10 June 1995), p. 2.

¹³⁹⁶ P890 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 10 June 1995), p. 2.

¹³⁹⁷ P888 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 3 June 1995), p. 2. See also P889 (Radovan Karadžić’s Order to VRS and to RS MUP, 2 June 1995). The remaining UN personnel were released by the end of June 1995. P890 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 10 June 1995), p. 2; P891 (Radovan Karadžić’s Order to VRS and RS MUP, 6 June 1995); P893 (Radovan Karadžić’s Order to VRS, 17 June 1995); P892 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report Sarajevo), 24 June 1995), pp. 2–3. See para. 5933.

¹³⁹⁸ See P5014 (UNSC Resolution 998, 16 June 1995), p. 1 (referring to the 9 June 1995 letter from the Secretary-General regarding the rapid reaction forces); Rupert Smith, T. 11498–11507 (10 February 2011).

¹³⁹⁹ D1125 (UNPROFOR daily report to UNSC, 9 June 1995).

¹⁴⁰⁰ P5014 (UNSC Resolution 998, 16 June 1995).

¹⁴⁰¹ P5014 (UNSC Resolution 998, 16 June 1995), p. 3.

¹⁴⁰² P5014 (UNSC Resolution 998, 16 June 1995), p. 3.

were what he believed to be targeted shelling against UNPROFOR by the SRK in Sarajevo.¹⁴⁰³ **(#Believes as facts!# One could guess what were his “believes”! in a criminal case this “believes” shouldn’t even be mentioned in such a serious judgement!!!)** Smith wrote to Mladić expressing his concerns about the reports about the shelling of Bihac, Srebrenica, Goražde, and Sarajevo.¹⁴⁰⁴ Smith reminded Mladić that the safe areas regime according to Security Council Resolution 836 was still in place but that there were increasing attacks on the civilian population.¹⁴⁰⁵ On 30 June 1995, Colonel Robert Meille, the Acting Sector Sarajevo UNPROFOR Commander, wrote a letter to Dragomir Milošević condemning the attacks in Sarajevo, including in the Alpašino Polje neighbourhood and the attack on the PTT building, which housed the headquarters of UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo.¹⁴⁰⁶

vii. Initiative by the USA

422. On 21 August 1995, the Accused, Krajišnik, and Buha met with UNPROFOR’s Chief of Mission to discuss the current peace initiative.¹⁴⁰⁷ The Accused agreed that it was a good time to find a political solution to the conflict; however, he rejected any notion of a united BiH and maintained that each constituent republic should have sovereignty.¹⁴⁰⁸

423. On 28 August 1995, the Markale market in Sarajevo was shelled.¹⁴⁰⁹ **(#By whom? Look what Harland said about it, T2126)** *There, General Smith had a plan to end the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or at least a series of initiatives that would contribute to the end of the war. And central to those initiatives was the need to direct NATO air-strikes against the Bosnian Serbs on a massive scale.* **“#Abuse of mandate, #... T2127: If we had gone to the Security Council, in advance of the operation we launched on the night of the 29th and 30th of August, and had explicitly asked for their legal imprimatur in advance, I don’t know. Perhaps you are correct. The mandate was relatively obscure, and -- but it gave very broad goals and very broad authorities, and in the end, we felt we could only reach those broad goals by the extensive use of those authorities...!”** On the same day, the Bosnian Serb Assembly adopted a resolution welcoming the initiative by the USA for a political resolution to the conflict and affirming the readiness of the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate a lasting peace.¹⁴¹⁰

¹⁴⁰³ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 209, 211. See also P896 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 2 July 1995), pp. 4–5.

¹⁴⁰⁴ P2274 (UNPROFOR letter to Ratko Mladić, 26 June 1995).

¹⁴⁰⁵ P2274 (UNPROFOR letter to Ratko Mladić, 26 June 1995).

¹⁴⁰⁶ P895 (Letter from UNPROFOR to Dragomir Milošević, 30 June 1995). See also P896 (UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report (Sarajevo), 2 July 1995).

¹⁴⁰⁷ P2287 (UNPROFOR report re meetings with Bosnian Serb leadership, 22 August 1995).

¹⁴⁰⁸ P2287 (UNPROFOR report re meetings with Bosnian Serb leadership, 22 August 1995), pp. 1–2.

¹⁴⁰⁹ See Scheduled Incident G.19. **Harland stated that in relation to this shelling incident a neutral statement was advised in order to prevent another hostage taking incident because UNPROFOR was going to call in large-scale air strikes against the VRS. This allowed a team of BritBat soldiers to safely leave Bosnian Serb-held territory near Goražde prior to the air strikes. P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 233.**

¹⁴¹⁰ P988 (Transcript of 53rd session of RS Assembly, 28 August 1995), pp. 59, 98. See also P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 316.

424. On 29 August 1995, a meeting of the Serbian and Bosnian Serb leaderships took place in Dobanovci, near Belgrade.¹⁴¹¹ The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the contents of the Contact Group plan along with a possible NATO response to the recent shelling of the Markale market in Sarajevo.¹⁴¹² At the meeting, Slobodan Milošević urged the parties to endorse a collective negotiation team to represent the interests of both the RS and FRY in future peace talks.¹⁴¹³ Milošević proposed that he be the head of that team.¹⁴¹⁴ The Bosnian Serb leaders conceded, signing an agreement which stipulated that the Accused, Mladić, and Krajišnik would be part of a six-member delegation led by Slobodan Milošević.¹⁴¹⁵ This delegation would conduct negotiations for peace in BiH.¹⁴¹⁶ The Accused and Mladić were replaced by Koljević and Buha.¹⁴¹⁷

425. Towards the end of August 1995, UNPROFOR reported the situation in Sarajevo and Goražde to be on “alert state orange” and very tense due to shelling.¹⁴¹⁸ Smith asked Harland to inform the Accused that large-scale air strikes would begin on VRS positions.¹⁴¹⁹ Harland attempted to call the Accused in Pale at 1 a.m. on 30 August 1995.¹⁴²⁰ Harland stated that the Pale switchboard could not be contacted at this time.¹⁴²¹ In addition to NATO air strikes, Smith ordered that VRS positions around Sarajevo be shelled by UNPROFOR’s rapid reaction force on Mt. Igman in an effort to suppress the SRK’s artillery fire.¹⁴²² On 30 August 1995, Akashi sent a letter to the Accused stating that NATO air strikes had started in BiH that day in response to the shelling of the Markale market in Sarajevo two days earlier.¹⁴²³ **(All of it will only be remembered as a shameful operation of the international centres of power. Nothing was as it was depicted!)**

426. On 1 September 1995, there was a formal pause in the air strikes to allow for a meeting between Smith and Mladić.¹⁴²⁴ UNPROFOR opened the Sarajevo airport under the Blue Routes regime despite a threat from Krajišnik that the VRS would shoot any vehicles

¹⁴¹¹ D3058 (Record of meeting between leaderships of FRY and RS, 29 August 1995); D3051 (Witness statement of Momir Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), para. 35A; P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), paras. 314, 317. Present at this meeting were Slobodan Milošević, Zoran Lilić, Momir Bulatović, Radoje Kontić, Momčilo Perišić, the Accused, Krajišnik, Koljević, Dušan Kozović, Buha, Tolimir, Đukić, Gvero, Mladić and Plavšić. D3058 (Record of meeting between leaderships of FRY and RS, 29 August 1995), pp. 1, 11. See also P5039 (Minutes of SDC meeting, 30 August 1995), p. 1.

¹⁴¹² P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 317; D3051 (Witness statement of Momir Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), para. 35B. See para. 4299.

¹⁴¹³ D3058 (Record of meeting between leaderships of FRY and RS, 29 August 1995); P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 317.

¹⁴¹⁴ D3058 (Record of meeting between leaderships of FRY and RS, 29 August 1995), p. 12; P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 317.

¹⁴¹⁵ D3058 (Record of meeting between leaderships of FRY and RS, 29 August 1995), pp. 12–13; P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 318.

¹⁴¹⁶ D3058 (Record of meeting between leaderships of FRY and RS, 29 August 1995), p. 12; P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 318.

¹⁴¹⁷ P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 319.

¹⁴¹⁸ P906 (UNPROFOR daily report, 28-29 August 1995), p. 3.

¹⁴¹⁹ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 235. NATO air strikes started during the night on 29 August 1995 and lasted until 1 September 1995. They resumed again on 5 September and lasted until 14 September 1995. See Adjudicated Facts 2798, 2799.

¹⁴²⁰ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 235.

¹⁴²¹ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 235.

¹⁴²² P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 236; Rupert Smith, T. 11507–11509 (10 February 2011); Dragomir Milošević, T. 33244–33245 (5 February 2013).

¹⁴²³ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 236. See also P906 (UNPROFOR daily report, 28-29 August 1995), p. 3. Smith also called the Accused to inform him of the same. P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 235. See also para. 300.

¹⁴²⁴ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 239.

attempting to cross the airport without their approval.¹⁴²⁵ Harland reported that this was the first time that traffic flowed freely in and out of Sarajevo since the siege had started in 1992.¹⁴²⁶

427. On 2 September 1995, Mladić made a number of concessions to Smith and UNPROFOR, including that the VRS would not conduct any combat operations or attacks in Sarajevo, Bihać, Tuzla, or Goražde; heavy weapons would be withdrawn; and a meeting of the Commanders would be organised.¹⁴²⁷ However, a few days later, Janvier at UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb reported that despite the assurances from the Bosnian Serbs, there was no evidence of heavy weapon withdrawal from the Sarajevo area.¹⁴²⁸

428. On 20 September 1995, Smith met with Miletić and Dragomir Milošević to discuss the progress of the removal of weapons from the TEZ and UNPROFOR's freedom of movement.¹⁴²⁹ Smith told them that progress on talks about a cease-fire in Sarajevo was contingent on the full restoration of utilities to the city.¹⁴³⁰

429. Between 6 and 8 October 1995, meetings were held between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serbs at Hotel Serbia in Ilidža, in order to negotiate a cease-fire arrangement between the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims.¹⁴³¹

430. On 11 October 1995, the UN received letters from both Muratović and Buha stating that they agreed to the cease-fire agreement of 5 October 1995, which would enter into force at 12:01 a.m. on 12 October 1995.¹⁴³² On the same day, President Bill Clinton announced that the "Proximity Peace Talks" were forthcoming in Dayton, Ohio, USA.¹⁴³³

viii. Dayton Agreement

431. On 29 October 1995, consistent with the meeting on 29 August 1995, the Accused authorised the Bosnian Serb delegation to negotiate, together with the delegation of the FRY, at the upcoming peace talks in Dayton.¹⁴³⁴

432. The Bosnia Proximity Peace Talks began at the Wright-Patterson Airforce Base in Dayton on 1 November 1995.¹⁴³⁵ In attendance were delegates from the EU, USA, Russian

¹⁴²⁵ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 240.

¹⁴²⁶ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 240.

¹⁴²⁷ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 241. *See also* D1053 (UNPROFOR letter to Ratko Mladić, 4 September 1995).

¹⁴²⁸ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 242; P907 (UNPROFOR update re Sarajevo, 5 September 1995), p. 1.

¹⁴²⁹ D2899 (Fax from UNPROFOR, 20 September 1995).

¹⁴³⁰ D2899 (Fax from UNPROFOR, 20 September 1995), p. 3.

¹⁴³¹ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 243; P908 (Minutes from the first meeting on the implementation of cease-fire agreement, 6 October 1995); P909 (Minutes from the second meeting on the implementation of cease-fire agreement, 8 October 1995). The Accused, in an interview with CNN, claimed that NATO bombings did not in fact push RS leaders toward peace talks, but rather pushed RS leaders away from peace negotiations. D4490 (Article from CNN entitled "Transcript of Interview with Karadžić", 28 November 1995), p. 3.

¹⁴³² P910 (BiH Government's acceptance of the cease-fire agreement, 11 October 1995); P911 (RS Government's acceptance of the cease-fire agreement, 11 October 1995); P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 245. This cease-fire agreement contained negotiated agreements regarding the restoration of electricity and gas to the Kokoska and the Visegrad-Sokolać-Veselići areas. Additionally, the cease-fire agreement provided for the opening of several routes surrounding Sarajevo for humanitarian aid delivered by the UNPROFOR. P908 (Minutes from the first meeting on the implementation of cease-fire agreement, 6 October 1995); P909 (Minutes from the second meeting on the implementation of cease-fire agreement, 8 October 1995).

¹⁴³³ P973 (Robert Donia's expert report entitled "Bosnian Serb Leadership and the Siege of Sarajevo, 1990-1995", January 2010), p. 103; P2538 (Patrick Treanor's research report entitled "Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995", 1 May 2009), para. 321.

¹⁴³⁴ D3604 (Radovan Karadžić's authorisation, 29 October 1995). P988 (Transcript of 53rd session of RS Assembly, 28 August 1995), p. 98.


¹⁴³⁵ D4127 (Report of VRS Main Staff, 25 November 1995) p. 1.

Federation, UK, France, Germany, FRY, Bosnian Serbs, Croatia, and the Muslim-Croat Alliance.¹⁴³⁶ Despite the removal of the Accused from the RS negotiating team he played a central consultative role in regards to RS negotiations at Dayton.¹⁴³⁷

Who said RK was removed from the RS negotiating team? The Accused didn't go to the Dayton, because there was a treath for him to be arrested. This was yet another unfair move from the western "international community" although it was recognized that Karadzic was the author of the Dayton Agreement (see: Ronald Hatchet, interview) and there was no any limitation to contact the team that was authorized by Karadzic. Instead of welcoming his activity in negotiations, the Chamber itself accuses him more than anyone else, and for the things not objected by anyone! See the R. Hatchet's article, D2247:

August 4, 1995 The Dallas Morning News 25 A

Don't ignore the Serbs' peace plan



RONALD HATCHETT

Evidently, all the options being considered by U.S. officials for ending the Bosnian crisis assume that the only solution is escalating military violence. The purpose, they say, is "to force the Serbs to the negotiating table."

But the Serbs are ready to negotiate now. In September and again a week ago, I gave the Clinton administration a proposal from Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. Essentially, it called on President Clinton to convene a Camp David meeting with the leaders of all the Yugoslav protagonists to work out a settlement.

Mr. Karadzic made clear that he would accept a 51 percent-49 percent split of the land as long as the 49 percent allotted to the Serbs was contiguous. He even included a map showing the territorial settlement he has in mind. It would leave the Serbs with about 23 percent less land than they had at the time the fighting began in 1992 and about 40 percent less than they now hold.

In return for the surrendered land, Mr. Karadzic insists that the Sarajevo government recognize the Serbs' right to self-determination within their allotted territory. The Serbs, he said, are willing to continue an association with other Bosnian areas as long as the arrangements assure the Serbs control over their daily lives within their state.

Had the West insisted on negotiations among the Yugoslav factions, all the suffering of the past four years could have been avoided. Under international law, people who want to secede from an internationally recognized state like Yugoslavia are obligated to negotiate the terms of the secession with the other peoples of that state.

That was done with Czechoslovakia in 1992. Czechs and Slovaks set up separate states free of violence. But with Yugoslavia the various peoples unilaterally declared themselves separated from Yugoslavia and unilaterally defined the territory they claimed.

The problem is that 63 percent of the territory claimed by the Bosnian Muslims and 25 percent of that claimed by the Croats has been the home of Serbs for centuries. Moreover, those Serbs account for about 30 percent of the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia, and the overwhelming majority of them want to retain a political, cultural and economic link with their brethren.

The obvious deal is for the Serbs to trade land for Muslim and Croatian recognition of the Serbian right to sovereignty over the territory allocated to them through negotiations.

Last fall, the Clinton administration ignored Mr. Karadzic's peace proposal, telling me that his overture showed Serbs were becoming desperate and that stepping up the pressure would cause them to give in.

Since then, Bosnian government forces have launched major offensives. Each has proved to be a disaster.

Now, the president seems to think widespread use of NATO (read American) air power will add the edge needed for the success of government troops. Few military men agree.

Others argue that lifting the arms embargo for the Muslims will provide them with what they need to win the war. But most military analysts know the embargo is so leaky that government forces already are getting all the arms they can handle.

The Clinton administration has only two choices for ending the suffering of the Yugoslav peoples:

- Commit the large number of American ground and air forces required to impose a Muslim government over all of Bosnia.

- Or rethink the administration's opposition to giving the Serbs the right of self-determination in the land allotted them through negotiations.

I think I know the option most American parents would prefer.

Ronald L. Hatchett is director of the Center for International Studies at the University of St. Thomas in Houston. He also served in top arms negotiating positions under Ronald Reagan.

What an impossible position was the Serb side: if they were in favour of peace, they had been seen as desperate, and would suffer more pressure, and if they were self-confident/defiant and ... they will be bombed)

433. On 21 November 1995, the Bosnian Proximity Peace Talks concluded, producing the "General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina", otherwise known as the Dayton Agreement.¹⁴³⁸ The agreement consisted of 17 separate agreements

¹⁴³⁶ D4127 (Report of VRS Main Staff, 25 November 1995) pp. 1-3.

¹⁴³⁷ Intercepted telephone conversations, as well as the RS negotiation team authorisation attest to the Accused's role. D3604 (Radovan Karadzic's authorisation, 29 October 1995). P4829 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Radovan Karadzic and Momčilo Krajišnik and (ii) Radovan Karadzic, Nikola Koljević, and Momčilo Krajišnik, 15 November 1995) in which Karadzic instructs the RS delegation to reject a proposed constitutional agreement. See also P4830 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadzic, Momčilo Krajišnik, Ratko Mladic, and General Tolimir, 15 November 1995); P4831 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, and General Tolimir, 20 November 1995); P4832 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, and General Tolimir, 20 November 1995); P4833 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadzic, Momčilo Krajišnik, General Miletić, and General Tolimir, 21 November 1995).

¹⁴³⁸ P2538 (Patrick Treanor's research report entitled "Radovan Karadzic and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995", 1 May 2009), para. 322; Milenko Todorović, D4124 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*), T. 13101.

drawn up during negotiations, organised into 11 separate annexes.¹⁴³⁹ The first of these agreements—the Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement—invited the Security Council to authorise NATO and non-NATO nations to establish a multinational Military Implementation Force (“IFOR”) under NATO command in order to assist in implementing the Dayton Agreement.¹⁴⁴⁰ The agreement provided for the cessation of hostilities in BiH, the withdrawal of all foreign forces—including UNPROFOR—from BiH territory, the creation of a corridor of free movement between Goražde and Sarajevo, and the exchange of prisoners between parties to the conflict.¹⁴⁴¹

434. While the Dayton Agreement nominally maintained a single Bosnian state, the envisioned geographical division saw the creation of two sub-national entities: the Federation of BiH and the RS.¹⁴⁴² The Dayton Agreement allotted 49% of the disputed territory to the newly created RS, while 51% of the disputed territory remained under the control of the Federation of BiH.¹⁴⁴³ The Dayton Agreement mandated that a four kilometre zone of separation would be created along the border between these two entities, from which all parties would withdraw all forces, explosives, or other lethal assets.¹⁴⁴⁴ The RS consisted of every town along the Sava and Drina River, with the exception of Goražde.¹⁴⁴⁵ They were connected by the Posavina corridor near Brčko.¹⁴⁴⁶ Meanwhile Goražde and much of Sarajevo were allotted to the Federation of BiH.¹⁴⁴⁷ To the dismay of Bosnian Serb leaders, 61% of Sarajevo’s pre-war territory was given to the Federation, including several neighbourhoods which had been under Bosnian Serb control since 1992.¹⁴⁴⁸ Finally, the parties agreed to demilitarise Sarajevo, and specified that Sarajevo would remain BiH’s capital city.¹⁴⁴⁹

435. The RS delegation was unsatisfied with the course of negotiations at Dayton, as well as their treatment as part of the FRY negotiation team.¹⁴⁵⁰ The RS delegation was particularly unhappy about the division of Sarajevo, the Posavina, Brčko and Goražde corridors, and the RS’s lack of access to the sea.¹⁴⁵¹ They were also unsatisfied with the Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement.¹⁴⁵² As a result, the members of

¹⁴³⁹ D4128 (Dispatch of VRS Main Staff to Security and Intelligence Affairs, 6 December 1995), p. 4.

¹⁴⁴⁰ D4127 (Report of VRS Main Staff, 25 November 1995) p. 5.

¹⁴⁴¹ D4127 (Report of VRS Main Staff, 25 November 1995) pp. 4–12.

¹⁴⁴² Herbert Okun, T. 1730 (27 April 2010); D1595 (BiH Map from Dayton Agreement, 21 November 1995); P6135 (Map of BiH).

¹⁴⁴³ P2604 (Minutes of 47th session of SDC, 28 November 1995), p. 7; D1595 (BiH Map from Dayton Agreement, 21 November 1995).

¹⁴⁴⁴ D4127 (Report of VRS Main Staff, 25 November 1995) p. 6.

¹⁴⁴⁵ D4127 (Report of VRS Main Staff, 25 November 1995) pp. 14–15; D1595 (BiH Map from Dayton Agreement, 21 November 1995); P2604 (Minutes of 47th session of SDC, 28 November 1995), p. 7; Momčilo Krajisnik, T. 43237 (7 November 2013). In the evening of 20 November 1995, Slobodan Milošević and General Wesley Clark agreed that Goražde should remain with the Muslim Croat Federation. Herbert Okun, T. 1743 (27 April 2010).

¹⁴⁴⁶ D1595 (BiH Map from Dayton Agreement, 21 November 1995); P2604 (Minutes of 47th session of SDC, 28 November 1995), p. 7.

¹⁴⁴⁷ See Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4266; Momčilo Krajisnik, T. 43237 (7 November 2013); D4127 (Report of VRS Main Staff, 25 November 1995) pp. 8–10; D1595 (BiH Map from Dayton Agreement, 21 November 1995).

¹⁴⁴⁸ P973 (Robert Donia’s expert report entitled “Bosnian Serb Leadership and the Siege of Sarajevo, 1990–1995”, January 2010), p. 103.

¹⁴⁴⁹ P973 (Robert Donia’s expert report entitled “Bosnian Serb Leadership and the Siege of Sarajevo, 1990–1995”, January 2010), p. 103. Further agreements within the General Framework dealt with regional stabilisation, elections, the BiH constitution, arbitration, human rights, refugees and displaced persons, the preservation of national monuments, public corporations within BiH, civilian implementation of the agreement, and the International Police Task Force. D4128 (Dispatch of VRS Main Staff to Security and Intelligence Affairs, 6 December 1995), p. 4.

¹⁴⁵⁰ P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990–1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 321. See also D4127 (Report of VRS Main Staff, 25 November 1995) p. 12; John Zametica, T. 42449–42450 (29 October 2013).

¹⁴⁵¹ The RS delegation wanted the city of Sarajevo to remain undivided and to be run by a joint government composed of both Serbian and Muslim members. Further, the RS delegation proposed freedom of movement between Goražde and Sarajevo rather than a formal corridor, and wanted the Posavina corridor to be expanded to 20 kilometres. D4127 (Report of VRS Main Staff, 25 November 1995) p. 18. See also D4490 (Article from CNN entitled “Transcript of Interview with Karadžić”, 28 November 1995), p. 2.

¹⁴⁵² D4127 (Report of VRS Main Staff, 25 November 1995) pp. 12–13.

the RS delegation refused to attend the final plenary session of the peace talks as well as the ceremonial initialling of the peace agreement.¹⁴⁵³

436. Despite the absence of the RS representatives, on 21 November 1995, the peace negotiations officially concluded, and the Dayton Agreement was initialled by Tuđman, Slobodan Milošević, and Izetbegović.¹⁴⁵⁴ On 22 November 1995, the Security Council passed Resolution 1022 suspending sanctions against the FRY.¹⁴⁵⁵ Members of the delegation, as well as the Accused, signed a statement declaring that the leadership of RS had accepted the Dayton Agreement, and that RS would fully implement the Accord and all obligations deriving from it.¹⁴⁵⁶ However, in the following weeks, members of the RS delegation met with officials from the UN and the USA in an attempt to make adjustments to the Dayton Agreement, especially in regards to Sarajevo.¹⁴⁵⁷ Despite their efforts at the follow-up conference held in London on 8 and 9 December 1995, neither Koljević nor Buha were able to obtain any significant changes to the Dayton Agreement.¹⁴⁵⁸

437. On 14 December 1995 in Paris, the Dayton Agreement was signed by those who had initialled the plan on 21 November, formally establishing peace in BiH.¹⁴⁵⁹ On 21 December 1995, UNPROFOR was replaced by IFOR.¹⁴⁶⁰

i. APPLICABLE LAW

c. REQUIREMENTS AND ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMES CHARGED

i. Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal

438. The Accused is charged with four counts of violations of the laws or customs of war pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute. Under Counts 6 and 11, the Accused is charged, respectively, with murder and the taking of hostages, both recognised by Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (“Common Article 3”). Count 9 charges the Accused with acts of violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population. Finally, Count 10 charges the Accused with unlawful attacks on civilians.

439. The Chamber will first assess the general requirements for offences charged under Article 3 of the Statute before proceeding with its analysis of the elements in relation to each of these offences.

¹⁴⁵³ P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 322. *See also* D4127 (Report of VRS Main Staff, 25 November 1995) p. 4; John Zametica, T. 42450 (29 October 2013).

¹⁴⁵⁴ Milenko Todorović, T. 13101 (20 April 2011).

¹⁴⁵⁵ P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 323.

¹⁴⁵⁶ P2604 (Minutes of 47th session of SDC, 28 November 1995), pp. 8–9. D4490 (Article from CNN entitled “Transcript of Interview with Karadžić”, 28 November 1995), p. 2.

¹⁴⁵⁷ *See also* D4127 (Report of VRS Main Staff, 25 November 1995) p. 15.

¹⁴⁵⁸ P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 327.

¹⁴⁵⁹ P2538 (Patrick Treanor’s research report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the Serbian Leadership 1990-1995”, 1 May 2009), para. 331.

¹⁴⁶⁰ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 246.

1. General requirements for violations of the laws or customs of war

440. Article 3 of the Statute provides that the Tribunal “shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the laws or customs of war”, and its sub-paragraphs identify a non-exhaustive list of offences that qualify as such violations. Accordingly, Article 3 is a general clause which confers jurisdiction over any serious violation of international humanitarian law not covered by Articles 2, 4, or 5 of the Statute, in addition to those expressly listed under Article 3.¹⁴⁶¹

441. For Article 3 to apply, two preliminary requirements need to be fulfilled, namely there must be an armed conflict and the crime must be closely related to that armed conflict (“nexus requirement”).¹⁴⁶² In relation to the requirement that there exist an armed conflict, the Appeals Chamber in the *Tadić* case articulated the test as follows: “[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized groups or between such groups within a State”.¹⁴⁶³ To determine the existence of an armed conflict, both the intensity of the conflict and the organisation of the parties to the conflict must be considered on a case-by-case basis.¹⁴⁶⁴ It is immaterial whether the armed conflict was international in nature or not.¹⁴⁶⁵

442. In relation to the nexus requirement, while there must be a connection between the alleged offences and the armed conflict, the Prosecution need not establish that the armed conflict was causal to the commission of the crime.¹⁴⁶⁶ However, it needs to be shown that the conflict played a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit the crime, his decision to commit it, the manner in which it was committed, or the purpose for which it was committed.¹⁴⁶⁷ To find a nexus, it is sufficient that the alleged crimes be closely related to hostilities occurring in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the conflict.¹⁴⁶⁸

443. In addition to these two preliminary requirements, the Tribunal’s jurisprudence has established the following general requirements for the application of Article 3 of the Statute, also known as the “*Tadić* Conditions”:

- (a) the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of international humanitarian law;
- (b) the rule must be customary in nature or, if conventional, the treaty must be unquestionably binding on the parties at the time of the alleged offence and not in conflict with or derogating from peremptory norms of international law;

¹⁴⁶¹ *Tadić* Jurisdiction Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, para. 91; *Čelebići* Appeal Judgement, paras. 125, 131, 133; *Boškoski and Tarčulovski* Appeal Judgement, para. 47.

¹⁴⁶² *Tadić* Jurisdiction Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, paras. 67–70; *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 342.

¹⁴⁶³ *Tadić* Jurisdiction Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, para. 70.

¹⁴⁶⁴ *Tadić* Trial Judgement, para. 562; *Limaj et al.* Trial Judgement, paras. 89–90; *Orić* Trial Judgement, para. 254.

¹⁴⁶⁵ *Tadić* Jurisdiction Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, para. 137; *Galić* Appeal Judgement, para. 120.

¹⁴⁶⁶ *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 58.

¹⁴⁶⁷ *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 342 (specifying that the Trial Chamber must establish the existence of a geographical and temporal linkage between the crimes ascribed to the accused and the armed conflict); *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 58.

¹⁴⁶⁸ *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 342 (referring to *Tadić* Jurisdiction Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, para. 70).

- (c) the violation must be serious, namely it must constitute a breach of a rule protecting important values and the breach must involve grave consequences for the victim; and
- (d) the violation of the rule must entail, under customary or conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule.¹⁴⁶⁹

444. Where a crime punishable under Article 3 of the Statute derives from protections found in Common Article 3, the victims of the alleged violation must have taken no active part in the hostilities at the time the crime was committed.¹⁴⁷⁰ Such victims include members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed *hors de combat* by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause.¹⁴⁷¹ In addition, the Chamber must be satisfied that “the perpetrator of a Common Article 3 crime knew or should have been aware that the victim was taking no active part in the hostilities when the crime was committed”.¹⁴⁷²

2. Murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war

445. Under Count 6 of the Indictment, the Accused is charged with murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war, punishable under Article 3 of the Statute.¹⁴⁷³ Murder is not explicitly listed in Article 3 but stems from the prohibition in Common Article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva Conventions, which provides that:

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed ‘*hors de combat*’ by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely [...]

To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

- (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds [...].¹⁴⁷⁴

a. *Actus reus*

446. The *actus reus* of murder is an act or omission resulting in the death of an individual.¹⁴⁷⁵ It is not necessary that proof of a dead body be produced if the victim’s death can be inferred circumstantially from other evidence which has been presented to the Chamber.¹⁴⁷⁶ With regard to the requisite causal nexus, the requirement that death must

¹⁴⁶⁹ *Tadić* Jurisdiction Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, paras. 94, 143.

¹⁴⁷⁰ *Čelebići* Appeal Judgement, para. 420.

¹⁴⁷¹ See *Čelebići* Appeal Judgement, para. 420 (referring to the wording of Common Article 3).

¹⁴⁷² *Boškoški and Tarčulovski* Appeal Judgement, para. 66.

¹⁴⁷³ Indictment, paras. 61–67. See also Schedules A and B Killing Incidents.

¹⁴⁷⁴ For the residual nature of Article 3 of the Statute, see para. 440.

¹⁴⁷⁵ *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 261. See also *Dragomir Milošević* Appeal Judgement, para. 108 (in relation to Article 5 of the Statute); *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 137; *Galić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 147–150 (also in relation to Article 5).

¹⁴⁷⁶ *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 260. Relevant factors to be considered when assessing whether a victim died include but are not limited to proof of incidents of mistreatment directed against the victim; patterns of mistreatment and disappearances of other victims; the coincident or near-coincident time of death of other victims; the fact that the victims were present in an area where an armed attack was carried out; the time, location, and circumstances in which the victim was last seen; the behaviour of soldiers in the vicinity, as well as towards other civilians, at the relevant time; and the lack of contact by the victim with others whom he/she would have been expected to

have occurred “as a result of” the perpetrator’s act or omission does not require this to be the sole cause for the victim’s death; it is sufficient that the “perpetrator’s conduct contributed substantially to the death of the person”.¹⁴⁷⁷

b. Mens rea

447. In order to satisfy the *mens rea* of murder, the Prosecution must prove that the act was committed, or the omission was made, with an intention to kill (*animus necandi*) or to wilfully cause serious injury or grievous bodily harm which the perpetrator should reasonably have known might lead to death.¹⁴⁷⁸

448. Thus, the *mens rea* of murder includes both direct intent (*dolus directus*), which is a state of mind in which the perpetrator desired the death of the individual to be the result of his act or omission, and indirect intent (*dolus eventualis*), which is knowledge on the part of the perpetrator that the death of a victim was a probable consequence of his act or omission.¹⁴⁷⁹

3. Unlawful attacks on civilians as a violation of the laws or customs of war

449. In Count 10 of the Indictment, the Accused is charged with criminal responsibility for unlawful attacks on civilians as a violation of the laws or customs of war, punishable under Article 3 of the Statute.¹⁴⁸⁰ While Article 3 does not explicitly prohibit “unlawful attacks on civilians” as such, the Appeals Chamber has held that attacks on the civilian population or individual civilians meet the threshold requirements for war crimes and are therefore covered by Article 3 of the Statute.¹⁴⁸¹ In so ruling, Chambers of the Tribunal have relied on Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I and Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II, both of which read in relevant parts that the civilian population and individual civilians shall not be the object of attack.¹⁴⁸² Thus, the targeting of civilians has been deemed by this Tribunal to be absolutely prohibited at all times and, as such, cannot be justified by military necessity or by the actions of the opposing side.¹⁴⁸³

450. As for the elements of the offence of unlawful attacks on civilians, they consist of (i) acts of violence directed against the civilian population or individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities causing death or serious injury to body or health within the civilian population (*actus reus*) and (ii) the offender wilfully making the civilian population or

contact, such as his/her family. See Lukić and Lukić Trial Judgement, para. 904; Martić Trial Judgement, para. 59, fn. 112; Halilović Trial Judgement, para. 37; Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 327.

¹⁴⁷⁷ Orić Trial Judgement, para. 347. See also Đorđević Trial Judgement, para. 1708; Popović et al. Trial Judgement, para. 788; Milutinović et al. Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 137; Lukić and Lukić Trial Judgement, para. 899.

¹⁴⁷⁸ Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 261. See also Dragomir Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 108; Milutinović et al. Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 138; Orić Trial Judgement, para. 348.

¹⁴⁷⁹ Delić Trial Judgement, para. 48; Martić Trial Judgement, para. 60; Strugar Trial Judgement, paras. 235–236; Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 587. See also Stakić Appeal Judgement, paras. 236, 239, 242 (discussing the application of *dolus eventualis* as the requisite *mens rea* of murder).

¹⁴⁸⁰ Indictment, paras. 76–82.

¹⁴⁸¹ Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras. 40–46; Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 123 (confirming the findings in the Galić Trial Judgement, paras. 16, 19–32).

¹⁴⁸² Dragomir Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 53; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 48; Galić Trial Judgement, paras. 16–19.

¹⁴⁸³ Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 130 (confirming Galić Trial Judgement, paras. 44, 49); Dragomir Milošević Appeal Judgement, paras. 53, 69. See also Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 109; Martić Appeal Judgement, paras. 268, 270; Strugar Appeal Judgement, para. 275. The Tribunal’s jurisprudence here is consistent with that of the International Court of Justice which, at paragraph 78 of the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, held that civilians must never be made the object of an attack.

individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities the object of those acts of violence (*mens rea*).¹⁴⁸⁴

a. *Actus reus*

451. Article 49 of Additional Protocol I defines “attacks” as “acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or defence”.¹⁴⁸⁵ Accordingly, the issue of who made use of force first is irrelevant.¹⁴⁸⁶

452. The meaning of civilian for the purposes of unlawful attacks on civilians stems from Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I¹⁴⁸⁷ which provides that a “civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4(A)(1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third [Geneva] Convention¹⁴⁸⁸ and in Article 43 of [Additional] Protocol I¹⁴⁸⁹.” This is a negative definition of “civilian” as it includes anyone who is not a member of the armed forces or an organised military group belonging to a party to the conflict.¹⁴⁹⁰ Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I also provides that in case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.¹⁴⁹¹ The protection from attack afforded to individual civilians by Article 51 of Additional Protocol I continues until such time as they take direct part in hostilities, that is until they engage in acts of war which, by their very nature and purpose, are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel or materiel of

¹⁴⁸⁴ *Galić* Trial Judgement, para. 56; *Dragomir Milošević* Trial Judgement, paras. 942, 951. See also *Kordić and Čerkez* Trial Judgement, para. 328; *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, paras. 47–68. This is consistent with the three fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, namely the principles of distinction, precaution, and protection. Under Article 48 of Additional Protocol I, the principle of distinction obliges the warring parties to distinguish at all times between the civilian population and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives. Article 57(2)(a)(ii) of Additional Protocol I requires that those planning an attack take all reasonable precautions in the choice of the means and methods of attack in order to avoid or minimise the incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian property. Finally, the principle of protection, as referred to in Article 51(1) of Additional Protocol I and Article 13(1) of Additional Protocol II, ensures that the civilian population and individual civilians enjoy general protections against dangers arising from military operations. See also *Dragomir Milošević* Trial Judgement, para. 941.

¹⁴⁸⁵ *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 47.

¹⁴⁸⁶ *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 47.

¹⁴⁸⁷ Given that the origin of the offence of unlawful attacks against civilians can be found in Additional Protocols I and II, the definition of “civilians” and “civilian population,” relied upon in cases dealing with this offence is derived from Article 50 of Additional Protocol I. See *Galić* Trial Judgement, paras. 47 and the footnotes therein; *Dragomir Milošević* Trial Judgement, para. 945; *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 48–50. See also *Dragomir Milošević* Appeal Judgement, para. 50 (where the Appeals Chamber held that the definition of civilians contained in Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I applies to crimes under both Article 3 and Article 5 of the Statute).

¹⁴⁸⁸ Article 4 of Geneva Convention III states, *inter alia*:

“A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy: (1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. (2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions: (a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. (3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power. [...] (6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.”

¹⁴⁸⁹ Article 43 of Additional Protocol I provides as follows:

“1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, ‘inter alia’, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. 2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities. 3. Whenever a Party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency into its armed forces it shall so notify the other Parties to the conflict.”

¹⁴⁹⁰ *Galić* Trial Judgement, para. 47; *Milošević* Trial Judgement, para. 945.

¹⁴⁹¹ See also *Galić* Trial Judgement, para. 50; *Dragomir Milošević* Trial Judgement, para. 946.

the enemy forces.¹⁴⁹² Thus, in order to establish that unlawful attacks against civilians have been committed, the Chamber has to find that the victims of these attacks were civilians and that they were not participating in the hostilities.¹⁴⁹³

453. The jurisprudence is also clear that the presence of individual combatants within the civilian population attacked does not necessarily change the fact that the ultimate character of the population remains a civilian one.¹⁴⁹⁴ In determining whether the presence of soldiers within a civilian population deprives the population of its civilian character, the number of soldiers, as well as whether they are on leave, must be examined.¹⁴⁹⁵

454. As stated above,¹⁴⁹⁶ for the attack to constitute an unlawful attack on civilians, the Prosecution has to show that it was directed against individual civilians or the civilian population. Whether this is the case can be determined from a number of factors, including the means and methods used in the course of the attack, the status and the number of victims, the distance between the victims and the source of fire, the ongoing combat activity at the time and location of the incident, the presence of military activities or facilities in the vicinity of the incident, the nature of the acts of violence committed, the indiscriminate nature of the weapons used, and the extent to which the attacking force has complied or attempted to comply with the precautionary requirements of the law of war.¹⁴⁹⁷ In this respect, the jurisprudence is also clear that both indiscriminate attacks and disproportionate attacks may qualify as attacks directed against civilians or give rise to an inference that an attack was directed against civilians.¹⁴⁹⁸ This is to be determined on a case by case basis, in light of the available evidence.¹⁴⁹⁹

455. Finally, before criminal responsibility can be incurred for the unlawful attacks on the civilian population or individual civilians, the Chamber has to find that they have resulted in the death or serious injury to body or health of the victims in question.¹⁵⁰⁰

b. Mens rea

456. For unlawful attacks on civilians to be established, the Prosecution must show that the perpetrator *wilfully* made the civilian population or individual civilians the object of the acts of violence.¹⁵⁰¹ In other words, the perpetrator has to act consciously and with intent,

¹⁴⁹² *Dragomir Milošević* Appeal Judgement, para. 57; *Galić* Trial Judgement, para. 48. See also *Dragomir Milošević* Trial Judgement, para. 947 (where the Trial Chamber, relying on the ICRC Commentary 1945, made a distinction between direct participation in hostilities and “participation in war effort”).

¹⁴⁹³ *Dragomir Milošević* Appeal Judgement, para. 57.

¹⁴⁹⁴ *Galić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 136–138. See also *Galić* Trial Judgement, para. 50; *Dragomir Milošević* Trial Judgement, para. 922; *Dragomir Milošević* Appeal Judgement, paras. 50–51.

¹⁴⁹⁵ *Galić* Appeal Judgement, para. 137, citing to *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 115. See also paras. 474–476.

¹⁴⁹⁶ See para. 450.

¹⁴⁹⁷ *Galić* Appeal Judgement, para. 132 (citing to *Kunarac* Appeal Judgement, para. 91 and *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 106); *Dragomir Milošević* Appeal Judgement, para. 66; *Strugar* Appeal Judgement, para. 271. See also *Dragomir Milošević* Trial Judgement, para. 948.

¹⁴⁹⁸ *Galić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 132–134 (confirming *Galić* Trial Judgement, paras. 57–58, 60); *Dragomir Milošević* Appeal Judgement, para. 66; *Strugar* Appeal Judgement, para. 275.

¹⁴⁹⁹ *Galić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 132–133 (confirming *Galić* Trial Judgement, para. 60); *Dragomir Milošević* Appeal Judgement, para. 67.

¹⁵⁰⁰ *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, paras. 55–68. The discussion in these paragraphs concerns not only unlawful attacks on civilians but also unlawful attacks on civilian objects as both were charged in the *Kordić and Čerkez* case. In the present case, however, the Indictment charges only unlawful attacks on civilians. See Indictment, paras. 76–82.

¹⁵⁰¹ *Galić* Appeal Judgement, para. 140 (confirming *Galić* Trial Judgement, para. 54). See also *Dragomir Milošević* Trial Judgement, para. 951; *Strugar* Appeal Judgement, para. 270.

willing the act and its consequences. This encompasses the concept of recklessness but not negligence.¹⁵⁰²

457. For the *mens rea* to be established, the Prosecution must also show that the perpetrator was aware, or should have been aware, of the civilian status of the persons attacked. In cases of doubt as to the status of those persons, the Prosecution must show that a reasonable person could not have believed that the individuals attacked were combatants.¹⁵⁰³ In addition, it is not required to establish the intent to attack particular civilians; rather, it is prohibited to make the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, the object of an attack.¹⁵⁰⁴

4. Terror as a violation of the laws or customs of war

458. In Count 9 of the Indictment, the Accused is alleged to be criminally responsible for acts of violence the primary purpose of which was to spread terror among the civilian population of Sarajevo as a violation of the laws or customs of war, punishable under Article 3 of the Statute.¹⁵⁰⁵ While Article 3 does not explicitly refer to the offence of terror as such, the Appeals Chamber has held that this offence meets the threshold requirements for war crimes and is therefore covered by Article 3 of the Statute.¹⁵⁰⁶ The prohibition of terror stems from Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I and Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II, both of which prohibit “acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population” and both of which have been deemed by the Appeals Chamber to be part of customary international law.¹⁵⁰⁷

459. The following elements need to be established before the Chamber can enter a conviction for terror:

- (a) acts or threats of violence directed against the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
- (b) the perpetrator wilfully made the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities the object of those acts of violence;
- (c) the above was committed with the primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population.¹⁵⁰⁸

a. *Actus reus*

460. The *actus reus* of terror¹⁵⁰⁹ consists of acts or threats of violence directed against the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.¹⁵¹⁰ As such, it

¹⁵⁰² ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocols, Commentary 3474.

¹⁵⁰³ *Dragomir Milošević* Appeal Judgement, para. 60 (citing to *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 48 and *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 111). See also *Dragomir Milošević* Trial Judgement, para. 952; *Strugar* Appeal Judgement, para. 271; *Galić* Trial Judgement, paras. 50, 55.

¹⁵⁰⁴ *Strugar* Appeal Judgement, para. 271.

¹⁵⁰⁵ Indictment, paras. 76–82.

¹⁵⁰⁶ *Galić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 87–98 (confirming *Galić* Trial Judgement, paras. 87–130).

¹⁵⁰⁷ *Galić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 87–90; *Dragomir Milošević* Appeal Judgement, paras. 31–33.

¹⁵⁰⁸ *Galić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 100–101.

¹⁵⁰⁹ The *Galić* Trial Chamber defined terror as “extreme fear”. The *Galić* Appeals Chamber later stated that terror “could” be defined in that way. See *Galić* Trial Judgement, para. 137; *Galić* Appeal Judgement, footnote 320.

is similar to the *actus reus* of unlawful attacks on civilians.¹⁵¹¹ Accordingly, as is the case with unlawful attacks on civilians, the acts or threats of violence constituting terror need not be limited to direct attacks on civilians or threats thereof, but may include indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks.¹⁵¹² In addition, they do not include legitimate attacks against combatants.¹⁵¹³

461. The nature of the acts or threats of violence directed against the civilian population or individual civilians can vary.¹⁵¹⁴ The Appeals Chamber has held that causing death or serious injury to body or health represents only one of the possible modes of commission of terror and thus is not an element of the offence *per se*. What is required—for this offence to fall under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal—is that the victims suffer grave consequences resulting from the acts or threats of violence, which may include but are not limited to death and/or serious injury to body or health.¹⁵¹⁵ However, while “extensive trauma and psychological damage form part of the acts or threats of violence”, the actual infliction of terror on the civilian population is not a legal requirement of this offence.¹⁵¹⁶

462. The definition of civilians and civilian population has already been discussed by the Chamber in the preceding section and, therefore, shall not be repeated here.¹⁵¹⁷

b. Mens rea

463. The *mens rea* of terror consists of both general intent and specific intent.¹⁵¹⁸ As in the case of unlawful attacks on civilians, to have the general intent the perpetrator must wilfully make the civilian population or individual civilians the object of acts or threats of violence.¹⁵¹⁹ The Chamber has already discussed the definition of “wilfully” in the context of unlawful attacks on civilians above, and shall therefore not repeat it here.¹⁵²⁰

464. The specific intent for this offence is the intent to spread terror among the civilian population.¹⁵²¹ The prohibition on terror also excludes terror which is not intended by the perpetrator but is merely an incidental effect of acts of warfare which have another primary object and are in all other aspects lawful.¹⁵²² Accordingly, the particular circumstances must be taken into account in determining whether the perpetrator intended to spread terror among the civilian population or individual civilians.¹⁵²³

465. The fact that the spreading of terror is referred to as the “primary purpose” does not mean that the infliction of terror is the only objective of the acts or threats of violence.

¹⁵¹⁰ The Chamber notes that, with respect to Count 9 of the Indictment, the Prosecution alleges that the Accused is responsible only for acts of violence designed to spread terror and makes no mention of threats of violence. See Indictment, para. 82.

¹⁵¹¹ See para. 451. The Chamber also reiterates that Article 49(1) of Additional Protocol I defines “attacks” as “acts of violence” which in turn means that terror can encompass *attacks* or *threats of attacks* on civilian population. See also *Galić* Appeal Judgement, para. 102.

¹⁵¹² *Galić* Appeal Judgement, para. 102.

¹⁵¹³ *Galić* Trial Judgement, para. 135.

¹⁵¹⁴ *Galić* Appeal Judgement, para. 102.

¹⁵¹⁵ *Dragomir Milošević* Appeal Judgement, paras. 32–33 (overturning *Dragomir Milošević* Trial Judgement, para. 880).

¹⁵¹⁶ *Dragomir Milošević* Appeal Judgement, para. 35; *Galić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 102–104.

¹⁵¹⁷ See paras. 452–454.

¹⁵¹⁸ *Dragomir Milošević* Appeal Judgement, para. 37. See also *Dragomir Milošević* Trial Judgement, para. 878.

¹⁵¹⁹ *Dragomir Milošević* Appeal Judgement, para. 37.

¹⁵²⁰ See paras. 456–457.

¹⁵²¹ *Galić* Trial Judgement, para. 136; *Dragomir Milošević* Trial Judgement, para. 878.

¹⁵²² *Galić* Appeal Judgement, para. 103. See also *Dragomir Milošević* Trial Judgement, para. 888.

¹⁵²³ *Dragomir Milošević* Trial Judgement, para. 888.

Accordingly, the co-existence of other purposes behind the acts or threats of violence would not disprove the charge of terror, so long as the intent to spread terror was the “principal among the aims”.¹⁵²⁴

466. The intent to spread terror can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the acts or threats of violence, including their nature, manner, timing, and duration.¹⁵²⁵ While, as stated above,¹⁵²⁶ the actual infliction of terror on the civilian population is not a legal requirement of this offence, the evidence of actual terrorisation may contribute to establishing other elements of the offence, including the specific intent to terrorise.¹⁵²⁷ The Appeals Chamber has also affirmed that the indiscriminate nature of an attack can be a factor in determining specific intent for terror.¹⁵²⁸

5. Taking of hostages as a violation of the laws or customs of war

467. Count 11 charges the Accused with the taking of hostages as a “violation of the laws or customs of war, as recognised by Common Article 3(1)(b), and punishable under Article 3 of the Statute”.¹⁵²⁹ The crime of hostage-taking is not explicitly mentioned as one of the offences listed under Article 3 but stems from the provision in Common Article 3(1)(b),¹⁵³⁰ which protects “persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed *hors de combat* by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause” from a list of prohibited acts, including hostage-taking.¹⁵³¹ The plain text of Common Article 3 indicates that the prohibition on hostage-taking is both absolute and without exception.¹⁵³²

468. In addition to fulfilling the chapeau requirements for Article 3, the offence of hostage-taking requires the following elements. The *actus reus* of this offence is the detention of persons and the use of a threat concerning the detained persons, including a threat to kill, injure or continue to detain, in order to obtain a concession or gain an advantage.¹⁵³³ The Appeals Chamber has held that the prohibition on the taking of hostages pursuant to Common Article 3 applies to “all detained individuals, irrespective of whether their detention is explicitly sought in order to use them as hostages and irrespective of their prior status as combatants”.¹⁵³⁴ The *mens rea* required for hostage-taking is the intention to

¹⁵²⁴ Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 104; Dragomir Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 37.

¹⁵²⁵ Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 104; Dragomir Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 37. See also Galić Trial Judgement, para. 134.

¹⁵²⁶ See para. 461.

¹⁵²⁷ Dragomir Milošević Appeal Judgement, paras. 35, 37; Dragomir Milošević Trial Judgement, para. 880.

¹⁵²⁸ Dragomir Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 37; Dragomir Milošević Trial Judgement, para. 881.

¹⁵²⁹ Indictment, paras. 83–87.

¹⁵³⁰ For the residual nature of Article 3 of the Statute, see para. 440.

¹⁵³¹ Common Article 3(1)(b) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; Appeal Decision on Count 11, para. 22 (citing ICRC Commentary III, p. 40). See also Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgement, para. 319. While Article 2(h) of the Statute prohibits taking civilians as hostages as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Article 3 of the Statute prohibits hostage-taking of all persons not taking direct part in the hostilities pursuant to Common Article 3.

¹⁵³² Appeal Decision on Hostage-Taking, para. 16.

¹⁵³³ Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 639, in which the Appeals Chamber cites to Article 1 of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 17 December 1979, which states:

“Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the “hostage”) in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking hostages (“hostage-taking”) within the meaning of this Convention.”

¹⁵³⁴ Appeal Decision on Hostage-Taking, para. 21. The Accused argues that unlawful detention is an element of the crime of hostage taking and that this element has not been proven because the “Bosnian Serbs were lawfully entitled to detain UN personnel as prisoners of war after they had become combatants by virtue of the NATO air strikes”. Defence Final Brief, para. 2738. The Chamber notes that the Appeals Chamber also recalled that under Common Article 3, the detention of a combatant during an

compel a third party to act or refrain from acting as a condition for the release of the detained persons.¹⁵³⁵ Because the essential feature of the offence of hostage-taking is the use of a threat to detainees to obtain a concession or gain an advantage,¹⁵³⁶ which may happen at any time during the detention, the requisite intent may be formed at the time of the detention or it may be formed at some later time, after the person has been detained.¹⁵³⁷ The erroneous belief that detained combatants are not entitled to Common Article 3 protections is not a defence should the elements of hostage-taking be met.¹⁵³⁸

ii. Article 5 of the Statute of the Tribunal

469. The Accused is charged with five counts of crimes against humanity under Article 5 of the Statute. Count 3 charges him with persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds punishable under Article 5(h) of the Statute.¹⁵³⁹ In Counts 4 and 5, the Accused is charged, respectively, with extermination under Article 5(b) of the Statute and murder under Article 5(a).¹⁵⁴⁰ Finally, Counts 7 and 8 charge him with deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer) punishable, respectively, under Articles 5(d) and 5(i) of the Statute.¹⁵⁴¹

470. As it did for Article 3 above, the Chamber will first assess the general requirements for offences charged under Article 5 of the Statute before proceeding with its analysis of the elements in relation to each of these offences.

1. General requirements for crimes against humanity

471. Article 5 of the Statute gives the Tribunal jurisdiction over various offences “when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population”. Unlike the exigency in Article 3 that the offences be closely related to the armed conflict, the requirement under Article 5 that the offence be committed in armed conflict is a purely jurisdictional prerequisite which is satisfied by proof that there was an armed conflict at the time and place relevant to the indictment but does not mandate any material nexus between the acts of the accused and the armed conflict.¹⁵⁴²

472. Tribunal jurisprudence has identified the following five general requirements for crimes against humanity under Article 5 of the Statute:

- (i) There must be an attack;
- (ii) the attack must be directed against any civilian population;

armed conflict automatically renders him *hors de combat* and that such detention triggers the protections of Common Article 3. Appeal Decision on Hostage-Taking, paras. 16–17.

¹⁵³⁵ *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 639.

¹⁵³⁶ *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 639.

¹⁵³⁷ Appeal Decision on Hostage-Taking, para. 17. *See also* *Sesay et al.* Appeal Judgement, paras. 597–598.

¹⁵³⁸ Appeal Decision on Hostage-Taking, para. 22.

¹⁵³⁹ Indictment, paras. 48–60.

¹⁵⁴⁰ Indictment, paras. 61–67.

¹⁵⁴¹ Indictment, paras. 68–75.

¹⁵⁴² *Šešelj* Appeal Jurisdiction Decision, para. 13. *See also* *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 83; *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 249.

- (iii) the attack must be widespread or systematic;
- (iv) the acts of the perpetrator must be part of the attack; and
- (v) the perpetrator¹⁵⁴³ must know that there is a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population and know that his acts constitute part of this attack.¹⁵⁴⁴

a. *There must be an attack*

473. The concepts of “attack” and “armed conflict” are not identical.¹⁵⁴⁵ An attack could precede, outlast, or continue during the armed conflict but need not be part of it.¹⁵⁴⁶ Furthermore, in the context of a crime against humanity, an attack is not limited to the use of armed force but encompasses any mistreatment of the civilian population.¹⁵⁴⁷

b. *The attack must be directed against any civilian population*

474. A population is considered to be a civilian population under Article 5 of the Statute if it is predominantly civilian in nature.¹⁵⁴⁸ The presence within a population of persons who do not come within the definition of civilians¹⁵⁴⁹ does not necessarily deprive the population of its civilian character.¹⁵⁵⁰ The Appeals Chamber has held that a determination as to whether the presence of soldiers within a civilian population deprives the population of its civilian character will depend on the number of soldiers, as well as whether they are on leave.¹⁵⁵¹

475. For the purpose of Article 5 of the Statute, an attack can be considered to have been directed against a civilian population if the civilian population was the “primary rather than an incidental target of the attack”.¹⁵⁵² In order to determine whether the attack was so directed, the Appeals Chamber has identified a non-exhaustive list of relevant factors, such as the means and method used during the course of the attack, the status of the victims, their number, the discriminatory nature of the attack, the nature of the crimes committed in the course of the attack, the resistance to the assailants at the time of the attack, and the extent to which the attacking force may be said to have complied or attempted to comply with the precautionary requirements of the laws of war.¹⁵⁵³ The term “population” does not mean that the entire population of the geographical entity in which the attack is occurring was

¹⁵⁴³ The use of the term “perpetrator” by the Chamber in this context includes the direct perpetrator as well as any indirect perpetrator or individual at whose behest the perpetrator is operating.

¹⁵⁴⁴ *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 85.

¹⁵⁴⁵ *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 86.

¹⁵⁴⁶ *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 86. See also *Šešelj* Appeal Jurisdiction Decision, para. 13 (stating that “there is no requirement that an attack directed against a civilian population be related to the armed conflict”).

¹⁵⁴⁷ *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 86.

¹⁵⁴⁸ *Tadić* Trial Judgement, para. 638 (cited in numerous trial judgements, including *Blagojević and Jokić* Trial Judgement, para. 544; *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 146).

¹⁵⁴⁹ Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I provides that a civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4(A)(1), (2), (3) and (6) of Geneva Convention III and in Article 43 of Additional Protocol I. For Article 4(A) of Geneva Convention III and Article 43 of Additional Protocol I, see fn. 1488, 1489.

¹⁵⁵⁰ See *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 50, reiterated in *Mrkšić and Šljivančanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 31.

¹⁵⁵¹ *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 115 (quoting the Trial Judgement which refers to the ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I, Article 50, p. 612, para. 1922, which specifies that the presence of soldiers does not alter the civilian character of a civilian population as long as “these are not regular units with fairly large numbers”).

¹⁵⁵² *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 92. See also *Dragomir Milošević* Trial Judgement, para. 921; *Galić* Trial Judgement, para. 142.

¹⁵⁵³ *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 91 (reiterated in *Mrkšić and Šljivančanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 25).

subjected to the attack.¹⁵⁵⁴ However, the attack must have targeted more than “a limited and randomly selected number of individuals” within the population.¹⁵⁵⁵

476. Finally, as discussed above, while the civilian status of the victims, the number of civilians, and the proportion of civilians within a civilian population are factors relevant to the determination as to whether an attack is directed against a “civilian population”, there is no requirement that individual victims of crimes against humanity be civilians.¹⁵⁵⁶ It is therefore possible for a person *hors de combat* to be a victim of an act amounting to a crime against humanity.¹⁵⁵⁷

c. *The attack must be widespread or systematic*

477. The attack must be widespread or, in the alternative, systematic.¹⁵⁵⁸ While the term “widespread” refers to the large-scale character of the attack and the number of persons targeted, the term “systematic” refers to the organised nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of their random occurrence.¹⁵⁵⁹ The assessment of what constitutes “widespread” or “systematic” is to be conducted on a case by case basis and may take into account the consequences of the attack upon the targeted population, the number of victims, the nature of the acts, the possible participation of officials or authorities, and any identifiable patterns of crimes.¹⁵⁶⁰ While the existence of a plan or policy may be used to demonstrate the existence of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, it is not a legal element under Article 5 of the Statute.¹⁵⁶¹

d. *The acts of the perpetrators must be part of the attack*

478. The acts of the perpetrator must be part of the attack on the civilian population, although they need not be committed in the midst of that attack.¹⁵⁶² An offence which is committed before or after the attack against the civilian population or away from it could still, if sufficiently connected, be part of that attack.¹⁵⁶³ Whether a given offence is sufficiently connected to the attack will depend on the factual circumstances of the case but, in any event, it should not be so far removed from the attack so as to constitute an isolated act void of any nexus to the attack.¹⁵⁶⁴

¹⁵⁵⁴ *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 90 (confirming *Kunarac et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 424).

¹⁵⁵⁵ *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 90 (as recalled in *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 95).

¹⁵⁵⁶ *Mrkšić and Šljivančanin* Appeal Judgement, paras. 29, 32 (citing *Martić* Appeal Judgement, para. 307).

¹⁵⁵⁷ *Martić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 313–314.

¹⁵⁵⁸ *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 93 (citing *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 248).

¹⁵⁵⁹ *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 101 (citing *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 94).

¹⁵⁶⁰ *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 95.

¹⁵⁶¹ *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 98 (reiterated in *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 120).

¹⁵⁶² *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 100 and *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 124 (referring to the “acts of the accused”) *But see* *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 152 (holding that “[i]t is the conduct of the physical perpetrator that must form part of the attack”) and para. 155 (recalling that the then practice of the Tribunal demonstrated that the requirement that the conduct charged related to the attack on the civilian population was satisfied by proof that the underlying offences comprised part of the attack regardless as to whether they were physically committed by the accused or by those for whose acts he bore responsibility); *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, paras. 751, 757 (referring to both the “acts of the perpetrator” and the “acts of the accused”); and *Stanišić and Župljanin* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 29 (referring to the “acts of the perpetrator”).

¹⁵⁶³ *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 100 (as reiterated in *Mrkšić and Šljivančanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 41).

¹⁵⁶⁴ *Mrkšić and Šljivančanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 41.

- e. *The perpetrator must know that there is a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population and know that his acts constitute part of this attack*

479. The perpetrator must know that there is a widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population and know that his acts comprise part of that attack.¹⁵⁶⁵ For the purpose of Article 5, the perpetrator need not have the knowledge of the details of the attack.¹⁵⁶⁶ Furthermore, his motives are irrelevant.¹⁵⁶⁷ It is the attack, not his acts, which must be directed against the targeted population and the perpetrator need only know that his acts are a part of that attack.¹⁵⁶⁸

2. Murder as a crime against humanity

480. Under Count 5 of the Indictment, the Accused is charged with murder, a crime against humanity, punishable under Article 5(a) of the Statute.¹⁵⁶⁹

481. The elements of murder under Article 5 of the Statute are the same as those articulated for murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war under Article 3.¹⁵⁷⁰ The Chamber therefore refers here to its earlier discussion as to the elements of murder pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute.

3. Extermination as a crime against humanity

482. Under Count 4 of the Indictment, the Accused is charged with extermination, a crime against humanity, punishable under Article 5(b) of the Statute.¹⁵⁷¹

a. *Actus reus*

483. The *actus reus* of extermination consists of “the act of killing on a large scale”.¹⁵⁷² This involves “any act, omission or combination thereof which contributes directly or indirectly to the killing of a large number of individuals”.¹⁵⁷³ In determining what is sufficient for a finding that a large number of individuals were killed, the Tribunal’s jurisprudence has consistently held that there is no minimum numerical threshold of victims that must be reached.¹⁵⁷⁴ Furthermore, it is not necessary that the victims of extermination

¹⁵⁶⁵ See *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 248; *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 102; *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 124; *Kordić* Appeal Judgement, para. 99 (referring to the requisite knowledge of the accused); *Šainović et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 264; *Mrkšić and Šljivančanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 42 (assessing the nexus of the crimes charged to the attack through the acts of the perpetrators); *Stanišić and Župljanin* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 213 and *Stanišić and Simatović* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 972 (both assessing the knowledge of the perpetrators). But see *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 786 (assessing the knowledge of the accused). See also *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, paras. 153–162, (conducting an in-depth analysis of Tribunal jurisprudence on this requirement and concluding as follows: “Either the physical perpetrator or the person who planned, ordered, or instigated the acts of the physical perpetrator or a member of the joint criminal enterprise, must know that there is an attack on the civilian population and know, or take the risk, that his acts comprise part of this attack”).

¹⁵⁶⁶ *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 102.

¹⁵⁶⁷ *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 103.

¹⁵⁶⁸ *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 103.

¹⁵⁶⁹ Indictment, paras. 61–67.

¹⁵⁷⁰ See *Stanišić and Župljanin* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 42; *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 714; *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 787; *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 136; *Lukić and Lukić* Trial Judgement, para. 903; *Martić* Trial Judgement, para. 58; *Blagojević and Jokić* Trial Judgement, para. 556.

¹⁵⁷¹ Indictment, paras. 61–67.

¹⁵⁷² *Lukić and Lukić* Appeal Judgement, para. 536; *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 259; *Seromba* Appeal Judgement, para. 189.

¹⁵⁷³ *Seromba* Appeal Judgement, para. 189. See also *Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana* Appeal Judgement, para. 522 (in relation to the notion of contributing “directly” and “indirectly” to the killing of a large number of individuals).

¹⁵⁷⁴ *Lukić and Lukić* Appeal Judgement, para. 537; *Rukundo* Appeal Judgement, para. 185; *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, paras. 471–472; *Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana* Appeal Judgement, para. 516; *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 260.

be precisely identified by name, and it suffices to establish that killings occurred on a mass scale.¹⁵⁷⁵ An assessment of whether the element of “massiveness” has been met must be made on a case by case basis, taking into account all the relevant factors.¹⁵⁷⁶ Relevant factors include, for example, the time and place of the killings, the selection of the victims and the manner in which they were targeted, and whether the killings were aimed at the collective group rather than victims in their individual capacity.¹⁵⁷⁷ There is no requirement to establish that there was a “vast scheme of collective murder”.¹⁵⁷⁸

484. Trial Chambers have previously found that it was possible to establish extermination “on an accumulation of separate and unrelated incidents, meaning on an aggregated basis”.¹⁵⁷⁹ The Appeals Chamber recently stated in *Tolimir* that the *actus reus* of extermination “may be established through an aggregation of separate incidents”.¹⁵⁸⁰ The Chamber notes that, in this formulation, the possibility of accumulating “unrelated” incidents was removed. The *Tolimir* Appeals Chamber went on to state that for the purpose of aggregating separate incidents, it is not required that the killing be on a vast scale in a concentrated location over a short period of time. However, even with respect to separate incidents, the Appeals Chamber made it clear that killing incidents which did not form part of the same murder operation could not be accumulated for the purposes of extermination.¹⁵⁸¹ In assessing whether specific killing incidents formed part of the same murder operation, the *Tolimir* Appeals Chamber also recalled that the ICTR Appeals Chamber stated that “as a general matter, the element of killing on a large scale cannot be satisfied by a collective consideration of distinct events committed in different prefectures, in different circumstances, by different perpetrators, and over an extended period of time”.¹⁵⁸²

¹⁵⁷⁵ *Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana* Appeal Judgement, paras. 521–522; *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 259, fn. 552. See also *Rukundo* Appeal Judgement, para. 186.

¹⁵⁷⁶ *Lukić and Lukić* Appeal Judgement, para. 538. See also *Tolimir* Appeal Judgement, para. 146; *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 725; *Perišić* Trial Judgement, para. 107; *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 800.

¹⁵⁷⁷ *Lukić and Lukić* Appeal Judgement, para. 538 (citing *Martić* Trial Judgement, fn. 120; *Krajišnik* Trial Judgement, para. 716; *Nahimana et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 1061; *Stakić* Trial Judgement, para. 653; *Vasiljević* Trial Judgement, para. 227).

¹⁵⁷⁸ *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 258–259.

¹⁵⁷⁹ *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, para. 391. See also *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 725; *Lukić and Lukić* Trial Judgement, para. 938; *Martić* Trial Judgement, para. 63. The Appeals Chamber in *Brđanin* noted that the approach of the Trial Chamber to “consider all of the killings in the territory of the ARK as a whole rather than to distinguish them by location and incident” was not challenged in that case. The Appeals Chamber thus decided that it need not consider the issue but found that, with respect to specific killing incidents, the *actus reus* for extermination had been established and upheld the Trial Chamber’s assessment that the scale of killings met the threshold of massiveness for the purposes of extermination. *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, paras. 471–472.

¹⁵⁸⁰ *Tolimir* Appeal Judgement, para. 147 (referring to *Karemera* Appeal Judgement, paras. 661–662).

¹⁵⁸¹ *Tolimir* Appeal Judgement, para. 147. The *Tolimir* Appeals Chamber found that the killing of three Bosnian Muslim leaders from Žepa in late August and September 1995 was not part of the same murder operation as the mass killings of the Bosnian Muslim men and boys of Srebrenica which began on 13 July 1995, such that these incidents could not be accumulated for the purposes of extermination. *Tolimir* Appeal Judgement, paras. 135, 145–150. The Appeals Chamber noted the Trial Chamber’s findings of five shared factors between the killings, including the fact that the victims were all Bosnian Muslims, “the general identity of the perpetrators of the killings as members of the Bosnian Serb Forces”, and “the link to the overall goal of the Bosnian Serb Forces of ‘ridding the enclaves of its Bosnian Muslim population’”. *Tolimir* Appeal Judgement, para. 148. The Appeals Chamber noted, however, that the three leaders were killed “after the main attack against the civilian population” of the enclaves of Srebrenica and Žepa and that the incidents in question were charged under two different JCEs. *Tolimir* Appeal Judgement, para. 149. The Appeals Chamber concluded that the killings of the three leaders were killed in a “different context and [...] circumstances” from the Bosnian Muslim males of Srebrenica. *Tolimir* Appeal Judgement, paras. 149–150.

¹⁵⁸² *Tolimir* Appeal Judgement, para. 147; *Karemera* Appeal Judgement, para. 661 (citing *Bagosora* Appeal Judgement, para. 396). The Chamber notes that in *Karemera*, the Appeals Chamber found that it had not been demonstrated in the context of that case that it was impermissible to aggregate killings to establish the large-scale requirement for extermination. *Karemera* Appeal Judgement, paras. 661–662. For some of the killings, the Appeals Chamber considered that “the [...] facts as found by the Trial Chamber reflect that these incidents individually satisfy the element of killings on a large scale”. *Karemera* Appeal Judgement, para. 661. *Karemera* Appeal Judgement, para. 661, fns. 1796–1797; *Karemera* Trial Judgement, paras. 1199, 1294, 1450, 1612, 1649–1653, 1662. The Appeals Chamber noted that “[w]ith respect to the remaining massive killings throughout Rwanda by mid-July 1994, [...] the Trial Chamber connected sets of massive killings to specific acts of a member of the joint criminal enterprise or a particular group of assailants”.

b. *Mens rea*

485. The *mens rea* of extermination requires the intention that a large number of individuals be killed.¹⁵⁸³

486. In line with jurisprudence on the *actus reus*, the *mens rea* of extermination similarly does not require the intent to kill a certain threshold number of victims.¹⁵⁸⁴ Additionally, there is no requirement that the act of extermination be carried out with the intent to destroy the group or part of the group to which the victims belong,¹⁵⁸⁵ or pursuant to a pre-existing plan or policy.¹⁵⁸⁶

4. Deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer) as crimes against humanity

487. Under Counts 7 and 8 of the Indictment, the Accused is charged with deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer) as crimes against humanity pursuant to Articles 5(d) and 5(i) of the Statute, respectively.¹⁵⁸⁷ The Accused is also charged with persecution, pursuant to Article 5(h) of the Statute, through the underlying act of forcible transfer or deportation.¹⁵⁸⁸

a. *Actus reus*

488. The elements of deportation and forcible transfer are substantially similar.¹⁵⁸⁹ Deportation and forcible transfer are defined as: (i) the forced displacement of one or more persons by expulsion or other forms of coercion, (ii) from an area in which they are lawfully present, (iii) without grounds permitted under international law.¹⁵⁹⁰ There is an important distinction between the two crimes; for deportation, the displacement of persons must be across a *de jure* border between two states or, in certain circumstances, a *de facto* border,¹⁵⁹¹ and for forcible transfer, the removal may take place within national boundaries.¹⁵⁹²

489. To establish deportation and forcible transfer, there must be a forced displacement of persons carried out by expulsion or other forms of coercion.¹⁵⁹³ The term “forced” may

Karemera Appeal Judgement, para. 662 (citing *Karemera* Trial Judgement, paras. 1619–1648). In *Bagosora*, the Appeals Chamber found that the incidents in question “presented distinct features” and “could not be considered to constitute one and the same crime sharing the same *actus reus*”. *Bagosora* Appeal Judgement, para. 396. See also *Bagosora* Appeal Judgement, paras. 111, 125, 140, 155, 174, 236, 304, 332, 349, 396, fn. 922; *Bagosora* Trial Judgement, paras. 1064, 2140–2157.

¹⁵⁸³ See *Lukić and Lukić* Appeal Judgement, para. 536; *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 259–260; *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 726.

¹⁵⁸⁴ *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 260. See also *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 726; *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 801; *Krajišnik* Trial Judgement, para. 716.

¹⁵⁸⁵ *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 726; *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 801; *Stakić* Trial Judgement, para. 639; *Vasiljević* Trial Judgement, para. 227.

¹⁵⁸⁶ *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, para. 225.

¹⁵⁸⁷ Indictment, paras. 68–75.

¹⁵⁸⁸ Indictment, para. 60(f).

¹⁵⁸⁹ See *Simić et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 123. See also *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 890; *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 163.

¹⁵⁹⁰ *Krajišnik* Appeal Judgement, para. 304; *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 278, 317. See also *Stanišić and Župljanin* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 61; *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 793; *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 891; *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 164.

¹⁵⁹¹ *Đorđević* Appeal Judgement, paras. 532, 535; *Krajišnik* Appeal Judgement, para. 304; *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 278, 289–300, 317. See also *Stanišić and Župljanin* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 61; *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 793; *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 892; *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 164.

¹⁵⁹² *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 317. See also *Stanišić and Župljanin* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 61; *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 793; *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 892; *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 164.

¹⁵⁹³ *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 279.

include physical force, as well as the threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression, or abuse of power, or the act of taking advantage of a coercive environment.¹⁵⁹⁴ The forced character of the displacement is determined by the absence of genuine choice by the victim in his or her displacement.¹⁵⁹⁵ As such, while persons may consent to, or even request, their removal, any consent or request to be displaced must be given voluntarily and as a result of the individual's free will, assessed in light of the surrounding circumstances of the particular case.¹⁵⁹⁶

490. Furthermore, the involvement of a non-governmental organisation in facilitating displacements does not in and of itself render lawful an otherwise unlawful transfer.¹⁵⁹⁷ An agreement among military commanders, political leaders, or other representatives of the parties in a conflict cannot make a displacement lawful either; it is the consent of the individual that determines whether a displacement is voluntary.¹⁵⁹⁸

491. As stated above, an element of deportation and forcible transfer is that the victim must be "lawfully present" in the area from which the forced displacement takes place.¹⁵⁹⁹ In analysing this element of deportation and forcible transfer, the terms "lawfully present" should be given their common meaning and should not be equated to the legal concept of lawful residence.¹⁶⁰⁰

492. International law recognises certain grounds permitting forced removals, such as the evacuation of: (i) a civilian population for its security or for imperative military reasons; and (ii) prisoners of war out of combat zones and into internment facilities, subject to the conditions set out therein.¹⁶⁰¹ If an act of forced removal is carried out on such bases, that act cannot constitute the *actus reus* of deportation or forcible transfer.¹⁶⁰² Evacuation is an exceptional measure which is permitted to protect the civilian population. However, it is unlawful to use evacuation measures based on imperative military reasons as a pretext to remove the civilian population and seize control over a desired territory.¹⁶⁰³ Although forced removal for humanitarian reasons is justifiable in certain situations, it is not justified where the humanitarian crisis that caused the displacement is itself the result of the perpetrator's own unlawful activity.¹⁶⁰⁴

¹⁵⁹⁴ Šainović *et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 366; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 319; Stakić Appeal Judgement, paras. 279, 281; Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, paras. 229, 233; Simić *et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 126.

¹⁵⁹⁵ Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 279; Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, paras. 229, 233; Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgement, para. 596; Brdanin Trial Judgement, para. 543.

¹⁵⁹⁶ Stakić Appeal Judgement, paras. 279, 282.

¹⁵⁹⁷ Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 286.

¹⁵⁹⁸ Tolimir Trial Judgement, para. 796; Popović *et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 897; Simić *et al.* Trial Judgement, paras. 127–128; Naletilić and Martinović Trial Judgement, para. 523.

¹⁵⁹⁹ See para. 488.

¹⁶⁰⁰ Popović *et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 900 (finding that the prohibition against forcible transfer and deportation should protect the right of victims to live in their homes and communities, whether long term or temporarily; therefore encompassing, for example, "internally displaced persons who have established temporary homes after being uprooted from their original community"). See also Tolimir Trial Judgement, para. 797.

¹⁶⁰¹ Stakić Appeal Judgement, paras. 284–285 (quoting Article 19 of Geneva Convention III, Article 49 of Geneva Convention IV, and Article 17 of Additional Protocol II). See also Popović *et al.* Trial Judgement, paras. 901–902; Milutinović *et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 166; Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgement, para. 597.

¹⁶⁰² Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 284.

¹⁶⁰³ Popović *et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 901; Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgement, para. 597.

¹⁶⁰⁴ Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 287. See also Popović *et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 903.

b. *Mens rea*

493. The *mens rea* required for deportation is the intent to forcibly displace the population across a *de jure* or *de facto* border.¹⁶⁰⁵ The *mens rea* for the crime of forcible transfer is the intent to forcibly displace the population within a national border.¹⁶⁰⁶ Deportation and forcible transfer do not require intent that the victims be displaced permanently, only that they be intentionally displaced.¹⁶⁰⁷

c. *Forcible transfer as “other inhumane acts” pursuant to Article 5(i)*

494. The category of “other inhumane acts” contained in Article 5(i) of the Statute is a residual category of crimes against humanity which includes serious criminal acts that are not exhaustively enumerated in Article 5.¹⁶⁰⁸ The following elements are required for an act or omission to constitute an inhumane act under Article 5(i): (i) there was an act or omission of similar seriousness to the other enumerated acts under Article 5; (ii) the act or omission caused serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constituted a serious attack on human dignity; and (iii) the act or omission was committed with the intent to inflict serious physical or mental suffering or to commit a serious attack on the human dignity of the victim(s), or with the knowledge that this act or omission was likely to cause such suffering or a serious attack upon human dignity.¹⁶⁰⁹

495. The Appeals Chamber has confirmed that “specific “acts of forcible transfer *may* be sufficiently serious as to amount to other inhumane acts”.¹⁶¹⁰ A Trial Chamber must therefore assess on a case-by-case basis if the specific instances of forcible transfer are sufficiently serious to amount to “other inhumane acts” pursuant to Article 5(i) of the Statute.¹⁶¹¹

5. Persecution as a crime against humanity

496. Under Count 3 of the Indictment, the Accused is charged with persecution pursuant to the following underlying acts: (a) killings; (b) torture, beatings, and physical and psychological abuse; (c) rape and other acts of sexual violence; (d) establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions; (e) terrorising and abuse;¹⁶¹² (f) forcible transfer or deportation; (g) unlawful detention; (h) forced labour at front lines and the use of human shields; (i) appropriation or plunder of property; (j) wanton destruction of private property, including cultural monuments and sacred sites; and (k) imposition and

¹⁶⁰⁵ See *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 801; *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 904; *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 164; *Martić* Trial Judgement, para. 111. See also *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 278.

¹⁶⁰⁶ *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 317. See also *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 801; *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 904; *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 164; *Martić* Trial Judgement, para. 111.

¹⁶⁰⁷ *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 206; *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 278, 304, 307, 317. See also *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 801; *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 905; *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 164.

¹⁶⁰⁸ *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 315–316; *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 117 (quoting *Kupreškić et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 563).

¹⁶⁰⁹ *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 117. See also *Vasiljević* Trial Judgement, paras. 234–236; *Krnojelac* Trial Judgement, paras. 130–132; *Kayishema and Ruzindana* Trial Judgement, paras. 153–154.

¹⁶¹⁰ *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 317 (emphasis added). See also *Krajišnik* Appeal Judgement, para. 331.

¹⁶¹¹ *Krajišnik* Appeal Judgement, para. 331; *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 317; *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 117.

¹⁶¹² This allegation only pertains to the Srebrenica component of the case, see Indictment, para. 60(e).

maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures.¹⁶¹³ The Prosecution charges the acts listed in (b), (c), (d), and (e) above as forms of “cruel and/or inhumane treatment”.

a. *General elements*

497. Persecution is defined in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal as an act or omission (i) which discriminates in fact and denies or infringes upon a fundamental right laid down in international customary law or treaty law (*actus reus*); and (ii) is carried out deliberately with the intention to discriminate on political, social or religious grounds (*mens rea*).¹⁶¹⁴ Although the Statute refers to the listed grounds in the conjunctive, the presence of discriminatory intent on any one of these listed grounds is sufficient to fulfill the *mens rea* requirement for persecution.¹⁶¹⁵

498. Persecution may take different forms.¹⁶¹⁶ It may be committed through acts or omissions, some of which are listed in the Statute.¹⁶¹⁷ For persecution to be established, the act or omission must discriminate in fact.¹⁶¹⁸ An act, or omission, is discriminatory if the victim is targeted due to his membership in one of the protected groups.¹⁶¹⁹

499. For the alleged underlying acts or omissions to be considered serious enough to amount to persecution, they must be of equal gravity to the other crimes listed in Article 5 of the Statute, whether considered in isolation or in conjunction with other underlying acts.¹⁶²⁰ The Appeals Chamber held that in considering which underlying acts could amount to persecution, it must be demonstrated that “these acts must constitute a denial of or infringement upon a fundamental right laid down in international customary law”.¹⁶²¹

500. Persecution requires the specific intent to discriminate on political, racial or religious grounds and it is this discriminatory intent which distinguishes this offence from other offences listed in Article 5 of the Statute.¹⁶²² This discriminatory intent requires that the perpetrator acted with the intent to harm the victim because he belongs to a particular

¹⁶¹³ Indictment, paras. 48–60; Schedules A, B, C, D, and E (Parts 1 and 2).

¹⁶¹⁴ *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 327; *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 101; *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 131; *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 113; *Krnjelac* Appeal Judgement, para. 185.

¹⁶¹⁵ See *Simić et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 52; *Tadić* Trial Judgement, para. 713.

¹⁶¹⁶ *Krnjelac* Appeal Judgement, para. 219.

¹⁶¹⁷ *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 296; *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, paras. 321–323; *Krnjelac* Appeal Judgement, para. 219; *Stanišić and Simatović* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 1239.

¹⁶¹⁸ *Lukić and Lukić* Appeal Judgement, para. 455; *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 320; *Krnjelac* Appeal Judgement, para. 185.

¹⁶¹⁹ *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, paras. 366, 455; *Kordić* Appeal Judgement, para. 111; *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, paras. 992–993; *Simić et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 51; *Kupreškić et al.* Trial Judgement, paras. 635–636.

¹⁶²⁰ *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 296; *Simić* Appeal Judgement, para. 177; *Naletilić and Martinović* Appeal Judgement, para. 574; *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, paras. 321, 323; *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, paras. 102–103, 672; *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 135, 139; *Krnjelac* Appeal Judgement, paras. 199, 221; *Nahimana et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 985. The Appeals Chamber has recently stated that it is not required that each underlying act be a violation of international law and that a “trial chamber does not need to establish the elements of the underlying acts, including the *mens rea*, even when the underlying act also constitutes a crime under international law”. *Popović et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 738. However, the Chamber is of the view that while it may not be necessary to look to the strict elements of the underlying acts to establish whether persecution has been committed, when those elements have been satisfied, this assessment is instructive in determining whether the underlying acts also amount to other crimes under Article 5 of the Statute or are of equal gravity to the other crimes listed under Article 5 of the Statute. For this purpose, the Chamber will set out how the underlying acts of persecution as charged in the Indictment have been defined.

¹⁶²¹ *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 139. Some Trial Chambers have stated that this gravity test is met when the act or omission amounts to a gross or blatant denial of fundamental human rights. *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, para. 995; *Krnjelac* Trial Judgement, para. 434; *Kupreškić et al.* Trial Judgement, paras. 620–621. This is also broadly similar to the ICC definition of persecution which refers to the “intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law [...]”. Rome Statute, Article 7(2)(g).

¹⁶²² *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 305; *Krnjelac* Trial Judgement, para. 435; *Kordić and Čerkez* Trial Judgement, para. 217; *Blaškić* Trial Judgement, para. 235.

community or group.¹⁶²³ While the discriminatory intent may not be inferred solely from the “general discriminatory nature of an attack characterised as a crime against humanity”,¹⁶²⁴ it may be inferred from the context as long as the circumstances surrounding the commission of the alleged acts substantiate the existence of the discriminatory intent.¹⁶²⁵ The Appeals Chamber has held that circumstances which may be taken into account include the systematic nature of the crimes committed against a certain group and the general attitude of the alleged perpetrator as demonstrated by his behaviour.¹⁶²⁶ However, the existence of a discriminatory policy is not a requirement for proving persecution, although persecutory acts may form a part of a discriminatory policy or practice.¹⁶²⁷

b. Underlying acts

i. Killings

501. Under Count 3, the Accused is charged with persecution, pursuant to Article 5(h) of the Statute, through the underlying act of killings.¹⁶²⁸

502. Murder is set out as a crime against humanity under Article 5(a). Accordingly killings can constitute persecution, provided the general elements for persecution are met.¹⁶²⁹ The Chamber has already found that the elements of murder under Article 5 of the Statute are the same as those articulated for murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war under Article 3 of the Statute.¹⁶³⁰ The Chamber thus refers to this earlier discussion.¹⁶³¹

ii. Cruel and/or inhumane treatment

503. The Accused is charged under Count 3 with persecution, pursuant to Article 5(h) of the Statute, through the underlying act of “cruel and/or inhumane treatment”. The Prosecution charges the following forms of cruel and/or inhumane treatment in the Indictment: (i) “torture, beatings, and physical and psychological abuse during and after the takeovers in the Municipalities and in detention facilities in the Municipalities”; (ii) “rape and other acts of sexual violence during and after takeovers in the Municipalities and in detention facilities in the Municipalities”; (iii) the establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions in detention facilities in the Municipalities; and (iv) “terrorising and abuse of Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica in Potočari and the beating of men and boys of Srebrenica prior to their execution”.¹⁶³²

504. The Appeals Chamber has held that the right to be free from “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” is recognised under customary international law and

¹⁶²³ *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 111 (holding that the discriminatory intent to cause injury to “a human being because he belongs to a particular community or group” does not require the perpetrator to possess a “specific persecutory intent” over and above a discriminatory intent); *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 165.

¹⁶²⁴ *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 110; *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 164; *Krnojelac* Appeal Judgement, para. 184.

¹⁶²⁵ *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 110; *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 164; *Krnojelac* Appeal Judgement, para. 184.

¹⁶²⁶ *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 460; *Krnojelac* Appeal Judgement, para. 184.

¹⁶²⁷ *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 967; *Blagojević and Jokić* Trial Judgement, para. 582; *Brdanin* Trial Judgement, para. 996; *Stakić* Trial Judgement, para. 739; *Krnojelac* Trial Judgement, para. 435; *Kupreškić et al.* Trial Judgement, paras. 615, 625.

¹⁶²⁸ Indictment, para. 60(a).

¹⁶²⁹ *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 972.

¹⁶³⁰ See para. 481.

¹⁶³¹ See paras. 446–448.

¹⁶³² Indictment, paras. 60(b)–(e).

enshrined in international human rights instruments.¹⁶³³ Cruel and/or inhumane treatment is defined as an act or omission which causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury, or which constitutes a serious attack on human dignity.¹⁶³⁴ The act or omission must be committed with the intent to cause serious mental or physical suffering or injury or a serious attack on human dignity, or with the knowledge that serious mental or physical suffering or injury or the serious attack on human dignity was a probable consequence of the act or omission.¹⁶³⁵ The Chamber will now examine, in turn, the various forms of cruel or inhumane treatment listed by the Prosecution as underlying acts of persecution under Count 3 of the Indictment.

1. Torture

505. Torture is expressly prohibited in Article 5(f) of the Statute and may constitute persecution if the general requirements of persecution are met.¹⁶³⁶ The Appeals Chamber has held that the definition of torture, as set out in the Convention Against Torture may be considered to reflect customary international law.¹⁶³⁷ Torture constitutes one of the most serious attacks upon a person's mental or physical integrity.¹⁶³⁸ The seriousness of torture lies in the infliction of severe mental or physical pain in order to attain a certain result or purpose.¹⁶³⁹ Accordingly, the level of harm an act or omission must cause in order to constitute torture must be "severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental".¹⁶⁴⁰

506. Torture has been defined as follows:

- i) The infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental;
- ii) the act or omission must be intentional; and
- iii) the act or omission must be aimed at obtaining information or a confession, or at punishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, or at discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or third person.¹⁶⁴¹

¹⁶³³ *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 106; *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 143.

¹⁶³⁴ *Čelebići* Appeal Judgement, paras. 424, 426. The Chamber notes that it is settled jurisprudence that the material elements of cruel treatment under Article 3 and "inhuman" treatment under Article 2 are the same and that the sole distinct element between cruel and inhuman treatment stems from the protected person requirement under Article 2. *Čelebići* Appeal Judgement, para. 426; *Blagojević and Jokić* Trial Judgement, para. 586, fn. 1938. Furthermore, it is settled that these offences and other *inhumane* acts under Article 5(i) of the Statute are also the same. See, e.g., *Simić et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 74. While in this present case cruel and/or inhumane treatment is charged as an underlying act of the offence of persecution, the Tribunal's jurisprudence has established that the definition of this underlying act is same as cruel treatment and inhuman treatment. See, e.g., *Gotovina et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. II, para. 1791; *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 853; *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 975.

¹⁶³⁵ *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 974; *Strugar* Trial Judgement, para. 261; *Limaj et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 231.

¹⁶³⁶ See paras. 497–500.

¹⁶³⁷ *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 246; *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 146; *Furundžija* Appeal Judgement, para. 111. See also Article 1(1) of the Convention Against Torture which defines torture as:

"[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions".

¹⁶³⁸ *Krnojelac* Trial Judgement, para. 180.

¹⁶³⁹ *Krnojelac* Trial Judgement, para. 180.

¹⁶⁴⁰ *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 246. See also *Furundžija* Appeal Judgement, para. 111; Convention Against Torture, Article 1(1).

¹⁶⁴¹ *Haradinaj et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 290; *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 142.

507. There is no exhaustive enumeration of all the acts or omissions which may constitute torture.¹⁶⁴² The allegations of torture must be considered on a case by case basis, so as to determine whether, in light of the acts committed and their context, severe physical or mental pain or suffering was inflicted.¹⁶⁴³ Acts inflicting physical pain may amount to torture even when they do not cause pain of the type accompanying serious injury, as long as severe pain or suffering is inflicted.¹⁶⁴⁴

508. The perpetrator must intentionally act in such a way which, in the normal course of events, would cause severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, to the victim(s), in pursuance of one of the purposes prohibited by the definition of the crime of torture as stated above.¹⁶⁴⁵ This purpose need not be the “predominant or sole purpose” behind inflicting the severe pain or suffering.¹⁶⁴⁶ There is no requirement that the perpetrator acted in an official capacity as a state official or other person in authority.¹⁶⁴⁷

2. Beatings and physical and psychological abuse

509. Beatings and physical abuse, although not expressly prohibited under Article 5 of the Statute, may constitute cruel and/or inhumane treatment as persecution if they reach the same level of gravity as the other acts prohibited in Article 5.¹⁶⁴⁸ Beatings constitute cruel or inhumane treatment if (i) the beatings caused serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constituted a serious attack on human dignity, and (ii) the beatings were performed deliberately.¹⁶⁴⁹ The Chamber considers that the same elements apply to physical abuse.

510. Psychological abuse, including harassment and humiliation, is also not explicitly listed under Article 5 of the Statute, but may constitute persecution if the abuse reaches the same level of gravity as the other crimes listed under Article 5 of the Statute and the general requirements of persecution are met.¹⁶⁵⁰ For example subjecting victims to constant humiliation and degradation may amount to psychological abuse as an underlying act of persecution.¹⁶⁵¹

3. Rape and other acts of sexual violence

511. Rape is listed as a crime against humanity under Article 5(g) of the Statute and may constitute an underlying act of persecution if the general requirements of persecution are

¹⁶⁴² *Naletilić and Martinović* Appeal Judgement, para. 299, affirmed by *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 251.

¹⁶⁴³ *Naletilić and Martinović* Appeal Judgement, para. 299, affirmed by *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 251.

¹⁶⁴⁴ *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 251.

¹⁶⁴⁵ *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 153.

¹⁶⁴⁶ *Simić et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 81; *Krnjelac* Trial Judgement, para. 184; *Kvočka et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 153; *Čelibići* Trial Judgement, para. 470.

¹⁶⁴⁷ *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 284 (affirming *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 148).

¹⁶⁴⁸ *Simić et al.* Trial Judgement, paras. 77, 83; *Stakić* Trial Judgement, paras. 751–753. See also *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 672. See paras. 497–500.

¹⁶⁴⁹ *Simić et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 78.

¹⁶⁵⁰ *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 154–155. See paras. 497–500.

¹⁶⁵¹ *Stakić* Trial Judgement, paras. 758–760, 807–808. Conditions of detention in camps including “gross overcrowding in small rooms without ventilation, requiring detainees to beg for water, and forcing them to relieve bodily functions in their clothes” which were intended to harass, humiliate and inflict mental harm on the detainees and “constant berating, demoralising and threatening of detainees, including guards’ coercive demands for money from detainees, and housing of detainees in lice-infected and cramped facilities, both of which were calculated by participants in the operation of the camp to inflict psychological harm upon the detainees”, and witnessing “torturous interrogations and random brutality perpetrated on fellow inmates” were all found to constitute psychological abuse. *Kvočka et al.* Trial Judgement, paras. 190, 192.

met.¹⁶⁵² Rape involves sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator, where such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim.¹⁶⁵³ Consent for this purpose must be given voluntarily, as a result of the victim's free will, and is assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances.¹⁶⁵⁴ The perpetrator must intend to effect this penetration and have the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim.¹⁶⁵⁵

512. Other acts of sexual violence encompass acts which may fall short of rape, including crimes such as sexual slavery or molestation, but are of equal gravity to other crimes under Article 5 of the Statute.¹⁶⁵⁶ These acts are often characterised as “sexual assault”.¹⁶⁵⁷ Serious abuses of a sexual nature inflicted upon the integrity of a person by means of coercion, threat of force, or intimidation in a way that is humiliating and degrading to the victim's dignity may constitute other acts of sexual violence.¹⁶⁵⁸ These acts are not limited to the physical invasion of the human body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact.¹⁶⁵⁹

513. Sexual violence is found when (i) the perpetrator commits an act of a sexual nature on another or requires the victim to perform such an act, (ii) that act infringes on the victim's physical integrity or amounts to an outrage to the victim's personal dignity, and (iii) the victim does not consent to the act.¹⁶⁶⁰ The perpetrator must intentionally commit the act, and be aware that the victim did not consent to the act.¹⁶⁶¹

4. Establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions

514. While there is no offence of “inhumane living conditions” recognised as such in international humanitarian law, inhumane living conditions is a factual description of the environment in which detainees are held and the treatment they receive.¹⁶⁶² The establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions has been considered a sub-category of cruel and/or inhumane treatment, which may constitute persecution if the acts reach the same level of gravity as the other crimes listed under Article 5 of the Statute and if the general requirements for persecution are also met.¹⁶⁶³

¹⁶⁵² See paras. 497–500.

¹⁶⁵³ *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, paras. 127–128; *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 395 (confirming *Kunarac et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 460).

¹⁶⁵⁴ *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, paras. 127–128; *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 395 (confirming *Kunarac et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 460).

¹⁶⁵⁵ *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, paras. 127–128 (confirming *Kunarac et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 460).

¹⁶⁵⁶ *Kvočka et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 180.

¹⁶⁵⁷ *Dorđević* Trial Judgement, para. 1766; *Akayesu* Trial Judgement, para. 688.

¹⁶⁵⁸ *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, para. 1012; *Stakić* Trial Judgement, para. 757. See also *Brima et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 720.

¹⁶⁵⁹ *Akayesu* Trial Judgement, para. 688; *Furundžija* Trial Judgement, para. 186.

¹⁶⁶⁰ *Dorđević* Trial Judgement, para. 1768; *Milutinović* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 201.

¹⁶⁶¹ *Dorđević* Trial Judgement, para. 1768; *Milutinović* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 201.

¹⁶⁶² See *Čelebići* Trial Judgement, paras. 554, 556.

¹⁶⁶³ *Krajišnik* Trial Judgement, paras. 755–756; *Krnjelac* Trial Judgement, paras. 439, 443. See paras. 497–500.

iii. Forcible transfer and deportation

515. In Count 3 of the Indictment, the Accused is charged with persecution, punishable under Article 5(h) of the Statute, through the underlying act of forcible transfer or deportation.¹⁶⁶⁴

516. Deportation is set out as a crime against humanity under Article 5(d) of the Statute and it has been settled that acts of forcible transfer may be sufficiently serious as to amount to “other inhumane acts” set out in Article 5(i) of the Statute.¹⁶⁶⁵ Accordingly, they can both constitute persecution provided the general elements for persecution are met.¹⁶⁶⁶ The Chamber thus refers to its discussion on the elements of deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer).¹⁶⁶⁷

iv. Unlawful detention in detention facilities

517. The Accused is charged under Count 3 with persecution, pursuant to Article 5(h) of the Statute, through the underlying act of “unlawful detention in detention facilities in the Municipalities”.¹⁶⁶⁸

518. The Chamber interprets the charge of unlawful detention in paragraph 60(g) of the Indictment as relating to the crime of imprisonment, which is a crime under Article 5(e) of the Statute.¹⁶⁶⁹

519. The term “imprisonment” pursuant to Article 5(e) of the Statute is understood as arbitrary imprisonment; that is the deprivation of liberty of an individual without the due process of law.¹⁶⁷⁰ The crime of imprisonment consists of the following elements: (i) an individual is deprived of his or her liberty; (ii) the deprivation of liberty is carried out arbitrarily, *i.e.*, there is no legal basis for it; and (iii) the accused or perpetrator acted with the intent to deprive the individual arbitrarily of his or her liberty.¹⁶⁷¹

520. If there is a legal basis for the deprivation of liberty, it must apply throughout the period of imprisonment, for the deprivation of liberty will become arbitrary as soon as the legal basis ceases to exist.¹⁶⁷²

521. Unlawful detention, carried out on discriminatory grounds, and for which the general elements of persecution are fulfilled, may constitute persecution.¹⁶⁷³

¹⁶⁶⁴ Indictment, para. 60(f).

¹⁶⁶⁵ See para. 495.

¹⁶⁶⁶ *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 153; *Krnjelac* Appeal Judgement, paras. 221–223.

¹⁶⁶⁷ See paras. 488–495.

¹⁶⁶⁸ Indictment, paras. 60(g).

¹⁶⁶⁹ Other Trial Chambers have similarly found that unlawful detention as a crime against humanity relates to imprisonment pursuant to Article 5(e) of the Statute. See *Gotovina et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol II, para. 1814; *Krajišnik* Trial Judgement, para. 751.

¹⁶⁷⁰ *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 116; *Krajišnik* Trial Judgement, para. 752.

¹⁶⁷¹ *Krnjelac* Trial Judgement, para. 115; *Krajišnik* Trial Judgement, para. 752.

¹⁶⁷² *Stanišić and Župljanin* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 79; *Gotovina et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. II, para. 1816; *Krajišnik* Trial Judgement, para. 753; *Krnjelac* Trial Judgement, para. 114.

¹⁶⁷³ *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 154; *Tadić* Trial Judgement, paras. 714, 717.

v. Forced labour and the use of human shields

522. In Count 3 of the Indictment, the Accused is charged with persecution, pursuant to Article 5(h) of the Statute, through the underlying act of forced labour at frontlines and the use of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats as human shields.¹⁶⁷⁴

523. While not all forms of forced labour are *per se* unlawful,¹⁶⁷⁵ acts of forced labour have, in certain circumstances, and when performed with discriminatory intent, been considered to constitute persecution as a crime against humanity.¹⁶⁷⁶ Furthermore, the use of prisoners of war and civilian detainees as human shields is prohibited under international law,¹⁶⁷⁷ and has been held to constitute inhuman or cruel treatment under Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute, respectively,¹⁶⁷⁸ and persecution as a crime against humanity pursuant to Article 5 of the Statute.¹⁶⁷⁹

524. The Prosecution needs to demonstrate that an individual was forced to perform labour and that the labour in question was prohibited under international law. The assessment as to whether the labour was performed involuntarily is done on a case-by-case basis and requires a consideration of both objective and subjective criteria.¹⁶⁸⁰ The following criteria may be examined in determining whether an individual was not in a position to make a real choice to undertake labour: (i) the substantially uncompensated aspect of the labour performed; (ii) the vulnerable position in which the detainees found themselves; (iii) the allegations that detainees who were unable or unwilling to work were either forced to do so or put in solitary confinement; (iv) claims of longer term consequences of the labour on the detainees, including on their health; and (v) the fact and the conditions of the detention.¹⁶⁸¹

525. In relation to the second prong and whether the performed labour was prohibited under international law, the Chamber notes that not all forms of forced labour are *per se* unlawful during armed conflict.¹⁶⁸² In that regard, the Appeals Chamber has held that “[t]here is a principle which states that the work required of a person in the ordinary course of lawful detention is not regarded as forced or compulsory labour.”¹⁶⁸³ Furthermore, individuals deprived of liberty, if made to work, shall have the benefit of working

¹⁶⁷⁴ Indictment, para. 60(h).

¹⁶⁷⁵ See para. 525.

¹⁶⁷⁶ *Krajišnik* Trial Judgement, paras. 759, 761; *Simić et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 93.

¹⁶⁷⁷ Article 23 of Geneva Convention III provides: “No prisoner of war may at any time be sent to, or detained in areas where he may be exposed to the fire of the combat zone, nor may his presence be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations.” See also Article 83 of Geneva Convention IV, which provides that the “Detaining Power shall not set up places of internment in areas particularly exposed to the dangers of war.” Finally, Article 51(7) of Additional Protocol I provides: “The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.”

¹⁶⁷⁸ *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 653 (referring to *Naletilić and Martinović* Trial Judgement, para. 303).

¹⁶⁷⁹ *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 155, 653; *Krajišnik* Trial Judgement, para. 764.

¹⁶⁸⁰ *Krnjelac* Appeal Judgement, para. 195 (specifying that “[i]n this case, given the particular circumstances of the detention centre, there was sufficient objective evidence to prove that the detainees were in fact forced to work, thus bearing out their conviction that the labour they performed was forced”).

¹⁶⁸¹ *Naletilić and Martinović* Trial Judgement, para. 259; *Krnjelac* Trial Judgement, paras. 373, 378.

¹⁶⁸² See Article 49 of Geneva Convention III; Article 51. See also *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 597.

¹⁶⁸³ *Krnjelac* Appeal Judgement, para. 200.

conditions and safeguards similar to those enjoyed by the local civilian population.¹⁶⁸⁴ For instance, compelling individuals to dig trenches or to prepare other forms of military installations has been found to constitute cruel treatment and persecution punishable under Articles 3 and 5 of the Statute, respectively.¹⁶⁸⁵ The use of human shields, namely the placement or detention of persons in areas where they may be exposed to combat operations, for the purpose of rendering certain areas or activities immune from military operations or armed attack, is prohibited under international law.¹⁶⁸⁶ The prohibition of the use of human shields is not dependent on actual harm or attack.¹⁶⁸⁷

526. In relation to forced labour, the perpetrator must have intended the victim to perform prohibited work involuntarily.¹⁶⁸⁸ In the absence of direct evidence, intent can be inferred from the circumstances in which the labour was performed.¹⁶⁸⁹ In relation to the use of human shields, the perpetrator must intend to shield a military objective from attack or shield, favour, or impede military operations.¹⁶⁹⁰

vi. Plunder of property

527. In Count 3 of the Indictment, the Accused is charged with persecution, a crime against humanity punishable under Article 5(h) of the Statute, through the underlying act of appropriation or plunder of property.¹⁶⁹¹ The Chamber considers that the formulation in the Indictment of the charge as “appropriation or plunder of property” is properly construed as “plunder of property”, since the term “appropriation” has been used by the Appeals Chamber to define plunder.¹⁶⁹²

528. Acts of plunder, which have been deemed by the Tribunal to include pillage, infringe various norms of international humanitarian law.¹⁶⁹³ The prohibition against plunder is general in scope and extends both to acts of looting committed by individual soldiers for their private gain and to the organised seizure of property undertaken within the framework of a systematic economic exploitation of occupied territory.¹⁶⁹⁴

¹⁶⁸⁴ Article 5(1)(e) of Additional Protocol II (referred to in *Simić et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 90). *See also* Article 52 of Geneva Convention III (prohibiting the forced use of prisoners of war to perform unhealthy or dangerous work); Commentary to Geneva Convention III, Article 52 (distinguishing between (a) work which is not dangerous in itself but which may be dangerous by reason of the general conditions in which it is carried out (*i.e.*: work done in the vicinity of military objectives or the battlefield), (b) work which is by its very nature dangerous or unhealthy (*e.g.*: mine-lifting), (c) work which is not in itself dangerous but which may be or may become so if it is done in inadequate conditions).

¹⁶⁸⁵ *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 597; *Krajišnik* Trial Judgement, para. 760; *Simić et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 835.

¹⁶⁸⁶ *Krajišnik* Trial Judgement, para. 763 (referring to *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 652–654).

¹⁶⁸⁷ *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 654.

¹⁶⁸⁸ *See Naletilić and Martinović* Trial Judgement, para. 260 (defining the *mens rea* as the Prosecution being required to establish “that the perpetrator had the intent that the victim would be performing prohibited work”).

¹⁶⁸⁹ *See Naletilić and Martinović* Trial Judgement, para. 260.

¹⁶⁹⁰ The Chamber notes that the *mens rea* of the use of human shields has not been defined in the Tribunal’s jurisprudence. The Chamber therefore relies on the definition as set out in the ICC Elements of Crimes, *see* ICC Elements of Crimes, Article 8(2)(b)(xxiii).

¹⁶⁹¹ Indictment, para. 60(i).

¹⁶⁹² *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 84. The Prosecution in its closing arguments clarified that with respect to footnote 8 of the Indictment, it did not allege criminal responsibility for both appropriation and plunder in certain municipalities, even though the footnote only referred to plunder. Closing Arguments, T. 47694 (30 September 2014).

¹⁶⁹³ *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 77; *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 147. Pillage is expressly prohibited in Articles 28 and 47 of The Hague Regulations, Article 33 of Geneva Convention IV, and Article 4 (2)(g) of Additional Protocol II. *See also Hadžihasanović and Kubura* Rule 98 *bis* Appeal Decision, paras. 37–38, for a discussion as to the customary nature of the prohibition against plunder both in international and non-international armed conflicts.

¹⁶⁹⁴ *Čelebići* Trial Judgement, para. 590.

529. Plunder involves the intentional and unlawful appropriation of private or public property.¹⁶⁹⁵ Furthermore, pursuant to Articles 1 and 5 of the Statute, the offence must involve grave consequences for the victim.¹⁶⁹⁶ The assessment as to when a piece of property reaches the threshold level of a certain value so as to create grave consequences for the victim can only be made on a case by case basis in conjunction with the particular circumstances of the case.¹⁶⁹⁷ The threshold of seriousness can be met in circumstances where appropriation is *vis-à-vis* a large number of individuals even though there are no grave consequences for each individual as the overall effect on the civilian population and the multitude of offences committed would render the violation serious.¹⁶⁹⁸

vii. Wanton destruction of private and public property, including cultural monuments and sacred sites

530. In Count 3 of the Indictment, the Accused is charged with persecution, a crime against humanity punishable under Article 5(h) of the Statute, through the underlying act of wanton destruction of private property, including homes and businesses, and public property, including cultural monuments and sacred sites.¹⁶⁹⁹

531. The destruction of various types of property is prohibited by a number of international instruments.¹⁷⁰⁰ In this context, the term of property is understood to cover both private and public property, including cultural and religious property.¹⁷⁰¹ While the destruction of property is listed as an offence under Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute in various forms,¹⁷⁰² Article 5 makes no mention of it. However, the Appeals Chamber has held that, depending on the nature and the extent of the destruction and if committed with discriminatory intent, the destruction of property can be of equal gravity to other crimes listed under Article 5 and as such may constitute persecution as a crime against humanity.¹⁷⁰³

532. For wanton destruction of property to be established, the Prosecution must prove the following elements: (i) the property was destroyed or damaged extensively; (ii) the destruction was not justified by military necessity; and (iii) the destruction was committed with the intent to destroy.¹⁷⁰⁴

¹⁶⁹⁵ *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 84.

¹⁶⁹⁶ See para. 499.

¹⁶⁹⁷ *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, paras. 80–83.

¹⁶⁹⁸ *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 83.

¹⁶⁹⁹ Indictment, para. 60(j). See also Schedule D.

¹⁷⁰⁰ See Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations (prohibiting “to destroy [...] the enemy’s property, unless such destruction [...] [is] imperatively demanded by the necessities of war”); Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV (providing: “Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations”); Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV (prohibiting the “extensive destruction [...], not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”); Article 52 of Additional Protocol I (protecting civilian objects); Article 53 of Additional Protocol I (protecting “historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples”). See also the Nuremberg Principles, Principle 6 referring to the “wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity” as a crime punishable under international law).

¹⁷⁰¹ See *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 145.

¹⁷⁰² Article 2 of the Statute prohibits the “extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly” while Article 3 refers to the “wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity”.

¹⁷⁰³ *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 146. See also *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 108.

¹⁷⁰⁴ See *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 74; *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 144–146; *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, paras. 206–210; *Strugar* Trial Judgement, para. 308.

533. The property must not have been used for a military purpose at the time it suffered the destruction or extensive damage. It is for the Prosecution to establish that the destruction or extensive damage was not justified by military necessity.¹⁷⁰⁵ The Appeals Chamber has held that determining whether destruction occurred pursuant to military necessity involves a determination of what constitutes a military objective with reference to the definition in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I, according to which military objectives are “those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage”.¹⁷⁰⁶

534. The act resulting in the destruction of property must have been committed with the intent, albeit direct or indirect, to destroy or damage extensively the property in question.¹⁷⁰⁷

viii. Imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures

535. Finally, in Count 3 of the Indictment, the Accused is also charged with persecution, a crime against humanity punishable under Article 5(h) of the Statute, through the underlying act of imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures.¹⁷⁰⁸ According to the Indictment, the alleged restrictive and discriminatory measures include (i) the denial of freedom of movement; (ii) the removal from positions of authority in local government institutions and the police, and the general dismissal from employment; (iii) the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of homes; (iv) unlawful arrest and/or the denial of the right to judicial process; and/or (v) the denial of equal access to public services.¹⁷⁰⁹

536. It has been held that these restrictive and discriminatory measures can constitute persecution when considered in isolation or in conjunction with other acts amounting to persecution under Article 5(h) of the Statute.¹⁷¹⁰

¹⁷⁰⁵ *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 337; *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 495 (within the context of Article 3 of the Statute); *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 208.

¹⁷⁰⁶ *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 337.

¹⁷⁰⁷ *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 74; *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, paras. 206, 210; *Orić* Trial Judgement, para. 589.

¹⁷⁰⁸ Indictment, para. 60(k). In relation to this specific charged form of persecution, the Accused requested that the Chamber dismiss paragraph 60(k) of the Indictment on the grounds that the acts of persecution described therein were not sufficiently grave to qualify as a crime against humanity, punishable under Article 5(h) of the Statute. The Accused further argued that paragraph 60(k) was so devoid of facts that it is impossible to prepare a defence to the allegations therein. Preliminary Motion to dismiss Paragraph 60(k) for Lack of Jurisdiction, 10 March 2009, paras. 5–6. On 28 April 2009, the Chamber issued a decision on this motion in which it dismissed, *inter alia*, the motion on the grounds that it did not raise a genuine jurisdictional challenge, or valid challenge to the form of the Indictment. The Chamber concluded that the underlying offences enumerated in paragraph 60(k) of the Indictment, when considered together, are capable of satisfying the equal gravity test and thus of amounting to persecution in terms of Article 5 of the Statute. Decision on Motions Challenging Jurisdiction, paras. 37–44, 81.

¹⁷⁰⁹ Indictment, para. 60(k).

¹⁷¹⁰ *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, paras. 295, 297 (holding that (a) the denial of freedom of movement; (b) the denial of employment; and (c) the denial of the right to judicial process fall under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal as underlying acts of persecution for the purposes of Article 5(h) of the Statute). The denial of the right to proper medical care was also alleged in *Brđanin*, however, the Appeals Chamber did not consider it as the accused in that case was not convicted of the crime of persecution with respect to this specific allegation. *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 294, fn. 595 (referring to *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, para. 1076). See also *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, para. 1049. In addition, the Trial Chambers in the *Stanišić and Župljanin* and *Krajišnik* cases found that the same five specific restrictive and discriminatory measures alleged in paragraph 60(k) of the Indictment constituted persecution when considered in conjunction with other acts amounting to persecution. *Stanišić and Župljanin* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, paras. 91–92; *Krajišnik* Trial Judgement, paras. 736, 738–741 (citing to judgements issued by the Nuremberg Tribunal and by tribunals applying the Allied Control Council Law No. 10 which found that various acts committed against Jews were crimes against humanity, including the denial of freedom of movement, the denial of the right to judicial process, the denial of access to public services, and the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of homes).

iii. Genocide

537. The Accused is charged with two counts of genocide under Article 4 (3)(a) of the Statute. Count 1 charges him with genocide against a part of the Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat national, ethnical, and/or religious groups as such in the following municipalities: Bratunac, Foča, Ključ, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Vlasenica, and Zvornik, through (a) the killing of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, including leading members of these groups; (b) the causing of serious bodily or mental harm to thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, including leading members of these groups, during their confinement in detention facilities where they were subjected to cruel or inhumane treatment, including torture, physical and psychological abuse, rape, other acts of sexual violence, and beatings; and (c) the detention of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, including leading members of these groups, in detention facilities, under conditions of life calculated to bring about their physical destruction, namely through cruel and inhumane treatment, including torture, physical and psychological abuse, rape, other acts of sexual violence, inhumane living conditions, forced labour and the failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care or hygienic sanitation facilities.¹⁷¹¹

538. Count 2 charges the Accused with genocide against a part of the Bosnian Muslim national, ethnical, and/or religious group as such in Srebrenica, through (a) the killing of over 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys of the Srebrenica enclave through executions; and (b) the causing of serious bodily or mental harm to thousands of Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica, including, but not limited to, the separation of men and boys from their families and the forcible removal of the women, young children and some elderly men from the enclave.¹⁷¹²

539. The crime of genocide punishable under Article 4 of the Statute adopts the definition and list of punishable acts enumerated in Article II of the Genocide Convention.¹⁷¹³ These provisions of the Genocide Convention have been considered to form part of customary international law and to constitute *jus cogens*.¹⁷¹⁴ Genocide as defined in the Statute was thus a punishable crime under customary international law at the time of the acts alleged in the Indictment.

540. Article 4(2) of the Statute provides that the following acts constitute genocide when “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”:

- (a) killing members of the group;
- (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and

¹⁷¹¹ Indictment, para. 40(a)–(c). See also Schedule C Detention Facilities.

¹⁷¹² Indictment, para. 47(a)–(b). See also Schedule E Killing Incidents.

¹⁷¹³ Genocide Convention, Article II.

¹⁷¹⁴ ICJ Advisory Opinion on Genocide, p. 23; 1993 Secretary General Report, para. 45, ICJ Bosnia Judgement, para. 161; *Jelisić* Trial Judgement, para. 60; *Akayesu* Trial Judgement, para. 495; *Rutaganda* Trial Judgement, para. 46.

(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.¹⁷¹⁵

1. The group

541. Article 4 of the Statute protects national, ethnical, racial or religious groups “as such” (“protected group”). The crime of genocide pertains to the destruction of a race, tribe, nation, or other group with a particular positive identity, not to the destruction of various people lacking a distinct identity.¹⁷¹⁶ The group targeted for genocide thus cannot be defined in terms of a negative characteristic, such as “non-Serbs” for instance.¹⁷¹⁷ The determination of the composition of the group is necessarily made on a case-by-case basis.¹⁷¹⁸ When more than one group is targeted, the elements of the crime of genocide must be considered in relation to each group separately.¹⁷¹⁹

2. *Actus reus*

a. *Killing members of the group*

542. The requirements for “killing” referred to under Article 4(2)(a) are equivalent to those for murder under Article 5.¹⁷²⁰ Murder as an act of genocide requires proof of a result.¹⁷²¹ The elements of murder have already been detailed in the sections on murder as a crime against humanity and as a violation of the laws or customs of war.¹⁷²² A numeric assessment of the number of people killed is not required for the *actus reus* of genocide to be established.¹⁷²³

b. *Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group*

543. Article 4(2)(b) refers to an intentional act or omission which causes serious bodily or mental harm to members of the protected group and requires proof of a result.¹⁷²⁴ The harm must go “beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation”, and result “in a grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life”.¹⁷²⁵ It need not be permanent and irreversible.¹⁷²⁶

544. The Chamber notes that according to the *Seromba* Appeals Chamber “[t]o support a conviction for genocide, the bodily or the mental harm inflicted on members of a group must be of such a serious nature *as to threaten its destruction in whole or in part*.”¹⁷²⁷

¹⁷¹⁵ As discussed above, the Chamber notes that the acts listed in Article 4(2)(d) and (e), namely imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group, are not charged in this case.

¹⁷¹⁶ *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 21. See also *Stakić* Appeal Judgement paras. 22–24.

¹⁷¹⁷ *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 16–27. See also *Jelisić* Trial Judgement, paras. 71–72.

¹⁷¹⁸ *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 25. fn. 68; *Blagojević and Jokić* Trial Judgement, para. 667; *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, para. 684; *Muvunyi* Trial Judgement, para. 484.

¹⁷¹⁹ *Stakić* Trial Judgement, para. 512; *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, para. 685.

¹⁷²⁰ *Kayishema and Ruzidana* Appeal Judgement, para. 151.

¹⁷²¹ *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, para. 688; *Stakić* Trial Judgement, para. 514.

¹⁷²² See paras. 446–448, 481.

¹⁷²³ Rule 98 *bis* Appeal Judgement, para. 23. However, the scale of atrocities is relevant to the assessment of the *mens rea* of genocide. See para. 550.

¹⁷²⁴ *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 737; *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 811; *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, para. 688; *Stakić* Trial Judgement, para. 514.

¹⁷²⁵ *Krstić* Trial Judgement, para. 513.

¹⁷²⁶ *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 738; *Krstić* Trial Judgement, para. 513.

¹⁷²⁷ *Seromba* Appeal Judgement, para. 46 (italics added) (citing *Kajelijeli* Trial Judgement, para. 814 (the Chamber notes that the *Seromba* Appeals Chamber erroneously cites para. 184 of the *Kajelijeli* Trial Judgement); *Krajišnik* Trial Judgement, para. 862; 1996 ILC Report,

However, in its assessment of the facts, the *Seromba* Appeals Chamber did not examine whether the evidence demonstrated that the inflicted harm was so serious as to threaten the group's destruction.¹⁷²⁸ Similarly, Trial Chambers of the Tribunal and the ICTR which recite the language in question have only examined the seriousness of acts without referring to any showing that the harm was such as to threaten the group's destruction.¹⁷²⁹ Moreover, the majority of trial judgements rendered prior to and after the *Seromba* Appeal Judgement consistently reiterate the language of Article 4(2)(b) of the Statute without requiring a showing that the harm was such as to threaten the group's destruction.¹⁷³⁰ Furthermore, in the instant case, the Appeals Chamber in the Rule 98 *bis* Appeal Judgement simply recalled Article 4(2)(b) without indicating the existence of an additional requirement.¹⁷³¹ In light of the foregoing, the Chamber is therefore of the view that there is no additional requirement that the serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group be of such serious nature as to threaten the destruction of the group in whole or in part. The degree of threat to the group's destruction may, however, be considered as a measure of the seriousness of the bodily or mental harm.

545. Determination of what constitutes serious harm depends on the circumstances of each case.¹⁷³² Examples of serious bodily or mental harm as an act of genocide include torture, inhumane or degrading treatment, sexual violence including rape, interrogations combined with beatings, threats of death, and harm that damages health or causes disfigurement or serious injury to the external or internal organs of members of the group.¹⁷³³ While forcible transfer does not of itself constitute an act of genocide,¹⁷³⁴ depending on the circumstances of a given case, it may cause such serious bodily or mental harm as to constitute an act of genocide under Article 4(2)(b).¹⁷³⁵

p. 46 (stating "The bodily harm or the mental harm inflicted on the members of a group must be of such a serious nature as to threaten its destruction in whole or in part").

¹⁷²⁸ *Seromba* Appeal Judgement, paras. 47–48 (discussing the *Seromba* Trial Chamber's failure to differentiate between the *actus reus* of causing serious bodily or mental harm and the physical elements of aiding and abetting the crime).

¹⁷²⁹ See, e.g., *Karemera and Ndirumpatse* Trial Judgement, paras. 1609, 1666 (finding that "the sexual assaults, mutilations and rapes that Tutsi women were forced to endure from April to June 1994 certainly constituted acts of serious bodily and mental harm"); *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, paras. 738, 753–759; *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, paras. 811, 844–847 (finding that through the killing operation, serious bodily and mental harm was inflicted upon the Bosnian Muslim males); *Nyiramasuhuko et al.* Trial Judgement, paras. 5731, 5868 (wherein the Trial Chamber made no factual findings due to its holding that the Indictment in that case was defective in failing to plead rape as genocide); *Gatete* Trial Judgement, paras. 584–608; *Kanyarukiga* Trial Judgement, paras. 637–641.

¹⁷³⁰ See, e.g., *Blagojević and Jokić* Trial Judgement, para. 645; *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, para. 690; *Stakić* Trial Judgement, para. 51; *Krstić* Trial Judgement, para. 513; *Ntawukuliyo* Trial Judgement, para. 452; *Kalimanzira* Trial Judgement, para. 159; *Renzaho* Trial Judgement, para. 762; *Bagasora* Trial Judgement, para. 2117; *Gacumbitsi* Trial Judgement, para. 291; *Ntagerura* Trial Judgement, para. 664; *Semanza* Trial Judgement, paras. 320–323; *Ntakirutimana* Trial Judgement, para. 784; *Bagilishema* Trial Judgement, para. 59; *Musema* Trial Judgement, para. 156; *Rutaganda* Trial Judgement, para. 51; *Akayesu* Trial Judgement, paras. 502–503.

¹⁷³¹ Rule 98 *bis* Appeal Judgement, para. 33. The Chamber notes that the ICJ did not apply any additional requirement to its factual findings in the ICJ Bosnia Judgement, see ICJ Bosnia Judgement, para. 319 (finding that "members of the protected group were systematically victims of massive mistreatment, beatings, rape and torture causing serious bodily and mental harm, during the conflict, and in particular in the detention camps. The requirements of the material element, as defined by Article II(b) of the [Genocide] Convention are thus fulfilled").

¹⁷³² *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 811; *Blagojević and Jokić* Trial Judgement, para. 646; *Krstić* Trial Judgement para. 513.

¹⁷³³ *Seromba* Appeal Judgement, para. 46; *Blagojević and Jokić* Trial Judgement, para. 645; *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, para. 690; *Krstić* Trial Judgement, para. 513. See also ICJ Bosnia Judgement, para. 319.

¹⁷³⁴ *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, para. 33 (referring to *Stakić* Trial Judgement, para. 519, which notes: "The expulsion of a group or part of a group does not in itself suffice for genocide"; *Blagojević and Jokić* Appeal Judgement, para. 123). See also ICJ Bosnia Judgement, para. 190 (noting: "Neither the intent, as a matter of policy, to render an area 'ethnically homogeneous', nor the operations that may be carried out to implement such policy, can as such be designated as genocide: the intent that characterizes genocide is to 'destroy, in whole or in part,' a particular group, and deportation or displacement of the members of a group, even if effected by force, is not necessarily equivalent to destruction of that group [...] (emphasis in original)" and referring to *Stakić* Trial Judgement, para. 519; *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 739; *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 813).

¹⁷³⁵ *Tolimir* Appeal Judgement, paras. 209, 212; *Blagojević and Jokić* Trial Judgement, para. 646; *Krstić* Trial Judgement, para. 513.

c. *Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part*

546. The acts punishable under Article 4(2)(c) are construed as “the methods of destruction by which the perpetrator does not immediately kill the members of the group, but which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction”.¹⁷³⁶ Contrary to the acts prohibited by Articles 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(b), this provision does not require proof of that a result was attained; as such, it does not require proof that the conditions actually led to death or serious bodily or mental harm of members of the protected group.¹⁷³⁷ When such “a result is achieved, the proper charge will be paragraphs (a) or (b)” of Article 4.¹⁷³⁸

547. Examples of such acts include, but are not limited to, subjecting the group to a subsistence diet; failing to provide adequate medical care; systematically expelling members of the group from their homes; and generally creating circumstances that would lead to a slow death such as the lack of proper food, water, shelter, clothing, sanitation, or subjecting members of the group to excessive work or physical exertion.¹⁷³⁹ Yet, Article 4(2)(c) applies only to acts that are deliberately calculated to cause a group’s physical destruction and, as such, these acts must be clearly distinguished from those acts designed to bring about the dissolution of the group.¹⁷⁴⁰

548. In the absence of direct evidence of whether the conditions of life imposed on the group were deliberately calculated to bring about its physical destruction, a chamber can be guided by the objective probability of these conditions leading to the physical destruction of the group in part.¹⁷⁴¹ The actual nature of the conditions of life, the length of time that members of the group were subjected to them, and the characteristics of the group such as its vulnerability are illustrative factors to be considered in evaluating the criterion of probability.¹⁷⁴²

3. *Mens rea*

549. The *mens rea* required for the crime of genocide—“intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” as defined in Article 4 of Statute—has been referred to variously as, for instance, special intent, specific intent, *dolus specialis*, particular intent and genocidal intent.¹⁷⁴³ Genocide requires not only proof of intent to commit the alleged acts of genocide, but also proof of the specific intent to destroy the protected group, in whole or in part.¹⁷⁴⁴ Therefore, when genocide is charged through the

¹⁷³⁶ *Akayesu* Trial Judgement, para. 505. See also *Stakić* Trial Judgement, paras. 517–518.

¹⁷³⁷ *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 814; *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, para. 691; *Stakić* Trial Judgement, para. 517.

¹⁷³⁸ *Tolimir* Appeal Judgement, paras. 227–228; *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, para. 905, fn. 2255. See also *Eichmann* Jerusalem District Court Judgement, para. 196, limiting the charge of imposing living conditions upon Jews calculated to bring about their physical extermination to persecution of Jews who had survived the Holocaust and ruling that Jews who were not saved should not be included “as if, in their case, there were two separate actions: first, subjection to living conditions calculated to bring about their physical destruction, and later the physical destruction itself”. See also *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 814, fn. 2930. In this case the acts charged under Article 4(2)(c) are the same as those charged under Article 4(2)(b). Indictment, para. 40(b), (c); Schedule C.

¹⁷³⁹ *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, para. 691; *Stakić* Trial Judgement, para. 517; *Musema* Trial Judgement, para. 157; *Kayishema and Ruzidana* Trial Judgement, paras. 115–116; *Akayesu* Trial Judgement, para. 506.

¹⁷⁴⁰ *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, paras. 692, 694; *Stakić* Trial Judgement, para. 519.

¹⁷⁴¹ *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 742; *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 816; *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, para. 906.

¹⁷⁴² *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 742; *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 816; *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, para. 906. See also *Krajišnik* Trial Judgement, para. 863; *Kayishema and Ruzidana* Trial Judgement, para. 548.

¹⁷⁴³ *Jelisić* Appeal Judgement, para. 45; *Akayesu* Trial Judgement, para. 498. See also Rule 98 bis Appeal Judgement, para. 22.

¹⁷⁴⁴ *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, para. 20.

framework of JCE I, the accused needs to share genocidal intent with other members of the JCE.¹⁷⁴⁵

550. In assessing evidence of genocidal intent, a Chamber should consider whether “all of the evidence, taken together, demonstrates a genocidal mental state”, instead of considering separately whether an accused intended to destroy a protected group through each of the relevant acts of genocide.¹⁷⁴⁶ Where direct evidence of genocidal intent is absent, the intent may still be inferred from all the facts and circumstances.¹⁷⁴⁷ Factors relevant to this analysis may include, but are not limited to, the general context, the scale of atrocities, the systematic targeting of victims on account of their membership in a particular group, the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts, or the existence of a plan or policy.¹⁷⁴⁸ Display of intent through public speeches¹⁷⁴⁹ or in meetings¹⁷⁵⁰ may also support an inference as to the requisite specific intent.

a. Intent to destroy the group “as such”

551. The specific intent to destroy the group “as such” makes genocide an exceptionally grave crime and distinguishes it from other serious crimes, such as persecutions as a crime against humanity.¹⁷⁵¹ The term “as such” has great significance as it shows that the crime of genocide requires intent to destroy a collection of people because of their particular group identity based on nationality, race, ethnicity, or religion.¹⁷⁵²

552. For example, the *Krstić* Trial Chamber found that the destruction of a sizeable number of men would inevitably result in the physical disappearance of the Bosnian Muslim population at Srebrenica.¹⁷⁵³ The Appeals Chamber in that case upheld this finding, stating that “[t]he physical destruction of the men therefore had severe procreative implications for the Srebrenica Muslim community, potentially consigning the community to extinction”.¹⁷⁵⁴ The *Krstić* Appeals Chamber further held that “[t]he finding that some members of the VRS Main Staff devised the killing of the male prisoners with full knowledge of the detrimental consequences it would have for the physical survival of the

¹⁷⁴⁵ Rule 98 *bis* Appeal Judgement, para. 79 (stating that “[...] in accordance with the allegations underlying Count 1 of the Indictment, it is the genocidal intent of Karadžić and other alleged JCE members, not the physical perpetrators of the underlying alleged genocidal acts, that is determinative for purposes of JCE I”). The Appeals Chamber stated that it was not persuaded that the Chamber’s conclusions on genocidal intent were restricted to the physical perpetrators of the acts or that it failed to assess Karadžić’s genocidal intent and that of other alleged JCE members. It went on to conclude that the Chamber’s focus on physical perpetrators in relation to the allegations of genocide in Srebrenica under Count 2 did not demonstrate that the Chamber “necessarily considered that liability under JCE I requires a showing of the physical perpetrators’ genocidal intent or that, in assessing the evidence of Count 1 of the Indictment, [it] failed to consider the genocidal intent of Karadžić and the other alleged JCE members”. Rule 98 *bis* Appeal Judgement, para. 83.

¹⁷⁴⁶ *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 55; Rule 98 *bis* Appeal Judgement, para. 56. See also *Tolimir* Appeal Judgement, paras. 246–247.

¹⁷⁴⁷ *Popović et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 468; *Hategekimana* Appeal Judgement, para. 133; *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 55; *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, para. 34; *Jelisić* Appeal Judgement, para. 47.

¹⁷⁴⁸ *Tolimir* Appeal Judgement, para. 246; *Popović et al.* Appeal Judgement, paras. 430, 440 (holding that the existence of a state policy is not a legal requirement of genocide), 468; *Hategekimana* Appeal Judgement, para. 133; *Jelisić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 47–48; Rule 98 *bis* Appeal Judgement, paras. 80, 99.

¹⁷⁴⁹ *Gacumbitsi* Appeal Judgement, para. 43.

¹⁷⁵⁰ *Kamuhanda* Appeal Judgement, paras. 81–82. See also *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 745.

¹⁷⁵¹ ICJ Bosnia Judgement, para. 187 (noting that “[i]t is not enough that the members of the group are targeted because they belong to that group, that is because the perpetrator has a discriminatory intent. Something more is required. That acts listed in [Article 4 of the Statute] must be done with intent to destroy the group as such in whole or in part. The words ‘as such’ emphasise that intent to destroy the protected group.”); *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, para. 699; *Krstić* Trial Judgement, para. 553; *Kupreškić et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 636.

¹⁷⁵² *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 20; *Niyitegeka* Appeal Judgement, para. 53.

¹⁷⁵³ *Krstić* Trial Judgement, para. 595.

¹⁷⁵⁴ *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, para. 28.

Bosnian Muslim community in Srebrenica further supports the Trial Chamber's conclusion that the instigators of that operation had the requisite genocidal intent".¹⁷⁵⁵

553. The Genocide Convention and customary international law prohibit only the physical and biological destruction of a group, not attacks on cultural or religious property or symbols of the group.¹⁷⁵⁶ However, while such attacks may not constitute underlying acts of genocide, they may be considered evidence of intent to physically destroy the group.¹⁷⁵⁷ Forcible transfer alone would not suffice to demonstrate the intent to "destroy" a group but it is a relevant consideration as part of the Chamber's overall factual assessment.¹⁷⁵⁸

554. Specific intent is distinguished from personal motive; however, the existence of a personal motive does not exclude the possession of genocidal intent.¹⁷⁵⁹

b. *"In whole or in part"*

555. It is well established that where a conviction for genocide relies on the intent to destroy a group "in part", such part must be a substantial part of the whole protected group.¹⁷⁶⁰ The targeted portion must be a "significant enough [portion] to have an impact on the group as a whole".¹⁷⁶¹ The *Krstić* Appeal Chamber stated that in determining substantiality, the following considerations can be made:

The numeric size of the targeted part of the group is the necessary and important starting point, though not in all cases the ending point of the inquiry. The number of individuals targeted should be evaluated not only in absolute terms, but also in relation to the overall size of the entire group. In addition to the numeric size of the targeted portion, its prominence within the group can be a useful consideration. If a specific part of the group is emblematic of the overall group, or is essential to its survival, that may support a finding that the part qualifies as substantial within the meaning of Article 4.¹⁷⁶²

Furthermore, the area of the perpetrators' activity, control, and the possible extent of their reach should be considered.¹⁷⁶³ The applicability of these factors and their relative weight will vary depending on the circumstances of a particular case.¹⁷⁶⁴

¹⁷⁵⁵ *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, para. 29.

¹⁷⁵⁶ *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, para. 25.

¹⁷⁵⁷ *Tolimir* Appeal Judgement, para. 230 (finding that the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that the destruction of mosques was an additional act of genocide under Article 4(2)(c) of the Statute); *Krstić* Trial Judgement, para. 580.

¹⁷⁵⁸ *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, para. 33. See also *Blagojević and Jokić* Appeal Judgement, para. 123; *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, para. 133 (holding that *Krstić* harboured no genocidal intent as "his own particular intent was directed to a forcible displacement. Some other members of the VRS Main Staff harboured the same intent to carry out forcible displacement, but viewed this displacement as a step in the accomplishment of their genocidal objective. It would be erroneous, however, to link *Krstić*'s specific intent to carry out forcible displacement with the same intent possessed by other members of the Main Staff, to whom the forcible displacement was a means of advancing the genocidal plan (footnotes omitted)."); ICJ Bosnia Judgement, para. 190 (holding: "Neither the intent, as a matter of policy, to render an area 'ethnically homogeneous', nor the operations that may be carried out to implement such policy, can *as such* be designated as genocide: the intent that characterizes genocide is to 'destroy, in whole or in part,' a particular group, and deportation or displacement of the members of a group, even if effected by force, is not necessarily equivalent to destruction of that group [...] (emphasis in original)" and referring to *Stakić* Trial Judgement, para. 519).

¹⁷⁵⁹ *Simba* Appeal Judgement, paras. 88, 269; *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 45; *Jelisić* Appeal Judgement, para. 49.

¹⁷⁶⁰ *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 8, 12.

¹⁷⁶¹ *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, para. 8. See also *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 749; *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, paras. 831–832.

¹⁷⁶² *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, para. 12. See also Rule 98 *bis* Appeal Judgement, para. 66; *Gacumbitsi* Appeal Judgement, para. 40.

¹⁷⁶³ *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, para. 13.

¹⁷⁶⁴ *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, para. 14.

d. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

i. Liability under Article 7(1) of the Statute

556. The Indictment charges the Accused with individual criminal responsibility under Article 7(1) for having, *inter alia*, committed crimes referred to in Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the Statute.¹⁷⁶⁵ The Prosecution does not allege that the Accused physically committed any of the crimes charged personally.¹⁷⁶⁶ Rather, he is alleged to have participated in four JCEs.¹⁷⁶⁷

557. The Accused is alleged to have shared the intent for the commission of each crime encompassed within each of the JCEs,¹⁷⁶⁸ and to have made significant contributions to each of them.¹⁷⁶⁹ Alternatively, the Prosecution asserts that if the implementation of the objective of the Overarching JCE only included the commission of forcible transfer and deportation, the Accused was aware of the risk that genocide and persecution, as well as murder and/or extermination, were possible consequences of the implementation of that objective,¹⁷⁷⁰ and the Accused willingly took those risks.¹⁷⁷¹

558. The Prosecution further alleges that through the acts and omissions outlined in the Indictment,¹⁷⁷² the Accused is also responsible for planning,¹⁷⁷³ instigating,¹⁷⁷⁴ and/or ordering the crimes charged in the Indictment.¹⁷⁷⁵ According to the Prosecution, the Accused either “directly intended or was aware of the substantial likelihood that the execution of his plans and orders, and/or the carrying out of the the acts and conduct which he instigated, would involve or result in the crimes charged” in the Indictment.¹⁷⁷⁶

559. According to the Prosecution, the Accused’s acts and omissions also render him responsible for aiding and abetting the crimes charged in the Indictment.¹⁷⁷⁷ In this regard, the Prosecution submits that the Accused was aware of the probability that the crimes charged would be committed and that his acts or omissions would contribute to their commission.¹⁷⁷⁸

1. Commission through participation in a JCE

560. When two or more persons act together to further a common criminal purpose, the jurisprudence of the Tribunal recognises three forms of criminal responsibility which may accrue to all members of the group.¹⁷⁷⁹ The first, “basic” category of JCE encompasses

¹⁷⁶⁵ Indictment, para. 5.

¹⁷⁶⁶ Indictment, para. 5.

¹⁷⁶⁷ See para. 3 (referring to paras. 9–31 of the Indictment).

¹⁷⁶⁸ Indictment, paras. 9, 16, 21, 26, 39, 42, 50, 58, 75, 77, 84.

¹⁷⁶⁹ Indictment, paras. 14, 19, 24, 29.

¹⁷⁷⁰ Indictment, paras. 10, 39, 50, 64.

¹⁷⁷¹ Indictment, paras. 10, 39, 43, 50, 59, 64, 67.

¹⁷⁷² Indictment, para. 14.

¹⁷⁷³ Indictment, paras. 30–31 (referring to acts described in paras. 14(a) and/or (e)).

¹⁷⁷⁴ Indictment, paras. 30–31 (referring to acts and omissions described in paras. 14(a)–(f) and/or (h)).

¹⁷⁷⁵ Indictment, paras. 30–31 (referring to acts described in paras. 14(d) and/or (j)).

¹⁷⁷⁶ Indictment, para. 31.

¹⁷⁷⁷ Indictment, paras. 30–31 (referring to acts and omissions described in paras. 14(a)–(i), and/or (j)).

¹⁷⁷⁸ Indictment, para. 31.

¹⁷⁷⁹ *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 195–226; *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 364; *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 82; *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, paras. 96–99. See also *Milutinović et al.* May 2003 Appeal Decision, paras. 18–23, 25–26, 28–30.

situations where all participants, acting pursuant to a common purpose, possess the same criminal intention to effectuate that purpose.¹⁷⁸⁰ The second, “systemic” form of JCE pertains to organised systems of ill-treatment.¹⁷⁸¹ The third, “extended” type of JCE involves the liability of a JCE participant for a crime which falls outside the common purpose or design, but which is nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of effectuating that common purpose.¹⁷⁸²

561. In order to find an accused criminally responsible on the basis of his participation in any of the three types of JCE, the following elements must be established: (i) the existence of a plurality of persons who act pursuant to a common purpose;¹⁷⁸³ (ii) the existence of a common plan, design, or purpose which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute; and (iii) the participation of the accused in furthering the common design or purpose.¹⁷⁸⁴ The Chamber will discuss each of these requirements in more detail below.

562. The Appeals Chamber has held that the plurality of persons need not be organised in a military, political, or administrative structure,¹⁷⁸⁵ and it may be sufficient to identify the plurality as a category or a group rather than as individuals by name.¹⁷⁸⁶ However, the criterion used to identify the group must be sufficiently specific to prevent vagueness and ambiguity.¹⁷⁸⁷

563. All three forms of JCE require proof of the existence of a “common plan, design or purpose which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute”.¹⁷⁸⁸ The existence of a common plan or purpose can be inferred from the fact that the plurality of persons acts in unison,¹⁷⁸⁹ and the plan may materialise extemporaneously rather than being previously arranged or formulated.¹⁷⁹⁰ Additionally, the Chamber must “specify the common criminal purpose in terms of both the criminal goal intended and its scope (for example, the temporal and geographic limits of this goal, and the general identities of the intended victims)”.¹⁷⁹¹ A JCE can come to embrace expanded criminal means, as long as the evidence shows that the JCE members agreed on such an expansion of means.¹⁷⁹² Such an expanded agreement need not be explicit, may also materialise extemporaneously, and can be inferred from circumstantial evidence.¹⁷⁹³

¹⁷⁸⁰ *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 196 (as confirmed in *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 82; *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 97).

¹⁷⁸¹ *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 202–203 (as confirmed in *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 82; *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 98).

¹⁷⁸² *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 204 (as confirmed in *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 83; *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 99).

¹⁷⁸³ Action by a “plurality” of persons denotes the concerted action of two or more persons. See *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 195–226.

¹⁷⁸⁴ *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 227 (as confirmed in *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, paras. 364, 430; *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 64; *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 81; *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 100; *Krnojelac* Appeal Judgement, para. 31).

¹⁷⁸⁵ *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 64; *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 100; *Krnojelac* Appeal Judgement, para. 31; *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 227.

¹⁷⁸⁶ *Krajišnik* Appeal Judgement, para. 156 (citing *Limaj et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 99).

¹⁷⁸⁷ *Krajišnik* Appeal Judgement, para. 157; *Stanišić and Župljanin* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 101; *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 889; *Đorđević* Trial Judgement, para. 1861.

¹⁷⁸⁸ *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 227(ii).

¹⁷⁸⁹ *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 109; *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 227(ii).

¹⁷⁹⁰ *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 418 (citing *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 227(ii); *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 100; *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 117).

¹⁷⁹¹ *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 430.

¹⁷⁹² *Krajišnik* Appeal Judgement, para. 163.

¹⁷⁹³ *Krajišnik* Appeal Judgement, para. 163.

564. An accused must have participated in furthering the common purpose at the core of the JCE by assisting in or contributing to the execution of the common plan or purpose, but need not have performed any part of the *actus reus* of the crime charged.¹⁷⁹⁴ The accused's contribution need not be *sine qua non*, without which the crime would not have been committed, nor must it necessarily be a substantial contribution to the JCE.¹⁷⁹⁵ However, the accused must "contribut[e] to the common purpose in a way that lends a significant contribution to the crimes".¹⁷⁹⁶

565. The question of whether the accused significantly contributed to a JCE is a question of fact to be determined on a case by case basis.¹⁷⁹⁷ In determining whether an accused's conduct constituted a significant contribution to a JCE, the Chamber may consider the size of the criminal enterprise, the function(s) performed by the accused, and the accused's position as well as other relevant factors.¹⁷⁹⁸

566. A significant contribution to a JCE may consist of an act or, where there is a legal duty to act, an omission.¹⁷⁹⁹ While the Accused accepts that, in theory, an omission may constitute a significant contribution, by reference to the *Mrkšić and Šljivančanin* Appeal Judgement, he contends that "the Appeals Chamber has held that the *actus reus* for 'commission by omission' is a higher standard than for aiding and abetting by omission, namely, the accused must exert 'concrete influence' on the perpetration of the crime".¹⁸⁰⁰ However, the Chamber observes that the relevant passages of both the *Mrkšić and Šljivančanin* Appeal Judgement as well as the *Orić* Appeal Judgement—to which the *Mrkšić and Šljivančanin* Appeals Chamber cited—primarily concern other forms of liability, namely aiding and abetting under Article 7(1) and superior liability under Article 7(3) of the Statute.¹⁸⁰¹ The Chamber considers that the relevant enquiry—which should be done on a case by case basis¹⁸⁰²—is whether an accused was obligated by law to act, and if so, whether such an omission significantly contributed to the JCE.¹⁸⁰³

567. In order to hold an accused criminally responsible where the person who carries out the *actus reus* of the crime charged is not a member of the JCE,¹⁸⁰⁴ there must be a link between that accused and such conduct.¹⁸⁰⁵ This link, which must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, is established if criminal responsibility for the other person's conduct can be imputed to one of the JCE members who, when using the other person, acted in accordance

¹⁷⁹⁴ *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 227(iii); *Krajišnik* Appeal Judgement, para. 215; *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 427; *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 64; *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 99; *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, paras. 100, 119.

¹⁷⁹⁵ *Krajišnik* Appeal Judgement, paras. 215, 675; *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, paras. 97–98.

¹⁷⁹⁶ *Krajišnik* Appeal Judgement, paras. 662, 706. See also *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 430. The Appeals Chamber has observed that any disparity in the scope of the contributions of JCE members would be adequately dealt with at the sentencing stage. *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 432.

¹⁷⁹⁷ *Krajišnik* Appeal Judgement, para. 696.

¹⁷⁹⁸ See *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 893; *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 105 (citing *Kvočka et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 311).

¹⁷⁹⁹ See *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 188; *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 663; *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 274; *Galić* Appeal Judgement, para. 175 (holding that an omission may lead to individual criminal responsibility pursuant to Article 7(1) where there is a legal duty to act); *Mrkšić and Šljivančanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 134; *Ntagerura* Appeal Judgement, p. 334; *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 894, fn. 3528; *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 103.

¹⁸⁰⁰ Defence Final Brief, para. 3158 (citing *Mrkšić and Šljivančanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 156).

¹⁸⁰¹ See *Mrkšić and Šljivančanin* Appeal Judgement, paras. 155–156; *Orić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 36–49.

¹⁸⁰² *Krajišnik* Appeal Judgement, para. 696.

¹⁸⁰³ Further, the Chamber notes that responsibility pursuant to the first form of JCE requires that the Accused shares the intent of the relevant crime, or crimes, with other members of the JCE.

¹⁸⁰⁴ *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 410.

¹⁸⁰⁵ *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, paras. 412, 430.

with the common plan.¹⁸⁰⁶ In such instances, “the crime in question”—meaning the crime with which the accused is charged—must also “for[m] part of the common criminal purpose”.¹⁸⁰⁷ This, in turn, may be inferred from the close co-operation of the accused—or any other JCE member—with the non-member in order to further the common criminal purpose.¹⁸⁰⁸ It is not necessary, however, to establish the existence of an additional understanding or agreement between the accused and the non-member to commit that particular crime.¹⁸⁰⁹

568. The mental elements differ substantially according to the relevant category of JCE.¹⁸¹⁰ Since only the first and third categories are charged in the Indictment, the Chamber will limit its discussion to the jurisprudence relevant to these forms of JCE.

569. With regard to the basic category of JCE, the accused must both share the intent to effect the common purpose of the JCE as well as intend the commission of the crime with which he is charged.¹⁸¹¹ Where an accused is charged with a crime requiring specific intent which allegedly formed part of the JCE’s common purpose, he and the other JCE members must share the requisite specific intent for that crime.¹⁸¹²

570. For a crime that falls outside the common purpose of the JCE (“extended crime”), an accused may nevertheless incur responsibility pursuant to the third category of JCE liability even when he does not share the intent to commit the extended crime if (i) he intended to participate in and contribute to the furtherance of the common criminal purpose, (ii) it was foreseeable to him that the extended crime might be perpetrated in carrying out the common purpose, and (iii) the accused willingly took the risk that the extended crime might occur by participating in the common purpose.¹⁸¹³ This is true even where the extended crime is a specific intent crime such as genocide or persecution.¹⁸¹⁴ Where that crime is genocide, the prosecution will be required to establish that it was reasonably foreseeable to the accused that an act specified in Article 4(2) would be committed and that it would be committed with genocidal intent.¹⁸¹⁵ Moreover, the possibility of the crime being committed must be sufficiently substantial as to be reasonably foreseeable, based on the information available to the accused at the time,¹⁸¹⁶ but an accused need not understand that the extended crime “would *probably* be committed”.¹⁸¹⁷ In other words, the accused must have sufficient

¹⁸⁰⁶ *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, paras. 413, 430.

¹⁸⁰⁷ *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, paras. 410, 418.

¹⁸⁰⁸ *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 410 (finding that when a member of the JCE uses a person outside the JCE to carry out the *actus reus* of a crime, the fact that the person in question knows of the existence of the JCE—without it being established that he or she shares the *mens rea* necessary to become a member of the JCE—may be a factor to be taken into account when determining whether the crime forms part of the common criminal purpose. However, this is not a *sine qua non* for imputing liability for the crime to that member of the JCE).

¹⁸⁰⁹ *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 418.

¹⁸¹⁰ *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 228. See also *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 365; *Stakić* Appeal Judgement, para. 65.

¹⁸¹¹ *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 82; *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 365; *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 33; *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, paras. 97, 101.

¹⁸¹² *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 110; *Krnjelac* Appeal Judgement, paras. 111–112; *Stanišić and Župljanin* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 105; *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 109. See also Rule 98 *bis* Appeal Judgement, para. 79 (“[I]t is the genocidal intent of [the accused] and other JCE members, not the physical perpetrators of the underlying alleged genocidal acts, that is determinative for purposes of [the basic form of] JCE [...]”). See also para. 549.

¹⁸¹³ *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 83. The *actus reus* of the extended crime may be perpetrated either by a JCE member or by a non-member who was used by a JCE member for that purpose. *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 411.

¹⁸¹⁴ *Brđanin* 2004 Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, paras. 5–7, 9.

¹⁸¹⁵ *Brđanin* 2004 Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, para. 6.

¹⁸¹⁶ Appeal Decision on JCE III Foreseeability, para. 18; *Brđanin* 2004 Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, para. 5; *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 897; *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 111.

¹⁸¹⁷ Appeal Decision on JCE III Foreseeability, para. 18.

knowledge that the extended crime was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the common criminal purpose.¹⁸¹⁸

2. Planning

571. To be found criminally responsible for planning under the Statute, the accused—either acting alone or with another—must have designed criminal conduct that is later carried out and which constitutes one or more crimes enumerated in the Statute.¹⁸¹⁹ The planning must have been a factor substantially contributing to the criminal conduct,¹⁸²⁰ but the Prosecution need not establish that the crime would not have been committed but for the accused’s plan.¹⁸²¹ The accused must intend to plan the commission of a crime or, at a minimum, must be aware of the substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of the acts or omissions planned.¹⁸²²

3. Instigating

572. Criminal liability for instigation would be incurred when an accused prompts another person to commit an offence,¹⁸²³ which is actually committed.¹⁸²⁴ The prompt may be either express or implied,¹⁸²⁵ it need not be direct or public,¹⁸²⁶ and it may consist of either an act or an omission.¹⁸²⁷ The accused’s prompting must have been a factor “substantially contributing to the conduct of another person committing the crime”, but the Prosecution need not prove that the crime would not have been committed but for such prompting,¹⁸²⁸ or that the accused had effective control or any other sort of authority over the perpetrator.¹⁸²⁹ The accused must intend to instigate another person to commit a crime, or at a minimum, he must be aware of the substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of the act or omission instigated.¹⁸³⁰

¹⁸¹⁸ Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 86.

¹⁸¹⁹ Dragomir Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 268; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 26.

¹⁸²⁰ Dragomir Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 268; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 26. See also Dragomir Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 270, fn. 793 (citing Brđanin Trial Judgement, paras. 357–358: “Responsibility for [planning] a crime could [...] only incur if it was demonstrated that the Accused was substantially involved at the preparatory stage of that crime in the concrete form it took, which implies that he possessed sufficient knowledge thereof in advance. [...] Although the Accused espoused the Strategic Plan, it has not been established that he personally devised it. [...] the Trial Chamber finds the evidence before it insufficient to conclude that the Accused was involved in the immediate preparation of the concrete crimes. This requirement of specificity distinguishes ‘planning’ from other modes of liability. [...]”) (emphasis added).

¹⁸²¹ Popović et al. Trial Judgement, para. 1006; Milutinović et al. Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 82.

¹⁸²² Dragomir Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 268; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras. 29–31. This is true regardless of whether the *mens rea* of the crime is general or specific. See Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 112 (citing Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 166).

¹⁸²³ Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 27; Kvočka et al. Trial Judgement, para. 252.

¹⁸²⁴ Brđanin Trial Judgement, paras. 267, 269 (citing, *inter alia*, Blaškić Trial Judgement, para. 280; Galić Trial Judgement, para. 168). See also Orić Trial Judgement, para. 269.

¹⁸²⁵ Tolimir Trial Judgement, para. 902; Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 269; Blaškić Trial Judgement, paras. 280–281.

¹⁸²⁶ Akayesu Appeal Judgement, paras. 477–478, 483; Stanišić and Župljanin Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 96; Popović et al. Trial Judgement, para. 1008.

¹⁸²⁷ Orić Trial Judgement, para. 273 (citing Blaškić Trial Judgement, paras. 270, 280; Kordić Trial Judgement, para. 387; Naletilić Trial Judgement, para. 60; Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 269; Limaj Trial Judgement, para. 514; Kamuhanda Trial Judgement, para. 593).

¹⁸²⁸ Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 27.

¹⁸²⁹ Semanza Appeal Judgement, para. 257; Tolimir Trial Judgement, para. 902; Orić Trial Judgement, para. 272 (holding that instigating does not presuppose any kind of superiority). See also Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 359 (finding it immaterial whether the physical perpetrators were even subordinate to the instigator so long as a causal link between the instigation and the commission of a crime exists).

¹⁸³⁰ Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 480; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras. 29, 32.

4. Ordering

573. To be held criminally responsible for ordering the commission of a crime, an accused must have instructed another person to engage in an act or an omission,¹⁸³¹ and such instruction must have resulted in the commission of a crime.¹⁸³² The accused must have held a position of authority over the other person, but it need not be formal and may even be temporary.¹⁸³³ However, there must be “proof of some position of authority on the part of the accused that would compel another to commit a crime in following the accused’s order”.¹⁸³⁴ The order need not be in written or any particular form,¹⁸³⁵ nor must it be transmitted directly to the physical perpetrator.¹⁸³⁶ As with planning and instigating, it need not be shown that the crime would not have been perpetrated but for the accused’s order,¹⁸³⁷ but the order must have had “a direct and substantial effect on the commission of the illegal act”.¹⁸³⁸ **(This qualification incriminate the most responsible leaders of the main powers, UN, NATO, European Community, who pursued the course of event towards the war, than Karadžić and the Serbs in Bosnia, who did everything to avoid a war!)**

The accused must intend to order a crime, or must be aware of the substantial likelihood that a crime would be committed in the execution of the act or omission ordered.¹⁸³⁹

5. Aiding and Abetting

574. [D I G E S T . + G R O U P S + G R O U P S 2 . d o c x . d o c x](#) Aiding and abetting is a form of liability in which the accused contributes to the perpetration of a crime that is committed by another person.¹⁸⁴⁰ The Prosecution must establish that the crime for which it seeks to make the accused responsible in fact occurred.¹⁸⁴¹
575. The physical element of aiding and abetting consists of acts or omissions “specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime [...]”.¹⁸⁴² This support must have a substantial effect upon the

¹⁸³¹ *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 28; *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 42. Such instruction necessarily requires a positive action on the part of the instructor. *Galić* Appeal Judgement, para. 176.

¹⁸³² *Nahimana et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 481; *Stanišić and Župljanin* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 98; *Martić* Trial Judgement, para. 441 (citing *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, para. 267).

¹⁸³³ *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 28; *Semanza* Appeal Judgement, para. 363.

¹⁸³⁴ *Semanza* Appeal Judgement, para. 361 (citing *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 28); *Galić* Appeal Judgement, para. 176. See also *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, para. 270 (finding that sufficient authority may be reasonably implied from the circumstances); *Mrkšić et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 550.

¹⁸³⁵ *Kamuhanda* Appeal Judgement, para. 76 (citing *Kordić and Čerkez* Trial Judgement, para. 388); *Stanišić and Župljanin* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 98. The order’s existence may also be proven by circumstantial evidence. *Mrkšić et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 550 (citing, *inter alia*, *Galić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 170–171).

¹⁸³⁶ *Blaškić* Trial Judgement, para. 282. See also *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 905; *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 1012; *Strugar* Trial Judgement, para. 331; *Brđanin* Trial Judgement, para. 270; *Naletilić and Martinović* Trial Judgement, para. 61; *Kordić and Čerkez* Trial Judgement, para. 388.

¹⁸³⁷ *Strugar* Trial Judgement, para. 332.

¹⁸³⁸ *Kamuhanda* Appeal Judgement, para. 75. See also *Stanišić and Župljanin* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 98; *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 905; *Strugar* Trial Judgement, para. 332.

¹⁸³⁹ *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, paras. 29–30; *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 41–42.

¹⁸⁴⁰ *Blagojević and Jokić* Appeal Judgement, para. 127; *Simić* Appeal Judgement, para. 85; *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 102(i). This other person may be either the person who carries out the *actus reus* of the crime with which the accused is charged or a participant in a JCE. See *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 102. See also *Popović et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 1015.

¹⁸⁴¹ *Aleksovski* Appeal Judgement, para. 165.

¹⁸⁴² *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 229(iii). See also *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 45 (construing the *Vasiljević* Appeals Chamber’s quotation of the *Tadić* Appeal Judgement as “set[ting] out the *actus reus* and *mens rea* of aiding and abetting”); *Orić* Appeal Judgement, para. 43; *Simić et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 85; *Kvočka et al.* Appeal Judgement, paras. 89–90. See further para. 576.

perpetration of the crime.¹⁸⁴³ Liability for “aiding and abetting by omission proper”, which must be distinguished from aiding and abetting by tacit approval and encouragement,¹⁸⁴⁴ may only attach where an accused had both a legal duty to act and the means to fulfil this duty.¹⁸⁴⁵

576. [DIGEST + GROUPS + GROUPS 2 docx.docx](#) Whether an act or omission had a substantial effect on the commission of a crime is a fact-based inquiry.¹⁸⁴⁶ The aider and abettor’s conduct may occur in a location remote from the scene of the crime.¹⁸⁴⁷ It is unnecessary to establish that the crime would not have been committed without the contribution of the aider and abettor.¹⁸⁴⁸ Nor must the Prosecution prove the existence of a plan or agreement between the aider and abettor and the perpetrator; the latter may not even know of the aider and abettor’s contribution.¹⁸⁴⁹ Finally, specific direction is not an element of aiding and abetting responsibility under customary international law.¹⁸⁵⁰ This means that there is no requirement of a showing that the acts of the Accused were specifically directed to assist, encourage, or lend moral support to the commission of the crimes.¹⁸⁵¹

577. The requisite mental element for aiding and abetting is “knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the commission of a specific crime”.¹⁸⁵² The aider and abettor must be aware of the essential elements of the crime which was ultimately committed,¹⁸⁵³ including the perpetrators’ state of mind and any relevant specific intent,¹⁸⁵⁴ although he need not share that specific intent.¹⁸⁵⁵ Moreover, an accused may be convicted for having aided and abetted a crime, including one which requires specific intent, even

¹⁸⁴³ *Aleksovski* Appeal Judgement, paras. 162, 164 (confirming the *Aleksovski* Trial Chamber’s reliance on the *Furundžija* Trial Judgement, paras. 233–235). See also *Krstić* Trial Judgement, para. 601 (citing *Aleksovski* Appeal Judgement, paras. 162–164) (“[A]iding and abetting” means rendering a substantial contribution to the commission of a crime.”); *Perišić* Trial Judgement (Majority Opinion), para. 126; *Dordević* Trial Judgement, paras. 1873–1874; *Lukić and Lukić* Trial Judgement, para. 901; *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 89; *Boškoski and Tarčulovski* Trial Judgement, paras. 401–402; *Mrkšić et al.* Trial Judgement, paras. 551–552; *Limaj et al.* Trial Judgement, paras. 516–517; *Blagojević and Jokić* Trial Judgement, para. 726; *Galić* Trial Judgement, paras. 168–169; *Naletilić and Martinović* Trial Judgement, para. 63; *Kvočka et al.* Trial Judgement, paras. 243, 253.

¹⁸⁴⁴ *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, paras. 273–274 (referring, for example, to the failure of an accused who holds a position of authority to intervene when physically present at the scene of a crime may be considered to amount to tacit and encouragement approval—as opposed to an omission proper—if found to have substantially contributed to the crime). In order for tacit approval to constitute a substantial contribution to the crime, however, the principal perpetrators must be aware of the encouragement and moral support. *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 277.

¹⁸⁴⁵ *Mrkšić and Šljivančanin* Appeal Judgement, paras. 49, 154 (citing *Orić* Appeal Judgement, para. 43). See also *Mrkšić and Šljivančanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 134 (citing *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 47 and stating that the Appeals Chamber has “consistently found that, in the circumstances of a given case”, the *actus reus* of aiding and abetting may be perpetrated through an omission). See further *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 274 (holding that “omission proper” may lead to individual criminal responsibility under Article 7(1) of the Statute where there is a legal duty to act); *Galić* Appeal Judgement, para. 175; *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 663.

¹⁸⁴⁶ *Lukić and Lukić* Appeal Judgement, para. 438 (citing *Blagojević and Jokić* Appeal Judgement, para. 134); *Mrkšić and Šljivančanin* Appeal Judgement, paras. 146, 200.

¹⁸⁴⁷ *Mrkšić and Šljivančanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 81; *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 48.

¹⁸⁴⁸ *Mrkšić and Šljivančanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 81 (citing *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 48); *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 348; *Simić* Appeal Judgement, para. 85.

¹⁸⁴⁹ *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 263 (citing, *inter alia*, *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 229(ii)); *Krnojelac* Appeal Judgement, para. 33.

¹⁸⁵⁰ *Šainović et al.* Appeal Judgement, paras. 1649, 1651.

¹⁸⁵¹ *Šainović et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 1651.

¹⁸⁵² *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 229(iv). See also *Lukić and Lukić* Appeal Judgement, para. 428; *Mrkšić and Šljivančanin* Appeal Judgement, paras. 49, 159; *Orić* Appeal Judgement, para. 43; *Blagojević and Jokić* Appeal Judgement, para. 127; *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 484; *Simić* Appeal Judgement, para. 86; *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 45, 49; *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 102; *Šainović et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 1649. This knowledge need not have been explicitly expressed, but may be inferred from all relevant circumstances. *Tolimir* Trial Judgement, para. 911; *Dordević* Trial Judgement, para. 1876; *Milutinović et al.* Trial Judgement, Vol. I, para. 94; *Strugar* Trial Judgement, para. 350.

¹⁸⁵³ *Mrkšić and Šljivančanin* Appeal Judgement, paras. 49, 159; *Orić* Appeal Judgement, para. 43; *Brđanin* Appeal Judgement, paras. 484, 487.

¹⁸⁵⁴ *Blagojević and Jokić* Appeal Judgement, para. 127; *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, para. 140; *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 142; *Krnojelac* Appeal Judgement, para. 52.

¹⁸⁵⁵ *Simić* Appeal Judgement, para. 86 (citing *Krnojelac* Appeal Judgement, para. 52; *Aleksovski* Appeal Judgement, para. 162).

where the specific individuals who committed the crime have not been tried or identified.¹⁸⁵⁶ If an accused is aware that one or more crimes would probably be committed, and one of these crimes is in fact committed, he is deemed to have intended the facilitation of the commission of that crime and is guilty as an aider and abettor.¹⁸⁵⁷

ii. Liability under Article 7(3) of the Statute

578. The Accused is also charged with individual criminal responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute on the basis that as the highest civilian and military authority in the RS, he was the superior of, and had effective control over, the Bosnian Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs who participated in the crimes alleged in the Indictment.¹⁸⁵⁸ It is alleged that the Accused knew or had reason to know that the alleged crimes were about to be committed or had been committed and that he failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent and/or punish these alleged crimes.¹⁸⁵⁹

579. Under Article 7(3) of the Statute, a superior may incur criminal responsibility with respect to a crime for which his subordinate is criminally responsible if the following three elements are established: (i) there was a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused and the perpetrator of the underlying crime; (ii) the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or had been committed; and (iii) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or punish the perpetrator thereof.¹⁸⁶⁰ A superior can bear responsibility under Article 7(3) with respect to the criminal conduct of his subordinates under “all other modes of participation under Article 7(1)”, namely the “planning, instigating, ordering, committing or otherwise aiding and abetting a crime” by his subordinates.¹⁸⁶¹

1. Superior-subordinate relationship

580. In order to establish that a superior-subordinate relationship exists between the accused and the perpetrator of an underlying crime, it must be proven that he exercised “effective control” over the perpetrator.¹⁸⁶² A superior is someone who possesses “the power or authority in either a *de jure* or a *de facto* form to prevent a subordinate’s crime or to punish the perpetrators of the crime”. In assessing whether there is a superior-subordinate relationship it does not matter whether the accused was a civilian or military superior.¹⁸⁶³ An evaluation of effective control is more a question of fact than of law and requires consideration of factors that show “that the accused had the power to prevent, punish, or initiate measures leading to proceedings against the alleged perpetrators where appropriate.”¹⁸⁶⁴

¹⁸⁵⁶ *Brdanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 355 (approving the Trial Chamber’s identification of the perpetrators as “members of the ‘Bosnian Serb forces’”); *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, para. 143.

¹⁸⁵⁷ *Mrkšić and Šljivančanin* Appeal Judgement, para. 159 (citing *Simić* Appeal Judgement, para. 86; *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 50).

¹⁸⁵⁸ Indictment, paras. 32–33.

¹⁸⁵⁹ Indictment, paras. 34–35.

¹⁸⁶⁰ *Perišić* Appeal Judgement, para. 86; *Gotovina* Appeal Judgement, para. 128; *Orić* Appeal Judgement, para. 18; *Halilović* Appeal Judgement, para. 59; *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 484; *Aleksovski* Appeal Judgement, para. 72.

¹⁸⁶¹ *Orić* Appeal Judgement, para. 21; *Blagojević* Appeal Judgement, para. 280.

¹⁸⁶² *Orić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 20, 91; *Halilović* Appeal Judgement, para. 59. See also *Čelebići* Appeal Judgement, paras. 196–197, 266.

¹⁸⁶³ *Alekovski* Appeal Judgement, para. 76; *Čelebići* Appeal Judgement, paras. 195–196.

¹⁸⁶⁴ *Perišić* Appeal Judgement, para. 87; *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 69; *Aleksovski* Appeal Judgement, para. 76.

581. Factors to be considered in assessing whether a superior exercised effective control include, *inter alia*, (i) his capacity to issue orders and whether those orders were in fact followed,¹⁸⁶⁵ (ii) the authority to issue disciplinary measures, and (iii) the power to promote personnel and terminate positions held.¹⁸⁶⁶ The superior's *de jure* authority "constitutes *prima facie* a reasonable basis for assuming that he has effective control over his subordinates" but still requires the Prosecution to prove that he exercised effective control.¹⁸⁶⁷

582. In assessing effective control what is relevant is whether the "superior has the material ability to prevent or punish the criminally responsible subordinate".¹⁸⁶⁸ In this regard the Appeals Chamber has held:

Whether the effective control descends from the superior to the subordinate culpable of the crime through intermediary subordinates is immaterial as a matter of law; instead; what matters is whether the superior has the material ability to prevent or punish the criminally responsible subordinate. The separate question of whether – due to proximity or remoteness of control – the superior indeed possessed effective control is a matter of evidence, not of substantive law.¹⁸⁶⁹

583. Furthermore, for the purposes of liability under Article 7(3), the accused need not know the exact identity of a subordinate perpetrator.¹⁸⁷⁰

2. Knew or had reason to know

584. For the accused to be held responsible under Article 7(3), the accused must have known or had reason to know that the subordinate committed a crime or was going to do so.¹⁸⁷¹

585. Knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence¹⁸⁷² but requires an assessment of the specific circumstances of each case and the "specific situation of the superior concerned at the time in question".¹⁸⁷³

586. To prove that the accused had reason to know of crimes committed, it is necessary to show that he had information available to him which would have put him on notice of unlawful acts committed or about to be committed by his subordinates.¹⁸⁷⁴ In this regard "it must be established whether, in the circumstances of the case, he possessed information sufficiently alarming to justify further inquiry".¹⁸⁷⁵ This information does not need to contain extensive or specific details about the unlawful acts committed or about to be

¹⁸⁶⁵ *Strugar* Appeal Judgement, para. 254; *Halilović* Appeal Judgement, para. 207. See also *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 609.

¹⁸⁶⁶ *Perišić* Appeal Judgement, para. 97. See also *Čelebići* Appeal Judgement, paras. 190, 206.

¹⁸⁶⁷ *Hadžihasanović and Kubura* Appeal Judgement, para. 21. See also *Orić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 91–92; *Čelebići* Appeal Judgement, para. 197.

¹⁸⁶⁸ *Čelebići* Appeal Judgement, paras. 192, 195–198, 256. See also *Orić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 91–92; *Halilović* Appeal Judgement, para. 59; *Limaj et. al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 273.

¹⁸⁶⁹ *Orić* Appeal Judgement, para. 20 (citing *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 69). See also *Čelebići* Appeal Judgement, para. 252.

¹⁸⁷⁰ *Blagojević* Appeal Judgement, para. 287.

¹⁸⁷¹ *Kordić and Čerkez* Appeal Judgement, para. 839. See also *Orić* Appeal Judgement, para. 18; *Čelebići* Appeal Judgement, para. 222.

¹⁸⁷² *Galić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 171, 180–184.

¹⁸⁷³ *Krnjelac* Appeal Judgement, para. 156; *Čelebići* Appeal Judgement, para. 239.

¹⁸⁷⁴ *Čelebići* Appeal Judgement, paras. 238, 241. See also *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 62.

¹⁸⁷⁵ *Strugar* Appeals Judgement, paras. 297–301; *Hadžihasanović and Kubura* Appeal Judgement, para. 28 (footnotes omitted).

committed.¹⁸⁷⁶ A failure by the accused to punish the past offences of his subordinates may be relevant to determining whether he “possessed information that was sufficiently alarming to put him on notice of the risk that similar crimes might subsequently be carried out by subordinates and justify further inquiry”.¹⁸⁷⁷

3. Necessary and reasonable measures

587. For the accused to be held responsible under Article 7(3), it must be established that he failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish the commission of the crimes charged.¹⁸⁷⁸ Determining what measures are necessary and reasonable to prevent or punish crimes committed by subordinates is a question of fact and not of substantive law.¹⁸⁷⁹ The degree of effective control can be used to determine “the necessary and reasonable measures within the competence of a superior”.¹⁸⁸⁰

588. The measures which are “necessary” are those which are “appropriate for the superior to discharge his obligation” to prevent or punish the underlying crime, while “reasonable” measures are those “reasonably falling within the material powers of the superior”.¹⁸⁸¹ Reasonable and necessary measures can include reporting the matter to competent authorities where this report is likely to trigger an investigation or initiate disciplinary or criminal proceedings,¹⁸⁸² carrying out an effective investigation to establish the facts,¹⁸⁸³ issuing specific orders prohibiting or stopping the criminal activities and securing implementation of those orders,¹⁸⁸⁴ protesting or criticising criminal action and taking disciplinary measures against the commission of crimes.¹⁸⁸⁵

589. The duty to prevent a crime is distinct from the duty to punish a crime as it involves “different conduct committed at different times”.¹⁸⁸⁶ The failure to punish relates to past crimes committed by subordinates and the failure to prevent concerns future crimes of subordinates.¹⁸⁸⁷ The obligation to prevent or punish “does not provide an accused with two alternative and equally satisfying options” in that where the accused knew or had reason to know that subordinates were about to commit a crime and failed to prevent that crime, “he cannot make up for his failure to act by punishing the subordinates afterwards”.¹⁸⁸⁸

¹⁸⁷⁶ *Hadžihasanović and Kubura* Appeal Judgement, para. 28; *Galić* Appeal Judgement, para. 184; *Krnojelac* Appeal Judgement, para. 155; *Čelebići* Appeal Judgement, para. 238.

¹⁸⁷⁷ *Hadžihasanović and Kubura* Appeal Judgement, paras. 30–31; *Krnojelac* Appeal Judgement, para. 155.

¹⁸⁷⁸ *Orić* Appeal Judgement, para. 18.

¹⁸⁷⁹ *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 72. *See also* *Hadžihasanović and Kubura* Appeal Judgement, para. 33.

¹⁸⁸⁰ *Boškoski and Tarčulovski* Appeal Judgement, paras. 230–231; *Strugar* Appeal Judgement, paras. 297–301; *Halilović* Appeal Judgement, para. 63; *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 72.

¹⁸⁸¹ *Halilović* Appeal Judgement, para. 63.

¹⁸⁸² *Boškoski and Tarčulovski* Appeal Judgement, paras. 230, 234; *Blagojević and Jokić* Trial Judgement, para. 793; *Blaškić* Trial Judgement, para. 335;

¹⁸⁸³ *Limaj et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 529; *Halilović* Trial Judgement, paras. 97, 100; *Strugar* Trial Judgement, para. 376 (referring to *Kordić* Trial Judgement, para. 446).

¹⁸⁸⁴ *Halilović* Trial Judgement, paras. 74, 89; *Strugar* Trial Judgement, para. 374.

¹⁸⁸⁵ *Halilović* Trial Judgement, para. 89; *Strugar* Trial Judgement, para. 374.

¹⁸⁸⁶ *Perišić* Appeal Judgement, para. 88 (citing, *inter alia*, *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 83). *See also* *Orić* Trial Judgement, para. 326.

¹⁸⁸⁷ *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 83.

¹⁸⁸⁸ *Blaškić* Trial Judgement, para. 336. *See also* *Strugar* Trial Judgement, para. 373.

590. For the purposes of Article 7(3), there is no requirement of causality between the superior's failure to prevent and the occurrence of the crime.¹⁸⁸⁹

4. Interaction between Articles 7(1) and 7(3)

591. Where both Article 7(1) and Article 7(3) responsibility are alleged under the same count, and where the legal requirements of both are met, a conviction should only be entered on the basis of Article 7(1) and the accused's superior position should be considered as an aggravating factor in sentencing.¹⁸⁹⁰ The Appeals Chamber in *Popović* further specified that it was "improper to maintain a conviction under Article 7(3) of the Statute in addition to a conviction under Article 7(1) of the Statute for the same count and *the same set of facts*".¹⁸⁹¹

IV. FINDINGS

A. MUNICIPALITIES COMPONENT

1. Facts

592. The Prosecution alleges that from at least October 1991 until 30 November 1995, the Accused participated in an overarching JCE to permanently remove Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat inhabitants from the territories of BiH claimed as Bosnian Serb territory by means which included the commission of the following crimes: genocide, persecution, extermination, murder, deportation, and inhumane acts (forcible transfer).¹⁸⁹² In this component, the Prosecution refers to the following municipalities: Bijeljina, Bratunac, Brčko, Foča, Rogatica, Višegrad, Sokolac, Vlasenica, and Zvornik (in relation to Eastern BiH); Banja Luka, Bosanski Novi, Ključ, Prijedor, and Sanski Most (in relation to the ARK); Hadžići, Ilidža, Novi Grad, Novo Sarajevo, Pale, and Vogošća (in relation to the Sarajevo area).¹⁸⁹³ **There is a great number of evidence against this assertion. Between October 1991 and 6 April 1992, when the war broke out, the Serb side was a very conservative, not planning anything and not seeking for anything new, but to preserve Yugoslavia and BiH in it. Until October 1991 there was going on a horrible political crisis with unilateral and violent, and a war in Slovenia and Croatia. The entire 1991 went in a Muslim/Croat illegal attempts to alter the Constitution of BiH and deprive the Serb side of their status of a constituent nation in BiH, as Croatia did, and treat it as a national minority. After October 1991 the war in Croatia had been ending, while the political crisis in BiH deteriorated. The Serb side did everything to avoid any clashes, and sacrifice many of its vital interests to preserve peace. Apart from a permanent advocating against the illegal secession, the Serb side proposed many safe alternatives, which had been rejected by the Muslim side, but understood by the European Community. THERE WAS NEVER ANY EVIDENCE, NOT EVEN HINT THAT THE SERBS INTENDED TO**

¹⁸⁸⁹ *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 73–77. See also *Hadžihasanović and Kubura* Appeal Judgement, paras. 38–40.

¹⁸⁹⁰ *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 91–92 (citing *Aleksovski* Appeal Judgement, para. 183 and *Čelebići* Appeal Judgement, para. 745). See also *Galić* Appeal Judgement, para. 186; *Kvočka et. al.*, Appeal Judgement, para. 104.

¹⁸⁹¹ *Popović et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 1806 (referring to *Nahimana et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 487; *Blaškić* Appeal Judgement, para. 91) (emphasis added).

¹⁸⁹² Indictment, para. 9.

¹⁸⁹³ Indictment, para. 48.

“PERMANENTLY REMOVE” ANYONE FROM THE TERRITORIES THAT WERE THEIR FROM THE IMMEMORIAL TIMES. THIS LIE AND CONSTRUCTION WAS NEVER CORROBORATED BY ANYTHING.

593. The Prosecution alleges that under the direction of the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership, civilian, military, and paramilitary organs collaborated to take over municipalities and territories throughout BiH in order to establish Serb control and permanently remove non-Serbs by force or threat of force. It is alleged that the physical take-overs of the Municipalities began in late March 1992 and that during and after these take-overs, Serb Forces and authorities, acting under the direction of the Accused, killed and mistreated thousands of individuals and expelled hundreds of thousands, while others fled in fear of their lives.¹⁸⁹⁴

594. The Accused’s case in relation to the Municipality component is that (i) the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale did not control events in the field and other organs of the RS;¹⁸⁹⁵ (ii) the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale lacked meaningful communications with the Municipalities to be able to control events in the field;¹⁸⁹⁶ (iii) the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale instructed Municipalities to protect the non-Serb civilian population;¹⁸⁹⁷ (iv) the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale took all possible measures to prevent and punish crimes against non-Serbs;¹⁸⁹⁸ (v) the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale did not create a climate of impunity that furthered crimes against non-Serbs;¹⁸⁹⁹ and (vi) the Bosnian Serb leadership did not commit crimes or support the perpetrators of crimes.¹⁹⁰⁰ **The President case in relation to the Municipality components IS NOT what the Chamber found, at least is not the main case. First of all, the President directs anyones attention on the main Serb proposal for the solution of the Municipality issues. THAT WAS THE PROPOSAL OF FORMING NEW MUNICIPALITIES, so that nobody can dominate over each other. Peter, if it is necessary, we will number evidence from the case where it was proposed and even planed and advanced in realisation. There was no a single municipality with a noticeable presence of another ethnic group that wasn’t proposed to create their own municipality, which would cover many of their needs, and merge common function. #New municipalities#.**

Among many other measures proposed by the Serbs to avoid the war, the formation of the new municipalities was the most simple and with a lowets costs. If it was implemented, noithing would happene on the municipality level.

HOW IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THE CHAMBER NEGLECTED THE VERY CORE OF THE PRESIDENT’s CASE?

The Chamber accepted a myth called #“taking over”# municipalities. This is totally unacceptable and unreasonable, and there is why:

¹⁸⁹⁴ Prosecution Final Brief, para. 4.

¹⁸⁹⁵ Defence Final Brief, paras. 402–499, 904–965.

¹⁸⁹⁶ Defence Final Brief, paras. 500–540.

¹⁸⁹⁷ Defence Final Brief, paras. 541–554.

¹⁸⁹⁸ Defence Final Brief, paras. 642–760.

¹⁸⁹⁹ Defence Final Brief, paras. 761–898.

¹⁹⁰⁰ Defence Final Brief, paras. 966–1219.

- a. From the beginning of the crisis it was evident that there were certain areas predominantly inhabited by one of the ethnic communities.
- b. There were at least 37 municipalities with the vast Serbian majority, and another 13 to 15 municipalities with the relative Serbian majority.
- c. This resulted in the Serbian electoral victory in 47 out of 109 municipalities, for the chamber of municipalities.
- d. Having in mind that the Serbs mainly inhabited rural areas, they inhabited as a majority over 65% of the BiH territory.
- e. Finally, the first conference map, the Cutileiro preliminary map, marked those areas.
- f. In all of those municipalities the Serb parties won the elections 1990 and remained on power to the next elections 1996.

Just take a look of the exhibit D1608, a HVO military intelligence report depicting the Muslim military leader's plan to take over Bijeljina. For that purpose they sent Capt. Hasan Tircic on 31. March 1992 to start taking over.

595. The Chamber will examine the allegations with respect to each of these Municipalities in turn.

5. Eastern Bosnia

a. Bijeljina

i. Charges

596. Under Count 3, the Prosecution alleges that persecution, a crime against humanity, was committed in Bijeljina as part of the objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats from the Municipalities.¹⁹⁰¹ Acts of persecution alleged to have been committed by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include killings during and after the take-over of Bijeljina;¹⁹⁰² killings related to detention facilities;¹⁹⁰³ and killings committed during, and deaths resulting from, cruel and inhumane treatment at scheduled detention facilities.¹⁹⁰⁴ The Prosecution also characterises these killings as extermination, a crime against humanity, under Count 4; murder, a crime against humanity, under Count 5; and murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war, under Count 6.¹⁹⁰⁵

¹⁹⁰¹ Indictment, paras. 48–49.

¹⁹⁰² Indictment, para. 60(a)(i). *See* Scheduled Incident A.1.1.

¹⁹⁰³ Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii). *See* Scheduled Incident B.2.1.

¹⁹⁰⁴ Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii). *See* Scheduled Detention Facility C.2.1.

¹⁹⁰⁵ Indictment, para. 63(a), 63(b).

597. Other acts of persecution alleged to have been committed in Bijeljina by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include (i) torture, beatings, and physical and psychological abuse, during and after the take-over and in scheduled detention facilities, as cruel or inhumane treatment;¹⁹⁰⁶ (ii) rape and other acts of sexual violence, during and after the take-over and in scheduled detention facilities, as cruel and inhumane treatment;¹⁹⁰⁷ (iii) the establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions in detention facilities in Bijeljina, including the failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care, or hygienic sanitation facilities, as cruel or inhumane treatment;¹⁹⁰⁸ (iv) forcible transfer or deportation of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from their homes;¹⁹⁰⁹ (v) unlawful detention in scheduled detention facilities;¹⁹¹⁰ (vi) forced labour at the frontline and the use of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats as human shields;¹⁹¹¹ (vii) the appropriation or plunder of property, during and after the take-over, during arrests and detention and in the course of or following acts of deportation or forcible transfer;¹⁹¹² (viii) the wanton destruction of private property including homes and business premises and public property including cultural monuments and sacred sites;¹⁹¹³ and (ix) the imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures.¹⁹¹⁴

598. Under Counts 7 and 8, the Prosecution alleges deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer), respectively, as crimes against humanity.¹⁹¹⁵ In this regard, the Prosecution alleges that by the end of 1992 Serb Forces as well as Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs had forcibly displaced Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Bijeljina in which they were lawfully present.¹⁹¹⁶ It is alleged that from March 1992, restrictive and discriminatory measures, arbitrary arrest and detention, harassment, torture, rape and other acts of sexual violence, killing, destruction of houses, cultural monuments and sacred sites, as well as the threat of further such acts caused Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to flee in fear while others were physically driven out.¹⁹¹⁷

ii. Lead-up

599. Bijeljina is a municipality located in the northeast of BiH in the Semberija region.¹⁹¹⁸ Approximately two-thirds of its municipal boundaries form part of the border between BiH and Serbia with the municipality bound by the Sava River to the north and the

¹⁹⁰⁶ Indictment, para. 60(b). *See* Scheduled Detention Facility C.2.1.

¹⁹⁰⁷ Indictment, para. 60(c). *See* Scheduled Detention Facility C.2.1.

¹⁹⁰⁸ Indictment, para. 60(d), 60(h). *See* Scheduled Detention Facility C.2.1.

¹⁹⁰⁹ Indictment, para. 60(f).

¹⁹¹⁰ Indictment, para. 60(g). *See* Scheduled Detention Facility C.2.1.

¹⁹¹¹ Indictment, para. 60(h).

¹⁹¹² Indictment, para. 60(i).

¹⁹¹³ Indictment, para. 60(j). *See* Scheduled Incident D.2.

¹⁹¹⁴ Indictment, para. 60(k). The restrictive and discriminatory measures alleged include the denial of freedom of movement; the removal from positions of authority; the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of homes; unlawful arrest and/or the denial of the right to judicial process; and/or the denial of equal access to public services.

¹⁹¹⁵ Indictment, paras. 68–75.

¹⁹¹⁶ Indictment, paras. 69, 72.

¹⁹¹⁷ Indictment, para. 71.

¹⁹¹⁸ D484 (Map of BiH); Adjudicated Fact 2233; P3033 (Reynaud Theunens's expert report entitled "Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)", e-court p. 374.

Drina River to the east.¹⁹¹⁹ Bijeljina is the closest municipality in BiH to Belgrade with one of the roads connecting Sarajevo and Belgrade crossing the municipality.¹⁹²⁰ Prior to the war, approximately 60% of the population in the municipality of Bijeljina were Bosnian Serbs and approximately 30% were Bosnian Muslims.¹⁹²¹ **(Adding Yugoslavs, who were mainly Serbs, and certainly didn't support the secessionist policy of the SDA, it was closer to 70% of population to be Serbian. Before the war, and even at the elections, none of Croats or Muslims declared themselves as "Yugoslav"!)**

600. Bijeljina controlled access to the "Posavina Corridor" which was the only land link connecting Krajina, Western Slavonia and the western part of SerBiH with Serbia, and the establishment of this corridor formed part of the Strategic Goals.¹⁹²² (1922)

601. Following the formation of national parties in mid-1990, inter-ethnic relations in Bijeljina deteriorated.¹⁹²³ **(Deteriorated, how? The very same day the SDS made a public meeting in the center of BN, the Muslim SDA gangs attacked the participants and wounded some of them. I do not know whether it is in the file, but it was very known, that the Serbs in the Serb majority Bijeljina were attacked.)** The SDS in Bijeljina was formed in July 1990 by Predrag Ješurić.¹⁹²⁴ **(Wrong, Jesuric was a policeman)** Milan Novaković was the President of the SDS in Bijeljina¹⁹²⁵ **(wrong, and inaccurate – it was Savo Kojic, see D01585)** and other members of the SDS leadership included Dragomir Ljubojević, Marko Stanković, and Dragan Vuković.¹⁹²⁶ Mirko Blagojević, an SDS member, established the Board of the SRS in Bijeljina.¹⁹²⁷

602. Following the multi-party elections, in November 1990, the SDS won an absolute majority in Bijeljina but formed a coalition government with the SDA in which official

¹⁹¹⁹ P3033 (Reynaud Theunens's expert report entitled "Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)", e-court p. 374. *See* Adjudicated Fact 2233.

¹⁹²⁰ *See* Adjudicated Fact 2234.

¹⁹²¹ P3033 (Reynaud Theunens's expert report entitled "Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)", e-court p. 374; P4994 (Addendum to Eva Tabeau's expert report entitled "Ethnic Composition in Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from 27 Municipalities of BiH 1991 to 1997", 3 February 2009), p. 30. Defence evidence suggested that the figures provided by the "international experts" exaggerated the number of Bosnian Muslims in Bijeljina in 1991. D3125 (Stevo Pašalić's expert report entitled "Ethnic Composition, Displaced Persons and Refugees from 27 Municipalities in the Territory of BiH, 1991-1997", August 2012), paras. 8, 85–91; Stevo Pašalić, T. 35426–35434 (14 March 2013); P6198 (Diagram re percentage of Bijeljina population born before 1980). However, the Chamber notes that Pašalić and his methodology fails to successfully explain why he concluded that the international experts were in error in their calculation of the number of Bosnian Muslims in Bijeljina in 1991. In addition the Chamber notes that his evidence was marked by evasiveness and bias which substantially compromised the veracity of his evidence. The Chamber thus does not consider his evidence to be reliable in this regard.

¹⁹²² P3033 (Reynaud Theunens's expert report entitled "Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)", e-court pp. 374–375. *See also* P2561 (Map of BiH re six Strategic Goals).

¹⁹²³ D3140 (Witness statement of Živan Filipović dated 18 March 2013), para. 3.

¹⁹²⁴ D3089 (Witness statement of Milivoje Kićanović dated 3 March 2013), para. 3 (stating that the SDA, HDZ and Party of Democratic Unity were formed before the SDS); D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), paras. 2–3; P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 11. The Chamber notes that the wording of several paragraphs in Kićanović's statement was almost identical to the statement provided by another defence witness Cvijetin Simić. Milivoje Kićanović, T. 34879–34881 (6 March 2013); P6184 (Comparison of witness statements of Milivoje Kićanović and Cvijetin Simić). While Kićanović's explanation for this does not seem plausible, the Chamber does not find that this completely undermines the content of their evidence. However, the Chamber has had regard to the identical wording of certain portions of their respective statements in assessing and weighing the evidence of both Kićanović and Simić.

¹⁹²⁵ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 3 (under seal) (testifying that Novaković was replaced by Savo Kojić who was in turn replaced by Savo Andrić); Milorad Davidović, T. 15541 (28 June 2011); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 10–11, 116. *See also* Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21658.

¹⁹²⁶ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 3 (under seal).

¹⁹²⁷ P2901 (SRT video footage of interview of Mirko Blagojević), p. 3.

positions were divided between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims.¹⁹²⁸ After 1991, people in Bijeljina started joining the SDS to keep their positions.¹⁹²⁹ **(If it was “after 1991”, the SDS wouldn’t win elections, but the Chamber accepted an opinion of a policemen who opposed SDS from a communist position)** Milorad Davidović who had been the Chief of SJB in Bijeljina was dismissed from his position as he did not join the SDS and was replaced by Ješurić.¹⁹³⁰ **(But Davidovic was promoted to the federal MUP. Apart of that, the vast majority of the MUP officials were not the SDS members, and we have this evidence in the file. However, Davidovic himself gave his motives to be against the SDS)**

603. By mid-1991, ethnic divisions were rife between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs in Bijeljina.¹⁹³¹ Tensions in Bijeljina continued to increase following the war in Croatia¹⁹³² and even more so in September 1991 after Bosnian Muslims boycotted the JNA mobilisation and started leaving their units; this resulted in the JNA units being manned almost completely by Serbs.¹⁹³³ **(what the Muslim conscripts and reservists did was a violation of laws, and an illegal conduct, and none of the consequences of such a conduct can be counted as a Serb failure. However, the Chamber is treating the issue as some childish demeanor, or even pacifism.)** Inter-ethnic relations in the municipality were further strained in the lead-up to and following the referendum on the independence of BiH.¹⁹³⁴ **(Not quite! The main concern of the Serb community was the fact that the Muslim/Croat conscripts were preparing their own secret army to fight the Serbs.)**

(Everything that worsened the inter-ethnic relations was initiated and perpetrated by the Muslim side, and it shouldn’t be skipped just as if it didn’t contribute to everything that happened afterwards. In no sense the Serb side contributed to the worsening of inter-ethnic relations.

¹⁹²⁸ D3089 (Witness statement of Milivoje Kićanović dated 3 March 2013), paras. 5–6; Milivoje Kićanović, T. 34883–34884 (6 March 2013); D3090 (Result of Bijeljina municipal elections, 28 November 1990); D3144 (Witness statement of Dragomir Ljubojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 11; D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), paras. 5–6; D3140 (Witness statement of Živan Filipović dated 18 March 2013), paras. 5–6; Živan Filipović, T. 35793 (21 March 2013). See also P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), pp. 2–3 (under seal).

¹⁹²⁹ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 10.

¹⁹³⁰ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 8, 10, 12–13; Milorad Davidović, T. 15579, 15639–15640 (29 June 2011); Milorad Davidović, D1411 (Excerpt of transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*) T. 14400; P2629 (Bijeljina’s SJB report, 9 April 1992), p. 1. Ješurić replaced Davidović and was appointed Bijeljina SJB Chief.

¹⁹³¹ D3141 (Witness statement of Dušan Spasojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 6; Živan Filipović, T. 35795 (21 March 2013); D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), para. 18. The SDA also organised and staged demonstrations in 1990 and 1991 which contributed to the deterioration of inter-ethnic relations and there were also incidents of harassment of Bosnian Serbs. D3140 (Witness statement of Živan Filipović dated 18 March 2013), paras. 3–4; D3089 (Witness statement of Milivoje Kićanović dated 3 March 2013), paras. 10–11; D3144 (Witness statement of Dragomir Ljubojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 4. See also D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), para. 2; D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), paras. 4, 37.

¹⁹³² D3089 (Witness statement of Milivoje Kićanović dated 3 March 2013), para. 7; D3144 (Witness statement of Dragomir Ljubojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 6; D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), para. 7. See also D3141 (Witness statement of Dušan Spasojević dated 18 March 2013), paras. 4–5 (stating that the SDA sent Bosnian Muslim men from the reserve police to Croatia for training).

¹⁹³³ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 2 (under seal); KDZ531, T. 15864 (1 July 2011) (closed session); D3089 (Witness statement of Milivoje Kićanović dated 3 March 2013), para. 8; D3144 (Witness statement of Dragomir Ljubojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 6; D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), para. 8; D3141 (Witness statement of Dušan Spasojević dated 18 March 2013), paras. 4–5.

¹⁹³⁴ D3140 (Witness statement of Živan Filipović dated 18 March 2013), para. 3; D3089 (Witness statement of Milivoje Kićanović dated 3 March 2013), para. 4; D3144 (Witness statement of Dragomir Ljubojević dated 18 March 2013), paras. 3, 7; D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), para. 2; D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), paras. 15–17; D3141 (Witness statement of Dušan Spasojević dated 18 March 2013), paras. 3–4; D3142 (Criminal report against Hasan Tirić), pp. 21–22.

604. At a meeting in Banja Luka on 11 February 1992, attended by senior officials including Mićo Stanišić and Mandić, there was discussion about the creation of a Bosnian Serb MUP; thereafter the SJB in Bijeljina was instructed by Mandić to begin preparations for this purpose.¹⁹³⁵

(This move was in the framework of the Conference on BiH, which from the beginning envisaged that the constituent units of BiH would have their own police. It seems as if the Chamber does the same as the OTP, extracting the data out of context. The EC Conference on Yugoslavia (ICFY) held in the Hague entire second part of 1991 stipulated the future structure of BiH, and Mr. Izetbegovic himself took commitments that the three BH sovereign ethnic groups will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, including governments, parliaments and police. Till 11 February it was established that BiH will have three entities, and the Serb police officials did everything legally and publicly.#Criminalisation of any activity#)

605. The existence of a Crisis Staff in Bijeljina was strongly contested by the Accused¹⁹³⁶ and Defence evidence suggested that there was no Crisis Staff in Bijeljina.¹⁹³⁷

However, the Chamber is satisfied, based on the evidence about the establishment and actions of the Crisis Staff, that there was a Crisis Staff in Bijeljina by the beginning of April 1992.¹⁹³⁸ In addition, local crisis staffs were also established in villages surrounding Bijeljina.^{1939 (1939)}

(If it is important, let us clarify this confusion about crisis staffs: 1. the SDS crisis staff existed, and it had nothing to do with the municipal authorities. 2. while the BH existed there was a mixed municipal authority, which had never been replaced by the municipal Crisis staff, although it would be if the authority couldn't gather and function. If the authorities functioned, the Crisis staff, formed or not, was non-existing. Had the CS BN existed, there wouldn't be any meeting of the "National defence council" or any other municipal body.(# Mixing up!# CS of Party vs. Municipal!).

However, there was the Majevisa and Semberija Crisis staff, led by Mauzer, or somebody else. For its existence see D01585). Since Bijeljina was a "capitol" of the Majevisa and Semberija SAO, this Crisis staff is mixed up with a non-existing municipal Crisis staff. It was also possible and the most probable that the surrounding

¹⁹³⁵ P1083 (Minutes of meeting of representatives of SerBiH MUP, 11 February 1992), p. 1; P1112 (Order of SRBiH MUP to all CSBs and SJBs, 13 February 1992); Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 8649.

¹⁹³⁶ Defence Final Brief, para. 1378.

¹⁹³⁷ See D3144 (Witness statement of Dragomir Ljubojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 11; Dragomir Ljubojević, T. 35899 (22 March 2013); D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), paras. 34, 42; Cvijetin Simić, T. 35691–35695 (20 March 2013); D3089 (Witness statement of Milivoje Kićanović dated 3 March 2013), para. 27.

¹⁹³⁸ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 3 (under seal); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 89; P2626 (Report of Bijeljina Crisis Staff, 1 April 1992). For evidence on the existence and actions of the Bijeljina Crisis Staff, see P6214 (Report of JNA 17th Corps, 7 April 1992), p. 1. When Filipović was asked about this order he was not very clear and tried to suggest that this was not the Crisis Staff; however, the Chamber does not find his answers convincing in this regard. Živan Filipović, T. 35808 (21 March 2013). Similarly, on cross-examination, Kićanović acknowledged that when the municipal Assembly could not be convened a municipal Presidency was set up comprising 10 people who managed the municipality, but he did not consider this to be a Crisis Staff. The witness was presented with a number of documents which made reference to the Bijeljina Crisis Staff (see P2626, P5587, P2855) but maintained that he was not aware of any Crisis Staff in Bijeljina. However, when questioned by the Chamber, Kićanović acknowledged that a Bijeljina SDS Crisis Staff probably did exist but that it was different from the municipal Crisis Staff. Milivoje Kićanović, T. 34886, 34888–34889, 34903–34907 (6 March 2013). Other witnesses were also shown documents with references to the Bijeljina Crisis Staff (P2626, P6211, P2629) but maintained that there was no Crisis Staff in Bijeljina. Cvijetin Simić, T. 35655–35660, 35667 (20 March 2013); Dragomir Ljubojević, T. 35900–35901 (22 March 2013). The Chamber does not find the witnesses' answers in this regard to be convincing. The Chamber also received evidence about Biljana Plavšić meeting with the Bijeljina Crisis Staff which supports the fact that it did exist. See para. 626.

¹⁹³⁹ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 89.

settlements had their own CS, because they were entitled to have them by the Law. In addition, this confusion about the crisis staffs wasn't repeated during the testimony (see chro. #84,) so, the statement mentioning the crisis staff was with "delayed disclosure" and is full of crap. The fn. 1938. of the Judgement clearly shows that some of the Chamber sources didn't understand anything, but still majority of witnesses denied existence of the CS. Additionally, there was no a single document signed by the BN CS. But, it is important that "the Chamber was satisfied", although the Goddess Justicia is unhappy)

606. Milan Novaković¹⁹⁴⁰ and Ljubiša Savić ("Mauzer") were leaders in the Bijeljina Crisis Staff.¹⁹⁴¹ (#Not accurate! As of February it was Savo Kojic. Milan Novakovic was a member of the Parliament of BiH, very known for his attempts to protect the Muslims in Bijeljina from irresponsible vague elements. Mauzer didn't have any official post in the SDS, but did have on the level of SAO Semberija and Majevisa. #Criminalisation of regular actions!#) Members of the Crisis Staff were all either from the SDS or prominent local people who were loyal to the party.¹⁹⁴² The Crisis Staff took on authority which previously belonged to other municipal bodies and took on the role as "commanding body of defence and military forces" and also provided logistical support to the JNA which had barracks in Bijeljina.¹⁹⁴³ Initially, the Crisis Staff met every day with only the closest group of leaders in attendance.¹⁹⁴⁴ It however evolved to become the Presidency of the Municipal Assembly¹⁹⁴⁵ and subsequently the War Presidency.¹⁹⁴⁶ There was a very close relationship between the Bijeljina branch of the SDS and the SDS party in Pale; and the SDS leadership, including the Accused and Krajišnik, often visited Bijeljina.¹⁹⁴⁷ The Bijeljina Crisis Staff kept the SDS Main Board informed of its activities.¹⁹⁴⁸ (again another confusion: the Bijeljina Crisis staff that informed the SDS Maind board, was the SDS Crisis staff, not municipal crisis staff) In addition, the Chief of the Bijeljina SJB reported to Mićo Stanišić on the situation in the municipality.¹⁹⁴⁹ (#"In addition" it had nothing to do with any Crisis Staff, but with a regular obligations of the police officials.#Criminalisation of everything).

¹⁹⁴⁰ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 3 (under seal).

¹⁹⁴¹ Milorad Davidović, T. 15583–15584 (29 June 2011), 15753, 15771 (30 June 2011). See also KDZ446, P29 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21056; Dragomir Andan, T. 40872 (5 July 2013) (identifying Mauzer's role as an SDS leader in Bijeljina). (The SDS was not a secret organisation, it is quite known who was the leader on the municipal level. I think it was Cvijetin Nikic, but certainly not Mauzer.)

¹⁹⁴² P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 3 (under seal); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 89; Cvijetin Simić, T. 35698–35699 (20 March 2013).

¹⁹⁴³ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 3 (under seal).

¹⁹⁴⁴ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 3 (under seal).

¹⁹⁴⁵ P2629 (Bijeljina's SJB report, 9 April 1992), p. 2.

¹⁹⁴⁶ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 3 (under seal). See also D3144 (Witness statement of Dragomir Ljubojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 11; Dragomir Ljubojević, T. 35899 (22 March 2013) (testifying that while he was not aware of the Crisis Staff, he was aware that the War Presidency had an active role in decision making in the municipality and acted openly).

¹⁹⁴⁷ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011) p. 4 (under seal).

¹⁹⁴⁸ For example see P2626 (Report of Bijeljina Crisis Staff, 1 April 1992) in which the Bijeljina Crisis Staff reported to the SDS Main Board on the situation in the municipality.

¹⁹⁴⁹ P2629 (Bijeljina's SJB report, 9 April 1992).

607. In the two or three months leading up to the conflict, both sides established units and armed themselves.¹⁹⁵⁰ The SDS and SDA armed Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims respectively.¹⁹⁵¹ Weapons were distributed to supporters of the SDS by the village level crisis staffs.¹⁹⁵² By the time the conflict broke out in Bijeljina, an armed intervention unit had been formed by the SDS from villagers trusted by the party.¹⁹⁵³ Ješurić also sought and received material assistance from the Serbian MUP in the lead-up to the conflict.¹⁹⁵⁴ In contrast, by 11 April 1992 while there remained some armed Bosnian Muslims, most had handed in their weapons to the local authorities.¹⁹⁵⁵ **(#Any ruling party would be obliged to participate in a territorial defence! Criminalisation of lawful duties!#)**

608. As discussed earlier in this Judgement, the Serbian National Guard, was a unit commanded by Mauzer, and later known as Mauzer's Panthers.¹⁹⁵⁶ Mauzer was also commander of the SAO Semberija TO and operated in Bijeljina with the support of the Presidency of the Bijeljina Municipal Assembly.¹⁹⁵⁷ **(#It was not "also", it was the same, because the "Panthers" had been this TO!#)** There was also a local paramilitary group of approximately 50 men affiliated with the SRS under the command of Mirko Blagojević in Bijeljina.¹⁹⁵⁸ Prior to the war, the SDS had called on the youth to attend Arkan's training camp across the Drina and later the Bijeljina Crisis Staff and Mauzer invited Arkan to the

¹⁹⁵⁰ KDZ059, P67 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 29101. See also D3065 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević dated 26 February 2013), paras. 172–173; D3089 (Witness statement of Milivoje Kićanović dated 3 March 2013), paras. 9, 11; D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), paras. 10–11; D3141 (Witness statement of Dušan Spasojević dated 18 March 2013), paras. 4, 9, 15–16; Dušan Spasojević, T. 35829–35830 (21 March 2013); D3142 (Criminal report against Hasan Tirić), pp. 3, 16, 21–23, 27, 30; Živan Filipović, T. 35793–35794 (21 March 2013); D1608 (Official note of the Croatian Security Information Service Centre, 9 May 1996), p. 1; KDZ555, T. 17366–17367 (17 August 2011). The Chamber is satisfied based on the above-mentioned evidence that Bosnian Muslim military formations, including the Patriotic League, were also established and operated in Bijeljina.

¹⁹⁵¹ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 8 (under seal).

¹⁹⁵² P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 3 (under seal).

¹⁹⁵³ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 3 (under seal). Simić testified that the Bosnian Serb authorities were against the formation of illegal organisations and the arming of the population and when officers from the Bijeljina garrison who were members of the League of Communists secretly distributed weapons to civilians, the authorities asked that the weapons be returned to the barracks and the officers were held to account. D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), para. 10. The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable and notes that Simić's evidence was marked by indicators which led to the conclusion that he withheld information from the Chamber, was evasive, and lacked sincerity.

¹⁹⁵⁴ P1083 (Minutes of meeting of representatives of SerBiH MUP, 11 February 1992), p. 2. See also P2875 (Freedom of movement pass issued by Semberija & Majevice Crisis Staff).

¹⁹⁵⁵ D3142 (Criminal report against Hasan Tirić), p. 30; D3141 (Witness statement of Dušan Spasojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 15.

¹⁹⁵⁶ See para. 233; P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 79, 89; Milorad Davidović, T. 15479–15480 (28 June 2011); see Adjudicated Fact 2237; P2855 (VRS Main Staff report on paramilitary formations, 28 July 1992), p. 5; D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), pp. 36–37; P3033 (Reynaud Theunens's expert report entitled "Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)", e-court pp. 270–271; D1612 (Video footage of Arkan in "My Guest, His Truth", July/August 1994), pp. 11–12; Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25447 (28 February 2012); P2044 (BBC news report re interview with Major Mauzer, with transcript), p. 1; KDZ446, P29 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21053–21054, 21056; Dragomir Andan, T. 40872 (5 July 2013). Predrag Ješurić was also involved in the operations of this unit. Čedomir Kljajić, T. 42219 (30 July 2013).

¹⁹⁵⁷ P2884 (Article from List SAO Semberije i Majevice entitled "Semberija Lost for Alija's Islamic State", 15 June 1992), p. 4. The Chamber received evidence from Šešelj that Mauzer and his group were not under the control of the Accused or the Bosnian Serb leadership and he had heard the Accused complain about this group. D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013), para. 47. The Chamber considers that Šešelj's assessment that Mauzer was not under the control of the Accused or the Bosnian Serb leadership to be his own opinion, and is therefore of little value.

¹⁹⁵⁸ Adjudicated Fact 2241; KDZ531, T. 15867 (1 July 2011) (closed session); P3033 (Reynaud Theunens's expert report entitled "Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)", para. 50, e-court pp. 256, 348, 381; D1612 (Video footage of Arkan in "My Guest, His Truth", July/August 1994), p. 11; P2901 (SRT video footage of interview of Mirko Blagojević), pp. 5–6; P2073 (BBC news report re Bijeljina, with transcript), p. 1; KDZ446, P29 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21008–21010. See also D3065 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević dated 26 February 2013), para. 173; Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21652; P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 118. But see D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013), para. 45 (stating that not a single man was sent by the SRS from Serbia to Bijeljina and that the local SRS members who fought in Bijeljina were not under his control). The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable given the interest of Šešelj in minimising his own involvement in this regard. The Chamber also notes that Šešelj himself granted the title of "Vojvoda" to Blagojević for his role in the Serbian Chetnik Movement and for his active participation in commanding units which operated in Bijeljina, Zvornik, and Brčko. P5035 (Order of Vojislav Šešelj, 13 May 1993), pp. 1–2. See also para. 234.

municipality after which his men arrived in Bijeljina.¹⁹⁵⁹ Plavšić at the 22nd session of the RS Assembly in November 1992 acknowledged that she had sent letters to many people including Arkan and others willing to fight in the RS for the “Serbian cause”.¹⁹⁶⁰ (1960)

(Again, everything is wrong and false. D03142 clearly shows that Cap. Hasan Tiric came in Bijeljina at the end of March 1992 with the task to organize a coup and take over Bijeljina from the legal authorities, which were multiethnic, since the SDS shared power in spite of the total victory. Apart of the D03142, we will add other evidence that wasn't available at the time, since we thought this legal criminal report (D03142) would suffice.) Now we add to this D03142 another evidence, D01608, the HVO Croatian official report indicating that the Black Swans had been founded and sent on the first assignment on 31 March to take control over Bijeljina. D01608. In addition, there is a newspaper clip with an interview of Hasan Tiric, who confirms his attack on Bijeljina, but it has not been translated and tendered, since it was found lately, and since those two genuine contemporaneous documents would be sufficient in any reasonable court. (ARMIJA BIH, 1. IZD.- Sarajevo: Ljiljan, 1997. – In this interview Mr. Hasan Tiric describes how they “let down a pylon of the “cetni” and lost three their combatants.#Confusion, who attacked, who defended!#)

609. At the end of March 1992, there were two violent incidents at a Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb café respectively. **(Not to be skipped: the Serb dominated police of Bijeljina had arrested the Serb perpetrator and handed him over to the Muslim dominated Tuzla police. So, there was no justification for the second incident.)** In one incident a young Bosnian Serb threw a hand grenade into the Istanbul café, injuring a number of people.¹⁹⁶¹ This café was frequented by Bosnian Muslims and the young man had previously been beaten and kicked out of the Istanbul café following an argument.¹⁹⁶² In the other incident, a Bosnian Muslim set out from the Istanbul café on horseback on 31 March 1992, intending to throw a grenade at the Srbija café; this resulted in an exchange of fire between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs.¹⁹⁶³ Following these incidents, barricades were erected by Bosnian Muslims at all the important points in Bijeljina and were secured

¹⁹⁵⁹ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 76, 117; Milorad Davidović, T. 15479–15484 (28 June 2011), T. 15716 (30 June 2011); KDZ446, P29 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21052–21055. See also Živan Filipović, T. 35799 (21 March 2013); P6211 (Four video clips of interviews with Arkan and others, with transcript), pp. 3–4; KDZ531, T. 15868–15869, 15879 (1 July 2011) (closed session); D1459 (Video interview of Arkan in Bijeljina, April 1992); D1612 (Video footage of Arkan in “My Guest, His Truth”, July/August 1994), p. 11; D1611 (Video footage depicting Arkan’s pre-election campaign in Zvornik, 8 September 1996); KDZ555, T. 17381–17384 (17 August 2011); Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21652–21653; D3065 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević dated 26 February 2013), para. 174. See also D1442 (Conclusion of Bijeljina’s Municipal Assembly Presidency, 29 May 1992) (which imposed a ban on engaging any individuals or groups which had not been invited by the legal authorities). However, Defence evidence suggested that no armed groups came to the municipality at the invitation of the municipal authorities. Svetozar Mihajlović, T. 35678 (20 March 2013); D3140 (Witness statement of Živan Filipović dated 18 March 2013), para. 13; Živan Filipović, T. 35800–35801 (21 March 2013); Cvijetin Simić, T. 35681–35682 (20 March 2013); The Chamber does not find the evidence of these witnesses to be reliable in this regard considering the other credible evidence received on this issue. In addition the Chamber notes that the evidence of Mihajlović and Simić was marked by contradictions and other indicators that they were not being straightforward in their testimony. Furthermore, the Chamber notes that Filipović’s evidence on this point is contradictory in the sense that he testified that he did not know how Arkan and his men came to the municipality but at the same time testified that the authorities did not invite him.

¹⁹⁶⁰ P1105 (Transcript of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23–24 November 1992), p. 20. See also Vojislav Šešelj, T. 39594 (10 June 2013).

¹⁹⁶¹ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 7 (under seal); Živan Filipović, T. 35796 (21 March 2013); D3141 (Witness statement of Dušan Spasojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 8. See also D3065 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević dated 26 February 2013), para. 173; D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), para. 18.

¹⁹⁶² D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), para. 18; D3141 (Witness statement of Dušan Spasojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 8.

¹⁹⁶³ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 7 (under seal); Živan Filipović, T. 35796 (21 March 2013); D3141 (Witness statement of Dušan Spasojević dated 18 March 2013), paras. 7–8, 10. See also D3065 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević dated 26 February 2013), para. 173; D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), paras. 18–20; D3142 (Criminal report against Hasan Tiric), pp. 21–23; P2901 (SRT video footage of interview of Mirko Blagojević), p. 4; KDZ446, P29 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21058.

by armed men with the support of the SDA.¹⁹⁶⁴ On 31 March 1992 there were armed clashes and shooting incidents between armed Bosnian Muslims, and Serb Forces.¹⁹⁶⁵

(#Look at this fine distinction: “Bosnian Muslims and Serb Forces” what “Serb Forces”? this still was the common authority of BiH, and there was no the Serb Army or any other forces out of the law on MUP and Territorial Defence. At least 15 hours the Muslims terrorised Bijeljina, the first victims were Serbian civilians, and only later the Muslims lost the battle! #Confusing cause/consequence!)

iii. Events in early April 1992

1. Take-over

610. By 1 April 1992, Bijeljina was completely surrounded by check-points.¹⁹⁶⁶ Members of the Bosnian Serb leadership in the municipality in a live radio broadcast asked for all citizens to get off the streets and lift the barricades; they also called for restraint.¹⁹⁶⁷ On 1 April 1992, negotiations between Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim representatives failed to reach an agreement on the lifting of barricades and fighting continued.^{1968 (1968)}

611. The take-over of Bijeljina began on 1 April 1992 and the Serb Forces involved included Arkan’s men, a local unit affiliated with the SRS under the command of Mirko Blagojević, Mauzer’s unit, the local TO, the police, the JNA and the local Bosnian Serb population.¹⁹⁶⁹ **How possibly a group of serious men can conclude that? The take-over**

¹⁹⁶⁴ P2901 (SRT video footage of interview of Mirko Blagojević), pp. 5–6; P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011) p. 8 (under seal); D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), paras. 21–23; D3142 (Criminal report against Hasan Tirić), pp. 23, 25; D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), para. 4; KDZ446, P29 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21059 (testifying that he could not enter Bijeljina because of the barricades erected in both the Muslim and Serb settlements); D3140 (Witness statement of Živan Filipović dated 18 March 2013), para. 8; D3141 (Witness statement of Dušan Spasojević dated 18 March 2013), paras. 11–12; Dušan Spasojević, T. 35831 (21 March 2013). See also KDZ531, T. 15867 (1 July 2011) (closed session). The Accused submits that the speed at which barricades were erected indicated prior planning by the Bosnian Muslims and that they intended to take power in the municipality. Defence Final Brief, para. 1380, referring to D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), para. 22; D3141 (Witness statement of Dušan Spasojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 11; D3140 (Witness statement of Živan Filipović dated 18 March 2013), paras. 7–8; D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), para. 6. However, the Chamber does not accept this evidence given that it based purely on speculation by these witnesses.

¹⁹⁶⁵ Adjudicated Facts 2240, 2235; D3140 (Witness statement of Živan Filipović dated 18 March 2013), paras. 7–8; D3141 (Witness statement of Dušan Spasojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 14; D3065 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević dated 26 February 2013), para. 174; Aleksandar Vasiljević, T. 34700–34701 (4 March 2013) (testifying that the first clashes occurred when Arkan’s men entered Bijeljina). For evidence on actions by Bosnian Muslims forces, see D3140 (Witness statement of Živan Filipović dated 18 March 2013), paras. 7–8, 10; D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), para. 6; D3141 (Witness statement of Dušan Spasojević dated 18 March 2013), paras. 11–12, 13–14; Dušan Spasojević, T. 35831 (21 March 2013); D3142 (Criminal report against Hasan Tirić), pp. 17, 23–26; D3140 (Witness statement of Živan Filipović dated 18 March 2013), para. 10; Živan Filipović, T. 35796 (21 March 2013); Milivoje Kićanović, T. 34882 (6 March 2013); D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), para. 6; D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), paras. 21, 23–24; P6211 (Four video clips of interviews with Arkan and others, with transcript), pp. 1–2.

¹⁹⁶⁶ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 7 (under seal).

¹⁹⁶⁷ D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), para. 25.

¹⁹⁶⁸ D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), para. 27; Cvijetin Simić, T. 35638–35639 (19 March 2013), 35675, 35692–35693 (20 March 2013); P6209 (JNA 2nd Military District report, 1 April 1992), p. 3. See also D3065 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević dated 26 February 2013), para. 171; D3140 (Witness statement of Živan Filipović dated 18 March 2013), para. 12. The Accused submits that the meeting failed because the SDA representatives refused to negotiate due to their belief that they had gained control of the municipality. Defence Final Brief, para. 1381. The Chamber does not consider that the evidence in the record supports this proposition.

¹⁹⁶⁹ See Adjudicated Fact 2241; KDZ531, T. 15867 (1 July 2011) (closed session); D1612 (Video footage of Arkan in “My Guest, His Truth”, July/August 1994), pp. 11–12; P2901 (SRT video footage of interview of Mirko Blagojević), pp. 5–6; P6209 (JNA 2nd Military District report, 1 April 1992), pp. 1, 3, 5. See also P3033 (Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court pp. 256, 348; Adjudicated Facts 2235, 2242; Richard Butler, T. 27655 (19 April 2012); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 118; D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013), para. 49; KDZ446, P29 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21008–21010, 21055, 21109; P2629 (Bijeljina’s SJB report, 9 April 1992), p. 2.

started 31 March and by the Muslim extremists, not the Serbs, while the legal forces of the municipality, TO, police and citizens defended their city. That was their duty and obligation according to the Law on All-people defense, and to the Constitution! #”Take-over”, Serb Forces#, # Time-frame, BiH existed.

Let us see what was said in a document-exhibit quoted by the Chamber(P02900)

It is generally known that attacks by Muslim armed groups on the territory covered by the Bijeljina CSB started on 1 April 1992. After the Bijeljina Territorial Defence, partly assisted by the so-called Serbian Volunteer Guard, had routed their armed forces, attempts were made to ensure the functioning of the legal organs and institutions of the Serbian Republic of BH. However, the paramilitary groups in

Who has the authority to distort the facts about this war and to stigmatize the entire Serbian people#?

612. Arkan’s men came to Bijeljina on 1 April 1992 and, in co-operation with a local unit affiliated with the SRS under the command of Mirko Blagojević, took control of important town structures¹⁹⁷⁰ which were then guarded by the police.¹⁹⁷¹ Arkan’s men and Mauzer’s unit operated under the supervision of the Bijeljina Crisis Staff **(Wrong, it was regular authority, not CS, although it would be legal too, had the regular authorities couldn’t meet)** and started to remove the Bosnian Muslim barricades in the centre of Bijeljina¹⁹⁷² which resulted in clashes.¹⁹⁷³ Arkan’s men also received the help of the local Bosnian Serb population who collected weapons that had been distributed to them from various depots.¹⁹⁷⁴ Members of the local TO were also present in Bijeljina town.¹⁹⁷⁵

613. On 1 or 2 April 1992, armed JNA reservists surrounded the town and columns of JNA tanks and other vehicles were seen in the area.¹⁹⁷⁶ On 1 April 1992, the Bijeljina Crisis Staff reported to the SDS Main Board about the imposition of a curfew and about the use of ethnically mixed patrols of the JNA to control vital buildings and areas in the town.¹⁹⁷⁷ **(AGAIN, IT WAS THE SAME SDS CS, BECAUSE ANY MUNICIPAL CS WOULDN’T REPORT TO THE MAIN BOARD OF SDS. (Additionally wrong: the**

¹⁹⁷⁰ See Adjudicated Fact 2241; KDZ531, T. 15867 (1 July 2011) (closed session); D1612 (Video footage of Arkan in “My Guest, His Truth”, July/August 1994), pp. 11–12; P2901 (SRT video footage of interview of Mirko Blagojević), pp. 5–6; P6209 (JNA 2nd Military District report, 1 April 1992), pp. 1, 3, 5. See also Adjudicated Fact 2235; Richard Butler, T. 27655 (19 April 2012); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 118; D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013), para. 49; KDZ446, P29 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21008–21010, 21055, 21109. Spasojević testified that municipal structures remained unchanged and that neither Arkan nor any other paramilitary took over a single municipal structure or post. D3141 (Witness statement of Dušan Spasojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 21; Dušan Spasojević, T. 35837–35838 (21 March 2013). The Chamber does not consider that this evidence is of much significance or contradicts the other credible evidence received on this point.

¹⁹⁷¹ P2629 (Bijeljina’s SJB report, 9 April 1992), p. 2.

¹⁹⁷² P2629 (Bijeljina’s SJB report, 9 April 1992), pp. 1–2. See also D3065 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević dated 26 February 2013), para. 171; Aleksandar Vasiljević, T. 34700 (4 March 2013); P6211 (Four video clips of interviews with Arkan and others, with transcript), pp. 2, 4–5; P2884 (Article from List SAO Semberije i Majevice entitled “Semberija Lost for Alija’s Islamic State”, 15 June 1992), p. 1.

¹⁹⁷³ D3142 (Criminal report against Hasan Tirić), pp. 26–27. See also Dušan Spasojević, T. 35887 (22 March 2013); D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), para. 30; D3089 (Witness statement of Milivoje Kićanović dated 3 March 2013), para. 15; KDZ555, T. 17367 (17 August 2011); D1459 (Video interview of Arkan in Bijeljina, April 1992).

¹⁹⁷⁴ D1612 (Video footage of Arkan in “My Guest, His Truth”, July/August 1994), p. 11.

¹⁹⁷⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 2242.

¹⁹⁷⁶ Adjudicated Fact 2241.

¹⁹⁷⁷ P2626 (Report of Bijeljina Crisis Staff, 1 April 1992), p. 1. See also P2629 (Report of Bijeljina SJB, undated) a report sent to Mićo Stanišić about the situation in Bijeljina in April 1992. But see P3033 (Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”, e-court p. 381 (reporting on Blagojević’s observation that there was no significant support from the JNA).

SDS Crisis Staff informed the Main Board of the SDS about what had the National Defense Council of the Bn Municipality decided, not about anything SDS did. Further, this NDC was composed of all, the Serbs, Croats and Muslims, i.e. it was a state body. Further, it is wrong to say that the “ethnically mixed patrols of the JNA...” it was ethnically mixed patrols of the JNA and Police. There is evidence that the JNA was refrained! The army barracks were blocked by Bosnian Serbs and Arkan’s men who threatened to attack the JNA if it were to interfere in the conflict.¹⁹⁷⁸ Arkan also encouraged Bosnian Serbs to leave the army and join his formations after which a large number of reservists took their weapons and did so.¹⁹⁷⁹ **(The authorities didn’t trust the JNA, with a lot of reason, particularly of ideological provenance. But, the authorities didn’t want to favorize Arkan too. Only a temporary president of Municipality, Zlatko Jokovic, an excellent man, trusted the JNA less than Arkan, and that is why RK made him to resign.)**

Do we need another evidence that the legal authorities of BN differed from Arkan? It was stil the SFRY and SRBIH, but later on RK had annulled and dismissed some decisions of the municipality of Bijeljina (D00454),

614. On 2 April 1992, the Serbian flag was raised on the high-rise building in the centre of the city¹⁹⁸⁰ and by 4 April 1992, the town of Bijeljina was controlled by the SDS and Arkan’s men.¹⁹⁸¹ Arkan was welcomed in Bijeljina and “treated like a god”; some of his men were given official positions and based themselves in the local SDS building; they accompanied regular police patrols for several days and were involved in arresting members of Bijeljina’s SDA presidency.¹⁹⁸² **(It wasn’t Arkan’s men in control of BN, it was a regular police, that regained this control by the help of Arcan and TO as a legal force. The Muslims also celebrated Arkan, and they said it even to the ECMM delegation, but the Prosecution disclosed this document after the Trial process. See what this**

¹⁹⁷⁸ D3065 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević dated 26 February 2013), para. 176.

¹⁹⁷⁹ D3065 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević dated 26 February 2013), para. 177; P5474 (Report of JNA 17th Corps, 4 April 1992), p. 1.

¹⁹⁸⁰ P2901 (SRT video footage of interview of Mirko Blagojević), pp. 6–7. *See also* Milivoje Kićanović, T. 34892 (6 March 2013); P6185 (Article from Slobodna Bosna entitled “The Bloody Byram in Bijeljina”, 10 April 1992), p. 2.

¹⁹⁸¹ P5474 (Report of JNA 17th Corps, 4 April 1992), pp. 1–2; P3033 (Reynaud Theunens’s expert report entitled “Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)”), e-court pp. 377–378, 381; P2901 (SRT video footage of interview of Mirko Blagojević), pp. 5–6; P2073 (BBC news report re Bijeljina, with transcript), p. 1 *See also* Milivoje Kićanović, T. 34892–34894 (6 March 2013); P6211 (Four video clips of interviews with Arkan and others, with transcript), pp. 5–6. *But see* D239 (Report of 17th Corps, 3 April 1992), p. 1 (in which the JNA 17th Corps reported that the situation was out of control and that party leaders were “incapable of ensuring peace and preventing the anarchical behaviour of individuals and groups”).

¹⁹⁸² P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 117. *See* Adjudicated Fact 2242. Defence witnesses disputed the arrest of members of the SDA presidency in Bijeljina. D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), para. 40; D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), para. 18. However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that Simić’s evidence was marked by indicators which led to the conclusion that he was withholding information from the Chamber, was evasive and lacked sincerity. The Chamber cannot rely on Mihajlović’s qualified evidence on this point as he simply stated that he did not know of anyone arresting members of the SDA presidency.

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35. ARKAN'S INTERVIEW

THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET "ARKAN" IN THE REGION OF BJN COULD BE OFFERED TO TEAM B3. SINCE HE IS ON THE LIST OF "SUPPOSED WAR CRIMINALS", THIS ENCOUNTER COULD BE DAMAGING FOR THE ECMM. HOWEVER, DURING OUR INVESTIGATIONS AT BJN, JANJA AND BATKOVIC, WE RECEIVED NUMEROUS TESTIMONIES OF MUSLIMS WHO SEE ARKAN AND HIS TIGERS AS A GUARANTEE FOR SECURITY IN THE REGION. OTHERS, SERBS AS WELL AS MUSLIMS, HAVE EXPLAINED TO US THAT THE TIGERS HAVE REDUCED THE LOSSES OF BELLIGERENT DURING COMBATS IN BRCKO AND BJN. THEY EVEN SEEM TO HAVE NEUTRALISED THE ACTIVITIES OF GANGS OF CRIMINALS FROM ANY ORIGIN WHO WERE LOOTING AND MURDERING THE INHABITANTS DURING THE BATTLE ITSELF.

THESE FACTS, WHETHER MYTH OR REALITY, DESERVE TO BE CHECKED WITH THE ONE WHO IS MAINLY INVOLVED - ARKAN HIMSELF.

615. On 3 April 1992, the JNA 17th Corps reported that even though the situation in Bijeljina had "calmed somewhat" there was still "general chaos, anarchy and panic in the town" with rumours that Bosnian Muslims were being slaughtered.¹⁹⁸³ **(Certainly, propaganda as usually. The same 17th Corps gave a proper report about killed (P06214) 5 Serbs, 8 Albanians, 2 Croats and 28 Muslims) But newly disclosed ECMM report confirms that Arkan didn't do anything wrong! Rumors shouldn't be valuable for a serious chamber! But, a rumors shouldn't be of any value before a serious chamber!)**

616. Arkan left Bijeljina on 6 April 1992, but some of his men came to Bijeljina after that date from time to time.¹⁹⁸⁴ In late April or early May 1992 some of Arkan's men had taken over the SUP and threatened the police.¹⁹⁸⁵ **EXCULPATORY! Why the Arkan's men would threaten the police? Because the police was opposed to their presence! And this was the RS police!** When Davidović reported to Petar Gračanin, the Federal Minister of the Interior, and Mićo Stanišić that Arkan's men had taken over the SUP, Stanišić commented that he knew, that nothing else could be done, and that's "how it ha[d] to be".¹⁹⁸⁶ **(What this stupidity does mean? At that time Gracanin didn't have any jurisdiction over the BiH, and Mico Stanisic was already Minister of Interior of the Republika Srpska. After the 6 April there was no Arkan or Arkan's men there, although some of the domestic guys could have identified themselves as "Arkans" or "Seseljs" men. However, Mico Stanisic continued to take care about the law and order, among other sending Dragan Andan to monitor and report. This resulted in a huge action of arresting many renegades. How possibly Mico Stanisic, being the Minister of Interior, "had taken over the SUP"???#)** Mićo Stanišić told Davidović that Arkan's men were in Bijeljina and Zvornik "helping to liberate territory they believed should become part of the [RS]" and that "there was an agreement with Arkan that whatever area

¹⁹⁸³ D239 (17th Corps Command combat report, 3 April 1992), p. 1; P3033 (Reynaud Theunens's expert report entitled "Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)"), e-court p. 377. See also D3140 (Witness statement of Živan Filipović dated 18 March 2013), para. 14 (stating that a meeting was held on 6 April 1992 in Janja where Bosnian Muslims were informed that the rumours about the massacre of Bosnian Muslims were false after which they surrendered their weapons).

¹⁹⁸⁴ Živan Filipović, T. 35806 (21 March 2013). See also KDZ531, T. 15876 (1 July 2011) (closed session); Adjudicated Fact 2249. Defence evidence suggested that Arkan's men arrived on 1 April 1992 but only remained in Bijeljina for about five days. D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), para. 19; Svetozar Mihajlović, T. 35724 (20 March 2013). See also D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), para. 41; D3141 (Witness statement of Dušan Spasojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 23. The Chamber does not consider that evidence which suggested that Arkan left the municipality after a few days is inconsistent with the evidence that some of his men were in Bijeljina from time to time. See also P2881 (Report of Bijeljina CJB, July 1992), p. 2; P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 64; D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), p. 57; P2900 (Letter from Bijeljina CSB to Radovan Karadžić, 29 July 1992), p. 2.

¹⁹⁸⁵ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 64, 66; D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), p. 57; P2900 (Letter from Bijeljina CSB to Radovan Karadžić, 29 July 1992), p. 2.

¹⁹⁸⁶ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 66, 73.

they took, they could take any property, any war booty and that would have been the price to pay for their engagement there.”¹⁹⁸⁷

Davidovic lied, since Arkan wasn't present there between 6 April and July when the paramilitaries were arrested. And what was the attitude of the RS leadership toward Arkan and Mauzer could be seen from the fact that Karadzic and Mladic degraded the President of Municipality (Zlatko Jokovic) and Mauzer from “major” to private. How to “liberate territory” when it was free. It could only be said “defended territory.”

And how possibly this can go along with the Arkans obedience to leave RS after 5 April, and not appearing again before the fall 1995? Also, Davidovic's testimony in the case of this President didn't corroborate this allegations.

2. Scheduled Incident A.1.1

617. The Prosecution alleges that at least 48 civilians were killed in the town of Bijeljina on 1 and 2 April 1992.

618. 618. The Chamber took judicial notice of the fact that at least 48 civilians, were killed by Serb paramilitaries during the Bosnian Serb take-over of Bijeljina¹⁹⁸⁸ and a total of 48 bodies, including those of women and children, were collected from the town's streets and houses, 45 of these victims were non-Serbs and none wore uniforms.¹⁹⁸⁹ The Chamber also took judicial notice of the fact that most of the dead had been shot in the chest, mouth, temple, or back of the head, some at close range.¹⁹⁹⁰ **(This kind of “monkey business” must happen when a fact adjudicated in one case is accepted in another. While in the former may happen that nobody was interested in opposing the allegation, in the later doesn't have a chance to oppose and challenge it. Everything in this is wrong:**

a) it didn't happen during the “Bosnian Serb take over of Bijeljina” but rather during the Muslim attempt to take over Bijeljina, see..... From whom would the Serbs take over Bijeljina? This town and municipality never belonged to anyone else but to the Serbs. Do we really need an Einstein to understand that?

b) there was 48 casualties (se P06214), with 5 Serbs, 8 Albanians, 2 Croats and 28 Muslims,

According to Bijeljina MUP information, recent conflicts in Bijeljina resulted in 43 casualties, i.e. 5 Serbs, 8 Albanians, 2 Croats and 28 Muslims were killed.

¹⁹⁸⁷ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 66.

¹⁹⁸⁸ Adjudicated Fact 2243. The Chamber notes that the Accused's submits that there was paramilitary activity prior to Scheduled Incident A.1.1. The Accused also submits that at the time of the incident the “local and military forces” were in a state of disarray and could not prevent the incident from occurring. See Defence Final Brief, para. 1388. However, the Chamber does not consider that the evidence cited by the Accused or the other evidence received in this case supports the conclusion that the local forces were unable to prevent the incident from occurring. The Accused also cites to D3142 to support his proposition that a criminal report was filed against the perpetrators of the attack who could be identified. The Chamber notes that D3142 is a criminal report filed against Bosnian Muslims for armed rebellion.

¹⁹⁸⁹ Adjudicated Fact 2245.

¹⁹⁹⁰ Adjudicated Fact 2246.

c) some were civilians indeed, such as the first victim, a Serb lady, but majority were combatants on the Muslim barricades,

d) have the Serbs killed all of them, including those 5 Serbs?

But, this is shameless and absolutely unacceptable, to shift the evidence to another category, such as D03142. it was an armed rebellion, an the whole incident started as the rebellion, a planned and prepared attack of the Muslim forces on BN with the aim to take it over. See the next exhibits: D03142, P02900,

619. Witnesses also testified that civilians were killed in Bijeljina on 1 April 1992.¹⁹⁹¹ A total of 55 individuals who went missing from Bijeljina between 1 April 1992 and 15 September 1993 were exhumed from individual or mass graves in the area.¹⁹⁹² However, of these 55 exhumed bodies, only five are linked to this scheduled incident.¹⁹⁹³ The Chamber will not make a finding with respect to the remaining 50 exhumed bodies.

620. The Accused disputed (i) the number of Bosnian Muslim victims; (ii) their status as civilians; (iii) the circumstances in which they were killed; and (iv) the identity of the perpetrators, and tendered evidence in support.¹⁹⁹⁴ However, the Chamber does not find the Accused's arguments to be convincing or the evidence adduced by the Accused on these issues to be reliable. In reaching this conclusion the Chamber considered that the evidence of the witnesses was either based on speculation or hearsay information and when cross-examined the source of the information was unclear.¹⁹⁹⁵ The Chamber does not accept the

¹⁹⁹¹ KDZ531, T. 15866, 15930–15933 (1 July 2011) (closed session); Martin Bell, T. 9781–9782 (14 December 2010); P2001 (BBC news report re Zvornik, with transcript), p. 1; D3065 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević dated 26 February 2013), para. 176; P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 117; P2919 (Witness statement of KDZ023 dated 29 September 1996), pp. 11, 28 (a photograph depicting a soldier identified as one of Arkan's men kicking bodies). KDZ446 testified about the killings of tens of people behind the SDS building and that he heard that some men were taken by Arkan's men to their garrison and shot: KDZ446, P29 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21108. The database of the Missing Persons Institute of BiH included five individuals who had been exhumed and identified who were allegedly killed in Bijeljina in early April 1992 and who were linked by Mašović to Scheduled Incident A.1.1. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 1–2 (the Chamber notes that when the English translation of a document is incomplete, the references cited in this Judgement are to the original version); P4850 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), para. 118; Amor Mašović, T. 27218–27219 (10 April 2012). The Chamber notes that Amor Mašović was a member of the State Commission for Exchange of Prisoners of War, Captured Persons and Bodies of People Killed and Record of People Killed, Injured, and Missing on the Territory of the Republic of BiH, also referred to as State Commission for Tracing Missing Persons and the Missing Persons Institute. P4850 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), para. 2.

¹⁹⁹² P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 1–2; Amor Mašović, T. 27218–27219 (10 April 2012).

¹⁹⁹³ P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 1–2 (referring to Adnan Komšić, Mustafa Komšić, Rijad Komšić, Muhamed Mulabdić, and Ajruš Ziberi).

¹⁹⁹⁴ See Defence Final Brief, para. 1388. The Accused tendered the following evidence in support of his position: D3140 (Witness statement of Živan Filipović dated 18 March 2013), para. 22; Živan Filipović, T. 35796 (21 March 2013); D3089 (Witness statement of Miliivoje Kićanović dated 3 March 2013), para. 24. Kićanović also claimed that there were 42 victims and that this number included seven Bosnian Serbs and that the Bosnian Muslims who had previously shot at him were not in uniform. On cross-examination he confirmed that this information was provided to him by those who conducted an on-site investigation at the hospital and that he had not seen the bodies himself. Miliivoje Kićanović, T. 34889–34890 (6 March 2013). See also D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), para. 39; Cvijetin Simić, T. 35633 (19 March 2013). Simić also stated that the armed Bosnian Muslims who guarded barricades were not in uniforms. Defence witnesses also denied knowledge of the killings. D3076 (Witness statement of Savo Bojanović dated 2 March 2013), para. 20. See also P2901 (SRT video footage of interview of Mirko Blagojević), p. 7. The District Council of Bijeljina on 16 April 1992 wrote to Cyrus Vance and the Accused that there had been false information regarding the number of victims in the town and invited them to visit Bijeljina to observe the situation and that the total number of victims was 41 and included "Muslim Fundamentalists and Albanian Mercenaries". D1463 (Bijeljina District Council letter to Cyrus Vance and Radovan Karadžić, 16 April 1992). KDZ531 confirmed that this was the figure of victims which was mentioned in public and that a three-member delegation did visit Bijeljina. KDZ531, T. 15877–15878 (1 July 2011) (closed session).

¹⁹⁹⁵ For example see Dušan Spasojević, T. 35839, 35842–35843 (21 March 2013); Dušan Spasojević, T. 35841 (21 March 2013) (private session); P2919 (Witness statement of KDZ023 dated 29 September 1996), p. 28.

self-serving video of Arkan that he only killed “Albanian extremists” in Bijeljina.¹⁹⁹⁶ **Let us see what the Chamber didn’t find convincing.**

1. What the President has to do with the incident that started 31. March and ended 3 or 4 April? This was a period when the BH functioned, and even sent its own Presidency delegation to inspect the situation?#

2. Does the Chamber deny that there were at least 5 Serb casualties, and if not, who killed them?

3. Was the President right in denying 2000 or 400 Muslim casualties in this incident? Was he right when said that even those 45 to 48 werent all Muslims?

4. Was it negligible that the MUP as a state organ reported to the JNA (obviously not pro-SDS) about the number and ethnicity of the casualties? Why it would be forged?

5. Since the witness (Davidovic) wasn’t present, why his assertions weren’t “hear-say”, and the testimonies of those present was “hear-say”?

6. for what reasons the Chamber rejected the documentary evidence from the JNA and HVO, which weren’t “pro-Serb” at all? #”Hear-say” vs. Documents ?

621. A report of the 17th Corps of the JNA dated 7 April 1992 noted that the Bijeljina MUP had provided them with information that the conflict in Bijeljina had resulted in 43 casualties consisting of 28 Bosnian Muslims, two Bosnian Croats, eight Albanians, and five Bosnian Serbs and that some victims had been buried without identification.¹⁹⁹⁷ **(Those werent additional victims, but the same, and the Judgment is counting some of them twice? What kind of argument is this?)** An article dated 10 April 1992 referred to the killing of 40 individuals in Bijeljina whose bodies were buried without religious rites.¹⁹⁹⁸ **So, now “an article” plays a role, while the official police criminal reports are not convincing? If there was several articles more, there could be counted several hundred casualties? What a shame! But, nota bene! This was an article in an objective magazine Slobodna Bosna. My god!)**

622. The Bijeljina SJB in a report to the Bosnian Serb MUP referred to 31 individuals who were killed at a barricade near the hospital in Bijeljina.¹⁹⁹⁹ The SJB report also suggests that six of the individuals named as victims of this incident²⁰⁰⁰ were killed by armed

¹⁹⁹⁶ D1461 (Video interview of Arkan in Bijeljina, April 1992); P5588 (Video footage of interviews with Ivan Rakić and Željko Ražnatović, Arkan), p. 3; D1612 (Video footage of Arkan in “My Guest, His Truth”, July/August 1994), p. 11. Arkan in an interview suggested that after Serb Forces broke through to the hospital, Bosnian Muslims were treated fairly and those who did not carry weapons had no problems. P6211 (Four video clips of interviews with Arkan and others, with transcript), p. 5. However, the Chamber does not consider this media clip to be reliable for the purposes of making a finding in this regard. Similarly the Chamber does not regard Arkan’s own denial of mistreatment to be reliable. See KDZ531, T. 15869, 15871–15872, 15932–15933 (1 July 2011) (closed session); D1459 (Video interview of Arkan in Bijeljina, April 1992); D3142 (Criminal report against Hasan Tirić), p. 22; P6211 (Four video clips of interviews with Arkan and others, with transcript), pp. 3–4; D1460 (Video interview of Arkan in Bijeljina, April 1992); D1461 (Video interview of Arkan in Bijeljina, April 1992). The Chamber also considered that KDZ531 testified that Arkan made unsubstantiated claims that Albanian extremists had arrived in the municipality. KDZ531, T. 15872 (1 July 2011) (closed session).

¹⁹⁹⁷ P6214 (Report of JNA 17th Corps, 7 April 1992), p. 1.

¹⁹⁹⁸ P6185 (Article from Slobodna Bosna entitled “The Bloody Byram in Bijeljina”, 10 April 1992), p. 1. Of the 40 individuals referred to in the article, one was unidentified and four other individuals had been buried previously and appear to be Bosnian Serbs. The 39 named individuals in this article correspond to the names of listed victims. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix, G.

¹⁹⁹⁹ D3142 (Criminal report against Hasan Tirić), pp. 26–27. Of the 31 named individuals in this report, 27 correspond to the names of listed victims. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix, G.

²⁰⁰⁰ Bisera Bišanović, Mirsada Bišanović, Nermina Bišanović, Zvonko Lazarević, Radmila Novaković and Ivo Vrhovec.

Bosnian Muslims.²⁰⁰¹ The Chamber does not accept the conclusion of the SJB report that 31 individuals were killed while “putting up armed resistance” at the barricade or that the six individuals were killed by Bosnian Muslims.²⁰⁰² In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that the language used in the Bijeljina SJB report is highly inflammatory and one-sided, which undermines its reliability and the weight which can be attributed to it.²⁰⁰³ **(Why shouldn’t it be inflammatory, when only three days earlier there was a carnage of the Serbian civilians in Sijekovac, a hundred kilometres away? And why a serious judges think of tone rather of facts? I want it to be publicized immediately, how the Chamber didn’t trust the official police report because of emotions, while trusted Slobodna Bosna, a highly partisan (SDA) magazine? How it is possible that the form and emotions could put aside the substance, whether a crime happened or not, and the numeric facts.)** Similarly, while there are differing contemporaneous reports as to the number of individuals killed, the Chamber does not consider that these reports undermine the evidence that in total at least 45 non-Serb civilians were killed on 1 and 2 April 1992, that most of the dead had been shot in the chest, mouth, temple, or back of the head, some at close range and that the victims included women and children and were not wearing uniforms.²⁰⁰⁴ **What “adjudicated facts”, while we do have the first class official report that it was 28 Muslims, and so on? This is an example how it must not be deliberated!** Considering (i) the nature of the injuries; **What nature of injuries? Did the Chamber have the pathological expertise?** (ii) that the victims did not wear uniforms and were identified as civilians; and **The Muslim Army didn’t have uniforms to the very end of the war. In the first year of war at least 80% of the Muslim combatants fought in civilian, and we have seen them in the footages, and this was confirmed in the Muslim official documents)** (iii) that the victims included women and children, the Chamber finds that these individuals were not killed during armed clashes. **#The incident happened before the war, and during the common BH Government!# Therefore, not a war crime! All other is forged#! (This interpretation should be saved for the eternal times. So stupid and malicious! What children had been killed? Not a single! When the Muslim Army got uniforms? If they didn’t die during the clashes, then when they died and in what circumstances? It was very known how long the clashes lasted. Why there is no evidence that they had been executed after the clashes? Shameless? Additionally, if it wasn’t an armed clash, was it a war crime, since there was no other precondition, such as an existence of an attack withing armed conflict? If not a war crime, was it a killing, and who committed it? Anyway, the Chamber is in a debt to point out: What children had been killed, and who killed them; was it right saying that 45 non-Serbd died; does it found that there was no a Serb casualties? Finally, what this Accused has to do with this event no matter what qualification of it is, taking into account that the BH still existed and the BH Presidency was in charge?**

623. The Chamber also received evidence which referred to the killing of Bosnian Muslims after 2 April 1992.²⁰⁰⁵ However, beyond noting this evidence for the purpose of

²⁰⁰¹ D3142 (Criminal report against Hasan Tirić), pp. 16, 26–27.

²⁰⁰² See D3142 (Criminal report against Hasan Tirić), p. 27.

²⁰⁰³ For example the report refers to the Muslim “fanatics”, “extremists”, “fundamentalists [...] [who] wanted to establish a Muslim state”. It also refers to the crushing of barricades and Muslims who “have stained their hands with the Serbs’ blood”. D3142 (Criminal report against Hasan Tirić), p. 27. The Chamber also notes that on cross-examination Spasojević acknowledged that he did not know the source of the information which suggested that these Bosnian Muslims were killed while putting up armed resistance. Dušan Spasojević, T. 35842 (21 March 2013).

²⁰⁰⁴ Adjudicated Facts 2243, 2245, 2246.

²⁰⁰⁵ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), pp. 7–8 (under seal); KDZ531, T. 15846–15847 (1 July 2011) (closed session) (testifying about the killing of SDA leaders); P2629 (Bijeljina’s SJB report, 9 April 1992), p. 2; P6218 (Excerpt from report on

setting the general background in Bijeljina after the take-over, the Chamber did not consider this evidence for the purpose of establishing the occurrence of crimes charged in the Indictment and the Accused's responsibility thereon.²⁰⁰⁶ **(Anyway, what the Accused has to do with all of this?)**

624. The Chamber therefore finds that at least 45 civilians were killed by Serb Forces on 1 and 2 April 1992 in the town of Bijeljina. **(What Serb Forces? It was a legitimate and legal Territorial defence, partly supported by the Guard of whatever. Who can forbid the TO to act according to the law? And who killed those Serbs among 45? Anyway, the TO and police in Bijeljina at that time were of the multi-ethnic composition, and the Supreme Commander of all the armed forces was Mr. Izetbegovic. Is the Chamber's position that none of the Muslim combatants commanded by Capt. Hasan Tiric didn't die in combat? How all of them had been turned to be civilians? Who and how it had been established? # Forgery, Serb Forces, #)**

(D) Developments in Bijeljina after take-over

625. Following the removal of barricades from the municipality, Serb Forces continued with a "global mopping-up" in Bijeljina until 6 April 1992.²⁰⁰⁷ **(#Criminalisation of regular police duties!# That is how the Chamber, alike OTP calls a legal investigating activities and arresting suspects by the only legal organs, the Police? Where are the limits for a confusion and mixing up the terms and meanings? What President Karad'ić has to do with the events in Bijeljina till 6. April 1992? Until that day, 6 April 1992, the authorities were common, the power belonged to the common institutions in which President Karad'ić didn't have any role. Only on the day, 6 April 1992 BiH got the recognition of independence, and the Republik of Srpska started to function!)**
626. On 4 April 1992 a commission **(Not "commission" but the highest Presidential delegation, accompanied by the Minister of Defense. This wasn't "commission" or "delegation" of SDS, but of BH Presidency!# Confusion BIH or SDS#)** consisting of, amongst others, Biljana Plavšić and Fikret Abdić, and high-ranking army officials visited

war crimes trials in Serbia in 2012), pp. 2–5; P6219 (Order of Bijeljina Prosecutor's Office, 14 July 2009), pp. 2–3; Dušan Spasojević, T. 35857–35860 (22 March 2013); KDZ531, T. 15853 (1 July 2011) (closed session); P6217 (Certificate of Bijeljina Red Cross, 20 May 2002), pp. 1–2; P2878 (Announcement of SRS, September 1992), p. 1; P3033 (Reynaud Theunens's expert report entitled "Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)", e-court p. 383; P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 121, 151–152; Milorad Davidović, T. 15507 (28 June 2011), T. 15585–15591 (29 June 2011). *See also* Dragomir Ljubojević, T. 35897 (22 March 2013); Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21737, 21740, 21824–21826; D3807 (Official note of BiH Prosecutor's Office, 12 December 2007), p. 1. While some steps were taken to investigate these incidents there was an ultimate failure of the authorities in Bijeljina to initiate proceedings against the perpetrators. Dušan Spasojević, T. 35858, 35860–35864 (22 March 2013); P6218 (Excerpt from report on war crimes trials in Serbia in 2012), pp. 4, 5; P6219 (Order of Bijeljina Prosecutor's Office, 14 July 2009), pp. 3–5; Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21827; P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 8 (under seal); Milorad Davidović, T. 15506–15507 (28 June 2011); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 159; D3807 (Official note of BiH Prosecutor's Office, 12 December 2007), p. 2; KDZ531, T. 15854 (1 July 2011) (closed session); Svetozar Mihajlović, T. 35735–35736, 35741 (20 March 2013); D3141 (Witness statement of Dušan Spasojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 25; Dušan Spasojević, T. 35844, 35846–35847 (21 March 2013); P6215 (Letter from Bijeljina CJB to Bijeljina Prosecutor's Office, 14 June 2002), p. 1; P6216 (Official note of Bijeljina SJB, 3 June 2002), pp. 1–2.

²⁰⁰⁶ The Chamber notes that the killing incidents alleged with respect to Bijeljina are limited to Scheduled Incident A.1.1 (killings on 1 and 2 April 1992 in Bijeljina town) and Scheduled Incident B.2.1 (killings at Batković camp from June 1992 until June 1995).

²⁰⁰⁷ P2629 (Report of Bijeljina SJB, undated), p. 2.

Bijeljina to assess the situation.²⁰⁰⁸ The removal of bodies from the streets of Bijeljina was ordered by Serb Forces in anticipation of the visit of this delegation.²⁰⁰⁹ **(What inteligencia? Does it mean that the bodies would remain on the streets had there was no the anticipation of visit? My God! This does have to be concluded by some inexperienced interns, not judges! Adjudicated Fact!)** Plavšić visited the Bijeljina Crisis Staff and congratulated Arkan for saving the Bosnian Serbs and was filmed kissing and hugging Arkan.²⁰¹⁰ When, in the course of the visit, Plavšić asked Arkan to hand over control of Bijeljina to the JNA, he replied that he had not yet finished his “business” there.²⁰¹¹ At a dinner with UNPROFOR representative, Cedric Thornberry, on 20 April 1992, Plavšić described Bijeljina as a “liberated” town.²⁰¹²

627. After the fighting ended, the local authorities including the TO Municipal Staff returned to Bijeljina.²⁰¹³ The Bijeljina SJB began operations in accordance with the instructions and guidelines of the Bosnian Serb MUP.²⁰¹⁴ On 28 April 1992, the Presidency of the Bijeljina Municipal Assembly issued a decision which provided that only members of the active and reserve police forces and members of the armed forces should maintain public law and order and strictly prohibited the establishment of local check-points by civilians and unauthorised persons without the approval of the Bijeljina SJB.²⁰¹⁵ **(A right move! And the first class evidence that there was no the Bijeljina Crisis Staff, otherwise the CS would issue this decision! The Crisis Staffs existed only in municipalities which didn’t have regular organs of authority working every day! The Presidency of the Bijeljina Municipal Assembly was a multi-ethnic body!)**

628. On 24 June 1992, the Bijeljina Municipal Assembly issued a decision on its composition and rules of procedure and provided that the Bijeljina Municipal Assembly would consist of members of “Serbian nationality”.²⁰¹⁶ **(It is clear that until that time**

²⁰⁰⁸ D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), para. 9; Svetozar Mihajlović, T. 35726 (20 March 2013); D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), para. 32. *See also* P6211 (Four video clips of interviews with Arkan and others, with transcript), pp. 5–6; Milivoje Kićanović, T. 34893–34894 (6 March 2013); P6185 (Article from Slobodna Bosna entitled “The Bloody Byram in Bijeljina”, 10 April 1992), p. 5; Živan Filipović, T. 35806 (21 March 2013); Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43336 (12 November 2013); D1694 (Intercept of conversation between Ješirić and Čedo Kljajić, 16 April 1992), pp. 1–2; KDZ531, T. 15876–15877 (1 July 2011) (closed session).

²⁰⁰⁹ *See* Adjudicated Fact 2247. **This is shameles to state that, was not proven or corroborated by anyone and anything, and neither there was enough time, nor any need for that kind of disguise.**

²⁰¹⁰ Momčilo Mandić, T. 4656 (6 July 2010); P1108 (Video footage of Biljana Plavšić and Arkan in Bijeljina); KDZ446, P5587 (Video footage of interviews with Biljana Plavšić), p. 3; P29 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21012–21013; KDZ555, T. 17267–17268 (16 August 2011); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 16; Aleksandar Vasiljević, T. 34701–34702 (4 March 2013); *see* Adjudicated Fact 2248; P6185 (Article from Slobodna Bosna entitled “The Bloody Byram in Bijeljina”, 10 April 1992), p. 5; P6211 (Four video clips of interviews with Arkan and others, with transcript), p. 8. *See also* P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 96; Vojislav Šešelj, T. 39594 (10 June 2013) (testifying that Arkan had come to Bijeljina with Plavšić’s “blessing”). *But see* D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), paras. 8–9; Svetozar Mihajlović, T. 35723–35725 (20 March 2013). *See also* Svetozar Mihajlović, T. 35727 (20 March 2013); P1106 (Intercept of conversation between Biljana Plavšić and “Rus”, 23 April 1992).

²⁰¹¹ Adjudicated Fact 2248; P6185 (Article from Slobodna Bosna entitled “The Bloody Byram in Bijeljina”, 10 April 1992), p. 5. *See also* P6211 (Four video clips of interviews with Arkan and others, with transcript), p. 6.

²⁰¹² Adjudicated Fact 2236. *See also* P2849 (Intercept of conversation between Goran Sarić and Mićo Davidović, 21 April 1992), p. 4; Milorad Davidović, T. 15459 (24 June 2011) (testifying that he was informed on 21 April 1992 by Goran Sarić that Bijeljina and Zvornik had been “solved” which he understood to mean that Bosnian Serbs had taken over power and there was no longer a problem).

²⁰¹³ D3140 (Witness statement of Živan Filipović dated 18 March 2013), paras. 9, 11. *See also* P2748 (SerBiH MUP daily report, 22 and 23 April 1992), p. 3; P2884 (Article from List SAO Semberije I Majevica entitled “Semberija Lost for Alija’s Islamic State”, 15 June 1992), p. 1.

²⁰¹⁴ P2629 (Bijeljina’s SJB report, 9 April 1992), pp. 1–2 (which also reports that the Bosnian Serb police wore berets and badges with the “tricolours from the Serbian MUP” from 4 April 1992).

²⁰¹⁵ D1441 (Bijeljina’s Municipal Assembly Presidency decision, 12 May 1992), p. 1.

²⁰¹⁶ D3136 (Bijeljina Municipal Assembly decision, 24 June 1992), p. 1. *See also* Svetozar Mihajlović, T. 35686 (20 March 2013). The Chamber notes that Simić testified that this decision was taken in accordance with the law. Cvijetin Simić, T. 35706 (20 March 2013).

there was a multi-ethnic composition of the municipal organs. Later it was in the period of an overall negotiations on forming ethnic municipalities. Beside, the local authorities were entitled to estimate what could disturb the peace, and nobody from the central level ordered any dismissal from jobs. After the clashes, and following investigations, the local authorities decided what was save in the circumstances. However, both, the President, and Minister of Interior, D00454, and D01529 respectively, indicate that the central authorities kept their eye on this local area.)

629. In April and May 1992, Bosnian Muslim employees were dismissed from their jobs and Bosnian Muslim members of the local municipal government were dismissed from their positions and expelled from their apartments.²⁰¹⁷ Family members of Bosnian Muslim intellectuals and leaders were dismissed from their positions and harassed.²⁰¹⁸ **(Which had been opposed by the most prominent SDS officials, see....)** Bosnian Muslim police officers were forced to pledge loyalty to the Bosnian Serb authorities and wear the Serb flag on their caps to retain their jobs.²⁰¹⁹ **(so what?!? There was the war, and the Muslims attacked the Serbs, and the remaining Muslims had to express their attitude, namely, whether they are loyal, or they will fight. The local Serbs had every right to be worried for their minors not to be killed by the neighbours. Also, it was very important to know whether it would be safe for a Muslim to keep a high position while the fights go on. And whose flag they should wear on their caps? The flags and other national insignias had been provided for in the ICFY! Is it the Tribunal's position that the Serbs had to accept the hostile fundamentalist regime after the old state had been destroyed? Those who wanted to be the state officials in the RS had to wear the legally determined insignias! # Legal, but criminalised! Provided for in ICFY)###.**

630. On 15 June 1992, Mauzer stated that the presidency of SAO Semberija-Majeveca had decided to replace Bosnian Muslims in managerial positions in Bijeljina, and should "the genocide against the Serbian people" in BiH continue, all Bosnian Muslims would be fired from their jobs and expelled from the territory.²⁰²⁰ **(Adjudicated fact)** Mauzer also stated

The Chamber does not consider Simić's evidence in this regard to be of relevance to its assessment of the evidence on this issue given that the effect of the decision was to reduce the size of the Municipal Assembly to include only Bosnian Serb representatives.

2017 P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), pp. 2, 8 (under seal); KDZ531, T. 15842–15844 (1 July 2011) (closed session) (testifying that Bosnian Muslims were forced to leave their jobs in April or May 1992 by VRS soldiers who used slurs and threatened them). See also Svetozar Mihajlović, T. 35686 (20 March 2013) (testifying about the replacement of the Bosnian Muslim TO commander with a Bosnian Serb). **(Prior to this, the Muslim central authorities dismissed general Vukosavljević, a Serb, from the post of the Commander of the BH TO, replacing him by col. Hasan Efendić, who immediately ordered attacks on the Serbs and JNA) But, why the Defense has to assemble the facts that are already in the file? Who was in charge to analyze the evidence?).** Kićanović testified that patients at Bijeljina hospital received treatment without discrimination. D3089 (Witness statement of Milivoje Kićanović dated 3 March 2013), paras. 16–17. However, the Chamber does not consider that this evidence is of relevance to the allegations with respect to Bijeljina given that the Prosecution has not led any evidence to suggest that there was discrimination with respect to access or treatment at the hospital. **But, where is now the all-mighty inference? Does this say anything about everything?**

2018 P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 8 (under seal). The Accused tendered evidence to suggest that Bosnian Muslims continued to be appointed to the commission for the enrolment of students in Bijeljina on 14 April 1992. D1440 (Decision of Bijeljina's Municipal Assembly Presidency, 12 April 1992), pp. 1–2. However, the Chamber finds that in light of Davidović's evidence on this document, it is not of much significance given that some Bosnian Muslims who were appointed in this period were eventually removed from office. Milorad Davidović, T. 15761–15762 (30 June 2011).

2019 P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 8 (under seal) (stating that a Bosnian Muslim police officer who signed an oath of loyalty and agreed to wear the Serb insignia was fired and was put under pressure, which forced him to leave Bijeljina).

2020 (2020)Adjudicated Fact 2238; P2884 (Article from List SAO Semberije I Majevece entitled "Semberija Lost for Alija's Islamic State", 15 June 1992), p. 2. Defence witnesses disputed Adjudicated Fact 2238. D3140 (Witness statement of Živan Filipović dated 18 March 2013), para. 23; D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), para. 20. However, the Chamber notes that the evidence of Filipović and Mihajlović simply states that they had not heard of this statement or decision but does not contradict the evidence that Mauzer did make such a statement or that the SAO did reach such a decision. **(So much about adjudicated facts. No matter this Accused wasn't in a position to challenge it, no matter the AF was denied by the**

that the 2,500 Bosnian Muslims aged between 18 and 35 who had fled Bijeljina in the aftermath of the take-over would lose their jobs, and their apartments would be seized and sealed, and he advised them not to return.²⁰²¹ **(Adjudicated fact. #Why it is important what Mauzer said, while the state organs and President himself guaranteed return?#Right to return#).**

The Chamber relies on the two dubious witnesses: M. Davidovic, who was not reliable and credible because of his lack of knowledge and his ideologic confrontation with the SDS; still, Mr. M. Davidovi} did have integrity to admit how much he didn't know about the President Karad`i} efforts and conduct, because the Prosecution didn't show to him so many exculpatory evidence, so that the Chamber couldn't take for granted what the witness said before the cross examination. Also, the Chamber relies on several Adjudicated facts, that had been "adjudicated" somewhere else, where it wasn't challenged at all, since the defences probably weren't interested in rebutting it, contrary to those claims, the Defence filed evidence: a) that the President nominated judges and prosecutors of the Muslim or/and Croat ethnicity, b) any policemen of the Muslim and Croat ethnicities were employed, maintaining their previous posts, c) many officials in the municipal administration kept their jobs. d) pertaining to apartments, it must be clarified who was an owner, because if a company employer is owner, an employee must return his apartment if losing job, or leaving company.

631. Paramilitary formations were involved in mistreating and stealing from the population.²⁰²² **(So, what!?! Those paramilitaries had been disowned by the President and entire state authorities, and persecuted, and finally arrest in July 1992. and "Arkan's man could be anyone, but certainly none associated with the authorities. Everithing that the Chamber is condemning is against a civil war, and it is in an accord with the Accused's attitude and conduct, and in no way could be allocated to the authorities, let alone to this Accused?)** More specifically, Arkan's men destroyed property of individuals involved with the SDA,²⁰²³ engaged in looting, and went to the homes of wealthy Bosnian Muslims demanding money.²⁰²⁴ Bosnian Muslims feared for their lives if they refused the demands of Arkan's men.²⁰²⁵ Croat

witnesses. But, who was Mauzer to say something? Even if he said something, he didn't have any power either to say it or to implement it. This Chamber anyway payed more attention to what some periferical, or sinister, or even a bit important official said than to what the highest officials said, and what the most official documents established. IT MUST ME CHALLENGED and rejected as a wrong doings.

²⁰²¹ Adjudicated Fact 2239.

²⁰²² D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), pp. 2, 6; P2899 (Report of Bijeljina CSB, 29 July 1992), p. 1; P3033 (Reynaud Theunens's expert report entitled "Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)"), e-court pp. 383–384; D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013), para. 46. See also Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21436–21437, 21563; Dragomir Andan, T. 40836 (5 July 2013); P2900 (Letter from Bijeljina CSB to Radovan Karadžić, 29 July 1992), p. 2.

²⁰²³ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 7 (under seal).

²⁰²⁴ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 117–118; Dragomir Andan, T. 40860–40861 (5 July 2013); KDZ531, T. 15868–15869, 15879 (1 July 2011) (closed session); Čedomir Kljajić, T. 42210 (30 July 2013) (testifying that he received reports about Arkan's operations in Bijeljina and that he had been involved in looting). See also Dragomir Andan, T. 40837–40838, 40857–40858 (5 July 2013). Arkan himself denied claims which he attributed to media controlled by the SDA that his men had come into the town, were terrorising and mistreating people and looting homes. D1459 (Video interview of Arkan in Bijeljina, April 1992); D1612 (Video footage of Arkan in "My Guest, His Truth", July/August 1994), p. 11. The Chamber does not find this evidence reliable given that it is based on Arkan's own interview where he has a clear interest in distancing himself from these incidents.

²⁰²⁵ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 117. The Accused submits that Arkan's men fought against Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat, and Albanian paramilitary units, that both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims were in a state of fear in Bijeljina and that Arkan publicly guaranteed safety to both the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims, see Defence Final Brief, confidential, paras. 1076–1077. In support, the Accused refers to a video which depicts a person who identified herself as a Muslim woman who refuted the allegations of looting, and destruction by Arkan's men and that they did not fear them as they had come to help. D1462 (Video interview of Arkan and Bijeljina residents, April 1992); [REDACTED]. The Chamber does not find this video evidence to be reliable, as it is unclear under what circumstances the video was made and it cannot verify whether or not it was made for propaganda purposes and that in

companies were also looted by Arkan's men.²⁰²⁶ There was also an incident in June 1992 when paramilitaries raped two Bosnian Muslim women and paraded them naked through a town before they took them away by car and raped them again.²⁰²⁷ **(But this specific incident, or rather crime, was registered and reported by the authorities. What the authorities has to do with that, and in particular, what the President has to do with that. This was a civil war, paramilitaries had been #banned and persecuted, credible evidence# (not testimonies of a dubious witnesses) are obtained by the Serb officials.)**

632. After some time, when the paramilitaries ran out of Bosnian Muslim houses to steal from, they started robbing Bosnian Serb houses and committed crimes against Serbs as well.²⁰²⁸ There were some difficulties in controlling the actions of paramilitaries.²⁰²⁹ However, the Chamber finds that paramilitaries were allowed to operate with impunity; all the police not aligned to the Crisis Staff or the SDS had been removed²⁰³⁰ **(this "all" was only the witness, M. Davidovic, who was a fierce communist, politicali opposed to the new results of elections, but still he was kicked upward, promoted to the Federal MUP. No other evidence to corroborate his assertions!)** and some of the crimes were carried out with the assistance of members of the SJB.²⁰³¹ In addition the paramilitaries continued to receive support from local Bosnian Serbs.²⁰³² **(Even if so, what does it mean "local Bosnian Serbs? Are they officials? Weren't the paramilitaries also (at least partly) local Bosnian Serbs? What kind of construction is the assertion that the paramilitaries were supported by local policemen, while at the same time turning against the authorities and Government. It was the most obvious that the legal authorities were**

addition Arkan is present and accompanied by armed men in this video. The Chamber therefore does not accept the Accused's submission that this video demonstrated that Arkan did not create fear among Bosnian Muslims. **You will have to accept when you see the ECMM report, that was lately disclosed.** The Chamber does accept, however, that some Bosnian Serbs also feared Arkan's men. **Why? How did you forget that Arkan himself had beaten the highest officials of the Zvornik Municipality in Motel Jezero, in front of the Muslim delegation?** [REDACTED]. See also P2901 (SRT video footage of interview of Mirko Blagojević, p. 7; P2900 (Letter from Bijeljina CSB to Radovan Karadžić, 29 July 1992), p. 2.

²⁰²⁶ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 118. While Davidović referred to Croatian owned companies, the Chamber finds that this related to Bosnian Croat owned companies.

²⁰²⁷ Dušan Spasojević, T. 35857–35860 (22 March 2013); P6218 (Excerpt from report on war crimes trials in Serbia in 2012).

²⁰²⁸ Dragomir Andan, T. 40829–40830 (5 July 2013). See also P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 78; P2855 (VRS Main Staff report on paramilitary formations, 28 July 1992), pp. 2–3; P2899 (Report of Bijeljina CSB, 29 July 1992), pp. 1–2; D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), pp. 2–3; Milorad Davidović, T. 15644 (29 June 2011); P2900 (Letter from Bijeljina CSB to Radovan Karadžić, 29 July 1992), p. 2. As a result, some Serbs also left Bijeljina. P2899 (Report of Bijeljina CSB, 29 July 1992), p. 2; D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), pp. 2–3.

²⁰²⁹ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 9 (under seal); Bogdan Subotić, T. 40002 (19 June 2013); P2853 (Report of Bijeljina CSB, 21 May 1992), p. 1; Milorad Davidović, T. 15474–15475 (28 June 2011); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 76, 84; Čedomir Kljajć, T. 42219–42220 (30 July 2013). See also Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21436–21437; Dragomir Andan, T. 40836, 40838–40839 (5 July 2013); Živan Filipović, T. 35814 (21 March 2013).

²⁰³⁰ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 76, 83.

²⁰³¹ P2899 (Report of Bijeljina CSB, 29 July 1992), pp. 1, 3; D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), pp. 2–3 (reporting that members of the SJB were also involved in registering stolen vehicles and weapons, failing to file criminal reports against perpetrators and participation in the commission of crimes); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 65, 91; P2881 (Report of Bijeljina CSB, July 1992), p. 2. The Chamber considered that Davidović's evidence was marked by indicators of reliability and sincerity and considered his evidence to be credible. The Accused in cross-examination of Davidović introduced a number of documents which related to a case against Davidović and his son in an attempt to attack his character and credibility (D1405, D1404, D1403, D1402, and D1401). Having considered this line of cross-examination by the Accused the Chamber finds that the cross-examination and the documents introduced by the Accused failed to cast doubt as to the character or credibility of Davidović. **This is not entirely correct. First, Davidovic implied Karadzic's son stating that Vojkan sent money to Karadzic through his son. Then Karadzic asked about Davidovic's son, because MD had already lied that his son underwent troubles, (being arrested and falsely accused) because of his testimony in the Krajisnik case. However, it appeared that his son was arrested several months prior to his testimony, therefore, HE LIED. Further, Davidovic himself retreated at least three times under the budren of a counter-arguments, admitting that he didn't know the things crucial for his testimony#.**

²⁰³² P2855 (VRS Main Staff report on paramilitary formations, 28 July 1992), pp. 1–2, 5.

against any paramilitaries, and if it wasn't so, the paramilitaries wouldn't ever turn against the authorities. #Paramilitaries#)

The most heinous, and totally unfounded conclusion of the Chamber is that "paramilitaries were allowed to operate with impunity;" To conclude that after knowing how much efforts the police and the Military police, and Yugoslav police (Davidovic) made to release those authorities from the torture and detention, imposed by the same paramilitaries, is out of mind! #Paramilitaries# Impunity#!)

633. The Chamber concludes that it was only after paramilitaries started undermining the authority of the local institutions by forming their own parallel authorities²⁰³³ (Why that happened? Because the legal authorities opposed the paramilitaries, otherwise there would be no discord between them! EXCULPATORY! #Confusion: CAUSES- CONSEQUENCES# Paramilitaries #) and also attacking Bosnian Serbs that the municipal authorities sought to exercise some real control over these units.²⁰³⁴ EXCULPATORY! Had this authorities approved the paramilitary actions, there wouldn't be any dispute#! In this regard the Chamber notes that the Presidency of the Bijeljina Assembly imposed a ban in May 1992 on armed formations which arrived in the municipality without invitation by the legal authorities.²⁰³⁵ EXCULPATORY! #Paramilitaries# Couldn't be earlier, It was a very beginning of the war!#) In addition on 11 June 1992, the Presidency of the Bijeljina Municipal Assembly issued an order that all armed formations in the municipality be placed under the single command of the VRS and tasked the MP with ensuring implementation of the order.²⁰³⁶ (EXCULPATORY! # Paramilitaries# There is a chain of similar orders, starting from April 1992 when Prime Minister Djerić issued a ban on the paramilitaries, since President Karadžić didn't have any official capacity until May 12, than in May general Mladić issued similar order, and finally the Accused issued his order on ban of any uncontrolled armed groups and personnel, publicly disowning such a groups and ordering their legal persecution. Additionally, this finding of the Chamber confirmed that there was no a municipal Crisis Staff.)

634. Davidović was tasked to lead a special unit of the Federal SUP to address problems with paramilitaries in northeastern BiH and arrived in Bijeljina on 27 June 1992.²⁰³⁷ (#By whom

²⁰³³ D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), pp. 2, 6.

²⁰³⁴ See P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 78, 121. Šešelj stated that on a number of occasions the Bijeljina Municipal Board issued public statements and held press conferences which "condemned and severely criticised" the actions of Mauzer. D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013), para. 46. However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. It notes that Šešelj's testimony was marked by political commentary which limited its reliability. Furthermore, in light of other accepted evidence to the contrary and noting that it has no other evidence to suggest that the municipal authorities condemned the actions of these units other than this unsupported statement of Šešelj, the Chamber does not find Šešelj's evidence in this regard to be reliable.

²⁰³⁵ D1442 (Conclusion of Bijeljina's Municipal Assembly Presidency, 29 May 1992). See also Cvijetin Simić, T. 35681–35682, 35699 (20 March 2013); D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), paras. 33, 35; D3134 (Bijeljina Municipal Assembly decision, 25 July 1992). Restrictions were also placed on paramilitaries entering the police station with long barrelled weapons. Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21437.

²⁰³⁶ D1443 (Order of Bijeljina's Municipal Assembly Presidency, 11 June 1992); D1444 (Conclusion of Bijeljina's Municipal Assembly Presidency, 25 June 1992); D1445 (Order of Bijeljina's Municipal Assembly, 25 June 1992). The Chamber also finds that the local authorities prohibited the sale of alcoholic beverages to uniformed persons in the municipality. D1437 (Order of Bijeljina's Municipal Assembly Presidency, 8 April 1992). Mihajlović testified that the local authorities tried to prevent and punish crimes committed against non-Serbs. D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), para. 14. However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber found that Mihajlović's evidence was marked by contradictions and indicators that he was not straightforward in his answers to the Chamber.

²⁰³⁷ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 73–74, 76; Milorad Davidović, T. 15554 (28 June 2011), 15645–15646 (29 June 2011), 15735, 15765 (30 June 2011); D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), pp. 4, 15; P2899 (Report of Bijeljina CSB, 29 July 1992), pp. 2, 4–5; D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), pp. 1–2, 4–5; P2900 (Letter from Bijeljina CSB to Radovan Karadžić, 29 July 1992), pp. 3–4.

he was tasked? By the President, through his accord with the Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic. Let us rectify this paragraph and make it as it was: Mr. Davidovic wasn't tasked by someone unknown. From the evidence it is clear that dr. Radovan Karadzic talked with the Yugoslav Prime minister MilanPanic about insufficiency in a manpower needed to arrest the paramilitaries. Karadzic asked Prime minister Panic to send him the most capable unit for several weeks, to help the domestic police and RS MUP. Without this invitation, Yugoslav Prime minister wouldn't dare to send the unit. The chain of decisions and command started from the President, through Minister for interior Stanisic, Minister for Justice Mandic, commander of the Special Police unit Karisik, and General Mladic, who assigned the 65th regiment under command of general Milomir Savcic. All of those involved deserved a credit for this massive action. How could it be used against this Accused?#Paramilitaries!) While Davidović's unit came from the Federal SUP in Belgrade it was re-subordinated to the command in Bosnian Serb MUP.²⁰³⁸ Davidović's special unit, in co-ordination with Dragomir Andan from the Bosnian Serb MUP, disarmed and broke up the paramilitary formations in the area of the Bijeljina CSB and arrested those "most deeply involved in criminal activities".²⁰³⁹ **EXCULPATORY! Dragomir Andan was the Serb MUP official.** Davidović had the support of Ratko Mladić to take these measures.²⁰⁴⁰ **EXCULPATORY! Mladic acted under the President's command!** Following the arrival of Davidović and his unit, and until they left on 27 July 1992, there was a significant improvement in the security situation.²⁰⁴¹ **EXCULPATORY!#Paramilitaries!** Pursuant to orders from the Bosnian Serb MUP approximately 40 policemen with criminal records were removed from the SJB which was reinforced by personnel from other centres including the SJB Sarajevo.²⁰⁴² **(2042) That was done by the Minister of Interior Mico Stanisic, supported by the entire his collegium of decent professionals. And all of that was done by the state institutions under president Karadzic's authority. Completely all highly EXCULPATORY!!!, both, for the Minister Stani{i}, for the President and for the entire Serb MUP!# Paramilitaries, contra-crime!**

²⁰³⁸ Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21454, 21667. See also D3807 (Official note of BiH Prosecutor's Office, 12 December 2007), p. 2.

²⁰³⁹ D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), p. 9; Milorad Davidović, T. 15604–15605, 15607 (29 June 2011); D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), p. 72. See also Dragomir Andan, T. 40837–40838, 40857–40858 (5 July 2013) (testifying that some paramilitaries were arrested for crimes committed against Bosnian Muslims); Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21425, 21434–21436, 21829–21830.

²⁰⁴⁰ Milorad Davidović, T. 15604–15605, 15607 (29 June 2011); D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), p. 72.

²⁰⁴¹ P2899 (Report of Bijeljina CSB, 29 July 1992), pp. 4–5; Milorad Davidović, T. 15645–15646 (29 June 2011); D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), pp. 4–5. Measures taken by Davidović and his unit to normalise conditions in Bijeljina included (i) preventing the carrying of weapons without permits, (ii) reporting incidents to the authorities in Pale daily; (iii) imposing a curfew and (iv) seizing stolen goods, see Milorad Davidović, T. 15722, 15753, 15766 (30 June 2011), 15810 (1 July 2011); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 87, 90–91, 121; D1438 (Order of Bijeljina's Municipal Assembly Presidency, 8 April 1992); P2899 (Report of Bijeljina CSB, 29 July 1992), pp. 3–5; Milivoje Kićanović, T. 34909 (6 March 2013); D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), pp. 3–4. See also Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21437–21438, 21440–21442, 21454–21455, 21499–21500, 21664–21666; D3782 (Report of Bijeljina SJB, 28 June 1992); P6434 (Excerpt from Dragomir Andan's interview with OTP), p. 6; P2881 (Report of Bijeljina CJB, July 1992), p. 1; D1436 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 17 June 1992), p. 6; P3033 (Reynaud Theunens's expert report entitled "Radovan Karadžić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)"), e-court p. 382. Andan also testified about measures taken by Davidović with respect to a detention facility used by Mauzer's unit. Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21442–21443; P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 95; Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix A, Bijeljina, para. 12. However, given that this is not a scheduled detention facility, the Chamber will not address this evidence.

²⁰⁴² Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21437, 21454–21455, 21499–21500, 21664–21666; P2899 (Report of Bijeljina CSB, 29 July 1992), p. 4; D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), p. 4. See also P6434 (Excerpt from Dragomir Andan's interview with OTP), p. 6; Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21499–21501; Dragomir Andan, T. 40860–40861 (5 July 2013) (testifying that the police presence in the village of Janja was upgraded and a check-point was established to prevent looting and attacks against the predominantly Bosnian Muslim population); P2881 (Report of Bijeljina CJB, July 1992), p. 1.

635. Davidović also arrested some military personnel; complaints were then made to Mićo Stanišić, who instructed Davidović not to take action against members of the military as this should be done by the MP.²⁰⁴³ However, subsequently, Stanišić confirmed Davidović's authority²⁰⁴⁴ and requested the command of the Eastern Bosnia Corps to extend their "full cooperation" to him and to take measures against "possible perpetrators" in their ranks.²⁰⁴⁵

(#EXCULPATORY! How possibly the action of Mr. Davidović could have been presented as anything but as an execution of the President orders issued through the MUP and VRS?#) Following this, Davidović in co-operation with the Military Security Service from the Main Staff command and the MP arrested and prosecuted military personnel.²⁰⁴⁶ **(#Testifying in the Karadzic case, Mr. Davidović confirmed that the MUP RS did not have at its disposal such a capable unit, which confirms the need to ask Prime Minister of Yugoslavia Mr. Panic for the assistance, and also explains why it wasn't accomplished earlier.)**

636. During a visit to Bijeljina on 20 July 1992 by Prime Minister Đerić, Andan asked for assistance in light of continuing problems.²⁰⁴⁷ Đerić gave his support for the efforts displayed by Andan and Davidović²⁰⁴⁸ and a special unit led by Duško Kljajić was sent to assist them.²⁰⁴⁹ **EXCULPATORY#!**

637. Despite these measures, there were difficulties in controlling Mauzer and his unit which opposed the attempts by Davidović and Andan to restore order in the municipality.²⁰⁵⁰ In one incident, the Bijeljina municipal authorities intervened and secured the release of Mauzer following pressure from his unit.²⁰⁵¹ Davidović made requests to the military command to control Mauzer's unit and while promises were made, no action was taken and Mauzer continued to have political support in the municipality and was close to the structures of power in the municipality.²⁰⁵² **That was the reason why the President and**

²⁰⁴³ P2808 (Letter from Zdravko Tolimir to Radovan Karadžić and Mićo Stanišić, 4 July 1992), p. 1; P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 85; P2895 (Order of SerBiH MUP, 5 July 1992); Milorad Davidović, T. 15605 (29 June 2011). See also Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21466–21467, 21675–21676, 21818–21819; Dragomir Andan, T. 40858 (5 July 2013); D3819 (Report of Bijeljina SJB, 7 July 1992), pp. 1–2.

²⁰⁴⁴ Milorad Davidović, T. 15609 (29 June 2011) (testifying that Stanišić confirmed that there should be no more objections or confrontation between Davidović and the organs of the VRS).

²⁰⁴⁵ D1408 (Request of SerBiH MUP, 5 July 1992), pp. 1–2. See also P2881 (Report of Bijeljina CJB, July 1992), pp. 1–2 (indicating that measures were taken to improve the capacity to process criminal cases committed by military personnel).

²⁰⁴⁶ Milorad Davidović, T. 15608–15609 (29 June 2011); D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), p. 39.

²⁰⁴⁷ Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21484; D3789 (Dragomir Andan's notes), p. 2.

²⁰⁴⁸ Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21484; D3789 (Dragomir Andan's notes), p. 2.

²⁰⁴⁹ Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21459–21460, 21464, 21485, 21462, 21671–21674, 21677–21678, 21730–21731, 21737, 21759–21760, 21762–21763. See also D3807 (Official note of BiH Prosecutor's Office, 12 December 2007), p. 1. This included a unit led by Duško Malović, known as Mićo Stanišić's unit or "Mićo's Specials".

²⁰⁵⁰ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 94, 96; Milorad Davidović, T. 15579 (29 June 2011); Momir Nikolić, T. 24732 (15 February 2012); Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21445, 21652, 21655–21658, 21703–21704, 21719–21722, 21817–21818; Dragomir Andan, T. 40871 (5 July 2013); P6434 (Excerpt from Dragomir Andan's interview with OTP), p. 3. In contrast to Mauzer, Blagojević issued a proclamation that Bosnian Muslims be protected from ethnic cleansing and opposed the expulsion or killing of Bosnian Muslims. Milorad Davidović, T. 15506 (24 June 2011); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 121.

²⁰⁵¹ Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21657; P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 94, 96.

²⁰⁵² Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21656, 21703–21704, 21721–21722, 21818; Dragomir Andan, T. 40874 (5 July 2013). See also P6434 (Excerpt from Dragomir Andan's interview with OTP), pp. 3–4; Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25455 (28 February 2012). Davidović also testified about visiting a private detention facility run by Mauzer but since this is not a scheduled detention facility, the Chamber will not make findings in this regard. P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 95; P2896 (Report of Bijeljina CSB, 7 July 1992), pp. 3–5; P2899 (Report of Bijeljina CSB, 29 July 1992), p. 3. See also Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21443–21444; D3783 (Bijeljina garrison record, 1 July 1992).

General Mladic only a week after these promises went to Bijeljina and demoted both, the President of Municipality and Mauzer himself! EXCULPATORY# However, Mauzer was objected for his rude demeanour, not for any crime# ! Davidović and his team were also threatened by Arkan's men.²⁰⁵³ (However, Davidovic wanted to have more power and authorisation even over the Army. He couldn't have any competence over the Army, and this is one of the most sensitive matters. The competences are strictly defined, and disciplining Mauzer was in the competence of his military commander. The most what he could make was to file a criminal or disciplinary report against Mauzer. Davidovic and Andan wanted more than they could have, and the Ministry didn't allow them. Davidovic testified in this case that he would also dismiss Andan for the same felony, which wasn't excuse, as Andan said. The experienced Chamber should see it, or shouldn't deal with that kind of rivalry among policemen. Particularly it shouldn't be an issue in the Judgement of this Accused. Anyway, this Accused and general Mladic degraded-demoted Mauzer and president of the Municipality in August 92, after all was settled down, because of disciplinary mistakes and misdemeanour #.

638. In August 1992, following demands by Mauzer for his expulsion and the arrest of a member of Arkan's men by Davidović's unit, Davidović's authority was obstructed by the Bijeljina Crisis Staff and his unit was ordered to leave for Belgrade.²⁰⁵⁴ (2054) (No matter neither the Chamber nor the Prosecution ever proved the existence of the Crisis Staff, the Chamber perpetuates this false fact. Andan was promoted after the first reports, he was maintained to participate in an overall action, but when he made the mistake, he was dismissed and relocated to the VRS. Mr. Davidovic wasn't even envisaged to stay as long after the action was accomplished. Further, his interference in the disciplinary matters of the Army, including Mauzer's misdemeanour, he was in risk to cause the internal clashes between the Army and MUP#) Andan and another MUP official who had taken action against paramilitaries were also removed from Bijeljina and dismissed from the Bosnian Serb MUP while the paramilitaries continued to operate in Bijeljina.²⁰⁵⁵ (2055) The footnote is more correct, because nobody denied that Andan made a mistake taking these poker machines, and this was undisputed. Prior to that, Andan was promoted for his participation in the action against paramilitaries. It is also false that the "paramilitaries continued to operate in Bijeljina". On the contrary, they had been banned in entering the RS even as private persons, let alone as a group, which was prevented, see:D2031

²⁰⁵³ P2898 (Official note of Bijeljina SJB, 8 July 1992), p. 2. See also P2900 (Letter from Bijeljina CSB to Radovan Karadžić, 29 July 1992), p. 5.

²⁰⁵⁴ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 93, 96–97, 99–100, 147–148; P2899 (Report of Bijeljina CSB, 29 July 1992), p. 6; D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), p. 6; D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), p. 57; Milorad Davidović, T. 15579–15581 (29 June 2011); P2897 (Official note of Bijeljina CJB, 7 July 1992), p. 1. The Municipal Assembly also called for the removal and expulsion of Jovo Miskin, a Republic Commissioner who supported Davidović's actions. P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 97; Milorad Davidović, T. 15580–15581, 15648–15649 (29 June 2011).

²⁰⁵⁵ Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21656; D1409 (Decision of SerBiH MUP, 11 September 1992); Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21777–21781. Andan also testified about the circumstances surrounding his removal from his position in the MUP. Andan testified that he was removed from the MUP in September 1992 because he allegedly took poker machines for private use but that this was an excuse for his removal given that individuals were against his professional approach. However, Andan could not confirm that he was removed because of measures he had taken in Bijeljina. See Dragomir Andan, T. 40825–40826, 40867–40868, 40877, 40883, 40897–40900, 40901–40905 (5 July 2013); D3807 (Official note of BiH Prosecutor's Office, 12 December 2007), p. 1; P6434 (Excerpt from Dragomir Andan's interview with OTP), pp. 3–4.

We have acquired information through intelligence work on the ground that Vojin VUČKOVIĆ, aka Žučo, leader of the paramilitary formation disarmed on 29 July, and Rad/?c/ TANACKOVIĆ, are preparing their groups for the return to the area of the Serbian municipality of Zvornik. He claims that he will try to legalise this through "influential people" in the Serbian Army in order to "finish his business" in the region. He added that he had expanded his hit list and that he would take the first opportunity to launch an artillery attack on the Zvornik Public Security Station and the building used by the local government of the Serbian municipality of Zvornik. His return is mostly "delayed" by the presence of the Special MUP Unit of the Serbian Republic deployed in Zvornik. Once this unit has withdrawn, he expects to carry out his plan without any problems.

On the Vuckovic's menu hadn't been the Muslims, but the Serb official authorities!#Paramilitaries!)

(E) Prosecution of crimes

- 639.** The Chamber finds that there was some record and investigation of crimes committed against Bosnian Muslims by Bosnian Serbs;²⁰⁵⁶ however, some of the investigations were discontinued.²⁰⁵⁷ **(This is a #false assertion#, made by the Chamber itself. The P06179 is the act issued on 30.12.1992. by an investigating military judge, who testified as an OTP witness. The act (P06179) doesn't say that the "investigation had been discontinued" but that the period of the detention had expired, and therefore the suspect had to be released from the detention. The next document thah the Chamber relied upon was D1478, issued by another military judge, also a withness before the same Chamber, and the exhibit entirely contradicts to the Chambers assertion, ordering on 21. 2. 93 the arrest of the same suspect who was released 30 December 92 for the procedural matters. Obviously, he didn't appear when**

²⁰⁵⁶

Savo Bojanović, T. 34819–34820 (5 March 2013); D3076 (Witness statement of Savo Bojanović dated 2 March 2013), paras. 9–12, 16, 18–19, 21, 23–26; Savo Bojanović, T. 34817–34819, 34829, 34850, 34857–34860, 34847–34848 (5 March 2013). For documents relating to the investigation and prosecution of crimes, *see* D1481 (Bijeljina Military Prosecutor request re Cvjetković/Jurošević case, 29 October 1992); D1482 (Bijeljina Military Court record re Cvjetković/Jurošević case, 29 October 1992); D1483 (Bijeljina Military Prosecutor request re Cvjetković/Jurošević case, 30 October 1992); D1484 (Statement of Amira Rendić to Bijeljina Military Court, 30 October 1992); D1485 (Bijeljina Military Court ruling in Cvjetković/Jurošević case, 20 November 1992); D3080 (Bijeljina Military Court's Proposition, 26 April 1993); D1486 (Bijeljina Military Court order in Cvjetković/Jurošević case, 17 December 1992); D1487 (Bijeljina Military Court order in Cvjetković/Jurošević case, 19 January 1993); D1488 (Bijeljina Military Court record re Cvjetković/Jurošević case, 23 January 1993); D1489 (Bijeljina Military Court decision in Cvjetković/Jurošević case, 1 April 1993) (under seal); D1490 (Indictment of Brčko Public Prosecutor, 28 July 1993); D1465 (Bijeljina Military Court indictment of Radovan Mićanović, 17 August 1993); D1466 (Bijeljina Military Court judgment in Radovan Mićanović case, 22 March 1995); D1467 (Bijeljina High Court judgement in Branko Đurić case, 27 October 1995), pp. 1–2, 10–11; D1468 (Correspondence between Bijeljina Lower Court and Radovan Karadžić, 9 June 2011); D1469 (Correspondence between Bijeljina District Prosecutor and Radovan Karadžić, 24 August 2009), pp. 1–5; D1470 (Bijeljina Military Court on-site investigation report, 28 September 1992); D1471 (Bijeljina Military Police criminal report in Rade Mihajlović case, 29 September 1992); D1472 (Bijeljina Military Police forensic-technical report, 30 September 1992); D1473 (Bijeljina Military Prosecutor request re Rade Mihajlović case, 30 September 1992); D1477 (Bijeljina Military Court correspondence in Rade Mihajlović case, 30 January 1993); D1476 (Bijeljina Military Court indictment of Rade Mihajlović, 5 January 1993); D3079 (Bijeljina Military Court's Ruling, 19 June 1993); D3077 (Supreme Military Court's Judgement, 16 May 1994); D3081 (Bijeljina Military Court's Verdict, 18 January 1994); D3799 (Report of Bijeljina SJB, undated). *See also* D3798 (List of criminal records submitted to Bijeljina Prosecutor's Office between 26 June and 25 July 1992); Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21453–21454, 21537–21538, 21542–21544 (testifying about the treatment of cases when he and Davidović were in Bijeljina).

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P6179 (Bijeljina Military Court's Decision, 30 December 1992); P6180 (Bijeljina Military Court's Decision, 5 January 1993); D1478 (Bijeljina Military Court order in Rade Mihajlović case, 21 February 1993); D1479 (Bijeljina District Court verdict in Rade Mihajlović case, 18 June 2001); D1480 (RS Supreme Court judgement in Rade Mihajlović case, 30 September 2003); P6181 (Bijeljina Military Court's Dispatch to Military Prosecutor's Office, 28 January 1993); D3078 (Bijeljina Military Court's Ruling, 22 January 1993), p. 1. With respect to one of the cases, Bojanović maintained that there was nothing unlawful and that the appropriate procedures and law were followed. Savo Bojanović, T. 34812, 34831–34834, 34863–34864 (5 March 2013).

summoned, and his arrest was ordered. Many times it was clarified in the Courtroom that the expiring detention didn't mean stopping the case. This particular case, against Rade Mihajlovic, had been successfully ended. #Distorted)

The Chamber finds that there was inbalance in the treatment of cases associated with the killing or mistreatment of Bosnian Muslims by Bosnian Serbs. Many incidents went unpunished or sentences were passed but not carried out.²⁰⁵⁸

One of the exhibits , under this fn. was the witness statement under the seal, and with the delayed disclosure. This witness was a military judge, and had every possibility to act in all cases he considered mismannaged. On the p. 9 he said:

To the best of my knowledge, many of the crimes were committed by paramilitary forces from Serbia, and it was very difficult to control those people. #

Impunity: Those originating from Serbia had been sued in Serbia! This was, among others, the reason why President Karadzic asked an aid from the Prime Minister Panic of SRY, so to avoid additional tensions on both sides of the Drina River in a case of casualties! However, the Chamber again uses an arbitrary model: "Some Serbs killed some Muslims"!#)

For another case the very same witness said:

There was a case involving perpetrators named Slaven Lukić, Oliver Radić, Istok Pojatar and Mladen Trkulja and a victim named Salko Kukić. Kukić was a commander of a Muslim unit in the East Bosnia Corps under the VRS command and after his killing the Muslim residents started leaving in massive numbers. This was in the summer of 1992. I am now examining a series of documents, are identified with numbers 02633563 through 02633625 which relate to this case. I recall that the accused in this case admitted to killing Kukić. I remember that the military prosecutor, Predrag Drinić, had a meeting with Dušan Tanacković, the Chief of Security for the East Bosnia Corps of the VRS. I was together with the deputy military prosecutor, Goran Blagojević, on the terrace of the prosecution building. The investigation was complete, and Blagojević was preparing the indictment. Tanacković came to visit Predrag Drinić and had a private meeting in the office of Drinić. The meeting lasted about half an hour. After Tanacković left the premises, Drinić issued a written decision terminating the case, despite the fact that this was Blagojević's case. Document number 0263-3568 is a copy of the decision issued by Drinić. I recognize the signature on this document as that of Drinić.

Had this witness's statement been disclosed timely, the Defense would call Drinic and others and clarify the situation. Another question would be directed to this witness: what he had done within the military judicial system to rectify the felony? Whether he informen Karadzic or anyone else? Did he informe the President of the SMC Novak Todorovic? It was well known that Karadzic didn't interfere in any judicial matters. Now, I demand this witness to be re-questioned, and no matter he is protected, I will sue him, so should the Tribunal too. Appart of this witness and his testimony, the Chamber had an insite in the entire case file and could analise it. What this Accused has to do with it. Are other presidents also liable for the professional and moral abilities of the judges in their countries? # BROJ PARA???? This added to the fear

²⁰⁵⁸

[REDACTED]; P2930 (Bijeljina Military Court file for Slaven Lukić et al., 8 September 1992), pp. 5–7; [REDACTED]; P2931 (Bijeljina Military Court indictment of Zoran Tomić and Dragan Matović, 24 June 1993), pp. 3–5, 17–18, 34–36, 61, 86–87. See also Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21446–21449; Dragomir Andan, T. 40824–40827, 40890–40891 (5 July 2013); D3813 (Decision of Bijeljina SJB, 3 August 1992); D3787 (Report of Bijeljina SJB, July 1992), p. 2; D3786 (Bijeljina SJB criminal report, 3 August 1992), pp. 1–3; D3785 (Decision of Bijeljina SJB, 3 August 1992), p. 1; D3784 (Investigation report of Bijeljina Lower Court, 2 June 1992); P6218 (Excerpt from report on war crimes trials in Serbia in 2012); P6219 (Order of Bijeljina Prosecutor's Office, 14 July 2009); Svetozar Mihajlović, T. 35736 (20 March 2013); P6218 (Excerpt from report on war crimes trials in Serbia in 2012), p. 5, fn. 101; Dušan Spasojević, T. 35860–35862 (22 March 2013).

and uncertainty of the Bosnian Muslim population and contributed to individuals leaving Bijeljina.²⁰⁵⁹ In addition, while proceedings were initiated against Bosnian Serbs for general crimes, no cases for war crimes against the civilian population were ever tried before the Bijeljina Military Court.²⁰⁶⁰ **This also could happen because there was no any war crime, isn't it? Bijeljina itself was not a combat zone, and crimes could have been crimes, but not war crimes, since there was no any attack (Doesn't fit under the schapeau??). Saying what had said, the Chamber was obliged to number cases of the war crimes that hadn't been tried, and should have been. Why the Chamber didn't ask the two witnesses named in this footnote, Bojanovic and Drinic, whose statement had been admitted as 92 bis? This Accused feels prejudiced and damaged in his rights why Drinic didn't testify, and why the statement P02929 was lately disclosed to him.**

640. Spasojević testified that all crimes against non-Serb citizens of Bijeljina were handled by members of the SJB, that if the perpetrators were found they were handed over for prosecution, and that there was no pressure from government organs to cover up crimes.²⁰⁶¹ However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable given that he was contradicted on cross-examination and acknowledged examples of cases involving murder of Bosnian Muslims which were still pending.²⁰⁶² **(2062) Did the Chamber figured out for what reason it was pending? Or was it all the same, no matter was it justified, or not? Was it pending longer than Seselj's case? If so, did the Chamber dismiss the entire testimoni of Spasojevic, or picked up as from the Swedish table what they liked? Finally, pending doesn't mean dismissed!**

i. Schedule Detention Facility C.2.1

641. The Indictment refers to the use of the Batković camp as a detention facility at least between 1 June 1992 and 31 December 1995.²⁰⁶³

1. Establishment of camp and arrival of detainees

642. On 17 June 1992, the Command of the Eastern Bosnia Corps issued an order requiring the selection of "locations and facilities to accommodate prisoners of war" pursuant to an order from the Main Staff.²⁰⁶⁴ Ratko Mladić had issued an order to set up a camp for "war prisoners" at the corps level to relieve the Birać Brigade from guarding up to 600 prisoners who were in their custody.²⁰⁶⁵ Following this order the Batković camp was

²⁰⁵⁹ KDZ531, T. 15854 (1 July 2011) (closed session).

²⁰⁶⁰ Savo Bojanović, T. 34849–34850 (5 March 2013); Predrag Drinic, P374 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić*), T. 10864–10865.

²⁰⁶¹ D3141 (Witness statement of Dušan Spasojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 18.

²⁰⁶² Dušan Spasojević, T. 35844–35845 (21 March 2013).

²⁰⁶³ Indictment, Scheduled Detention Facility C.2.1. In Appendix B to the Prosecution Final Brief, however, the Prosecution only refers to the period between 25 June 1992 and 24 December 1995.

²⁰⁶⁴ D3237 (Order of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 17 June 1992), pp. 1–2; D3236 (Witness statement of Gojko Čekić dated 31 March 2013), para. 9. See also Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25167 (23 February 2012).

²⁰⁶⁵ P3238 (Order of the VRS Main Staff, 17 June 1992), pp. 1–2; P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 90 (under seal). See also Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21529.

established.²⁰⁶⁶ The civilian and military authorities took over the hangars belonging to the agricultural company in Batković which was approximately 12 kilometres from Bijeljina towards the Sava River.²⁰⁶⁷

643. The order for the establishment of the camp provided that (i) Momčilo Despot be appointed commander of the camp (ii) the treatment of the prisoners of war be “in accordance with provisions of the international law of war”; (iii) the detainees be treated appropriately; (iv) unauthorised persons be prevented from entering the camp; and (v) the provision of food would be organised at the Corps Command level.²⁰⁶⁸ Despot ordered that records be kept of detainees and of items seized from them, including valuables and money.²⁰⁶⁹ He also ordered that detainees could be used for work, including maintenance and agricultural work, but not for work directly linked to combat operations, and that interrogations would be conducted by the Eastern Bosnia Corps.²⁰⁷⁰ This order also provided for a list of all detainees to be communicated to the Red Cross and for detainees to be treated humanely without violence, with “exemplary hygiene” and regular medical checks.²⁰⁷¹ While these rules were promulgated, the evidence below as to the conditions of detention and treatment of detainees indicates that the rules were not complied with.²⁰⁷²

What wasn't complied with? Was it a deliberate degradation of the conditions, or was it a possible consequence of a very cruel sanctions imposed upon the RS by the entire world, including Serbia and Russia? And what the President has to do with that? The ICRC was able to inspect and order improvements.

However, the Chamber didn't trust a very beloved witness M. Davidovic on this occasion, and didn't consult the ICRC findings, the Chamber again dismissed a very convincing evidence in favour of a false translation (FORCED LABOUR DIDN'T EXIST) of the document already used to dismiss another witness and evidence. How many times this #falsely translated dokument# will be used against the interests of this Accused? And how many other false translations, that the Accused couldn't identify, will play a crucial role in convicting this Accused?

²⁰⁶⁶ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 90 (under seal); D3237 (Order of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 17 June 1992), p. 2.

²⁰⁶⁷ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 11 (under seal); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 151; Milorad Davidović, T. 15782–15783 (30 June 2011); D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), p. 24; P6263 (Photographs of Batković camp). *See also* Dragomir Andan, T. 40833–40835 (5 July 2013); Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21471–21472, 21528–21529; D3796 (SerBiH MUP instructions to CSBs, 8 August 1992), p. 1; D3817 (Bijeljina SJB dispatch to Eastern Bosnia Corps, 11 August 1992).

²⁰⁶⁸ D3237 (Order of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 17 June 1992), p. 2; P2890 (Order of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 2 July 1992), p. 2; D3236 (Witness statement of Gojko Čekić dated 31 March 2013), paras. 9–10. *See also* P2890 (Order of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 2 July 1992), p. 1; Milorad Davidović, T. 15545–15546 (28 June 2011); Petar Salapura, T. 40304 (24 June 2013).

²⁰⁶⁹ D1449 (Instructions of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 2 July 1992), pp. 1–3. The Chamber notes that this order refers to “Ekonomija”, but the Chamber has other evidence that this facility was located in Batković and thus considers it to be another name for Scheduled Detention Facility C.2.1. D3239 (Instruction of Batković Collection Centre, 12 July 1992).

²⁰⁷⁰ D1449 (Instructions of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 2 July 1992), p. 2.

²⁰⁷¹ D1449 (Instructions of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 2 July 1992), p. 2.

²⁰⁷² *But see* Milorad Davidović, T. 15784–15786 (30 June 2011). While Davidović testified that Despot complied with these instructions, the Chamber does not find that this is entirely consistent with the other evidence on the conditions of detention and treatment of detainees. For example, the Chamber notes that P2891 (Instructions of the Eastern Bosnia Corps, 2 July 1992), p. 2, which was signed by Despot as commander of the camp, implicitly acknowledged that detainees were subject to forced labour.

644. The camp was guarded by VRS soldiers who were mainly from the military reserve²⁰⁷³ and the army had jurisdiction over the camp.²⁰⁷⁴ From August 1992, the commander of the Batković camp was Velibor Stojanović.²⁰⁷⁵

645. From at least June until December 1992, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were detained in the Batković camp.²⁰⁷⁶ The first groups brought to Batković were Bosnian Muslims after which Bosnian Croats were also brought to the facility.²⁰⁷⁷ The detainees held at the Batković camp originated from a large number of different municipalities, including Kalesija, Brčko, Ključ, Lopare, Rogatica, Sanski Most, Sokolac, Ugljevik, Vlasenica, Živinice, and Zvornik.²⁰⁷⁸ Some people were taken from their homes and transported in buses to the Batković camp.²⁰⁷⁹ **This is too arbitrary! How possibly could the Serb police take anybody from Kalesija, or other Muslim places, which were all the time under the Muslim control? Beside that, a combatant could be caught while in his home, it doesn't make him innocent! Why would the state take them into custody and feed them, while there was no food for the army?** Many were transferred from other detention facilities, including Sušica camp in Vlasenica and Manjača camp in Banja Luka.²⁰⁸⁰ Some individuals were detained for over a year.²⁰⁸¹ **If some of the POW-s were captured at their homes, it doesn't mean they were not combatants, taking part in the conflict in some of possible ways. And how come the Chamber talks about "detainees" and a time they spent in the camp? Those were the POW-s under the permanent supervision of the Red Cross. If there would be children and women, the ICRC would know and report.**

646. When KDZ603 arrived from Sušica camp he was in a hangar with approximately 1,600 Bosnian Muslims from various municipalities who were placed in groups depending

²⁰⁷³ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), pp. 11–12 (under seal); P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), para. 36 (under seal); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 160. *See also* Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 872; P84 (Witness statement of Mirsad Kuralić dated 27 June 1996), p. 7. **92bis Rule, Not cross examined!**

²⁰⁷⁴ Savo Bojanović, T. 34850–34852 (5 March 2013). *See also* Dragomir Andan, T. 40834–40835 (5 July 2013).

²⁰⁷⁵ *See* Adjudicated Fact 2252. *But see* D3236 (Witness statement of Gojko Čekić dated 31 March 2013), para. 22 (stating that Stojanović was the commander of the guards).

²⁰⁷⁶ *See* Adjudicated Fact 2250. In August 1992 there were over 1,200 Bosnian Muslim men detained in a single warehouse at Batković camp. *See* Adjudicated Fact 2253.

²⁰⁷⁷ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 153. When Andan asked why a Bosnian Croat associate had been taken away from Brčko and detained at the camp he was told that “there was no reason” and it appeared that the only reason was because he was a Bosnian Croat: Dragomir Andan, T. 40870 (5 July 2013).

²⁰⁷⁸ Adjudicated Fact 2251; P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 153; P84 (Witness statement of Mirsad Kuralić dated 27 June 1996), p. 7; Mirsad Kuralić, P63 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajšnik*), T. 12568–12569; P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 10; Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 872; P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 153.

²⁰⁷⁹ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 10.

²⁰⁸⁰ Adjudicated Fact 2251; P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 153; P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 6 (under seal); KDZ044 was transferred in a group of detainees from Sušica camp on 30 June 1992; P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), paras. 35, 37 (under seal); KDZ044, P109 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Nikolić*), T. 269 (under seal); Asim Egrlić, P3570 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajšnik*), T. 4796 (under seal); Asim Egrlić, T. 19980 (5 October 2011); Svetozar Andrić, T. 41668–41669 (22 July 2013) (testifying that the commander of the Main Staff on 17 June 1992 ordered that detainees at Sušica should be transferred to the Batković camp on 17 June 1992). In late June 1992 approximately 400 detainees from Sušica camp were told they would be exchanged but were transported to Batković camp on buses which were heavily guarded by guards in JNA uniforms. The detainees had not engaged in military activities. P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 45–46, 149, 156; Ibro Osmanović, T. 17999 (29 August 2011); KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 488–489 (under seal). Over 500 detainees were brought to Batković camp in late 1992 after the Manjača camp was dismantled. P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 154; Ibro Osmanović, T. 17947–17948 (25 August 2011); KDZ163, T. 20748–20749 (1 November 2011).

²⁰⁸¹ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 872; P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 145–147, 180; KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 491 (under seal).

on their municipality of origin.²⁰⁸² There were also some women, children, and elderly persons detained in a separate hangar.²⁰⁸³ **#Uncorroborated by the ICRC reports, and this camp was under their control all the times! But look at this footnote 2084: contradicts to this assertion completely. At this state of matter, this “finding” shouldn’t be in the dispositive at all!**

647. On arrival in Batković, the detainees were ordered by Serb soldiers to empty their pockets of money and valuables and were forced to pass a cordon of soldiers who beat them with chains and batons before being taken to a hangar.²⁰⁸⁴ The detainees were informed by a platoon leader that they were “war prisoners” on Serb territory and had no rights.²⁰⁸⁵ **#Again, the ugliest assertions originate from other cases, a statements of unexamined witnesses, adjudicated facts...! #This doesn’t make the UN proud and must not be done that way! By being a POW, one is automatically granted the rights belonging to a POW, and the ICRC was controlling it#.**

648. Between 2,000 and 3,000 non-Serbs went through the camp after its establishment with new groups arriving when other groups left.²⁰⁸⁶ The exchange of detainees in groups of 50 to 100 began in August 1992.²⁰⁸⁷ **Does it mean that the other side had a camps and POWs too?** In 1995, Bosnian Muslims from Karakaj²⁰⁸⁸ and Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica, including elderly and children who were captured were brought to Batković.²⁰⁸⁹ **And this is lie!!! In the list P03213) there is no inmates younger than 15, while there was a negligible percent of those of 16 and 17 years old, and we know that they mobilised everyone between 15 and 77.**

²⁰⁸² P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), para. 37 (under seal); KDZ603, T. 18165 (1 September 2011).

²⁰⁸³ Mirsad Kuralić, P63 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 12568–12569; **92bis Rule, Not cross examined!** Adjudicated Fact 2253. See also P3213 (List of persons detained at Batković camp); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 155 (testifying that there were only two women at the camp, and some children who did not want to be separated from their fathers). But see D3236 (Witness statement of Gojko Čekić dated 31 March 2013), para. 19; Gojko Čekić, T. 36508–36509 (3 April 2013) (testifying that there were no women, children, or elderly at the camp). **Thus, they hadn’t been detained. Why it is not in the paragraph instead in the footnote?**

²⁰⁸⁴ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 10; **92bis Rule, Not cross examined!** P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 160.

²⁰⁸⁵ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 10. See also Mirsad Kuralić, P63 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 12575–12577 (testifying that he was charged before a court but was not afforded proper procedure). **92bis Rule, Not cross examined!**

²⁰⁸⁶ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 11 (under seal); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 153; Ibro Osmanović, T. 17948 (25 August 2011). In a list of detainees recorded as having arrived at Batković detention facility between 27 June 1992 and 22 December 1995, a total of 2,468 detainees were listed. Of these detainees, 28 were listed as having died, 2,002 were listed as having been exchanged, 406 were listed as having been released, **Obviously, as a result of investigation. Therefore, no arbitrary detention!** 7 were listed as deported, 20 escaped or went missing, and 5 were remanded to another prison. P3213 (List of persons detained at Batković camp).

²⁰⁸⁷ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 12–13. These exchanges continued, and for example in July 1993, 400 men from Batković were taken by bus to Lopare municipality and exchanged for Bosnian Serb civilians. **So, the Muslims got their combatants for the Serb civilians!!!** P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 180; P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 7 (under seal); P107 (Transcript from KDZ044’s testimony), T. 492 (under seal). Following his appointment as commander of the camp in August 1994, Čekić with the agreement of the Corps Command released 50 older detainees. D3236 (Witness statement of Gojko Čekić dated 31 March 2013), para. 19; Gojko Čekić, T. 36508–36509 (3 April 2013); Gojko Čekić, T. 36528–36529 (4 April 2013). For evidence on exchange of detainees in 1995, see P5440 (RS Ministry of Defence list of persons exchanged from the Batković Collection Centre, 13 March 2002), pp. 1–9; D2052 (Statement of KDZ333 to State Commission on Gathering Facts on War Crimes, 20 July 1996), p. 6 (under seal).

²⁰⁸⁸ D2052 (Statement of KDZ333 to State Commission on Gathering Facts on War Crimes, 20 July 1996), p. 5 (under seal); KDZ333, T. 24162–24163 (2 February 2012).

²⁰⁸⁹ D3236 (Witness statement of Gojko Čekić dated 31 March 2013), paras. 13, 21; Gojko Čekić, T. 36504–36505, 36508–36509 (3 April 2013); D3244 (Drina Corps combat report, 26 July 1995), p. 2; P3213 (List of persons detained at Batković Camp), e-court pp. 9, 11, 25, 40, 47, 52, 78, 84, 92, 106, 131, 133, 149, 157, 168, 170, 175, 184, 188, 191, 193. See also para. 5131.

But, this is the most flagrant mockery of justice and even decency. To put this finding in this Judgement on the basis of 92bis testimony in another case, and the AF from the same case, while a competent witness (Gojko Cekic) testified that there were no children or elderly. Still, the AF and 92 bis survived. If so, then the Justice died.

The entire chapter is based on many Adjudicated facts, and many 92bis Rule evidence, i.e. those witnesses hadn't been cross examined by this Defence.

No official documents as evidence!

1. Conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

649. The detainees in Batković were forced to sleep on their sides on the concrete floor where they “were packed into the hangar like sardines”.²⁰⁹⁰ Initially two detainees would share a single military mattress but subsequently these mattresses were taken away and the detainees had to sleep on straw and hay.^{2091 (2091)} **It wasn't “taken away” but there was more and more POW-s. Beside that, the ICRC was free to obtain the mattresses. But, anyway, what it has to do with the President to charge him for technicalities hat depended on the situation of a general shortage of everything# Distortion, not “taken away”#?**

650. The detainees were forbidden from sitting with their legs crossed, and were required to seek permission before using the toilet or getting water.²⁰⁹² They had a makeshift toilet which was a 10 metre long dug-up hole which they could use during the day but not at night.²⁰⁹³ They were also required to seek permission before addressing the guards by making the three fingered Serb sign, bowing their heads to the ground, and saying “Sir Serb soldier let me address you”.²⁰⁹⁴ When detainees walked they had to have their hands behind their back and keep their heads bowed.^{2095 (2095)}

651. Sanitary conditions at Batković camp were poor and detainees were given little food.²⁰⁹⁶ The detainees received a slice of bread for breakfast, had some cooked food at lunch and boiled corn flour for dinner.²⁰⁹⁷ Given the lack of food, detainees sold valuables

²⁰⁹⁰ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 11. **92bis Rule, Not cross examined!**

²⁰⁹¹ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 159. *See also* D3238 (Report of Batković Collection Centre, 11 January 1996). The Chamber does not place weight on this report which reflects the number of blankets in the camp when the facility was closed in 1996, thus falling outside the time frame of the allegations in the Indictment with respect to the Batković camp.

²⁰⁹² P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 11. **92bis Rule, Not cross examined!**

²⁰⁹³ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 159.

²⁰⁹⁴ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 11. **92bis Rule, Not cross examined!**

²⁰⁹⁵ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 11.

²⁰⁹⁶ *See* Adjudicated Fact 2254. The conditions in Batković while similar to Manjača, were “somewhat better” with less beatings, fewer people called out at night and better access to water. Asim Egrlić, P3570 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4797 (under seal). *See also* D2052 (Statement of KDZ333 to State Commission on Gathering Facts on War Crimes, 20 July 1996), p. 5 (under seal). Čekić disputed this adjudicated fact and testified that the food received by the detainees was the same as the VRS soldiers and they all had three meals a day and that the detainees had several showers and toilets. D3236 (Witness statement of Gojko Čekić dated 31 March 2013), para. 23. The Chamber does not consider that this evidence is of much weight given that Čekić was commander of the camp only from August 1994. The Chamber also found that Čekić's evidence was marked by indicators of evasiveness and did not consider his evidence to be reliable in this regard. **This is the way to easlily discredit all the Defence witnesses, without a reason. Why Mr. Cekic would be evasive, he was never suspected of anything/ #Defense witnesses “evasive”#!).**

²⁰⁹⁷ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 159. While Adjudicated Fact 2254 suggests that detainees were given little water, the Chamber accepts that in light of the evidence of Osmanović and that of Egrlić, detainees did have access to water. P3570 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4797 (under seal). **Then, why other assertions of the same witnesses who lied had been valued as credible?**

to soldiers “for just a few loaves of bread”.²⁰⁹⁸ Some detainees experienced extreme weight loss during their detention while four or five older prisoners died of starvation or exhaustion.²⁰⁹⁹ **#92bis Rule, Not cross examined!**

652. Bosnian Serb soldiers who came to the area were given access to the camp and allowed to enter the hangar whenever they wanted to beat the detainees.²¹⁰⁰ If a Bosnian Serb soldier was killed on the frontline, the soldiers would take revenge on the detainees.²¹⁰¹ The soldiers forced some of the detainees to hit each other, beat all of them randomly with different objects, and ordered them to kneel with their heads bowed and hands behind their backs.²¹⁰² After 30 June 1992, there were daily beatings until the first visit of the ICRC in August 1992.²¹⁰³ The beatings of the detainees increased to five or six times a day after two detainees escaped²¹⁰⁴ and when a detainee who escaped was returned he was beaten.²¹⁰⁵

653. There were approximately ten detainees accused by the guards of being “extremists” or “Alija’s specialists” who were subjected to daily beatings and additional mistreatment and some of these detainees died from these beatings.²¹⁰⁶ The detainees in this group were beaten at least three times a day, forced to beat each other, knocked over by fire hoses, and forced to have sexual intercourse with each other, often in front of other detainees.²¹⁰⁷ The guards were aware of these actions but did nothing but laugh.²¹⁰⁸ **It the guards “were aware of these actions, but did nothing but lough” who forced the detainees to beat**

²⁰⁹⁸ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 12. **#92bis Rule, Not cross examined!**

²⁰⁹⁹ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 12; P84 (Witness statement of Mirsad Kuralić dated 27 June 1996), p. 8; P74 (Supplemental information sheet for Mirsad Kuralić), pp. 2–3. **#92bis Rule, Not cross examined!**

²¹⁰⁰ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), **#92bis Rule, Not cross examined!** T. 874; P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), pp. 11–12. These soldiers wore grey, olive green camouflage uniforms and some had the insignia of the SerBiH. The Chamber notes that KDZ333 who only arrived at Batković in July 1995 testified he was not maltreated when interrogated during his detention. D2052 (Statement of KDZ333 to State Commission on Gathering Facts on War Crimes, 20 July 1996), p. 5 (under seal).

²¹⁰¹ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), pp. 11–12.

²¹⁰² P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), pp. 11–12 (testifying that a soldier from around Gorazde known as “Gligor” was responsible for most of the beatings). Guards at Batković camp who carried out beatings at Batković included Veselin Nikolić, Zoran Zarić, a person identified as “Major” from the Semberija company, Panić from Sarajevo and Gligor from Gorazde. P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 163–164. Osmanović also identified four individuals who were singled out for beating, including one person who was accused of making knives used to kill Serbs. Ibro Osmanović, T. 17942 (25 August 2011). Other individuals who beat detainees in the hangar included Daco, Fikret Piklić from Brezovo Polje, and Džemal called “Pajzer” from Zenica. P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), pp. 11–12.

²¹⁰³ P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 6 (under seal); KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044’s testimony), T. 491–492 (under seal). [REDACTED]. See also Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 874–875 (testifying that treatment of the detainees improved slightly and the beatings occurred less frequently after the commander of the camp was replaced).

²¹⁰⁴ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 11.

²¹⁰⁵ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 86, 119.

²¹⁰⁶ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 12; Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 873; P84 (Witness statement of Mirsad Kuralić dated 27 June 1996), p. 8; Mirsad Kuralić, P74 (Supplemental information sheet), p. 2; Mirsad Kuralić, P63 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 12569, 12571–12572 (under seal); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 171. See also Adjudicated Fact 2256.

²¹⁰⁷ P84 (Witness statement of Mirsad Kuralić dated 27 June 1996), p. 8. See also Adjudicated Fact 2256. Čekić disputed Adjudicated Fact 2256 and suggested that nobody beat the detainees or forced them to engage in degrading sexual acts and that the guards at the facility were “family men” or older people who would never do such things. Čekić also testified about the conditions in the camp and the absence of mistreatment of detainees in 1994. D3236 (Witness statement of Gojko Čekić dated 31 March 2013), paras. 4–5, 8–9, 11–12, 15–16, 20, 25. The Chamber does not find this evidence to be credible. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber noted that Čekić was commander of the camp only from August 1994 and that when confronted with evidence of abuse and poor conditions in 1992, Čekić stated that he was not at the centre at the time and was not aware of it. The Chamber also noted that Čekić had an interest in minimising his involvement in any mistreatment of detainees. **Why, since nobody suspected him? #Evasive#** See Gojko Čekić, T. 36490–36491, 36493–36495, 36503, 36511–36512 (3 April 2013). The Chamber also found that Čekić’s evidence was marked by indicators of evasiveness and did not consider his evidence to be reliable in this regard. The Chamber also does not find Čekić’s evidence that many detainees “discretely asked not to be exchanged” as they were safer in the camp than in their own territory where they would be mobilised and sent to the frontline to be credible. See D3236 (Witness statement of Gojko Čekić dated 31 March 2013), para. 20.

²¹⁰⁸ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 173.

each other and to have the sexual acts? The detainees each other? Some detainees suffered lasting harm which was both physical and psychological including post traumatic stress disorder.²¹⁰⁹ **What the President has to do with it since he facilitated unhindered access to the ICRC. Stil, the letter of the UNHCR sent 16 Sept. 1993 never reached the Accused, since he was settling down the military coup in BL. But beside that, this kind of letters is not trustworthy, because it is founded on the statements of a notorious members of the ABIH, and is nothing but “hear-say” in spite of that, the President replaced many officials throughout BH due to such reports.**

654. Even though there was a doctor at the camp, the detainees in the Batković camp, including those who had heart attacks, were not provided with medical treatment or were refused medication and, as a result, a number of detainees died.²¹¹⁰ When a detainee complained of toothache, the doctor threatened to call the soldiers to pull out the tooth.²¹¹¹ **92bis Evidence. Highly unbelievable, particularly since the Batkovic Camp was # under the ICRC supervision all the time#! No such a reports in the ICRC reportings#!**

655. The police would take away detainees for work at factories while VRS soldiers took the detainees away for labour on the frontlines.²¹¹² Detainees at Batković were forced to perform manual labour daily, including digging trenches, clearing mines and carrying munitions at the frontline, and burying bodies.²¹¹³ While compelled to dig trenches on the frontline the detainees were forced to sing Serb national songs and bury the dead.²¹¹⁴ On two occasions, the detainees worked on the frontlines when combat was ongoing. In one incident, a man named Ahmed Pašić was killed and, in December 1992, two detainees were wounded and two others were killed.²¹¹⁵ The detainees were forced to work in all weather conditions, including in extreme heat, which affected their health.²¹¹⁶ They were not allowed to refuse to work at Batković.²¹¹⁷ An order of the commander of the Batković

²¹⁰⁹ P84 (Witness statement of Mirsad Kuralić dated 27 June 1996), pp. 9–10; Mirsad Kuralić, P63 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 12578–12579 (under seal). See also P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 13. Referred to in Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, p. 4.

²¹¹⁰ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), pp. 11–12; Mirsad Kuralić, P63 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 12578 (testifying that he received no treatment for his wounds and had to use salt or his own clothes as bandages).

²¹¹¹ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), pp. 11–12.

²¹¹² P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 178.

²¹¹³ See Adjudicated Fact 2257; P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 12; Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 875–876, 889; P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 175; P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 6 (under seal); P107 (Transcript from KDZ044’s testimony), T. 491–492 (under seal); P5421 (Letter from humanitarian organisation to Radovan Karadžić, 16 September 1993), p. 2 (under seal); D2052 (Statement of KDZ333 to State Commission on Gathering Facts on War Crimes, 20 July 1996), p. 5 (under seal); Mirsad Kuralić, P74 (Supplemental information sheet), p. 3; P5483 (ICRC press release, 30 August 1994). Čekić testified that detainees were not forced to dig trenches, carry munitions to the frontlines or bury dead bodies and that detainees only buried three other prisoners of war in a Muslim graveyard. In addition Čekić testified that detainees were selected for work according to their skills and “their wishes were also respected” and that the detainees had a “huge interest” in going to work as they were freer, had more food, tobacco and drinks. D3236 (Witness statement of Gojko Čekić dated 31 March 2013), paras. 20, 24; Gojko Čekić, T. 36495, 36499 (3 April 2013). The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 2096 in assessing Čekić’s evidence.

²¹¹⁴ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 875–876, 889; P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 175.

²¹¹⁵ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 175.

²¹¹⁶ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), pp. 11–12; Mirsad Kuralić, P63 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 12578. **92bis, not cross examined, not corroborated by any objective evidence!**

²¹¹⁷ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 176. But see KDZ603, T. 18166–18167 (1 September 2011) who testified that men were asked, not ordered, to work and that these men usually returned well-fed and bringing food for the others in the camp. The Chamber does not consider that it can rely on KDZ603’s evidence in this regard given that he never left the facility himself for the purposes of work in contrast to other witnesses, including Osmanović, who were personally forced to work. **The manner in which the Chamber infer is erroneous. #KDZ603 had seen many, many inmates returning from the voluntary job, and if there was a single one forced, his testimony would be different. As a matter of fact,**

camp implicitly acknowledged the practice of forced labour by outlining the procedure for guarding detainees who were “performing forced labour”.²¹¹⁸

656. The ICRC received information about the detainees at the facility from the POW exchange commission of the Eastern Bosnia Corps and this information was also relayed on a daily basis to the Main Staff level.²¹¹⁹ **Exactly, and for that reason it has nothing to do with the President. It is difficult to understand that a serious Chamber would take into account statements of the inmates that are #interested to denigrate the Serbs#, instead of obtaining the data about deceased or killed by the ICRC!# Biased witnesses!#)**

2. Conclusion on conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

657. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from multiple locations were brought to and detained at Batković camp from June 1992 until 1995 by Serb Forces. The detainees were held in poor conditions which included lack of space, inadequate bedding, poor sanitary conditions, lack of food, and inadequate medical care. Detainees were subjected to regular beatings, sexual mistreatment and were #forced to work at a number of locations in extreme conditions including on the frontlines digging trenches and clearing mines.# The Chamber finds that some detainees died as a result of starvation, exhaustion or while working on the frontlines.²¹²⁰ **Who, and for what reason???? Why the Chamber, on what basis skips the names of Muslims and Croats that died, calling them just “detainees” captured by the Bosnian Serb Forces, when the Batkovic was recognized as the camp for the POW, not of the Muslims and Croats. There were many others, like Albanians, Hungarians, mercenaries**

But the crucial question for the Defence is: whether the Prosecution proved, or the Chamber found by itself, that the Republika Srpska authorities could have obtained more food, more mattresses and blankets. Without establishing this fact, no objections, let alone accusation and charge should be mentioned. And the OTP never proved that the RS could have done it better.

The most erroneous was to deliberate on the basis of so many Adjudicated facts and 92 bis evidence, which couldn’t be tested in the cross examination. Those statements had been given by the adversaries, who were motivated to distort the facts. This error is more drastic particularly since the ICRC had regularly visited Batkovic, and the Chamber didn’t establish it’s finding on these official reports.

KDZ603 was in a better position to see than others. Why the testimony of KDZ603 wasn’t compared to testimony of G. Cekic? Would then it be reliable#?

²¹¹⁸ P2891 (Instructions of the Eastern Bosnia Corps, 2 July 1992), p. 2.

²¹¹⁹ Milenko Todorović, D4124 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*), T. 12959–12961.

²¹²⁰ This finding does not include the persons alleged to have been killed in Scheduled Incident B.2.1 which is discussed below.

3. Scheduled Incident B.2.1 15 – 16 JAN.

658. The Prosecution alleges that at least six men were killed in the Batković camp between June 1992 and June 1995.

659. A detainee known as “professor” was taken out one night by 10 guards, beaten through the night, and found dead the next day.²¹²¹ Executions were also carried out at the camp, with intellectuals and SDA leaders specifically targeted²¹²² and the bodies of detainees were removed from the hangar wrapped in blankets.²¹²³ **All based on un-checkable “hear-say”** Pašić saw two elderly men killed at the camp following beatings.²¹²⁴ **#92bis Rule, Not cross examined!** Of the two elderly men, one was Zulfo Hadžiomerović,²¹²⁵ a 70 year old man accused of having a “U” tattooed under his arm; **(Although this alleged death is not proven by any objective evidence, there should be explained what was the meaning of the tattooed “U” on the arm. The “U” was the most horrifying insignia of “Ustasha” movement, a Hitler’s ally in Croatia, which killed about 1 million Serbs)** he was beaten on many occasions and in early July 1992 died as a result of a beating.²¹²⁶ **(If he was beaten “on many occasions” the only reasonable inference would be that there was no intent to kill him, and we do not see any evidence that his death was “a result of beating”).** Gligor and “Major” had started the beating and Veselin Nikolić and some police from Zenica joined and once Hadžiomerović died, other detainees were ordered to take the body out and load it onto a military truck.²¹²⁷ His body was covered with bruises, but men wearing doctors’ insignia in JNA uniforms arrived about an hour later and pronounced that he had died of natural causes.²¹²⁸ Two other men, including a jeweller named “Husein” and Ferid Zečević also died on or about the same day.²¹²⁹ While Osmanović did not see the beatings, Husein and

²¹²¹ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 873; P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 12. **#92bis Rule, Not cross examined! Invalid and imprecise, no name, a nickname “professor” doesn’t enable any checking!**

²¹²² P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), pp. 11–12 (under seal) (testifying that he heard that Ferid Zečević and Muhamed Čurtić were killed at Batković and that a guard named Ljubiša Mišić was rumoured to have been one of the worst killers in the camp but was still rewarded by the SDS). See also P4850 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), para. 54.

²¹²³ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 12; Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 873; see Adjudicated Fact 2260. See also P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 73. KDZ044 also saw detainees who died two or three days after being beaten. P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 7 (under seal). Čekić testified that when he was commander of the camp from August 1994, he heard about the death of only two detainees at the camp and this involved two detainees who returned from work drunk and attacked a guard who shot them in “self-defence” and that there was an investigation into this incident. D3236 (Witness statement of Gojko Čekić dated 31 March 2013), para. 18; Gojko Čekić, T. 36524–36525 (4 April 2013). The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber recalls its credibility assessment in fn. 2096 in assessing Čekić’s evidence. In addition it was not clear whether Čekić was able to speak about killings which occurred before he was commander of the camp.

²¹²⁴ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 873; P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 12. **#92bis Rule, Not cross examined!**

²¹²⁵ See Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix G. **This is not evidence!**

²¹²⁶ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 165–166. On one occasion one of the detainees was forced to beat Hadžiomerović.

²¹²⁷ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 166–167.

²¹²⁸ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 167.

²¹²⁹ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 168; P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), pp. 11–12 (under seal). The body of Ferid Zečević was exhumed from a grave in 2005. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 73. Davidović knew that Zečević and Husein Apaka were taken to the Batković camp and never returned and thought they were killed there. **This is not the only inference, and not even likely to be true. To where they “never returned”? Couldn’t they be released, or exchanged, joining their Army, and got killed in combats? “Thought they were killed there” relies only on the fact they had been killed, as if they couldn’t be killed elsewhere in a fierce civil war!** P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 153. KDZ531 was also told about the killing of Muhamed Čurtić who was nicknamed Hapaka at Batković. **The witness didn’t see it, but he was**

Zečević had been beaten at the army barracks before their arrival at Batković and he saw both bodies placed outside and put onto a truck.²¹³⁰ **But none of them saw the very act of killing!!!**

660. Pašić also testified about the shooting of one detainee.²¹³¹ With respect to this shooting, in the late summer 1992, there was an investigation into the death of Muhamed Čudić but no one was charged.²¹³²

661. The Chamber therefore finds that at least six Bosnian Muslim men were killed by Serb Forces at the Batković camp between June 1992 and June 1995. **As in the whole Bijeljina case, the Chamber has nothing more than the testimonies and adjudicated facts collected in other cases, or in lately disclosed statements of a protected witnesses. Nothing objective. A several witnesses of Muslim provenance, obviously extremists that had been captured early in the war, had a motiv to lie. WHAT ALL OF THIS HAS TO DO WITH THE PRESIDENT? HE ISSUED ALL NECESSARY ORDERS AND FACILITATED THE ICRC REGULAR VISITS.**

(5)ICRC Visits

662. The ICRC first visited the Batković camp in August or September 1992, registered the detainees, and issued them with identity cards.²¹³³ Before the ICRC visits, all children, the elderly and those that had been beaten badly, including the group of ten men who had been targeted for additional beating and mistreatment, were taken away and hidden in other locations.²¹³⁴ **That was not possible at all, because the ICRC could visit the Camp any time, without any notification in advance. All the witnesses involved in this matter were motivated to lie! Not clear how a serious Chamber so easily accept this kind of forgery, particularly since it got the evidence to contrary, see footnote 2084, also P3213 (List of persons detained at Batković camp); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 155 (testifying that there were only two women at the camp, and some children who did not want to be separated from their fathers). So, even a Muslim witness confirmed only “two women” and some children who didn’t want to separate from fathers!** These detainees were similarly hidden during the visits of journalists.²¹³⁵ In order to cover for the absence of detainees who had been

“told by a reliable source!” P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011) (under seal), p. 11. The Prosecution notes that the man identified as Muhamed Curtić by KDZ531 and as Husein by Osmanović to be the same individual. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix G.

²¹³⁰ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 168.

²¹³¹ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 873.

²¹³² P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011) (under seal), p. 11. KDZ531 also testified about killings not linked to the Batković camp and the failure to charge anyone for these incidents: P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 12 (under seal). However, given that these incidents relate to unscheduled detention facilities the Chamber will not make any findings in that regard.

²¹³³ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 179; P81 (ICRC identification document of Sakib Husefović). See also Bogdan Subotić, T. 40178 (21 June 2013); D3242 (VRS Main Staff instructions, 1 December 1995); Gojko Čekić, T. 36519–36520 (4 April 2013); Adjudicated Fact 2258.

²¹³⁴ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 877; P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 179; P84 (Witness statement of Mirsad Kuralić dated 27 June 1996), p. 8; Mirsad Kuralić, P74 (Supplemental information sheet), p. 2 (Mirsad Kuralić was not a civilian as he had been drafted into the AbiH in April 1992 and was on the frontlines when captured); Mirsad Kuralić, P63 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 12572–12573; KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 86–87, 120, 157–158. See also Adjudicated Fact 2258.

²¹³⁵ Mirsad Kuralić, P63 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 12572–12573.

hidden and the detainees who had been killed, other people including guards or police were substituted in their place.²¹³⁶

662. The detainees were also instructed to lie and tell the ICRC representatives that conditions were fine, that food was good, that they were provided with cigarettes, and had not been beaten.²¹³⁷ **(This couldn't be true, since the ICRC interviewed the detainees without presence of the guards and officials!)** Anyone who did not say what they were instructed to say was beaten severely.²¹³⁸ While the ICRC provided the detainees with supplies, such as blankets, soap, shoes, gloves and cigarettes, the soldiers would take anything they wanted once the ICRC left the camp.²¹³⁹ However, the conditions at Batković did improve after the ICRC began to visit the facility.²¹⁴⁰ The ICRC was given access to and visited Batković camp until late 1995.²¹⁴¹

663. The Batković facility was disbanded in early 1996.²¹⁴²

ii. Scheduled Incident D.2

664. The Indictment refers to the destruction of three mosques in Bijeljina in the summer of 1992.²¹⁴³ (2143)

665. [REDACTED] Riedlmayer reported that the Atmačići mosque was almost destroyed.²¹⁴⁴ The Janjari mosque was lightly damaged and vandalised with graffiti with the initials of the SRS written on the walls in Cyrillic.²¹⁴⁵ The Srendja Trnova mosque was completely destroyed.²¹⁴⁶ There was evidence of blast damage to two of the mosques and the adjacent buildings to all three mosques were in good condition.²¹⁴⁷ While the Chamber relies on Riedlmayer for the purposes of finding that the mosques were destroyed, and the nature and extent of the damage to the mosques and surrounding buildings, it does not rely on his evidence as to when and who was responsible for the destruction of the mosques which fall

²¹³⁶ Mirsad Kuralić, P63 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 12572–12573; P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 12 (under seal) [REDACTED]; P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 179.

²¹³⁷ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 878, 890. Čekić testified that the ICRC maintained lists of detainees who only complained about the lack of showers and toilets after which the ICRC provided the material for extra showers and toilets were built at Batković. D3236 (Witness statement of Gojko Čekić dated 31 March 2013), para. 11; Gojko Čekić, T. 36491–36492, 36497–36498, 36503 (3 April 2013); P6258 (Report of facilities handed over by Batković Collection Centre, 5 January 1996). The Chamber does not find this evidence to be conclusive as to the actual conditions at Batković, given the credible evidence about the hiding of detainees and detainees being instructed to not complain about conditions. **But what are corroborating evidence to those statement given somewhere else, not in this process? They are liars because they hate the Serbs, and there is no a single objective evidence to support this. Further, those statements and testimonies had been given in the cases where the accuseds neither knew about it, nor were interested in opposing it. This must be removed from this case, or those witnesses would have to be cross-examined.**

²¹³⁸ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 878, 890.

²¹³⁹ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 12.

²¹⁴⁰ See Adjudicated Fact 2259.

²¹⁴¹ Bogdan Subotić, T. 40178 (21 June 2013); D3242 (VRS Main Staff instructions, 1 December 1995); Gojko Čekić, T. 36519–36520 (4 April 2013).

²¹⁴² See para. 5502.

²¹⁴³ Specifically, the mosques are the Atmačići mosque, the Janjari mosque, and the Srednja Trnova mosque.

²¹⁴⁴ P4069 (Cultural destruction database), record 39; P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled “Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH” prepared for the Karadžić case, formatted records), pp. 11–17. See also KDZ531, T. 15857 (1 July 2011) (closed session) (testifying that he heard that the three mosques listed in Schedule D.2 were also destroyed).

²¹⁴⁵ P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled “Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH” prepared for the Karadžić case, formatted records), pp. 11–17; P4069 (Cultural destruction database), record 40.

²¹⁴⁶ P4069 (Cultural destruction database), record 42.

²¹⁴⁷ P4069 (Cultural destruction database), records 39, 41–42.

outside his expertise and are based on informant statements which he received.²¹⁴⁸ Riedlmayer also reported on damage to other cultural monuments and sacred sites in Bijeljina,²¹⁴⁹ but given that these sites are not alleged in Schedule D of the Indictment, the Chamber will not make findings in this regard. **Thanks God, a bit of law! However, Riedlmayer should ask some others in addition to the Islamic Community, like a state investigative organs, and the Serb communities! A destruction of cultural heritage and religious buildings is highly expected in an inter-religious civil war, but the question of villains remains un-answered! It can not and must not be allocated to such a people like the Accused, who ordered ban on this activity!**

666. While KDZ531 testified that the destruction of the mosques was a “clear signal to non-Serbs” that they should leave Bijeljina, the Chamber considers this to be the witness’s speculation and will not rely on his opinion in this regard.²¹⁵⁰ KDZ531 also stated that in the summer of 1992, the Department of Urbanism and Construction supervised the destruction of religious and cultural monuments in Bijeljina which was carried out by the engineering group of the 1st Krajina Corps.²¹⁵¹ He also stated that the rubble from destroyed religious and cultural monuments was removed with the assistance of Bosnian Muslims on work detail who were required to perform this work.²¹⁵² During his testimony, KDZ531 confirmed that he heard that the Atmačići mosque, the Janjari mosque, and the Srednja Trnova mosque had been destroyed.²¹⁵³ However, when questioned about how he knew that the mosques were destroyed by the engineering group of the 1st Krajina Corps, he qualified his statement and testified that his knowledge about who destroyed the mosques was based on unattributed hearsay and what he heard people and soldiers talking about as he had no direct knowledge about this issue.²¹⁵⁴ Having regard to the way in which KDZ531 qualified his evidence, the Chamber is not satisfied that it can rely on his evidence to establish who destroyed the mosques charged in the Indictment.

667. Therefore, based on its review of the evidence, while the Chamber finds that the Atmačići, Janjari, and Srednja Trnova mosques were destroyed, it does not have sufficient evidence to identify, beyond reasonable doubt, who destroyed those mosques. **This is a piece of law, that misses in many other deliberations. Who, why, when, how, beyond reasonable doubt, and finally, what does it have to do with President Karadzic?** The Chamber is not satisfied that the evidence presented by the Prosecution with respect to Bijeljina is sufficient to allow for an inference to be drawn that Serb Forces destroyed these

²¹⁴⁸ P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of Andrés J. Riedlmayer, entitled “Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH” prepared for the Karadžić case, formatted records), pp. 11–17. Riedlmayer’s report, which is based on his visits to the sites in 2002 and on information he received from the Islamic Community of BiH and other sources, identifies the following mosques and the level of damage: Atmačići mosque (almost destroyed), Janjari mosque (lightly damaged), and Srednja Trnova mosque (completely destroyed). P4069 (Cultural destruction database), records 39, 41–42.

²¹⁴⁹ P4069 (Cultural destruction database), records 28–40; P4068 (Andrés Riedlmayer’s expert report on Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1992–1995, 7 May 2009), para. 55. KDZ531 also testified about the destruction of other religious and cultural sites. P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 12 (under seal); KDZ531, T. 15857 (1 July 2011) (closed session). However, the Chamber will not make findings with respect to these unscheduled sites.

²¹⁵⁰ See P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 12 (under seal); KDZ531, T. 15857 (1 July 2011) (closed session).

²¹⁵¹ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 12 (under seal); KDZ531, T. 15858 (1 July 2011) (closed session). See also Milorad Davidović, T. 15486 (28 June 2011) (testifying that the mosque in Bijeljina was destroyed in the second half of 1993). The Chamber notes that Davidović does not identify who destroyed the mosque and his evidence does not appear to be linked to the specific mosques charged in the Indictment. In the Accused’s submission in light of the presence of paramilitaries and the chaos in the municipality there is no evidence that the mosques in Schedule D.2 were destroyed by either the local authorities or the VRS. Defence Final Brief, para. 1393.

²¹⁵² P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 12 (under seal). KDZ531 also stated that the Catholic church was “spared, apparently at the intervention of the orthodox Bishop from Tuzla”. KDZ531, T. 15857 (1 July 2011) (closed session).

²¹⁵³ KDZ531, T. 15857–15858 (1 July 2011) (closed session).

²¹⁵⁴ KDZ531, T. 15858 (1 July 2011) (closed session).

three mosques. (The same should be applied to all the cases of destruction of the cultural, religious, national heritage facilities. The Serb side never accused the leadership of the two other sides for destruction of the churches in their areas of control. Some of those monuments were ancient Serb monasteries from 14th, 15th and 16th centuries. There was no evidence that the Muslim/Croat leadership participated in this destruction, and it was easy to understand that perpetrators on all sides are of a very low social stratum. And certainly this wasn't in the interest of the side in control of a respective territory. In such a civil war within the "Armed nation" as Tito created, many more things happen out of any control than under control. It is illustrative how the Serb police spent the most time of questioning the arrested "Yellow Wasps" members about who and why destroyed the Mosque in Zvornik, see T.17496, and T.17532-33, closed sessions. See also the Accused's order to protect the Banjaluka mosques after the first explosion, see D106, of 11 May 1993:

I HEREBY ORDER

that all places of worship in the town and its surroundings shall be secured and protected from increased terrorist activity by means of reinforced Banja Luka Security Services Centre patrols.

Execute this order immediately and report the measures undertaken to me.

TO:

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

1. Republika Srpska Ministry of the Interior

2. Banja Luka Security Services Centre

Dr Radovan KARADŽIĆ

3. Archives

/signed/

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iv. Movement of the population from Bijeljina

668. As found above,²¹⁵⁵ in 1992 many Bosnian Muslims left Bijeljina out of fear²¹⁵⁶ while others were expelled.²¹⁵⁷ The media coverage and Bosnian Serb propaganda at the time also contributed to the fear among the Bosnian Muslim population.²¹⁵⁸ Mauzer in an interview stated that the Bosnian Muslims who had fled Bijeljina "will not come back and I would advise them not to".²¹⁵⁹

²¹⁵⁵ See para. 630.

²¹⁵⁶ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), pp. 4, 8–9 (under seal).

²¹⁵⁷ Milorad Davidović, T. 15528–15529 (28 June 2011); P2884 (Article from List SAO Semberije i Majevice entitled "Semberija Lost for Alija's Islamic State", 15 June 1992), p. 1; Živan Filipović, T. 35811 (21 March 2013). The Chamber finds that some Bosnian Serbs also left the municipality at the beginning of April 1992 out of fear but returned when Bosnian Serb authorities took measures to stabilise the security situation. **Some Muslims also returned on an invitation of this Accused, but it appear to be too early, premature, and some of them returned with an ambition to fight. All proven, with evidence in the file!!!** D3089 (Witness statement of Milivoje Kićanović dated 3 March 2013), para. 13; Milivoje Kićanović, T. 34882 (6 March 2013); D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), paras. 5, 7. See also KDZ240, T. 16057, 16080, 16081–16082 (5 July 2011) (closed session); KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 6754 (under seal); Colm Doyle, T. 2932 (28 May 2010); P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), paras. 94–95; John Wilson, T. 3968–3969 (21 June 2010) (who received reports of "ethnic cleansing" in Eastern Bosnia from late March through April 1992 which mentioned the involvement of the JNA in providing perimeter security while paramilitaries would enter settlements "commit demonstration killings and rapes as examples to villages that they would meet the same fate unless they left the area").

²¹⁵⁸ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 161; Milorad Davidović, T. 15527–15528 (28 June 2011).

²¹⁵⁹ P2884 (Article from List SAO Semberije i Majevice entitled "Semberija Lost for Alija's Islamic State", 15 June 1992), p. 3.

669. By August 1992, there were approximately 17,000 Bosnian Muslims who remained in Bijeljina and 12,000 in Janja.²¹⁶⁰ Davidović testified that he was present when five days after his arrival in Bijeljina a plan was discussed “for the ethnic cleansing” of Bosnian Muslims who remained in municipalities, including Bijeljina and Zvornik.²¹⁶¹ **This is an obvious lie. At that time Zvornik as a municipality had been divided on two, the Muslim and Serb parts, and there was no any “cleansing” in Zvornik even as of the end of May 92. Many Muslims remained in Bijeljina to the end of war, the same is with Janja, a small town close to Bijeljina. Many predominantly Muslim settlements stayed untouched in the Republic of Srpska to the end of war, unlike the Serb settlements in the Muslim/Croat Federation. None of the Serb settlements, villages, hamlets survived till September 18992.** Davidović testified that this plan was discussed by Mauzer, other members of the SDS, and the Bijeljina Crisis Staff and he informed Mićo Stanišić about the plan.²¹⁶² **A Bijeljina Crisis Staff didn’t exist! Mauzer wasn’t important in any political sense, the top of the Bijeljina authorities is very known, and if Davidovic heard some bla-bla, this certainly wasn’t any relevant and official position.** According to Davidović, the plan consisted of three phases. In the first phase, scheduled to start in September or October 1992, there would be a division of the city **(this is nonsense!!! Bijeljina would be offered to make two ethnic municipalities as other had been offered, but it was so compactly dominant Serb municipality, that nobody ever mentioned this!)** and the creation of an atmosphere of fear to convince the Bosnian Muslims to leave.²¹⁶³ **This is an unacceptable “conclusion” of the witness. See KDZ340, testimony on T. 17499-17500: ?????? to find) about Zvornik and Bijeljina general and mutual fear of the Muslim and Serb population, and their reasons to leave. He mentioned Minister Mico Stanisic acted by forming a joint forces, including Davidovic himself, and the Special police brigade, with the 65th regiment from VRS, to arrest the said perpetrators. It is understandable that a witness may not have known what had been done, but the Chamber had alland every necessary evidence, and couldn’t be in dilemma!)** In the second phase, Bosnian Muslims who refused to respond to the call for mobilisation would be fired from their positions, and would have their services cut and would be required to report for work obligation including on the frontlines.²¹⁶⁴ In the third phase, wealthy and intellectual Bosnian Muslims were to be targeted for humiliation by assigning them to menial tasks such as sweeping the streets.²¹⁶⁵ **All uncorroborated with any evidence, and based of an “expert’s opinion” of a witness supposed to testify about facts. This court enabled false and fake testimonies without any consequence more than any other court.**

²¹⁶⁰ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 149–150.

²¹⁶¹ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 149–150, 156; Milorad Davidović, T. 15582 (29 June 2011); Adjudicated Fact 2261.

²¹⁶² P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 150; Milorad Davidović, T. 15582–15584 (29 June 2011). The Chamber observes that Davidović in a prior interview did deny specific knowledge about the killing of Bosnian Muslim families, but contrary to the Accused’s submission this does not undermine his evidence with respect to informing Mićo Stanišić about the plan to remove the Bosnian Muslim population from Bijeljina. **“Apples and oranges”! what any plan for removal has to do with a specific case of killing? Did he lie? He did!!!** See Defence Final Brief, para. 1116; Milorad Davidović, T. 15589 (29 June 2011); D1407 (Official note of BiH’s Prosecutor’s Office in Sarajevo, 14 January 2008), p. 2.

²¹⁶³ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 151. Davidović identified Drago Vuković who was a member of the Crisis Staff and Predrag Ješurić as being in charge of this phase of the plan. **Both of them his personal opponents, never suspected by anyone else!**

²¹⁶⁴ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 98, 153; D1450 (Milorad Davidović’s statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), p. 21. See also Adjudicated Fact 2264.

²¹⁶⁵ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 98, 153–154. See also Adjudicated Fact 2264.

670. Having reviewed the evidence, the Chamber finds that this three phase plan existed and was discussed by Bosnian Serb authorities in Bijeljina and in accordance with this plan, Duško Malović's special police unit, following the lead of Drago Vuković who was a member of the Bijeljina Crisis Staff, instilled fear in the Bosnian Muslims who remained in Bijeljina by September 1992.²¹⁶⁶ The Chamber also finds that in accordance with the second and third phase of the plan Bosnian Muslims, including prominent Muslims who did not comply with demands for mobilisation or work obligation, were sent to Batković camp or expelled from the municipality.²¹⁶⁷ The police knew about this and condoned it and did nothing to prevent people from being taken to Batković camp or to prevent expulsions.²¹⁶⁸ The simultaneous execution of the three phases of this SDS operation caused large numbers of Bosnian Muslims to flee Bijeljina out of fear.²¹⁶⁹ **Although Mr. Davidovic had been confronted in the Cross examination and rebutted concerning this subject, see T.15554 to 15591, the Chamber accepted his rebutted assertions. Although the witness admitted that he wasn't present in Bijeljina at that time, and he admitted that he kept drawing his conclusions which appeared to be arbitrary and fake. He also admitted that he was tasked by the RS leadership to arrest the war criminals of the Serb nationality: see T. 15646-37** *A. "Considering," is that what you mean, "that between April and September 1992, at the order of the leadership of Republika Srpska, I was involved in identifying and arresting war criminals who are Serbs, and disarming various Serbian paramilitary formations, as well as information that since 1992 I received frequent threats from the members of these groups, I conclude that this is provocation designed to compromise me as a character and as a member of the Federal MUP."*

But not only that: Mr. Davidovic admitted that he testified without knowing the majority of the Accused's documents aimed against any crime, including those in Bijeljina, and without being aware of the overall President efforts against crimes, and praised the Accused for that, see T.15677, or T. 1570, question and answer: *Q: "You are familiar with our political system. Does the president of the republic have other tools at his disposal except to suggest to the government and the Assembly certain measures that he believes should be taken? Can he do anything else apart from the MUP, et cetera?"*
A) No. No, nothing except what can be seen from these orders. These are your constitutional responsibilities and powers, as far as I know". Means that the President had done what he was supposed to do and could do. See: T15735: "I can see that you were -- your position was against that and you wanted people who were doing such things to be arrested. So I'm not contesting at any time the efforts that you were making in that

²¹⁶⁶ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 151–152. See also Adjudicated Fact 2264. The Chamber does not see any merit in the Accused's submission that because Vuković had to go through a very thorough clearance process before being appointed an adviser to the joint BiH presidency that this somehow undermines the evidence that he carried out expulsions of Bosnian Muslims. See Defence Final Brief, para. 1117; Milorad Davidović, T. 15591–15594 (29 June 2011). Fear was created by the killing of Bosnian Muslim families and looting of their homes. P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 151–152; Milorad Davidović, T. 15506–15507 (28 June 2011). While the Chamber received specific evidence about killings carried out by Malović's group, given that these are not scheduled killing incidents the Chamber will not make a finding with respect to these killings, but accepts this evidence for the purposes of concluding that an environment of fear was being created.

²¹⁶⁷ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 98, 153; Milorad Davidović, T. 15517 (28 June 2011); D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), p. 21. See also Adjudicated Fact 2264.

²¹⁶⁸ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 153.

²¹⁶⁹ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 160. See also Adjudicated Fact 2264. Defence witnesses disputed Adjudicated Fact 2264 and suggested that the SDS did not have such a plan nor had they heard of these things occurring in the municipality and that any problems Bosnian Muslims faced did not come from the authorities in Bijeljina which treated all citizens equally: D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), para. 42; D3089 (Witness statement of Milivoje Kićanović dated 3 March 2013), para. 27; D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), para. 21; D3141 (Witness statement of Dušan Spasojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 25. The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching this conclusion the Chamber concluded that the evidence of the relevant witnesses was marked by insincerity, evasiveness, the withholding of information, contradictions, and bias.

direction.” **And further, T. 15793: You just have to be decisive enough and professionally capable of doing it properly, if they had your support. And I see through all this they could have had your support, so they shouldn't have been afraid of possible consequences of such activities. If I had known of this support, I would have returned from Serbia to the MUP and I would have placed myself at your disposal, and you may be sure that you wouldn't be sitting here today.” There is no more blatant evidence that the witness didn't know the very basic facts while testifying. This confession of the witness sheds a completely new, different light on his testimony, and for that reason nothing from his testimony prior to his acquaintance with documents should be taken against the President!)**

671. The Bijeljina SDS also compiled a list of names of Bosnian Muslims to be expelled, including the wealthy, which was done with the help of Mauzer.²¹⁷⁰ **Once again, a witness politically opposed to SDS, and without sufficient knowledge!!! Mauzer was not as important in the political structure as Davidovic taught!** Dragomir Ljubojević, the President of the Municipal Assembly and SDS leader, was responsible for drawing up the lists and co-ordinating the expulsions.²¹⁷¹ **There can be nothing more false that this, since Mr. Ljubojevic was a very decent man!** Aided by Mauzer's unit, Vojkan Đurković who was an SDS field operative in Bijeljina as well as one of Arkan's men,²¹⁷² **(This is a blasphemy! Vojkan couldn't be in any connection with the SDS, but quite contrary. If he was in any party, that could have been Arkan's Party of Serbian Unity!** paid visits to those on the list in order to extort property from them.²¹⁷³ **Had it been so, Djurkovic**

²¹⁷⁰ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 70, 92, 150, 162, 206; Milorad Davidović, T. 15593–15594 (29 June 2011) (testifying that (i) he saw Bosnian Serb officials compile a list of Bosnian Muslim names for “cleansing”; (ii) that a list of wealthy Bosnian Muslims that were to be robbed and killed was found with Arkan's and Mauzer's men; and (iii) he intervened on a number of occasions to have people removed from the list, and while the Bosnian Serb leadership complied in most cases, sometimes they refused); P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), pp. 3, 6 (under seal); KDZ531, T. 15844–15845 (1 July 2011) (closed session). See also Adjudicated Facts 2261; 2262. **(Not even Arkan and Mauzer, but “Arkan's and Mauzer's men...” another word, some bumps and street-criminals. What kind of “Bosnian Serb officials”? no names, no date, no a single relevant fact. And what kind of “list” was it, since the witness could have seen it on streets with somebody pretending to be “Arkan's and Mauzer's men”? now we see how damaging was the late disclosure of the document of ECOMM, depicting the Muslim population delighted by Arkan! The Chamber shouldn't pay any attention to such a floccule, or should have demanded a clarification!)**

²¹⁷¹ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 6 (under seal); KDZ531, T. 15845 (1 July 2011) (closed session). Ljubojević disputed his involvement and denied that he ever planned or expelled Bosnian Muslims. Ljubojević also testified that he never received orders from the SDS leadership to expel non-Serbs from the municipality. He also testified that it was not in his zone of responsibility and that he was not present in the municipality because he was on sick leave. D3144 (Witness statement of Dragomir Ljubojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 11. However, the Chamber is not convinced that this evidence is reliable and finds that Ljubojević had a clear interest in distancing himself from the events in question. The Chamber noted that the witness was evasive in his testimony in this regard, which was marked by insincerity. His testimony is also contradicted by direct evidence that he was seen twice advocating the expulsion of Bosnian Muslims from Bijeljina. **[](Why would Mr. Ljubojevica respected man with good reputation, former president of the Bijeljina municipality, be “evasive” before this Chamber? And why he had never been even mentioned, let alone accused and indicted after the war?)**

²¹⁷² Dragomir Andan, T. 40869 (5 July 2013); Milorad Davidović, T. 15714–15716 (30 June 2011); Dragomir Ljubojević, T. 35897–35898 (22 March 2013). See also P2858 (Video footage of Radovan Karadžić and Arkan at award ceremony in Bijeljina with transcript) (Davidović identified Đurković in this video footage); Živan Filipović, T. 35799 (21 March 2013); D1136 (UNPROFOR report, 9 September 1994), para. 6. **(Why neither Vojkan, nor Arkan, nor Mauzer, had ever been indicted and sentenced after the war? Certainly, the BiH Court, being under the powerful influence of the internationals and the Muslim side, wouldn't miss such a “promissing” processes, if there was any punishable crimes to be charged!)**

²¹⁷³ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 70, 159. See also Adjudicated Fact 2262. Davidović testified that a portion of the extorted proceeds from Bijeljina was sent to the Accused and Krajišnik in Pale and Vojkan Đurković boasted about going to see the Accused and Krajišnik and giving them money. P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 70, 165; Milorad Davidović, T. 15725, 15730 (30 June 2011). However, the Chamber does not find that it can rely on this evidence in the absence of further corroboration given that Davidović in cross-examination acknowledged that Đurković was a person who liked to boast and he could not say how much truth there was in what he was saying and whether it was bragging or a lie. Milorad Davidović, T. 15728–15730 (30 June 2011). Đurković was also known as Puškar. Živan Filipović, T. 35799 (21 March 2013); Milivoje Kićanović, T. 34900 (6 March 2013).

would have been sued, at least after the war, by the court of BiH. Whenever there were some allegations against him, the Muslims named as his victims defended him, confessing that they wanted him to facilitate them to cross to the other side of the confrontation line! Anyway, this has nothing to do with the SDS! Đurković promised to take some Bosnian Muslims across the Drina for a fee while others who remained were “subjected to threats and intimidation.”²¹⁷⁴ In some cases the residents were given ten-minutes to leave after which they were loaded onto trucks.²¹⁷⁵ **Had it been so, the victims, allegedly expelled Muslims, would sue him after the war, wouldn’t they? The Chamber had nothing except the testimony of Davidović, and a few impressions of others! Anyway, what all of it has to do with the Accused? And why the Accused was limited by the Chamber and the Prosecution, to defend only himself, and not to compile a white book of everything that happened in this war? This wasn’t a proper position of the Chamber, particularly since the Chamber took these allegations against the Accused! 000**

672. Some Bosnian Muslims initially paid to be able to stay in Bijeljina.²¹⁷⁶ **Adjudicated fact!** From the beginning of April 1992 until the end of the war, Ješurić, along with his counterpart in the Serbian MUP Puzović, arranged for the daily transport of Bosnian Muslims through Serbia to a third country, and those Bosnian Muslims who wanted to leave **(now it appears that some Muslims “wanted to leave”!!! what the Defence was proving all the time. There was no any removal against a will of those who wanted to leave. Otherwise, who would force them to pay and to collect many documents that enabled them to leave?)** had to pay “exorbitant fees” to obtain the necessary travel documentation.²¹⁷⁷ Others were detained immediately, stripped of their valuables, and transferred to “no-man’s land” between the warring factions, where they remained, sometimes for days, before being able to cross into Muslim-controlled territory.²¹⁷⁸ **Uncorroborated by evidence. Had it been the case, there would be many processes against perpetrators after the war. The Accused would commend such a development, because he fought such crimes during the war.**

673. According to Defence witnesses, (i) there was no organised campaign for the expulsion of Bosnian Muslims from Bijeljina by the local authorities; (ii) Bosnian Muslims were not expelled and they voluntarily left combat areas and areas where Bosnian Muslims

²¹⁷⁴ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 70, 159–160, 165; Milorad Davidović, T. 15532–15533 (28 June 2011), 15724–15725 (30 June 2011); P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 5 (under seal); KDZ531, T. 15855 (1 July 2011) (closed session); P5421 (Letter from humanitarian organisation to Radovan Karadžić, 16 September 1993), p. 2 (under seal). See also Jeremy Bowen, T. 10100–10101 (13 January 2011); P2073 (BBC news report re Bijeljina, with transcript), pp. 1–2; Svetozar Mihajlović, T. 35738–35739 (20 March 2013); D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), para. 14.

²¹⁷⁵ Milorad Davidović, T. 15532–15533 (28 June 2011), T. 15594–15595 (29 June 2011), T. 15728 (30 June 2011); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 70, 160; P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 5 (under seal); P5421 (Letter from humanitarian organisation to Radovan Karadžić, 16 September 1993), p. 1 (under seal).

²¹⁷⁶ Adjudicated Fact 2262.

²¹⁷⁷ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 162–163; P2885 (Excerpt from video from TV BiH Studio Tuzla re expelled people from Semberija); D1450 (Milorad Davidović’s statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), p. 26; Milorad Davidović, T. 15533 (28 June 2011); P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), pp. 4–5 (under seal).

²¹⁷⁸ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 70, 160; Milorad Davidović, T. 15532–15533 (28 June 2011), 15724–15725 (30 June 2011); P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 5 (under seal); KDZ531, T. 15855 (1 July 2011) (closed session); P5421 (Letter from humanitarian organisation to Radovan Karadžić, 16 September 1993), p. 2 (under seal). **Those organisations could have written only what they had been said by the Muslim propaganda!** See also Adjudicated Facts 2261, 2262.

were no longer a majority; (iii) Bosnian Muslims who wanted to stay, could do so and worked normally throughout the war; (iv) Bosnian Muslims requested to leave the municipality because of a number of factors, including the increasing number of Bosnian Serb refugees in the municipality and the increasing ethnic polarisation; (v) there was no list of Bosnian Muslim names identified for expulsion; (vi) Đurković was never a member of the SDS and while he took Bosnian Muslims to the demarcation line, he simply helped them to leave the territory upon their request; (vii) Đurković did not have a large unit of armed men that would be able to forcibly expel such a large group of Bosnian Muslims; and (viii) the authorities facilitated the voluntary departure of Bosnian Muslims, calling for measures to be taken against groups that were trying to disturb relations and pressure Bosnian Muslims to leave the municipality.²¹⁷⁹ However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching this conclusion the Chamber noted that this evidence was based to a large extent on the witnesses' own assumptions and speculation **(How possibly these evidences could have been based on "the witnesses' own assumptions and speculations", while Davidovic and other Prosecutor witnesses were shortly and accidentally present, while the Defence witnesses lived there all the time, participated in authorities and were familiar with all processes in the society? None of them had ever been suspected for any crime, let alone sued and sentenced! They didn't have any need to be evasive! Particularly it was well known how these witnesses, as a part of authorities, were confronted with Djurkovic, Mauzer and others mentioned as a SDS members)** and that the evidence of the relevant witnesses was marked by substantial contradictions and evasiveness. The Chamber also noted that this is contrary to the credible evidence which the Chamber received with respect to the involvement of Bosnian Serb authorities in the expulsion of the Bosnian Muslim population.²¹⁸⁰ **(A relying on paras 669-671 is not sufficient, because from the comments on those paras it is clear that all the deliberations in it were fake!)**

674. **A private agency staffed by the MUP but not formally part of the MUP was established to "expel non-Serbs and to confiscate their property".²¹⁸¹ Many Bosnian Muslims were required to sign a statement which left all their property to the agency which subsequently put Serb refugees into these houses.²¹⁸² Abandoned Bosnian Muslim houses were looted at night by village guards who were under the control of the SDS Main Board in Bijeljina after which the property was taken to Serbia and the houses allocated to Serbs.²¹⁸³ **(Those kind of lies were the easiest to be checked! There was no a single case of change of ownership over any property. If some real estate had been used temporarily, for the purpose of war, which was a rare case, in Bijeljina maybe none, it****

²¹⁷⁹ D3089 (Witness statement of Milivoje Kićanović dated 3 March 2013), para. 25; Milivoje Kićanović, T. 34897–34898, 34900–34901, 34908, 34910–34913 (6 March 2013); D3141 (Witness statement of Dušan Spasojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 24; D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), paras. 15, 21; Svetozar Mihajlović, T. 35738–35739 (20 March 2013); D3144 (Witness statement of Dragomir Ljubojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 18; Dragomir Ljubojević, T. 35910, 35920 (22 March 2013).

²¹⁸⁰ See paras. 669–671.

²¹⁸¹ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 4 (under seal). **Uncorroborated by any real evidence!**

²¹⁸² P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), pp. 4–5 (under seal); Milorad Davidović, T. 15789 (30 June 2011). See also P2451 (Witness statement of Anthony Banbury dated 19 May 2009), paras. 62–63. Ljubojević testified that refugees were not only accommodated in houses of Bosnian Muslims but also in the houses of Bosnian Serbs and that a commission existed which made lists of property which was assigned for the use of displaced persons but after the war this property was returned to its previous owners. Dragomir Ljubojević, T. 35906, 35917–35918 (22 March 2013). The Chamber does not find evidence that abandoned Bosnian Serb homes were also used for the accommodation of refugees undermines the evidence about the way in which Bosnian Muslims were forced to sign over their property. The Chamber also noted that Ljubojević showed signs of insincerity and evasiveness when questioned about the expulsion of Bosnian Muslims from Bijeljina.

²¹⁸³ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 70, 89; P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 5 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 2263.

was in accordance with the law, and on a temporary basis. Why the Prosecutor didn't obtain any material document on this? If that happened, there would be litigations before the RS or the BH courts. This can not be lied so easily, because this is provable so easily!)

675. Đurković was arrested after he expelled a Bosnian Muslim who was on good terms with senior SDS members who had established a military unit of Bosnian Muslims in the VRS.²¹⁸⁴ (This is an argument against the Chamber's "finding" that the SDS was conveying this ethnic cleansing! But, the proceedings weren't stopped because of any RS documents, but because Djurkovic submitted that the said person had been wanting to be transferred by his relatives in Tuzla! And that was always the reason why the judiciary couldn't do anything against him, because the said Muslims defended him! This is also not accurate that Djurkovic was arrested because of a Muslim that had been in good terms with the senior SDS members. Davidovic, as a faithful Prosecutor's witness, testified about Djurkovic, T.15706-97: "Request to bring in and start proceedings against citizen Vojislav Djurkovic and his associate Risto Marjan from Bijeljina, because on the night of 22nd and 23rd July, 1995, without the knowledge or approval of the authorised representatives of Bijeljina municipality, they took away by force about 50 Muslims from Mount Majevisa." Therefore, this document D1429 proves that the Serb police was concerned for 50 Muslim people, and requested an investigation. The Request had been signed by the several highest SDS officials in Bijeljina, see the same: And Dr. Novakovic is one of the signatories? A. Yes. And further, "Likewise at about noon on 23rd July 1995 in a public place in the area outside the hospital in Bijeljina, before more than 100 people, Djurkovic publicly and loudly threatened and insulted the people's deputy, that is, MP Dragoljub Micic, saying that he would muddy the Drina River with a deputy." Djurkovic, therefore, threatened a very prominent SDS member of parliament by death in the river! It is evident that what Djurkovic was doing the SDS didn't like, and vice versa!) However, these proceedings were stopped and Đurković was released when he provided documents which suggested that he was authorised and had orders to expel Bosnian Muslim residents from Bijeljina.²¹⁸⁵ In July 1995, there was a request by the Bijeljina SJB to commence proceedings against Đurković for having expelled Bosnian Muslims without the knowledge of municipal authorities.²¹⁸⁶ (How this is consistent with the Chamber's finding that the "municipal authorities" controlled "expelling" of the Muslims?) However, the Chamber notes that this request relates to one specific incident in July 1995, and the evidence is equivocal as to whether or not these proceedings were concluded or whether Đurković was released.²¹⁸⁷ Filipović testified that Đurković was acquitted in BiH for forcibly expelling Bosnian Muslims.²¹⁸⁸ (Look at that!!! This is a court that wouldn't release a Serb indicted for such a serious crimes! The BiH Court is completely under the SDA/Muslim influence!) The evidence led, however, does not provide any detail about when these proceedings were concluded; further, the evidence does not reveal whether the proceedings related to a

²¹⁸⁴ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 5 (under seal); KDZ531, T. 15856 (1 July 2011) (closed session); Dragomir Ljubojević, T. 35914–35915 (22 March 2013).

²¹⁸⁵ P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 5 (under seal); KDZ531, T. 15856 (1 July 2011) (closed session); Svetozar Mihajlović, T. 35738–35739 (20 March 2013).

²¹⁸⁶ D1429 (Request of Bijeljina's Municipal Assembly, 24 July 1995), pp. 1–2; D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), para. 14.

²¹⁸⁷ D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), para. 14; Svetozar Mihajlović, T. 35738–35739 (20 March 2013).

²¹⁸⁸ Živan Filipović, T. 35811–35812 (21 March 2013)

specific incident or time frame. The Chamber finds the evidence led on this issue to be inconclusive and lacking detail and does not consider that it establishes, as the Accused submits, that the accusations against Đurković were false.²¹⁸⁹ **(The Accused was not interested in defending Djurkovic or anyone else, but to establish the truth. There can not be any “inconclusiveness” because it is sufficient to know that Djurkovic wasn’t sentenced in any of the regional courts so many years after the war, and is still a free man. Why? Because there was no evidence that he did something what his “victims” didn’t ask from him! How possibly a few unreliable testimonies of the political opponents (mainly communists) could lead the Chamber to accept those assertions against this Accused???)**

²¹⁸⁹

Defence Final Brief, para. 1387.

676. On 9 September 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly in Bijeljina issued a declaration inviting all citizens who had left their homes to return and assured citizens of “other nationalities” that their rights would be recognised and that all who were members of the “enemy forces” but who had not committed crimes against the Serb people would not be criminally prosecuted.²¹⁹⁰ **(EXCULPATORY!!! And this was the first offer of amnesty of ordinary combatants in this war. And the Chamber shouldn’t neglect the Accused’s invitation to the Muslims in Bijeljina to return, see:@@@....** While some Bosnian Muslims did return to Bijeljina,²¹⁹¹ even by May 1993 the number of Bosnian Muslims who were present in Bijeljina was limited²¹⁹² **(How Harland could have known that? Is there any document to corroborate this lie? How come only Harland knew about it, and no document that regulated this limit?)** and by September 1993, the expulsion of the remaining Bosnian Muslims by Đurković and men under his command intensified.²¹⁹³ **(What men under his command? Is there any single name? he was doing what he was doing in an accord with the Muslim “victims” and his counterpart in the Muslim controlled Tuzla, a Muslim lawyer!)** The same process of expulsions of Bosnian Muslims continued into August and September 1994.²¹⁹⁴ **(These references, a letter from humanitarian organisation, a UNPROFOR Weekly political assessment... are only an echo of the Muslim propaganda. Certainly, there were leavings from the municipality, but the authorities had never contributed to that, and it was influenced by a feeling of insecurity. For that reason, and on a suggestions by the internationals, the Accused initiated the Minister for Interior to replace the regional chief of police, although he didn’t make any omission, but just to improve the state of security!)**

677. The systematic expulsion of Bosnian Muslims continued until the signing of the Dayton Accords with only 500 to 1,000 Bosnian Muslims remaining in Bijeljina by the time the Dayton Accords were signed.²¹⁹⁵ This resulted in Bijeljina effectively being turned into an “ethnically Serb town”.²¹⁹⁶ **(Bijeljina was always “ethnically Serb municipality”, and**

²¹⁹⁰ D114 (Declaration of RS Assembly, 9 September 1992), p. 1.

²¹⁹¹ Momčilo Mandić, T. 5278 (15 July 2010); Milorad Davidović, T. 15732 (30 June 2011); D473 (SerBiH MUP, Summary from the MUP management meeting held on 20 August 1992), p. 10 (which suggests that some Bosnian Muslims returned to their homes in Bijeljina influenced by statements made by the Accused and Panić); Milivoje Kićanović, T. 34912 (6 March 2013).

²¹⁹² P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para.273; David Harland, T. 2116-2117 (7 May 2010).

²¹⁹³ P5421 (Letter from humanitarian organisation to Radovan Karadžić, 16 September 1993), pp. 1–2 (under seal); P2471 (UNPROFOR Weekly BiH Political Assessment, 3 September 1994), p. 4; P5423 (UNPROFOR report, 20 September 1994), p. 2. *But see* P2073 (BBC news report re Bijeljina, with transcript), p. 1 (in which Đurković denies the reports about his actions). The Chamber sees this as an attempt by Đurković to distance himself from mistreatment of Bosnian Muslims and will therefore not rely on this part of the evidence.

²¹⁹⁴ P2457 (UNPROFOR Weekly BiH Political Assessment, 28 August 1994), pp. 2, 4; P2471 (UNPROFOR Weekly BiH Political Assessment, 3 September 1994), p. 4; P5483 (ICRC Press Release re Forced Population Transfers, 30 August 1994); P2087 (UNHCR protest letter to Radovan Karadžić, 5 September 1994); P2458 (UNPROFOR Weekly BiH Political Assessment, 11 September 1994), pp. 2–3; P2885 (Excerpt from video from TV BiH Studio Tuzla re expelled people from Semberija); P5423 (UNPROFOR report, 20 September 1994), p. 2; P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 7 (under seal); P2932 (ICRC report re Bijeljina, 19 September 1994). Ljubojević disputed the accuracy of this ICRC document. Dragomir Ljubojević, T. 35912 (22 March 2013). The Chamber does not find Ljubojević’s evidence to be reliable in this regard. The witness failed to explain why he considered the document to be inaccurate and simply stated that he was not aware of these incidents or the pattern of expulsions. The Chamber also noted that the witness’s evidence was marked by evasiveness and a lack of forthrightness in this regard.

²¹⁹⁵ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 162, 164. *See also* P1473 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 27 January–5 September 1995), pp. 87–88.

²¹⁹⁶ Jeremy Bowen, T. 10100–10101 (13 January 2011); P2073 (BBC news report re Bijeljina, with transcript), pp. 1–2; P2932 (ICRC report re Bijeljina, 19 September 1994); Milorad Davidović, T. 15531–15532 (28 June 2011); Milorad Davidović, T. 15717 (30 June 2011). *See also* P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 7 (under seal); D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 30. Mihajlović testified that the Bosnian Serb leadership in Bijeljina never received instructions from the republican organs for the movement of non-Serbs from Bijeljina and that no such orders were issued to staff at the municipality level: D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), para. 13. The Chamber does not consider this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber observed that the witness had an interest in distancing himself from alleged crimes in Bijeljina and

had it been an objective of the local authorities, let alone the central authorities of the RS, there wouldn't be any Muslims longer that 1992. Beside that, Bijeljina was not "under any attack except by the attack on 31. March 92, and therefore all the alleged crimes werent "during an attack" and didn't fall under the "shapeau"!"

678. Having considered the totality of the evidence and assessed the circumstances in which departures occurred, the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims were forced to leave Bijeljina. (And what would be the President Karadzic's liability??? So far he was not sentenced only for a heavy raining! And the Chamber pleaded that President Karadzic do not defend the entire Serb people in BiH, but only himself!!!)

b. Bratunac

i. Charges

679. Under Count 3, the Prosecution alleges that persecution, a crime against humanity, was committed in Bratunac as part of the objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats from the Municipalities.²¹⁹⁷ Under Count 1, the Prosecution further alleges that in certain municipalities, including Bratunac, this persecutory campaign included or escalated to include conduct that manifested an intent to destroy in part the national, ethnical and/or religious groups of Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats as such.²¹⁹⁸

680. Acts alleged to have been committed in Bratunac by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include killings during and after the take-over;²¹⁹⁹ killings related to detention facilities;²²⁰⁰ and killings committed during, and deaths resulting from, cruel and inhumane treatment at scheduled detention facilities.²²⁰¹ The Prosecution characterises these acts as killing, an underlying act of genocide, under Count 1; persecution, a crime against humanity, under Count 3; extermination, a crime against humanity, under Count 4; murder, a crime against humanity, under Count 5; and murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war, under Count 6.²²⁰²

681. Other acts alleged to have been committed in Bratunac by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include torture, beatings, and physical and psychological abuse, during and after the take-over and in scheduled detention facilities, as well as the establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions in detention facilities, as cruel or inhumane treatment, an act of persecution under Count 3.²²⁰³ In

that his evidence was marked by contradictions. Ljubojević also testified that by 1995 there were approximately 10,000 Bosnian Muslims who remained in the municipality and that he was not aware of the pattern of expulsions. D3144 (Witness statement of Dragomir Ljubojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 14. *See also* Dragomir Ljubojević, T. 35915 (22 March 2013). The Chamber does not find Ljubojević's evidence to be reliable in this regard. The witness's evidence was marked by evasiveness and insincerity with respect to this issue.

²¹⁹⁷ Indictment, paras. 48–49.

²¹⁹⁸ Indictment, paras. 37–38.

²¹⁹⁹ Indictment, para. 60(a)(i). *See* Scheduled Incidents A.3.1, A.3.2.

²²⁰⁰ Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii). *See* Scheduled Incident B.4.1.

²²⁰¹ Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii). *See* Scheduled Detention Facilities C.6.1, C.6.2.

²²⁰² Indictment, paras. 40(a), 60(a), 63(a), 63(b).

²²⁰³ Indictment, para. 60(b), 60(c), 60(d) (specifying that the conditions included the failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care, or hygienic sanitation facilities). *See* Scheduled Detention Facilities C.6.1, C.6.2. The Chamber notes that the Prosecution does not allege criminal responsibility for rape and other acts of sexual violence or for forced labour at the frontlines in Bratunac. Indictment, fns. 5, 7.

relation to Count 1, the Prosecution alleges that in scheduled detention facilities in Bratunac, thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were subjected to cruel or inhumane treatment, including torture, physical and psychological abuse, and beatings by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs; the Prosecution characterises this inhumane treatment as causing serious bodily or mental harm to Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, an underlying act of genocide.²²⁰⁴ In addition, under Count 1, the Prosecution alleges that thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were detained under conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, namely through cruel and inhumane treatment, including torture, physical and psychological abuse, inhumane living conditions, and the failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care or hygienic sanitation facilities.²²⁰⁵

682. Under Count 3, other acts of persecution alleged to have been committed in Bratunac by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs, include (i) forcible transfer or deportation of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from their homes;²²⁰⁶ (ii) unlawful detention in scheduled detention facilities;²²⁰⁷ (iii) the appropriation or plunder of property, during and after the take-over of Bratunac, during arrests and detention and in the course of or following acts of deportation or forcible transfer;²²⁰⁸ (iv) the wanton destruction of private property, including homes and business premises, and public property, including cultural monuments and sacred sites;²²⁰⁹ and (v) the imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures.²²¹⁰

683. Under Counts 7 and 8, the Prosecution alleges deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer), respectively, as crimes against humanity.²²¹¹ In this regard, the Prosecution alleges that, by the end of 1992, Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs had forcibly displaced Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Bratunac in which they were lawfully present.²²¹² It is alleged that from March 1992, restrictive and discriminatory measures, arbitrary arrest and detention, harassment, torture, killing, destruction of houses, cultural monuments and sacred sites, as well as the threat of further such acts caused Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to flee in fear while others were physically driven out.²²¹³ It is further alleged that acts of forcible displacement continued between January and March 1993 when Serb Forces attacked the Konjević Polje area in Bratunac.²²¹⁴

ii. Lead-up

²²⁰⁴ Indictment, para. 40(b).

²²⁰⁵ Indictment, para. 40(c). *See* Scheduled Detention Facilities C.6.1, C.6.2.

²²⁰⁶ Indictment, paras. 56, 60(f).

²²⁰⁷ Indictment, para. 60(g). *See* Scheduled Detention Facilities C.6.1, C.6.2.

²²⁰⁸ Indictment, para. 60(i).

²²⁰⁹ Indictment, para. 60(j). *See* Scheduled Incident D.6.

²²¹⁰ Indictment, para. 60(k). The restrictive and discriminatory measures alleged include the denial of freedom of movement; the removal from positions of authority; the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of homes; unlawful arrest and/or the denial of the right to judicial process; and/or the denial of equal access to public services.

²²¹¹ Indictment, paras. 68–75.

²²¹² Indictment, paras. 69, 72.

²²¹³ Indictment, para. 71.

²²¹⁴ Indictment, para. 72.

684. Bratunac is a municipality in eastern BiH located to the south of Zvornik, the east of Vlasenica, and the north of Srebrenica.²²¹⁵ The Drina River forms a border between Bratunac and Serbia to the east.²²¹⁶ Prior to the war, the population of Bratunac was approximately 33,000 and consisted of about 62% Bosnian Muslims, 36% Bosnian Serbs, and 2% from other groups.²²¹⁷ The town of Bratunac itself had a population of between 7,000 and 8,000.²²¹⁸

685. The SDS was formed in Bratunac following a meeting on 8 August 1990 and Miroslav Deronjić was elected president of the SDS Municipal Board and subsequently chairman of the municipal board.²²¹⁹ Deronjić was the most influential Bosnian Serb official in Bratunac.²²²⁰ The constituent assembly of the SDA was held in Bratunac in September 1990.²²²¹ Following the formation of the national parties, and as relations between ethnic groups deteriorated, fear in the municipality increased.²²²² **If this is important, than is important to establish who was the first to form the national party, in BiH, not in Bratunac. Undoubtedly, the SDS was the last one, only after 12 July, two months later than SDA and four months after the announcement that there will be the SDA. The HDZ was formed even a year earlier and won the elections in Croatia in April 1990.**

687. The SDA won the majority of seats in Bratunac after the multi-party elections. A coalition government was formed and leadership positions were divided between representatives of the SDA and SDS.²²²³ Nijaz Dubišić, a Bosnian Muslim, was the President of the Municipality, the President of the Executive Board was a Bosnian Serb and there was equal representation between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims on the

²²¹⁵ D484 (Map of BiH).

²²¹⁶ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 26(a).

²²¹⁷ P4994 (Addendum to Ewa Tabeau's expert report entitled "Ethnic Composition in Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from 27 Municipalities of BiH 1991 to 1997", 3 February 2009), e-court pp. 30, 33, 36, 39; P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 3; Dževad Gušić, T. 17813 (24 August 2011); D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 4; P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 4 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17882 (25 August 2011); P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 10; D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 28; D225 (Ethnic map of BiH based on 1991 census).

²²¹⁸ D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 4.

²²¹⁹ P4376 (Minutes from first meeting of the Initial Board for the formation of the SDS in Bratunac, 8 August 1990), pp. 1–2. *See also* P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), paras. 6–7, 12; P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 8; Mušan Talović, T. 17638 (22 August 2011); P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 6; P3204 (List of Bratunac leadership prepared by Dževad Gušić, 2 May 2003); P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 9 (under seal).

²²²⁰ Sribislav Davidović, P4100 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović*), T. 9260; Sribislav Davidović, T. 24384 (9 February 2012). Ljubisav Simić and Rodoljub Đukanović were both members of the SDS leadership in Bratunac. D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), para. 19; P3204 (List of Bratunac leadership prepared by Dževad Gušić, 2 May 2003).

²²²¹ D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 10. On or around 20 March 1992 Dževad Gušić was appointed president of the SDA in Bratunac. Dževad Gušić, T. 17778 (24 August 2011); P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 5, 71; P3204 (List of Bratunac leadership prepared by Dževad Gušić, 2 May 2003); P3203 (Summary of Dževad Gušić's personal background, 2 May 2003); P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 9, 17 (under seal).

²²²² P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 10; D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), paras. 3–4; D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), paras. 7, 10. *See also* D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 8–9; D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 21; D3852 (Witness statement of Mirko Perić dated 1 July 2013), para. 6; D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), para. 8.

²²²³ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 7; P3204 (List of Bratunac leadership prepared by Dževad Gušić, 2 May 2003); P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 4, 10a; Dževad Gušić, T. 17813, 17843, 17846 (24 August 2011); D1658 (Report of Bratunac Municipal Assembly, 5 March 1991); P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 12 (under seal); D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 30; D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 12; Milenko Katanić, T. 24513–24514 (10 February 2012). *See also* P3197 (Minutes of sessions of Bratunac SDS Crisis Staff and Municipal Board), p. 6.

Executive Board.²²²⁴ Senad Hodžić was appointed as head of the police in late 1991 and Džemo Hodžić was the Bosnian Muslim commander of the TO staff.²²²⁵ Over time, there were disagreements between the SDS and SDA regarding those who were recommended for certain posts.²²²⁶

688. From 1991, there was growing Bosnian Serb nationalist sentiment with increasing intimidation of Bosnian Muslims.²²²⁷ **Political crap. The Muslims were in majority, and the Serbs were scared. It was a quite contrary: In Bratunac the Bosnian Muslims were the majority; (64% Bosnian Muslim, 34% Serb and 2% other; D3398, para 4; D3126, para 28 DFB) the spread of Bosnian Muslim nationalism led to a division of the population in municipality and a large number of the Bosnian Serb population relocating to Serbia (D3194, para 7; D3398, para 7 DFB)** SDS members wrote slogans on street and traffic signs as well as on public and private property, which were derogatory towards Bosnian Muslims, including messages to the effect: “Muslims, Balijas, Turks move out, you’re going to be slaughtered”, “there is no Bosnia any more”.²²²⁸ Other slogans included the names of Slobodan Milošević, the Accused, “Chetnik” commanders from the Second World War and phrases such as: “This is Serbia, Greater Serbia”.²²²⁹ These developments coincided with SDS representatives stating that co-existence was not possible and that Bratunac was a “Serb municipality”.²²³⁰ **There is no evidence that the authorities had anything to do with the “vagabond” graphite, as the most probably Mr. Izetbegovic didn’t have any connection with their graphite. Knowing that the Muslims were a significant majority, the Chamber should take this allegation with a bit of reserve. BUT, BUT, BUT, if this is important to the Chamber, then the Chamber erred when prevented the Defence in depicting conduct of the other (Muslim/Croat) side. Only speeches of Mr. Izetbegovic in 1990 would be sufficient to scare the Serbs, not to mention media like Vox, Islamic newspaper etc.**

689. There was also an increase in Bosnian Muslim rhetoric that Serbs should go to Serbia and that BiH belonged to the Muslims, which led to many Bosnian Serbs moving from Bratunac to Serbia.²²³¹ Tensions increased further when (i) there were attacks against Bosnian Serb leaders²²³² and SDS members; (ii) Bosnian Muslims boycotted the JNA mobilisation but started going to Croatia for training,²²³³ and (iii) in the autumn of 1991

²²²⁴ Dževad Gušić, T. 17815–17819 (24 August 2011); P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 5–6, 10, 71; P3204 (List of Bratunac leadership prepared by Dževad Gušić, 2 May 2003); Rodoljub Đukanović, T. 36163 (27 March 2013); D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 2, 12. *See also* Milenko Katanić, T. 24515 (10 February 2012).

²²²⁵ P3204 (List of Bratunac leadership prepared by Dževad Gušić, 2 May 2003); P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 10b, 71; Dževad Gušić, T. 17818–17819 (24 August 2011). *See also* Milenko Katanić, T. 24515 (10 February 2012).

²²²⁶ D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 30; D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 12. *See also* Dževad Gušić, T. 17843 (24 August 2011).

²²²⁷ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 13–14, 16.

²²²⁸ Dževad Gušić, T. 17789 (24 August 2011).

²²²⁹ Dževad Gušić, T. 17779–17780, 17789 (24 August 2011); P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 42.

²²³⁰ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 14, 17.

²²³¹ D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 7–11; D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 13; Milenko Katanić, T. 24516, 24530 (10 February 2012). *See also* D3174 (Witness statement of Vujadin Stević dated 23 March 2013), paras. 8, 12; D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), para. 6. *But see* P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 17.

²²³² D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 20; D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 14, 23; Rodoljub Đukanović, T. 36148 (27 March 2013); D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 24.

²²³³ D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), paras. 15, 19–20; D3399 (Letter from Bratunac SJB to Tuzla CSB, 17 March 1992); D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 8–11, 13, 15; D260 (SDA letter re MUP training in Croatia, 11 July 1991); P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 20 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17895

there was a mobilisation of the reserve police force, which in Bratunac consisted of over 60% Bosnian Muslims.²²³⁴ **This is correct, except, to be more accurate, it was 64% of the Muslim reservists, the same reference. And this was more scaring to the Serb minority than everything what the Serbs could do or say towards the Mualims. But, it was only visible in the autumn 1991. while a clandestine enforcement of the Muslim component of the Police started at the beginning of 1991. See: D00387**

690. At a meeting of the SDS Municipal Board of Bratunac in February 1991, Deronjić and others were chosen to conduct negotiations with the SDA.²²³⁵ At another meeting of the SDS Municipal Board on 12 April 1991, it was agreed that instructions would be requested from the SDS headquarters “regarding the referendum, our behaviour and functioning” and that the regional redrawing of municipal borders which was occurring in Banja Luka was “fully supported, and those questions should be posed in our areas as well”.²²³⁶ It was also noted that the Presidency of Bratunac should meet with the Accused urgently with respect to the questions raised.²²³⁷ **The “redrawing of the municipal borders only ment that the authorities of one community wouldn’t rule over another community. This exclude any idea of resettlement of population, since everyone would remain to live where lived before, but the offices of their authorities would be separated. AND THERE IS NO MORE CONVINCING EVIDENCE AGAINST ANY IDEA OF ETHNIC CLEANSING THAN THIS RE-ARRANGEMENT OF THE COMPETENCES OF THE MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES.**

691. In that period, there was increasing intimidation of Bosnian Muslim professionals and incidents where prominent Bosnian Muslim men were beaten.²²³⁸ **Who was beaten, and by whom? This is nonsecne, since the Muslims had a majority, and had a secret paramilitary units.** Road-blocks were erected by Bosnian Serbs.²²³⁹ **The road blocks were erected only at the end of August, beginning of Semtember, in the occasion of the riots initiated by the Muslims preventing the JNA in exercising its duties. By definition, road-blocks were a defensive, self-protection move.** In the SJB there was greater distrust between Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb police officers.²²⁴⁰ **After the mobilisation of the reserve police and the arming of 64 per cent of the Bosnian Muslims in Bratunac (see: D3194, para 18 DFB), incidents of civil disobedience by Bosnian Muslims became more frequent from this point; with many entering into conflict with Bosnian Serbs. (see: D3194, para 19 – 23, DFB)** Dževad Gušić, the President of the SDA in Bratunac, was subjected to intimidation and was shot at on a

(25 August 2011). See also D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), paras. 20, 22; D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), paras. 5–6; D3174 (Witness statement of Vujadin Stević dated 23 March 2013), para. 3.

²²³⁴ This mobilisation was ordered by Alija Delimustafić of the MUP. D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 18; Rodoljub Đukanović, T. 36149–36150 (27 March 2013). See also D3174 (Witness statement of Vujadin Stević dated 23 March 2013), para. 6.

²²³⁵ P3197 (Minutes of sessions of Bratunac SDS Crisis Staff and Municipal Board), p. 10.

²²³⁶ P3197 (Minutes of sessions of Bratunac SDS Crisis Staff and Municipal Board), p. 13. The Chamber rejects Đukanović’s evidence that, except for one order in relation to a humanitarian convoy from the Accused, there was practically no communication between Bratunac and Pale (D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 51; Rodoljub Đukanović, T. 36147, 36169–36170, 36172–36173, 36178, 36179, 36191–36192, 36202, 36209–36210 (27 March 2013). The Chamber finds that Đukanović’s testimony was marked by contradictions, extreme evasiveness and indicators of insincerity and does not find his evidence to be reliable in this regard.

²²³⁷ P3197 (Minutes of sessions of Bratunac SDS Crisis Staff and Municipal Board), p. 13.

²²³⁸ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 15; Dževad Gušić, T. 17795 (24 August 2011).

²²³⁹ Mušan Talović, T. 17647–17649 (22 August 2011). See also P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 77–78; Dževad Gušić, T. 17849 (24 August 2011).

²²⁴⁰ D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), paras. 3–5.

number of occasions while leaving his home.²²⁴¹ **(Although it is not regarded by the Chamber, for it wasn't charged according to the Schedule, for the sake of truth and credibility of the Muslim witnesses, see:D01643 which undoubtedly show that the Serb dignitaries were attempted to assassinate, and it was No. two in the Municipality, a Serb and president of the Executive board. See:D01643)** There was also shooting at night from Bosnian Serb villages at Bosnian Muslim villages and some Bosnian Muslims were taken from their homes and killed.²²⁴² There were also increasing confrontations and division between ethnic groups in the work place.²²⁴³ **Bosnian Muslims misappropriated TO weapons and illegally obtained others from Sandzak and Sarajevo. As a result, the Bosnian Serbs began arming themselves for protection. (see: D3194, para 24 DFB)**

692. Inter-ethnic relations deteriorated further in late August 1991, following failed attempts by SDS supporters, with the help of a JNA unit and members of the Bosnian Serb police, to demand military documentation from the Municipal Secretariat to identify the names of men who could be mobilised.²²⁴⁴ **On the contrary: the JNA wanted the lists which had been the JNA property, and SDS supported the JNA lawful action. The Muslim extremists violated the law of Defence.** Their attempts to secure these military records were blocked by a large crowd of SDA supporters and Bosnian Muslim members of the police.²²⁴⁵ Following this incident there were increased inter-ethnic clashes in Bratunac,²²⁴⁶ which disrupted the coalition government.²²⁴⁷ **It has to be qualified properly: the Muslim blockade of the JNA to get its own documentation for mobilisation was a criminal act, and within the context, it was an anti-constitutional act, aimed to help the mutiny in Croatia, and to disable the JNA in exercising its duties. For the Serbs, not necessarily SDS followers, it was clear that the Bratunac Muslims will fight against Yugoslavia and the Serbs.**

693. Tensions and mistrust increased even further in September 1991 following an incident in Kravica in which Bosnian Muslims were ambushed, wounded, and some killed.²²⁴⁸ **Just see D01643, and it will be clear that the Muslims first tried to kill the**

²²⁴¹ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 44–47.

²²⁴² P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 31–33 (under seal); P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 45a, 74. See also P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), paras. 6–8; Suad Džafić, T. 18193 (1 September 2011). The Chamber has only had regard to these killings for the purpose of setting the general background in Bratunac given these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.

²²⁴³ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 30 (under seal).

²²⁴⁴ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 20, 25; Dževad Gušić, T. 17822 (24 August 2011). See also D1657 (Excerpt from book entitled “The Truth about Bratunac”), p. 1; D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), para. 10; D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), para. 11.

²²⁴⁵ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 12; P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 20–25; P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 19–20 (under seal); D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 23; D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), para. 11; D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), paras. 20–23; KDZ605, T. 17894–17895 (25 August 2011); Momir Nikolić, T. 24713 (14 February 2012). See also D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 15–16; D3195 (Official note of Tuzla CSB, 4 September 1991), p. 2; D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), paras. 7, 10–12; D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), paras. 11–13.

²²⁴⁶ D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 24; D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 17; D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 24; D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), para. 14.

²²⁴⁷ Milenko Katanić, T. 24517 (10 February 2012).

²²⁴⁸ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 33, 79; Dževad Gušić, T. 17824 (24 August 2011); D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), para. 14; D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), paras. 25–26, 28; D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 19–20, 22–24; D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), paras. 23, 25–26. See also P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 13–14 (under seal); D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 21; D3195 (Official note of Tuzla CSB, 4 September 1991), p. 2. Đukanović testified that this incident was used by Bosnian Muslims to their advantage to be “even more brutal in their behaviour” and as justification to arm themselves on a large scale. D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24

President of the Executive Board, then wounded two Serbs that were taken care in Han Pijesak, then demonstrated through the Serb village Kravica, shooting and threatening inhabitants. But, such a unilaterally told story is not correct, and is **damaging the Accused's interests.** A large crowd of Bosnian Muslims demanded that the incident be investigated and called for the perpetrators to be brought to justice.²²⁴⁹ The situation was only calmed down when political leaders, including Nikola Koljević, arrived in Bratunac and made public assurances to Bosnian Muslims that there would be an investigation.²²⁵⁰ **This is not a complete fact: there was a delegation of the Presidency of BH, Ejup Ganic and Nikola Koljevic, not on behalf of the RS or SDS, and prior to them there was a visit of the high officials of the BH MUP Avdo Hebib and V. Zepinic. So, this had nothing to do with this Accused. Further, D3398 doesn't even mentioned what is said in this paragraph** However, Koljević subsequently went to the site and reassured Bosnian Serbs who had gathered there that the investigation would not take place **This is also a lie. The witness wasn't there, because it was the Serbian village, but nobody ever reported that there would be no investigation, nor anybody would dare to say it, because it wasn't in yhe hands of politicians;** the Accused himself in a radio broadcast guaranteed that there would be no investigation.²²⁵¹ **This is what this withness said that he heard. However, if it was relly true, that would be on the front pages of every single newspaper. In addition, there is a very documented engagement of this Accused just this same day, and the Chamber should at least mention it. This is more than enough to se D01643, the intercepted conversation, to see several crucial facts: the Accused had been at meeting with Izetbegovic the entire day, knew nothing or almost nothing, and suggested the Serbs to refrain, and so on. Only this exhibit is sufficient to dismiss all the lies of the SDA leaders from Bratunac. See also D04543, of the same kind. But with cumulative value. See also D04544, Karadzic – Zulfikarpasic, feeling that the SDA is trying to spoil the Historic Serb-Muslim Agreement, and it is obvious that the crisis in Bratunac was aimed to achieve it. See D01642, Koljevic – Karadzic, and see what Karadzic knew and thought, and suggested.** The increased tension contributed to a feeling of insecurity, which prompted both ethnic groups to start performing night guard duty around their homes.²²⁵² **One could guess which ethnic group felt more insecure! The Serbs, certainly, because the police was led by the Muslims!**

March 2013), paras. 21, 24. See also D3195 (Official note of Tuzla CSB, 4 September 1991), p. 2. The Chamber notes that Đukanović's testimony was marked by extreme evasivenesses, contradictions, speculation, and indicators of insincerity which undermined the reliability of his evidence in this regard. **But the Chamber didn't take into account that there passed 12 years, that those witnesses were theated as a possible suspects and lived under horrible pressure. And there was no need to "trust" the words or a body expressions in the cases we had the documents. The Serbs didn't trust the Court, and this was an experimental – artificial situation, not natural. And for the division of the municipalities we have documents in the file.**

²²⁴⁹ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 33–34. See also P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 14 (under seal).

²²⁵⁰ D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), paras. 27–28; P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 35. See also D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 22.

²²⁵¹ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 35.

²²⁵² D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), paras. 29–30, 32; D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 25. See also D3174 (Witness statement of Vujadin Stević dated 23 March 2013), paras. 7, 9; D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), para. 8; P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 14 (under seal).

694. The SDS issued an ultimatum before the Municipal Assembly was due to be convened; this insisted on a 50:50 power sharing arrangement even though they were in the minority.²²⁵³ The SDA accepted this ultimatum.²²⁵⁴

1. Militarisation of Bratunac

695. Before the multi-party elections, the JNA had withdrawn the local TO weapons and placed them under their control.²²⁵⁵ **The TO was under the JNA command and control, and since the SFRY Presidency envisaged the civil war, had withdrawn armament everywhere, not only in Bratunac.** In late August 1991, SDS officials, including Deronjić, and the JNA were involved in training and arming local Bosnian Serbs with these weapons.²²⁵⁶ **Taking into account the number of references, the Chamber considered this issue as a very important one. However, it is well known even to the Chamber, that the JNA had to maintain the reserve contingent trained, and it was a continued praxis all after the WWII, to summon reservists from time to time to trainings. Since the Muslims and Croats ceased to respond, the only available reservists were the Serbs. Anyway, it has nothing to do with anyone's felony, and particularly not with the Accused. So, this presentation of the fact is not correct.** At the end of 1991 and early into 1992, JNA military formations moved closer to Bratunac, and there was an increasing movement of military vehicles and personnel in the surrounding villages and hills.²²⁵⁷ **So what? That was their own area of responsibility, and in addition, many of the JNA units were withdrawing from Slovenia and Croatia to SFRY. It could upset only those who had a plan to attack the Serbs and JNA, and to secede from the SFRY.**

696. The SDA was also involved in the distribution of weapons to Bosnian Muslims²²⁵⁸ and a Bosnian Muslim crisis staff was established.²²⁵⁹ Bosnian Muslim villagers organised local guards.²²⁶⁰ **While the Serbs were behaving in accordance with the Constitution**

²²⁵³ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 10-10a; Dževad Gušić, T. 17813-17814 (24 August 2011). See also D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubišav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 17.

²²⁵⁴ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 10. Prior the multi-party elections, the SDS was able to lobby the deputies of the Municipal Assembly to change the statute of the Assembly to require a two-third majority for decisions which effectively prevented the SDA, after the elections, from passing any decisions without support from the SDS. P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 7-8; Dževad Gušić, T. 17813-17814 (24 August 2011).

²²⁵⁵ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 18, 74. The JNA took over the stock of TO weapons and ammunition pursuant to an order of Federal Secretariat for National Defence of the SFRY on 14 May 1990. P3201 (Order of SFRY Federal Secretariat for National Defence, 14 May 1990), pp. 1-2.

²²⁵⁶ P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 25; P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 19, 27-27a, 30b, 62; Dževad Gušić, T. 17794-17795 (24 August 2011). See also D3195 (Official note of Tuzla CSB, 4 September 1991), p. 2; P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 21, 23 (under seal). Defence witnesses testified that Bosnian Serbs only began to buy weapons in response to the massive scale arming of the Bosnian Muslim population and also denied their own involvement in the distribution of weapons. D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 32; D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 24, 54; Rodoljub Đukanović, T. 36148-36149 (27 March 2013). The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber notes that the evidence of the relevant witnesses was marked by extreme evasivenesses, contradictions, and indicators of insincerity.

²²⁵⁷ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 26-26a; P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 10, 21 (under seal).

²²⁵⁸ D3195 (Official note of Tuzla CSB, 4 September 1991); D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubišav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 30; Momir Nikolić, T. 24712 (14 February 2012). See also D3174 (Witness statement of Vujadin Stević dated 23 March 2013), para. 8; D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), paras. 6-7; P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 10 (under seal).

²²⁵⁹ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 17 (under seal). See also D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubišav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 50. Dževad Gušić, T. 17818, 17826-17827, 17831, 17836-17837 (24 August 2011); P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 71, 73-74. The Chamber finds that there were armed Bosnian Muslim formations in Bratunac. KDZ480, T. 24236 (7 February 2012); D1657 (Excerpt from book entitled "The Truth about Bratunac"), pp. 1-3.

²²⁶⁰ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 73. See also D1657 (Excerpt from book entitled "The Truth about Bratunac"), p. 2.

and laws, the Muslim side (SDA) was preparing for the war against the SFRY, JNA and the Serbs. No doubts about that, the evidence is overwhelming. Or maybe the Chamber doesn't differentiate the legal status and legal conducts versus illegal and anti-constitutional?

2. Division of municipal structures

697. In October 1991, following the Accused's declaration of a state of emergency of the SDS, an emergency meeting of the SDS Municipal Board of Bratunac was held.²²⁶¹ There, Deronjić informed those present about the SDS Main Board instructions.²²⁶² At this meeting, the SDS Crisis Staff of Bratunac was formed with Deronjić as its chief.²²⁶³ **It was a Party Crisis Staff, not municipal, and therefore didn't have any competence of authority, and could only inform the Party Centre!** In addition, the President of the Executive Board of the Bratunac Municipal Assembly briefed the participants about preparations for regionalisation.²²⁶⁴ On 25 October 1991, the SDS Municipal Board gave authorisation to expand the SDS Crisis Staff.²²⁶⁵ The SDS Crisis Staff met on 26 October 1991 and discussed the formation of regions.²²⁶⁶ **Not to forget that this happened after the illegal and anti-constitutional decision of the Muslim-Croat part of the Assembly. As usually, neither this Serb move was without a good reason, i.e. a violation of the laws and Constitution.**

698. On 23 December 1991, the SDS Municipal Board held a meeting where the Variant A/B Instructions were presented.²²⁶⁷ Deronjić informed the members about the session of the SDS Presidency and said that a decision had been reached to establish the SerBiH and that Variant B was envisaged for Bratunac since Bosnian Serbs were a minority in the municipality.²²⁶⁸ In accordance with these instructions, a decision was made to form the Bratunac Crisis Staff which would start working immediately.²²⁶⁹ The Bratunac Crisis

²²⁶¹ P3197 (Minutes of sessions of Bratunac SDS Crisis Staff and Municipal Board), p. 1; Dževad Gušić, T. 17797–17798 (24 August 2011). P5831 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Miljana LNU, 17 October 1991). *See also* P6238 (Radovan Karadžić's Decision, 18 October 1991); Dorothea Hanson, T. 14857–14859 (17 June 2011).

²²⁶² P3197 (Minutes of sessions of Bratunac SDS Crisis Staff and Municipal Board), p. 1. *See also* P2589 (Dorothea Hanson's expert report entitled "Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War Commissions 1991–1995", 10 September 2009), fn. 13.

²²⁶³ P3197 (Minutes of sessions of Bratunac SDS Crisis Staff and Municipal Board), pp. 1–2; P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 6, 11; Dževad Gušić, T. 17794 (24 August 2011); P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 8; Mušan Talović, T. 17638 (22 August 2011); P3204 (List of Bratunac leadership prepared by Dževad Gušić, 2 May 2003); P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 9 (under seal). *See also* P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), paras. 6–7, 13; D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 29; D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), para. 19.

²²⁶⁴ P3197 (Minutes of sessions of Bratunac SDS Crisis Staff and Municipal Board), p. 2.

²²⁶⁵ P3198 (Minutes of 2nd session of Bratunac SDS Municipal Board, 25 October 1991), p. 2.

²²⁶⁶ P3197 (Minutes of sessions of Bratunac SDS Crisis Staff and Municipal Board), p. 3.

²²⁶⁷ P2598 (Minutes of meeting of Bratunac SDS Municipal Board, 23 December 1991), p. 1; P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 15; P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991).

²²⁶⁸ P2598 (Minutes of meeting of Bratunac SDS Municipal Board, 23 December 1991), p. 1; Milenko Katanić, T. 24525–24526 (10 February 2012). Defence witnesses testified that they were not aware of any meeting in Bratunac where the Variant A/B Instructions were discussed and the Bosnian Serb authorities resolved all problems on their own. D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 27; Rodoljub Đukanović, T. 36181–36183 (27 March 2013); D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 53. The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 2248 above as to why it does not consider Đukanović's evidence to be reliable in this regard. Further, with respect to Simić, the Chamber notes that his evidence is qualified, given that he simply states that he did not know about such a meeting. In addition, Simić's evidence was marked by contradictions and inconsistencies.

²²⁶⁹ P2598 (Minutes of meeting of Bratunac SDS Municipal Board, 23 December 1991), pp. 1–2; P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), paras. 15–16. *But see* Rodoljub Đukanović, T. 36202, 36206 (27 March 2013); D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 33; Jovan Nikolić, T. 35487 (14 March 2013); D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 50. The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 2248, 2256, and 2268 as to why it

Staff included the Commander of Police, representatives of the military, Ministry of Defence and “distinguished civilians”.²²⁷⁰ In addition to the Bratunac Crisis Staff, crisis staffs were also formed at the local commune level and they informed the Bratunac Crisis Staff about issues at the local level.²²⁷¹ **Again, not to forget that this was in the occasion of the illegal claims of the common BH Government to apply for the independence, against the Serb veto in the Presidency and in the Government. Again, this was only a reaction to the unlawfull moves of the Muslim/Croat part of authorities, a violation of the law and Constitution.**

699. On 30 December 1991, the first session of the Serbian Municipal Assembly of Bratunac was held, Ljubisav Simić was appointed as President of the Assembly, and Radoljub Đukanović was appointed as Chairman of the Executive Board.²²⁷² At this session a proposal to join the region of Birač was adopted and there was discussion about “regionalisation”.²²⁷³ Bratunac became part of the SAO Birač and Rodoljub Đukanović was elected to the Executive Council of the SAO.²²⁷⁴ **The proper wording would be “The Serbian municipality of Bratunac became part of the SAO Birac...” Namely, it is clear from the entirety of evidence that the ethnic municipalities pertained to only this ethnicity, while the other community was free to form their municipality and affiliate it to other municipal associations as they wanted!# THE CHAMBER NEVER UNDERSTOOD THE REAL MEANING OF THE THNIC MUNICIPALITIES!**

700. At a meeting of the SDS Municipal Board on 22 January 1992, Deronjić stated that the policies pursued and advocated by Milošević, the Accused and Babić had “met with failure after failure” and that the objective of the SDS of preserving the SFRY was history.²²⁷⁵ At this same meeting, Deronjić demanded to meet with the Accused and Koljević in Bratunac and Simić alerted that if necessary the Bratunac leadership “will refuse obedience even to Sarajevo”.^{2276 (2276)} **So much about the autocracy in the SDS! Yet, there was no a single consequence for those who criticised the leadership, because that was a democratic right of everyone!**

701. On 24 February 1992, the SDS Municipal Board discussed the implementation in Bratunac of the second level of the Variant A/B Instructions.^{2277 (2277)} At this meeting, it was noted that since the first phase of the instructions had been implemented, the second phase, which was a state of emergency, would be activated.²²⁷⁸ Deronjić read the instructions at the meeting and said that they imposed a duty to “act accordingly”. These instructions

does not consider that the evidence of these witnesses is reliable with respect to the issue of when and why the Bratunac Crisis Staff was formed.

²²⁷⁰ P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), paras. 15–16; Milenko Katanić, T. 24526–24527 (10 February 2012).

²²⁷¹ D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 51.

²²⁷² P3199 (Minutes of 1st meeting of Bratunac Municipal Assembly, 30 December 1991), pp. 2–3; D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 3; P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 11; Dževad Gušić, T. 17794 (24 August 2011); P3204 (List of Bratunac leadership prepared by Dževad Gušić, 2 May 2003). The decision proclaiming the establishment of a Serbian Municipality of Bratunac was subsequently verified and approved at the 12th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly. P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), pp. 23–24.

²²⁷³ P3199 (Minutes of 1st meeting of Bratunac Municipal Assembly, 30 December 1991), pp. 3, 5.

²²⁷⁴ D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 26; Rodoljub Đukanović, T. 36163–36164 (27 March 2013).

²²⁷⁵ D3127 (Excerpt from minutes of meeting of Bratunac SDS Municipal Board, 8 July 1991), p. 1.

²²⁷⁶ D3127 (Excerpt from minutes of meeting of Bratunac SDS Municipal Board, 8 July 1991), p. 1.

²²⁷⁷ P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 18.

²²⁷⁸ P2597 (Minutes of meeting of Bratunac's SDS Municipal Board, 24 February 1992), p. 1; Milenko Katanić, T. 24527–24528 (10 February 2012).

included creating a municipal Executive Board and forming a reserve structure of the Bosnian Serb police.²²⁷⁹ In addition local boards were tasked with reporting on measures taken with respect to safety and with the collection and storage of food in Bosnian Serb areas.²²⁸⁰ Deronjić also instructed that guard duties should be set-up and citizens should co-operate with the Bratunac Crisis Staff.²²⁸¹ **All of it has to be seen within the context: the Conference had already established that there will be the three republics, the illegal Bosnian Referendum was going to be held, but even if seen out of the context, all of those measures were perfectly legitimate, since their nature was exclusively defensive.**

702. At the 24 February 1992 meeting of the SDS Municipal Board, Branko Obrenović commented that he feared that the war would find them unprepared and that they needed to “activate the Crisis staffs that would take care of everything” and a war plan was needed.²²⁸² Deronjić agreed with this proposal.²²⁸³ It was also reported that contact with the army had been established and there was discussion about the formation of military units and training of individuals.²²⁸⁴ **All of that was legitimate, unless the Chamber represents the SDA position.**

703. On 28 February 1992, the Serbian Municipal Assembly of Bratunac adopted the proposal to appoint one person to take on the role of national defence secretary and chief of the SJB.²²⁸⁵ At this meeting, Deronjić stressed the importance of setting up a Bosnian Serb police.²²⁸⁶ **So what? It was within the frame of the Conference. In addition, as could be seen from D01643, D04543, how it was extremely risky if the Muslim police entered the Serb areas.**

But, the most important is the fact that militarisation of Bratunac started much earlier, as early as March 1992. to that date the Muslim side, namely SDA had trained many non-professional reserve policemen at the Croatian MUP. It was particularly sensitive in Bratunac. See: D00387

In the dispatch of the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ of the SR BH number 362 of 4 March 1992, a 100 percent increase in the reserve police force was ordered.

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In keeping with that, in a letter to the Bratunac Municipal Secretariat of National Defence, we requested a list of the required free military conscripts according to local communes, respecting the ethnic structure.

²²⁷⁹ P2597 (Minutes of meeting of Bratunac SDS Municipal Board, 24 February 1992), p. 1; P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 18.

²²⁸⁰ P2597 (Minutes of meeting of Bratunac SDS Municipal Board, 24 February 1992), p. 1; Milenko Katanić, T. 24527 (10 February 2012).

²²⁸¹ P2597 (Minutes of meeting of Bratunac SDS Municipal Board, 24 February 1992), p. 1.

²²⁸² P2597 (Minutes of meeting of Bratunac SDS Municipal Board, 24 February 1992), p. 1. The Chamber refers to para. 698, where it found that the Bratunac Crisis Staff had already been established in December 1991. The Chamber finds that this reference in February 1992 relates to the activation of that crisis staff for the purposes of war. In accordance with the second phase of the Variant A/B Instructions, the Crisis Staff was given the responsibility for “organisation of defence”. P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), p. 9.

²²⁸³ P2597 (Minutes of meeting of Bratunac SDS Municipal Board, 24 February 1992), p. 1.

²²⁸⁴ P2597 (Minutes of meeting of Bratunac's SDS Municipal Board, 24 February 1992), p. 2.

²²⁸⁵ P3199 (Minutes of 1st meeting of Bratunac Municipal Assembly, 30 December 1991), p. 6.

²²⁸⁶ P3199 (Minutes of 1st meeting of Bratunac Municipal Assembly, 30 December 1991), p. 7.

After we received the requested list and started making the expected checks, we obtained information that the list included a certain number of Muslim military conscripts who have spent time in Croatia on a part of the training within the MUP of Croatia. We do not know on whose orders or recommendation, but it is believed that Serbian citizens do not have enough trust in such future members of the reserve police force. We would therefore like to know what to do with such military conscripts, especially since we know that of the newly-invited trainees, dispatch number 09/4-241 of 12 March 1992, some ten candidates for active policemen from our municipality have participated in a part of the training of the Croatian MUP.

We have contacted the Tuzla CSB and the SR BH MUP by telephone regarding this problem and have decided to request in writing your opinion with respect to taking on such military conscripts for war assignment.

C H I E F
PUBLIC SECURITY STATION
Senad HODŽIĆ
/signed/

It was written and signed by a Muslim Chief of police. At that state the Serbs didn't dare to let any Muslim policeman to enter their villages.

704. At a meeting with SDA representatives, Deronjić stated that "Serbs need to keep their own Serbdom, their own history, their own tradition, their own culture" and in order to do that they should live separately from the Bosnian Muslim people.²²⁸⁷ **This is a typical consequence of the absence of context. What Deronjic said pertained only to the situation of the illegally imposed secession of BiH and its inner unitaristic structure ruled by the Islamic fundamentalist regime. This is not fair, and could be said that this is a malicious and cunning maneuver, to present this as an unconditional standpoint of Deronjic and SDS. This must have been written by an intern, not by the distinguished judges. But, let us see what the favourite witnesses of the Prosecution, KDZ605 said about the prospectives of the common life in the independent BiH, and how the Serbs would be treated:**

Prior to the elections the Serbs held most of the key and influential positions in the municipality. The Serbs were told that they would be replaced after the elections. The Serbs did not agree with that so they reacted openly and stated they were being threatened.(all in KDZ605 Amalgamated Statement, Exhibit P3183 (under seal), para.11. The SDA won the elections and the SDS came in second. The first problem that arose before the elections was that the Muslims wanted an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serbs disagreed and openly threatened war. This was never stated on television but it was often stated in SDA/SDS political meetings and discussions. Immediately after the elections, confrontations and arguments began between the different ethnic groups. People argued and had physical confrontations over politics. All in the: KDZ605 Amalgamated Statement, Exhibit P3183 (under seal), para.12.

Therefore, there was no any anti-muslim sentiment at the Serb community in Bratunac, but it was vice versa!

Deronjić explained "[w]e in the SDS have plans that were prepared. I even have certain instructions how to act with regard to these questions".²²⁸⁸ After this, a meeting was held which was attended by directors of major companies, and Deronjić informed them that the Bosnian Serbs should live separately, that there were plans, and that Bratunac **(Exactly, Bratunac wasn't envisaged to belong to the Serbs entirely,**

²²⁸⁷ Dževad Gušić, T. 17790–17792 (24 August 2011).

²²⁸⁸ Dževad Gušić, T. 17791 (24 August 2011).

but to be divided in two ethnic municipalities) and BiH should be divided.²²⁸⁹ So, the Deronjić's material is excluded from this case, but brought back in a worse version, through the false and biased testimonies of his direct political opponents. Again, all what Deronjić allegedly said was in the response of the Muslim try to take BH out of Yugoslavia and keep it as a unitary state, endangering the existence of the Serbs as a nation. But, look at D04544, @ @ @ an intercepted conversation of Karadzic-Zulfikarpasic, to see that the Serbs wanted to live with Muslims, but not under their domination and rule of the Islamic fundamentalists. It was not only Zulfikarpasic and his Party (MBO) but all the secular intelligentsia and other political parties of the Muslim provenance. But, the main issue is that the Chamber considers every single fact or event out of the general context, and also every municipality separately. The division of BiH was proposed by the SDA leader and the President of the Presidency of BiH Alija Izetbegovic in May 1991. See: D01282, see D04657, agreement of the three to monitor situation, 27 Aug 91. At the same time, the Zagreb "jutarnji (or Vecernji) list proposed cantonisation, which B. Plavsic recommended for consideration. see D01650, the Accused and A. Zulfikarpasic, agreeing against division of BiH, but when Izetbegovic rejected it, then the division was the only solution, unless BiH stayed in Yugoslavia.

705. At the beginning of April 1992, in a meeting between SDS and SDA representatives, Deronjić reiterated that the police should be divided and that separate Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb police units should be formed.²²⁹⁰ When the SDA representatives opposed the idea as it would lead to greater tensions, Deronjić threatened that if they did not comply "Muslims would disappear".²²⁹¹ This is rubbish, taken from the Accused's speech from October 91. Which never was a treat, but warning. How possibly the Muslims could disappear if they had been offered to form their municipality and enjoy as much rights as the Serbs? As we already know, an agreement on formation of the two municipalities was reached. The main concern of the Serbs was not to be dominated by the Muslims, not whether the Muslims will have their municipality and their authorities. So, this witness is more than dubious, and certainly a direct enemy of the Serbs, and the Chamber pays him full credit. As a matter of fact, all what Deronjić proposed was already agreed in the Conference, and the Serb MUP (police) had been established.

706. Deronjić said that if the Bosnian Muslim representatives agreed to the division, it "would be the best way for the Muslims to prevent violence from breaking out".²²⁹²

²²⁸⁹ Dževad Gušić, T. 17791 (24 August 2011). Gušić stated that when he spoke to an SDA official about the division of BiH, the SDA official said that the Accused had told him "we'll have to split up. There's no other way out" and the Accused insisted on this division even when he was told that Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, and Bosnian Croats lived together in the same buildings. P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 11–12. However, Gušić clarified that the SDA official later spoke to him and was not sure whether he had spoken to the Accused or to another official. Dževad Gušić, T. 17778–17779, 17783–17785, 17810 (24 August 2011). Given this qualification, and the hearsay nature of the evidence, the Chamber does not consider that it can rely on it solely, in the absence of further corroboration, to determine whether or not it was the Accused who made such a statement. Simić stated that the proposed division of the municipality contributed to easing tensions and improved security. D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), paras. 32–33. The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 2268 as to why it does not consider Simić's evidence as to the effect of the proposed division of the municipality to be reliable.

²²⁹⁰ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 31; Dževad Gušić, T. 17793–17794 (24 August 2011); P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 26 (under seal).

²²⁹¹ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 32; Dževad Gušić, T. 17793 (24 August 2011).

²²⁹² P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 31a–32, 36, 39; Dževad Gušić, T. 17793–17794 (24 August 2011). Gušić further testified that Deronjić said that the Accused himself had strongly pressured him to have the police in Bratunac divided and would be pleased if the division was agreed. However, the Chamber in the absence of further corroboration does not rely on this evidence with respect to the involvement of the Accused. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber had regard to evidence that while Deronjić was very close to the Accused, he often used the Accused's name in negotiations "as a lever" to get agreement for his demands. P3196 (Witness

#Exculpatory#! The SDS representatives also promised that if the police was split, the JNA would remove weapons from the surrounding hills and the town and non-Serbs would be protected.²²⁹³ **A flagrant proof that Deronjic wanted to avoid violence. But this partition of the evidence and the course of events is unacceptable and not serious, and is on the account of the Accused. Another word, the Chamber is “establishing” a fake history of the war! Beside that, in all the documents of ICFY until that moment there was envisaged the separate police!#!**

707. The SDA representatives initially refused to divide the police, following which the situation in Bratunac deteriorated even further.²²⁹⁴ However, on 8 April 1992, after Deronjić had guaranteed that there would be peace and security in Bratunac, the SDA agreed to the split.²²⁹⁵ This agreement also provided for equal numbers of Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim policemen and that both SJBs should guarantee the peace and safety of all citizens.²²⁹⁶ The decision on the separation of the police was adopted at a meeting of the Municipal Assembly.²²⁹⁷ **EXCULPATORY#! All in accordance with the results of the Conference! Even there was an agreement on forming two ethnic municipalities reached, and such a development would completely exclude any possibility of violence or ethnic cleansing!**

708. The Bosnian Serb police left the police building and moved into the primary school next to the municipality building while the Bosnian Muslim police remained in the police station.²²⁹⁸ Following this separation, Milutin Milošević who had been working in Serbia was appointed as head of the Bosnian Serb police²²⁹⁹ and it was agreed that joint patrols would operate in Bratunac town while separate patrols would be carried out in Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim villages.²³⁰⁰ **EXCULPATORY#!**

709. After the Bosnian Serbs established their own police force, they also set up additional barricades and check-points, and carried out attacks with firearms and explosives; two coffee bars, one owned by a Bosnian Muslim and another by a Bosnian Croat were blown up.²³⁰¹ Bosnian Muslims also established check-points around their villages.²³⁰² **This**

statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 40–41; Dževad Gušić, T. 17793 (24 August 2011); D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 28; Rodoljub Đukanović, T. 36173 (27 March 2013); D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 29; Jovan Nikolić, T. 35485–35486, 35490–35491 (14 March 2013).

²²⁹³ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 26 (under seal). See also Dževad Gušić, T. 17794 (24 August 2011).

²²⁹⁴ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 11; P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 36.

²²⁹⁵ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 36; Dževad Gušić, T. 17793 (24 August 2011). See also D3174 (Witness statement of Vujadin Stević dated 23 March 2013), para. 13; D297 (Agreement between SDA and SDS on division of Bratunac Municipality, 8 April 1992), p. 1.

²²⁹⁶ D297 (Agreement between SDA and SDS on division of Bratunac Municipality, 8 April 1992), p. 2. See also Milenko Katanić, T. 24520 (10 February 2012).

²²⁹⁷ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 39.

²²⁹⁸ D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 34; Suad Džafić, T. 18178–17179 (1 September 2011); D3852 (Witness statement of Mirko Perić dated 1 July 2013), para. 5; Vujadin Stević, T. 36059 (26 March 2013); D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), paras. 15–16; Srbslav Davidović, T. 24377 (9 February 2012).

²²⁹⁹ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 37–38; D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 33; D3852 (Witness statement of Mirko Perić dated 1 July 2013), para. 7; D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), paras. 9, 16. Luka Bogdanović was the commander of the police, Branimir Tešić was deputy commander. D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), para. 15.

²³⁰⁰ D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 34. See also D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 31; D3852 (Witness statement of Mirko Perić dated 1 July 2013), paras. 4–5.

²³⁰¹ See Adjudicated Fact 2308. See also P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 64. Defence witnesses testified that they had no knowledge about the existence of barricades or of any attacks against coffee bars. D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 59; D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 87; D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), para. 42. The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 2248, 2268, and 2336 as to why it does not find the evidence of these witnesses to be reliable with respect to these attacks and the establishment of barricades.

is totali unacceptable to dismiss several Serb witnesses and accept an adjudicated fact, adjudicated in anoter case, and the Muslim witnesses with an interest in the case. After all, had there been those two explosions, that certainly would be noted in all the media as a deterioration of situation. Since it was after 8 April, there was already the war throughout BiH, but the Chamber implies as if the Serbs weren't faitfull to the agreement. Certainly, even if there was an explosion, the Chamber lackes to indicate who was responsible and certainly not that the Serb authorities were responsible.

710. Bosnian Serbs also asked for the division of Bratunac into two municipalities but the SDA representatives did not agree to this proposal.²³⁰³ It was practically impossible to divide the territory of the municipality given the distribution of Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim villages and of mixed villages, which were neighbouring each other.²³⁰⁴ The division of the police and of businesses, as well as the attempt to divide the municipality in general increased tensions between the communities.²³⁰⁵ **This is ridiculous! There was a fierce fighting all over BiH at that time, certainly in Zvornik as the closest geographically, and that is what incrised the tensions, not the division of the police in Bratunac. But, stil this was not the case in Bratunac, and there was the division of the municipality, i.e. forming of the two municipalities, both in Bratunac and in neighbouring Vlasenica. We remember the letter of a Muslim lady Rabija Subic, the Chairwoman of the Socialist Party of BiH, to Izetbegovic, blaming him for not encouraging other municipalities to follow the Bratunac-Vlasenica example.**

iii. Take-over of Bratunac

711. There was increasing fear that Bratunac would be taken over by Serb Forces after news was received about what had happened in Bijeljina and Zvornik.²³⁰⁶ Given the increasing tensions in Bratunac, in April 1992 a joint meeting was organised by the SDA and SDS leadership with prominent citizens of Bratunac to discuss the political and security situation in the municipality.²³⁰⁷ **EXCULPATORY#!** Deronjić addressed those who attended this meeting and told them: “[i]f it has to be that conflicts break out all over Bosnia then we will do our best to ensure that Bratunac is the last place where this will happen”.²³⁰⁸ **EXCULPATORY#!** During this meeting the Bosnian Serb representatives were asked about why they “were rushing into war”, why the JNA was training “Serbian civilians” in the handling of weapons and why heavy artillery had been deployed and pointed at Bratunac.²³⁰⁹ **(What civilians? These were a regular reservists uder the competence of the JNA, and had the Muslim civilians responded to the mobilisation calls, they would have been trained too! But, they went to Croatia, to train and fight against the JNA**

²³⁰² Momir Nikolić, T. 24711–24712 (14 February 2012).

²³⁰³ D3174 (Witness statement of Vujadin Stević dated 23 March 2013), para. 10; Vujadin Stević, T. 36059 (26 March 2013); KDZ605, T. 17888–17889 (25 August 2011). *See also* Momir Nikolić, T. 24710–24711 (14 February 2012); Milenko Katanić, T. 24521 (10 February 2012); D3690 (Witness statement of Nedo Nikolić dated 8 June 2013), para. 5. The Chamber noted inconsistencies in Defence evidence as to whether or not there was an agreement on the division of the municipality. D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 33; D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 30; D297 (Agreement between SDA and SDS on division of Bratunac Municipality, 8 April 1992).

²³⁰⁴ Momir Nikolić, T. 24711 (14 February 2012). *See also* Milenko Katanić, T. 24517–24518 (10 February 2012).

²³⁰⁵ Momir Nikolić, T. 24710–24711 (14 February 2012).

²³⁰⁶ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 43a. **A favourit witnesses, can say whatever they wanted!**

²³⁰⁷ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 28, 29c; P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 16 (under seal).

²³⁰⁸ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 16 (under seal).

²³⁰⁹ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 28. **Uncorroborated!**

and Serbs, and to implement it in Bratunac, see@) The Bosnian Serb representatives gave vague responses and assured them that there was no need to worry.²³¹⁰ After this meeting it was decided that a joint-declaration would be issued by SDS and SDA representatives on the “peaceful co-existence” of all citizens in Bratunac in order to reassure the population.²³¹¹ **EXCULPATORY#! While there were fights all over the BiH, in Bratunac there was a relative peace. But we saw (D00387) that it was more than a year as the Muslims prepared their reserve in Croatia, in order to enlarge the number of the reserve police. The Bratunac SDA President must have known that. However, it is ridiculous to ask the SDS why the JNA is deployed along the Drina River, i.e. along the border. The JNA had its own interests to protect bridges and border. NO TAKE-OVER, NO SERB AGGRESSIVE MOVES. AGREED SEPARATION OF MUNICIPALITIES.**

712. The Bratunac Crisis Staff adopted a decision which proclaimed a state of emergency and provided that it would temporarily take over the competencies of the organs of the Assembly and the Executive Board, which would cease to operate.²³¹² **Regulated by the law!** On 13 April 1992, on the basis of the state of emergency,²³¹³ the Bratunac Crisis Staff decided that the Bratunac TO and the SJB would take over the defence of the Serb municipality of Bratunac.²³¹⁴ **Exactly, ONLY THE SERB MUNICIPALITY OF BRATUNAC, and that was the reason to form two ethnic municipalities, so that there wouldn't be a confusion or incidental clashes, and to defend the Serb municipality of Bratunac didn't comprise the Muslim municipality of Bratunac. Was Bratunac on the Moon, or in the BiH? See what happened in the BiH before those days:**

a) Izetbegovic proclaimed the general mobilisation on 4 April 92, and this included Bratunac municipality too; See:D00392 the very same day the National Security Council issued Statement against this dangerous move, see D00394; the very same day Karadzic and Krajisnik sent the letter to H.E. Ambassador Cutileiro about the same, see D01189

b) April 5 the Government of BiH, ministry for Defence (Min. J. Doko) reiterated the order of mobilisation, see: D00397;

c) General Kukanjac, the Commander of the 2nd Military District ordered to his units throughout the Military district 2 the highest readiness and emergency state, see D03679; the next day, April 5, General Kukanjac proclaimed the general mobilization, and this included Bratunac municipality too. See:D01386

d) April 8 the Muslim-Croat part of the Presidency replaced General Vukosavljevic from the post of the Commander of the Territorial defence of BiH and nominated col. Hasan Efendic; See:D393:

- on disbanding the previous Republican Territorial Defence Staff and forming a Territorial Defence Staff of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

²³¹⁰ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 28–29a.

²³¹¹ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 29–29c.

²³¹² P3202 (Decision of Bratunac Crisis Staff, 1992), p. 1; D2061 (List of decisions and orders issued by the Crisis Staff, War Staff, and Wartime Presidency of Bratunac Municipality, 29 August 1992), p. 1. See also P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 60.

²³¹³ D3123 (Order of Bratunac Crisis Staff, 13 April 1992), p. 1; Aleksandar Tešić, T. 35341 (13 March 2013).

²³¹⁴ D2061 (List of decisions and orders issued by the Crisis Staff, War Staff, and Wartime Presidency of Bratunac Municipality, 29 August 1992), p. 4; P3202 (Decision of Bratunac Crisis Staff, 1992), pp. 1–2. [REDACTED].

The Presidency relieved from duty Colonel General Drago VUKOSAVLJEVIĆ, previously Commander of the Republican Territorial Defence Staff of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Lieutenant Colonel Fikret JAHIĆ, Chief of the Republican Territorial Defence Staff of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Presidency appointed Colonel Hasan EFENDIĆ Commander of the Territorial Defence Staff of the Republic of BH, and Colonel Stjepan ŠIBER Chief of Staff of the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

d) 8 April the Muslim-Croat presidency formed a new Territorial defence without the Serbs, and proclaimed the state of emergency and the state of imminent war, marking the Serbs and JNA as the enemies See:D393;

e) the Serb side nominated the (temporary) commander of the SerbTO on 15 April, se:D03709

f) April 18 the Defense Minister of the SerBiH Bogdan Subotic re-established the Serb TO, and proclaimed the state of emergency, and proclaimed the general mobilisation, see: D03703

So, the entire chain of a very dramatic events pertaining to the entire BiH is missed from the Chamber's presentation of the situation in Bratunac. And there is no chance to comprehend what really happened, for what reasons. By removing so drastic reasons for a lawful defensive measures, the Chamber accepted the manner of the Prosecution, to depict all and every Serb move as a crime.

713. On 16 April 1992, following an order by the Presidency of the SerBiH, the Bratunac Crisis Staff issued an order for general mobilisation and also required military conscripts assigned to Bratunac TO units to immediately respond to the mobilisation.²³¹⁵ Only the Bosnian Serb population was mobilised and the Bosnian Muslim population did not receive the call-up papers.²³¹⁶ **(This is how the Chamber adopted Prosecutor's obscure formulations about the Serb responsibility for this event: the Muslims didn't allow the JNA or TO to take the registry cards, and therefore nobody got call-up papers. Further, the Muslims had been already called up for mobilisation many times, and didn't respond, and finally, they had been mobilized on 4 April by the Muslim Government and President. The JNA Commander of 2nd Military District (General Kukanjac) responded by the general mobilisation on 5 April, which was obligatory to all, the Serb, Muslim and Croat conscripts and reservist, see: D01386, but only the Serbs responded to this call-up. So, the Serb municipality of Bratunac, or any other municipality, got the order to mobilise – from the only legal army, the JNA, then from the Muslim/Croat part of Presidency, and from the local authorities. The only responsible for this mess was the SDA Muslim leadership!#SHIFTING RESPONSIBILITY, NEGLECTING FACTS AND CONTEXT#!**

714. On or about 17 April 1992, Serb Forces entered the town of Bratunac without facing any resistance from Bosnian Muslims and formed a guard around the Hotel Fontana.²³¹⁷ The Serb Forces consisted of JNA troops from the Novi Sad and Užice Corps, TO members, and local reservists and were joined later by heavily armed paramilitary units from Serbia, including the White Eagles, Šešelj's men, and Arkan's men.²³¹⁸ Members of the SJB also provided support.²³¹⁹ Local Bosnian Serbs also joined the paramilitary units, including Arkan's men and the White Eagles, while others joined JNA reserve units.²³²⁰ **No court all over the world is supposed to qualify the "Serb Forces" that way, and in the occasion of this Accused in particular! Within the Novi Sad and Užice Corps there were soldiers of all national and ethnic origin. What does it mean "the Serb Forces" consisted of the JNA? Who was in command of those "Serb Forces"? What has to be done to make the Chamber and the entire Tribunal aware of the facts: a) the JNA was withdrawing towards Yugoslavia! b) Even at this time the JNA was still the only legitimate force, because there was no agreement for the withdrawal! c) All others, the**

²³¹⁵ P4383 (Order of Bratunac Crisis Staff, 16 April 1992), p. 1; D2061 (List of decisions and orders issued by the Crisis Staff, War Staff, and Wartime Presidency of Bratunac Municipality, 29 August 1992), p. 4. See also Adjudicated Fact 2309; D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), para. 16. The SAO Birač Crisis Staff also proclaimed a state of war and, on 29 April 1992, ordered mobilisation in the entire SAO of Birač following mobilisation orders issued by the Ministry of Defence on 16 April 1992. P2615 (Decision of Birač Crisis Staff, 29 April 1992); P2412 (Decision of SerBiH Ministry of Defence, 16 April 1992).

²³¹⁶ P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 23. See also Suad Džafić, T. 18185–18187 (1 September 2011).

²³¹⁷ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 50, 53b, 61, 73; Dževad Gušić, T. 17782, 17831 (24 August 2011); KDZ605, T. 17903 (25 August 2011). See also D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 29; D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 35; Aleksandar Tešić, T. 35334 (13 March 2013).

²³¹⁸ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 5; P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 22, 24, 31 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17896–17897 (25 August 2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 2309; Srblav Davidović, T. 24371–24372 (9 February 2012); Milenko Katanić, T. 24531–24532 (10 February 2012); D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), para. 48. Jovan Nikolić stated that the JNA arrived in Bratunac to calm down the situation in agreement with the municipal organs. D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 37. The Chamber does not consider the evidence of Nikolić to be reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 2256 and notes that his evidence is equivocal as to who tasked the JNA with calming down the situation in the municipality. The Chamber does not find the evidence of Simić and Nikolić that the municipal authorities were not aware of, and were even shocked by the arrival of the paramilitaries to be reliable. D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), paras. 35–37. See also D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), paras. 35–36. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 2256, 2268.

²³¹⁹ Dževad Gušić, T. 17782 (24 August 2011). See also P2761 (RS MUP report on work for period April to December 1992), p. 7.

²³²⁰ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 9; Suad Džafić, T. 18186–18187 (1 September 2011).

TO, voluntaries, reservists, were parts of the JNA formation and subjugated to the JNA, and were supposed to act independently only in an absence of the JNA. Only if this is an Indictment and Judgment against the entire Serbian people, the term “Serb Forces” would mean “composed mainly of Serbs”.

715. The Bosnian Muslim leadership in the municipality met to discuss the developments which were contrary to the assurances they had received from the SDS that no external unit would enter the municipality.²³²¹ Deronjić later informed the Bosnian Muslim leadership that some military formations had entered Bratunac and directed them to a meeting at the Hotel Fontana with the officers of the “Serbian army units”.²³²² **Deronjić couldn’t guarantee anything concerning the JNA, nor there were any “Serbian army units” before 20th May 92. The Chamber is literally accepting every single lie of the SDA leaders. It is well known that the SDA attacked the JNA in the entrance of Bratunac, and caused a clash and war first against the JNA, and later against the Serbs from Bratunac.**

716. At this meeting, the Bosnian Muslim representatives were told by officers, who wore JNA and camouflage uniforms, that Bratunac was a “Serbian municipality and that they had taken power, that Serbian laws would be introduced”, that Bosnian Muslims could remain, and there would be no killings.²³²³ **Although the Muslims started to form their own municipality, and already formed the police station, “the officers who wore the JNA uniforms told them that they may remain even in the Serb part of municipality... #EXCULPATORY!!!** These officers warned however, that if a Bosnian Muslim “fired so much as a single bullet they would eliminate the whole of his family”.²³²⁴ They told the Bosnian Muslim representatives to draw up a list of Bosnian Muslims in the municipality and that they would “settle accounts with them”.²³²⁵ As the Bosnian Muslims left this meeting, they saw 40 to 50 uniformed local Bosnian Serbs being issued with weapons.²³²⁶ A deadline was also given for the surrender of weapons,²³²⁷ and non-Serbs then handed over hunting rifles and some private weapons.²³²⁸ **The JNA had every right to replenish its manpower by those who belonged to the JNA. It has nothing to do with the Accused.**

717. On 19 April 1992, the Bratunac Crisis Staff issued a decision authorising the Bratunac SJB and Bratunac TO to disarm citizens.²³²⁹ **#EXCULPATORY#! There was a legal possibility to keep the weapons only if associated with the JNA, but the Muslims rejected the call-up for mobilisation, which was oral and general, obligatory to every conscript and reservist!** While the decision did not specify which citizens were to be disarmed,²³³⁰ in practice only Bosnian Muslims were disarmed.²³³¹ On 25 April 1992, Mićo

²³²¹ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 50, 61.

²³²² P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 52–53a, 61.

²³²³ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 53.

²³²⁴ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 53.

²³²⁵ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 54. *See also* D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 30; Rodoljub Đukanović, T. 36186 (27 March 2013); D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 35.

²³²⁶ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 56.

²³²⁷ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 54.

²³²⁸ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 26 (under seal).

²³²⁹ P4377 (Order of Bratunac Crisis Staff, 19 April 1992), p. 1; D2061 (List of decisions and orders issued by the Crisis Staff, War Staff, and Wartime Presidency of Bratunac Municipality, 29 August 1992), p. 1.

²³³⁰ P4377 (Order of Bratunac Crisis Staff, 19 April 1992), p. 1.

²³³¹ P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 24. *See also* P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 14; Mušan Talović, T. 17659 (22 August 2011).

Stanišić reported that weapons were handed over in the area of Bratunac.²³³²
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718. The Bosnian Muslim representatives met again with Deronjić who tried to convince them that “everything would be all right”.²³³³ However, on the same day, Deronjić arrived with some officers at the police station, kicked the doors open and searched for weapons.²³³⁴ One soldier threatened to throw a grenade if the Bosnian Muslim representatives did not obey and Gušić was ordered to compile a list of Bosnian Muslim extremists and nationalists by the next morning.²³³⁵ The police station was taken over, the members of the Bosnian Muslim police were disarmed and sent home, and the Bosnian Serb police and new civilian recruits started wearing their own uniforms with Serb insignia.²³³⁶

Now it is clear why Dzevad Gusic is allocating all the responsibility to the Serb counterparts, because he was blamed by the SDA for failing to take over Bratunac. No matter what, all the talks went on among the local leaders, and it has nothing to do with the Accused. According to the All-people Defence Law, any local leadership is responsible for security of their population! There is no president who could order them not to take precautionary measures and organize defence!

i. Developments in Bratunac after take-over

719. On 17 April 1992, threatened by Serb paramilitaries and aware of the situation in other municipalities, the Bosnian Muslim leadership left Bratunac.²³³⁷ Serb soldiers looted

²³³² P2749 (SerBiH MUP daily report, 25 April 1992), p. 3.

²³³³ P3196 (Witness statement of Dzevad Gušić undated), para. 57.

²³³⁴ P3196 (Witness statement of Dzevad Gušić undated), para. 58.

²³³⁵ P3196 (Witness statement of Dzevad Gušić undated), para. 58.

²³³⁶ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 27–28 (under seal); *see* Adjudicated Fact 2308. Defence witnesses testified *inter alia* that (i) the Bosnian Muslim police wanted to set up a new police station; (ii) the Bosnian Serb police only took over the police station after the Bosnian Muslim police had abandoned it. Rodoljub Đukanović, T. 36142 (27 March 2013); D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 36–37; D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 40; D3852 (Witness statement of Mirko Perić dated 1 July 2013), para. 7; D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), paras. 17–19, 43; D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 38. Having reviewed their testimony, the Chamber does not find that their evidence with respect to the circumstances surrounding the take-over of weapons and the police building to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 2248 and 2256 with respect to Đukanović and Nikolić. The Chamber further notes that the testimony of Branimir Tešić and Perić were also marked by extreme evasiveness, contradictions and indicators of bias and attempts to mislead the Chamber.

²³³⁷ *See* Adjudicated Fact 2310; KDZ605, T. 17910 (25 August 2011). *See also* D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 38; D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 37; P3196 (Witness statement of Dzevad Gušić undated), paras. 63, 65–66, 70. The Bosnian Muslim leaders while stopped at a check-point were provided an escort out of Bratunac. *But see* D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 88. While Simić stated that he was not aware of any threats, this is not determinative of whether such threats were made. He did acknowledge that prominent Bosnian Muslims left after Bosnian Serb refugees from Srebrenica started arriving in the municipality. The Chamber finds however, that by July 1992, the Bosnian Muslim authorities had re-established some structures for Bratunac such as a TO, a War Presidency, and a military police and that measures were taken to establish Bosnian Muslim forces in the municipality. D4707 (Decisions of Bratunac TO Municipal Staff, 16 July 1992); D1596 (Order of ABiH General Staff, 10 July 1992), p. 1. **This fn. compromised a common sense, and completely justifies everything that the Serbs from Bratunac did then and in the next year. The Serbs had offered to the Bratunac Muslims to form their municipality and their police, all as a civilian structures, parallel to such structures on the Serb side, which would guarantee both of them a peace and equality. However, the Chamber thinks that it was OK, and that they shouldn't be disturbed to form their military formations, which would guarantee a war. ### In spite of a horrifying events in May 92, the rest of the Bratunac Muslims remained and formed their organs after the former leadership left. But what they formed wasn't aimed for the co-existence with the Serbs, but for the war. Until April 93 the two third of the Bratunac territory was under control of the Muslim forces. D01596 clearly shows**

abandoned Bosnian Muslim properties.²³³⁸ **They asked the Serbs for an escort, and got one, see# : For this move, the local SDA leaders had been accused for a treason by their own Party. For that reason they were interested in presenting as if they couldn't do anything more#! Anyway, the Serbs didn't "take-over" anything but the Serb municipality of Bratunac. The same was in many municip[alities with a substantial presence of both ethnic groups, like Prijedor, Kljuc, Sanski Most, Rogatica, Vlasenica, Foca, some of them with an agreement between the sides, although these municipalities had already been within the Republic of Srpska#!.**

720. The situation in Bratunac was relatively calm between 18 and 29 April 1992. **EXCULPATORY! How come? The Serb side was not interested in any turmoil!** At that time, people were called back to work and allowed to move freely in the town but most of the Bosnian Muslim population had already left in that period and many did not return to work as they were too afraid.²³³⁹ **They left without any force, as many Serbs did!** The Bosnian Serb authorities also announced that Bosnian Muslims who left the area could come back, sign loyalty pledges to the new Bosnian Serb authorities in Bratunac, and be protected; **EXCULPATORY!** however, if they did not return, "the safety of their personal property could not be guaranteed".^{2340 (2340)} **No sufficient police officers to guard it! But, everything the Serb authorities did was to restore the peace and safe life, calling the refugees and employees back, still assuming that the two communities and two municipalities could have co-existed.**

721. The deadline for Bosnian Muslims to sign documents pledging their loyalty to the Serb Municipality of Bratunac was 29 April 1992.²³⁴¹ Most Bosnian Muslims had left Bratunac by this e.²³⁴² Most of those who remained signed these documents because they

that while the Serb authorities in Podrinje were in favour of the co-existence, the Muslim side prepared an overall war in Podrinje, with the ambition of "liberating the area completely" from the Serbs.

²³³⁸ Adjudicated Fact 2313. *See also* P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 33–34 (under seal). Defence witnesses testified that only paramilitaries were involved in looting and both Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim properties were looted and that the police prevented looting as much as they could. D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 60; D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), para. 44; D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), para. 44. The Chamber does not find the evidence of these witnesses as to who was involved in looting, and whether the police tried to prevent looting to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 2248 and 2336 with respect to Đukanović and Branimir Tešić. Further the Chamber notes that the evidence of Aleksandar Tešić was marked by indicators of evasiveness and contradictions which undermined his evidence in this regard. **This is completely wrong! Is the Chamber's position that the legal authorities looted the Muslim and Serb homes? And only due to their impression about the witnesses? Already it is clear that those who composed the Judgment on behalf of the Chamber, probably interns, were not objective, professional, experienced and neutral. This is horrible.**

²³³⁹ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 36 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17911 (25 August 2011).

²³⁴⁰ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 35, 37–39 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17911–17912 (25 August 2011).

²³⁴¹ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 35 (under seal). *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2311.

²³⁴² ⁽²³⁴²⁾ *See* Adjudicated Fact 2312; P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 61, 80 (stating that in the first month of military occupation 21,000 Bosnian Muslims were "expelled"). *But see* D3174 (Witness statement of Vujadin Stević dated 23 March 2013), para. 37 (stating that Bosnian Muslims did not start leaving in large numbers before May 1992). The Chamber notes that Stević's evidence was marked by contradictions, evasiveness, and indicators of bias which undermine the reliability of his evidence in this regard. The Chamber also notes that the evidence that both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs left Bratunac is not inconsistent with Adjudicated Fact 2312. D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 89; D3690 (Witness statement of Nedo Nikolić dated 8 June 2013), para. 6. **Then, if it is the Chamber's position, nothing that happened "during the first month of military occupation has nothing to do with the SDS or the local authorities, since the JNA was present there until 20 May 92, and there was no military authority above them.**

were afraid and felt they had no choice.²³⁴³ (#They had a choice, either to live in the Muslim municipality of Bratunac, which comprised 80% of the former municipality, or to stay in the Serb municipality, accepting the laws and regulations! The agreement on the two municipalities arrangement had already been reached!, still, no matter they would have their municipality, they were invited to stay with the Serbs! After this deadline had passed, Bosnian Muslim homes continued to be searched, their property stolen and more Bosnian Muslims were killed.²³⁴⁴ By whom, when, how? But, this is a lie, since the first skirmishes appear on 3 May in village Hranca, in which the Muslims ambushed the JNA! Such a skipping a significant cause, and presentation a consequence without cause must be forbidden legal manoeuvre, which shouldn't be allowed even to a prosecutor, let alone a chamber! #“Somebody killed somebody”!#)

722. One or two days after the remaining Bosnian Muslim population had signed these loyalty oaths, announcements were made with the use of loudspeakers on military vehicles that all men were to assemble in town.²³⁴⁵ A JNA officer accompanied by a dozen soldiers told the Bosnian Muslims that all weapons had to be surrendered in order for their freedom and safety to be guaranteed.²³⁴⁶ (Any JNA action, while the JNA was in charge in this area, i. e. until 20 May, has nothing to do with this Accused, or the local Serbs. The JNA couldn't afford itself to have a hostile armed forces on it's area of responsibility, behind their back. No army would allow it.)

723. After the Serb Forces arrived in Bratunac, Bosnian Muslims in factories and municipal bodies were fired from their jobs (This is fake and uncorroborated! No company was working, and the personal changes happened only in the new municipal organs, since there had been formed two municipalities) and all key positions in the local government were taken over by Bosnian Serbs.²³⁴⁷ (This is unacceptable skipping of the crucial events. On 3rd May in the suburb of Bratunac, called Hranca, the Muslim forces made a massive ambush to the JNA withdrawing to Yugoslavia. It was completely unnecessary, since there was a period of succesfull negotiating. This skirmish was between the Muslim forces organized for a war, not for a peace, on the order from Sarajevo) At the 17th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly on 26 July 1992, Rajko Dukić stated that he hoped they would not be judged for having expelled all Muslim judges from the municipalities of Vlasenica, Bratunac, and Zvornik.²³⁴⁸ (That was a very nice concern of Mr. Dukic, No. 2 in the SDS, and No. 1 in Birac region, but until that time the Muslims had slaughtered two very prominent Serbian judges. There would be more concern for the Muslim judges had they stayed there, because who could guarantee there wouldn't be a revenge? Serb Forces began patrolling Bratunac and took away the most prominent Bosnian Muslims, some of whom were detained at the Vuk Karadžić School.²³⁴⁹ All arbitrary and incomplete! Why would the Serb authorities

²³⁴³ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 35 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17909, 17912 (25 August 2011).

²³⁴⁴ (²³⁴⁴) P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 40, 42 (under seal). The Chamber also received evidence that approximately 1,000 Bosnian Muslims were killed in Bratunac in the first month of military occupation. (#The first month of military occupation is not a responsibility of the Republika Srpska organs and structures, it should be noted once and for all! P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 61, 80; Dževad Gušić, T. 17781 (24 August 2011). The Chamber notes that with the exception of the scheduled killings in specific villages, these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.

²³⁴⁵ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 41 (under seal).

²³⁴⁶ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 41 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17913 (25 August 2011).

²³⁴⁷ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 6; Suad Džafić, T. 18184 (1 September 2011).

²³⁴⁸ D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24-26 July 1992), p. 72.

²³⁴⁹ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), paras. 6-8. See also Suad Džafić, T. 18193 (1 September 2011).

detain and feed an ordinary people, if there was no a security reasons. The Chamber didn't differentiate the reasons for somebody's detention, nor accepted the Defence witnesses testimonies.

724. On or around the night of 9 May 1992, there was shooting mostly from the direction of Bratunac towards Srebrenica and the village of Mihaljevići, which was above the Drina on the border with Serbia, was burnt.²³⁵⁰ Following this incident, a number of Bosnian Serb families moved to Serbia.²³⁵¹ **Why would the Serb families escape to Serbia, if it was a Serb military action? The Chamber neglected a very famous fact, that on the eve of this day there was a military action of a group of Muslims, ambushing Judge and Member of the Bosnian Parliament Mr. Goran Zekic. Killing such a prominent member of the Serbian community initiated the war, and except the 3rd May skirmish between the JNA and Muslims in Hranca, there was a promising prospectivnes to preserve peace. This kind of skipping the context could facilitate conviction of anyone, but it is not just and legal.** Soldiers and paramilitaries were everywhere in Bratunac and Arkan's men were stationed at the Jasen hotel.²³⁵²

725. A large number of Bosnian Serb refugees from Srebrenica arrived in Bratunac in May 1992 and entered abandoned Bosnian Muslim homes.²³⁵³

726. On 17 June 1992, the appointment of members of the War Commission of Bratunac was confirmed by the Accused.²³⁵⁴ **(EXCULPATORY!!!** At the 43rd Session of the Bosnian Serb Government on 29 July 1992 it was reported that the security and political situation in Bratunac and Foča was "extremely complex" and that "all necessary steps should be taken to prevent conflict and protect the population".²³⁵⁵ **EXCULPATORY!**

727. However, by November 1992, at a meeting attended by Bosnian Serb leaders, including Branko Đerić and Bogdan Subotić, it was reported that the entire territory of Bratunac was under the control of Bosnian Muslim forces.²³⁵⁶ **(More precise, 80% of the municipal territory was under the Muslim control!)**

i. Attacks on surrounding villages

728. In the days following the take-over of Bratunac town, **(What "take over"? this contradicts to the previous paragraph and several footnotes and documents in them.**

²³⁵⁰ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 43, 45 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17913 (25 August 2011); Mirsada Malagić, T. 23505 (24 January 2012).

²³⁵¹ KDZ480, T. 24242 (7 February 2012). See also D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 41; D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), paras. 28, 43.

²³⁵² P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 44 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17903 (25 August 2011).

²³⁵³ Sribislav Davidović, T. 24389, 24392 (9 February 2012). See also P4394 (Article from The Independent entitled "Bosnian Serbs Flee Muslim Vengeance", 29 December 1992), p. 2. Simić stated that the arrival of a large number of Bosnian Serb refugees created an environment of "total chaos, because the civilian organs of authority were not functional". D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 47. While the Chamber finds that the arrival of these refugees created difficulties in the municipality, it does not consider that Simić's evidence that the civilian authorities were not functional to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 2268.

²³⁵⁴ P5491 (RS Presidency Confirmation of Appointment of Members of the War Commission in Bratunac, 17 June 1992).

²³⁵⁵ D452 (Minutes of 43rd session of Government of SerBiH, 29 July 1992), p. 7.

²³⁵⁶ D3696 (Minutes of RS Government session, 7 November 1992), p. 5. See also D2231 (Report of Tuzla District Defence Staff, 1 October 1992), p. 2 (relating to operations by Bosnian Muslim forces and their control of some territory in Bratunac, Vlasenica and Zvornik);

P4394 (Article from The Independent entitled "Bosnian Serbs Flee Muslim Vengeance", **EXCULPATORY!** 29 December 1992), p. 2; [REDACTED]. See Section IV.C.1: Srebrenica component (Facts), which addresses who was in control of areas of Bratunac in 1995.

Until springtime 1993 the Serbs controlled only 20% of Municipality, i.e. Serb parts of it!) Bosnian Serb paramilitary units went to the Bosnian Muslim villages surrounding Bratunac starting from the villages closest to the town and moving outwards.²³⁵⁷ The JNA and Bratunac TO were involved in disarming Bosnian Muslim villagers throughout Bratunac municipality.²³⁵⁸ **(Not accurate, and based on an Adjudicated fact! Only the Muslim villages within the Serb municipality of Bratunac, i.e. 20% of the Bratunac municipality, were to be disarmed, as the Serb civilians had to hand over their armament, unless they joined the JNA or TO.)** During these disarming operations paramilitaries “harassed locals and pillaged abandoned Muslim homes”.²³⁵⁹ **(How to defend from such an Adjudicated fact? What does it have to do with this Accused, who disowned and banned all the paramilitaries? No president all over the world would be safe from this kind of the “international justice”!)** They entered the villages and asked for weapons to be handed over. The villages were then attacked and set on fire while the villagers were sent to the Bratunac Football Stadium.²³⁶⁰ Many villagers were killed during these attacks.²³⁶¹ **Who was killed if didn’t fight the JNA and TO forces?**

729. In the village of Voljevci, barricades were set up.²³⁶² Prominent and educated people from the village were taken away and people were killed.²³⁶³ **(Not charged, because did not happen and no evidence!)** The population surrendered weapons in compliance with the ultimatum issued.²³⁶⁴ In May 1992, individuals who introduced themselves as the representatives of the “Serb people” came to Voljevci and told the population that they could no longer live in the village; they had to leave, go to the local commune in Pobrđe; and sign a statement to the effect that they were leaving their homes and property voluntarily and would never return there again.²³⁶⁵ The population was told they would be evacuated by bus towards Kladanj for their safety and security.²³⁶⁶ Some Bosnian Muslims decided not to sign the papers, and left the village for Srebrenica.²³⁶⁷ **All arbitrary and uncorroborated! Voljavca was a stronghold of the Muslim extremists, see how many prominent inhabitants of this village had been in the Muslim army: @ @ @**

²³⁵⁷ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 10.

²³⁵⁸ See Adjudicated Fact 2310; P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 24. Defence witnesses testified that the decision was taken to disarm people who had obtained weapons illegally and did not distinguish based on nationality.

EXCULPATORY! D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), paras. 20–21, 43; D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 38. However, the Chamber does not find their evidence to be reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion it refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 2236 and 2256.

²³⁵⁹ See Adjudicated Fact 2310.

²³⁶⁰ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 10. See also D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 43; P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 107 (under seal); see Adjudicated Fact 2329. But see D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 63; Rodoljub Đukanović, T. 36154–36155 (27 March 2013). Đukanović testified that he had no knowledge about the burning of specific Bosnian Muslim villages. The Chamber does not consider this qualified evidence to be of significance.

²³⁶¹ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 10. See also P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 107 (under seal). The Chamber notes that these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13. **Certainly, not charged, because didn’t happen, and couldn’t be proven!**

²³⁶² Mirsada Malagić, T. 23461–23462, 23503–23504 (24 January 2012).

²³⁶³ Mirsada Malagić, T. 23462 (24 January 2012). The Chamber notes that these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.

²³⁶⁴ Mirsada Malagić, T. 23498 (24 January 2012).

²³⁶⁵ Mirsada Malagić, T. 23458, 23495 (24 January 2012); Mirsada Malagić, P356 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krstić*), T. 1940–1941.

²³⁶⁶ Mirsada Malagić, T. 23458 (24 January 2012).

²³⁶⁷ Mirsada Malagić, T. 23458 (24 January 2012).

730. On 10 May 1992, Serb Forces attacked the Bosnian Muslim villages of Suha and Mihaljevići, near the town of Bratunac.²³⁶⁸ The village of Mihaljevići was set ablaze.²³⁶⁹

The Judgment skipped to depict the context: on 8 May and the next day the Muslim extremists killed Judge Goran Zekic, a very prominent Serb and deputy in the common parliament of BiH, and started an attack on everyone who used the only communication of Bratunac. (see para 740 of this Judgment) Those villages were strongholds of those extreme armed groups of the secret Muslim army, and thus they initiated a war against the JNA at first place, because no other units were supposed to act out of the JNA control!

731. The village of Krasanpolje was also attacked on 10 May 1992.²³⁷⁰ Houses were burnt, there was shooting, and a number of people were killed.²³⁷¹ **(Shooting? Unilateral? Is that “the whole truth”? The village of Krasanpolje was militarised, otherwise neither it would be of any interest of the JNA, nor there would be any exchange of fire! Anyway, president Karadžić didn’t have any command duty at that date!####)**

After the attack on Krasanpolje, Bosnian Muslims in the village of Vitkovići were told that it would be safer for them to flee to the woods, which they did.²³⁷² **(Told, by whom? If by the Serbs, as it looks like from the next sentences, then it is EXCULPATORY!)**

The villagers returned to Vitkovići after they were told the situation had calmed down.²³⁷³ The next day, the Bosnian Serb police patrolled Vitkovići to ensure the population remained in the village.²³⁷⁴ **EXCULPATORY!** Armed local Bosnian Serbs dressed in camouflage uniforms surrounded the village.²³⁷⁵

The Novi Sad Corps entered Vitkovići in search of weapons.²³⁷⁶ On 17 May 1992, Serb Forces shelled the Muslim settlement of Konjević Polje, near Hrnčići, and attacked it on 27 May.²³⁷⁷ **See this fn.: Konjevic Polje was a very known Muslim stronghold until April 1993. The Muslims from those places kept ambushing and killing all, the JNA and the “Serb Forces” and civilian drivers employed in the boxite mine, and any civilian.**

732. On 17 May 1992, the police chief came to Vitkovići and gave an ultimatum that all Bosnian Muslims in the village had to hand over their weapons, and if they did not do so, their safety could not be guaranteed.²³⁷⁸ Soldiers from the Novi Sad Corps entered and told the villagers they had to leave with whatever they could carry and gather by noon as they

²³⁶⁸ See Adjudicated Fact 2321.

²³⁶⁹ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 45 (under seal). Defence witnesses testified that this was part of a disarming operation and that the village was not torched. D3174 (Witness statement of Vujadin Stević dated 23 March 2013), paras. 23–25; Vujadin Stević, T. 36042–36043 (26 March 2013); D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), para. 24; D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), para. 26. The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 2336, 2338, and 2342 in concluding that the evidence of these witnesses is unreliable with respect to the attack on these villages.

²³⁷⁰ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 12. See also Adjudicated Fact 2325. Đukanović stated Krasanpolje was a majority Bosnian Serb village and that to his knowledge it was not burnt. D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 64. The Chamber notes that even if the village had a majority Bosnian Serb population, Đukanović’s qualified evidence does not undermine the accepted evidence that Bosnian Muslim homes in that village were attacked.

²³⁷¹ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 12; Suad Džafić, T. 18192 (1 September 2011). The Chamber notes however, that there is no scheduled killing incident with respect to this village.

²³⁷² P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 13; Suad Džafić, T. 18191 (1 September 2011).

²³⁷³ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 13.

²³⁷⁴ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 14.

²³⁷⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 2322.

²³⁷⁶ Suad Džafić, T. 18189 (1 September 2011).

²³⁷⁷ See Adjudicated Fact 2315. The Chamber finds that there was Bosnian Muslim resistance to the attack on Konjević Polje. Dževad Gušić, T. 17839–17840 (24 August 2011). See also Momir Nikolić, T. 24709 (14 February 2012).

²³⁷⁸ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 15; see Adjudicated Fact 2322; Suad Džafić, T. 18181 (1 September 2011) (testifying that the legally held weapons in the village had already been surrendered).

would be taken towards Tuzla.²³⁷⁹ **Obviously, the JNA still was there, and had a security problems with the armed villages! What does it have to do with the President?** Villagers from Vitkovići were loaded onto two buses by the Bosnian Serb police. Soldiers then started looting the houses and cattle.²³⁸⁰ **It is already well known that the Muslim leadership from Bratunac demanded that the civilians be escorted to the Muslim controlled territory, how this fact secpaped from the Chamber's attention?**

1. Scheduled Incident A.3.1

733. The Prosecution alleges that at least 12 people were killed in the village of Hranča between 3 and 9 May 1992. **What does it have to do with the President or any Bosnian Serb. This was an ambush of the Muslim secret army to the JNA which was peacefully withdrawing to Yugoslavia.**

734. Hranča is a village located to the west of Bratunac.²³⁸¹ The Chamber took judicial notice that on 3 May 1992, members of the Bratunac TO surrounded the Muslim village of Hranča and torched 43 houses.²³⁸² Over the following week, they attacked and arrested residents of Hranča. They captured nine villagers, and killed four of them, including a six year old girl.²³⁸³ **(HL##)(It has nothing to do with the TO Bratunac, unless it had been engaged by the JNA, which had been ambushed and attacked by the Muslim extremists, the same 3 May, while the second butchering of the JNA was going on in Sarajevo!# That is how it is with the Adjudicated facts! No matter, these "adjudicated facts" were rebuted by the Defence witnesses, but as a Serbs, they weren't "credible"! No mentioning of the ambush and JNA, which was attacked and defended itself! See: @ @ @ !**

735. The Chamber also took judicial notice that on 9 May 1992, members of the Bratunac TO shot eight Muslims.²³⁸⁴ **No TO was able to act independently in the presence of the JNA. But, the Chamber is taking judicial notes from other cases, in which it wasn't opposed or questioned. It is well known that the skirmishes on 3 May and later on 8 and 9 May were initiated by the Muslim combatants!** However, with respect to the killing of these eight victims, the Chamber is not satisfied that it has sufficient

²³⁷⁹ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 17; Suad Džafić, T. 18195–18196 (1 September 2011) (testifying that the Bosnian Muslims were not mistreated during this process); *see* Adjudicated Fact 2322.

²³⁸⁰ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 19; Suad Džafić, T. 18195 (1 September 2011); *see* Adjudicated Fact 2322.

²³⁸¹ P268 (Map of BiH marked by Mevludin Orić).

²³⁸² Adjudicated Fact 2316. *See also* Mirsada Malagić, T. 23504 (24 January 2012); P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 16; Mušan Talović, T. 17659–17660 (22 August 2011).

²³⁸³ *See* Adjudicated Fact 2317. *See also* P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 16; Mušan Talović, T. 17659–17660 (22 August 2011).

²³⁸⁴ Adjudicated Fact 2318. The Chamber notes that this figure corresponds to the number of individuals identified by Mašović who were reported to have gone missing on 9 May 1992 from Hranča and exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 2–5. Defence witnesses testified that there was a “firefight” following a Bosnian Muslim attack on a JNA column and also testified about those involved in this incident. D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 39; Rodoljub Đukanović, T. 36142 (27 March 2013); D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 43; D3852 (Witness statement of Mirko Perić dated 1 July 2013), para. 10; D3174 (Witness statement of Vujadin Stević dated 23 March 2013), para. 13; D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), paras. 20, 23, 46; D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), paras. 22–23; D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 56. *See also* D3690 (Witness statement of Nedo Nikolić dated 8 June 2013), paras. 8, 11; D1644 (Video footage of attack on JNA troops). Having reviewed this evidence, the Chamber does not consider the evidence of these witnesses in this regard to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 2248, 2256, 2268, 2336, 2338, and 2342 and also notes that their evidence is to a great extent based on hearsay information. *See also* Mušan Talović, T. 17660–17661 (22 August 2011) (denying any knowledge of an attack on a JNA column). In any event, the Chamber does not consider that the occurrence of an attack against a JNA column is of much significance.

evidence pertaining to their status and the circumstances in which they were shot and killed to make a finding with respect to this incident. **Thanks God! But the same is with all these “judicial notices” of something not established in this case in the courtroom!**

736. A total of 14 individuals from Hranča were exhumed from mass graves.²³⁸⁵ Six of them are reported to have gone missing after 9 May 1992 and as such cannot be linked to this scheduled incident.²³⁸⁶ **(Who said that? If some of the Muslim witnesses, it should have been checked! one of them are proven to be victims out of combat!**

737. The Chamber therefore finds that at least four people were killed by Serb Forces in the village of Hranča between 3 and 9 May 1992. **(## A well known ambush, no “Serb Forces”! Before May 20, there was no any Serb Forces” that would act out of the JNA control, nor president Karad’i} any armed force under his control! If the “Serb Forces” comprised the JNA Corps, then no way to defend! They may be killed, but within the combat initiated by the Muslims! And that was a very known and undoubtedly established attack from an ambush against the JNA while withdrawing to FRY, and the attack was a part of the serial of carnages of a helpless soldiers, such as: attempt to take-over Prijedor due to the cable of 29 April 92, attacks and carnages of the JNA soldiers on 2 and 3 May in Sarajevo (Dobrovolja~ka street) this ambush in Hran~a 3. May, murder of Judge Goran Zeki} in Bratunac 8. May, attacks from the Glogova village 9. May, attack on the column of JNA in Tuzla 15. May... How was it possible that the Chamber neglected established facts and circumstances, the truth that all of that were the Muslim attacks on the JNA, to which President Karad’i} didn’t have any command responsibility??? HL. ###)**

2. Scheduled Incident A.3.2

738. The Prosecution alleges that at least 65 men were killed in the village of Glogova on or about 9 May 1992.

739. The village of Glogova, which had a majority Bosnian Muslim population prior to the conflict, is located approximately 10 kilometres from Bratunac.²³⁸⁷ From 1 April 1992, members of the Bosnian Serb police walked around Glogova with loudspeakers and called on people to surrender weapons and promised their safety if they did so.²³⁸⁸ **EXCULPATORY!** Villagers were invited to surrender their weapons to the local SDS authorities.²³⁸⁹ **Because the village was within the Serb municipality of Bratunac!** As Bosnian Muslim villagers surrendered their weapons, JNA soldiers from the Novi Sad Corps shot in the air with automatic weapons.²³⁹⁰ The villagers were instructed to continue their daily activities without fear **EXCULPATORY!** but Mušan Talović was told by his

²³⁸⁵ P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 2–5.

²³⁸⁶ The Chamber notes that two other individuals referred to by the Prosecution as victims of Scheduled Incident A.3.1 were reported as having gone missing on 9 May 1992 from locations other than Hranča and therefore cannot be linked to the scheduled incident. See Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix G.

²³⁸⁷ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), paras. 6–7; KDZ605, T. 17886 (25 August 2011).

²³⁸⁸ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 13.

²³⁸⁹ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 13.

²³⁹⁰ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 13; Mušan Talović, T. 17654–17655 (22 August 2011).

employer that he would receive a phone call if he was required at work.²³⁹¹ **Not unusual, because many companies ceased to produce!**

740. On 8 May 1992, following the killing of Goran Zekić, a prominent SDS member and Judge,²³⁹² in an ambush by Bosnian Muslims, the Bratunac Crisis Staff met and planned an attack on the village of Glogova the following morning.²³⁹³ **(That was not “an attack”, but a legitimate police action for disarming the terrorists and arresting perpetrators of this terrorist crime of killing an unarmed civilian and Judge!** Deronjić told the Bratunac Crisis Staff that the village of Glogova would be encircled and the Bosnian Muslims would be disarmed.²³⁹⁴ **Therefore, not to “attack”, but to disarm, which appeared to be inevitable, since the Muslims from Glogova kept ambushing and killing the Serbs!**

741. Milenko Katanić received call-up papers before the attack on Glogova and proceeded to the municipal building.²³⁹⁵ Deronjić informed Katanić that Goran Zekić had been “murdered” and that an operation was being prepared and that it would be launched against Glogova.²³⁹⁶ Deronjić also said that the purpose of the operation was to defend the line “so if Muslims started retreating towards Srebrenica” they would be arrested and prevented from retreating.²³⁹⁷

742. On 9 May 1992, Serb Forces, including the JNA and Bratunac TO units, surrounded Glogova; there was no armed resistance to the Serb advance because the village had already been disarmed.²³⁹⁸ **It hadn’t been disarmed, otherwise how the villagers could ambush and kill the Serbs? Anyway, the JNA was still there, it was a target of those Muslim forces and the entire operation was under the JNA presence!** Apart from the JNA and Bratunac TO units, volunteers²³⁹⁹ and armed members of the SJB were also part of this operation.²⁴⁰⁰ The stated plan was for the Novi Sad Corps to enter Glogova in

²³⁹¹ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 15; Mušan Talović, T. 17656, 17659 (22 August 2011).

²³⁹² P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 44 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17908 (25 August 2011) (private session); P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 27; Milenko Katanić, T. 24536 (10 February 2012); KDZ480, T. 24241 (7 February 2012).

²³⁹³ See Adjudicated Fact 2319. See also Sribislav Davidović, T. 24384–24385. (9 February 2012). But see D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 90. Witnesses testified that the attack on Glogova was not carried out because of the killing of Zekić. D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 62; D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), para. 47. Katanić for example testified that the decision to attack Glogova had been made before the killing of Zekić, but his death accelerated the operation. P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 26; Milenko Katanić, T. 24455–24456 (9 February 2012). The Chamber does not consider the issue of what prompted the attack on Glogova and whether or not the killing of Zekić played a role in that decision to be of significance.

²³⁹⁴ D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 41; D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 57. See also Ljubisav Simić, T. 37317 (16 April 2013); D3690 (Witness statement of Nedo Nikolić dated 8 June 2013), paras. 9–10; D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 44; D3174 (Witness statement of Vujadin Stević dated 23 March 2013), paras. 14–15; D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), paras. 20–21; Branimir Tešić, T. 35260 (12 March 2013).

²³⁹⁵ P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 28.

²³⁹⁶ P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), paras. 27–29. Katanić stated that he did not think that Deronjić ordered or was aware that such a large number of people would be killed in Glogova or that Deronjić considered it to be a legitimate military target. The Chamber finds this to be speculative opinion and of limited weight. See also D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), para. 22.

²³⁹⁷ P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 31; Milenko Katanić, T. 24537 (10 February 2012).

²³⁹⁸ See Adjudicated Fact 2320; P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 19. While the village had been disarmed the stated purpose of the operation in Glogova was to disarm the population and prevent anyone escaping with weapons. P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 33; Milenko Katanić, T. 24537 (10 February 2012); D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), para. 21; D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 46 (stating that the military police was also involved in ensuring that nobody withdrew from the village with weapons). See also D3174 (Witness statement of Vujadin Stević dated 23 March 2013), para. 15.

²³⁹⁹ D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), para. 21.

²⁴⁰⁰ P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), paras. 32–33, 35.

APCs and disarm the population, with the TO units stationed around the village to prevent anyone from trying to escape with weapons.²⁴⁰¹ At sunrise, Serb Forces entered the village. There was then shooting and houses were set on fire.²⁴⁰² **(How come, “there was shooting” if the village was disarmed?)**

743. Mušan Talović’s cousin came to his house and told him that the hamlet of Tarat had also been attacked.²⁴⁰³ Talović’s neighbours gathered at his house and 23 men decided to hide in the underbrush at a nearby creek.²⁴⁰⁴ When Meho Delić joined this group, the Bosnian Serb soldiers who were chasing him, found the hidden Bosnian Muslims and ordered them out at gun-point.²⁴⁰⁵ The Bosnian Muslim men were ordered to put their hands on their heads and were searched for weapons. Talović’s pistol was confiscated and they were then ordered to walk to a field and line up.²⁴⁰⁶ **(How come, if Talović was disarmed???)** One of the Bosnian Serb soldiers contacted their “Vojvoda”, Najdan Mladenović, by radio and asked what they should do with the captured “Balijs”.²⁴⁰⁷ The soldiers were instructed to take the Bosnian Muslim men to the centre of Glogova in front of the supermarket. Mladenović would then decide what to do with them.²⁴⁰⁸ **(If there was a “vojvoda”, this couldn’t be either JNA or the VRS, because “vojvoda” was a title of the Cetniks units, a royal army in the WWII, and in no way this Accused could be liable for that! Beside that, no evidence that any Mladjenovic existed, and a witness (V. Stevic) even testified that there was no Mladjenovic, se fn. 2409. ALL OTHER IS BASED ON A STATEMENT OF ONE WITNESS!!!)**

744. En route, the soldiers provoked the Bosnian Muslims by saying that “this is a Serb country” and that they “should be expelled”.²⁴⁰⁹ The men were lined up against the wall of the supermarket and ordered to put their hands up and stand in that position for half-an-hour.²⁴¹⁰ Many Bosnian Serb soldiers were gathered in the area near the supermarket.²⁴¹¹ These soldiers were not regular JNA soldiers but included local Bosnian Serbs.²⁴¹² There was also a tank with JNA markings and an APC in the centre of Glogova.²⁴¹³

²⁴⁰¹ P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 33; Milenko Katanić, T. 24537 (10 February 2012); D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), para. 21; D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 46. *See also* D3174 (Witness statement of Vujadin Stević dated 23 March 2013), para. 15.

²⁴⁰² P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), paras. 19, 37. *See also* Mirsada Malagić, T. 23504 (24 January 2012); P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 34. The Chamber does not consider that Katanić’s observation that he did not know whether this was part of the assignment or whether individuals set fire to homes on their own accord to be of much weight. Similarly, the Chamber places no weight on Stević’s assumption that the shooting and fire indicated that Serb Forces met with resistance. D3174 (Witness statement of Vujadin Stević dated 23 March 2013), para. 16.

²⁴⁰³ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 20.

²⁴⁰⁴ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 20; Mušan Talović, T. 17666 (22 August 2011).

²⁴⁰⁵ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), paras. 21–22. *See also* D3174 (Witness statement of Vujadin Stević dated 23 March 2013), para. 18.

²⁴⁰⁶ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), paras. 23–24.

²⁴⁰⁷ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 24. *But see* D3174 (Witness statement of Vujadin Stević dated 23 March 2013), paras. 19–22; Vujadin Stević, T. 36037–36039 (26 March 2013). The Chamber does not find Stević’s evidence that he did not know anyone named Mladenović and that the Bosnian Muslims were ordered to stand against a wall for their own protection to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 2342. It more specifically notes that Stević was contradicted by evidence that both he and Mladenović were members of the SDS Municipal Board. Vujadin Stević, T. 36040–36041 (26 March 2013); P6233 (Minutes of meeting of Bratunac SDS Municipal Board, 22 September 1993), p. 2.

²⁴⁰⁸ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 24.

²⁴⁰⁹ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 24.

²⁴¹⁰ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), paras. 25–26.

²⁴¹¹ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 33; Mušan Talović, T. 17668 (22 August 2011).

²⁴¹² P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 33.

²⁴¹³ Mušan Talović, T. 17638–17639 (22 August 2011).

745. Talović saw Momir Nikolić arrive from the direction of Bratunac with a group of four or five armed Bosnian Serbs in uniform.²⁴¹⁴ At that time, Momir Nikolić was a member of the Bratunac Crisis Staff and a high ranking officer of the Bratunac TO.²⁴¹⁵ When Najdan Mladenović arrived from the direction of Kravica with his driver, he said that he did not need to hide because the men were “going to be killed and no one can tell that he was there”.²⁴¹⁶

746. Three of the Bosnian men from the group were taken away in Mladenović’s car.²⁴¹⁷ After this, Mladenović told Dragan Stević to “[e]xecute the punishment and kill them all”.²⁴¹⁸ The remaining 20 Bosnian Muslims were taken by four Bosnian Serb soldiers armed with rifles and automatic weapons and ordered to line up on the riverbank with their faces towards the river.²⁴¹⁹ This group included two boys who were 11 and 13 years old; the rest were young men.²⁴²⁰ The soldiers then started to shoot at the men.²⁴²¹ Talović and a man named Šećo Delić, though injured, were the only two men who survived this shooting.²⁴²² When the shooting started, Talović was hit, he fell into the river unconscious, and was washed down the stream; when he awoke there were bodies on and around him.²⁴²³

747. As Talović and Delić returned to the village, they found 68 bodies in three piles.²⁴²⁴ In one of the piles were the bodies of the men who had been shot along with Talović and Delić. The bodies were all of people from Glogova, 24 of whom Talović could identify by name, and included two women.²⁴²⁵ Having regard to the circumstances surrounding the attack on Glogova and the evidence about the capture and execution of villagers, the Chamber is satisfied that the bodies that Talović and Delić saw in the village were killed by Serb Forces in a similar manner. When Talović returned to his home, he saw that his house had been burnt down and found approximately 100 women and children

²⁴¹⁴ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 27; Mušan Talović, T. 17667 (22 August 2011).

²⁴¹⁵ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 32; Mušan Talović, T. 17638 (22 August 2011).

²⁴¹⁶ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), paras. 28–29.

²⁴¹⁷ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), paras. 31, 34; Mušan Talović, T. 17639–17640, 17667–17668 (22 August 2011). Talović testified that two of those who were taken away by car were killed on the same night. However, the Chamber does not consider that Talović’s evidence is sufficient to make a finding with respect to the killing of these two individuals.

²⁴¹⁸ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), paras. 31, 34. The men who were sent to Mladenović’s car were Mustafa Golić, Sejid Ibišević, and Almaz Talović. The men who were returned to the main group were Mušan Talović and Dževad Ibišević.

²⁴¹⁹ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 35; Mušan Talović, T. 17640 (22 August 2011). The men who were taken to the river were identified as Mušan Talović, Hušo Junuzović, Abid Junuzović, the son of Abid Junuzović, Redo Delić, Meho Delić, Bego Delić, Dževad Ibišević, Kemal Ibišević, Ilijaz Ibišević, Ramo Ibišević, Sabrija Ibišević, Mustafa Ibišević, Mujo Ibišević, Muharem Ibišević, Selmo Omerović, Mirzet Omerović, Šećo Delić, a man with the surname Gušić, and a man with the surname Hasibović. Mušan Talović, T. 17668 (22 August 2011). Of these names identified by Talović, 10 bodies were identified by Mašović as having been exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 3–6.

²⁴²⁰ Mušan Talović, T. 17640–17641 (22 August 2011).

²⁴²¹ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 36.

²⁴²² Mušan Talović, T. 17640 (22 August 2011); P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 37. Šećo Delić jumped into the river when the shooting started and was shot at when he got out of the river.

²⁴²³ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 36. The bodies of Dževad and Kemal Ibišević which were lying on top of Talović were exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 3.

²⁴²⁴ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 38. See also P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 11 (stating that “[s]ome 60 villagers” were killed in the attack on Glogova on 9 May 1992).

²⁴²⁵ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 38; Mušan Talović, T. 17641 (22 August 2011). Talović saw the bodies of Adem Junuzović, Banovka Junuzović, Hamed Delić, Đafo Delić, Uzeir Talović, Avdo Golić, Nezir Omerović, Šaban Gerović, Medo Delić, Šaban Mušić, Jusuf Ibišević, Mehmed Ibišević, Hajdar Alihromić, Selmo Omerović, Čamil Rizvanović, Jasmin Rizvanović, Mustafa Rizvanović, Nermin Omerović, Ramo Golić, Ramiz Gerović, Halid Milačević, Osman Ibišević, Ramo Gerović, and Refik Ibišević. The witness confirmed that the name Selmo Omerović appears twice, once on this list and once on the previous list referred to in fn. 2419 because they were two different people. Mušan Talović, T. 17642 (22 August 2011). Of these names identified by Talović, nine were identified by Mašović as having been exhumed from individual or mass graves. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 3–6.

gathered in his yard.²⁴²⁶ The survivors split in two groups and left the village with one group heading in the direction of Konjević Polje while the other group headed to Srebrenica.²⁴²⁷ Bosnian Serbs were involved in the collection and movement of the bodies with tractors.²⁴²⁸ **(Obviously, a combat casualties, collected after the battle, in the proces of obligatory sanitation of battlefield! How the Chamber could have taken any stance about it?# COMBAT CASUALTIES DEPICTED AS CIVILIANS!##)**

748. The Chamber took judicial notice that approximately 65 inhabitants of Glogova were killed during the operation and that most of the buildings in the village were then burned.²⁴²⁹ The villagers from Glogova who were not killed were taken into the custody of the Serb Forces and transported to the Bratunac Stadium; the able-bodied men were separated and taken to the Vuk Karadžić School while the women and children were loaded on buses and taken to Bosnian Muslim controlled areas.²⁴³⁰

749. The Chamber therefore finds that at least 65 Bosnian Muslims were killed by Serb Forces in the village of Glogova on or about 9 May 1992. **?# COMBAT CASUALTIES DEPICTED AS CIVILIANS!##)**

All of this is based on the statements of one or two Muslim extremists, while there is firm evidence that there was a fight of the two groups, the Muslim extremists and the Serbs were joined by paramilitaries. The “killing” was a combat event, there was no executions, no a single document corroborate testimony of Talovic, and the Chamber dismissed all the Serb testimonies, see fn. 2431-2432. What does it have to do with this Accused.

ii. Actions of paramilitaries

750. The municipal authorities faced problems with paramilitaries and volunteers who arrived in Bratunac, tried to take power, terrorised the population²⁴³¹ and did not accept the

²⁴²⁶ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 39.

²⁴²⁷ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 41.

²⁴²⁸ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), para. 42; P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), paras. 37–40; Milenko Katanić, T. 24538 (10 February 2012).

²⁴²⁹ See Adjudicated Fact 2320. Defence witnesses testified *inter alia* (i) that during the fighting in Glogova there was mayhem as paramilitary units also joined and that 25 people of military age were killed by volunteers who sought revenge; (ii) the Bratunac Crisis Staff intended to disarm and not kill civilians; (iii) some people were killed during the operation to disarm Bosnian Muslim “extremists”; and (iv) Serb Forces were under strict orders not to kill anyone unless attacked. D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 42, 48, 51; D3852 (Witness statement of Mirko Perić dated 1 July 2013), para. 11; D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 46. See also D3690 (Witness statement of Nedo Nikolić dated 8 June 2013), paras. 9–10; D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), para. 25; Branimir Tešić, T. 35259 (12 March 2013); D3174 (Witness statement of Vujadin Stević dated 23 March 2013), para. 15. Having reviewed this evidence, the Chamber does not find the testimony of the relevant witnesses to be reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 2248, 2256, 2336, 2338, and 2342. The Chamber further notes that when challenged on cross-examination, Perić conceded that he only testified about what he had heard and he did not know anything about the killings. Mirko Perić, T. 40802–40804 (3 July 2013).

²⁴³⁰ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), paras. 10–11. See also D3852 (Witness statement of Mirko Perić dated 1 July 2013), para. 12. Defence witnesses testified that the population stated they wanted to leave voluntarily for their own security. D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 47; D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 59. The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 2256 and 2268 in concluding that the evidence of the relevant witnesses about the voluntariness of the departure of the Bosnian Muslim population to be unreliable.

²⁴³¹ Milenko Katanić, T. 24531–24532 (10 February 2012); P6196 (Romanija-Birač CSB report, 27 August 1992), pp. 2–3; Aleksandar Tešić, T. 35334 (13 March 2013); KDZ480, T. 24235–24237 (7 February 2012). But see Branimir Tešić, T. 35261–35264 (12 March 2013) (denying the suggestion that the authorities in Bratunac only became concerned with the actions of volunteers after they started attacking Bosnian Serbs).

command structures or local authorities.²⁴³² **#EXCULPATORY!** In contrast, volunteers who came to the municipality and placed themselves at the disposal of the JNA or joined the Bratunac Brigade were welcomed.²⁴³³ For instance, representatives of the volunteers were also included in the War Staff of Bratunac which was proclaimed on 8 May 1992.²⁴³⁴ **(In accordance with the law and decision of the Presidency of SFRY. #(lawful depicted as unlawful#).** Đukanović and Deronjić were involved in bringing volunteers from Vukovar to Bratunac.²⁴³⁵

751. On 1 May 1992, the Bratunac Crisis Staff decided that all volunteers who did not want to place themselves under the command of the army would be expelled from Bratunac and forbade all paramilitary formations, “illegal citizens”, and other groups who illegally possessed weapons from acting in the municipality.²⁴³⁶ **EXCULPATORY#!** The Bratunac Crisis Staff also issued a decision that if paramilitaries did not comply with the decision to leave the municipality, military formations would be ordered to intervene.²⁴³⁷ **EXCULPATORY#!** Despite these orders, the paramilitary units did not leave the municipality.²⁴³⁸ On 6 May 1992, the Crisis Staff issued a decision that all paramilitary formations should leave Bratunac by the next day, **EXCULPATORY#!** however, Bosnian Serb citizens rallied in support of the paramilitary units.²⁴³⁹ **This was regrettable, but neither Yugoslav, nor Bosnian state could have secured the civilians against the Muslim extremists, this fact contributed to this event!**

752. The Bratunac Crisis Staff issued a number of other decisions in May 1992, including restrictions on the sale of alcohol, and measures to combat looting, smuggling, and the illegal movement by individuals into apartments.²⁴⁴⁰ **EXCULPATORY#!**

²⁴³² D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), para. 30; D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), paras. 36, 40. *See also* Srbslav Davidović, T. 24439 (9 February 2012); D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), para. 17.

²⁴³³ Milenko Katanić, T. 24533 (10 February 2012).

²⁴³⁴ D2061 (List of decisions and orders issued by the Crisis Staff, War Staff, and Wartime Presidency of Bratunac Municipality, 29 August 1992), p. 3.

²⁴³⁵ P1477 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 14 February–28 May 1992), p. 253. *But see* Rodoljub Đukanović, T. 36185–36188 (27 March 2013) (who denied the truth of this diary entry which suggested that they were responsible for bringing “all the cutthroats from Vukovar” to the municipality and testified that he was not aware of who brought the volunteers to Bratunac). Simić testified that the local authorities tried unsuccessfully to prevent some volunteers from arriving in the municipality. D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), paras. 42–45. However, the Chamber does not find Simić’s evidence to be entirely reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion, it refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 2268.

²⁴³⁶ D2060 (Order of Bratunac Crisis staff, 1 May 1992), pp. 3–4; Milenko Katanić, T. 24532, 24535 (10 February 2012); D2061 (List of decisions and orders issued by the Crisis Staff, War Staff, and Wartime Presidency of Bratunac Municipality, 29 August 1992), p. 4; D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), paras. 38–39; D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), paras. 64–65; Ljubisav Simić, T. 37295 (16 April 2013). *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2314; D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 45; Rodoljub Đukanović, T. 36199 (27 March 2013); D3117 (Bratunac Crisis Staff order, 1 May 1992); Branimir Tešić, T. 35261, 35273, 35277–35278 (12 March 2013); D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), para. 26; Aleksandar Tešić, T. 35331–35333 (13 March 2013).

²⁴³⁷ D2061 (List of decisions and orders issued by the Crisis Staff, War Staff, and Wartime Presidency of Bratunac Municipality, 29 August 1992), p. 3.

²⁴³⁸ *See* Adjudicated Fact 2314. *But see* D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 45, 48; D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 39; Ljubisav Simić, T. 37296 (16 April 2013); Aleksandar Tešić, T. 35331–35333 (13 March 2013). The Chamber does not consider their evidence that the TO Staff and police were unable to remove paramilitaries because they were too strong to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 2248, 2256, 2268, and 2338.

²⁴³⁹ D3116 (Bratunac Crisis Staff decision, 6 May 1992); Branimir Tešić, T. 35274–35275 (12 March 2013).

²⁴⁴⁰ D2061 (List of decisions and orders issued by the Crisis Staff, War Staff, and Wartime Presidency of Bratunac Municipality, 29 August 1992), pp. 3, 5; Milenko Katanić, T. 24542 (10 February 2012). *See also* D4698 (Order of Bratunac Interim Government, 8 July 1992). The local authorities, including the police, faced problems from paramilitaries and volunteers and some measures were taken to try and control them. D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), para. 30; D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), para. 18; D3196 (Witness statement of Dušan Mičić dated 24 March 2013), para. 3; D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 50.

753. Following an inspection by the Romanija-Birač CSB in August 1992, it was reported that the Bratunac SJB had been involved in investigating and documenting war crimes committed against Bosnian Serbs.²⁴⁴¹ This report also indicated that while volunteers had become involved in “robberies and troublemaking”, Ljubisav Simić said that the police should be engaged to prevent further lootings since Bosnian Serb houses were now being looted too.²⁴⁴² **(# A malicious distortion#! Not a fair interpretation and suggestion. Simic didn't say that the paramilitaries should be prevented because the Serb houses were now looted, but it was an illustration that the paramilitaries weren't any Serb patriots. The Simic's remark wasn't the first demand to stop the paramilitares, it was after many orders prior to this time.**

754. In September 1992, paramilitaries remained in Bratunac and the SJB, with the assistance of the military and civilian authorities, sought to place them under the command of the VRS.²⁴⁴³ On 17 December 1992, it was reported that there were still a number of paramilitary formations in the zone of responsibility of the Bratunac Brigade and they were only there to loot.²⁴⁴⁴ On 29 December 1992, the Accused ordered the establishment of military rule in Bratunac.²⁴⁴⁵ **EXCULPATORY#! Shows the chain of events, and the President's action after failure of previous attempts.**

755. On 1 February 1993, Deronjić delivered a speech at a meeting of the SDS Municipal Board attended by the RS commissioner, Jovo Mijatović.²⁴⁴⁶ Deronjić provided an overview of events from 1 April 1992 and assessed that, with the assistance of the SDS Main Board and local boards, operations had been carried out very well in the

²⁴⁴¹ P6196 (Romanija-Birač CSB report, 27 August 1992), p. 2. See also P6197 (Romanija-Birač CSB report, 8 September 1992), p. 4. Branimir Tešić testified that when filing criminal reports no distinction was made based on ethnicity. However, when confronted with these documents which suggested that the SJB was successful in conducting war crimes investigations into crimes committed by Bosnian Muslims and did not mention investigations into crimes committed by Bosnian Serbs, he distanced himself and claimed that this was not his job. Branimir Tešić, T. 35264–35268, 35284 (12 March 2013). Having regard to his evasiveness on the issue and apparent contradictions, the Chamber does not find Tešić's evidence to be reliable in this regard. The Chamber also refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 2236. However, the Chamber finds that in May 1992, the police were involved in preventing the rape of a Bosnian Muslim woman. D4673 (Bratunac SJB criminal report, 25 May 1992); D4277 (Request from Zvornik Prosecutor's Office, 26 May 1993).

However, this was not a correct move. Namely, the critical part of the Report (P06196) is incorrectly translated. Here is how this is translated:

In proving of war crimes and identifying of war criminals the Bratunac SJB has achieved significant results using all available means and all operative knowledge based on which they created a photo and video documentation of the victims of genocide while they are compiling a list of perpetrators of Muslim nationality who carried out genocide against the Serbian nation based on civil records that is to say personal IDs which they have been able to keep in safe custody at the Bratunac SJB. The Head of

And how this should be translated: “...(d)ocumentation of the victims of genocide, while on the other hand there is going on completion of a list of perpetrators of Muslim nationality...This, “while ON THE OTHER HAND” gives different meaning of this part of report!##Distortion thorough translation#!

²⁴⁴² P6196 (Romanija-Birač CSB report, 27 August 1992), p. 3.

²⁴⁴³ P6197 (Romanija-Birač CSB report, 8 September 1992), para. 6. See also P1107 (SerBiH MUP report to the Minister of Interior re inspection of Romanija-Birač CSB and SJB, 10 August 1992), p. 3. The Chamber also received evidence that a paramilitary group was involved in the killing Bosnian Muslims in August 1992. P3264 (Report of Milić SJB, 3 August 1992), pp. 1–2. But see Branimir Tešić, T. 35267–35268 (12 March 2013). The Chamber notes that this killing is not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.

²⁴⁴⁴ P2955 (Report of the Drina Corps, 17 December 1992), pp. 3–4.

²⁴⁴⁵ D3122 (Bratunac Brigade report, 30 December 1992), p. 1; Aleksandar Tešić, T. 35338 (13 March 2013).

²⁴⁴⁶ P4378 (Minutes of the Bratunac SDS Municipal Board meeting, 1 February 1993), p. 1.

municipality.²⁴⁴⁷ At this same meeting, objections were voiced to the SJB due to their “indolence” with respect to crime prevention, in particular in relation to the unauthorised appropriation of property, which was sometimes covered up or allowed.²⁴⁴⁸ The SDS Main Board thus proceeded to pass a no-confidence vote in the chief of the SJB. Jovo Mijatović then nominated Ljubiša Borovčanin as the commander.²⁴⁴⁹ **EXCULPATORY#! The appropriate measures taken to improve the state of the law and order!**

756. The municipal authorities continued to face problems with paramilitaries, including a paramilitary unit which, in March 1993, was involved in looting and had no respect for the Bosnian Serb civilian and military authorities in Bratunac.²⁴⁵⁰ **EXCULPATORY#!** Momir Nikolić reported on the activities of this paramilitary unit, demanded that they stop mistreating members of the Bratunac Brigade, and asked that they be withdrawn from the municipality.²⁴⁵¹ **EXCULPATORY#! This is a clear evidence that the local authorities were rather victims of the paramilitary groups, and not their accomplices!**

i. Detention facilities in Bratunac

1. Scheduled Detention Facility C.6.1

757. The Indictment refers to the use of the Bratunac Football Stadium as a detention facility from at least 10 to 18 May 1992.²⁴⁵²

758. The Bratunac Football Stadium was located close to the Bratunac SJB and the Vuk Karadžić School.²⁴⁵³

759. Following the attack by Serb Forces on Mihaljevići and Suha on 10 May 1992, male villagers were arrested and taken to the Vuk Karadžić School, while women and children were taken to the Bratunac Football Stadium.²⁴⁵⁴ **(#DISTORTION, on the line action-reaction!# The Chamber didn’t establish what kind of “attack” that was! First of all, this happened before the VRS had been formed, and the most important, this happened within the Muslim terrorist attacks on the JNA and Serb settlements. These attacks started in April, and intensified on 3 May in Hranca, and on 8 May when Judge Goran Zeki} had been killed! All afterwords were a legal JNA and police actions against the terrorists!!!# Was there a bilateral skirmish, or a unilateral Serb attack? After all, it is the Tribunal’s responsibility to bring about “the whole truth” Thus, based on Adjudicated fact and testimonies of the Serb opponents and adversaries, while discrediting so many Serb testimonies IS NOT A FAIR TRIAL!**

²⁴⁴⁷ P4378 (Minutes of the Bratunac SDS Municipal Board meeting, 1 February 1993), pp. 1–3; P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 19; Milenko Katanić, T. 24529 (10 February 2012).

²⁴⁴⁸ P4378 (Minutes of the Bratunac SDS Municipal Board meeting, 1 February 1993), pp. 2–3.

²⁴⁴⁹ P4378 (Minutes of the Bratunac SDS Municipal Board meeting, 1 February 1993), p. 3; Milenko Katanić, T. 24530 (10 February 2012).

²⁴⁵⁰ D2062 (Report of Bratunac Brigade, 5 March 1993); Momir Nikolić, T. 24730–24734 (15 February 2012).

²⁴⁵¹ Momir Nikolić, T. 24733 (15 February 2012).

²⁴⁵² Indictment, Scheduled Detention Facility C.6.1, fn. 7, referring to Rule 73 *bis* Submission, Appendix B, p. 13.

²⁴⁵³ P4308 (Book of photographs and maps prepared by Jean-René Ruez, 22 June 2009), p. 282; Branimir Tešić, T. 35253 (12 March 2013); P290 (Aerial photograph of Bratunac marked by KDZ107).

²⁴⁵⁴ See Adjudicated Fact 2321; Mirsada Malagić, T. 23505 (24 January 2012); P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 50–52 (under seal). See also D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 44; KW12, T. 44742, 44745 (9 December 2013).

That rather looked as a malice and a racism! Serb Forces drove Bosnian Muslims from their homes and told them not to lock their doors and to head to Bratunac.²⁴⁵⁵ Through loudspeakers, the men were threatened that if they did not surrender the women and children would be killed.²⁴⁵⁶ Those who surrendered formed a column and were led on foot towards the Bratunac Football Stadium by Bosnian Serb reserve soldiers, including local Bosnian Serbs wearing JNA uniforms.²⁴⁵⁷ The Bosnian Muslims were reassured by one soldier that nothing would happen to them, that they would be taken to the stadium for their own protection, and that they would be protected from Arkan's men.²⁴⁵⁸

760. On or about 17 May 1992, villagers from Vitkovići were taken by bus to the Bratunac Football Stadium, along with a third bus filled with villagers from Krasanpolje and other villages close to Bratunac.²⁴⁵⁹

761. After the attack on Glogova,²⁴⁶⁰ Deronjić informed the Bratunac Crisis Staff that he had information that “volunteers had gathered the Muslim population at the stadium in Bratunac” and some men had been taken out to the Vuk Karadžić School.²⁴⁶¹

762. Milenko Katanić was able to speak to a commander of a paramilitary group and secure the release of his best man who had been detained at the stadium.²⁴⁶²

EXCULPATORY#! Katanic was an official, and still he had to beg for his best man! It is clear that the legal authorities weren't in charge! Thousands of Bosnian Muslims, including women, children and the elderly,²⁴⁶³ were detained at the Bratunac Football Stadium before being transported to locations such as Tuzla.²⁴⁶⁴ People were being constantly brought to and taken away from the stadium from Bratunac and surrounding villages.²⁴⁶⁵ Soldiers used loudspeakers to call out names of people who would be taken away from the stadium.²⁴⁶⁶ Money, jewellery, and identification documents were taken away and soldiers threatened children that they would cut off their ears if they did not give them their earrings.²⁴⁶⁷ One man was also beaten and stabbed.²⁴⁶⁸ **None of allegations**

²⁴⁵⁵ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 46 (under seal).

²⁴⁵⁶ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 47 (under seal).

²⁴⁵⁷ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 47–49 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17914 (25 August 2011). *See also* P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 50. Đukanović stated that he sought information about the detention of Bosnian Muslims and tried to take steps to prevent it but was ordered not to interfere. D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 44. The Chamber does not find Đukanović's evidence with respect to what he tried to do and what he was told about the Bosnian Muslims who he saw outside the Bratunac stadium to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 2248.

²⁴⁵⁸ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 48 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17915 (25 August 2011).

²⁴⁵⁹ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), paras. 21–22; Suad Džafić, T. 18193–18194 (1 September 2011); Adjudicated Fact 2322. Džafić also testified about the killing of a man who was taken off the bus. The Chamber notes that this killing is not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. *See* fn. 13.

²⁴⁶⁰ For general evidence on the attack against Glogova, *see* paras. 738–749.

²⁴⁶¹ D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 59. *See* P3207 (Aerial photograph of Bratunac marked by KDZ605) (under seal) for location of the school; P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 5 (under seal). Tešić stated that Deronjić had gone to the stadium and asked the paramilitaries not to mistreat people. D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), para. 24. The Chamber notes that Tešić's evidence in this regard is of very little weight given that he claimed that he did not know that Bosnian Muslims had been brought to the stadium but then states that he was later told about Deronjić's actions to protect the Bosnian Muslims.

²⁴⁶² P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), paras. 50–51; Milenko Katanić, T. 24539 (10 February 2012).

²⁴⁶³ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 62–64 (under seal).

²⁴⁶⁴ P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 50.

²⁴⁶⁵ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 63–64 (under seal); P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 45.

²⁴⁶⁶ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 62 (under seal).

²⁴⁶⁷ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 62 (under seal).

²⁴⁶⁸ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 62 (under seal). *See also* P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajšić dated 18 December 1993), pp. 3–4 (stating that approximately 430 detainees were brought from the Bratunac Football Stadium and

about those incidents had ever been corroborated by any document, nor anyone was tried in the domestic courts after the war, which would be, if happened. But, even if some of these incidents happened, the official local authorities were not responsible. Anyway, either way, what does it have to do with the Accused? # That was a local civil war, Bratunac didn't have regular communication even with the closest police station, let alone with the central authorities, as can be seen from P6196 on 22 and 23 August 92:

They agreed to procure one telephone line from the Republic of Serbia for the needs of Bratunac SJB to which a telefax could be added as well in order to improve the communication with the Pale CSB via the MUP/Ministry of Interior/.

763. After being held for some time, the Bosnian Muslims in the stadium were informed via loudspeaker that they had to move; they were taken to buses and trucks outside the stadium, and told they were going to Tuzla.²⁴⁶⁹ **There is a sufficient evidence that the Muslim leadership demanded to have the civilians transported to Tuzla.@@@** A large number of soldiers separated the able-bodied men and sent the women and children to the buses which headed to Tuzla; the men were taken under guard to the Vuk Karadžić School.²⁴⁷⁰ Women and children from Suha who could not fit on the buses were told to go home and return the next morning to be taken by bus to Tuzla.²⁴⁷¹ **Obviously, the civilians from Suha wanted to go to Tuzla, otherwise why they would "return the next morning"?** They were warned not to leave and told that if they complied they would guarantee the lives of their husbands.²⁴⁷² From mid-May 1992 on, detainees held at the Bratunac Football Stadium were forced on buses and sent to Vlasenica municipality where some men were detained at the Vlasenica municipal prison.²⁴⁷³

764. The Chamber therefore finds that in mid-May 1992, Bosnian Muslims from Bratunac and surrounding villages, including women, children and the elderly, were brought to and detained at the Bratunac Football Stadium by Serb Forces. The Bosnian Muslims were detained at this location until their transportation to other municipalities or detention facilities. Detainees were threatened and their valuables were confiscated and at least one man was beaten and stabbed.

detained at the gym in Pale and they told him they had been beaten at the stadium and some had been mutilated). While the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims were taken from the Bratunac Football Stadium and detained in Pale, in the absence of further evidence, it does not consider that it can rely on Smajšić's hearsay evidence alone to establish that detainees were mutilated at the Bratunac Football Stadium by Serb Forces. For evidence relating to the detention in Pale Gym, see Scheduled Detention Facility C.19.2.

²⁴⁶⁹ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 66 (under seal). See also D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), para. 28; Branimir Tešić, T. 35255–35256, 35272 (12 March 2013) (private session). **The entire statement of the KDZ605 is marked with his lies, documented in his statements, particularly pertaining to some people allegedly killed, see; KDZ605 Amalgamated Statement, Exhibit P3183 (under seal), para.6. KDZ605 Amalgamated Statement, Exhibit P3183 (under seal), para.7. KDZ605 Amalgamated Statement, Exhibit P3183 (under seal), para.7. KDZ605 Amalgamated Statement, Exhibit P3183 (under seal), para.7. This is what had been documented and confessed by the witness, and this shaded sufficient doubt in his credibility!**

²⁴⁷⁰ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 67–69 (under seal); P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 10; P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 45. See also Branimir Tešić, T. 35253–35259 (12 March 2013).

²⁴⁷¹ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 67 (under seal).

²⁴⁷² P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 67 (under seal).

²⁴⁷³ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), paras. 24–29; see Adjudicated Fact 2323. For evidence of detention at the Vlasenica prison, see Scheduled Detention Facility C.25.2.

2. Scheduled Detention Facility C.6.2 and Scheduled Incident B.4.1.

765. The Indictment refers to the use of the Vuk Karadžić School as a detention facility at least between 1 May and 31 December 1992.²⁴⁷⁴ The Prosecution alleges that approximately 50 people were killed while being detained at the Vuk Karadžić School between 10 and 16 May 1992.²⁴⁷⁵

a. Arrival of detainees and control of facility

766. After the arrival of Serb Forces in Bratunac, some prominent Bosnian Muslims were brought to the Vuk Karadžić School and detained there.²⁴⁷⁶ Groups of volunteers would select individuals from the Bosnian Muslim population in Bratunac, interrogate them, and then bring them to the Vuk Karadžić School.²⁴⁷⁷

767. On 10 May 1992, after the attack on Krasanpolje by paramilitaries, over 500 Bosnian Muslim men from villages in Bratunac were detained in the Vuk Karadžić School.²⁴⁷⁸ On 11 May 1992, the Bratunac TO brought approximately 250 of Hranča's inhabitants to the municipal hall of Bratunac and from there, approximately 60 men were taken to the school.²⁴⁷⁹ Further, as mentioned, a very large group of able-bodied Bosnian Muslim men were separated from women and children held at the Bratunac Football Stadium and taken under guard to the school.²⁴⁸⁰ This group included some elderly men.²⁴⁸¹ On the same day, hundreds of men were brought to the school in groups every hour.²⁴⁸² The people detained at the school were Bosnian Muslim civilians; some were captured while they were trying to escape but most were rounded up from their homes by Bosnian Serb soldiers.²⁴⁸³

768. There were approximately 30 soldiers on guard around the school.²⁴⁸⁴ The soldiers were wearing reserve military uniforms and carried automatic and semi-automatic rifles.²⁴⁸⁵ Some of Arkan's men were present when Bosnian Muslims were brought to the school.²⁴⁸⁶ Bosnian Serb officials, including Deronjić and Momir Nikolić, also visited the school and

²⁴⁷⁴ The Prosecution submits that the evidence presented shows that the facility was operational from 3 May 1992 until on or about 14 May 1992. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, fn. 136.

²⁴⁷⁵ Indictment, Scheduled Incident B.4.1.

²⁴⁷⁶ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), paras. 6, 8; P4375 (Aerial photograph of Bratunac marked by Milenko Katanić); P4308 (Book of photographs and maps prepared by Jean-René Ruez, 22 June 2009), p. 282. See also P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), paras. 31, 40.

²⁴⁷⁷ P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 46.

²⁴⁷⁸ See Adjudicated Fact 2325.

²⁴⁷⁹ Adjudicated Fact 2327. Simić denied any knowledge of this incident and stated that the municipality building was unable to accommodate that many people. D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 91. The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 2268 in concluding that it does not find Simić's evidence with respect to the transfer and detention of residents from Hranča to be reliable. In addition his evidence on this issue is qualified, in that he denied any personal knowledge about this incident.

²⁴⁸⁰ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 51, 69–70 (under seal). See also KW12, T. 44745–44746 (9 December 2013).

²⁴⁸¹ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 70 (under seal).

²⁴⁸² P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 71 (under seal).

²⁴⁸³ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 73 (under seal).

²⁴⁸⁴ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 53 (under seal).

²⁴⁸⁵ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 54 (under seal).

²⁴⁸⁶ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 54 (under seal).

the gym where the detainees were held.²⁴⁸⁷ Detainees were threatened to give statements indicating their involvement in the distribution of arms and the killing of Bosnian Serbs.²⁴⁸⁸

(#Obviously, the JNA was still there, and this event was a result of the Muslim attack on the JNA column in Hranca on 3 May, then the ambush and killing of Judge Goran Zekic, and the fights that developed afterwards. The Chamber recognised the paramilitaries, and the JNA and paramilitaries, in an absence of the VRS (which started to be formed as of 20 May) excuse the local authorities. Anyway, it had nothing to do with this Accused#.

b. Conditions of detention, treatment, and killing of detainees

769. Detainees at the Vuk Karadžić School were severely mistreated and beaten repeatedly.²⁴⁸⁹ For example, on 9 May 1992, after the attack on Glogova, Mustafa Golić was taken to the school and severely beaten.²⁴⁹⁰ Similarly, a former Bosnian Muslim policeman was taken out and beaten.²⁴⁹¹ **(Obviously, a personal motives, and responsibility must not be stretched further from perpetrator##!)** On 11 May 1992, detainees were severely beaten in the sports hall with, *inter alia*, iron tubes, heavy wooden sticks, and a rifle butt.²⁴⁹² One of the detainees was threatened before being cut with a knife.²⁴⁹³ Detainees were thrown to the ground, kicked, and some were beaten till they lost consciousness while others were killed.²⁴⁹⁴ These killings and mistreatment were carried out by three soldiers while other soldiers guarded the door or stood in the corridors or at the entrance to the school.²⁴⁹⁵ Some of the soldiers inside the school identified themselves as Arkan's men and told the detainees they were paid to do what they were doing and would make more money if they killed more people.²⁴⁹⁶ **All of it is dubious and not corroborated by documents, nobody was indicted and tried after the war, and finally,**

²⁴⁸⁷ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 105 (under seal). KDZ605 recognised Deronjić but was told about Nikolić by the other detainees.

²⁴⁸⁸ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 56 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17917 (25 August 2011) (private session), T. 17918–17919 (25 August 2011).

²⁴⁸⁹ Adjudicated Fact 2326. *See also* KW12, T. 44746 (9 December 2013). Mičić stated that the members of the military police did not see any detainees being beaten, did not hear any shots, or see any bodies near the school. D3196 (Witness statement of Dušan Mičić dated 24 March 2013), paras. 7, 12. The Chamber does not find Mičić's evidence with respect to the mistreatment of detainees to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber notes that his evidence was marked by contradictions and indicators that he was not being forthright in his testimony. In addition the Chamber notes that the value of Mičić's evidence in this regard is further undermined given that he stated that he did not go to the school himself.

²⁴⁹⁰ P3188 (Witness statement of Mušan Talović dated 14 July 2011), paras. 31, 40.

²⁴⁹¹ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 83 (under seal).

²⁴⁹² P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 57, 60 (under seal).

²⁴⁹³ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 60 (under seal).

²⁴⁹⁴ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 58 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17898 (25 August 2011). While KDZ605 testified that some of the detainees were killed, there is insufficient evidence to determine how many were killed in this incident.

²⁴⁹⁵ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 59 (under seal). Defence evidence sought to place the complete blame for the beating and killing of detainees at the school on volunteers and tried to distance the authorities and themselves from direct knowledge of the mistreatment of detainees and control of the facility. Defence witnesses also testified that civilian authorities and the Bratunac Crisis Staff tried to intervene to protect and secure the release of the detainees at the facility but were unsuccessful due to the power of the volunteers. D3852 (Witness statement of Mirko Perić dated 1 July 2013), para. 12; D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), paras. 25, 31; Aleksandar Tešić, T. 35331–35332 (13 March 2013); Vujadin Stević, T. 36045–36047 (26 March 2013); D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), paras. 60–62; P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 47. *See also* D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), paras. 24, 28; Branimir Tešić, T. 35252 (12 March 2013). The Chamber notes that the evidence of these witnesses was marked by extreme evasiveness, contradictions and indicators of bias and that they were seeking to mislead the Chamber. For example Perić was contradicted by evidence that he himself brought detainees to the school. The Chamber therefore does not consider their evidence in this regard to be reliable.

##Still, there is a sufficient evidence that the local authorities did their best to expel the paramilitaries and volunteers that hadn't been subjugated to the JNA, but the Chamber didn't pay any attention to it.

²⁴⁹⁶ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 59, 75 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17897, 17904 (25 August 2011). The other soldiers included locals from Bratunac and from Serbia.

it has nothing to do with this Accused, who banned and disowned all paramilitaries, and had forbidden any mistreatment! One of the detainees was saved from further mistreatment by a soldier who knew him and was told that he could be taken to the Bratunac Football Stadium but that he and other Bosnian Muslims would have to go from there to Tuzla because Bosnian Serbs were going to live in Bratunac.²⁴⁹⁷

770. A man who identified himself as Goran Zekić's father came to the school on one occasion and said that "300 people had to pay for the death of his son".²⁴⁹⁸ **(A personal vendeta, not a state crime!)** When an individual named Zaim Huseinović from Potočari was identified, he was questioned about who killed Zekić and Arkan's men in Potočari; he was then beaten and fell to floor.²⁴⁹⁹ A man named Krke intervened to stop the beating but once Krke left, **(Obviously, Krke was an official, "next level" correction!)** Huseinović was hit several times until his brains spilled out and he died.²⁵⁰⁰ On his arrival at the facility, KDZ605 saw five or six bodies including the body of Safet Karić who was lying on his stomach in the toilet.²⁵⁰¹

771. A soldier who called himself Zoka and was known as the "Macedonian", would often come in and out of the sports hall, mistreat, and kill detainees.²⁵⁰² **How this undefined allegation could be a judicial fact? Who was Zoka? If he was "Macedonian", it must have been JNA soldier. Whom he had killed? Is there any other evidence, a document or so? How come such a case could be built up solely on a testimony of a leader of SDA?** Zoka was accompanied by two others, including a man from Serbia named Bane Topolović who identified himself as one of Arkan's men and a man who identified himself as "Dragan from Milići".²⁵⁰³ These men, along with other guards, beat the detainees severely for three days with steel rods, tubes, handles from rakes and shovels.²⁵⁰⁴ **(#How the Accused could be connected to these, obviously, paramilitaries?)**

772. The detainees were told to squeeze into the sports hall and when they told the guards that they would not all fit, the guards told them that whoever was left outside the door would be killed. Approximately 10 to 20 of the men were taken outside; there was then screaming and gunfire.²⁵⁰⁵ **(#Almost every Muslim-SDA witness said the same: didn't see any killing, but "heard gunfire", or "they never returned" as if killing was the only possible outcome!)** The detainees were taken to one side of the sports hall and "stacked almost up to the ceiling"; they were then beaten, provoked, and asked if they still wanted their independence. Some of the detainees were made to sing "Chetnik" songs and display the "Serb three-finger sign".²⁵⁰⁶ Topalović, Dragan, and Zoka identified the main Muslim priest in Bratunac, Mustafa Mujkanović.²⁵⁰⁷ He was ordered to take off his coat so

²⁴⁹⁷ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 60–61 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17898 (25 August 2011).

²⁴⁹⁸ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 97, 104 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17922 (25 August 2011).

²⁴⁹⁹ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 86, 96 (under seal).

²⁵⁰⁰ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 86 (under seal).

²⁵⁰¹ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 55 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17922 (25 August 2011). The body of Safet Karić was exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 4.

²⁵⁰² P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 74 (under seal). KDZ605 stated that Zoka appeared to be drunk or on drugs.

²⁵⁰³ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 74 (under seal).

²⁵⁰⁴ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 75 (under seal).

²⁵⁰⁵ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 72 (under seal).

²⁵⁰⁶ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 76 (under seal).

²⁵⁰⁷ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 90 (under seal).

that he could be beaten more easily; he was then forced to sing “Chetnik” songs, drink beer, and join the men in the corner of the hall who had to make the “Serb three-finger sign”. When Mujkanović refused to make this sign and showed only two fingers, he was stabbed in the throat by Bane Topalović and was taken out to the hangar.²⁵⁰⁸ Mujkanović showed signs of life as he was taken out and shot.²⁵⁰⁹

773. A military commander in JNA uniform entered the room and ordered the three soldiers to stop beating the detainees. Seven or eight detainees at the bottom of the pile were found to have died of suffocation.²⁵¹⁰ The military commander ordered that the detainees be given food and water and he shouted at the soldiers saying: “What are you doing to these people?”²⁵¹¹ After this, the Bosnian Serb guards told the detainees that their fight against the paramilitaries had not been successful thus far but that the “Bosnian Serb leadership” would soon be able to throw them out.²⁵¹² **EXCULPATORY!# A clear distinction in conduct of the officials and paramilitaries! As always, once an official appears, the irregular deeds of the irregular persons cease, and the regular soldiers rectify misdeeds! There are numerous examples of it, in Hadzici, in Prijedor, in Sanski Most – whenever a chief of shift appears, irregularities cease at once. The combination of a civil war and a people’s army, with the citizens literally fighting each other, brings about this catastrophic results, but the officials neither order nor tolerate that!)**

774. However, after the commander left, the three soldiers returned and started calling out names of detainees at random, after which those called out were severely beaten or killed.²⁵¹³ People who worked in the school and intellectuals from Bratunac were also called out and some men were killed.²⁵¹⁴ KW12 estimated that approximately 20 detainees were beaten and then killed in his presence.²⁵¹⁵ The soldiers played Serbian music, drank a lot of beer, and made the detainees swear against the Bosnian State and President and sing “Chetnik” songs.²⁵¹⁶ On the first day of these killings and acts of mistreatment, the detainees were not given any food.²⁵¹⁷ On the second day the guards were ordered to provide the detainees with food and water, and some sandwiches and juice were thrown into

²⁵⁰⁸ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 90 (under seal).

²⁵⁰⁹ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 90 (under seal). The body of Mustafa Mujkanović was exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 5.

²⁵¹⁰ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 78 (under seal). KDZ605 identified three of those who died, namely Omer Muhić, Husnija Hadžibulić, and Hazim Muratović. The bodies of Husnija Hadžibulić and Omer Muhić were identified as having been later exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 3–4.

²⁵¹¹ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 79 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17919 (25 August 2011).

²⁵¹² P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 77 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17919 (25 August 2011). *See also* P3206 (Video footage re people from Bratunac in Visoko sports hall, with transcript); P3209 (Video still of the face of a man) (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17871–17874, 17876–17878 (25 August 2011) (private session).

²⁵¹³ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 80, 82, 84–86, 94–95, 98, 133–134 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17920–17921 (25 August 2011).

²⁵¹⁴ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 81 (under seal). The Chamber has insufficient evidence to identify how many detainees were killed or the manner in which they were killed.

²⁵¹⁵ KW12, T. 44746–44747, 44755 (9 December 2013).

²⁵¹⁶ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 98 (under seal).

²⁵¹⁷ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 93 (under seal).

the room but it was only sufficient for half of the detainees.²⁵¹⁸ **EXCULPATORY! Ordered, by whom? Obviously, by some officials! Given as much as they could have!**

775. When detainees were beaten they were threatened and subjected to political comments such as “You wanted a state: here is a state for you”, “where is now your Alija to save you?”, “Where is Naser, your liberator?”²⁵¹⁹ **(It is meant Naser Oric, a Muslim commander who himself used to kill the Serb civilians! Obviously, many misdoings fell within the circle of personal revenges!)** In one incident, the shape of a cross was cut on the arm of one detainee with a knife.²⁵²⁰ If detainees made eye-contact with Topolović he would call them out and they would be beaten.²⁵²¹

776. Topolović beat some of the detainees to death.²⁵²² For example, Ramo Karić was called out, beaten, and shot in the elbow by Topolović before being beaten again, this time to death.²⁵²³ Ahmet Salkić was selected and called “Ustasha”. He was hit on the forehead close to the eye before falling to the ground and sustaining another blow. His body was then carried out by the detainees.²⁵²⁴ Hajrudin Čomić was ordered to kneel down and place his forehead on the floor before Topolović shot him in the back of his lower neck with a pistol.²⁵²⁵ The beatings and killings continued through the night and KDZ605 saw at least 50 Bosnian Muslims killed with the use of different objects, including wooden handles, iron pipes, iron bed legs, and pistol butts.²⁵²⁶ **(The same way KW (Karadzic’s witness, a Muslim) testified that he said in cameras how he was bitten, and the journalis later said that he had died, see P3206, commentted at the closed session: “ ... And that night I watched TV and I heard the news mentioning me as somebody who had died, and that was aired all over the world. I was at a meeting in 2010 with (REDACTED) and he told me that I had been recorded as missing because everybody believed that I was dead. And as a result of that, my father claimed benefits on my behalf) . However, all of it was staged and fake! The Tribunal is enabling the continuation of war through the fake testimonies of the soldiers of one side, while discrediting every single of 230 witnesses of the Serb ethnicity!)**

777. One old man was beaten and killed after he was told that his son had shot at Bosnian Serb troops.²⁵²⁷ Another man named Džemo Hodžić was accused of being a military expert and of arming the Bosnian Muslims; he was beaten until the soldiers thought he was dead and then he was placed on a truck with bodies.²⁵²⁸ When Hodžić was found to

²⁵¹⁸ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 94–95 (under seal).

²⁵¹⁹ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 92 (under seal).

²⁵²⁰ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 133, 135 (under seal); P3210 (Video still of exposed torso of a man) (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17875 (25 August 2011) (private session); KDZ605, T. 17897–17902 (25 August 2011).

²⁵²¹ KDZ605, T. 17897–17898 (25 August 2011).

²⁵²² KDZ605, T. 17898 (25 August 2011).

²⁵²³ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 99 (under seal). The body of Ramo Karić was exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 4. The Chamber does not consider that KDZ605’s estimation that Topolović was responsible for approximately 90% of the killings at the school to be of much weight.

²⁵²⁴ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 100 (under seal). The body of Ahmet Salkić was exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 5.

²⁵²⁵ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 101 (under seal). The body of Hajrudin Čomić was exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 2.

²⁵²⁶ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 91 (under seal). *See also* P3206 (Video footage re people from Bratunac in Visoko sports hall, with transcript).

²⁵²⁷ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 92 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17906–17907 (25 August 2011).

²⁵²⁸ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 102 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17922–17923 (25 August 2011).

be still alive, he was then taken back inside, beaten, and then stabbed to death.²⁵²⁹ Several men detained at the Vuk Karadžić School were taken out by the guards and killed.²⁵³⁰ For example, Mensur Husić was brought to the school and beaten.²⁵³¹ Husić screamed and begged not to be killed. He was then taken outside, and a burst of fire, and another scream was heard.²⁵³² Detainees were assigned to take away the bodies of those who had been killed in the sports hall and to take them to the hangar.²⁵³³ There was a large pile of bodies in the hangar.²⁵³⁴

778. Đukanović was informed that people brought from Hranča in May 1992 had been taken to the Vuk Karadžić School and killed there.²⁵³⁵ The Bosnian Serb authorities arranged for the Civilian Protection to bury the Bosnian Muslim bodies at the hangar.²⁵³⁶ A mass grave was dug in which between 100 and 150 bodies of Bosnian Muslims who KDZ107 identified as having been killed at the Vuk Karadžić School were buried in a field by the Drina River.²⁵³⁷ **(For sure, a combat casualties had also been buried at the same grave, and since the skirmishes had been very fierce!#Combat vs. civilian casualties#)**

779. On 14 May 1992, following a decision of the Bratunac Crisis Staff, approximately 400 Bosnian Muslim detainees were packed onto trucks and buses,²⁵³⁸ transported to Pale under the escort of the MP and civilian police, and from there transferred to Bosnian Muslim controlled territory.²⁵³⁹

²⁵²⁹ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 102 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17922–17923 (25 August 2011). The body of Džemo Hodžić was exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 3.

²⁵³⁰ Adjudicated Fact 2328. *See also* KW12, T. 44746 (9 December 2013); P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 106 (under seal) (stating that some detainees were taken away but that he did not know what happened to them).

²⁵³¹ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 103 (under seal).

²⁵³² P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 103 (under seal). The body of Mensur Husić was exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 3.

²⁵³³ P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 87–88 (under seal). **To bring the comparison of the ABIH and Masović concerning the fn below @ @ @**

²⁵³⁴ [REDACTED]. The Chamber received evidence about the exhumation and disappearance of a large number of Bosnian Muslims from Bratunac in 1992. P4854 (Updated Table 1 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 1; P4852 (Report of Amor Mašović, 20–21 October 2009), p. 3; P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 1–107; D2250 (Ewa Tabeau's report entitled "Deaths and Disappearance of BiH Muslims 1992–1995," 25 April 2012); Ewa Tabeau, T. 28411–28412 (2 May 2012); Ewa Tabeau, T. 28411–28412 (2 May 2012); Dževad Gušić, T. 17780–17781 (24 August 2011). However, the Chamber will not rely on this evidence in the absence of a positive connection with a scheduled killing incident charged in the Indictment.

²⁵³⁵ D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 40, 46. The Chamber notes an inconsistency in his evidence with respect to the lack of involvement of the authorities in the matter and his evidence that he convened a Bratunac Crisis Staff meeting to discuss how to save people who were in danger. Similarly Tešić testified that the Bratunac Crisis Staff was shocked to hear about the killings, that it condemned this action, and agreed that such conduct by paramilitaries should be prevented. D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), para. 25. The Chamber does not find the evidence of Tešić and Đukanović to be reliable in this regard as they tried to distance themselves and the local authorities from this incident. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber also refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 2248 and 2338 with respect to Đukanović and Tešić. **BUT EVEN THE TESTIMONY OF KDZ605 CORROBORATES THESE ASSERTIONS OF THE SERB WITNESSES ABOUT THE DIFFERENCE IN CONDUCT OF THE OFFICIALS AND PARAMILITARIES!!!#)**

²⁵³⁶ D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 47. Tešić testified that they only found approximately 20 dead bodies which were taken away and buried correctly following autopsies. D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), paras. 27–29. The Chamber does not find Tešić's evidence as to the number of bodies buried or that they were buried correctly following autopsies to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 2338.

²⁵³⁷ KDZ107, P345 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 9397–9399, 9557. While KDZ107 testified that these victims had been killed at the Vuk Karadžić School, he does not clarify on what basis he knew this. The Chamber is therefore not satisfied that it can rely on his evidence to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that all of these bodies were of detainees who had been killed at the school as charged in this scheduled incident.

²⁵³⁸ P3208 (List of men taken from Bratunac to Pale); P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 108–111, 127 (under seal); D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para. 17; D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), para. 26. *See also* P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnčalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 56.

²⁵³⁹ KW12, T. 44746–44748, 44751 (9 December 2013); D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 46–47; D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para. 17; P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated

c. Conclusion

780. The Chamber therefore finds that hundreds of Bosnian Muslim men, including the elderly, were detained by Serb Forces at the Vuk Karadžić School in May 1992. Detainees were subjected to severe beatings, including with iron tubes, wooden sticks and rifle butts, and some were stabbed. Detainees were held in cramped conditions and on one occasion some detainees died of suffocation. Detainees were also subjected to acts of humiliation and threats while detained at the school. A number of detainees died following beatings while others were taken out and shot. The Chamber finds that in total at least 50 detainees were killed by Serb Forces while detained at the Vuk Karadžić School between 10 and 16 May 1992. (#Why it was not important to the Chamber that the Serbs maintained the peace entire four weeks after the war broke out in the entire BiH, until the Muslim forces ambushed the JNA on 3 May in the village of Hranca? Was it of any significance that this period between 10th and 16th May started with the killing of the Judge Goran Zekic, a prominent Serb, on 8 May? How come a “new victimology” does not take into account circumstances, context and contribution of the other side to the events? How come that everything that happened in a local piece of a civil war is a liability of this accused as the highest official of one side, although he didn’t influence it in any way, but took steps to prevent and forbid such a development?#)

i. Scheduled Incident D.6

781. The Indictment refers to the destruction of four cultural monuments and sacred sites in Bratunac between April and May 1992.²⁵⁴⁰

782. The Chamber took judicial notice that four Muslim monuments in Bratunac municipality were heavily damaged or completely destroyed between April and June 1992, including the mosque in Bratunac town and the mosque in Glogova, which was demolished with explosives during the attack on 9 May 1992.²⁵⁴¹ (Or maybe the Mosque was a storage of this very same explosive and other war materials of the Muslim extremists? How come it was so easy to place lies and uncorroborated “stories” of only one side?) During attacks on Muslim villages, including Glogova, Serb Forces deliberately torched and destroyed mosques.²⁵⁴² Adjudicated fact!?! Was there any abuse of those objects for the purpose of fighting? The Bratunac town mosque, the Islamic archive in Bratunac and the Qur’an school in Glogova were completely destroyed while the Glogova mosque was heavily damaged.²⁵⁴³ (Was there any Christian (Serb) church that had been destroyed

11 October 2011), para. 49. See also D3196 (Witness statement of Dušan Mičić dated 24 March 2013), para. 13; D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), para. 29; Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15395–15396. For evidence relating to treatment of detainees in Pale, see Scheduled Detention Facility C.19.2. Defence witnesses also testified that the Bosnian Muslims could not be returned to Bratunac and were transferred to Pale to save and protect them from the volunteers when the Bratunac Crisis Staff heard about the killings. D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 46, 48; D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), paras. 26, 31. However, having reviewed the evidence, the Chamber does not consider this evidence to be reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber also had regard to its credibility assessment in fn. 2236 above and also notes that the evidence was marked by indicators that the witnesses in question were seeking to distance themselves from any responsibility with respect to events at the Vuk Karadžić School.

²⁵⁴⁰ These are the Bratunac town mosque, Glogova mosque, a Qur’an school in Glogova, and the Islamic archives of Bratunac.

²⁵⁴¹ See Adjudicated Fact 2330; P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 69; P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 55. While Gušić testified to the destruction of ten mosques in Bratunac, not all are charged in the Indictment.

²⁵⁴² See Adjudicated Fact 2331.

²⁵⁴³ P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled “Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH” prepared for the Karadžić case, formatted records), pp. 65-72; P4071 (Slide images of damaged religious sites in BiH), p. 19; P4069 (Cultural destruction

by the Muslims prior to that, and what was the impact of this event to the destruction of the Muslim objects? Is there an understanding that there was no such a mutual revengeful conduct, but everything was apart of the official policy? The Chamber had a sufficient evidence about the Accused's attitude towards this issue?)

783. Therefore the Chamber finds that four cultural monuments and sacred sites were heavily damaged or completely destroyed by Serb Forces between April and June 1992.

i. Movement of the population from Bratunac

784. The increasing intimidation and the reports that Bosnian Serbs were being armed by the SDS and JNA prompted people to slowly move out of Bratunac even before the conflict began.²⁵⁴⁴

(The Muslim population had a much better insight in the war preparations of the SDA. Even the boys from Bratunac went to Croatia for the training for war, see: D387 pasted in para 703 of this Judgment, so they didn't need any rumors about the Serb arming themselves. Bratunac certainly was one of 98 municipalities which had developed Patriotic leagu even in 1991, see D298:

Immediately after involving myself in preparations for the defence of R BH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/, in September 1991, together with the late Safet HADŽIĆ, who was appointed president of the crisis staff of the Sarajevo region, and with the help of Mirsad ČAUŠEVIĆ, now in the MIP /Ministry of the Interior/ and Senad MAŠOVIĆ, now at the command of the Third Corps, I drew up a proposal for organising the Patriotic League for the Sarajevo area, organised the regional staff of the Patriotic League and a plan for the defence of the Sarajevo area.

After that I set about realising the plan that had been accepted and organising the Main Staff of the Patriotic League of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, nine regional military staffs, 98 municipal military staffs of the PL /Patriotic League/ and a large number of manoeuvre, area and logistic units.

Who is to say that it was not known to such an extreme Muslim municipality as Bratunac was? Taking into account 6 Croatian and several Serbian municipalities, out of 109 BH municipalities, 98 of them had the secret military structure, which presented the heaviest crime against peace and security of the country!)

In the months leading up to the conflict in Bratunac, Bosnian Serbs, consisting mostly of women, children and the elderly left the municipality.²⁵⁴⁵ Large numbers of citizens also left Bratunac out of fear after the armed conflict began in Bijeljina and Zvornik.²⁵⁴⁶ As discussed above, following the killing of Goran Zekić by Bosnian Muslims in May 1992, Serb Forces launched a number of attacks against Bosnian Muslim villages.²⁵⁴⁷ The killing of Goran Zekić at the beginning of May 1992 created great fear and caused both Bosnian Serbs and

database), records 82–85. See also P4068 (András Riedlmayer's expert report on Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1992-1995, 7 May 2009), paras. 16, 54; András Riedlmayer, T. 22544–22545 (9 December 2011). Riedlmayer surveyed a total of 12 religious sites in Bratunac which were destroyed but the Chamber notes that only four are charged in the Indictment.

²⁵⁴⁴ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), paras. 45(a), 49.

²⁵⁴⁵ P3196 (Witness statement of Dževad Gušić undated), para. 75; P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 29 (under seal). Gušić also stated that Bosnian Serbs claimed to be leaving Bratunac because they were in danger but they were in fact leaving in order to achieve a number of objectives, including to allow them to be placed under a unified command to later occupy Bratunac. The Chamber places no weight on the views and speculation of Gušić's and KDZ605 views as to why the Bosnian Serbs left Bratunac.

²⁵⁴⁶ D3852 (Witness statement of Mirko Perić dated 1 July 2013), para. 6; D3690 (Witness statement of Nedo Nikolić dated 8 June 2013), para. 6. See also D3174 (Witness statement of Vujadin Stević dated 23 March 2013), para. 8; D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), paras. 9–10. Branimir Tešić acknowledged that especially Bosnian Muslims left the municipality.

²⁵⁴⁷ See paras. 740–742.

Bosnian Muslims to leave Bratunac.²⁵⁴⁸ **(There is a valid evidence that it was not so: the fear was present throughout the entire 1991, and was initiated by the “secret” organisation of the Patriotic League and Green Berets, as well as because of sending the policemen of Muslim ethnicity for a training to Croatia, see D387, quoted in para 703 of the Judgment!)**

785. After Bosnian Serbs took over the police station, **(#Wrong, the Serbs took only their own police station, the Muslims had their own)** Bosnian Muslims left Bratunac daily.²⁵⁴⁹ Some Bosnian Muslims left after being told by their neighbours that they had to leave and that it would be better for them if they left Bratunac because “some people” would come to the municipality.²⁵⁵⁰ **(Again, not forced, and certainly not by the authorities)** Bosnian Muslims left Bratunac and surrounding villages out of fear, *inter alia*, of the paramilitaries.²⁵⁵¹ Other Bosnian Muslims were forcibly moved out of their villages.²⁵⁵² The last group of Bosnian Muslims left after Bosnian Serb refugees arrived in Bratunac.²⁵⁵³

786. In mid-April 1992, after Serb Forces had entered Bratunac, some Bosnian Muslims asked for permission from Bosnian Serb municipal officials to leave Bratunac for Tuzla and were allowed to do so.²⁵⁵⁴ The Bosnian Serb authorities were requested to secure escorts and passes for their safe passage by Bosnian Muslim leaders.²⁵⁵⁵ A large number of permits were issued for both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs to leave the municipality.²⁵⁵⁶ At that time, a large group of Bosnian Muslims gathered in front of the municipality building and asked to be escorted to Konjević Polje and then police patrol escorted this group.²⁵⁵⁷ While Bosnian Muslims may have asked to leave the municipality, the Chamber finds that these requests were not made voluntarily when considering the surrounding circumstances in which they left after Serb Forces had entered Bratunac. **This is an erroneous finding. The population that asked to leave did it voluntarily, although sadly. There can not be found that somebody from authorities forced them. If the circumstances forced them, this is an argument against the civil war, not against this Accused!**

²⁵⁴⁸ D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), paras. 39, 46.

²⁵⁴⁹ D3852 (Witness statement of Mirko Perić dated 1 July 2013), para. 8.

²⁵⁵⁰ KDZ065, P336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krstić*, and *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 3212.

²⁵⁵¹ Srblisav Davidović, T. 24450 (9 February 2012); P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), paras. 41, 43; Milenko Katanić, T. 24520–24521, 24540 (10 February 2012). The Chamber does not find Katanić’s evidence to be plausible that Bosnian Muslims were transported from their villages to be protected from volunteers who could not be controlled. *See also* P405 (Witness statement of Amer Malagić dated 19 June 2000), p. 3.

²⁵⁵² KDZ605, T. 17891 (25 August 2011).

²⁵⁵³ D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić dated 10 March 2013), para. 30.

²⁵⁵⁴ D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 30–31; Rodoljub Đukanović, T. 36186 (27 March 2013); D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 35.

²⁵⁵⁵ D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 32; D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 40.

²⁵⁵⁶ D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 52. *See also* D3690 (Witness statement of Nedo Nikolić dated 8 June 2013), para. 6; Mirko Perić, T. 40807 (3 July 2013).

²⁵⁵⁷ D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 33. While the Chamber finds that the Bosnian Serb authorities arranged for the transport of Bosnian Muslims, the Chamber does not find the evidence of Defence witnesses that this demonstrated that the authorities were simply respecting the wishes of the Bosnian Muslims who voluntarily wanted to leave the municipality to be reliable. D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 41; D3852 (Witness statement of Mirko Perić dated 1 July 2013), para. 8. *See also* D3690 (Witness statement of Nedo Nikolić dated 8 June 2013), para. 6; D3852 (Witness statement of Mirko Perić dated 1 July 2013), para. 12; D3174 (Witness statement of Vujadin Stević dated 23 March 2013), paras. 25–27; Vujadin Stević, T. 36043–36045 (26 March 2013). In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 2236, 2256, and 2342 and also refers to its findings with respect to the overall circumstances created in the municipality.

787. A municipal commission was established in Bratunac, which drew up a list of all Bosnian Muslim houses and sealed them off and when Bosnian Serb refugees arrived they were accommodated in these houses.²⁵⁵⁸ **(Temporarily, of course!)** However, when large numbers of refugees arrived, some of the houses were broken into and the head of police was criticised for failing to prevent these property crimes.²⁵⁵⁹ **(#EXCULPATORY# Next leves, Superiors rectified#)!**

788. In late May or early June 1992 the Bratunac Brigade called on Bosnian Muslims who did not want to fight a war to return to their homes and live normally.²⁵⁶⁰ **EXCULPATORY!** However, by June 1992, with the exception of a few individuals there were no Bosnian Muslims in Bratunac.²⁵⁶¹ **(It could be correct only for the Serb part of municipality, which was only 20% of the whole territory!)**

789. On 6 June 1992, the Accused, Mladić, and Koljević were informed by Ostojić that there were “no Muslims in Bratunac municipality”.²⁵⁶² The Accused was at a meeting in Zvornik on 30 June 1992 when Simić said that only two Muslims remained in Bratunac.²⁵⁶³ **(#Mladić’s #“Notebook”# was not a verbatim nor precise in any terms, the same as Okun’s notes. Up until April 1993 the majority of the Bratunac municipal territory was controlled by the Muslims, and the rest of 20% was controlled by the Serbs. For the reasons of mutual mistrust, there was no a single Serb in this 80% of municipal territory under the Muslim control! All of them had been either killed, or expelled, and the first mass graves had been discovered right in Bratunac, all was documented, and General Morillon attended this discovery!)**

790. As discussed in more detail in Section IV.C.1.a., while Serb Forces were successful in taking over and holding town centres in municipalities including Bratunac, pockets in the surrounding countryside, which had a Bosnian Muslim majority population, remained under the control of Bosnian Muslim forces.²⁵⁶⁴ Bosnian Muslim forces in the second half of 1992 and early 1993 launched an offensive in which they took control of territory in Bratunac.²⁵⁶⁵ The counter-offensive by the VRS in spring 1993 prompted the movement of the vast majority of the Bosnian Muslim civilians who remained in Konjević Polje and thousands fled towards Srebrenica.²⁵⁶⁶

791. Having considered the totality of the evidence and assessed the circumstances in which departures occurred, the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims were forced to leave Bratunac. **(Forced, by whom or by what? In the Serbian language being “forced” to do**

²⁵⁵⁸ P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 22; D2061 (List of decisions and orders issued by the Crisis Staff, War Staff, and Wartime Presidency of Bratunac Municipality, 29 August 1992), p. 3; Milenko Katanić, T. 24542 (10 February 2012).

²⁵⁵⁹ Sribislav Davidović, T. 24392 (9 February 2012); P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 22.

²⁵⁶⁰ D3398 (Witness statement of Ljubisav Simić dated 7 April 2013), para. 55.

²⁵⁶¹ P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 44; P4994 (Addendum to Ewa Tabeau’s expert report entitled “Ethnic Composition in Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from 27 Municipalities of BiH 1991 to 1997”, 3 February 2009), p. 30.

²⁵⁶² P1478 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 93, 98, 101.

²⁵⁶³ P1478 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 246, 258. See also Ljubisav Simić, T. 37302–37303, 37310–37311 (16 April 2013) (testifying that he was referring only to Muslims who remained in Bratunac town).

See para. 4946.

²⁵⁶⁵ See para. 4946. The Chamber received evidence that by the end of 1992, following a counter-offensive by Bosnian Muslim forces, many Bosnian Serbs from Bratunac fled across the Drina River to Serbia. See D1504 (Report of humanitarian organisation, 21 December 1992), paras. 2–6 (under seal). However, the Chamber considers that such evidence does not negate its findings with respect to the displacement of the Bosnian Muslim population by Serb Forces.

²⁵⁶⁶ See paras. 4947–4949, 4954–4956, 4962.

something is the same for being forced by some subject and by the objective situation or circumstances. The Muslims “were forced to leave Bratunac” by the circumstances of the civil war that they wanted and they initiated! This truth will never expire! #Forced to leave#, of couse by events!#)

a. *Brčko*

i. Charges

792. In relation to Brčko, the Prosecution has limited the allegations in the Indictment to crimes associated with Luka camp.²⁵⁶⁷

793. Under Count 3, the Prosecution alleges that persecution, a crime against humanity, was committed in Luka camp as part of the objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats from the Municipalities.²⁵⁶⁸ Acts of persecution alleged to have been committed at Luka camp by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include killings related to the detention facility as well as killings committed during, and deaths resulting from, cruel and inhumane treatment.²⁵⁶⁹ The Prosecution also characterises these killings as extermination, a crime against humanity, under Count 4; murder, a crime against humanity, under Count 5; and murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war, under Count 6.²⁵⁷⁰

794. Other acts of persecution alleged to have been committed in Luka camp by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include (i) torture, beatings, and physical and psychological abuse as cruel or inhumane treatment;²⁵⁷¹ (ii) rape and other acts of sexual violence as cruel and inhumane treatment;²⁵⁷² (iii) the establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions, including the failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care, or hygienic sanitation facilities, as cruel or inhumane treatment;²⁵⁷³ (iv) unlawful detention;²⁵⁷⁴ and (v) forced labour at the frontline and the use of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats as human shields.²⁵⁷⁵

i. Lead-up

²⁵⁶⁷ See Prosecution Submission Pursuant to Rule 73 bis(D), 31 August 2009, fn. 14; Pre-Trial Conference, T. 467 (6 October 2009); Rule 73 bis Decision, para. 6; Decision on Fourth Adjudicated Facts Motion, para. 28; Hearing, T. 16607, 14 July 2011 (recalling that while the Prosecution may lead general evidence relating to the take-over of Brčko, it should not present evidence pertaining to incidents alleged to have occurred in Brčko during the take-over and in detention facilities which were struck out of the Indictment after the Rule 73 bis Decision and noting that with respect to the alleged Municipalities JCE, given the large number of municipalities remaining in the Indictment and the number of crimes alleged to have occurred therein, there is no need for the Prosecution to present evidence relating to crimes struck out under Rule 73 bis in order to present its case on the pattern of events across the municipalities).

²⁵⁶⁸ Indictment, paras. 48–49.

²⁵⁶⁹ Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii). See Scheduled Incident B.5.1.

²⁵⁷⁰ Indictment, para. 63(b).

²⁵⁷¹ Indictment, para. 60(b). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.7.2.

²⁵⁷² Indictment, para. 60(c). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.7.2.

²⁵⁷³ Indictment, para. 60(d). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.7.2.

²⁵⁷⁴ Indictment, para. 60(g). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.7.2.

²⁵⁷⁵ Indictment, para. 60(h). The Chamber notes that in footnote 8 of paragraph 60(i) of the Indictment, the Prosecution specifies that it will not allege criminal responsibility for plunder of property in municipalities including Brčko. The Chamber further recalls that the Prosecution in its closing arguments clarified that with respect to footnote 8 of the Indictment, it did not allege criminal responsibility for both appropriation and plunder in certain municipalities, even though the footnote only referred to plunder. Prosecution Closing Argument, T. 47694 (30 September 2014). The Chamber further notes that the Prosecution does not allege criminal responsibility for forcible transfer or deportation in Brčko. Indictment, fn. 6.

795. Brčko is a municipality in northeastern BiH on the border with Croatia along the Sava River.²⁵⁷⁶ In 1991, the population of Brčko consisted of approximately 45% Bosnian Muslims, 25% Bosnian Croats, and 20% Bosnian Serbs.²⁵⁷⁷ Inter-ethnic relations deteriorated in Brčko after the formation of national parties, the organisation of political rallies in Brčko,²⁵⁷⁸ the outbreak of war in Croatia and Slovenia and the referendum on the secession of BiH.²⁵⁷⁹ From the autumn of 1991 there was an increasing militarisation of Brčko with weapons distributed to residents of all ethnicities²⁵⁸⁰ and the arrival of paramilitary units.²⁵⁸¹

796. In December 1991 the President of the SDS in Brčko, Milenko Vojinović received and read out the Variant A/B Instructions²⁵⁸² after which (i) the Serb Municipal Assembly of Brčko was formed and Đorđe Ristanić was appointed as President;²⁵⁸³ and (ii) a Crisis Staff was formed with Boško Maričić as its president.²⁵⁸⁴

797. In the lead-up to April 1992, preparations were made for the establishment of a Bosnian Serb SJB in Brčko.²⁵⁸⁵ There were also discussions and an agreement between the SDS and SDA on the physical division of Brčko following an SDS proposal.²⁵⁸⁶
(#EXCULPATORY!!! It was not any “physical division”, but an administrative

²⁵⁷⁶ D484 (Map of BiH); P3009 (Map of BiH and Brčko); Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 389, 410; Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4278.

²⁵⁷⁷ P2888 (Brčko's War Presidency Summary of events in Brčko Municipality), p. 1; P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), para. 2; Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 392–393. *See also* Pero Marković, T. 34722 (4 March 2013). The town of Brčko consisted of approximately 56% Bosnian Muslims, 20% Bosnian Serbs and 7% Bosnian Croats. P2888 (Brčko's War Presidency Summary of events in Brčko Municipality), p. 1; Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 410.

²⁵⁷⁸ Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 400, 402, 538–539.

²⁵⁷⁹ D3003 (Witness statement of Petar Kaurinović 17 February 2013), paras. 3–6; D3073 (Witness statement of Obren Marković dated 2 March 2013), paras. 3–4, 9; D3072 (Witness statement of Pero Marković dated 1 March 2013), paras. 7, 9. The Chamber also heard evidence that SDS representatives began being outvoted on the Executive Board. D3072 (Witness statement of Pero Marković dated 1 March 2013), para. 6.

²⁵⁸⁰ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 3; P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 8–12, 87–88; Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 404–406, 535; D1563 (Letter signed by Isak Gaši), p. 2; Adjudicated Facts 2335–2336; P2888 (Brčko's War Presidency Summary of events in Brčko Municipality), pp. 1–2; D3073 (Witness statement of Obren Marković dated 2 March 2013), paras. 9, 13; Obren Marković, T. 34774, 34777 (5 March 2013).

²⁵⁸¹ P2888 (Brčko's War Presidency Summary of events in Brčko Municipality), p. 3; P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 98–100, 102; Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 406; D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), p. 7.

²⁵⁸² P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 13, 32–37, 65–66. *See also* Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16732 (15 July 2011) (testifying that Vojinović was in contact with and received instructions on behalf of the Brčko SDS from republican-level leaders, particularly Krajišnik by telephone).

²⁵⁸³ P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 1, 41–44. *See also* Pero Marković, T. 34721–34722 (4 March 2013).

²⁵⁸⁴ P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 39–40. Other members of the Crisis Staff were Vojinović, Pero Marković, and Miodrag Pajić. *See also* P2761 (RS MUP report on work for period April to December 1992), p. 5. The Chamber received Defence evidence that while the Crisis Staff was formed it did not have any role. *See* D3072 (Witness statement of Pero Marković dated 1 March 2013), para. 19. However, in light of the evidence received about the existence and role of the Crisis Staff in Brčko, discussed for example in paras. 829 and 833, the Chamber does not accept this evidence.

²⁵⁸⁵ P2761 (RS MUP report on work for period April to December 1992), p. 5; Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16781 (18 July 2011). For evidence on the divisions between police *see* D3003 (Witness statement of Petar Kaurinović 17 February 2013), paras. 7–8, 20; D3073 (Witness statement of Obren Marković dated 2 March 2013), para. 10. *See also* D3072 (Witness statement of Pero Marković dated 1 March 2013), para. 8. Other municipal structures including the War Presidency (which was replaced by the War Commission) and the War Executive Board were formed in April and May 1992. P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 17–19, 21–25, 29, 144–145, 149; P2888 (Brčko's War Presidency Summary of events in Brčko Municipality), p. 1; D3072 (Witness statement of Pero Marković dated 1 March 2013), para. 30; P2888 (Brčko's War Presidency Summary of events in Brčko Municipality), p. 6; P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 30–31. *See also* Pero Marković, T. 34721–34722, 34727 (4 March 2013); P6172 (Brčko War Presidency travel pass, 8 May 1992).

²⁵⁸⁶ Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 407–408. The Chamber received Defence evidence which suggested that the division of the municipality was a joint proposal from all three parties in power. *See* D3072 (Witness statement of Pero Marković dated 1 March 2013), para. 33. The Chamber does not find this evidence reliable in light of Marković's equivocal answers when questioned about whether it was an SDS proposal. In addition the Chamber finds that Marković's evidence was marked by insincerity and evasiveness.

reorganisation of a rather big municipality. It is completely clear that the Serb side wanted to have their own municipality comprised of the Serb settlements, as the Muslim and Croats would have their own. In a situation where a citizen was “nothing” and a member of an ethnic community “everything” – the only way to prevent dominance and confrontation was to make an ethnic municipalities within the same city. Had it been accepted, there wouldn’t be any war, any leaving of population, and crime! This is the fact, and no interpretation can alter it.

798. On 30 April 1992, the pedestrian and railroad bridges that connected Brčko with Croatia were blown up in twin explosions.²⁵⁸⁷ **(That happened within the context of the JNA – Croatia war, and the local Serb authorities weren’t capable to influence the events at all. Since Croatia feared from the influx of the JNA troops from Bosnia, it is more likely that they have blown up the bridges. Anyway, in no variant the Accused could be liable for that!)** On or about 1 May 1992 Serb Forces numbering approximately 1,000 men launched an attack on Brčko.²⁵⁸⁸ The Serb Forces involved in this attack included Serb units of the JNA, over 500 men from Bijeljina consisting of uniformed units, active and reserve police officers, soldiers, military reserves, a TO battalion, Ljubiša Savić’s (“Mauzer”) Serbian National Guard, Arkan’s men, the White Eagles and the Radicals commanded by Mirko Blagojević.²⁵⁸⁹ The Serb Forces initially met with armed resistance from groups using light infantry weapons but they quickly took control of the town.²⁵⁹⁰ **(This is continuation of the abuse of the #“Serb Forces”# term. It is well known that the JNA was still present there, and no units under the control of this Accused appeared. All the combat groups had to be under the JNA control, even those Muslim and Croat units, which weren’t. The Chamber missed to establish who started confrontation and what was the aim of the Muslim/Croat, and what the JNA forces, not to mention the #legality/ilegality# issue!)**

(C)Scheduled Detention facility C.7.2

²⁵⁸⁷ KDZ057, P66 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 564–565 (under seal); P2888 (Brčko’s War Presidency Summary of events in Brčko Municipality), p. 2; D1574 (Report of Brčko SJB, undated), p. 1; Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*) T. 411–412; P3010 (Photograph of bridge in Brčko); P3018 (Map of Brčko marked by Isak Gaši); P3020 (BiHTV report entitled “Dossier Brčko”, with transcript), pp. 1, 6; D1563 (Letter signed by Isak Gaši), p. 6; Pero Marković, T. 34724 (4 March 2013). The Chamber received evidence about the circumstances in which the bridges were blown up and who was supposedly responsible for this incident. However, given the limited allegations with respect to Brčko, the Chamber will not enter findings with respect to who was responsible for these explosions and the number or identity of the people killed or injured in this incident. See P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 3; D3073 (Witness statement of Obren Marković dated 2 March 2013), paras. 18–19; Obren Marković, T. 34778 (5 March 2013); Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*) T. 496–497; Isak Gaši, T. 16671 (15 July 2011); KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 59–60, 103; P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 111–116; Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16741 (18 July 2011).

²⁵⁸⁸ Adjudicated Fact 2340.

²⁵⁸⁹ Milorad Davidović, T. 15541 (28 June 2011); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 123; P2888 (Brčko’s War Presidency Summary of events in Brčko Municipality), pp. 2–4; D3144 (Witness statement of Dragomir Ljubojević dated 18 March 2013), para. 8; Dragomir Ljubojević, T. 35905 (22 March 2013); P2889 (Report of the Eastern Bosnia Corps, 29 September 1992), p. 1; P3020 (BiHTV report entitled “Dossier Brčko”, with transcript), p. 7; P2901 (SRT video footage of interview of Mirko Blagojević), p. 9; P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 4; KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 136–137. See also Adjudicated Facts 2340, 2341, 2343; Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16709, 16711, 16720–16721 (15 July 2011); P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 131, 174; KDZ057, P66 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 567–568, 570 (under seal); P2763 (Bijeljina CSB report, 7 May 1992); D3003 (Witness statement of Petar Kaurinović 17 February 2013), para. 18; Obren Marković, T. 34785 (5 March 2013); D3072 (Witness statement of Pero Marković dated 1 March 2013), para. 17; Pero Marković, T. 34735 (4 March 2013). On 19 May 1992, the Bijeljina CJB reported to the MUP that the Serb TO of SAO Semberija and Majevica had “liberated and holds three quarters of the Brčko town territory” and that combat operations were being carried out in the neighbourhood of Klanac where the forces of the “TO of former BH” had concentrated. P5489 (Report of Bijeljina SJB, 19 May 1992), p. 1.

²⁵⁹⁰ See Adjudicated Fact 2344. See also P2901 (SRT video footage of interview of Mirko Blagojević), p. 9.

799. The Indictment refers to the use of the Luka camp as a detention facility at least from 7 May 1992 until mid July 1992.²⁵⁹¹

(1) Establishment and control of camp

800. Luka Camp was located in the vicinity of the Brčko SJB building²⁵⁹² and consisted of hangars or warehouses which had been previously used for the storage of goods.²⁵⁹³ From early May 1992, many military-aged non-Serb men from Brčko municipality were taken to Luka Camp and detained in a hangar, after having been separated from women, children and the elderly.²⁵⁹⁴ **(Adjudicated Facts, and insufficient findings about the circumstances and perpetrators, as well as their relations with the President!)** The men were brought to the camp from various locations in Brčko including the barracks,²⁵⁹⁵ the Laser Company,²⁵⁹⁶ the mosque,²⁵⁹⁷ the Brčko hospital,²⁵⁹⁸ and the police station.²⁵⁹⁹ Bosnian Muslims were taken to the mosque from their homes during searches for weapons which were conducted by armed men who had disguised their faces with paint or black stockings.²⁶⁰⁰ **(None of the official troops of the Republic of Srpska, or JNA ever wore masks, therefore these armed people hadn't been members of any official force!#Masks, insignias#)** This operation was commanded by Mauzer.²⁶⁰¹ Between May and June 1992 groups of people were brought in and out of the hangar at Luka Camp with the number of people detained ranging from 100 to 200 people, approximately 90% of whom were Bosnian Muslims with the remainder Bosnian Croats and Albanians.^{2602 (2602)} **(How come Albanians were there!)**

²⁵⁹¹ Indictment, Scheduled Detention Facility C.7.2. The Prosecution submits that the evidence shows that the facility operated from 4 May until at least August 1992. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B.

²⁵⁹² Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16710 (15 July 2011); P3024 (Map of Brčko marked by Đorđe Ristanić).

²⁵⁹³ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 7; P3012 (Aerial photograph of Luka Camp); D1570 (Map of Brčko marked by Đorđe Ristanić); P3015 (Photograph of warehouse at Luka Camp); P3018 (Map of Brčko marked by Isak Gaši); P3014 (Photograph of hangar at Luka Camp).

²⁵⁹⁴ See Adjudicated Facts 2354, 2356. One woman and her son were also among the people detained with Gaši. Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 450–454. See also Milorad Davidović, T. 15543–15544 (28 June 2011).

²⁵⁹⁵ Adjudicated Fact 2357.

²⁵⁹⁶ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), pp. 7–8.

²⁵⁹⁷ Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16712–16713 (15 July 2011); Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16743 (18 July 2011); P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), pp. 4, 7–8.

²⁵⁹⁸ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 55–56, 116–117, 133, 137–139, 154–155 (testifying that he was arrested by men in military camouflage uniforms, some with red berets, including Dušan Tadić, Pero Zarić and a man identified as Zeljko). P417 (Photograph of hangar marked by KDZ010). See also Adjudicated Fact 2347. [REDACTED].

²⁵⁹⁹ Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 422, 441–442, 444–445, 468, 526–529; Isak Gaši, T. 16614–16615 (14 July 2011) (testifying that he was arrested and taken to the police station in Brčko and was detained there for up to an hour before being called out by a local Bosnian Serb wearing a JNA uniform and another man who wore a camouflage uniform and spoke in a Serbian accent and that on arrival at the Luka Camp, he was taken by a policeman from Brčko to an office); P3011 (Photograph of entrance to police station, in Brčko).

²⁶⁰⁰ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), pp. 4–6 (testifying that when being taken away, he saw many of his neighbours including women and children heading towards the mosque and groups of two or three soldiers every five to ten metres along the way. On the way to the mosque, Husrefović was told to stop against a tree, and was beaten with rifle butts by five or six soldiers and when detained in the mosque the detainees were guarded by five to ten Bosnian Serb soldiers dressed in grey olive colour uniforms).

²⁶⁰¹ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), pp. 4–6. **92bis!!! Mauzer had never been mentioned as a perpetrator in this case, and he was licenced for the policing jobs by the internationals after the war!**

²⁶⁰² Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*) T. 450–454. The people detained with Gaši were all men who were in civilian clothes with the exception of one woman and her son and nearly all of them were from Brčko. Gaši testified that the people ranged in age from 20 to 75. See also Adjudicated Fact 2358.

801. Members of the Brčko SJB and others in police uniforms were present at Luka Camp or visited there.²⁶⁰³ **(The D3774, p. 21428, Dragomir Andan testified that:**

4 "Tasks and work in the field of crime prevention function
5 practically from the time when the division took place, that is the
6 establishing of the Brcko Serb SJB."

Which clearly indicates that the forming of separate police stations was useful! In addition, soldiers in JNA uniforms, other men in camouflage uniforms, including those with the insignia of Arkan, as well as members of the Serbian SUP would also come to the camp.²⁶⁰⁴ Goran Jelisić was in charge of the camp²⁶⁰⁵ **(Who appointed him, how and when?)** and introduced himself to the detainees as the "Serbian Adolf Hitler".²⁶⁰⁶ **(Let's see what is said in this document: D21428 – not a word about any official capacity of Jelisić!**

21 Q. Does the name Goran Jelisić from Brcko ring a bell?

22 A. I never met this person but I know the name of Goran Jelisić,
23 nicknamed Adolf. That is the how he introduced himself in Brcko and that
24 is what the top police personnel at the public security station in Brcko
25 said to me.

Jelisić wore a blue police uniform and later wore a military camouflage uniform.²⁶⁰⁷ Towards the end of May 1992, Jelisić was replaced by a new director named Konstantin Simonović who was a policeman from the Brčko SJB.²⁶⁰⁸ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!# "Officials vs. criminals"?)**

802. In early May 1992, the Brčko War Presidency was informed by the Chief of the Brčko SJB and Brčko residents that people were being detained at Luka Camp with no legal grounds and that they were mostly Bosnian Muslims from Brčko who were brought there by Serb Forces.²⁶⁰⁹ **(#The absurdity of this "the Serb Forces" abuse is here so convincing: both the SJB that reported this crime, and the Brcko War Presidency were the legal and official Serb institutions, while Goran Jelisić had never been in any official role.#Abuses of the Serb Forces#!)** Veselić in agreement with the War Presidency sent police inspectors to Luka Camp to identify what was happening there and to officially question people about the reason for their detention; some detainees were then released and

²⁶⁰³ Isak Gaši, T. 16613–16615, 16617–16618 (14 July 2011); P3005 (Brčko SJB payroll sheet, September 1992), pp. 1, 4–6; Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16817 (18 July 2011). See also Petar Kaurinović, T. 34129–34131 (20 February 2013); Obren Marković, T. 34795 (5 March 2013); P6177 (Brčko District Police information, 11 September 1999).

²⁶⁰⁴ Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 455–456.

²⁶⁰⁵ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 58. See also Adjudicated Fact 2355.

²⁶⁰⁶ KDZ057, P66 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 604, 649–650 (under seal); Adjudicated Fact 2365. See also Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić*), T. 21428.

²⁶⁰⁷ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 76; Isak Gaši, T. 16638–16639 (14 July 2011). Gaši identified Jelisić and the uniform he wore in this photograph. P3008 (Photograph of an execution outside Brčko SJB). See also P3028 (Photograph of Goran Jelisić outside Brčko SJB); Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*) T. 458. While Jelisić dressed in police uniform the Chamber received evidence that he was not a regular policeman and that at the time individuals wore uniforms and put on ranks and insignia and gave themselves titles. D3003 (Witness statement of Petar Kaurinović 17 February 2013), para. 26; Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16794–16795 (18 July 2011); Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić*), T. 21650–21651, 21815–21816.

²⁶⁰⁸ Adjudicated Fact 2355; Isak Gaši, T. 16615–16616 (14 July 2011); Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 456–457; Obren Marković, T. 34795 (5 March 2013); KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 129–130. The Chamber finds that Kaurinović was contradicted with respect to his evidence that Simonović was never an employee of the MUP. D3003 (Witness statement of Petar Kaurinović 17 February 2013), para. 32; Petar Kaurinović, T. 34132–34133 (20 February 2013); P3005 (Brčko SJB payroll sheet, September 1992), p. 1.

²⁶⁰⁹ Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16712–16715 (15 July 2011). See also P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 192–193.

some were issued with passes to leave the camp.²⁶¹⁰ **(##Officials vs. criminals #EXCULPATORY!!! Also the Serb institutions and officials, undertaking the most proper action!** Some of the detainees were also released when Bosnian Serb acquaintances came and asked for their release, but this did not happen very often and, in some cases, they were re-arrested and detained after their release.²⁶¹¹ This demonstrates that detainees were released in a selective manner, based on personal connections and that there still remained a significant number of Bosnian Muslims who were detained at Luka Camp. **(#Officials vs. crim.This “demonstrates” that there may be an additional evidence against them too! And this is the most probable inference, and shouldn’t be neglected in a case like this one!)** Ristanić visited Luka Camp on one occasion to secure the release of some detainees, but he did not visit the camp again.²⁶¹²

803. From around June 1992 some detainees from Luka Camp were taken to Batković camp in Bijeljina.²⁶¹³ When Davidović and his team arrived in Brčko in July 1992 he went to Luka Camp and found approximately 60 to 70 Bosnian Muslims, including children detained, in a hangar.²⁶¹⁴ These detainees were released.²⁶¹⁵ **(EXCULPATORY!!! Davidovic and his group acted within the President’s Police and on the President Karad’i} orders! And those were the only “Serb Forces”, and not renegades like Jelisić!##Officials vs. criminals!)**

1. Conditions of detention and treatment of detainees²⁶¹⁶

804. The detainees were held in a hangar in crowded, unsanitary conditions.²⁶¹⁷ Some detainees were lying on cardboard and on the concrete floor on both sides of the hangar.²⁶¹⁸ Their personal documents and valuables were seized by the guards on arrival.²⁶¹⁹ Detainees were not allowed to leave the camp and had to ask for permission from the guards each time

²⁶¹⁰ P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 194–195, 198–199; Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16715–16719, 16722 (15 July 2011), T. 16793, 16809–16812 (18 July 2011); P3027 (Aerial photograph of Luka Camp marked by Đorđe Ristanić), marked with B; P3025 (Travel permit issued by Brčko’s War Presidency, 9 May 1992); P3026 (Travel pass issued by Brčko’s War Presidency, 14 May 1992). One of these passes was signed by Jelisić as “Adolf” with the notation “100% clean and vouched for!”. Between 80 to 100 people were selected by Ristanić for release when he visited the administration building of Luka Camp. D3003 (Witness statement of Petar Kaurinović 17 February 2013), paras. 25–26. See also Pero Marković, T. 34730, 34733 (4 March 2013); P6173 (Brčko garrison travel pass, 13 July 1992); D1577 (Brčko garrison travel pass, 8 July 1992); D1578 (Certificate of Brčko MUP, July 4 1992); D1579 (Brčko War Presidency travel pass, 23 May 1992); D1580 (Brčko War Presidency travel pass, 8 May 1992).

²⁶¹¹ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 122–124. See also Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 454, 490–493, 495, 497–499, 519. Gaši was detained at the camp until 7 June 1992 when he was released by a man in the uniform of the JNA military police who introduced himself as Rade Bozić and was informed that Captain Dragan of the Red Berets had issued the order for his release. See KDZ057, P66 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 619 (under seal).

²⁶¹² Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16722–16723 (15 July 2011). The Chamber received contrary evidence which suggested that Ristanić was angry when Kaurinović reported that some of the detainees had been released and that he ordered that the detainees be kept in detention for the purposes of exchange. Petar Kaurinović, T. 34138–34140 (20 February 2013); P6147 (Excerpt from record of interview with Petar Kaurinović, undated), pp. 2–3. However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber observed that Kaurinović’s evidence was marked with contradictions and evasiveness and it was of the view that he was not a frank and forthcoming witness.

²⁶¹³ Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16805 (18 July 2011).

²⁶¹⁴ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 111; Milorad Davidović, T. 15544 (28 June 2011).

²⁶¹⁵ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 111.

²⁶¹⁶ The Chamber received evidence about the nature and conditions of detention and mistreatment of detainees at other locations in Brčko. P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), pp. 5–7; Milorad Šehovac, T. 31353–31355, 31361–31363 (12 and 13 December 2012); P6043 (Map of Bosanski Samac marked by Milorad Šehovac); Adjudicated Fact 2347. The Chamber will not enter findings in this regard given that the allegations in the Indictment are limited to mistreatment and detention at Luka camp.

²⁶¹⁷ See Adjudicated Fact 2354.

²⁶¹⁸ Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 445, 451. See also KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 63–64.

²⁶¹⁹ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 64, 85.

they wanted to go outside to use the toilet or drink water.²⁶²⁰ When detainees were given permission to go to the toilet and take some water they were beaten.²⁶²¹ Gaši was told that he would be given one tablet to treat the diarrhoea he was suffering from, for each Muslim “extremist” he named.²⁶²² **(No matter the guards and Jelisić were renegades, there was some search for the Muslim extremists, which means that their “extremism” was more decisive that their religious affiliation. So, even criminals that held them were looking for the Muslim villains, but more likely, there probably was a #vengeful conduct#! Still, it had nothing to do with the legal authorities, let alone with this Accused!)**

805. The detainees were told by Jelisić that they would be interrogated, that those who were found to be “guilty” would be killed and the others would be released.²⁶²³ Jelisić boasted to the detainees that he had killed many people at Luka Camp thus far and that he would continue to do so.²⁶²⁴ He also told the detainees that he had been given the green light to do whatever he wanted to the Bosnian Muslim detainees and that it was his duty to hate and “eradicate the Muslim people” as there were too many of them.²⁶²⁵ The Chamber received evidence that Jelisić was unpredictable and not of sound mind.²⁶²⁶ However, this is not medical evidence and simply reflects an observation about the nature of Jelisić’s conduct; it does not amount to a medical diagnosis which the Chamber could rely on to make a finding in this regard. **(Maybe the Chamber couldn’t make a findings in the regard of the Jelisić’s mental health, (although that could have been done while the Jelisić case was going on,) but certainly could have made findings concerning the President, and the only reasonable would be acquittal of President Karadzic from any charges in Luka Brcko! The President may be a psychiatrist, but not necessarily a lunatic to tolerate people like Jelisić in an official capacity!)**

806. Detainees were frequently verbally abused, threatened, and beaten by the guards at the camp, sometimes with mace like weapons or wrenches.²⁶²⁷ Two of the detainees, were nicknamed the “Muslims snipers” and were taken outside and beaten daily. One of these detainees was a mentally disabled man named “Jovo”.²⁶²⁸ **(Jovo is a Serbian name!)** Some of these detainees were beaten by a man named Enver who introduced himself as a “Chetnik”.²⁶²⁹ On one occasion Enver grabbed a man by the neck and kicked him,²⁶³⁰

²⁶²⁰ Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*) T. 455.

²⁶²¹ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 83–84. **92 bis, not cross examined!**

²⁶²² Isak Gaši, T. 16616 (14 July 2011).

²⁶²³ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 58–59 (testifying that Jelisić had stated that in his view there was not “a single balija who was not guilty”).

²⁶²⁴ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 60. See also Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 458; Isak Gaši, T. 16616–16617 (14 July 2011); D1436 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 17 June 1992), p. 3.

²⁶²⁵ KDZ057, P66 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 604 (under seal); Adjudicated Facts 2347, 2365. See also Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić*), T. 21428. The Chamber received evidence which suggested that Jelisić was given instructions by Mauzer’s and Arkan’s men to carry out killings in Brčko. P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 115. However, the Chamber does not accept this evidence in the absence of further corroboration as it is not clear on what basis Davidović reached his conclusion in this regard.

²⁶²⁶ Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić*), T. 21642–21643. See also D1436 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 17 June 1992), p. 3.

²⁶²⁷ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 56, 63–64, 98, 128–129, 152–153; P417 (Photograph of hangar marked by KDZ010); P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), pp. 7–8; KDZ057, P66 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 585, 611 (under seal); Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 468–469 (testifying that he was beaten by a man named Zivan who wore a camouflage uniform with the insignia of Arkan’s men and who was accompanied by two men in JNA reserve uniforms); Adjudicated Facts 2359–2360.

²⁶²⁸ Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*) T. 552.

²⁶²⁹ Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*) T. 464. See also KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 127.

²⁶³⁰ Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*) T. 464.

(Obviously, Enver was a Muslim, since it is exclusively Muslim name!) Enver then carved a cross on his forehead with a knife and the man fell to the ground bleeding.²⁶³¹ On one occasion, a man was brought into the middle of the room where newly arrived detainees were present and beaten fiercely until his screams stopped.²⁶³² Jelisić told the detainees that this “is just an example of what could happen to you”.²⁶³³ Detainees were also ordered to beat each other.²⁶³⁴ The detainees were called “balijas”, a “Turkish gang, a fictitious people, a non-existent people” and told that they would all be killed or exterminated.²⁶³⁵ They were also forced to sing “Chetnik” songs which were played.²⁶³⁶ Jelisić and Ranko Češić took part in the beating of detainees.²⁶³⁷

807. Petar Kaurinović (a.k.a. Pero), a member of the Brčko SJB, carried out interrogations at the camp and asked detainees about weapons and “Bosnian Muslim extremists”.²⁶³⁸ Gaši was not mistreated when he was interrogated by Kaurinović and was asked whether he had been ill-treated and why he had bruises on his head.²⁶³⁹ Gaši for fear of repercussions decided to say he had not been ill-treated.²⁶⁴⁰ **(Kaurinovic was an official, and his conduct was quite different from the conduct of paramilitaries!#Officials vs. criminals#)**

808. On one occasion Češić interrogated a female detainee and intimidated her by firing an automatic rifle in her direction.²⁶⁴¹ Češić then drove her out of the camp and raped her at knife point in a vehicle.²⁶⁴² After this Češić said he would take her to the bridge, cut her throat and throw her into the river.²⁶⁴³ Češić was then stopped by a man who identified himself as “Dragan”, who berated Češić for taking out a detainee without permission.²⁶⁴⁴ **(EXCULPATORY! #Officials VS. criminals#)** The female detainee was then taken by Dragan to the SUP where she was interrogated by Veselić, taken to the Brčko hospital and then driven back to Luka Camp with three other detainees.²⁶⁴⁵ The female detainee was

²⁶³¹ Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*) T. 464.

²⁶³² KDZ057, P66 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 605–608 (under seal).

²⁶³³ KDZ057, P66 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 605–608 (under seal).

²⁶³⁴ KDZ057, P66 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 587 (under seal).

²⁶³⁵ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 56, 64, 98, 152–153. See also KDZ057, P66 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 585 (under seal).

²⁶³⁶ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 64, 152–153. See also Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*) T. 456, 487 (testifying that on one occasion soldiers in camouflage uniforms, including the old and new JNA uniforms, and carrying flash lights arrived at the camp at around 2 a.m. and started beating and kicking the detainees and forced them to sing a “Serbian song” as loud as they could for 40 minutes while beating them and pointing the flashlights in their faces).

²⁶³⁷ Adjudicated Facts 2359–2360. On one occasion, a woman identified as “Monika”, arrived with Jelisić, poured a bottle of cola over one of the detainees, and broke the bottle over his head. Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*) T. 457–458. Češić was at the time a member of the police reserve corps of the war station of the Brčko SJB. Isak Gaši, T. 16612–16613 (14 July 2011); P3004 (Brčko SJB certificate re Ranko Češić, 28 October 1992); Obren Marković, T. 34792 (5 March 2013); P6177 (Brčko District Police information, 11 September 1999). See also Petar Kaurinović, T. 34132 (20 February 2013). Češić was a member of the Brčko SJB from 15 May until 26 June 1992 and then continued to serve in the VRS in Brčko till October 1992. P6176 (Certificate of RS Ministry of Defence, Brčko Department, 5 July 2002); Obren Marković, T. 34792–34793, 34801–34802 (5 March 2013).

²⁶³⁸ Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*) T. 470–472; P3005 (Brčko SJB payroll sheet, September 1992); Isak Gaši, T. 16611–16613 (14 July 2011), T. 16698 (15 July 2011).

²⁶³⁹ Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*) T. 471–472. Seven or eight days after Gaši’s arrival at Luka Camp he was also questioned by Pero Zarić and Branko Gajić who were assistants to the commander of the Brčko SJB. Isak Gaši, T. 16611–16612 (14 July 2011); P3003 (Minutes of Brčko SJB, 2 June 1992), p. 1. But see Petar Kaurinović, T. 34141 (20 February 2013) (stating that he did not recall having a conversation with Gaši).

²⁶⁴⁰ Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*) T. 471.

²⁶⁴¹ [REDACTED].

²⁶⁴² [REDACTED]. The witness testified that while being raped he said words to the effect of “it was a pleasure to have one more balija woman to rape”. [REDACTED].

²⁶⁴³ [REDACTED].

²⁶⁴⁴ [REDACTED].

²⁶⁴⁵ [REDACTED].

taken to a room and raped again by two soldiers.²⁶⁴⁶ When in this room, she saw a woman lying on the floor undressed and heard the screams of another woman.²⁶⁴⁷ From 5 to 19 May 1992 while detained at the camp, the female detainee was raped on a continuous basis.²⁶⁴⁸ On 19 May 1992, some detainees outlined the nature of their rape and mistreatment to a military officer who visited the camp with Veselić, after which the mistreatment stopped with a guard posted at the entrance to the detainees' rooms.²⁶⁴⁹

(#EXCULPATORY!!! Once some officials got involved, the situation improved! However, all of these findings had been founded on a single witness's statement under the Rule 92bis, which means there was no any cross examination! #Officials vs. criminals#)

809. As detailed below, the mistreatment and beating of the detainees continued even after Jelisić told them about receiving an order to prohibit such acts.²⁶⁵⁰ **So, there was an order to prohibit the mistreatments! It must have been issued by the Serb authorities! Therefore, any mistreatment would be contrary to the order of authorities, and would be an exception rather than a rule!#Officials vs. criminals#)**

810. Some detainees were forced to serve soldiers food, clean their offices and toilets with their bare hands and were also taken from the camp to clean Bosnian Muslim houses in the town for the use of Bosnian Serb families who would return.²⁶⁵¹ Detainees were also forced to carry bodies, and were beaten and taunted when doing so.²⁶⁵²

1. Conclusion on conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

811. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that Serb Forces brought to and detained non Serbs, including women, children, and the elderly at Luka camp from May to June 1992. The Chamber further finds that the detainees were held in poor conditions. These included lack of space, adequate bedding, and poor sanitary conditions. The Chamber also finds that detainees were regularly and viciously subjected to beatings by Serb Forces at Luka camp. Finally, the Chamber finds that female detainees were raped while at the camp. **(All of these findings are based on a 92 bis evidence, without a possibility to contest and cross examine. But, the most erroneous is again the abuse of the "Serb Forces" term#. Even in this Judgment there is sufficient evidence that the criminal part of conduct was pursued by the renegades, and was condemned and corrected by the real "Serb Forces" such as police from SJB, and other municipal authorities! #Abuse of the "Serb Forces"# Officials vs. criminals#!)**

2. Scheduled Killing Incident – B.5.1

²⁶⁴⁶ [REDACTED].

²⁶⁴⁷ [REDACTED].

²⁶⁴⁸ [REDACTED].

²⁶⁴⁹ [REDACTED].

²⁶⁵⁰ See para. 822. The Chamber received evidence that Kaurinović in the few days he was at the camp only heard about one incident of mistreatment which he passed on to Veselić and that Veselić said they would try to do everything to prevent such incidents and restore order in Luka but that the paramilitaries had absolute power and could do what they wanted. Petar Kaurinović, T. 34136–34137, 34146 (20 February 2013). The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching this conclusion the Chamber observed that Kaurinović's evidence was marked with contradictions and evasiveness and concluded that he was not a frank and forthcoming witness.

²⁶⁵¹ KDZ057, P66 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 613–614 (under seal). See also Isak Gaši, T. 16614–16615 (14 July 2011). While Gaši uses the phrase "collected volunteers" to sweep the streets and do other jobs in town, in light of the other evidence, and the circumstances of their detention, the Chamber does not accept that the detainees performed this work voluntarily. However, the Chamber notes that this type of forced labour is not charged in the Indictment, which only covers forced labour at the frontlines.

²⁶⁵² See para. 816.

812. The Prosecution alleges that a number of men were killed at Luka camp between 8 May and 6 June 1992.²⁶⁵³

813. On numerous occasions, groups of detainees at Luka camp were taken out of the hangar and summarily executed.²⁶⁵⁴ **(Adjudicated fact!!! Such a huge allegation and finding was not established in the courtroom in this case)** While at the camp, one detainee saw a document entitled “People to be executed”, which listed approximately 50 prominent, educated, or wealthy Muslims and Croats.²⁶⁵⁵ **(Again, Adjudicated fact, and 92bis statement, without possibility to cross examine!!!)** On 9 May 1992, Jelisić brought Stjepo Glavočević, a Bosnian Muslim, into the hangar, while he was holding the man’s severed ear, he then struck Glavočević with a sabre, killing him.²⁶⁵⁶ **(Adjudicated fact! Stjepo couldn’t be a Muslim!)** Jelisić also took two Bosnian Muslim men from Bijeljina out of the hangar and later ordered two other detainees to move their bodies to a pile of other bodies.²⁶⁵⁷ **(92bis evidence)** Jelisić also shot two men named Jasminko and Cita.²⁶⁵⁸ **(92bis evidence!) However, this is an evidence on a renegade’s conduct, and has nothing to do with the local authorities, let alone this Accused. Are all other presidents responsible for such a people who didn’t belong to their forces and acted contrary to every of their orders? #Abuse of “Serb Forces”#)**

814. During the night of 11 May 1992, four detainees were called out of the hangar, and other detainees could hear the blows, the detainees moaning and begging as they were beaten and cursed outside the hangar.²⁶⁵⁹ One of the detainees was instructed to lie down and lean his head against a grate, after which a “silenced shot” was heard, followed by the “blunt sound of a blow against the concrete”.²⁶⁶⁰ This was repeated in the following days, with groups of four detainees taken out approximately 25 to 30 times with only one or two detainees returning from each group.²⁶⁶¹ **(92bis, evidence without cross examination!)**

815. The guards would yell that the detainees should come out by themselves and on the second or third day of his detention, KDZ010 “volunteered” to go out, after about ten groups of four “volunteers” had left the hangar.²⁶⁶² Outside they were beaten and cursed, after which they were lined up against the wall with their heads bent down and hands behind their backs.²⁶⁶³ One man was pulled out of the group of four by a man identified as “Ivan” who was also known as “Repić” and ordered to lie on the asphalt and place his head on a grate after which he was shot by Jelisić.²⁶⁶⁴ **(In no way this could be a Muslim! But,**

²⁶⁵³ The Prosecution submits that the evidence shows that these killings occurred between 4 May 1992 and 7 June 1992. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B.

²⁶⁵⁴ See Adjudicated Fact 2362.

²⁶⁵⁵ Adjudicated Fact 2366; KDZ057, P66 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 612–613 (under seal).

²⁶⁵⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 2363.

²⁶⁵⁷ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), pp. 8–9.

²⁶⁵⁸ P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), pp. 8–9.

²⁶⁵⁹ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 65.

²⁶⁶⁰ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 65–66. See also Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 460; P3016 (Photograph of Luka Camp).

²⁶⁶¹ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 70, 81, 113–114.

²⁶⁶² KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 66.

²⁶⁶³ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 67; P417 (Photograph of hangar marked by KDZ010) (the detainees were lined up at the spot marked 1).

²⁶⁶⁴ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 67–70, 81, 156–157 (testifying that after killing one of the detainees in this manner Jelisić said: “Another balija less”); P417 (Photograph of hangar marked by KDZ010). See also Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 459 (stating that he heard about Jelisić killing detainees from another detainee present during the execution and that Gaši was also told that 80 detainees had been killed in this way and that this detainee had helped load the bodies onto a truck).

the Defence couldn't cross examine this witness. In this manner there could be as much charges as one wanted, particularly since there is no elements that could be checked, either concerning victims or perpetrators!) On one occasion the guards entered the hangar and asked if any of the detainees were married to Serb women, and when one man stood up and was taken outside, the detainees could hear that he was verbally abused, beaten and then ordered by Jelisić to lie down and put his head against the grate; a gun shot was then heard.²⁶⁶⁵ (As usually, nothing seen, just heard! Can you imagine: the war is all around, and then all of a sudden a shot is heard!?! #Heard, not seen#!) On another occasion Gaši saw "four civilians" being taken out of an office at Luka Camp and saw Česić shooting at their backs after which two men fell to the ground.²⁶⁶⁶ On yet another day, a detainee dropped a bottle of water, soldiers beat him fiercely, and Jelisić took him to a grate where he was killed in the same way as the other detainees.²⁶⁶⁷

816. At the end of every night a group of seven or eight detainees were called out to clean the blood outside the hangar.²⁶⁶⁸ Detainees were also ordered to carry bodies into a refrigerated lorry²⁶⁶⁹ which was used to transport the bodies elsewhere; other bodies were thrown into the Sava River.²⁶⁷⁰ When Gaši returned to the hangar after helping with the disposal of the bodies a soldier told them: "You'd better keep quiet about what you had done and what you had seen".²⁶⁷¹ After detainees returned from carrying bodies they were beaten and taunted by threats that they would face the same fate in a few days.²⁶⁷²

817. On one occasion, approximately 50 civilians were lined up near the entrance to the warehouse after which a blast of gunfire, moans and the sound of bodies falling onto the concrete could be heard.²⁶⁷³ (Again, 92bis, and again, something #“heard”, but not seen!#)

818. There was an agreement between the War Presidency and Veselić, the Chief of the Brčko SJB, under which the bodies collected from Luka Camp would be identified.²⁶⁷⁴

²⁶⁶⁵ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 82–83.

²⁶⁶⁶ Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 461 (testifying that he could not confirm whether the people were killed on the spot and that a man in camouflage uniform identified as Mišo Cajević and a man in police uniform who Gaši believed was Pudić were at the scene when the shooting occurred). See also P3017 (Photograph of Ranko Česić).

²⁶⁶⁷ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 84–85. KDZ010 could only see him beaten but was taken out of sight when he heard the shot.

²⁶⁶⁸ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 70.

²⁶⁶⁹ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 69, 79–80, 155–156. The witness identified the truck in this photograph as the one used for the purpose of storing the bodies. P420 (Photograph of mass grave in Brčko); Adjudicated Fact 2364.

²⁶⁷⁰ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 155–156; Adjudicated Fact 2364. Gaši and three or four detainees were taken by a man in camouflage uniform and two guards in JNA reserve uniforms to throw a group of 15 to 20 bodies into the river. The bodies were in civilian clothes and had bloodstains on their backs and bullet holes in the back or in the back of their heads and necks. Gaši recognised two of the bodies and they were Bosnian Muslims. Gaši was not sure whether the bodies thrown into the river were shot at Luka Camp or at another location. Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 464–466; Isak Gaši, T. 16626 (14 July 2011).

²⁶⁷¹ Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*) T. 467–468.

²⁶⁷² KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 69–70, 81, 156–157, Adjudicated Fact 2364.

²⁶⁷³ KDZ057, P66 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 591–593 (under seal).

²⁶⁷⁴ (²⁶⁷⁶) Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16816 (18 July 2011). The Chamber also received evidence about steps taken by Bosnian Serb authorities for the identification of 60 Bosnian Muslims killed by paramilitaries. However, it is not clear whether or not these killings relate to Luka Camp, therefore the Chamber will not make any findings in this regard. Why this omission of the Chamber to establish whether these killings were connected with the Luka would be put as a disadvantage on the Accused' account??? Where else there was a paramilitary killing? Petar Kaurinović, T. 34115–34116, 34125–34129 (20 February 2013). The Chamber received other evidence about disappearances, killings and burials of victims in mass graves in Brčko. See P1607 (RS Ministry of Justice report on prisons and camps on the RS territory, 22 October 1992), p. 3; D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 27; Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35196 (11 March 2013); P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 189–191, 202–205, 214–217, 220–223; Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16726, 16730, 16736 (15 July 2011); P4854 (Updated Table 1 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 1; P4852 (Report of Amor Mašović, 20–21 October 2009), pp. 3, 11. See also P87 (List of Commissions for

(This is the first step in a criminal investigation, and it is consistent with other steps of the local authorities, as well as majority of the content of this fn. 2676. However, the Chamber missed to notice that all the investigative operations had been done by the local Serb authorities, as well as the official authorities of the Republic of Srpska, which is **#EXCULPATORY##Officials vs. criminals#!** The P1607, which is a governmental investigation of all the allegations about abuses in the detention facilities, does not say what this paragraph and fn. suggested. See: P1607:

In the town of Brčko or its environs there is no prison or camp for the temporary accommodation of detained enemy soldiers.

I visited this town to verify a report by the International Red Cross whose content was alarming. It said that a large number of citizens of Muslim nationality (the figure quoted was about 2,500 people) had been liquidated in that town.

I held a meeting with the most responsible people in Brčko (the president of the Municipality, the president of the Executive Board and the deputy in the Assembly of Republika Srpska). I checked and ascertained that in the immediate vicinity of the town (a suburb) there are five mass graves where a total of 226 people are buried, of whom 17 died of natural causes. These people died during combat activities in Brčko. Since there was the danger of an epidemic, these people were buried with religious rites at the said sites, at least according to their statements. /sentence as printed/ The relevant services of the Interior Ministry and other services carried out the identification of the dead people on several occasions.

On that occasion, I learned that in the Brčko area there was a mass grave containing the bodies of 36 Serbian fighters. It is assumed that there are also mass graves of Muslims who buried their fighters during the retreat.

(...) This was a Serb Government Commision for a facts finding. Nothing in this report sounds untrue. This is exactly all what this President could have known, nothing else! Was there a combat activity lasting several months? It was! Did both side have a combat casualties? Certainly! Did the sides in retreat buried? No! what happened with them? The remains of combatants of the both sides were buried in a mass graves #Combat – civilian casualties#!)

819. While the Chamber received evidence which suggested that the Bosnian Serb authorities in Brčko were not aware of events or killings at Luka Camp until much later, the Chamber is not satisfied that Kaurinović was able to adequately explain a prior inconsistent statement which suggested that the Crisis Staff was in charge of the town and would have known about events at the camp.²⁶⁷⁵ **(#Officials vs. criminals# However, it is established that the local officials took refuge out of the centre of the city, and were in jeopardy to be killed by the same paramilitaries! Such an evidence is in the file** Kaurinović was also confronted with and did not adequately explain evidence that tended to contradict his evidence that the police were unable to control the activities of paramilitaries in the

Exchange, 1992) (under seal). However, this evidence cannot be directly connected to events at Luka Camp, and so the Chamber will not be making findings in this regard. **Why would it, when it would be a “pro reo”?**

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D3003 (Witness statement of Petar Kaurinović 17 February 2013), paras. 22–23; Petar Kaurinović, T. 34116–34117, 34120–34121 (20 February 2013). Ristanić was also unclear about whether and when he received information about the killings which were reported to have occurred at Luka Camp; he claimed that he only heard rumours and later through stories reported in the media and from people who had been in the camp about what happened there. Given his equivocal answers in an attempt to distance himself from knowledge of these events, the Chamber does not accept Ristanić’s evidence in this regard. See P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 185–187; Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16726 (15 July 2011); Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16796 (18 July 2011).

camp.²⁶⁷⁶ (Why a witness should be able to explain an evidence of another witness? Kaurinovic could have testify only about what he personally knew, and this had to be taken together with other evidence and judged in it's entirety. Let us see what was "this contradictory evidence" that rebutted the Kaurinovic's assertion that the paramilitaries controlled Brcko, D3003, T.34120-34121: Now, Mr. Kaurinovic, just to explain, this is in the context of a discussion of whether the Crisis Staff knew what was going on at Luka camp. We'll come back to the issue of Luka camp, but right now I'd just like to focus you on the issue of who was in authority of the town and --in the town, and you say -- or, sorry, you were asked: "It isn't possible that the Crisis Staff would have -- would have not been aware of the sort of things that were happening at the camp."

Your response was: "I don't think so." The interviewer said: "It would have been very difficult for them to have not known what was happening." And your response was: "I can only assume that they were the one who should have known what was happening in this town, because they were the one who were the authority in town." Now, do you accept this as -- statement as accurate? A. I don't know which question to answer now. Your previous question was upon my return to Brcko, as I had stated earlier, the Crisis Staff was in power, was in charge and ruled Brcko. Upon my arrival in Brcko, that's indeed what I thought. However, when I realised what the situation in town really is and what was going on, I came to the conclusion that the Crisis Staff was apparently able to do nothing about it. I came to the police station, for instance, and found all offices broken into, the safe boxes we had in our offices were burgled. All the valuables were gone, and we had seized some valuables from criminals we had worked on. And that's when I finally realised that the Crisis Staff, if it had any power, would never have allowed that. (#Officials vs. criminals#! So, the witness Kaurinovic sometimes responded that the formal authority was the Crisis Staff, but explained that for the critical period the Crisis Staff was helpless and couldn't do anything. In the respond further the Witness described the Police station ruined and robbed by the paramilitaries, and there is no a singl word allowing such a "finding" as the Chamber did in this paragraph (819). In such a way, because of the linguistic problems, a cunning tactics of the Prosecution lawyers, totally unfair, had a success! The Chamber's role should be to disable this.) This contradictory evidence revealed that the police themselves were actually involved in the killing and mistreatment of detainees.²⁶⁷⁷ The evidence about lack of knowledge about events at Luka Camp on the part of the Bosnian Serb authorities is also not consistent with evidence that in June or July 1992, Dr. Milan Novaković who was the President of the Bijeljina Municipal Board of the SDS "announced on radio that the Jelisić 'factory' was the most productive (at expulsion and murder of Muslims) at the time".²⁶⁷⁸ (#Linguistic trouble#! Almost the same sentence was "heard" to be allegedly said in Zvornik. This ironic remarks were a criticism of the situation, but those who do not know Serbian, could not see the right meaning! Since the sentence in Zvornik was written down, and this one for Brcko came from Davidovic's testimony, the later is not probable! See what Davidovic said, in P2848, para 116:

²⁶⁷⁶ D3003 (Witness statement of Petar Kaurinović 17 February 2013), paras. 22–23; Petar Kaurinović, T. 34116–34117, 34120–34121, 34134 (20 February 2013), T. 34134 (20 February 2013).

²⁶⁷⁷ D3003 (Witness statement of Petar Kaurinović 17 February 2013), paras. 22–23; Petar Kaurinović, T. 34116–34117, 34120–34121, 34134 (20 February 2013), T. 34134 (20 February 2013).

²⁶⁷⁸ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 116.

released the following day. Dr Milan Novaković, President of the Bijeljina Municipal Board of the SDS, announced on radio that the Jelisić “factory” was the most productive (at expulsion and murder of Muslims) at the time, that is, in the expulsion of Muslims. This was in June or July 1992. At this time I was in Brčko and the SDS policy as far as I perceived it was the creation of an atmosphere of hatred and fear so that the Muslims would voluntarily leave. Individual Muslims had given various members of the SDS considerable amounts of

First of all, Dr Milan Novakovic wasn't President of the Bijeljina Municipal Board of the SDS, but a distinguished member of the Bosnian Parliament, who as other SDS dignitaries, like D. Micic and others, protected the Bijeljina Muslims, and he could have been only ironical about Jelisić, although there is no other evidence that Dr. Novakovic said anything like that. Next, a sentence wasn't correctly translated. In Serbian it said:

Ovo je bilo u junu ili julu 1992. Ja sam bio u Brčkom u to doba i meni se činilo da je politika SDS-a da se stvori takva atmosfera mržnje i straha da Muslimani odu dobrovoljno. Pojedini

Which should be translated, instead of “as far as I perceived” – “it seemed to me that it was the creation” ...Even the witness was aware that it was so shaky assertion based on a personal feelings and impressions. So many dubious elements, and a serious chamber should not rely upon this! #Impressions, feelings#!)

820. Ristanić testified that with respect to the Bosnian Serb municipal authorities “we either didn’t have [the] strength or willingness” to stop Jelisić.²⁶⁷⁹ While the Chamber accepts that the Bosnian Serb authorities were not willing to stop Jelisić it does not accept the suggestion that they did not have the power to do so.²⁶⁸⁰ **(However, the most favourite (the most quoted) Prosecution witness Milorad Davidovic confirmed before the same Chamber that the entire Serb MUP, Police, didn't have such a capable group of policemen to arrest the paramilitaries, and that this was the reason why the Serb leadership, including the President, asked for this help from the Yugoslav Federal police. #Officials vs. criminals# See: Davidovic testimony, T.15554: Q. Earlier today, you mentioned that you realised certain things in the beginning of May. Is it right that at the request of the leadership of Republika Srpska - let me not mention my own contacts with Prime Minister Panic - you came to Republika Srpska on the 26th of June on an assignment to help the police force of Republika Srpska to deal with the problem of illegal armed paramilitary groups?)**

A. *When I was summoned by my superiors, primarily the minister of the interior, Bogdanovic, we went together to the office of General Petar Gracanin, who was minister of defence, and I was told then that they designated me to go to Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to help the Ministry of Interior of Republika Srpska to disarm paramilitary units, because allegedly you, together with Prime Minister Panic of Serbia, at some meeting in Geneva or somewhere, had asked Serbia's assistance in disarming the paramilitary units in Republika Srpska, saying that you could not do it yourself, on your own, and that you needed help. So they designated that help to be me. **On a direct question of the President whether the Republic of Srpska had the ability to arrest paramilitaries by its own forces, Davidovic responded that the RS did not have such a capable unit, –see also D1412, a report of Davidovic, which confirmed all the Defence positions!***

²⁶⁷⁹ P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), para. 210.

²⁶⁸⁰ P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 209–211.

821. In this regard the Chamber notes that Jelisić was eventually removed from the police, but there was no investigation of the alleged crimes and he was simply transferred to a military unit.²⁶⁸¹ In addition the Chamber received evidence of an Eastern Bosnia Corps report which suggested that Ristanić himself was aware about murders which had been committed in the municipality and did not care about preventing the information from leaking “because there were much larger graves in Prijedor”.²⁶⁸² While Ristanić denied the specific detail contained in this report, the Chamber accepts that it supports the other evidence received which suggests a level of awareness by the Bosnian Serb authorities about crimes committed in the municipality and attempts to cover them up.²⁶⁸³

(Let us see how this paragraph is wrong: 1. The author of this report was a Serb officer, and he acted informing the superiors about the crimes; 2. Let us see how the report qualified the situation on the basis of knowledge, in comparison to what the Army “believed” – P02889:

- After both bridges over the Sava river had been destroyed in Brčko, the events started to loose control by both civilian authorities and the then military command, which in that period didn't function (the way it should have function in the state of war). The town was flooded by different "patriotic" orientated individuals who used "devotion to Serbism" as an excuse for robberies, rapes and as a result of that murders for no justified reason. Besides those groups, which by the way came with looting plans worked out in detail before departure. We also believe that there were groups which came as ordered, i.e. who had the support of the than military and civilian authorities. Here we mean the leadership in

(#Official reports on crimes used against officials#) No misunderstanding: the author as an official representative of the RS Army had identified the “loosing control by both civilian and the then military command”. The civilian authorities had lost control, therefore the crimes happened because of this, aand not because of the will of authorities! “; 3. “the then military command” clearly indicates that the author meant literally he then”, that meant before the Eastern Bosnia Corps was formed, i.e. duriong the JNA presence. #Before VRS, during JNA# 4. The Chamber suggested that Djordje Ristanic was trying to cover up the crimes. However, the Report confirms just opposite, let us see, the same document P2889:

free zone, while for the other pits the exact locations are not known. According to a statement of the President of Municipality, Đorđe RISTANIĆ, 300 people were killed. He personally is not upset because of that. When certain organs warned him to take some measures to prevent information leaking, he said he didn't care because there were much larger graves in Prijedor.

No confusion: some “certain organs warned him (Ristanic) to take some measures to prevent information leaking”... but Ristanic refused, #contrary to the Chamber’s finding!!!# So, Ristanic didn’t care the information had been leaking, not that the people had been killed! The author of report was from the Serb official structures, as well as Ristanic. #Officials vs. criminals#!)

821. In this regard it was also reported that the commander of the Brčko barracks, Colonel Đurđević and the Corps Staff were informed of these events “in order to prevent leakage of information” but that they responded that this was a matter for the civilian

²⁶⁸¹ P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 209–211.

²⁶⁸² P2889 (Report of the Eastern Bosnia Corps, 29 September 1992), p. 1.

²⁶⁸³ P2889 (Report of the Eastern Bosnia Corps, 29 September 1992), p. 1. Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16731–16732 (15 July 2011), T. 16746 (18 July 2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 2367.

authorities.²⁶⁸⁴ This report also noted that organs from the Army and SUP and Simo Radovanović, who was one of Captain Dragan's instructors, suggested that the civilian authorities "do this properly to prevent information leakage".²⁶⁸⁵ **(#Contrary to these recommendations, the civilian authorities rejected to prevent the "information leakage", and why would they, since they didn't commit any crime, but the paramilitaries to which the same authorities had been confronted! There is a sufficient evidence that the authorities had been suspended by the paramilitaries, see P2889 and the other evidence in the file!#Officials vs. criminals#)** This report also observed that the next action was to "officially admit in front of the international community that a certain number of Muslims and Croats for whom we would have to prove that they had been working on ethnic cleansing of Serbs from these areas".²⁶⁸⁶ The report stressed that "absolutely correct documentation" had to be established for these Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats for presentation to representatives of the international community who were expected to visit Brčko very soon.²⁶⁸⁷ The report mentioned that the "next phase would be public trial of two or three extremists with all possible publicity" for the international reporters.²⁶⁸⁸

822. The killings at Luka Camp continued until on or about 16 May 1992 when Jelisić entered the hangar with Major Džurković and a captain wearing a JNA uniform and said that they had received an order that the killing and mistreatment of detainees were prohibited after which the names and personal details of the detainees were recorded.²⁶⁸⁹ However, contrary to this order, the mistreatment and beating of the detainees continued.²⁶⁹⁰ **As anyone knows, the JNA was the only legal armed force in BiH until 20 May 1992. At the moment described in this paragraph there was no any VRS, nor President Karadzic commanded to any armed force. Neither the JNA was a "Serb Force" as described in this Indictment/Judgement, nor Goran Jelisić was a "Serb Force". The only Serb Force was this unit composed of the Federal MUP unit, led by M. Davidovic, the Special police unit led by Mr. Karisik and the 65th Protection Regiment led by General Savcic – who on the order of the President arrested all the paramilitaries in Brcko, Bijeljina and Zvornik! This kind of inversion of the President's proper conduct into his, (and of Minister Stanisic and other Serb officials) criminal responsibility is unknown in the history of judiciary!)**

823. In light of the evidence above, the Chamber finds that a large number of non-Serb men were killed by Serb Forces at the Luka Camp between at least 9 May 1992 and 16 May 1992. **(#Before the VRS and any "Serb Forces"# And what both the Prosecution and the Chamber missed to explain is: what all of this has to do with this Accused, who was elected in the Presidency only on 12 May, and got the VRS on 20 May, although there passed the rest of 1992 to form the VRS and get in command!)**

However, the number of criminal casualties was not established and differentiated from the combat casualties, which is a source of the most malignant distortions on

²⁶⁸⁴ P2889 (Report of the Eastern Bosnia Corps, 29 September 1992), pp. 1–2.

²⁶⁸⁵ P2889 (Report of the Eastern Bosnia Corps, 29 September 1992), p. 2. **See the Defence comment in the Para 820 above!**

²⁶⁸⁶ P2889 (Report of the Eastern Bosnia Corps, 29 September 1992), p. 2.

²⁶⁸⁷ P2889 (Report of the Eastern Bosnia Corps, 29 September 1992), p. 2.

²⁶⁸⁸ P2889 (Report of the Eastern Bosnia Corps, 29 September 1992), p. 2.

²⁶⁸⁹ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 70–71, 85, 143–145. The Chamber notes that contrary to this order the mistreatment and beating of the detainees continued. KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 130–131, 145–146.

²⁶⁹⁰ KDZ010, P416 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Jelisić*), T. 130–131, 145–146.

account of the Serbs. (#Combat vs. civilian casualties#) For instance, Davidovic and his unit came on 27 June 1992, and found that there were killings and “silent liquidations of upto 10 persons of all the ethnic groups, see D2889, p.2, the Davidovic’s Report:

frequently accompanied by physical expulsion and even the liquidation of some owners, as well as “silent liquidations and so on” (for example, more than 10 people of various ethnic groups were killed for no apparent reason,

Therefore, regardless of religion or ethnic affiliation, and without reason. The state didn’t have anything in common with these killings!)

ii. Problems with paramilitaries and law and order

824. The Bosnian Serb local authorities had difficulties in controlling paramilitary groups which entered and operated in Brčko; these paramilitaries attacked or mistreated police, army officers, soldiers and civilians and placed pressure on the SJB and other municipal structures.²⁶⁹¹ The paramilitaries issued an ultimatum for the “removal of the entire management team of the Brčko SJB” which was complied with by the local authorities out of fear.²⁶⁹² (#EXCULPATORY!!! Why it was so? Had the local authorities been in a good terms with the paramilitaries, the paramilitaries would never turn agaist such a cooperative local authorities! # Officials vs. criminals#!)

825. The Brčko SJB faced structural problems in carrying out investigations and had shortages in vehicles, equipment and communication facilities.²⁶⁹³ Proposals were made to recruit new personnel, re-organise management, and remove individuals from reserve police units who had been charged with criminal acts, to cancel all unauthorised positions, and to improve co-operation with the military security, neighbouring SJB’s and the Serbian MUP.²⁶⁹⁴ (#EXCULPATORY!!! This was the Serbian police! #Officials vs. criminals#!) The Brčko War Presidency leadership sent a summary of the situation in Brčko to the RS Presidency to identify the results achieved and the problems that needed to be resolved.²⁶⁹⁵ (#EXCULPATORY!!! The Brcko War Presidency was the local Serb authority! #Officials vs. criminals#!)

²⁶⁹¹ Živan Filipović, T. 35813 (21 March 2013); P2888 (Brčko’s War Presidency Summary of events in Brčko Municipality), pp. 3–6; D3003 (Witness statement of Petar Kaurinović 17 February 2013), para. 23; D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), pp. 7–8, 10; P2889 (Report of the Eastern Bosnia Corps, 29 September 1992), p. 1; D3073 (Witness statement of Obren Marković dated 2 March 2013), para. 29; D3072 (Witness statement of Pero Marković dated 1 March 2013), para. 20; P2853 (Report of Bijeljina CSB, 21 May 1992), p. 1; Milorad Davidović, T. 15474–15475 (28 June 2011); Dragomir Andan, T. 40835–40836 (5 July 2013); D1436 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 17 June 1992), pp. 3–4; Milorad Davidović, T. 15748–15749 (30 June 2011). See also P58 (Witness statement of Sakib Husrefović dated 27 May 1995), p. 2; Pero Marković, T. 34738 (4 March 2013); D3003 (Witness statement of Petar Kaurinović 17 February 2013), paras. 21, 23–24; Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*, T. 506–507; Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21411; P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), para. 25; D3003 (Witness statement of Petar Kaurinović 17 February 2013), paras. 13, 18, 21; D3073 (Witness statement of Obren Marković dated 2 March 2013), para. 29; Obren Marković, T. 34788–34789, 34800 (5 March 2013); D3072 (Witness statement of Pero Marković dated 1 March 2013), paras. 14, 15, 16–17, 19. The paramilitary groups identified as operating in Brčko included the units affiliated with Arkan, Mauzer, Captain Dragan, Šešelj, “Žika the Montenegrin”, “the Obilić men from Kosoco”, Živojin Ivanović, who was also known as “Crnogorac”.

²⁶⁹² D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), p. 8; D3003 (Witness statement of Petar Kaurinović 17 February 2013), para. 22. Paramilitaries also threatened officials of the local authorities. Milorad Šehovac, T. 31381 (13 December 2012)

²⁶⁹³ D1574 (Report of Brčko SJB, undated), p. 4; Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16799 (18 July 2011).

²⁶⁹⁴ D1574 (Report of Brčko SJB, undated), p. 4; Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16800 (18 July 2011).

²⁶⁹⁵ P2888 (Brčko’s War Presidency Summary of events in Brčko Municipality), p. 6. See also Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16728–16729 (15 July 2011); P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 224–225.

826. Between 29 May and 12 June 1992, employees of the Serbian MUP inspected and offered professional assistance to the Brčko SJB with respect to the failure to perform its basic functions.²⁶⁹⁶ **#Wrong in fact#! The MUP of Serbia didn't offer anything, but the RS MUP asked for an assistance, after president Karad`i} appointed the arrangement with the Yugoslav (FRY) Prime Minister Milan Panic. There is sufficient evidence on that. Finally, M. Davidovic himself confirmed that in his testimony, as well as in his Report to his (Yugoslav) MUP, P 2889:**
 Due to the growing security problems in the area of north-eastern Bosnia (Bijeljina, Zvornik, Brčko) which came to the fore in May and June of this year, the Serbian Republic of BH MUP asked the Federal Secretary of the Interior of the FRY /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ to send, if possible, a number of policemen and SSUP /Federal Secretariat of the Interior/ Brigade Deputy Commander Milorad DAVIDOVIĆ²⁶⁹⁷ to this area with the aim of becoming directly engaged in stabilising the security situation, establishing the legality of work and normal functioning of organs of internal affairs, and ensuring the legitimacy of the organs of authority. The **So, the Accused and his Police, the Ministry of Interior asked for the help. Next passage, Dragan Andan was a high official of the Accused's MUP.** Dragan Andan was sent to Brčko to rebuild the SJB structures and organisation; **(EXCULPATORY!!!He was sent by the Accused and his Police Minister! #Officials vs. criminals#)** he also attempted to eliminate the operations of paramilitary groups such as the Red Berets in Brčko and in doing so had ongoing struggles with the local political structures and paramilitary groups.²⁶⁹⁷ **The D3810, upon the Chamber relied for this finding didn't say what the Chamber found, but quite contrary to it, see D3810 concerning paramilitaries:**
 As the situation with the paramilitary forces in Brčko and Zvornik has not been resolved yet, our forces are to a great extent involved there instead of participating in armed combat.
 The military and political situation ~~in the remaining part~~ is unchanged.
But, anyway, there is so many evidence that the majority of the officials of the Republic of Srpska acted in their best to meet all the legal requirements. Why the Accused would be charged for an ommisiom, negligence or even criminal conduct of a negligeeable minority of the officials?

827. On 2 June 1992, the Brčko SJB established an organisational structure for the police station, appointed commanders and assistant commanders and outlined the tasks and obligations of personnel in preserving public law and order and protecting property.²⁶⁹⁸ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! #Officials vs. criminals# The Chamber is theating the Serb**

²⁶⁹⁶ D1436 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 17 June 1992), p. 1.

²⁶⁹⁷ Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21402–21403, 21406–21421, 21426–21427, 21629–21631; D3779 (Minutes from meeting of Brčko SJB specialist board, 2 June 1992), pp. 3–4; D3780 (Brčko SJB information, undated); D3810 (Bijeljina CSB dispatch to SerBiH MUP, 23 July 1992); D3811 (Bijeljina CSB dispatch to SerBiH MUP, 24 July 1992); Dragomir Andan, T. 40819–40822, 40836 (5 July 2013); D3789 (Dragomir Andan's notes), pp. 3–4; D3778 (CSB Bijeljina authorisation, 28 May 1992); D3788 (Bijeljina CSB report to SerBiH MUP, 20 July 1992). Andan acknowledged that in the few weeks he was in Brčko his first task was to set up the police station but he did not have time to investigate mass graves, murders and rapes. Dragomir Andan, T. 40897 (5 July 2013).

²⁶⁹⁸ P3003 (Minutes of Brčko SJB, 2 June 1992), p. 1.

regular police as somebody's else, and criminals as a "Serb Forces"! That was done without any assistance from Yugoslavia, which arrived on 27 June 1992, and it was accomplished in a good fate of the RS MUP. That was necessary, because just a month ago the common state and police ceased to function. An agreement was reached that all detention measures "be recommended and submitted in writing" to the head of the Brčko SJB by the head of the Crime department and that a depot be established in which stolen items could be stored.²⁶⁹⁹ **Exculpatory#!!!**

828. Over 150 policemen from the frontlines were withdrawn to form a functioning patrol in the town of Brčko and other measures were taken to gather information on crimes committed including property offences, violent and sex crimes.²⁷⁰⁰ Given that a large number of crimes had also been committed by members of the SJB, it was agreed that the gathering of information would continue once the armed conflict was over and necessary measures would be taken against the persons in question at that time.²⁷⁰¹ **ALL (#EXCULPATORY!!!)**

829. In the summer of 1992, given the increasing security problems in northeast BiH including in Brčko, the SerBiH MUP requested the Federal SUP to send the police and Milorad Davidović to the area to stabilise the security situation and establish the normal functioning of organs of internal affairs.²⁷⁰² Davidović was asked by the leaders of the Crisis Staff in Brčko to come to Brčko to re-establish law and order.²⁷⁰³ This followed a request from the Accused that a special unit be sent to Brčko to address the problems with paramilitaries.²⁷⁰⁴ **EXCULPATORY#!!!**

830. Davidović located, disarmed and arrested the Red Berets including their leader "Žika" and the Božić brothers who had identification from the Serbian MUP.²⁷⁰⁵ After he arrested some of the Red Berets, Frenki Simatović phoned Davidović twice, cursed him and asked how he had the right to act in that way.²⁷⁰⁶ The Chief of the SJB was arrested and beaten by members of a paramilitary unit and Ristanić himself was detained by paramilitaries wearing red berets in late July or early August 1992 for bringing people from Bijeljina to Brčko to introduce order.²⁷⁰⁷ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! Officials vs. criminals!#)** The paramilitaries expressed their anger and threatened Ristanić because their men had been arrested.²⁷⁰⁸ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! The Chamber notified this in para 824 of this Judgement! But somehow the Chamber didn't recognise that these "forces" which got**

²⁶⁹⁹ P3003 (Minutes of Brčko SJB, 2 June 1992), p. 3.

²⁷⁰⁰ D1436 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 17 June 1992), pp. 1–2; Milorad Davidović, T. 15747 (30 June 2011); Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21410, 21422, 21639–21640.

²⁷⁰¹ D1436 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 17 June 1992), p. 2.

²⁷⁰² D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), p. 1. *See also* Petar Kaurinović, T. 34135 (20 February 2013); D3072 (Witness statement of Pero Marković dated 1 March 2013), para. 21; Pero Marković, T. 34752 (4 March 2013); D1632 (Report of Bijeljina SJB, 23 July 1992), p. 2.

²⁷⁰³ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 102, 105. The delegation that came to Bijeljina to request assistance from Davidović were Đorđe Ristanić, Dr. "Beli" and Pavle Milinković. *See also* D3003 (Witness statement of Petar Kaurinović 17 February 2013), para. 24; D3073 (Witness statement of Obren Marković dated 2 March 2013), para. 30.

²⁷⁰⁴ Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16796 (18 July 2011). *See also* D3072 (Witness statement of Pero Marković dated 1 March 2013), para. 21; Pero Marković, T. 34752 (4 March 2013); Milorad Šehovac, T. 31381–31382 (13 December 2012); Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21456–21457.

²⁷⁰⁵ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 103, 106; Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16801–16802 (18 July 2011); D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), pp. 6, 9–10. *See also* Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21456–21457; D3073 (Witness statement of Obren Marković dated 2 March 2013), para. 30.

²⁷⁰⁶ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 80, 112.

²⁷⁰⁷ P3023 (Witness statement of Đorđe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 25–26; Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16786, 16802–16804 (18 July 2011).

²⁷⁰⁸ Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16803–16804 (18 July 2011).

into the conflict with paramilitaries were the President's legal state forces, fighting against all sort of crimes! #Officials vs. criminals!#)

831. Davidović was transporting the arrested paramilitaries to Bijeljina when he received a radio call which demanded the immediate release of the Red Berets and informed him that the members of the Crisis Staff were being held hostage and one person would be killed every half an hour if the demand was not complied with.²⁷⁰⁹ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!The legal organs of authority were hostages of paramilitaries, because the authorities didn't approve crimes!# Officials vs. criminals#!)** VRS Lieutenant Colonel Milinković, also pleaded with Davidović to release the arrested men or otherwise the Red Berets would kill him.²⁷¹⁰ Davidović refused to comply with these demands and took the arrested persons to Bijeljina.²⁷¹¹

832. Davidović returned to Brčko the next morning and was informed that the members of the Crisis Staff had been released, after which 90 Red Berets were arrested, of which 80 were from Serbia.²⁷¹² The arrested individuals were placed on buses and transported across the border to Sremska Rača and handed to representatives of the Serbian MUP.²⁷¹³

833. Davidović established curfews and check-points in Brčko with the support of the Crisis Staff, engaged the active duty policemen and was able to restore some law and order within three days of taking control of the Brčko SJB.²⁷¹⁴ **#EXCULPATORY!!!** An agreement was reached between the VRS and the SDS regarding the command of the area which allowed Davidović and his team to move back and forth between Bijeljina and Brčko to maintain stability.²⁷¹⁵ **#EXCULPATORY!!!**

b. *Foča*

i. Charges

834. Under Count 3, the Prosecution alleges that persecution, a crime against humanity, was committed in Foča as part of the objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats from the Municipalities.²⁷¹⁶ Under Count 1, the Prosecution further alleges that in certain municipalities, including Foča, this persecutory campaign included or escalated to include conduct that manifested an intent to destroy in part the national, ethnical and/or religious groups of Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats as such.²⁷¹⁷

²⁷⁰⁹ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 108; D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), p. 8; Milorad Davidović, T. 15799 (30 June 2011).

²⁷¹⁰ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 109.

²⁷¹¹ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 108–109; Milorad Davidović, T. 15800 (30 June 2011).

²⁷¹² P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 110. *See also* Đorđe Ristanić, T. 16804 (18 July 2011). While Ristanić's version of events is slightly different in terms of timing, the Chamber accepts that Davidović's direct evidence to be more reliable.

²⁷¹³ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 110; Milorad Davidović, T. 15676 (29 June 2011).

²⁷¹⁴ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 111; Milorad Davidović, T. 15544 (28 June 2011); Milorad Davidović, T. 15765–15766 (30 June 2011); Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21419–21421, 21639–21640. *See also* D3003 (Witness statement of Petar Kaurinović 17 February 2013), para. 24; Petar Kaurinović, T. 34117 (20 February 2013).

²⁷¹⁵ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 124.

²⁷¹⁶ Indictment, paras. 48–49.

²⁷¹⁷ Indictment, paras. 37–38.

835. Acts alleged to have been committed in Foča by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include killings during and after the take-over of Foča,²⁷¹⁸ killings related to detention facilities; and killings committed during and deaths resulting from, cruel and inhumane treatment at scheduled detention facilities.²⁷¹⁹ The Prosecution characterises these acts as killing, an underlying act of genocide, under Count 1; persecution, a crime against humanity, under Count 3; extermination, a crime against humanity, under Count 4; murder, a crime against humanity, under Count 5; and murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war, under Count 6.²⁷²⁰

836. Other acts alleged to have been committed in Foča by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include torture, beatings, and physical and psychological abuse, rape and other acts of sexual violence during and after the take-over and in scheduled detention facilities, as well as the establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions in detention facilities, as cruel or inhumane treatment, an act of persecution under Count 3.²⁷²¹ In relation to Count 1, the Prosecution alleges that in scheduled detention facilities in Foča thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were subjected to cruel and inhumane treatment, including torture, physical and psychological abuse, rape, other acts of sexual violence, and beatings by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs; the Prosecution characterises this inhumane treatment as causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups, an underlying act of genocide.²⁷²² In addition, under Count 1, the Prosecution alleges that members of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups were detained under conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, namely through cruel and inhumane treatment, including torture, physical and psychological abuse, rape, other acts of sexual violence, inhumane living conditions, forced labour and the failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care or hygienic sanitation facilities.²⁷²³

837. Under Count 3, other acts of persecution alleged to have been committed in Foča by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs, include (i) forcible transfer or deportation of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from their homes;²⁷²⁴ (ii) unlawful detention in scheduled detention facilities;²⁷²⁵ (iii) forced labour at the frontline and the use of human shields;²⁷²⁶ (iv) appropriation or plunder of property, during and after the take-over of Foča, during arrests and detention and in the course of or following acts of deportation or forcible transfer;²⁷²⁷ (v) the wanton destruction of private property including homes and business premises and public property including cultural monuments and sacred

²⁷¹⁸ Indictment, para. 60(a)(i). See Scheduled Incidents A.5.2 and A.5.4. The Chamber notes that Scheduled Incident A.5.1 was withdrawn by the Prosecution pursuant to the "Notice of Withdrawal of Incident A.5.1." filed on 18 August 2014.

²⁷¹⁹ Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii). See Scheduled Incident B.8.1. The Prosecution does not allege criminal responsibility for killings resulting from cruel and inhumane treatment at Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.2, C.10.5, C.10.6, C.10.7. Indictment, fn. 4.

²⁷²⁰ Indictment, paras. 40(a)(i), 40(a)(ii), 63(a), 63(b).

²⁷²¹ Indictment, para. 60(b), 60(c), 60(d) (specifying that the conditions included the failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care, or hygienic sanitation facilities). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.1, C.10.2, C.10.4, C.10.5, C.10.6, and C.10.7. The Prosecution does not allege criminal responsibility for rape and other acts of sexual violence in Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.1 and C.10.6. Indictment, fn. 5.

²⁷²² Indictment, para. 40(b).

²⁷²³ Indictment, para. 40(c). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.1, C.10.2, C.10.4, C.10.5, C.10.6, C.10.7.

²⁷²⁴ Indictment, para. 60(f).

²⁷²⁵ Indictment, para. 60(g). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.1, C.10.2, C.10.4, C.10.5, C.10.6, C.10.7.

²⁷²⁶ Indictment, para. 60(h).

²⁷²⁷ Indictment, para. 60(i).

sites;²⁷²⁸ and (vi) the imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures.²⁷²⁹

838. Under Counts 7 and 8, the Prosecution alleges deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer), respectively, as crimes against humanity.²⁷³⁰ In this regard, the Prosecution alleges that, by the end of 1992, Serb Forces, Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs had forcibly displaced Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Foča in which they had been lawfully present.²⁷³¹ It is alleged that from March 1992, restrictive and discriminatory measures, arbitrary arrest and detention, harassment, torture, rape and other acts of sexual violence, killing, destruction of houses, cultural monuments and sacred sites, as well as the threat of further such acts caused Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to flee in fear while others were physically driven out.²⁷³²

(B) Lead-up

GENERAL REMARKS: Everything that happened in Foca should be seen in the light of a very heavy experiences and a horrifying events of mutual carnage during WWII. The Foca Muslims were members of the Croatian nazi units of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH). The mutual extermination happened in sequences: attacks – revenges – revenges, endlessly throughout the WWII. Even in the eve of the first multi-party elections there was a severe crisis connected with a company called “Focatrans” so, it wouldn’t be accurate to say that the “interethnic relations deteriorated” when the ethnic parties had been formed!

839. Foča is a large municipality in eastern BiH located to the southeast of Sarajevo in the region of Podrinje.²⁷³³ Prior to the war the population of Foča was approximately 40,000 and consisted of about 52% Bosnian Muslims, 45% Bosnian Serbs, and about 3% who were Montenegrin.²⁷³⁴ While Foča was ethnically mixed, there were neighbourhoods in Foča town and villages in the municipality which could be identified as predominantly Bosnian Muslim or Bosnian Serb.²⁷³⁵

840. Inter-ethnic relations in Foča deteriorated following the formation of national parties and after the multi-party elections with increasing divisions and suspicion on all sides.²⁷³⁶ Petko Čančar was elected President of the SDS, but was later replaced by Miroslav Stanić.²⁷³⁷ **(It happened because Mr. Cancar, a distinguished lawyer, had been**

²⁷²⁸ Indictment, para. 60(j). See Scheduled Incident D.10.

²⁷²⁹ Indictment, para. 60(k). The restrictive and discriminatory measures alleged include the denial of freedom of movement; the removal from positions of authority; the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of homes; unlawful arrest and/or the denial of the right to judicial process; and/or the denial of equal access to public services.

²⁷³⁰ Indictment, paras. 68–75.

²⁷³¹ Indictment, paras. 69, 72.

²⁷³² Indictment, para. 71.

²⁷³³ D484 (Map of BiH); Momčilo Mandić, T. 5279–5280 (15 July 2010); Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32289 (21 January 2013); P1367 (Transcript of 26th session of RS Assembly, 2 April 1993), p. 25; P1371 (Transcript of 30th session of RS Assembly, 5–6 May 1993), p. 78.

²⁷³⁴ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1296–1301; KDZ239, T. 18937 (16 September 2011); D4002 (Letter from Nedžad Ugljen to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 23. See also P1480 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 10–30 September 1992), p. 66.

²⁷³⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 724. See also Radojica Mladenović, T. 36605 (4 April 2013).

²⁷³⁶ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1182–1183; see Adjudicated Fact 725; Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7601. See also Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32289–33290 (21 January 2013).

²⁷³⁷ D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 14. Radojica Mladenović was Vice President of the SDS.

elected in the BiH Assembly) Rallies were held by both the SDS and SDA;²⁷³⁸ **(The SDA rallies were first, in August 1990, and were marked by an anti-Serb rhetoric, while the SDS rallies were tolerant, see: Mladjenovic, T.36707-8 D2767, para 2; D3314, para 6; D3320, pp. 3-4; Mladjenovic, T.36708-10 D2767, para 3; D3314, para 16; Mladjenovic, T.36624 D2767, para 3; D3314, para 16; Mladjenovic, T.36624-5 The SDS was not formed until 1 September 1991; party rallies, attended by the Accused and other Bosnian Serb leaders, promoted a spirit of tolerance, see D2767, para 3; D3314, para 16; Mladjenovic, T.36624-5 #Wrong in fact#)** this disrupted inter-ethnic relations further and led to rumours that the territory of the municipality, the companies, and institutions would be split along ethnic lines.²⁷³⁹ **(#Wrong in fact#! This didn't arise from the rallies of the parties, because the ideas about division of municipalities appeared much later, after the Muslim side pushed for an illegal and anti-constitutional independence and a fundamentalist regime that would include the Serbs as a deprived minority in their own country! And it wasn't just "splitting" it was a proposal to transform all the municipalities which had a huge ethnic communities into the cities with two or more municipalities, so that no community could take any advantage or domination over the other one. That was the Serb proposal, which would save peace in Bosnia, and there couldn't be any persecution, "ethnic cleansing" and any crime)** Relations further deteriorated after war broke out in Slovenia and Croatia²⁷⁴⁰ and the two communities further separated with Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims having their own cafés.²⁷⁴¹ **(#Wrong in fact!# Even before the war in Slovenia and Croatia, and even before the multiparty elections, in August 1990, inter-ethnic relations drastically deteriorated after the so-called Focatrans affair, see D3314, para 9; Mitar Rasevic, T.46762, and that was even before the elections, and under the communist regime,**


²⁷³⁸ For evidence on SDA rallies, publications and the strike of Bosnian Muslims workers at the Fočatrans company which also disrupted inter-ethnic relations, see Milutin Vujičić, T. 32095, 32103–32104, 32106–32111, 32115–32121, 32141 (17 January 2013); D2767 (Witness statement of Milutin Vujičić dated 14 January 2013), paras. 2, 4; Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32293–32295, 32321, 32333–32334 (21 January 2013); D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), paras. 5–6, 9, 15; Radojica Mladenović, T. 36689, 36709–36710 (5 April 2013); D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), para. 37; P6079 (Foča SJB statement, 12 September 1990); KDZ017, T. 19881–19882 (4 October 2011); Robert Donia, T. 3223 (2 June 2010); Mitar Rašević, T. 46768–46769 (11 February 2014).

²⁷³⁹ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1183–1185, 1294–1296; P6078 (Video clip re founding assembly of Foča SDA, with transcript); D2767 (Witness statement of Milutin Vujičić dated 14 January 2013), paras. 3, 5 (stating that the SDS was formed after the SDA); Milutin Vujičić, T. 32103–32109, 32112, 32114 (17 January 2013). See also Radojica Mladenović, T. 36624–36625 (5 April 2013). According to Defence evidence and in the Accused's submission, the SDS rallies were directed towards respect for neighbourly relations and the preservation of peace. D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), paras. 15–16; D2767 (Witness statement of Milutin Vujičić dated 14 January 2013), para. 3; Defence Final Brief, para. 1758. However, the Chamber does not find the evidence adduced by the Accused to be reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that the evidence of the relevant witnesses was marked by multiple contradictions and extreme evasiveness.

²⁷⁴⁰ D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 10.

²⁷⁴¹ KDZ017, T. 19877 (4 October 2011).

already on 1 August 1990, the SDA had armed formations, see: D0246 p.7:



841. In 1991, Bosnian Serb leaders, including the Accused, Koljević, and Plavšić attended SDS rallies in Foča.²⁷⁴² Other SDS leaders from the Republican level including Velibor Ostojić, the minister of information in BiH,²⁷⁴³ and Vojislav Maksimović, the President of the SDS Deputies' Club would often visit Foča, while Plavšić also visited occasionally.²⁷⁴⁴ Maksimović, who was from Foča, made a statement at a public SDS rally in Goražde that "in the previous war the Drina flowed bloody, and in this war the Cehotina river would flow bloody too".²⁷⁴⁵ **(Taken as such, out of context, it is not clear whether it was a warning, a threat or a dark and fearful prediction. The Defence is certain that it was a fearful prediction and warning, because the course of events was directed by the Muslims towards a conflict, which jeopardized particularly Foča, with a very traumatic memories on WWII #Out of context#)**

842. In June 1991, representatives of the SDA and SDS of Foča met to discuss issues, including an inter-party agreement for the appointment of personnel to official positions in the municipality including the SJB, the judiciary and the Municipal TO Staff.²⁷⁴⁶ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!)**

Division of municipal structures

²⁷⁴² D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 16; Radojica Mladenović, T. 36624 (5 April 2013); KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1186; KDZ239, T. 18961–18962 (16 September 2011). See also P5681 (Intercept of conversation between Biljana Plavšić and Radovan Karadžić, 23 May 1991), p. 1.

²⁷⁴³ KDZ379, P3332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 3124.

²⁷⁴⁴ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1186; KDZ239, T. 18961 (16 September 2011); KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2902, 2941; KDZ017, T. 19867–19868 (4 October 2011), 19868–19870 (4 October 2011) (private session); P90 (Witness statement of KDZ216 dated 8 June 1998), p. 16. (under seal).

²⁷⁴⁵ KDZ239, T. 18912, 18931 (15 September 2011); KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1186. The Chamber notes that the Cehotina River flows through Foča. D484 (Map of BiH).

²⁷⁴⁶ D1686 (Minutes of meeting between SDA and SDS, 20 June 1991), pp. 1–2; D1685 (Clarification of Foča Executive Board, 3 October 1991). See also D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 2. The Chamber notes there were disagreements about the appointment of individuals to certain positions but the parties discussed the importance of avoiding conflict. D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), paras. 3, 12, 18, 29; D4872 (Letter from Vukosavljević to Foča Executive Board, 21 February 1992); D1686 (Minutes of meeting between SDA and SDS, 20 June 1991), p. 3; D2767 (Witness statement of Milutin Vujičić dated 14 January 2013), para. 28.

843. In December 1991 the SDS decided to establish the Serb Assembly of Foča.²⁷⁴⁷ **(That is when the division started, and that prove that the Defence is right: only a persistent pushing for the independence led to the reorganisation of municipalities, so that nobody could jeopardize the other!)** On 24 January 1992, the Serb Assembly of Foča established an Executive Board with Radojica Mladenović as Chairman.²⁷⁴⁸ **(At that moment the role of the SDS ceased, because the Assembly was composed of the Serb representatives from all the parties!)**

844. In an intercepted conversation between Stanić and the Accused in January 1992, the Accused asked Stanić about the situation in Foča.²⁷⁴⁹ Stanić proceeded to tell the Accused that they had formed a “Serb municipality and you have that information” after which the Accused said: “Yes, yes, and take complete control over your affairs” to which Stanić agreed and said “everything as it is in the instructions”.²⁷⁵⁰ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! Forming their own municipality and “taking control over your affairs” can not be anything but a peaceful retreat from the common institutions which had been abused by the SDA – Muslim party. !#Common institutions abused by SDA#! The Muslims had been invited to form their own municipality. Both ethnic municipalities would comprise their respective parts of the urban core and so the villages with their majority. In such a case nobody could impose anything to the other community, and peace would be preserves. Finally, the Brussels function thah way. #Ethnic municipalities# against conflict, domination, abuses!#)**

845. On 3 April 1992, the Statute of the Serb Municipality of Foča was promulgated and stated that the municipality was part of the SAO Herzegovina.²⁷⁵¹ This statute provided that the boundaries in the municipality “may be modified only keeping with the will of the local Serbian people” and also stipulated that the Serb Municipality of Foča was to enforce the laws of the SerBiH and the SAO Herzegovina.²⁷⁵² Pursuant to the terms of the statute, the Crisis Staff of the Serb Municipality of Foča (“Foča Crisis Staff”) was established on the same day²⁷⁵³ and Miroslav Stanić was appointed as its president.²⁷⁵⁴ Bosnian Muslims also established a crisis staff in Foča.²⁷⁵⁵ The Foča Crisis Staff operated from the Bosnian Serb neighbourhood of Čerežluk²⁷⁵⁶ and was required to take over the duties of the

²⁷⁴⁷ P3333 (Official Gazette of Serbian Municipality of Foča, 17 September 1992), pp. 1–3; D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), paras. 14, 20. See also Adjudicated Fact 729.

²⁷⁴⁸ P3333 (Official Gazette of Serbian Municipality of Foča, 17 September 1992), p. 11; P6264 (Excerpt from transcript of extended session of SDS Main Board and Executive Board, 14 February 1992, with audio), pp. 1–2. See also D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 20.

²⁷⁴⁹ P3337 (Intercept of conversation between Miroslav Stanić and Radovan Karadžić, 6 January 1992), p. 2; KDZ239, T. 18909 (15 September 2011).

²⁷⁵⁰ P3337 (Intercept of conversation between Miroslav Stanić and Radovan Karadžić, 6 January 1992), p. 2. The Chamber finds that considering the timing of this conversation and the context, the reference to “the instructions” is a reference to the Variant A/B Instructions which were distributed in December 1991. P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 6, 10.

²⁷⁵¹ P3333 (Official Gazette of Serbian Municipality of Foča, 17 September 1992), p. 14; KDZ239, T. 18938 (16 September 2011).

²⁷⁵² P3333 (Official Gazette of Serbian Municipality of Foča, 17 September 1992), pp. 14, 16.

²⁷⁵³ P3333 (Official Gazette of Serbian Municipality of Foča, 17 September 1992), pp. 39–40. See also D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 20; D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 23.

²⁷⁵⁴ KDZ239, T. 18940 (16 September 2011). Members of the Foča Crisis Staff were not necessarily all SDS members. KDZ379, T. 18850–18851 (15 September 2011); Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32329 (21 January 2013). Other members of the Foča Crisis Staff included Vojislav Maksimović, Velibor Ostojić, Petko Čančar, Milum Milanović, Dragan Gagović, and Radojica Mladenović. D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 23. See also D1684 (Order of Foča Crisis Staff).

²⁷⁵⁵ See Adjudicated Facts 729, 730; KDZ017, T. 19878 (4 October 2011); D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), paras. 4, 23.

²⁷⁵⁶ Adjudicated Fact 731.

Municipal Assembly during an imminent threat or state of war.²⁷⁵⁷ **(#All legal and legitimate, and available equally to both communities, as the Serb as the Muslim)**

846. On 7 April 1992, following pressure from the SDS leadership, the police was divided along ethnic lines.²⁷⁵⁸ **(The police was, and still is a municipal institution. If both communities had their own Crisis Staffs, they had to have their own police, responsible to them, and responsible for maintaining the law and order in their respective parts of municipality!#All legal, ethnic municip!)**

Militarisation of Foča

847. By January 1992 all Bosnian Muslim reservists had left the JNA base at Ustikolina following orders of the SDA.²⁷⁵⁹ **(It happened far before the war, while there was the Carrington-Cutileiro Conference. Certainly, the SDA needed them for their #secret army,# the Patriotic League and Green Berets! So, the Muslim side negotiated in a “bad fait” while preparing for a war!)** At that time, in addition to regular JNA troops a significant number of Serb reservists came to the JNA barracks and were provided with supplies.²⁷⁶⁰ **(Such a created “shortage” of manpower the JNA had to replenish it’s units by a reservists who didn’t reject mobilisation. Unlike the Muslim able-bodied men, who were under the SDA command, the Serb able-bodied men weren’t under any SDS command, but under the JNA command, and president Karad i} and other Bosnian Serb leaders didn’t have anyone under their command. #Before VRS, during JNA#!)**

848. In the months before the outbreak of the conflict in Foča, both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims began to arm themselves, though Bosnian Serbs were better prepared.²⁷⁶¹

²⁷⁵⁷ P3333 (Official Gazette of Serbian Municipality of Foča, 17 September 1992), pp. 31, 40–41; D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), paras. 20, 22. See also Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32348–32349 (21 January 2013) (testifying that the Foča Crisis Staff was established when negotiations fell through).

²⁷⁵⁸ See Adjudicated Fact 732. See also Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32288 (21 January 2013); D3319 (Belgrade Radio news report, 8 April 1992).

²⁷⁵⁹ KDZ379, T. 18867–18868 (15 September 2011); KDZ379, P3332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 3101, 3103.

²⁷⁶⁰ KDZ379, P3332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 3098, 3100.

²⁷⁶¹ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1187, 1307; KDZ379, T. 18857–18858 (15 September 2011); P90 (Witness statement of KDZ216 dated 8 June 1998), p. 3 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 727. Pljevaljčić disputed the extent to which the Bosnian Serbs were armed and testified that only one reserve complement of Bosnian Serbs was armed and that Bosnian Serbs had access to hunting weapons but only took infantry weapons from warehouses when the conflict broke out. Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32299–32300, 32333 (21 January 2013). However, the Chamber notes that when confronted with evidence which suggested that the Bosnian Serb population was being armed, Pljevaljčić maintained that Gojko Janković was not involved but denied all knowledge about the formation of four battalions under the organisation of the SDS in 1991 and claimed he was not aware of what the Foča Crisis Staff did in forming units. **(# All legal#! IF THE CRISIS STAFF FORMED UNITS, THIS WAS A LEGAL MUNICIPAL FORMATION, AND NOT A PARTY FORMATION. THE SDS WAS INVOLVED ONLY BECAUSE THIS PARTY WAS IN POWER, AS ANY OTHER PARTY IN POWER WOULD BE OBLIGED TO FOR THE MUNICIPAL TO! THIS MUST BE KNOWN TO ANY CHAMBER DEALING WITH THIS MATTERS!)** Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32335–32336 (21 January 2013); P6082 (Proposal of Foča Territorial Group, 13 August 1993), p. 1. In light of these equivocal answers and the other evidence received on this issue, the Chamber does not accept Pljevaljčić’s evidence about the extent to which Bosnian Serbs were being armed in Foča. The Chamber is however, satisfied that Bosnian Muslims were also armed to some extent and that Bosnian Muslim paramilitary formations, such as the Patriotic League and Green Berets, were present in Foča before clashes broke out. **(CONTRARY TO THE SERB EXAMPLE, THE MUSLIM SIDE DIDN’T FORM THEIR MUNICIPAL TERRITORIAL DEFENCE UNITS, BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNDER THE JNA COMMAND. THEREFORE, THE MUSLIM FORMATIONS WERE THE PART OF THE SECRET MUSLIM ARMY, LATER THE ABiH!)** D2767 (Witness statement of Milutin Vujičić dated 14 January 2013), paras. 3, 5, 19, 22–24; Milutin Vujičić, T. 32124–32126, 32141 (17 January 2013); Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32286, 32291–32292, 32324, 32338–32339, 32342, (21 January 2013); D3065 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević dated 26 February 2013), paras. 126, 222; D299 (ABiH Supreme Command Staff Special Report, 17 July 1993), p. 2; D246 (Article from Ljiljan, entitled “Interview of the week: Halid Čengić”, 18–25 May 1998), pp. 1, 6–7; D3128 (Witness

(Because the Serb conscripts and reservists responded to mobilisation calls!) Bosnian Serbs armed themselves surreptitiously at first, distributing weapons by truck in the evenings, or from local businesses.²⁷⁶² Immediately prior to the outbreak of the conflict, the distribution of arms to Bosnian Serbs was done openly.²⁷⁶³ On 17 March 1992, the Executive Board of the Serb Assembly of Foča sent a letter to the JNA General Staff urgently requesting that a JNA garrison be stationed in Foča.²⁷⁶⁴ **(#All legal#armament#! That is right, and that is why the Serbs were armed openly, because this armament was under the control of the JNA, and units were part of the legal defence system!)**

849. The SDS and Gojko Janković were involved in military preparations and formed several units in the municipality.²⁷⁶⁵ **(#Due to domestic laws and Constitution, Law on All-people's defense# It was not crucial these officials were in the SDS. Whatever party was in power, it's officials would be obliged to prepare for a defence within the system of the "All-people's Defence". A ruling party was obliged to facilitate a self defence, and if the state main forces, like JNA weren't present, the municipal TO units were obliged to act independently. A self-defence is a basic right that nobody can deny, neither the Accused nor anyone else. A state that is not capable of protecting it's citizens must facilitate a self-defence. The Serbs weren't protected from the Federal state, and had been attacked by their own state of Bosnia and Herzegovina!)** Stanić, who was also a member of the SDS Main Board, was the commander of the Tactical Group of Foča and became known as the "First War Commander" in the municipality.²⁷⁶⁶ **(All legal and legitimate, and obligatory #due to the domestic laws.# Any chamber should have known all the local legal provisions!)** Another significant leader in Foča was Marko Kovač, a former JNA officer²⁷⁶⁷ who subsequently took over from Stanić as the commander of the Tactical Group.²⁷⁶⁸ Stanić and Kovač reported on behalf of the Tactical Group to Mladić²⁷⁶⁹ and this unit was transformed into a unit of the VRS in May 1992.²⁷⁷⁰ **(All the Teritorial Defence units had been transformed into the VRS units, but only after 20 May, after the JNA withdrew. #Due to the domestic laws#!)** The Tactical Group reported to the Herzegovina Corps,²⁷⁷¹ which in turn reported on the activities of the Tactical Group to the VRS Main Staff.²⁷⁷²

(C) Take-over of Foča

statement of Veljko Marić dated 16 March 2013), para. 10; D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), paras. 9, 11–12, 14, 45; D2739 (4th Corps security organ report, 1 December 1991), p. 3.

²⁷⁶² See Adjudicated Fact 728.

²⁷⁶³ See Adjudicated Fact 728.

²⁷⁶⁴ P5481 (Request of Foča Municipal Assembly, 17 March 1992).

²⁷⁶⁵ P6081 (Video clips re interview and speech of Miroslav Stanić, with transcript). See also KDZ239, T. 18933 (15 September 2011); P6082 (Proposal of Foča Tactical Group, 13 August 1993), p. 1.

²⁷⁶⁶ KDZ379, T. 18832–18833, 18836–18837 (15 September 2011); see Adjudicated Fact 731; P3476 (Video clip of interview with Miroslav Stanić, with transcript), pp. 2–3; P6081 (Video clips re interview and speech of Miroslav Stanić, with transcript); Radojica Mladenović, T. 36645–36646 (5 April 2013).

²⁷⁶⁷ P90 (Witness statement of KDZ216 dated 8 June 1998), p. 15 (under seal); KDZ216, P69 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Kunarac*), T. 3386 (under seal).

²⁷⁶⁸ Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32327 (21 January 2013); Radojica Mladenović, T. 36645–36646 (5 April 2013). See also P3476 (Video clip of interview with Miroslav Stanić, with transcript), p. 3 (stating that the Tactical Group was the name given to the group previously commanded by Stanić and that Stanić had handed over command of the group to Kovač).

²⁷⁶⁹ P1480 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 10–30 September 1992), pp. 60–71; P1478 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), p. 394 (showing that Pero Elez also met with Mladić and requested supplies).

²⁷⁷⁰ KDZ239, T. 18932–18934 (15 September 2011), T. 19006 (16 September 2011).

²⁷⁷¹ See P3355 (Combat report of Foča's Tactical Group, 21 July 1992); P6080 (Report of Foča Military Post, 10 October 1992).

²⁷⁷² P3356 (Combat report of the Herzegovina Corps, 31 July 1992); P6659 (List of prisoners in Foča prison, 27 October 1993).

850. On 2 March 1992, the SDS Municipal Board of Foča sent a letter addressed to the office of the President of the SDS Crisis Staff in Sarajevo indicating that they were “ready to carry out any order”.²⁷⁷³ **(#Wrong in fact#!Again, it is incomplete and inaccurate: there was no a Crisis Staff of the SDS on the central level, except for these several days at the beginning of March, and this wasn’t related to any Foca event, but the barricades in Sarajevo in the occasion of the wedding ceremony assassination! So, it shouldn’t be put in the context of the development of events in Foca!)**

851. On 4 March 1992, at a meeting between representatives of the SDA and SDS, negotiations concluded with an agreement to lift blockades which had been erected by both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs and to hold an extraordinary session of the Municipal Assembly to discuss the political and security situation.²⁷⁷⁴ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! These barricades were an echo of the events in Sarajevo!)** There were also discussions between Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim representatives about the division of Foča into two municipalities and the division of power.²⁷⁷⁵ **(#Two municipalities# EXCULPATORY!!! What wrong could have come from this arrangement? This is “par excellence” evidence that the Serbs didn’t even meditated to control the Muslim parts of Foca, let alone to expel anyone!)**

852. In early April 1992, Stanić, was heard on Radio Foča saying that it was no longer possible for Bosnian Serbs to live with their Bosnian Muslim neighbours, that they could not be woken every morning by the hodža from the mosque, and that there was a danger that the Bosnian Serb population would be circumcised.²⁷⁷⁶ **(#Out of context#! This shouldn’t be considered without an insight in the Muslim media from this period, particularly the main newspapers and magazines such as “Vox”, “the Muslim voice” and even the common media. Let us see just an example from the “VOX” D2768:**

²⁷⁷³ P5515 (Letter from SDS Municipal Board of Foča to SDS Crisis Staff in Sarajevo, 2 March 1992).

²⁷⁷⁴ Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32286–32287, 32300, 32305 (21 January 2013); D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 22; D3315 (Protocol of inter-party meeting between SDS and SDA on 4 March 1992).

²⁷⁷⁵ D1690 (Announcement of Foča Municipal Assembly, 7 April 1992); D3317 (Agreement re Foča, 8 April 1992), p. 1; Radojica Mladenović, T. 36604–36607 (4 April 2013); Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32288–32289 (21 January 2013); D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 50. *See also* D3317 (Agreement re Foča, 8 April 1992) which pertains to an agreement reached between Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb representatives for the removal of barricades, the expulsion of armed people who had entered from outside, the introduction of a curfew, and a ban on the movement of units.

²⁷⁷⁶ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1185.



A year prior to this edition there was published the next article, now reprinted, with the remark that it was a joke, because of the public reaction, while this front page wasn't labelled as a joke. So, within a year the Muslims published this horrifying article twice:

WHAT TO DO WITH THE SERBS IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The day of the announced proclamation of the Islamic Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina approaches. The date which makes the heart of each Muslim from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandžak race has been known for a long time – 31

December of this year. There are some indications that the Serbs from BH might oppose this historic event. In connection with that, some measures have been taken which would be applied should the Serbian population of Bosnia and Herzegovina disagree with this idea.

1. Each individual Serb must be aware of the responsibility of the whole people for their uncontrolled actions: punishment for the crimes committed will be collective –

10 Serbian houses will be destroyed for one destroyed Muslim house, 100 Serbs will be killed for one dead Muslim, 10-50 Serbs for one wounded Muslim (depending on the severity of the wound).

2. All the Serbs have a 12-hour working day, their salaries are proportional to the loyalty of all the employees and, as a rule, they are 30% lower than the salaries of the Muslims holding the same job.

3. The Serbs shall have priority when redundancies are made.

4. The Serbs may not visit all public institutions without special permits.

5. The Serbs shall exchange ration coupons for food, in shops working specially for them.

6. The Serbs shall have no ethnic parties, and if they do not respect the rules of political life, they will have no right to political organisation or right to vote.

7. In the Islamic Republic, the Serbs shall not be denied the right to make alcohol, but the Muslims have the right to impose sharia law on all people in the state.

8. The Serbs are equal to the Muslims if they voluntarily convert to Islam, the religion of their forefathers – nobody has the right ever to criticise them for the way they lived before, because it is not their fault that they are Serbs, and no generation can be held responsible for the actions of the generation before or any previous generations.

9. A good Serb is an alive and obedient Serb, or a dead disobedient Serb.

WORTHWILE TO NOTICE THAT THE OWNER AND PUBLISHER OF THIS MAGAZINE WAS A DEPUTY FROM FOCA, AND A PROMINENT LEADER OF THE SDA – MR. SAHINPASIC, WHO ARMED THE MUSLIM UNITS IN FOCA FAR BEFORE THE WAR, see: D246 above !!!

There is no a multi-ethnic society all over the world which wouldn't be astonished by such an announcement, particularly since the Muslims massively participated in the Ustasha's (a Croatian nazi army in WWII.) genocide against the Serbs. Whatever the Serb low ranking officials said, it must be seen within this context!!

Stanić also stated the Bosnian Serb position that “the Drina would never become a border but a windpipe between two lungs”, which was a reference to the RS and Serbia.²⁷⁷⁷ Other messages were broadcast by radio to the effect that “the time had come for the Serbs to

²⁷⁷⁷

KDZ379, T. 18832–18834 (15 September 2011); P3476 (Video clip of interview with Miroslav Stanić, with transcript), p. 2.

settle accounts with the balijas once and for all, and that the Serbs would no longer allow their ribs to be broken. They will no longer allow their children to be circumcised”.²⁷⁷⁸ These radio broadcasts created further divisions in Foča.²⁷⁷⁹ **(No matter how nasty were these reactions, the main issue is that all of it was a reaction to the Muslim plans and actions against the Serbs!)**

853. Despite these negotiations, armed clashes began in Foča on 6 April 1992 when the results of the referendum on the independence of BiH were published.²⁷⁸⁰ By 7 April 1992, there was a presence of Serb Forces on the streets, and some people failed to report for work, fearful of the rising tensions in the town.²⁷⁸¹ After the conflict broke out there were calls by the military authorities for mobilisation of the Bosnian Serb population from loudspeakers.²⁷⁸² **(A usual lawful procedure!)** A number of Bosnian Serbs were mobilised on 7 April 1992 and issued with weapons and that night, Bosnian Serbs took over the Foča radio station, the warehouse of the regional medical centre, and the TO warehouse where weapons were stored.²⁷⁸³

854. On 7 April 1992, the President of the Serb Municipality of Foča made a public announcement that in accordance with decisions made by the Bosnian Serb Assembly, all organs of the Serb municipality would become operational.²⁷⁸⁴ **(#All lawfull#! Therefore, the Serb municipality had been only proclaimed, but was enacted only when it was clear that there will be a war. There is a set of rules and provisions in the domestic judiciary envisaged for such a danger from war.)** This same announcement called “upon the Serbian people and other civilians to maintain composure and common sense” and observed that TO units and the SJB would maintain public law and order, protect people and property, and prevent the presence of paramilitary formations in the Serb Municipality of Foča.²⁷⁸⁵ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! Contra paramilitaries!)** It also appealed to all citizens, including Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs, not to move out of Foča and for those who had left to return.²⁷⁸⁶ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!)**

855. Serb Forces deployed heavy artillery weapons on elevated sites around Foča.²⁷⁸⁷ On the morning of 8 April 1992, Serb Forces commenced the main attack on the town of Foča, with a combination of infantry fire and shelling from artillery weapons directed primarily at predominantly Muslim neighbourhoods.²⁷⁸⁸ **(Alhtough the Chamber**

²⁷⁷⁸ KDZ239, T. 18929 (15 September 2011).

²⁷⁷⁹ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1185.

²⁷⁸⁰ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1187–1188; *see* Adjudicated Facts 488, 491.

²⁷⁸¹ *See* Adjudicated Fact 738. Mladenović disputed that the army was visibly present on the streets on 7 April 1992. D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 54. However, the Chamber does not consider that Mladenović’s evidence can be relied on in this regard. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber noted that his evidence was marked by contradictions, evasiveness, and bias.

²⁷⁸² Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7596, 7767–7768. This message was also broadcast on radio. KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1336.

²⁷⁸³ *See* Adjudicated Fact 738. *See also* KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1336.

²⁷⁸⁴ D1690 (Announcement of Foča Municipal Assembly, 7 April 1992).

²⁷⁸⁵ D1690 (Announcement of Foča Municipal Assembly, 7 April 1992).

²⁷⁸⁶ KDZ239, T. 18983, 18985 (16 September 2011). KDZ239 testified further that this was just a trap and the announcement was made “to increase the number of those who were caught” and those Bosnian Muslims who returned believing it to be safe “fared badly”. However, the Chamber does not rely on KDZ239’s assessment, which is based on his speculation.

²⁷⁸⁷ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1190–1191; KDZ017, T. 19877 (4 October 2011). *See also* Adjudicated Fact 728.

²⁷⁸⁸ *See* Adjudicated Facts 741, 742. *See also* KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1190–1191; Triško Pljevaljić, T. 32304, 32321 (21 January 2013). Adjudicated Fact 741 indicates that the shelling was from Kalinovik and Miljevina. However, Vujičić testified that this was not possible given that Kalinovik was 40 kilometres away and thus out of range. Milutin Vujičić, T. 32145 (17 January 2013). While Vujičić’s evidence was marked by evasiveness and some aspects were unreliable, the Chamber considers that

recognized some doubt about the origin of fire, the Chamber missed the mainpoint: namely, the Muslim forces initiated the attack, and first confronted the JNA. (#Causes and consequences#) At that moment there was no any “Serb Forces” there was a legal territorial defence without heavy weaponry and under the JNA command and control, and there was the JNA with it’s heavy weaponry! (#Before the VRS, during JNA#) As the Chamber found, see para: 847 the Muslim conscripts and reservists left the JNA by their own will and on order issued by the SDA, and for that reason the JNA was predominantly Serbian) They proceeded to take over Foča area by area, including the areas of Donje Polje and Šukovac where there was resistance by Bosnian Muslim forces.²⁷⁸⁹ The Foča Crisis Staff issued orders for the taking of certain positions, which were implemented by Serb Forces.²⁷⁹⁰ The Serb Forces that took part in the attack included local soldiers as well as soldiers from Serbia and Montenegro, the Foča Tactical Group and paramilitaries, including the White Eagles.²⁷⁹¹ (#Before the VRS, during JNA#) Everything that happened before 20 May 1992 was under the JNA control, as well as any volunteers! The issue of volunteering in JNA was regulated by law, and at that period only a minority of the volunteers reneged to be paramilitaries! #Paramilitaries, non-SDS#!) The attack continued for six or seven days, although the worst shelling and damage took place in the first few days.²⁷⁹² The attack resulted in large numbers of wounded civilians, most of whom were Bosnian Muslims.²⁷⁹³ (Many of them were Bosnian Serbs too! But, this presentation of development in Foca is not correct and not complete! If it was a unilateral Serb attack, how come there was the Serb casualties? There should be a precise and honest qualification of events: this wasn’t any Serb attack, this was an armed conflict! And once attacked or dragged into a combat skirmish, population is free to defend as much as can, and no president is able or even supposed to prevent them from their defence in necessity! #Defense necessity!# #Context# Cause and consequence#!)

his evidence does cast some doubt as to the precise origin of fire. However, this does not undermine the evidence that Serb Forces launched the artillery attacks in question.

²⁷⁸⁹ See Adjudicated Fact 743. Donje Polje was also the location of the Bosnian Muslim crisis staff in Foča. KDZ017, T. 19878 (4 October 2011); Adjudicated Fact 730. See also D3128 (Witness statement of Veljko Marić dated 16 March 2013), para. 24 (stating that the Serb Forces did not occupy the hospital but that the Bosnian Muslim forces retreated as they lost their position).

²⁷⁹⁰ KDZ379, T. 18834, 18836 (15 September 2011); P3476 (Video clip of interview with Miroslav Stanić, with transcript). Mladenović testified that the goal of the Foča Crisis Staff was simply to “save the people” and deal with resources, supply and production. D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), paras. 20, 26; Radojica Mladenović, T. 36626–36627, 36684 (5 April 2013). The Chamber does not consider that it can rely on Mladenović’s evidence in this regard given that his evidence was marked by significant contradictions and evasiveness which undermined his credibility and showed bias.

²⁷⁹¹ D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 23; see Adjudicated Fact 741. See also KDZ379, P3332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 3111; KDZ379, T. 18880–18881 (15 September 2011); KDZ216, P69 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Kunarac*), T. 3316 (under seal); KDZ017, T. 19892 (4 October 2011) (testifying that some of the soldiers also wore the five pointed star of the JNA); KDZ239, T. 18993 (16 September 2011) (testifying that Arkan’s men and Šešelj’s men and a “Guard” from Užice took part in the attack but he could not remember the insignia they wore).

²⁷⁹² See Adjudicated Fact 747.

²⁷⁹³ See Adjudicated Fact 744. Defence witnesses testified that (i) Serb Forces were able to “liberate” Foča with few casualties on both sides; (ii) the White Eagles and JNA never took part in the conflict; (iii) civilians were not killed in the first few days; (iv) there was no heavy artillery fire at Foča; (v) Bosnian Serbs only fought with light arms until June 1992; (vi) the shelling by Bosnian Muslims caused panic and prompted large numbers of both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims to head towards Montenegro and Serbia; and (vii) Serb Forces were able to take control of Foča with no assistance from the SDS leadership or the JNA. D2767 (Witness statement of Milutin Vujičić dated 14 January 2013), paras. 5–6, 12, 26–27, 29; Milutin Vujičić, T. 32122–32125 (17 January 2013); Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32301, 32303–32304, 32306, 32321–32322, 32327–32328, 32342, 32347–32348, 32350–32351 (21 January 2013); D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 55; Radojica Mladenović, T. 36612 (4 April 2013), T. 36617, 36690–36691 (5 April 2013). However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber noted that the evidence of the relevant witnesses was either based on speculation alone, or marked by evasiveness, contradictions, negative demeanour and indicators that they were trying to mislead the Chamber. These factors undermined their credibility and in light of the other evidence received, the Chamber does not consider this evidence to be reliable.

856. The Chamber finds that there were clashes between Serb Forces and Bosnian Muslim forces but before long Serb Forces had control of the town.²⁷⁹⁴ **(No wonder, because the town of Foca itself had a Serb ethnic majority)** During the conflict, many civilians hid in their homes, basements, or with relatives while others left Foča altogether for their safety.²⁷⁹⁵ **(It was the case with both, the Serb and Muslim civilians. Therefore, not expelled! #Not expelled#!)**

857. During the attack, some neighbourhoods were destroyed and Bosnian Muslim homes were set on fire by Serb Forces.²⁷⁹⁶ **(The “Serb Forces” is still a dubious term, at least before 20 May 1992. #The Serb Forces# But, it has to be opposed: it wasn’t an attack, it was a mutual, two way skirmish, and the Chamber’s decision to call it “attack” is not fair towards the Defence and the Serbs generally!)** Bosnian Muslim homes were also set on fire by Serb Forces at that time as well as after the town had been secured.²⁷⁹⁷ Some of these houses were looted before being set on fire.²⁷⁹⁸ Some Bosnian Muslim houses were destroyed and were beside an untouched Serb apartment identified with a note saying “Serb apartment — do not torch”.²⁷⁹⁹ **(An Adjudicated fact, couldn’t be checked. Beside that, even a Muslim inhabitant could have written this note, what would prevent this, and it would be really clever if one of them did so! Obviously, the note was needed because of the presence of reservists and volunteers from other areas, since the domestic combatants knew whose was every apartment!)** Fire engines protected Bosnian Serb houses while Bosnian Muslim houses burned.²⁸⁰⁰ **(Does it mean that the Serb houses were torched too? Did the Serbs torch them?)** Other Bosnian Muslim houses were dismantled for materials or re-allocated to Bosnian Serbs who had lost

²⁷⁹⁴ KDZ017, T. 19869 (4 October 2011) (private session); T. 19876–19877 (4 October 2011); Adjudicated Fact 743; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1188; D2767 (Witness statement of Milutin Vujičić dated 14 January 2013), para. 1; Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7589. See also D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), paras. 30–31, 33; Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32305 (21 January 2013).

²⁷⁹⁵ Adjudicated Fact 746. Vujičić testified that both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims left Foča during the fighting. D2767 (Witness statement of Milutin Vujičić dated 14 January 2013), para. 7. While the Chamber is satisfied that some Bosnian Serbs may have left, the remaining evidence indicates that this did not happen on the scale at which Bosnian Muslims left the municipality. See paras. 929–934. **(IT WAS VERY KNOWN THAT THE MUSLIM LEADERSHIP SPREAD A PROPAGANDA ABOUT A HUGE SERB FORCES COMING FROM OTHER AREAS, AIMED TO ALARM THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC AS A MATTER OF FACT SCARED THEIR OWN POPULATION, WHICH LEFT FOČA.)**

²⁷⁹⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 902. See also Adjudicated Fact 813.

²⁷⁹⁷ See Adjudicated Fact 902; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1188–1189. For example Donje Polje, the largely Muslim neighbourhood of Šukovač, and Bosnian Muslim houses in Kamerici and in Granovski Sokak were burned as was the old town neighbourhood of Prijeka Čaršija with its oriental-Islamic style market and Muslim houses in Pilipovići and the neighbouring village of Paunci. Adjudicated Facts 903, 904, 909. See also P90 (Witness statement of KDZ216 dated 8 June 1998), p. 12 (under seal); KDZ216, P69 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Kunarac*), T. 3367–3368 (under seal); P502 (Video clip of a man and destroyed houses). While KDZ239 testified that Bosnian Muslim homes were set on fire in order “to frighten the local population to flee the town”, the Chamber does not rely on his opinion in this regard. The Chamber notes that the evidence adduced by the Defence does not dispute the destruction of Bosnian Muslim homes, but challenges the systematic nature of the destruction and seeks to blame Bosnian Muslim Forces for instigating these events. Mladenović testified that (i) Bosnian Muslim houses were not systematically torched during the attack on the town; (ii) the torching of houses was started by Bosnian Muslim units; (iii) the military command issued an order which involved sealing abandoned properties and prohibiting destruction and looting of property; and that (iv) the burning of houses by both sides got out of control when Bosnian Muslim forces started burning houses. D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), paras. 46, 56; Radojica Mladenović, T. 36615–36616, 36679, 36697 (5 April 2013). While the Chamber finds that some Bosnian Serb homes may have been burnt (see KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1188–1189), it does not consider Mladenović’s evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that Mladenović’s evidence was marked by contradictions, extreme evasiveness and bias which undermined his credibility.

²⁷⁹⁸ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1189.

²⁷⁹⁹ See Adjudicated Fact 905.

²⁸⁰⁰ See Adjudicated Fact 906.

their own homes.²⁸⁰¹ Bosnian Muslim businesses were looted or burned, or had equipment confiscated.²⁸⁰² **(Anyway, too many adjudicated facts for such a serious case!)**

858. On 8 April 1992, roadblocks were set up throughout the town,²⁸⁰³ but the Foča Crisis Staff called on citizens of all nationalities to remain calm and informed the population that the Bosnian Serb TO and SJB were controlling the town.²⁸⁰⁴ **EXCULPATORY#!** By around mid-April 1992, Serb Forces had taken control of the town of Foča.²⁸⁰⁵ **(#That means that up until this period there were at least two armed forces influencing the life and death in Foca! #Conflict, not attack#!)** Many of the Bosnian Muslims who had remained during the fighting fled Foča when Serb Forces took control of the town.²⁸⁰⁶ **(#Deadly combination#! This Adjudicated fact was properly rebutted by the testimony of the witness M. Vujicic, see the fn 2808 below, but the Chamber undermined his testimony because of some “indicators pertaining to his credibility. This is the way one could easily convict St. Peter, and even Christ himself!”)** After the Bosnian Serb civilian authorities returned to the municipality,²⁸⁰⁷ **(Why it was not depicted that this leadership had to flee from Foca?)** it was announced on the radio during the second half of April 1992 that the administration of the entire municipality of Foča would be run by the Serbs.²⁸⁰⁸ **(Only the Serb municipality! This is an Adjudicated fact!)** Ostojić reported that the Bosnian Serbs had “established state and executive authority in the Serbian commune of Foča”.²⁸⁰⁹ **(#Only Serb parts#! That is correct, the authority concerned only the Serbian commune of Foca. Meanwhile there was, throughout the war time, and even now, a Muslim commune of Foca. Therefore, as in many other municipalities the Serb side achieved its own commune, while the Muslims continued to control their own parts of municipality. That was the case with Foca, Pale, all the Sarajevo municipalities, Gorazde, Rogatica, Visegrad, Bratunac, Zvornik. And the Muslims controlled their municipalities as long as they didn’t attack the Serb parts of municipalities. There is a sufficient evidence that it was so! #”Ethnic municipalities”!)** On or about 26 April 1992, Bosnian Serb officials including Maksimović, Stanić, Čančar and Ostojić, met at the Foča Crisis Staff headquarters.²⁸¹⁰ (2810)

²⁸⁰¹ Adjudicated Fact 907.

²⁸⁰² See Adjudicated Fact 779.

²⁸⁰³ Adjudicated Fact 740.

²⁸⁰⁴ D3319 (Belgrade Radio news report, 8 April 1992); Radojica Mladenović, T. 36704 (5 April 2013).

²⁸⁰⁵ KDZ017, T. 19890 (4 October 2011); KDZ017, T. 19909–19910 (5 October 2011); P3338 (TANJUG news report, 14 April 1992) (in which Ostojić reported that the Bosnian Serb TO was controlling a “huge part of the town” and that the entire Bosnian Serb TO “is on its feet”); see Adjudicated Fact 748.

²⁸⁰⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 748. Vujičić testified that by the end of April, (i) Foča was freed and the remaining Bosnian Muslim civilian population and their homes were not touched; and (ii) civilians who had not left the villages remained in their homes. D2767 (Witness statement of Milutin Vujičić dated 14 January 2013), paras. 30–31. The Chamber does not consider Vujičić’s evidence to be reliable on this issue. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that his evidence was marked by evasiveness and other indicators which undermined his credibility.

²⁸⁰⁷ Radojica Mladenović, T. 36636 (5 April 2013).

²⁸⁰⁸ Adjudicated Fact 769.

²⁸⁰⁹ D3319 (Belgrade Radio news report, 8 April 1992); Radojica Mladenović, T. 36704 (5 April 2013). Ostojić was the state commissioner for Foča Municipality until this authority was transferred to Vojislav Maksimović on 4 June 1992 by a certificate signed on behalf of the Accused. P3339 (Certificate of appointment signed by Radovan Karadžić, 4 June 1992); KDZ239, T. 18911–18912 (15 September 2011).

²⁸¹⁰ KDZ379, P3332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 3118–3120; KDZ379, T. 18885–18886 (15 September 2011). See also P90 (Witness statement of KDZ216 dated 8 June 1998), p. 16 (under seal). [REDACTED]. In addition the Chamber received hearsay evidence that Velibor Ostojić attended meetings in Foča during the attack in April 1992 and said that there should be no negotiations, that “they should all be killed” and that they should “slaughter anything that is human”. KDZ017, T. 19868–19870, (4 October 2011) (private session), T. 19872 (4 October 2011). See also Radojica Mladenović, T. 36636–36638 (5 April 2013) (acknowledging that Ostojić was present at some time during the take-over of Foča); KDZ379, P3332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 3118–3121. But see Velibor Ostojić, D2361 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 26732–26734, 26738–26739; D2362 (Witness statement of Velibor Ostojić dated 6 June 2006), para. 36. However, having weighed the relevant evidence, the Chamber, while satisfied that Ostojić did attend

859. After Serb Forces took control of Foča town, attacks against the non-Serb civilian population continued, including attacks against Bosnian Muslim villages which were taken over and destroyed.²⁸¹¹ **(Adjudicated fact!)** For example, the village of Brod was attacked on 20 April 1992, after the village authorities did not respond to a Foča Crisis Staff demand that the village surrender.²⁸¹² **(Adjudicated fact! Still, if the village wanted to continue with the war, the authorities had right to issue an ultimatum. Otherwise, the villagers could have attacked the Serbs in a critical moment and defeat them! And no president or other official could or should order the people not to defend! #Military, defense necessity!#)** Similarly around 28 April 1992, Serb Forces attacked Ustikolina where Bosnian Muslims had tried to form resistance, after which the Serb Forces set fire to Bosnian Muslim houses there.²⁸¹³ **(Adjudicated fact. Beside that, it is clear even from this paragraph that those houses had been used for a combat purpose, and therefore were a legitimate targets! # Legitimate targets#! #Military – defense necessity#!) ! Anyway, the local population had their own countdowns, revenges and skirmishes, how this President could be liable for that? #Revengeful#!)**

860. On 30 April 1992, Ostojić reported to the Bosnian Serb government that Ustikolina was “liberated” and that the civilian authorities had “control over the overall situation”.²⁸¹⁴ Thereafter, Serb Forces continued attacking and destroying Muslim villages along the Drina while the population fled.²⁸¹⁵ **(#Wrong presentation# #The “Serb Forces#! Presented like that, it looks as if the “Serb Forces” whatever that meant, have chased civilians from their new shelters. However, nothing is thus far from truth: the Muslim combatants continued to attack from every new post, and it was a continued combat.)** Ostojić continued to report on progress of the military action in Foča to republican level organs.²⁸¹⁶ By around the end of April 1992, Serb Forces had control of the municipality.²⁸¹⁷ **(Those reports weren’t accurate: the Serbs never controlled entire municipality of Foca. Ustikolina was a seat of the Muslim municipality of Foca throughout the war, and after the war, even now! #Control of only Serb parts#!)**

861. In June 1992, Serb Forces continued to attack, loot, and burn down Bosnian Muslim villages in Foča.²⁸¹⁸ During these attacks Bosnian Muslim villagers were rounded up or captured, and sometimes beaten.²⁸¹⁹ For example, in Miljevina, Serb Forces set the surrounding Muslim villages on fire and arrested Bosnian Muslim civilian males.²⁸²⁰ **There**

some meetings during the conflict in Foča, is not satisfied that it can make a finding about what Ostojić said at those meetings based on this hearsay evidence.

²⁸¹¹ See Adjudicated Facts 749, 750.

²⁸¹² See Adjudicated Fact 753.

²⁸¹³ See Adjudicated Facts 910, 755.

²⁸¹⁴ P4986 (Report of SerBiH Government, 30 April 1992), p. 1.

²⁸¹⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 756. While the Adjudicated Fact also refers to the killing of Bosnian Muslims, the Chamber notes that these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.

²⁸¹⁶ P3476 (Video clip of interview with Miroslav Stanić, with transcript), p. 3.

²⁸¹⁷ Adjudicated Fact 745; KDZ379, T. 18834–18835 (15 September 2011); P3476 (Video clip of interview with Miroslav Stanić, with transcript). See also Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32307 (21 January 2013).

²⁸¹⁸ See Adjudicated Facts 751, 752.

²⁸¹⁹ See Adjudicated Fact 752. While the Adjudicated Fact also refers to the killing of Bosnian Muslims, the Chamber notes that these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13. See also Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7888.

²⁸²⁰ See Adjudicated Fact 754. According to Defence witnesses, when soldiers were mobilised into the Serb Forces they were informed about provisions of Geneva Conventions which were contained in the rules of conduct and an official announcement was read out to soldiers informing them that when mopping up villages the civilian population, homes and property were “completely off limits and that every transgression of these units would be strictly punished”. D2767 (Witness statement of Milutin Vujičić dated 14 January 2013), paras. 14–15; Milutin Vujičić, T. 32133, 32145–32146 (17 January 2013). Considering that Vujičić’s evidence was marked by indicators of

is no justification for doubts expressed in this footnote, see our remarks bellow! The alleged “civilian males” were combatants, and were treated as a POW-s #Combatants presented as civilians#!)

ii. Events after the take-over of Foča

862. After the take-over, the municipality was run by the Foča Crisis Staff until the municipal assembly was able to function.²⁸²¹ Immediately after the take-over, restrictions were imposed on the non-Serb inhabitants.²⁸²² **(Adjudicated fact!)** Between 10 April 1992 and the beginning of June 1992, large-scale arrests of non-Serb civilian men, mostly of Muslim ethnicity, were carried out throughout Foča.²⁸²³ **(Adjudicated fact!)** Non-Serbs were arrested throughout the municipality. Bosnian Muslim men were rounded up in the streets, separated from the women and children and from the Bosnian Serb population.²⁸²⁴ **(Adjudicated fact! The entire municipal territory was a combat zone, and the local leaders and commanders had every right to secure the town and population against the enemies, and the Accused neither knew about details, nor could influence the events, because the issue of security and defence is a sovereign right of the population! #Military – defense necessity#!)** Others were arrested in their apartments or in the houses of friends and relatives, taken away from their workplaces, or dragged from their hospital beds and detained at multiple detention facilities.²⁸²⁵ **(#Lawful – unlawful#! Because somebody was arrested in his house or in a shelter doesn’t mean that it was unlawful arrest! It always happens when the investigating organs have a criminal report and search for a villain. Such a general qualification for an arrest of males in a civil war is not valid before a criminal court. It should be proven that it was unlawful)** Upon arrest and during transportation to detention facilities, they were referred to by Serb soldiers by the derogatory term “balija”, cursed, and beaten.²⁸²⁶

863. The Foča hospital continued to function and treated both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs and civilians of all ethnicities who sought shelter there at the start of the conflict.²⁸²⁷ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!)** On one occasion, a Bosnian Serb soldier severely kicked three patients in Foča hospital and beat them with a chair after learning that they were Muslim and the beating stopped only when a doctor intervened and called the

evasiveness and attempts to mislead the Chamber, the Chamber does not find that this evidence is reliable. **THAT WAS NOT A MATTER OF THE CHAMBER’S IMPRESSIONS AND INDICATORS OF EVASIVENESS OF THIS WITNESS, IT WAS PROVEN BY MANY UNDOUBTABLE EVIDENCE, THE ORDERS, see: D1849, D434, D93, ISSUED BY THE ACCUSED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR AND REPEATED MANY TIMES, OR D1848, A VERY DETAILED ORDER OF GEN. MLADIC ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR, OR THE DEFENCE MINISTER’S “RULES OF CONDUCT” ISSUED BY THE DEFENCE MINISTER B. SUBOTIC, ATTACHED TO THE ACCUSED’S ORDER OF 13 JUNE 92! BUT THE CHAMBER SO EASILY DISCREDITED SO MANY SERB WITNESSES! #SEE EVIDENCE#!)**

²⁸²¹ P6265 (Video footage of interview with Veljko Ostojić, with transcript), p. 6; Radojica Mladenović, T. 36642 (5 April 2013).

²⁸²² See Adjudicated Fact 766.

²⁸²³ See Adjudicated Fact 822.

²⁸²⁴ See Adjudicated Fact 767.

²⁸²⁵ KDZ239, T. 18946, 18984 (16 September 2011). See Adjudicated Fact 768.

²⁸²⁶ See Adjudicated Facts 766, 780.

²⁸²⁷ D3128 (Witness statement of Veljko Marić dated 16 March 2013), paras. 5, 8–13, 21–23; Veljko Marić, T. 35570–35574, 35578, 35580–35582, 35607–35613, 35621–35622 (19 March 2013); D3129 (Record of patients in pediatric ward of Foča Hospital March - December 1992); D3130 (Record of patients in Foča Hospital); D3131 (Excerpt from Foča Hospital patients log); D3132 (Excerpt from list of patients transferred from Goražde to Pljevlja, 1992). See also D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 22; P6080 (Report of Foča Military Post, 10 October 1992).

police.²⁸²⁸ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! The misdoings were committed by a private person, but the officials (a doctor and the police) acted properly! #Officials vs. criminals#!)**

864. In April and May 1992, Bosnian Muslim households were searched by the Bosnian Serb MP or soldiers, including for weapons and money.^{2829 (2829)} **(#Military necessity# Certainly, if the officials (police) got an order to search for armament and stolen stuff, as noted in this footnote, they had to do it. Why the Chamber disqualified this document D1681(D1684) will never be clear, se fn 2831!)** Bosnian Serb houses were not searched, or at most were searched superficially.²⁸³⁰ **(Adjudicated fact! Why the Serb authorities would profoundly search the Serb homes if nobody fire against the police or the Army from those homes?# Military necessity#!)** Bosnian Muslims were ordered to surrender their weapons while Serbs were allowed to keep theirs.²⁸³¹ **(So what? The Serbs responded to the mobilisation calls by the JNA and put them at disposal to the JNA and Territorial defence.#Lawful, #Legal, obligatory#)** Many of the Bosnian Muslims gave up their personal weapons so that they would not be accused of participating in the conflict.²⁸³² **(#Legal, legitimate and clever by the Muslims! This confirms that there was no problem about the Muslims religion, but the main problem was whether they participated in conflict! #Combatants, or civilians#!)**

865. From April 1992, Bosnian Muslims were laid off from their jobs or were prevented or discouraged from reporting to work.²⁸³³ **(Adjudicated fact! A reasons for that could be multiple: a) if there was a skirmish going on, the Muslims on streets wouldn't be safe; b) the companies hardly worked, because of the war and sanctions there was no production,... and other reasons, like some of the Muslims on the streets could have participate in combats! #Military necessity#!)** Restrictions were placed on the movement of non-Serbs and announcements were made over the radio and with a loudspeaker on a police car that Bosnian Muslims were not allowed to move about.²⁸³⁴ **(Adjudicated fact! It is unbelievable that the Chamber disqualified the Serb witnesses rebutting and opposition to this adjudicated fact. First, the witness Mladjenovic was never suspected of any misdoings, while Dr. Maric didn't have any reason to be evasive. If the Chamber was not satisfied with the specific ... the Chamber was able to clarify it. Se, from fn. 2836, how Maric's testimony was discredited: With respect to Marić, the Chamber notes that he simply states that Adjudicated Fact 772 is not correct and that it was dangerous for all citizens to walk around but does not expressly address whether or not there were additional restrictions imposed on Bosnian**

²⁸²⁸ Adjudicated Fact 781. Veljko Marić testified that he had never heard about this incident. D3128 (Witness statement of Veljko Marić dated 16 March 2013), para. 26. The Chamber does not consider that Marić's lack of knowledge about this incident is inconsistent with it having occurred.

²⁸²⁹ See Adjudicated Fact 776. See also Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7888. The Chamber notes that D1684 (Order of Foča Crisis Staff) is an order by the Foča Crisis Staff to the MP to disarm and take into custody any person involved in theft in the town and to "prohibit any misuse and conduct unbecoming a soldier". However, given that the order is undated, this limits its probative value.

²⁸³⁰ See Adjudicated Fact 777.

²⁸³¹ See Adjudicated Fact 778.

²⁸³² See Adjudicated Fact 747.

²⁸³³ See Adjudicated Facts 770, 771.

²⁸³⁴ See Adjudicated Fact 772. Defence witnesses disputed this adjudicated fact and testified that it was dangerous for all citizens to walk around and that there were no restrictions on the movement of the non-Serb population except during the curfew when all citizens were subject to movement restrictions. D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), paras. 25, 57; D3128 (Witness statement of Veljko Marić dated 16 March 2013), para. 25. The Chamber does not consider that this evidence is reliable. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber noted that Mladenović's evidence was marked by multiple contradictions and extreme evasiveness. With respect to Marić, the Chamber notes that he simply states that Adjudicated Fact 772 is not correct and that it was dangerous for all citizens to walk around but does not expressly address whether or not there were additional restrictions imposed on Bosnian Muslims.

Muslims. It could not be more specific, since it concerned to all the citizens!#Disregard of defense witnesses without basis#!) At the same time, the Bosnian Serb population could move around freely, with the exception of a night curfew from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. imposed on all inhabitants.²⁸³⁵ Bosnian Muslims were forbidden to meet with each other, and had their phone lines cut off.²⁸³⁶ Restrictions imposed resulted in them being under virtual house arrest.²⁸³⁷ Military check-points were established, controlling access in and out of Foča and its surrounding villages.²⁸³⁸ **(#All military necessities#!None of those measures had nothing to do with the Muslim affiliation to their religion, but only to their “affiliation” to the Muslim armed forces deployed around the town. So, they could easily direct the artillery fire of their fellows Muslims. All of those measures fell within the sovereign right of people to secure against enemies, and the Accused has nothing to do with that!)**

866. Paramilitary formations were present in Foča, including units known as Tuta’s Group, Pero’s group, Brane Čosović’s group, Gojko Janković’s group, and Zaga’s unit which was led by Dragan Kunarac, a.k.a. Zaga.²⁸³⁹ Paramilitaries were involved in looting gold, jewellery, and money from homes.²⁸⁴⁰ Commanders of these units would visit Kovač.²⁸⁴¹ However, by May 1992 the authorities attempted to expel paramilitary formations from the municipality.²⁸⁴² **(#EXCULPATORY!!! Already by May 1992 the authorities tried to expel the paramilitaries! This clearly prove that the paramilitaries and their misdoings were not tolerated, let alone ordered, by the local Serb authorities!#Contra paramilitaries#)** In July 1992, Mićo Stanišić instructed the special unit led by Davidović and Andan to establish law and order in Foča and to take measures against paramilitaries who were disrupting the functioning of the legal authorities.²⁸⁴³ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! Mico Stanisic was the president Karad’i’s Minister for Interior, and acted in accordance with the President’s general orders!)**

²⁸³⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 772.

²⁸³⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 773. Radojica Mladenović disputed this adjudicated fact and testified that it was not possible to selectively disconnect phone lines. D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 58. The Chamber does not consider that it can rely on this evidence as it was marked by multiple contradictions and extreme evasiveness which undermined his credibility.

²⁸³⁷ See Adjudicated Fact 774.

²⁸³⁸ Adjudicated Fact 775.

²⁸³⁹ P90 (Witness statement of KDZ216 dated 8 June 1998), pp. 6, 13, 15 (under seal); D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 23; P69 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Kunarac*), T. 3330, 3378, 3385–3386 (under seal); Milutin Vujičić, T. 32127–32128 (17 January 2013); Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32331–32332 (21 January 2013). See also P3354 (Order of Foča Tactical Group, 7 July 1992), p. 3 (identifying the involvement of Zaga’s unit in mopping up operations).

²⁸⁴⁰ P90 (Witness statement of KDZ216 dated 8 June 1998), p. 15 (under seal).

²⁸⁴¹ P69 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Kunarac*), T. 3386 (under seal); P90 (Witness statement of KDZ216 dated 8 June 1998), p. 15 (under seal). See also Radojica Mladenović, T. 36673 (5 April 2013) (testifying that these units “acted in concert with regular units of the army”). Defence witnesses testified that paramilitary groups (i) came to the municipality randomly for the purposes of plunder; (ii) were not considered welcome by the civilian and military authorities; and (iii) killed both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), paras. 42–43; Mitar Rašević, T. 46813–46815 (11 February 2014); Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32332–32333 (21 January 2013); D2767 (Witness statement of Milutin Vujičić dated 14 January 2013), para. 10; Milutin Vujičić, T. 32124 (17 January 2013). The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In this regard, with respect to Vujičić the Chamber notes a contradiction in his evidence. On the one hand, Vujičić states that the paramilitary formations were completely unknown to him, but he knew that they killed people regardless of ethnicity. Similarly, the evidence of Mladenović that these groups came randomly is contradicted by his evidence that some of the units “acted in concert with the regular units of the army”. In addition the evidence of these witnesses is marked by multiple other contradictions and extreme evasiveness, which undermine their credibility.

²⁸⁴² KDZ379, T. 18889 (15 September 2011); D2767 (Witness statement of Milutin Vujičić dated 14 January 2013), para. 9; Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32332 (21 January 2013).

²⁸⁴³ Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21493–21494, 21503, 21505. See also D4312 (Report of RS MUP, 14 September 1992), p. 1; D1675 (Report re Foča police station, 1 December 1992), pp. 1–4; D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 47.

1. Scheduled Incident A.5.2

867. The Prosecution alleges that a number of civilians from the village of Jeleč were killed between 1 and 5 May 1992.

868. Jeleč is a village about 22 kilometres from Foča near Miljevina. Jeleč was shelled, attacked by infantry, and taken over by Serb Forces on 4 or 5 May 1992.²⁸⁴⁴ Serb Forces set Jeleč on fire after which the population fled to a nearby forest. Muslims who stayed in their homes or who tried to escape were killed.²⁸⁴⁵ Other male Bosnian Muslim villagers were captured and detained before being transferred to the KP Dom Foča.²⁸⁴⁶

869. The Chamber therefore finds that a number of civilians from the village of Jeleč were killed by Serb Forces between 1 and 5 May 1992. **(Is the Chamber of an opinion that there was no a Muslim armed unit in Jele~? What does it mean “number of civilians” in a civil war? The village of Jeleč was a very famous extremist’s stronghold. The Muslim armed extremists attacked many Serb villages in the surrounding, set them to fire and killed many disabled, old and youngster Serb civilians. The attack on the Serbian village of Josanica was probably the cruellest crime in the entire war. But, the Chamber disabled and prevented the Defence to depict such a cases under the code that it would be “tu quoque”. However, in any criminal case there must be established a #chain of events#, a #causes and consequences#, and an outcome. It is of a crucial importance to establish why something happened, whether it was a part of policy, whether a Serb commander ordered it, or maybe a recent Muslim crime ordered it! This can not be even mentioned as a fair trial! #Context#)**

2. Scheduled Incident A.5.4

870. The Prosecution alleges that a number of people hiding in the woods near Mješaja/Trošanj were killed in early July 1992.

871. On 3 July 1992, the Bosnian Muslim village of Mješaja/Trošanj, situated between Foča and Tjienstište, was attacked by Serb Forces including units led by Gojko Janković and Radomir Kovač.²⁸⁴⁷ **(See the remark to the fn. 2849!)** Kovač was a member of Čosović’s group.²⁸⁴⁸

²⁸⁴⁴ See Adjudicated Fact 760.

²⁸⁴⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 761. See also Adjudicated Fact 752. The Prosecution refers to Mašović’s evidence with respect to the exhumation of one individual who it links to this incident. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix G, Foča, Scheduled Incident A.5.2. Mašović refers to one individual from Jeleč who went missing on 4 May 1992 and who was exhumed from a grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 6. However, the Chamber is not satisfied that, in the absence of further evidence it can link the named individual with this scheduled incident based on Mašović’s evidence and will therefore not rely on this exhumation evidence for the purposes of entering findings with respect to this incident. Mladenović testified that Jeleč was a stronghold of the Patriotic League and Serb Forces “liberated” the village after previous failed attempts to negotiate for the return of weapons and to avoid clashes. D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 41. Similarly the Accused made a submission that the casualties in Jeleč were collateral damage in a military operation. Defence Final Brief, para. 1771. However, the Chamber does not consider that Mladenović’s evidence or the Accused’s unsupported submission contradicts the evidence which relates to the conduct of the members of Serb Forces who entered Jeleč, burnt down the village, forced villagers to flee, and killed those who remained in their houses or who tried to escape.

²⁸⁴⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 761. See Scheduled Detention Facility C.10.1 for evidence relating to detention and treatment at KP Dom Foča.

²⁸⁴⁷ See Adjudicated Facts 763, 2398. The Chamber received evidence that Janković went to villages to identify how Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs could be rescued and that there had been previous attempts to negotiate the surrender of weapons in the village of Trošanj and assurances given to Bosnian Muslims who surrendered their weapons. Milutin Vujičić, T. 32128 (17 January 2013); D3316 (Agreement between Trošanj Muslim representatives and Foča authorities, 24 April 1992), p. 1. However, the Chamber does not accept that this evidence is reliable or can be connected with this incident. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that Vujičić’s evidence

872. At the time of the attack, some Bosnian Muslim villagers in Trošanjan continued living in their houses but would sleep in the woods at night and only return to their homes during the daytime.²⁸⁴⁹ They were afraid because they saw other Muslim villages burning and felt targeted as Muslims.²⁸⁵⁰ The Chamber also took judicial notice that three villagers in Mješaja/Trošanjan were killed during the initial attack.²⁸⁵¹ However, the Chamber does not have sufficient evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the deaths of these three individuals during the attack on the village to make a finding in this regard. **(This criterion fulfilled many, many incidents and assertions of the Prosecution and the Muslim side and witnesses!)**

873. After capturing a group of about 50 Muslim villagers, Serb Forces separated the men from the women. The women were chased down a hill towards the village **(Another word, returned to their homes! It is clear that they had been captured somewhere out of their village!)** and seven detained men were beaten and then killed.²⁸⁵² **(As the Chamber noticed discrepancies in evidence, see fn. 2854, this “assertion” shouldn’t be in the Judgement, unless to corroborate the Defence’s position that there had to be differentiated a combat losses from a possible unlawful killings. Who can believe that there was no combat and combat casualties? #Combatants vs. civilians#!)** Serb soldiers hit the villagers with rifle butts and tree branches, kicking them, and calling them

was marked by evasiveness and indicators that he was attempting to mislead the Chamber, which resulted in his credibility being undermined. In addition, the Chamber notes that Mladenović acknowledged that he may have not been properly informed about all events in the village and denied any knowledge of evidence which suggested that Bosnian Muslims did in fact hand over weapons. Radojica Mladenović, T. 36655–36656 (5 April 2013). The Chamber therefore does not consider that Mladenović’s evidence casts any doubt on the evidence received which relates to the conduct of Serb Forces during the attack. **(# Believes contra documents!# SO, AN ADJUDICATED FACT, ADJUDICATED IN ANOTHER CASE, WHERE PROBABLY NOBODY HAD ANY INTEREST TO REBUT IT, APPEARED TO BE STRONGER THAN THE TESTIMONY OF TWO SERB WITNESSES AND A CONTEMPORANEUS DOCUMENT SIGNED BY THREE MUSLIMS. LET US SEE WHAT WAS WRITTEN IN THIS AGREEMENT:**

1. All weapons, whether legal or illegal, owned by the Muslims in the area of the village of Trošanjan are to be surrendered.
2. The Serbs who are not engaged in military formations are to surrender their weapons.

THEREFORE, THE SERBS HAD TO HAND OVER THEIR WEAPONRY UNLESS ENGAGED IN LEGAL MILITARY FORMATIONS. IN ADDITION TO THIS PART, THERE IS AN ADDITION: THE MUSLIM AND SERB NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ISSUED A COMMON DECISION ON EMERGENCY MEASURES!!!THERE IS NO LOGICS TO DISCREDIT THIS DOCUMENT AND TESTIMONIES# contra documents!

National Security Council of the two peoples at its session of 8 April 1992 issued Decision on Emergency Measures for the town of Foča.

Citizens are cautioned not to move in the town between 2000 in the evening and 0600 in the morning.

The measures remain in force until further notice.

²⁸⁴⁸ KDZ216, P69 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Kunarac*), T. 3385 (under seal).

²⁸⁴⁹ Adjudicated Fact 764.

²⁸⁵⁰ See Adjudicated Fact 764. See also Adjudicated Fact 752.

²⁸⁵¹ See Adjudicated Facts 765, 2398, 2399.

²⁸⁵² See Adjudicated Facts 765, 2398, 2399, 2401. The Prosecution refers to Mašović’s evidence with respect to the exhumation of one individual who it links to this incident. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix G, Foča Scheduled Incident A.5.4. Mašović’s evidence is that ten bodies which were exhumed from a mass grave at Trošanjan are linked to individuals who went missing on 1 May 1992. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 6. The Chamber notes that this date is not consistent with the evidence which suggested that these killings occurred in July 1992. In addition, in the absence of further evidence, the Chamber cannot link the named individual with this scheduled incident based on Mašović’s evidence and will therefore not rely on this exhumation evidence for the purposes of entering findings with respect to this incident.

“Ustashes” and one of the Muslims lost an eye as a result of the beating.²⁸⁵³ Some Bosnian Muslims from the village were taken to detention facilities including KP Dom²⁸⁵⁴ and the Worker’s Huts at Buk Bijela.²⁸⁵⁵

874. The Chamber therefore finds that Serb Forces killed at least seven Bosnian Muslim civilians from the village of Mješaja/Trošanj in July 1992. **(The entire this chapter of the Judgement is based on the Adjudicated facts and discredited genuine documents and testimonies of the Defence witnesses, se the footnotes! This Defence wasn’t in a position to contest those adjudicated facts, because it had been “adjudicated” in other cases. So, the main points of the Judgement are founded on inferences and adjudicated facts, completely out of any chance that the Defence challenge it! #Adjudicated facts, believes, vs. documents#! Combatants, or civilians#!)**

iii. Detention Facilities in Foča

1. Scheduled Detention Facility C.10.6

875. The Indictment refers to the use of the TO military warehouses at Livade as a detention facility between 14 and 17 April 1992. **(So what?#Before the VRS#! It didn’t have anything to do with the President. Not only the Accused didn’t know anything about development in Foca, but he didn’t command to any force at that time. The Territorial Defence of the Republic of Srpska was established only on 18 April 1992 by the act of Ministry for Defence, D03703 which also reinforced the old definition according to which the Territorial Defence was a sovereign defence force of every municipality, under the command of every municipal president and the municipal and regional staffs of the TO, see: D03703:**

1. The Territorial Defence of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be formed as an armed force of the SBH. The Territorial Defence will be under the command and control of municipal, district and regional staffs and the Republican Staff of the SBH TO /Territorial Defence/.

#All legal and obligatory#!)

876. In mid-April 1992, many Bosnian Muslim civilians who were arrested in the centre of Foča or other areas of the town were taken and detained at the TO military warehouses at Livade.²⁸⁵⁶ **(Adjudicated fact! #Combatants, or civilians#! Thus the Defence couldn’t check how many of those “civilians” were combatants in civil cloathing. Since the Prosecution never checked their sources, and the Defence didn’t have resources nor time to make investigation, this way was secured an unfair trial! Anyway, what does it have to do with the President? The Serbs and Muslims in Foca didn’t succeed to make an agreement and maintain the peace, and it was possible only because all were armed, and hoped to achieve their goals by fights. Thus the whole process stucked in a “terra ignota” because the Chamber prevented the Defence to**

²⁸⁵³ See Adjudicated Fact 2400.

²⁸⁵⁴ Trifko Pljevaljić, T. 32346 (21 January 2013). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.10.1 for evidence relating to detention and treatment at KP Dom Foča.

²⁸⁵⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 2407. See Scheduled Detention Facility C.10.4 for evidence relating to detention and treatment at the Worker’s Huts at Buk Bijela.

²⁸⁵⁶ See Adjudicated Facts 782, 783, 784, 785.

present what were the objectives of the warring factions. The Serb side didn't intend to control the entire Bosnia, not even a single Muslim/Croat settlement, and therefore could achieve it's objective politically, while the Muslim side wanted the entire Bosnia only for themselves! Anyway, it was #before the VRS was formed!#) Those detained included several doctors and medical staff from Foča hospital and members of the SDA who were arrested by soldiers, including members of the TO and soldiers in camouflage JNA uniforms.²⁸⁵⁷ (Obviously, it happened in the presence of the JNA and out of any President's influence.#Before the VRS# Why doctors and medical staff wouldn't be opposed to the JNA at least helping the Muslim secret army of the Patriotic League and Green Berets? Again, another Adjudicated fact from another case, and undermining of the eye witness testimonies! A fair trial???) During the arrests, several of the detainees were severely beaten and injured while others had their hands tied before being taken away.²⁸⁵⁸ (Adjudicated fact!!!) In mid April 1992, approximately 80 to 100 men were detained in hangars at the facility.²⁸⁵⁹ (Did the Chamber establish that this detention was unlawful?) This figure did not include the women and children who were separated and taken to other hangars.²⁸⁶⁰ Most the people detained were Bosnian Muslims and one was a Bosnian Croat.²⁸⁶¹ (From another case!)

877. Some detainees who arrived at the facility had already been severely beaten.²⁸⁶² Veselin Čančar was the commander of Livade and was heard cursing and threatening the detainees.²⁸⁶³ A boy who was captured in the town of Foča and brought to Livade, was tied to a fence and beaten with ropes.²⁸⁶⁴ While the detainees could not see the beating, they could hear the blows, his screams and the "rope piercing the air".²⁸⁶⁵ (None of it was even mentioned in this case!#Heard, not seen#)

878. KDZ239 testified that the conditions at the facility were very poor, there "was a lot of humidity there. Hygienic conditions were poor, also food was not good, and this was not a good place to stay either. Conditions were poor".²⁸⁶⁶ The Chamber does not consider that KDZ239's evidence in this regard provides sufficient detail to allow the Chamber to make a finding as to the conditions of detention at this facility. On 17 April 1992, all the male Bosnian Muslim civilians detained at Livade were transferred to the KP Dom Foča.²⁸⁶⁷ (It was impossible to deal with all of this, since everything was imported #from other cases#. Neither it had been established that the detention was unlawful, nor that it was as described by the Serb adversaries in this war, who usually presented themselves as civilians while they weren't, nor that the "poor conditions" were set up deliberately

²⁸⁵⁷ KDZ239, P3335 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1195–1200, 1198–1199 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 785. Mladenović stated that Bosnian Muslim civilians were brought to this facility for a short time as they were suspected of being involved in the arming of the Bosnian Muslim population. D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 36. The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that Mladenović's evidence was marked by multiple contradictions and extreme evasiveness.

²⁸⁵⁸ Adjudicated Fact 786. See also KDZ239, P3335 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1197 (under seal).

²⁸⁵⁹ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1200. See also Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*) T. 7887–7888.

²⁸⁶⁰ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1200.

²⁸⁶¹ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1200, 1202. The Bosnian Croat was identified as Krunoslav Marinović.

²⁸⁶² KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1200, 1202.

²⁸⁶³ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1201–1202.

²⁸⁶⁴ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1202.

²⁸⁶⁵ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1202.

²⁸⁶⁶ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1202.

²⁸⁶⁷ See Adjudicated Fact 823; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1204; Radojica Mladenović, T. 36657 (5 April 2013). See also Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*) T. 7887–7888.

instead of being the only possible conditions due to the war and sanctions. Particularly, on 17 April 1992 president Karad'ić didn't command to anyone in Foca! #Before the VRS# But, if the Chamber implies the President's responsibility because of the war as it, the Chamber would be wrong for the following reasons: the Tribunal didn't incriminate crime against peace, and therefore didn't deal with "ius at war" nor allowed any arguments about the responsibility for the war, not approved any presentation of the conduct of the other side, nor kept in mind that the President was keen to avoid the war at any cost, see: D1523, p.5 of 8 March 1992, a month before the war broke out:

Cutileiro talks. Dr. Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Serbs, was also positively inclined towards these talks. He wanted to avoid a war at all costs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Secretary Vance

This evidence originates from the top of the International community involved in this crisis! How come this didn't have any effect to the Chamber?)

879. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that non-Serbs were brought to and detained at the TO military warehouses in Livade in mid-April 1992 and that some of the detainees were beaten there. (The non-Serbs had been captured in Foca, because it was a civil war, but the non-Muslims (the Serbs) had been captured in Foca, as well as throughout Bosnia by their adversaries, the non-Serbs. When it will be accepted that it was a civil war of the Muslims and Croats against the Serbs and vice versa, the Muslims against Croats, and the Muslims against another Muslims (against the Autonomous Region of Western Bosnia, Abdic) all would look different. The only solution was to avoid the civil war, all other wasn't manageable!)

2. Scheduled Detention Facility C.10.1

880. The Indictment refers to the use of the KP Dom Foča as a detention facility from 18 April 1992 until at least 31 December 1992.²⁸⁶⁸

a. Arrival of detainees and control over the detention facility

881. Before the war KP Dom functioned as a prison with a capacity of between 600 and 800 detainees.²⁸⁶⁹ (convicts, to be precise!) However, many of these detainees were released or escaped in the lead-up to the war.²⁸⁷⁰ Bosnian Muslims who had been arrested were transferred to the KP Dom Foča from mid-April 1992.²⁸⁷¹ For example, all Bosnian Muslim civilians detained at Livade were transferred to the KP Dom in mid April 1992.²⁸⁷² (They had been "civilians" according to their statements, and according to an

²⁸⁶⁸ The Prosecution submits that the evidence shows that the facility operated from 18 April 1992 until 4 October 1994. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B.

²⁸⁶⁹ D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), paras. 3–5. See also P6657 (Sketch of KP Dom marked by Mitar Rašević); Adjudicated Fact 823; Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7669 (testifying that to his knowledge the facility could house between 1,000 and 1,200 people); KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2894–2895; D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 48; Radojica Mladenović, T. 36657, 36667 (5 April 2013); D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), paras. 34–35; P5527 (Decision of Radovan Karadžić to establish Correctional Facility in Foča), p. 1.

²⁸⁷⁰ D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 5.

²⁸⁷¹ See Adjudicated Facts 822, 823; KDZ239, T. 18914–18915 (15 September 2011).

²⁸⁷² See Adjudicated Fact 823; KDZ239, T. 18914–18915 (15 September 2011) (testifying that none of the detainees had been on the frontline). On arrival, detainees from Livade were met by soldiers and police. KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1204. See also Radojica Mladenović, T. 36657 (5 April 2013); Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7887–7888.

Adjudicated fact, but it wasn't established. Why the Serbs would detain some civilians only, and feed and guard them, while others not?#Combatants or civilians#)

When this group arrived there were already between 40 and 60 detainees in one room.²⁸⁷³

After a few days the names and professions of the detainees were recorded by one of the guards.²⁸⁷⁴ **("Recording" their names indicate that they hadn't been arrested on a base of any list, but captured in the battlefield!)**

Towards the end of April 1992, detainees were taken from the Velečevo prison to KP Dom. **(This only means that an investigation indicated that they ought to be detained, as indicated in the previous sentence!)** At the entrance of the KP Dom there was a bus filled with women and children.²⁸⁷⁵ **(#Obscure# So what? What happened to them? Were they detained? Just to mention it that way, without specifying a purpose and lead-up is not fair, because they may be given transport as a favour. Anyway, this appeared in another case, without possibility that this Defence clarify it.)**

A group of about 20 Bosnian Muslims from Foča who had fled were arrested in Montenegro and brought to KP Dom in May 1992 under the escort of police from Foča.²⁸⁷⁶ **(Why and when they fled from Foca? Was it before the fights and their defeat, or after it?)**

After a few days, 50 to 60 other Bosnian Muslims civilians were brought from Foča and surrounding villages to the facility.²⁸⁷⁷ **(It is from another case. Who established they were civilians not participating in this civil war? The Muslim armed forces spent the entire 1992 fighting in their civil cloathings!#Combatants, or civilians#)** More non-Serb detainees were brought to the facility in June 1992.²⁸⁷⁸ **(Were there any combat activities in this period, and between whom? If there was a combat activities, what happened with a captured combatants?)**

Some Bosnian Serbs were also detained at the facility primarily for breaches of military discipline.²⁸⁷⁹

882. Even though Bosnian Muslims had been transferred to the facility from mid-April 1992, it was only on 4 July 1992 that the KP Dom Foča was formally established following a decision by the government of the SerBiH.²⁸⁸⁰ **(No matter the detainees had been transferred to the KP Dom from mid-April, this facility never ceased to be a prison, but in the circumstances of the war, it was re-named in July 92. Big deal!)** Members of the municipal level military and civilian authorities visited the facility.²⁸⁸¹ Both the Ministry of Justice and the military authorities in Foča had responsibility and exercised control over the facility.²⁸⁸² However, it was the military authorities at KP Dom that had

²⁸⁷³ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1217.

²⁸⁷⁴ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1204.

²⁸⁷⁵ KDZ379, P3332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 3127, 3129.

²⁸⁷⁶ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2774–2778, 2781–2782, 2789, 2793; KDZ017, T. 19894–19896 (4 October 2011); Momir Bulatović, T. 34569–34571 (1 March 2013). Miodrag Stevanović an official from Foča was involved in this arrest and transfer. The group of detainees brought from Montenegro included Bosnian Serb soldiers who had deserted but they were only detained at the KP Dom for a few days. This transfer occurred at the request of the Foča SUP. D1746 (Excerpt from report), pp. 1–4.

²⁸⁷⁷ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2789.

²⁸⁷⁸ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2792, 2799, 2820–2821 (testifying that those detained with him included men in their 60s and 70s and two of the 72 detainees held in his room were Bosnian Croats while the remainder were Bosnian Muslims).

²⁸⁷⁹ D2767 (Witness statement of Milutin Vujičić dated 14 January 2013), para. 31; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2793; *see* Adjudicated Fact 826; P5545 (Report of Foča Penal and Correctional Facility, 11 July 1992), p. 3; D2722 (Report of KP Dom Foča to RS Ministry of Justice, undated), pp. 16–17; KDZ379, T. 18858 (15 September 2011).

²⁸⁸⁰ P1098 (Minutes of 36th session of SerBiH Government, 4 July 1992), pp. 2, 4; Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35153 (11 March 2013); P6195 (Report on organising judiciary institutions in Foča); D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 8.

²⁸⁸¹ D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 16. Rašević identified Marko Kovač as one of the individuals who visited the facility.

²⁸⁸² *See* Adjudicated Facts 836, 837, 838, 839, 840; D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 48; D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), paras. 11–16; Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7599, 7944, 8175–8176; P6195 (Report on organising judiciary institutions in Foča), p. 2; P3343 (Ruling of RS Ministry of Justice and Administration, 16 December 1992), p. 1; P5545 (Report of Foča Penal and Correctional Facility, 11 July 1992), p. 1. While the Chamber accepts that there may have been difficulties in communication, Rašević's evidence that there was no contact between the

the power to make decisions concerning which non-Serb detainees would be detained in, and released from, the facility.²⁸⁸³ **(Naturally! #Combatants, or civilians# Since the detained were captured in combats, they had to be treated as a Prisoners of War (POW-s) and this element indicated that they hadn't been civilians. The military would never bother with civilians, no matter guilty or innocent. But it is the highest priority of any army to secure it's own lives and to deal with the POW-s And, anyway, it was a period #before the VRS, during the JNA# which had been challenged by the Muslim secret army, formed in Foča in summer 1990, see: D246 above!)** The military authorities at KP Dom could also make decisions about which persons would be permitted to enter the facility, and had some power over the appointment of persons to work assignments at the facility.²⁸⁸⁴ Krnojelac was kept informed about who was to be detained by the military authorities and who was to be released²⁸⁸⁵ and was obliged to forward requests for release of these detainees to the Foča Crisis Staff or the Foča Tactical Group.²⁸⁸⁶ Krnojelac did forward some requests for release of Bosnian Muslim detainees to the Foča Crisis Staff and to the Foča Tactical Group and some requests were approved after the detainees had been processed.²⁸⁸⁷ **(#Legal and obligatory# As in any other country! "Released after been processed" means that one was not detained for religious or ethnic reasons! All this procedure clearly confirmed that there was no civilians detained, but only combatants! Neither would the civilian police allow that militaries deal with a civili crimes!)**

883. Bosnian Muslim civilians who were arrested by Serb Forces were detained at KP Dom for periods lasting from four months to more than two and a half years.²⁸⁸⁸ **(Civilians – that was not properly established. On the contrary, it was clear that the Army kept their prisoners. Otherwise, why would the Serb side, civilian or military authorities, keep “civilians” – guard and feed them while there was no food for the soldiers and population?#Combatants, or civilians#)** They were not detained on any legal grounds and their continued detention was not subject to review by Serb authorities.²⁸⁸⁹ **(Again an**

KP Dom on the one hand and the Minister of Justice and the Republican government on the other for a period for several months is not credible and in any event does not rule out the possibility of communication between other organs of the local authorities and the Republican government. See D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 40.

²⁸⁸³ See Adjudicated Fact 837; P3347 (Order of Foča's Military Post, 7 September 1992); KDZ239, T. 18921 (15 September 2011). See also Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 8138; Milorad Krnojelac, D2715 (Testimony of Milorad Krnojelac in *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7687–7689, 7691 (under seal).

²⁸⁸⁴ See Adjudicated Fact 839.

²⁸⁸⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 838.

²⁸⁸⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 837; Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7645–7648; D2723 (Request for release from KP Dom Foča, 30 July 1992); D2724 (Request for release from KP Dom Foča, 30 July 1992); D2725 (Request for release from KP Dom Foča, 14 May 1992).

²⁸⁸⁷ Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7936–7938, 7940–7943; P3344 (Letter from KP Dom Foča's Acting Warden to Foča Crisis Staff, 15 May 1992); KDZ239, T. 18917 (15 September 2011), T. 18986–18987 (16 September 2011); D1688 (Report of Foča Tactical Group “A”, 18 July 1992); P5540 (Discharge letter of Foča Crisis Staff re the release of Dževad Dedović, 7 May 1992); P5539 (Discharge letter of Foča Crisis Staff re the release of Enes Zuko, 21 May 1992); P5526 (Certificate of the Foča Crisis Staff, 7 July 1992); D1691 (Travel permit of Foča SJB, 26 June 1992); D1687 (List of men released from KP Dom Foča, 8 December 1992).

²⁸⁸⁸ See Adjudicated Fact 825; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2818, 2820. Defence witnesses testified that the KP Dom Foča and other detention facilities (i) were “reception facilities” which were used by the Bosnian Serb authorities to protect and guarantee the security of these civilians from uncontrolled paramilitary and criminal elements; (ii) Bosnian Muslims who were held at these centres could ask for permission from the guards to either leave the municipality or to return to their villages to care for livestock or buy food from the shops. D2767 (Witness statement of Milutin Vujičić dated 14 January 2013), paras. 31, 33; Milutin Vujičić, T. 32097, 32133 (17 January 2013); Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32313–32316, 32344 (21 January 2013). The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber noted that Vujičić's evidence was marked by evasiveness and indicators that he was seeking to mislead the Chamber which undermined his credibility in this regard. With respect to Pljevaljčić's evidence on this issue, he testified in general terms and the Chamber is not satisfied that it pertains specifically to those detained at KP Dom Foča.

²⁸⁸⁹ See Adjudicated Facts 826, 827. Mitar Rašević testified that no detainee was brought to the facility without being referred by the army command with appropriate documentation which listed the grounds for detention. D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2

Adjudicated fact, stronger than a testimony of an eye witness, althou this witness gave a reasonable explanation and description, se this fn., that all the papers were of a military nature. As said in the previous paragraphs, the releases on the decisions of military clearly indicate that the Army conducted investigations which resulted either with release, or denial of it!) Investigators from the MUP came to the KP Dom to interrogate detainees.²⁸⁹⁰ (Why would they bother and spend time if there was no a need to differentiate criminals from ordinary combatants? It was obvious that their religion wasn't of any importance, but only their deeds. #Not understood basics#! Although clarified in the courtroom, the Chamber didn't understand why the detainees had been kept if there was no intention to process them in courts. However, a regular combatants, who didn't commit any crime, had to be kept and was subject to a POW exchange, while those who committed crimes during conflict were to be sued and not to be exchanged!) The Chamber also received evidence that in February 1993, Slobodan Avlijaš sent a letter to penal and correctional facilities, including the KP Dom Foča, noting that the Ministry of Justice had been informed that people were detained without detention orders from a competent court. Avlijaš requested these correctional facilities to inform the Ministry about the number of detainees and those who did not have detention orders and to release the latter.²⁸⁹¹ (#EXCULPATORY!!! Mr. Avlijas was an official of the state led by this President, and if the Ministry of Justice had been informed about some irregularities, the most appropriate action was what Mr. Avlijas did on behalf of the Ministry!) However, ultimately, the Bosnian Muslim detainees were not suspected, charged, tried, or convicted for any crime before being detained or while detained at the KP Dom.²⁸⁹² (#Not understood basics#! See this misunderstanding: thay had been suspected, otherwise there wouldn't be any interrogation, but why would they be tried and convicted if they didn't commit a crime, but were only combatants and POW-s?) nor were they advised of their rights before or during their detention.²⁸⁹³ After the conflict started, the overwhelming majority of those detained at the facility were Bosnian Muslims, these included doctors and medical health workers, journalists, former KP Dom employees, managers, police officers, and other civilians.²⁸⁹⁴ (And how was it established that those detained didn't participate in the armed conflict, either directly with armament, or supplying with medical materials, or supporting with money, or with propaganda? That was not established, therefore their statements that didn't participate are not valid! #Combatants, or civilians#!) No consideration was given to age, state of health or

February 2014), paras. 29, 43; Mitar Rašević, T. 46816 (11 February 2014). The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber noted contradictions in the testimony of Rašević in this regard and his denial of knowledge that documentation used for the detention of individuals contained standard wording which suggested that they were captured in war operations, when they were actually civilians. (#Combatants, or civilians# But, in a civil war, civilians fight each other, and even attack a legal army, the JNA! No ground to rject Rasevic's testimony!) Mitar Rašević, T. 46777–46780 (11 February 2014); P6656 (Excerpt from Mitar Rašević's testimony before BiH State Court, 11 December 2007), pp. 5–6. Similarly, the Chamber notes contradictions in Krnojelac's evidence on this issue. He initially testified that he was told people were detained there because they were Bosnian Muslims but later retracted this statement. Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7844–7845.

²⁸⁹⁰ Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7660–7663, 7849–7850, 8072.

²⁸⁹¹ P5544 (Instructions on Detention of the RS Ministry of Justice and Administration, 23 February 1993).

²⁸⁹² See Adjudicated Fact 828; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2783, 2818, 2820.

²⁸⁹³ See Adjudicated Facts 829, 830.

²⁸⁹⁴ See Adjudicated Facts 830, 832. Marić also testified that in the middle of July 1992, Bosnian Muslim staff left the hospital but were not forced to do so. Marić was challenged about this evidence and maintained that non-Serb employees of the hospital were not expelled or detained at the KP Dom Foča but then acknowledged that one of his colleagues did end up at the facility. Veljko Marić, T. 35597–35599 (19 March 2013); P6206 (Order of Foča Tactical Group, 4 July 1993). In light of this inconsistency, the Chamber will not rely on the witness's assertion that no Bosnian Muslim employees of the hospital were detained at the KP Dom.

civilian status. The detainees ranged from 15 to almost 80 years of age.²⁸⁹⁵ In addition to the mainly civilian population at the KP Dom, there was a small number of Bosnian Muslim soldiers kept in isolation cells separately from the civilian detainees.²⁸⁹⁶ **(Adjudicated fact! But this is an evidence that there was a combat activity, and that all the detained could have been captured in connection with this. Some of them being isolated means nothing. How was it established that those isolated from others weren't criminals that required isolation? This kind of deliberations in such a complex case is not fair. The mere fact that the Army was running the prison for POW-s clearly indicated that detained people were involved in combats!)**

884. In mid-April-1992, the facility was run by the Užice Corps of the JNA.²⁸⁹⁷ Apart from members of the Užice Corps, the civilian police, and people from Serbia were also present at the KP Dom.²⁸⁹⁸ When the Užice Corps left, a unit known as the Livade Company consisting of local Bosnian Serbs, including the police, took responsibility for detained Bosnian Muslims.²⁸⁹⁹

885. On 18 April 1992, Milorad Krnojelac was appointed by the Foča Crisis Staff as the warden of KP Dom.²⁹⁰⁰ Krnojelac was associated with members of the SDS and wore a military uniform at the facility.²⁹⁰¹ Savo Todović was the deputy warden and issued orders to detainees regarding work obligations.²⁹⁰² Bosnian Muslim detainees could not be taken

²⁸⁹⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 832. See also KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1217. Rašević testified that (i) there were no people under the age of 18; (ii) he did not recall seeing people over the age of 60 or 65 at the facility; and (iii) all detainees whether they were prisoners of war or convicts were treated the same regardless of ethnicity. D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 43; Mitar Rašević, T. 46753, 46776–46777, 46783 (11 February 2014). The Chamber does not consider Rašević's evidence to be reliable in this regard. The Chamber notes that Rašević himself acknowledged that he did not know the situation until mid May 1992 when he returned to the facility and was inconclusive in his testimony when confronted with evidence which suggested that elderly detainees, women and children had been detained at the facility. **REGARDLESS OF THIS, RASEVIC WAS RIGHT, BECAUSE UNTIL 20 MAY THE KP DOM WAS UNDER THE JNA CONTROL, AS REPEATEDLY MENTIONED IN THIS VERY SAME JUDGEMENT!** See P6660 (Report of Foča Tactical Group, 31 August 1992), **EVEN THE EXHIBIT P6660 IS #EXCULPATORY FOR THIS ACCUSED. IT WAS HIS COMMISSION (LED BY S. AVLJAS) THAT WAS TO VISIT THE FOČA KP DOM, AND THE AUTHOR OF THIS REPORT WANTED TO PREVENT THIS COMMISSION TO SEE WHAT HE DIDN'T WANT THEM!#Superiors rectify#!** p. 2; P6659 (List of prisoners in Foča prison, 27 October 1993) and KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1224.

²⁸⁹⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 831; KDZ379, P3332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 3137, 3141, 3152. See also KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1212–1213.

²⁸⁹⁷ See Adjudicated Fact 823; Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7610–7611, 7615, 7618–7619, 8217–8218.

²⁸⁹⁸ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1211. See also D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 13.

²⁸⁹⁹ See Adjudicated Fact 823; Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7610–7611, 7615, 7618–7619, 8217–8218.

²⁹⁰⁰ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1213; D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 11; Mitar Rašević, T. 46774–46775 (11 February 2014); D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 48; D2729 (Letter from RS Ministry of Justice and Administration re Krnojelac's employment status, 3 June 1994). See also Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7600, 7638–7639, 7710–7711, 7768, 7775–7777 (testifying that he only received formal appointment to this role from the Ministry of Justice in July or August 1992). See P1141 (Decision of Ministry of Justice of SerBiH appointing Milorad Krnojelac, 17 July 1992). The Chamber notes Krnojelac's testimony that he was appointed to this post by the president of the Executive Board of the municipal assembly of Foča and denied knowledge that the Foča Crisis Staff appointed him to the post of warden of the facility or that he had the Foča Crisis Staff phone number. However, the Chamber does not consider his evidence to be reliable given that he was directly contradicted during his prior cross-examination which showed that he did have the Foča Crisis Staff number. Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7604, 7781, 7784, 7844–7845. See also P3349 (List of persons working at Srebrenica Penal and Correctional Facility between April 1992 and October 1994), p. 1, where Milorad Krnojelac is listed as a temporary acting warden from 18 April 1992 to 17 July 1992.

²⁹⁰¹ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2900–2901, 2905.

²⁹⁰² KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2911–2912, 2927; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1280; D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), paras. 11, 15; Milorad Krnojelac, D2715 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7691 (under seal). Todović was appointed acting deputy warden of KP Dom on

away from the facility without prior authorisation by Todović²⁹⁰³ or Krnojelac.²⁹⁰⁴ Mitar Rašević was the commander of the guards at the facility.²⁹⁰⁵ The guards included the former guards of KP Dom and wore military uniforms, the old KP Dom uniform, while others wore standard police, military, camouflage and multicoloured uniforms.²⁹⁰⁶ **(This had to be that way, because beside the prisoners of war there were prisoners from civilian sector, convicted far before the war started. #For them the JNA – VRS weren't responsible, but only for the newly captured in combats!#)** During the first few weeks of detention, military units were responsible at KP Dom.²⁹⁰⁷ Members of the military would enter the KP Dom, although they needed the prior permission of the military authorities.²⁹⁰⁸ **(As commented above! And this is an additional evidence that they had been prisoners of war, outhewise the civilian police would be in charge concerning them!)** Towards the end of April 1992, pursuant to an order of the Executive Board of the Serb Municipality of Foča, approximately 40 people who had worked as policemen were assigned by the Foča Crisis Staff to work at the KP Dom.²⁹⁰⁹ The Foča Crisis Staff also appointed authorised persons for the purposes of interrogations at the facility.²⁹¹⁰ **(Those interrogations aimed to find out whether the suspected inmates committed crimes in the civic terms, or were regular combatants. Their religion didn't have anytning to do with it, because all of them knew each other, and it was known that they were Muslims!)**

886. In May 1992, the Command of the Foča Tactical Group requested the allocation of rooms within the KP Dom for “accommodation of prisoners of war”.²⁹¹¹ **(Look at that!!! What the Defence was claiming all the time? There were a three sorts of prisoners: the convicts sentenced before the war, prisoners of war with criminal record and regular prisoners of war, aimed for exchange of POW-s)** This request was approved by Krnojelac.²⁹¹² In August 1992, the Bosnian Serb Government established commissions for the inspection of “collection centres and other facilities for prisoners”.²⁹¹³ **(Commented in footnote 2897. This commission had been formed and tasked after an order of the**

16 December 1992 by a ruling signed by Momčilo Mandić. P3343 (Ruling of RS Ministry of Justice and Administration, 16 December 1992), p. 1; KDZ239, T. 18916 (15 September 2011)

D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 15.

See Adjudicated Fact 840. The Chamber does not accept Krnojelac's evidence on this point which sought to minimise his involvement in the facility and which sought to distance himself from anything to do with detainees and his claims that he raised concerns about the detainees. Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7605–7606, 7614, 7618, 7623–7626, 7639, 7654, 7855. The Chamber finds that his testimony is contradicted by other evidence received including Krnojelac's own reports regarding the use of the facility for the accommodation of Bosnian Muslim detainees and the request for personnel and funds. D2732 (Report of KP Dom Foča, 6 May 1993); P5545 (Report of Foča Penal and Correctional Facility, 11 July 1992).

KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2915; Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 8070; Milorad Krnojelac, D2715 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7691 (under seal); D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 1; Mitar Rašević, T. 46752–46754 (11 February 2014); D4308 (Excerpt of rules governing the internal organisation of KP Dom Foča, August 1992). See also KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1280–1281.

KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1281; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2916; D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 13. See also Adjudicated Fact 835; P3349 (List of persons working at Srbinje Penal and Correctional Facility between April 1992 and October 1994); D2730 (Decision of SerBiH Presidency published in Official Gazette, 12 May 1992), pp. 1–2.

See Adjudicated Facts 834, 833.

Adjudicated Fact 840.

KDZ239, T. 18910–18914 (15 September 2011); P3340 (Decision of Foča Executive Board, 26 April 1992); Radojica Mladenović, T. 36661 (5 April 2013).

P6268 (Request of KP Dom Foča to Foča Crisis Staff, 20 May 1992); Radojica Mladenović, T. 36661–36662 (5 April 2013); P3349 (List of persons working at Srbinje Penal and Correctional Facility between April 1992 and October 1994).

P3341 (Request by Foča's Tactical Group, 8 May 1992).

P3342 (Decision of KP Dom Foča Temporary Warden, May 1992); Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 8168–8169 (testifying that this decision was based on the approval of Mladenović).

D466 (Decision of Government of SerBiH on establishment of Commission for Inspection of Collection Centres and other facilities for prisoners, 9 August 1992), p. 2.

President, and that was #EXCULPATORY!!! These commissions were instructed to look into the status of people held at these facilities in accordance with international conventions, to speed up the processing of these individuals, and to report on their inspection.²⁹¹⁴ Avlijaš was a member of a commission which visited Foča and was informed by the commander of the Foča Tactical Group that the “prisoners of war in the facility” were his business and it was a military matter for him to handle.²⁹¹⁵ **(#Before the VRS# This is a definite evidence that the POW-s in Foca were under the jurisdiction of the JNA, which was followed by the VRS after May 20. All the newly captured and detained were considered as a prisoners of war, while old convicts were in jurisdiction of the police and Ministry of Justice, as it is in any country!)** In November 1992, Krnojelac reported to the Ministry of Justice that the KP Dom was used for the accommodation of Bosnian Muslim “prisoners of war” and requested a resolution about the legal status of the KP Dom.²⁹¹⁶ **(Another proof! #EXCULPATORY!!! Why the President from his position would interfere in the regular activities of Ministry of Justice, since it was carrying out it’s duties?)**

887. Some detainees were released after interrogation on the condition that they report daily to the police or were released for the purposes of exchange.²⁹¹⁷ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! This is another evidence that once the interrogations indicated insufficient evidence for a criminal conduct, the people had been released, or exchanged, regardless they still were of the Muslim fate.#Combatants or civilians#)** Groups of detainees were transferred from the KP Dom to other camps in BiH, including the Kula camp before eventually being exchanged.²⁹¹⁸ **#EXCULPATORY!!!** On at least one occasion, detainees were taken across a national border (to Montenegro) in these exchanges.²⁹¹⁹

888. At its peak in the summer of 1992, there were about 500 to 600 detainees at the KP Dom.²⁹²⁰ This number decreased from the autumn of 1992 until 1993 when about 200

²⁹¹⁴ D466 (Decision of Government of SerBiH on establishment of Commission for Inspection of Collection Centres and other facilities for prisoners, 9 August 1992), pp. 2–3.

²⁹¹⁵ D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), paras. 33–35.

²⁹¹⁶ D2722 (Report of KP Dom Foča to RS Ministry of Justice, undated), pp. 16–17.

²⁹¹⁷ D3318 (Foča Crisis Staff certificate of release, 26 April 1992); D4779 (List of POWs released from KP Dom, 12 July 1993); P3345 (List of people to be released from KP Dom Foča, 7 May 1992); KDZ239, T. 18918 (15 September 2011); P5540 (Discharge Letter of Foča Crisis Staff re the release of Dževad Dedović, 7 May 1992); D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 60; D1689 (List of men to be released from KP Dom Foča on 21 October 1992); P6206 (Order of Foča Tactical Group, 4 July 1993). See also KDZ379, P3332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 3152, 3175–3176; Radojica Mladenović, T. 36668–36669 (5 April 2013); Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7928–7932. Avlijaš testified that one of these exchanges was done independently of the central authorities which did not have knowledge of events in Foča until December 1992. D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 60. However, the witness when cross-examined acknowledged that he was not in a position to know what kind of information was being reported by representatives of Foča to the Bosnian Serb leadership. Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35150–35151 (11 March 2013); P6194 (SerBiH Government request to Foča Crisis Staff, 23 May 1992). In light of this qualification the Chamber does not rely on Avlijaš’s assessment in this regard.

²⁹¹⁸ Soniboj Škiljević, T. 36925 (10 April 2013), T. 36926–36927, 36929–36930 (10 April 2013) (private session); see Adjudicated Fact 876; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1204, 1283; P3348 (ICRC Certificate re KDZ239, 1 July 1994) (under seal); P3350 (Certificate of BiH’s State Commission for the Exchange of POWs, 11 November 1994) (under seal); KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2917–2918.

²⁹¹⁹ See Adjudicated Fact 901. In August, a group of approximately 55 detainees were taken for exchange to Montenegro, but the bus was intercepted by a Bosnian Serb soldier who separated 20 younger men and took them away and the remaining 35 men were exchanged in Montenegro. The 20 younger men were not seen again.

²⁹²⁰ Adjudicated Fact 824; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1218, 1225; KDZ239, T. 18935, (15 September 2011), T. 18946, 18973 (16 September 2011) (private session) (testifying that the number of detainees at KP Dom was the largest at the end of May and beginning of June 1992 and he estimated that there were between 600 and 650 detainees). KDZ017 counted a total of 570 detainees at KP Dom and during his detention this figure reached 752 and in his estimation more than 1,000 men were detained at some point in time at the facility. KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2893–2895, 2916; KDZ017, T. 19899–19900 (4 October 2011). See also P5545 (Report of Foča Penal and Correctional Facility, 11 July 1992), p. 3.

to 300 detainees remained.²⁹²¹ The last detainees were only released from the facility in October 1994.²⁹²² However, given that the Indictment only alleges detention until at least 31 December 1992 at KP Dom, the Chamber will not make findings with respect to detention after this date. **(#Legal# The convicts from the civilian judiciary couldn't be released or exchanged before expiring certain part of the time of penalty!)**

b. Conditions of detention

889. The detainees were forced to endure inadequate living conditions while being detained at the KP Dom, as a result of which numerous individuals have suffered lasting physical and psychological problems.²⁹²³ **(#General shortage# of everything! Adjudicated fact! The Serb part of country was under the strictest sanctions, poor and without economy. The Chamber didn't establish that the conditions were deteriorated deliberately, for the purpose of harassing the detainees! The P6660 contains data that the moral of the troops deteriorated, see p. 3**

Moral is still dropping over failure to solve issues of desertion, back salaries, exhaustion, rotation of manpower, and similar.

Defence witness Rašević referring to KP Dom expressed regret for the “fate that befell all of these people” and acknowledged that “evil [...] was done to these people”.²⁹²⁴ Detainees were locked in their rooms except for meals and work duty.²⁹²⁵ The detainees were deliberately housed in cramped conditions. Even though the KP Dom had the capacity to house more than the maximum number of non-Serbs detained at the facility, the detainees were crowded into a small number of rooms.²⁹²⁶ **(#Deadly combination#! Adjudicated fact. The Defence witness Rasevic was discredited because he didn't know everything, but it was established tha he wasn't at the facility from the first day, and finally, he could have known everything about the military part of prison! None of the Defence witnesses was taken seriously, mainly on no basis. For instance, Rasevic was processed and didn't have any reason to be evasive or defensive, as stated in this fn.!) Solitary**

confinement cells designed to hold one person were packed with up to 18 people at a time, making it impossible for the detainees to move around the cell, or to sleep lying down.²⁹²⁷ Because of the overcrowding, not everyone had a bed or even a mattress, and there were insufficient blankets.²⁹²⁸ Bedding was insufficient or non-existent.²⁹²⁹ The only bed linen

²⁹²¹ See Adjudicated Fact 824.

²⁹²² KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2893–2894, 2916. See also Adjudicated Fact 824; D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 39.

²⁹²³ See Adjudicated Fact 841; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2806, 2918–2919, 2931–2932.

²⁹²⁴ P6655 (Excerpt of Mitar Rašević's interview with OTP), p. 5; Mitar Rašević, T. 46768–46769 (11 February 2014).

²⁹²⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 844.

²⁹²⁶ See Adjudicated Facts 842, 844. Defence witnesses testified that overcrowding was only an issue during the first month after which almost every detainee had their own bed. D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 17. The Chamber does not find Rašević's evidence in this regard to be credible. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that the witness was evasive and contradicted by reference to his prior testimony. The witness was also very defensive about the conduct of his guards and the Chamber found his lack of knowledge about mistreatment at the facility to be incredible, especially since, as noted in para. 889, he acknowledged that “evil” was done to the detainees.

²⁹²⁷ Adjudicated Fact 843. Rašević also testified that the solitary confinement cells were small but contained a bed, toilet and sink and it was not possible for 18 people to be placed in these rooms and detainees were only placed in solitary confinement for misdemeanours. D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), paras. 8, 21–22. The Chamber does not find Rašević's evidence in this regard to be credible. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its earlier assessment in fn. 2926 regarding the credibility of Rašević's evidence.

²⁹²⁸ Adjudicated Fact 844; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1212–1213; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2805, 2813. Krnojelac testified that there was sufficient bedding and blankets and that he gave instructions for their use by detainees. Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7669–7670. The Chamber does not find Krnojelac's evidence to be reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that in his prior testimony in his own case, Krnojelac's evidence was marked by evasiveness, contradictions, and attempts to minimise his own involvement.

provided was that left-over from former convicts, and these items were never washed or changed throughout 1992.²⁹³⁰ **(#Deadly combination#! Almost all and every finding in this paragraph is based on the Adjudicated facts, with undermining the Defence witnesses!)**

890. Hygienic conditions were deplorable and washing facilities minimal.²⁹³¹ Detainees only occasionally were given soap to wash their clothes in cold water.²⁹³² Access to baths or showers, with no hot water, was irregular at best.²⁹³³ There were insufficient hygienic products and toiletries.²⁹³⁴ Due to the poor hygienic conditions and since the detainees did not have an opportunity to bathe or change clothes there was a major problem with lice.²⁹³⁵

891. Non-Serb detainees were held in rooms with insufficient heating during the harsh winter of 1992, no heaters were placed in the rooms, windowpanes were left broken and clothes made from blankets to combat the cold were confiscated.²⁹³⁶ Stoves and furnaces had been produced to heat the offices in the administration building, and there was sufficient raw material for such furnaces to have been provided for the non-Serb detainees.²⁹³⁷ **(#Deadly combination#! All Adjudicated facts#!)**

892. Any attempts made by non-Serb detainees to improve their living conditions in the camp were punished with solitary confinement.²⁹³⁸ Acts which resulted in beatings or periods in the isolation cells included efforts to get additional food or access to warm water, and attempts to communicate with each other, the guards, or the outside world.²⁹³⁹

²⁹²⁹ Adjudicated Fact 846; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1212–1213.

²⁹³⁰ Adjudicated Fact 846.

²⁹³¹ Adjudicated Fact 845.

²⁹³² KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2979.

²⁹³³ Adjudicated Fact 845. Defence witnesses testified that water problems were fixed and measures were taken to allow for the heating of water to allow detainees to bathe. D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 17; Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7668–7669. The Chamber does not consider this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber notes the equivocal nature of these requests and the unreliability of evidence given by Krnojelac considering his interest in minimising his own responsibility for the conditions of detention at the facility as he claimed to have not actually entered the premises where people were detained. The Chamber also refers to its earlier assessment in fn. 2926 regarding the credibility of Rašević's evidence. **(Who could defend against this #deadly combination# of Adjudicated facts and discrediting of the Defence witnesses?!? Nobody! And in particular, the Chamber erred in finding that the witnesses their "interest in minimizing ... responsibility". Why the witnesses that had been finally convicted and were under any new treath would lie?)**

²⁹³⁴ Adjudicated Fact 845. The Chamber finds that hygienic conditions did improve to some extent by 1993 but the allegations with respect to KP Dom are limited to the end of 1992. KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2979.

²⁹³⁵ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1227–1228. See also Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7676; Adjudicated Fact 847.

²⁹³⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 848; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1212–1213, 1226. See also Adjudicated Fact 850. The Chamber also received evidence that furnaces were only provided to non-Serb detainees by the ICRC in October 1993. Adjudicated Fact 849. However, given that this falls outside the period of alleged detention at KP Dom, the Chamber does not consider this to be of significance. For other evidence on the improvements of conditions after Krnojelac left the facility in 1993, see KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2910–2911, 2947. See also D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 23.

²⁹³⁷ Adjudicated Fact 849. See also Adjudicated Fact 850. Mitar Rašević testified that the first winter was the worst, the heating did not work, there were not enough furnaces, and they were unable to supply firewood because of the war. D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 19. The Chamber does not find Rašević's evidence in this regard to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its earlier assessment in fn. 2926 regarding the credibility of Rašević's evidence.

²⁹³⁸ Adjudicated Fact 865.

²⁹³⁹ Adjudicated Fact 866; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2805, 2810–2813, 2815–2816, 2979.

893. The effect of the cold on the detainees was exacerbated by the fact that while they received two meals a day, the food was poor.²⁹⁴⁰ A large number of the Bosnian Muslim detainees experienced severe weight loss and saw their medical condition deteriorate.²⁹⁴¹ While non-Serb detainees were fed starvation rations leading to severe weight loss and other health problems,²⁹⁴² Bosnian Serb detainees received army rations with extra meat and vegetables and did not suffer the extreme weight loss of non-Serb detainees.²⁹⁴³ **All Adjudicated facts, or 92bis, or both! Why this process was pursued, since everything had been prejudiced?!**

894. Apart from a short period at the beginning of their detention at the KP Dom, Bosnian Muslim detainees were denied any contact with the outside world or with their families, and (for a long time) with the ICRC.²⁹⁴⁴ **All Adjudicated facts!** By April 1992, detainees were not allowed to receive visits and therefore could not supplement their meagre food rations and hygienic supplies.²⁹⁴⁵ **(Doesn't concern this Accused, nor the VRS, which didn't exist yet!)** From mid-July 1992, the conditions of detention deteriorated even further.²⁹⁴⁶ On one occasion after Krnojelac's son was wounded in June or July 1992, **(Wounded??? Is there any doubt that this was a war zone with the permanent combats? However, the Chamber treats the events as if there was no a civil war!)** the guards and staff at KP Dom were angry and as a result the detainees received the bare minimum of food.²⁹⁴⁷ While there was a general shortage of food in Foča during the conflict, there was a deliberate policy to feed the non-Serb detainees barely enough for their survival while the Bosnian Serbs in the facility received normal meals.²⁹⁴⁸ **(Finally, the Chamber recognized that there was "a# general shortage of food"#, but given this fact, it had to be undoubtedly established that "there was a deliberate policy to feed the non-Serbs" less htan it could be! How that was established? It wasn't whatsoever!)** Left-over food from the Bosnian Serb detainees, if any, would occasionally be given to the

²⁹⁴⁰ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1226; KDZ239, T. 18968 (16 September 2011).

²⁹⁴¹ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1226, 1299, 1287, 1311–1312; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2805–2806 (testifying that he lost approximately 25 kilograms while in detention).

²⁹⁴² See Adjudicated Fact 851.

²⁹⁴³ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2952–2953; see Adjudicated Facts 852, 853. Defence evidence was adduced to suggest that (i) the military command provided for food for the detainees in general and there was no distinction made in the food prepared for Bosnian Muslim detainees; (ii) the Bosnian Serb authorities provided extra food and supplies when requested; and (iii) there were no complaints regarding lack of food. Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7629–7631, 7633–7634, 7651–7652, 7664–7665, 7903–7904, 8096–8101; D2720 (Request from KP Dom Foča to Foča Red Cross, 21 October 1992); D2721 (Request from KP Dom Foča to Foča garrison, 3 March 1993); D2726 (Report of KP Dom Foča to RS Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Justice, 15 November 1992); D2727 (Request from KP Dom Foča to RS Ministry of Economy, 7 December 1992); D2735 (Request from KP Dom Foča to Foča Executive Board, 19 February 1993); D2736 (Request from KP Dom Foča to Foča Executive Board, 30 March 1993); D4309 (Letter from KP Dom to Foča Red Cross, 21 October 1992); D4310 (Letter from Milorad Krnojelac to Foča Garrison Military Post, 3 March 1993); D4311 (Order of Foča Tactical Group, date illegible); D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 48; D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 20; Mitar Rašević, T. 46757–46761, 46794–46795 (11 February 2014). While the Chamber accepts that some requests for supplies were made, this does not cast doubt about the credible evidence received as to the discrimination between the food received by Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb detainees. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber notes the equivocal nature of these requests and the unreliability of evidence given by Krnojelac considering his interest in minimising his own responsibility for the conditions of detention at the facility. The Chamber also notes that Rašević's evidence was highly qualified and he admitted that he did not know whether some people received more or less food when distributed. Mitar Rašević, T. 46794–46795 (11 February 2014).

²⁹⁴⁴ See Adjudicated Fact 827. Milorad Krnojelac testified that Bosnian Muslim detainees had visitors, that visitors were only prohibited for a few days when there was lice outbreak, and that it was the military command which authorised these visits. Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7676, 8109. However, the Chamber does not consider Krnojelac evidence to be reliable in this regard given his interest in minimising his own responsibility for the conditions of detention at the facility.

²⁹⁴⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 851. See also Mitar Rašević, T. 46810 (11 February 2014).

²⁹⁴⁶ KDZ239, T. 18916 (15 September 2011).

²⁹⁴⁷ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1270.

²⁹⁴⁸ See Adjudicated Fact 852; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2799–2801, 2944–2945; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1229.

non-Serb detainees.²⁹⁴⁹ **(In addition to their part of food. If there was a “deliberate policy”, that wouldn’t happen!)**

895. While the KP Dom had its own medical clinic and detainees had access to a physician,²⁹⁵⁰ medical care was inadequate and medicine was in very short supply.²⁹⁵¹ **(Because of a #general shortage of everything#, the international humanitarian organisations neglected the Serb areas and their needs, and if there was no a generous and unconditioned help from Japan, many Serb hospitals would be closed!)** A basic medical service was provided but those in need of urgent medical attention were left unattended or given insufficient treatment.²⁹⁵² At least one detainee died as a result of poor medical care.²⁹⁵³ **(#Deadly combination#! Again, an Adjudicated fact, together with undermining the Defence witnesses)** Detainees who were kept in isolation cells and solitary confinement were denied all access to medical care.²⁹⁵⁴ Non-Serb detainees who arrived at the KP Dom with injuries sustained prior to or in the course of their arrest were not given access to medical treatment, nor were non-Serb detainees who were severely beaten during interrogations at the KP Dom.²⁹⁵⁵ KDZ017 asked for medical treatment but was not taken to the clinic until he met with Rašević.²⁹⁵⁶ The Chamber finds that while detainees had access to some basic medical treatment not all detainees were treated. Further, the treatment in many cases was inadequate.

896. The shortage of food, basic hygienic conditions, and medicine in KP Dom had a significant impact on detainees who were sick.²⁹⁵⁷ The condition of the sick detainees, including those who had heart conditions, deteriorated while they were detained at KP Dom.²⁹⁵⁸ Poor living conditions and lack of medication also contributed to detainees suffering multiple bouts of pneumonia.²⁹⁵⁹ The authorities in the facility received complaints from detainees regarding the food, the poor living and hygienic conditions, and

²⁹⁴⁹ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1229.

²⁹⁵⁰ KDZ239, T. 18968 (16 September 2011); KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2949. See also Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7665–7666.

²⁹⁵¹ Adjudicated Fact 854; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2949–2950. Krnojelac testified that (i) the medical facilities at KP Dom were adequate and detainees had regular access to doctors and nurses; (ii) there was no distinction between the treatment of Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim detainees; and (iii) detainees were taken to hospital if necessary. Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7665–7668, 8116. The Chamber does not find Krnojelac’s evidence to be reliable given that he disclaimed knowledge of most matters related to detainees and then claimed that he knew about the provision of medical care. Krnojelac’s evidence in his own case also demonstrated a clear interest in minimising his involvement and downplaying the poor conditions of detention at the facility.

²⁹⁵² See Adjudicated Fact 854. See also KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1219, 1231, 1266.

²⁹⁵³ See Adjudicated Fact 854; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2789–2792; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1230. KD017 and KDZ239 testified about the death of Ešad Hadžić who died from internal bleeding after his medication finished and that threats were made by the guards who were asked to help. Veljko Marić testified that he did not believe any detainee died at the KP Dom because of lack of medical treatment but acknowledged that he did not know what was happening at the facility as he did not have occasion to see it. D3128 (Witness statement of Veljko Marić dated 16 March 2013), paras. 17–20; Veljko Marić, T. 35599–35601 (19 March 2013). In light of Marić’s qualification that he did not always know what was happening at the facility, the Chamber does not consider that it can rely on his evidence in this regard.

²⁹⁵⁴ Adjudicated Fact 855.

²⁹⁵⁵ Adjudicated Fact 856.

²⁹⁵⁶ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2817.

²⁹⁵⁷ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2797–2798. The detainees identified included Hamdija Mandzo and Ismet Pasović.

²⁹⁵⁸ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1220–1221.

²⁹⁵⁹ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2805–2806.

the deficient provision of medical care but claimed that nothing could be done due to the war conditions.²⁹⁶⁰

897. In July 1992, to prevent detainees from escaping, the inner compound of KP Dom was mined by a group of soldiers under the orders of Foča Crisis Staff member Milun Milanović who was accompanied by Krnojelac.²⁹⁶¹

898. Whenever the ICRC arrived at KP Dom, a group of detainees, which included prominent men from Foča, was taken away and hidden in a cellar until the ICRC left.²⁹⁶² In October 1992, the ICRC demanded that it be allowed to have private conversations and examine prisoners at KP Dom without the presence of official organs from the facility, but this request was rejected until they were able to do the same for Serb prisoners in Goražde.²⁹⁶³ Conditions in the facility would improve for a day or so after the ICRC visited.²⁹⁶⁴ When a film crew accompanied by Rašević visited, the detainees were given meals which were “a bit more plentiful” and when another film crew visited, the detainees were ordered to clean all the premises in the facility in the days leading up to the visit.²⁹⁶⁵

c. Mistreatment of detainees

899. The detainees were forced to endure inadequate living conditions while being detained at the KP Dom, as a result of which numerous individuals have suffered lasting physical and psychological problems.²⁹⁶⁶ **(Adjudicated fact! The Serb part of country was under the strictest sanctions, poor and without economy. The Chamber didn't establish that the conditions were deteriorated deliberately, for the purpose of harassing the detainees! The P6660 contains data that the moral of the troops deteriorated, see p. 3)**

Moral is still dropping over failure to solve issues of desertion, back salaries, exhaustion, rotation of manpower, and similar.

Defence witness Rašević referring to KP Dom expressed regret for the “fate that befell all of these people” and acknowledged that “evil [...] was done to these people”.²⁹⁶⁷ Detainees were locked in their rooms except for meals and work duty.²⁹⁶⁸ The detainees were deliberately housed in cramped conditions. Even though the KP Dom had the capacity to house more than the maximum number of non-Serbs detained at the facility, the detainees

²⁹⁶⁰ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1275, 1277, 1280; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2915.

²⁹⁶¹ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2910, 2941. See also Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 8183–8184, 8186–8188. Krnojelac testified that the reason the mines were laid was to protect property and not to prevent detainees from escaping and that the order was simply given to him by Todović to sign. The Chamber notes contradictions in Krnojelac's evidence as to the reason why the mines were laid and who was responsible. The Chamber does not find his evidence in this regard to be credible.

²⁹⁶² KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2897; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1267–1268; KDZ239, T. 18992(16 September 2011). Mitar Rašević denied knowledge that detainees were hidden during ICRC visits. Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7707–7708; Mitar Rašević, T. 46801–46802 (11 February 2014). However, the Chamber notes that when confronted with his prior statement Rašević acknowledged that detainees were taken away by the army before the ICRC visits but claimed the staff at the KP Dom were not involved. In light of this contradiction, the Chamber finds Rašević's evidence on this issue to be unreliable. Similarly the Chamber noted that Krnojelac attempted to distance himself from all knowledge of mistreatment of detainees or conditions of detention.

²⁹⁶³ P6080 (Report of Foča Military Post, 10 October 1992), pp. 1–2.

²⁹⁶⁴ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2948.

²⁹⁶⁵ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2804.

²⁹⁶⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 841; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2806, 2918–2919, 2931–2932.

²⁹⁶⁷ P6655 (Excerpt of Mitar Rašević's interview with OTP), p. 5; Mitar Rašević, T. 46768–46769 (11 February 2014).

²⁹⁶⁸ See Adjudicated Fact 844.

were crowded into a small number of rooms.²⁹⁶⁹ **(Adjudicated fact. The Defence witness Rasevic was discredited because he didn't know everything, but it was established that he wasn't at the facility from the first day, and finally, he couldn't have known everything about the military part of prison! None of the Defence witnesses was taken seriously, mainly on no basis. For instance, Rasevic was processed and didn't have any reason to be evasive or defensive, as stated in this fn.!) Solitary confinement cells designed to hold one person were packed with up to 18 people at a time, making it impossible for the detainees to move around the cell, or to sleep lying down.²⁹⁷⁰ Because of the overcrowding, not everyone had a bed or even a mattress, and there were insufficient blankets.²⁹⁷¹ Bedding was insufficient or non-existent.²⁹⁷² The only bed linen provided was that left-over from former convicts, and these items were never washed or changed throughout 1992.²⁹⁷³ **(Almost all and every finding in this paragraph is based on the Adjudicated facts, with undermining the Defence witnesses!)****

900. Hygienic conditions were deplorable and washing facilities minimal.²⁹⁷⁴ Detainees only occasionally were given soap to wash their clothes in cold water.²⁹⁷⁵ Access to baths or showers, with no hot water, was irregular at best.²⁹⁷⁶ There were insufficient hygienic products and toiletries.²⁹⁷⁷ Due to the poor hygienic conditions and since the detainees did not have an opportunity to bathe or change clothes there was a major problem with lice.²⁹⁷⁸

901. Non-Serb detainees were held in rooms with insufficient heating during the harsh winter of 1992, no heaters were placed in the rooms, windowpanes were left broken and

²⁹⁶⁹ See Adjudicated Facts 842, 844. Defence witnesses testified that overcrowding was only an issue during the first month after which almost every detainee had their own bed. D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 17. The Chamber does not find Rašević's evidence in this regard to be credible. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that the witness was evasive and contradicted by reference to his prior testimony. The witness was also very defensive about the conduct of his guards and the Chamber found his lack of knowledge about mistreatment at the facility to be incredible, especially since, as noted in para. 889, he acknowledged that "evil" was done to the detainees.

²⁹⁷⁰ Adjudicated Fact 843. Rašević also testified that the solitary confinement cells were small but contained a bed, toilet and sink and it was not possible for 18 people to be placed in these rooms and detainees were only placed in solitary confinement for misdemeanours. D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), paras. 8, 21–22. The Chamber does not find Rašević's evidence in this regard to be credible. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its earlier assessment in fn. 2926 regarding the credibility of Rašević's evidence.

²⁹⁷¹ Adjudicated Fact 844; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1212–1213; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2805, 2813. Krnojelac testified that there was sufficient bedding and blankets and that he gave instructions for their use by detainees. Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7669–7670. The Chamber does not find Krnojelac's evidence to be reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that in his prior testimony in his own case, Krnojelac's evidence was marked by evasiveness, contradictions, and attempts to minimise his own involvement.

²⁹⁷² Adjudicated Fact 846; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1212–1213.

²⁹⁷³ Adjudicated Fact 846.

²⁹⁷⁴ Adjudicated Fact 845.

²⁹⁷⁵ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2979.

²⁹⁷⁶ Adjudicated Fact 845. Defence witnesses testified that water problems were fixed and measures were taken to allow for the heating of water to allow detainees to bathe. D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 17; Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7668–7669. The Chamber does not consider this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber notes the equivocal nature of these requests and the unreliability of evidence given by Krnojelac considering his interest in minimising his own responsibility for the conditions of detention at the facility as he claimed to have not actually entered the premises where people were detained. The Chamber also refers to its earlier assessment in fn. 2926 regarding the credibility of Rašević's evidence. **(Who could defend against this #deadly combination# of Adjudicated facts and discrediting of the Defence witnesses?!? Nobody! And in particular, the Chamber erred in finding that the witnesses their "interest in minimizing ... responsibility". Why the witnesses that had been finally convicted and were under any new treath would lie?)**

²⁹⁷⁷ Adjudicated Fact 845. The Chamber finds that hygienic conditions did improve to some extent by 1993 but the allegations with respect to KP Dom are limited to the end of 1992. KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2979.

²⁹⁷⁸ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1227–1228. See also Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7676; Adjudicated Fact 847.

clothes made from blankets to combat the cold were confiscated.²⁹⁷⁹ Stoves and furnaces had been produced to heat the offices in the administration building, and there was sufficient raw material for such furnaces to have been provided for the non-Serb detainees.²⁹⁸⁰ **All Adjudicated facts!**

902. Any attempts made by non-Serb detainees to improve their living conditions in the camp were punished with solitary confinement.²⁹⁸¹ Acts which resulted in beatings or periods in the isolation cells included efforts to get additional food or access to warm water, and attempts to communicate with each other, the guards, or the outside world.²⁹⁸²

903. The effect of the cold on the detainees was exacerbated by the fact that while they received two meals a day, the food was poor.²⁹⁸³ A large number of the Bosnian Muslim detainees experienced severe weight loss and saw their medical condition deteriorate.²⁹⁸⁴ While non-Serb detainees were fed starvation rations leading to severe weight loss and other health problems,²⁹⁸⁵ Bosnian Serb detainees received army rations with extra meat and vegetables and did not suffer the extreme weight loss of non-Serb detainees.²⁹⁸⁶

(#Deadly combination#! All Adjudicated facts, or 92bis, or both! Why this process was pursued, since everything had been prejudiced?!

904. Apart from a short period at the beginning of their detention at the KP Dom, Bosnian Muslim detainees were denied any contact with the outside world or with their families, and (for a long time) with the ICRC.²⁹⁸⁷ **All Adjudicated facts!** By April 1992,

²⁹⁷⁹ See Adjudicated Fact 848; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1212–1213, 1226. See also Adjudicated Fact 850. The Chamber also received evidence that furnaces were only provided to non-Serb detainees by the ICRC in October 1993. Adjudicated Fact 849. However, given that this falls outside the period of alleged detention at KP Dom, the Chamber does not consider this to be of significance. For other evidence on the improvements of conditions after Krnojelac left the facility in 1993, see KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2910–2911, 2947. See also D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 23.

²⁹⁸⁰ Adjudicated Fact 849. See also Adjudicated Fact 850. Mitar Rašević testified that the first winter was the worst, the heating did not work, there were not enough furnaces, and they were unable to supply firewood because of the war. D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 19. The Chamber does not find Rašević's evidence in this regard to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its earlier assessment in fn. 2926 regarding the credibility of Rašević's evidence.

²⁹⁸¹ Adjudicated Fact 865.

²⁹⁸² Adjudicated Fact 866; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2805, 2810–2813, 2815–2816, 2979.

²⁹⁸³ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1226; KDZ239, T. 18968 (16 September 2011).

²⁹⁸⁴ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1226, 1299, 1287, 1311–1312; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2805–2806 (testifying that he lost approximately 25 kilograms while in detention).

²⁹⁸⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 851.

²⁹⁸⁶ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2952–2953; see Adjudicated Facts 852, 853. Defence evidence was adduced to suggest that (i) the military command provided for food for the detainees in general and there was no distinction made in the food prepared for Bosnian Muslim detainees; (ii) the Bosnian Serb authorities provided extra food and supplies when requested; and (iii) there were no complaints regarding lack of food. Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7629–7631, 7633–7634, 7651–7652, 7664–7665, 7903–7904, 8096–8101; D2720 (Request from KP Dom Foča to Foča Red Cross, 21 October 1992); D2721 (Request from KP Dom Foča to Foča garrison, 3 March 1993); D2726 (Report of KP Dom Foča to RS Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Justice, 15 November 1992); D2727 (Request from KP Dom Foča to RS Ministry of Economy, 7 December 1992); D2735 (Request from KP Dom Foča to Foča Executive Board, 19 February 1993); D2736 (Request from KP Dom Foča to Foča Executive Board, 30 March 1993); D4309 (Letter from KP Dom to Foča Red Cross, 21 October 1992); D4310 (Letter from Milorad Krnojelac to Foča Garrison Military Post, 3 March 1993); D4311 (Order of Foča Tactical Group, date illegible); D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 48; D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 20; Mitar Rašević, T. 46757–46761, 46794–46795 (11 February 2014). While the Chamber accepts that some requests for supplies were made, this does not cast doubt about the credible evidence received as to the discrimination between the food received by Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb detainees. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber notes the equivocal nature of these requests and the unreliability of evidence given by Krnojelac considering his interest in minimising his own responsibility for the conditions of detention at the facility. The Chamber also notes that Rašević's evidence was highly qualified and he admitted that he did not know whether some people received more or less food when distributed. Mitar Rašević, T. 46794–46795 (11 February 2014).

²⁹⁸⁷ See Adjudicated Fact 827. Milorad Krnojelac testified that Bosnian Muslim detainees had visitors, that visitors were only prohibited for a few days when there was lice outbreak, and that it was the military command which authorised these visits. Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7676, 8109. However, the Chamber does not consider Krnojelac evidence to be reliable in this regard given his interest in minimising his own responsibility for the conditions of detention at the facility.

detainees were not allowed to receive visits and therefore could not supplement their meagre food rations and hygienic supplies.²⁹⁸⁸ **(Doesn't concern this Accused, nor the VRS, which didn't exist yet!#Before the VRS#)** From mid-July 1992, the conditions of detention deteriorated even further.²⁹⁸⁹ On one occasion after Krnojelac's son was wounded in June or July 1992, **(Wounded??? Is there any doubt that this was a war zone with the permanent combats? However, the Chamber treats the events as if there was no a civil war!)** the guards and staff at KP Dom were angry and as a result the detainees received the bare minimum of food.²⁹⁹⁰ While there was a general shortage of food in Foča during the conflict, there was a deliberate policy to feed the non-Serb detainees barely enough for their survival while the Bosnian Serbs in the facility received normal meals.²⁹⁹¹ **(Finally, the Chamber recognized that there was #“a general shortage of food”#, but given this fact, it had to be undoubtedly established that “there was a deliberate policy to feed the non-Serbs” less than it could be! How that was established? It wasn't whatsoever!)** Left-over food from the Bosnian Serb detainees, if any, would occasionally be given to the non-Serb detainees.²⁹⁹² **(In addition to their part of food. If there was a “deliberate policy”, that wouldn't happen!)**

905. While the KP Dom had its own medical clinic and detainees had access to a physician,²⁹⁹³ medical care was inadequate and medicine was in very short supply.²⁹⁹⁴ **(Because of a #general shortage# of everything, the international humanitarian organisations neglected the Serb areas and their needs, and if there was no a generous and unconditioned help from Japan, many Serb hospitals would be closed!)** A basic medical service was provided but those in need of urgent medical attention were left unattended or given insufficient treatment.²⁹⁹⁵ At least one detainee died as a result of poor medical care.²⁹⁹⁶ **(#Deadly combination# Again, an Adjudicated fact, together with undermining the Defence witnesses!)** Detainees who were kept in isolation cells and solitary confinement were denied all access to medical care.²⁹⁹⁷ Non-Serb detainees who arrived at the KP Dom with injuries sustained prior to or in the course of their arrest were not given access to medical treatment, nor were non-Serb detainees who were severely beaten during interrogations at the KP Dom.²⁹⁹⁸ KDZ017 asked for medical treatment but

²⁹⁸⁸ See Adjudicated Fact 851. See also Mitar Rašević, T. 46810 (11 February 2014).

²⁹⁸⁹ KDZ239, T. 18916 (15 September 2011).

²⁹⁹⁰ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1270.

²⁹⁹¹ See Adjudicated Fact 852; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2799–2801, 2944–2945; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1229.

²⁹⁹² KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1229.

²⁹⁹³ KDZ239, T. 18968 (16 September 2011); KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2949. See also Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7665–7666.

²⁹⁹⁴ Adjudicated Fact 854; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2949–2950. Krnojelac testified that (i) the medical facilities at KP Dom were adequate and detainees had regular access to doctors and nurses; (ii) there was no distinction between the treatment of Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim detainees; and (iii) detainees were taken to hospital if necessary. Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7665–7668, 8116. The Chamber does not find Krnojelac's evidence to be reliable given that he disclaimed knowledge of most matters related to detainees and then claimed that he knew about the provision of medical care. Krnojelac's evidence in his own case also demonstrated a clear interest in minimising his involvement and downplaying the poor conditions of detention at the facility.

²⁹⁹⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 854. See also KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1219, 1231, 1266.

²⁹⁹⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 854; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2789–2792; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1230. KD017 and KDZ239 testified about the death of Ešad Hadžić who died from internal bleeding after his medication finished and that threats were made by the guards who were asked to help. Veljko Marić testified that he did not believe any detainee died at the KP Dom because of lack of medical treatment but acknowledged that he did not know what was happening at the facility as he did not have occasion to see it. D3128 (Witness statement of Veljko Marić dated 16 March 2013), paras. 17–20; Veljko Marić, T. 35599–35601 (19 March 2013). In light of Marić's qualification that he did not always know what was happening at the facility, the Chamber does not consider that it can rely on his evidence in this regard.

²⁹⁹⁷ Adjudicated Fact 855.

²⁹⁹⁸ Adjudicated Fact 856.

was not taken to the clinic until he met with Rašević.²⁹⁹⁹ The Chamber finds that while detainees had access to some basic medical treatment not all detainees were treated. Further, the treatment in many cases was inadequate.

906. The shortage of food, basic hygienic conditions, and medicine in KP Dom had a significant impact on detainees who were sick.³⁰⁰⁰ The condition of the sick detainees, including those who had heart conditions, deteriorated while they were detained at KP Dom.³⁰⁰¹ Poor living conditions and lack of medication also contributed to detainees suffering multiple bouts of pneumonia.³⁰⁰² The authorities in the facility received complaints from detainees regarding the food, the poor living and hygienic conditions, and the deficient provision of medical care but claimed that nothing could be done due to the war conditions.³⁰⁰³ **(#General shortage# of everything#!)**

907. In July 1992, to prevent detainees from escaping, the inner compound of KP Dom was mined by a group of soldiers under the orders of Foča Crisis Staff member Milun Milanović who was accompanied by Krnojelac.³⁰⁰⁴

908. Whenever the ICRC arrived at KP Dom, a group of detainees, which included prominent men from Foča, was taken away and hidden in a cellar until the ICRC left.³⁰⁰⁵ In October 1992, the ICRC demanded that it be allowed to have private conversations and examine prisoners at KP Dom without the presence of official organs from the facility, but this request was rejected until they were able to do the same for Serb prisoners in Goražde.³⁰⁰⁶ Conditions in the facility would improve for a day or so after the ICRC visited.³⁰⁰⁷ When a film crew accompanied by Rašević visited, the detainees were given meals which were “a bit more plentiful” and when another film crew visited, the detainees were ordered to clean all the premises in the facility in the days leading up to the visit.³⁰⁰⁸ **(Nobody would prevent them to do it every day!)**

d. Mistreatment of detainees

²⁹⁹⁹ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2817.

³⁰⁰⁰ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2797–2798. The detainees identified included Hamdija Mandzo and Ismet Pasović.

³⁰⁰¹ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1220–1221.

³⁰⁰² KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2805–2806.

³⁰⁰³ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1275, 1277, 1280; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2915.

³⁰⁰⁴ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2910, 2941. See also Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 8183–8184, 8186–8188. Krnojelac testified that the reason the mines were laid was to protect property and not to prevent detainees from escaping and that the order was simply given to him by Todović to sign. The Chamber notes contradictions in Krnojelac’s evidence as to the reason why the mines were laid and who was responsible. The Chamber does not find his evidence in this regard to be credible.

³⁰⁰⁵ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2897; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1267–1268; KDZ239, T. 18992(16 September 2011). Mitar Rašević denied knowledge that detainees were hidden during ICRC visits. Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7707–7708; Mitar Rašević, T. 46801–46802 (11 February 2014). However, the Chamber notes that when confronted with his prior statement Rašević acknowledged that detainees were taken away by the army before the ICRC visits but claimed the staff at the KP Dom were not involved. In light of this contradiction, the Chamber finds Rašević’s evidence on this issue to be unreliable. Similarly the Chamber noted that Krnojelac attempted to distance himself from all knowledge of mistreatment of detainees or conditions of detention.

³⁰⁰⁶ P6080 (Report of Foča Military Post, 10 October 1992), pp. 1–2.

³⁰⁰⁷ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2948.

³⁰⁰⁸ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2804.

909. On arrival, one group of detainees was met by a group of uniformed soldiers who cursed, kicked, and hit them with rifle butts.³⁰⁰⁹ On entry into the KP Dom the detainees were searched and had their identity cards, money, jewellery and watches seized.³⁰¹⁰ (#Legal and obligatory, as in UN DU, or any prison!#) Individuals or groups of armed soldiers were allowed into KP Dom during the first months of the detention of non-Serb civilians.³⁰¹¹ The guards were also involved in the beating of non-Serb detainees.³⁰¹² The MP was also allowed to enter the facility, remove detainees, and beat them.³⁰¹³

910. From April until July 1992, beatings took place on a frequent and systematic basis.³⁰¹⁴ The guards called out the names of detainees on a list and took them to other rooms or buildings where they were beaten.³⁰¹⁵ Detainees were also regularly interrogated by guards, soldiers or police officers and would often be beaten or mistreated during this process.³⁰¹⁶ For example, eight detainees from the Marinkovići area in Foča were beaten and ill-treated after their arrival at the facility.³⁰¹⁷ They were taken out three or four days after their arrival to give statements and when they returned, they could not stand as they had been badly beaten “on the orders of the investigators”.³⁰¹⁸ Detainees were punched, kicked, and beaten with batons.³⁰¹⁹ Some beatings lasted for several hours³⁰²⁰ and detainees

³⁰⁰⁹ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2783–2786.

³⁰¹⁰ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2786.

³⁰¹¹ Adjudicated Fact 859.

³⁰¹² Adjudicated Facts 857, 868, 877. KP Dom guards identified as involved in these beatings, included Dragomir Obrenovnić, Milenko Burilo, Zoran Matović, Vlatko Pljevaljčić, Predrag Stefanović, Jovo Savić, Radovan Vuković, Milovan Vuković, Milivoj Milić and Milenko Elčić. See Adjudicated Fact 858. Rašević testified he was not aware that these guards were involved in mistreating detainees and he was therefore not able to launch an investigation, all the more because there was no organised or systematic mistreatment. See also Mitar Rašević, T. 46766, 46788–46791, 46807 (11 February 2014); P6657 (Sketch of KP Dom marked by Mitar Rašević); D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), paras. 25–27, 30, 35. The Chamber does not find Rašević’s evidence in this regard to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its earlier assessment in fn. 2926 regarding the credibility of Rašević’s evidence. The Chamber also notes that on cross-examination Rašević acknowledged that he had no information about the conduct of others during interrogations and detainees may not have dared to report it and that there was some mistreatment by military police during interrogations but that he took measures to stop night time interrogations unless ordered by the army commander. Mitar Rašević, T. 46766–46767 (11 February 2014); D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 26; Mitar Rašević, T. 46792 (11 February 2014). Rašević himself testified that he intervened during the interrogation of a detainee after which the beating stopped and he saw that he was bleeding which is in conflict with his testimony that he never saw detainees being beaten. Mitar Rašević, T. 46796 (11 February 2014). In light of these contradictions and indicators of bias, the Chamber does not consider Rašević’s evidence to be reliable in this regard.

³⁰¹³ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2956; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1238, 1324; see Adjudicated Fact 868. See also Mitar Rašević, T. 46766–46767 (11 February 2014). Rašević himself testified he could not do his job efficiently in maintaining security over the facility because he was often away from the KP Dom and that there was some mistreatment. D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 23; P6655 (Excerpt of Mitar Rašević’s interview with OTP), p. 5; Mitar Rašević, T. 46768–46769 (11 February 2014). The Chamber does not find Rašević’s evidence about his inability to maintain security in the facility seeking, to minimise his own involvement, to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its earlier assessment in fn. 2926 regarding the credibility of Rašević’s evidence.

³⁰¹⁴ Adjudicated Fact 867.

³⁰¹⁵ See Adjudicated Facts 858, 867, 878, 879; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1235–1240, 1253, 1256; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2830, 2836. See also KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1281, 1283 (who was not himself physically mistreated during his detention); KDZ379, P3332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 3148–3150 [REDACTED]. Detainees who were severely beaten by guards of the KP Dom and military policemen, and who were then kept in solitary confinement for several days included Vahida Džemal, Enes Uzunović, Aziz Šahinović, and Elvedin Čedić. See Adjudicated Fact 868.

³⁰¹⁶ See Adjudicated Facts 863, 878, 888.

³⁰¹⁷ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2820–2821. These men included men in their 60s and 70s.

³⁰¹⁸ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2822.

³⁰¹⁹ See Adjudicated Facts 860, 874; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2807–2808; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1209–1211. For example Emir Mandžović was restrained in a chair before being beaten and kicked until he fainted while KDZ017 was slapped and kicked in the chest and around the kidneys. Rašević testified that he visited detainees in solitary confinement on a daily basis, and was never told that the guards had beaten them. On cross-examination, he acknowledged that he did see injured people in the isolation cells but the detainees told him the injuries were not inflicted by the guards and if they had medical problems he would refer them to the nurse. When confronted with his prior testimony Rašević acknowledged that it was possible that the detainees told him that the military police officers beat them but he claimed to have reported it to the warden but that they did not have the power to enter and be present during interrogations by the military. In addition Rašević’s suggestion that the guards were not involved in mistreatment of detainees is inconsistent with his evidence that he felt threatened even by his own guards because he treated

were beaten all over their bodies, including on the soles of their feet with a baseball bat.³⁰²¹ Detainees were tied by chains and belts while they were beaten³⁰²² and in one case a detainee was cut on his neck and ear with a knife.³⁰²³ Many were returned to their rooms with visible wounds and bruises resulting from the beating.³⁰²⁴ Some were unable to walk, stand or talk for days after the beatings.³⁰²⁵ Detainees were also beaten while lining up for lunch or while being taken back and forth through the compound.³⁰²⁶ One of the detainees hanged himself in the premises of KP Dom.³⁰²⁷ Apart from the physical effects of detention at KP Dom, detainees continued to suffer ongoing psychological effects which required psychiatric treatment.^{3028 (2985)} **(#Deadly combination#! All of these “findings” are based, as so often, on the Adjudicated facts and at the same time denial of the testimonies of the Defence. The Chamber decided to always accept the testimonies of the Muslim extremists that had been detained, and to dismiss the testimonies of the Serb officials, no matter what. An adjudicated fact should not be more valuable, particularly when rebutted by a witness, and should be challenged in this case too! However, having in mind the number of detainees and the length of their detention, the conditions as suggested in the Indictment/Judgement would certainly result in many more casualties and deaths. This can not be considered as fair trial!)**

911. Detainees heard the groans and screams of those who were being beaten and physically abused and this lasted until mid-July 1992, thus creating fear among them.³⁰²⁹ The beating began at dusk and would continue into the night and sometimes till daylight.³⁰³⁰ When the beating stopped, victims were sometimes taken to an isolation cell.³⁰³¹ On one occasion in October 1991 when soldiers from outside the facility beat detainees and ordered them to lie on the ground, this was watched by Rašević and the guards did not intervene.³⁰³²

Bosnian Muslims well. The Chamber finds that the contradictions in this regard cast doubt on the reliability of Rašević's evidence that guards were not involved in mistreatment. See D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), paras. 21, 31–32; Mitar Rašević, T. 46775–46776, 46804–46806 (11 February 2014); P6656 (Excerpt from Mitar Rašević's testimony before BiH State Court, 11 December 2007), p. 8.

³⁰²⁰ See Adjudicated Fact 870. Krnojelac testified that he never saw any detainees who had visible signs of beatings nor did he ever hear any moans, screams or cries of pain and that he was never told about any beating. Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7677–7678. The Chamber notes that Krnojelac's evidence is directly contradicted by evidence that detainees met with him and complained about their treatment. KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1271–1280. In addition the Chamber does not consider Krnojelac's evidence to be credible in this regard given his evidence is marked by indicators that he was seeking to minimise his own involvement in the mistreatment at the facility.

³⁰²¹ See Adjudicated Fact 871. Other detainees who in the summer of 1992 were called out and severely beaten by KP Dom guards or soldiers included Ramo Džendušić, Nail Hodžić, Emir Frašto, Husko or Husein Rikalo, Nurko Nisić, Esad Kiselica, Latif Hasanbegović, Aziz Hasković, Halim Seljanci, Kemo or Kemal Isanović, a young man by the last name of Čedić, and Emir Mandžo. See Adjudicated Facts 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874. Ekrem Zeković was beaten following his re-capture after escaping from the facility. Mitar Rašević, T. 46796–46797 (11 February 2014).

³⁰²² KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1246.

³⁰²³ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1247; KDZ239, T. 18993 (16 September 2011).

³⁰²⁴ Adjudicated Facts 864, 872; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1237–1240, 1256; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2826.

³⁰²⁵ See Adjudicated Facts 864, 871.

³⁰²⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 861; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1264–1265; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2889, 2891.

³⁰²⁷ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2888; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1233, 1252; Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7678. The detainee was Juso Džamalja who was exhumed from an individual grave in 2001. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 82.

³⁰²⁸ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2919.

³⁰²⁹ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1235, 1264; see Adjudicated Facts 864, 869, 872, 880; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2839–2840.

³⁰³⁰ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1248; see Adjudicated Fact 880.

³⁰³¹ Adjudicated Fact 881.

³⁰³² KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2891–2892; see Adjudicated Fact 862. Rašević testified that he never saw this incident and that if he received information about it, it was only in verbal form otherwise it would have been documented. D4307

(#Deadly combination#! Again, a mere Adjudicated facts, #heard, but not seen#. In October 91 it couldn't be treated in this Judgement, since the then it could only be a convict from the previous period, and not detainee during the war, which started on 6 April 1992. #Time shifting# Why a serious chamber would facilitate so many revengeful lies of the one side combatants against their opponents, thus continuing the war? And why in a such serious case charges hadn't been proven in the courtroom, instead of importing them from other cases, in which it may be not challenged?)

912. Detainees were forced to work while detained at KP Dom and were engaged in work at the farm, bakery, furniture factory, or in gardening and selling wood.³⁰³³ (2990) Detainees were placed on lists to be taken under guard to work in hospitals, mines, hotels, and sometimes the MP would escort them to work.³⁰³⁴ Todović, who was in charge of labour affairs, gave guards the list of work assignments to be carried out by the detainees.³⁰³⁵ On a couple of occasions, a detainee who refused to work was beaten and taken to an isolation cell.³⁰³⁶ However, some detainees were not required to work at the facility.³⁰³⁷ Two detainees were ordered to drive vehicles to detect landmines.³⁰³⁸

(#Deadly combination# All of this is unacceptable in a serious court and a serious case! All is based upon adjudicated facts, on "hear-say", all on a unilateral statements of those who fought against the Serbs and lost in battle, but continued to damage their adversaries. It was well known that many detainees were willing to go out for a work, because that way they obtained food, tobacco, even drinks. It has to be kept in mind that the detainees and their guards or employers knew each other very well, and if it was as presented to the Chamber, there would be many private litigations after the war, which is not the case!)

e. Conclusion on conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

913. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that non-Serbs from multiple locations were brought to and detained at KP Dom Foča by Serb Forces from mid-April 1992 until at least 31 December 1992. **(The majority had been detained before 20 May, i.e. when the Muslim extremists confronted the JNA and became their prisoners of war. #Before the VRS#)** The detainees were held in poor conditions. These included lack of space, inadequate bedding, poor sanitary conditions, insufficient heating, lack of food, and inadequate medical care. **(The entire country was in a poor conditions, because of the**

(Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 42. The Chamber does not find Rašević's evidence in this regard to be credible given his attempt to distance himself from mistreatment and knowledge of mistreatment of detainees.

³⁰³³ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2896; KDZ239, T. 18992 (16 September 2011). Krnojelac testified that (i) some Bosnian Muslim detainees were taken out to do work but he was told that these detainees wanted to work voluntarily as they preferred this to spending time in the detention facility; (ii) they worked regular hours and received food; and (iii) he was not aware of detainees being used for trench digging on the frontline or used to search for mines. Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7692–7696, 7698–7699, 7914. The Chamber does not find Krnojelac's evidence to be reliable in this regard, given that he qualifies this evidence based on what he was told. The Chamber notes that this is also contrary to his evidence relating to his lack of knowledge or involvement in affairs relating to detainees and also notes that Krnojelac acknowledged that some detainees were involved in working on his house which had burnt down during the conflict. Krnojelac was also unable to adequately explain why Bosnian Muslim detainees were engaged in the economic unit given that there was no reform element required for this category of detainees, *see* Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7821–7822; D2730 (Decision of SerBiH Presidency published in Official Gazette, 12 May 1992), p. 3. In any event, the Chamber will only enter findings on the type of forced labour charged in the Indictment. *See* Indictment, para. 60(h).

³⁰³⁴ D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), para. 24.

³⁰³⁵ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2911–2912.

³⁰³⁶ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2915.

³⁰³⁷ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1267.

³⁰³⁸ *See* Adjudicated Fact 875.

war, and because of the sanctions in particular, and there is no convincing evidence that the poor conditions were imposed deliberately!) Detainees were subjected to regular beatings, and were forced to work at a number of locations. The Chamber finds that at least one detainee died as a result of the inadequate medical care at the facility.³⁰³⁹ (How possibly this could have been the Accused's liability? Out of 600 detained there was one death because of lack of care, this makes less than 0,5 per mille, and this rate is much higher out of the detention in Foca)

f. Scheduled Incident B.8.1

914. The Indictment refers to the killing of over 200 detainees at KP Dom Foča between June and December 1992.

915. In some instances after detainees had been taken out to be beaten, other detainees heard the sound of pistol shots, as well as the sound of vehicles moving.³⁰⁴⁰ (#Heard, not seen# This is so "typical" for all and every testimony of the Muslim extremist: it had never been established whether they heard those sounds only then, and not before or after that. What evidence is this, to hear sounds of weapons in a civil war? Could that kind of evidence be acceptable in the countries that support this court?)

916. Groups of detainees, generally young people, were taken out of the KP Dom by either regular police or MP and disappeared.³⁰⁴¹ (#Deadly combination.# The least probable inference# What could have happened to them? If they had been released, the remaining inmates shouldn't have known that, because it was a rule. Had they been exchanged, also. Had they been transferred to another facilities, no one remaining could have known that. So many inferences, much more reasonable than the Chamber accepted should prevail in any reasonable court! The testimony of Krnojelac is dismissed as non-reliable, but why he and other weren't summoned to testify in this case?) This included one group consisting of 35 detainees, another group of 23 detainees,³⁰⁴² and a group of detainees suffering from untreated mental conditions.³⁰⁴³

³⁰³⁹ This finding does not include the persons alleged to have been killed in Scheduled Incident B.8.1, which is discussed below. Further, witnesses also testified about the death of detainees after 31 December 1992 but this falls outside the alleged period of detention charged in the Indictment with respect to this facility. KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1230–1231, 1233–1235, 1313–1314; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2824–2825.

³⁰⁴⁰ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1248; KDZ239, T. 19000–19001 (16 September 2011); see Adjudicated Fact 881.

³⁰⁴¹ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1212, 1230, 1238–1243, 1245–1246, 1253–1255, 1256, 1259, 1314–1315; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2790–2792, 2798, 2823, 2836–2837, 2862, 2889, 2956–2958. Krnojelac testified that he heard that Halim Konjo had committed suicide and that a commission came to carry out an investigation and that he was never told about or aware of detainees disappearing overnight. Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 8114–8115. The Chamber does not consider Krnojelac's evidence in this regard to be reliable given that he sought to minimise his involvement in the facility and distance himself from anything to do with detainees.

³⁰⁴² KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1212, 1230, 1238–1243, 1245–1246, 1253–1255, 1256, 1259, 1314–1315; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2790–2792, 2798, 2823, 2836–2837, 2862, 2889, 2956–2958. KDZ017 knew that these individuals were missing after having spoken to the relatives of some of them who told him that they were never seen alive again. See Adjudicated Fact 900. The group of 23 detainees who were taken out and disappeared included Ismet Pasović, Nurko Kušić, Hamdo Bićo (who was exhumed from an individual grave), Halim Konjo, Halid Konjo, three brothers named Rikalo, Karabegović, Adil Granov, Zulfo Veiz, Krunoslav Marinović, Asim Mezbur (who was exhumed from a mass grave), Hajro Sabanović, Dr. Aziz Torlak (who was brought to the facility by the Užice Corps), Esad Kiselica, and Ismet Deleut. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 80, 82; see Adjudicated Facts 889, 893.

³⁰⁴³ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2794, 2888; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1218–1219 (testifying that some of the detainees with mental conditions who were detained separately started mutilating themselves). See also P3351 (Schedule C of List of Indictment against Milorad Krnojelac). Mujo Murguz, Ibrahim Ovcina, Babić were identified as having been in a group of detainees with mental conditions who disappeared and Omer Mujezinović, Hakan Hajdarević, Edhem Bunda and "Culum" were detainees with mental conditions who were separated and detained separately.

When the detainees spoke to the guards about the disappearances, they would claim that they knew nothing and that others were making the decisions.³⁰⁴⁴ **(Certainly, not even the civilian police or authorities could have known what the Army does with it's prisoners of war. Any army is concerned with their soldiers captured by the adversary army, and the exchange was in their hands completely!)** Some of the detainees were called out from lists and taken out on the pretext that they were going to be exchanged, but these were not exchanges and with a few exceptions, they were not seen again.³⁰⁴⁵ **(#Never seen again# Who was supposed to see them again? Were they exchanged and after the exchange whether they joined their Army, or have chosen to go to the third countries, as was the most common case?)** These disappearances were confirmed through contact with families, other detainees, or the ICRC.³⁰⁴⁶ Witnesses testified that approximately 400 to 450 men “disappeared” in these exchanges. **(#Never seen again#! So, out of around 600 detainees only 200 survived, and none of the remaining 400 to 450 had not been exchanged and didn't survive? Where is the evidence? How they died and where? Where their remains recovered?)** Only approximately 200 detainees who remained at KP Dom survived.³⁰⁴⁷ For example, in September 1992, between 35 to 60 detainees were selected by KP Dom guards from a list and taken out of the facility in two groups but never returned and were never seen again.³⁰⁴⁸ **(#Never seen again#! If only two of those prisoners had been exhumed what happened with other 58?) Were other 58 been exhumed from the same grave? If not, how come? Do we have an evidence that they hadn't been exchanged, after which they joined their army and got killed in a combat? Until those questions are answered, no a reasonable and serious court should make any deliberation!)**

³⁰⁴⁴ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1260.

³⁰⁴⁵ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1265; see Adjudicated Facts 877, 884, 900. Mitar Rašević, T. 46778, 46793 (11 February 2014); D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), paras. 32–35, 37–38; P6655 (Excerpt of Mitar Rašević's interview with OTP), e-court pp. 2–3. While Rašević stated that detainees were taken away for exchange according to lists provided by the army and he did not notice large groups of detainees going missing, he acknowledged on cross-examination that some detainees disappeared in these “exchanges” and sometimes that detainees were taken away without permission. The Chamber finds that Rašević's evidence only serves to confirm that some detainees did disappear in these apparent exchanges and that the Military Police was involved in taking away detainees but in light of the credibility assessment of Rašević in fn. 2926, the Chamber does not place any weight on his testimony that they were taken away without permission and that he did not notice large groups of detainees going missing.

³⁰⁴⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 900.

³⁰⁴⁷ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2894–2895; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1265–1266, 1315. Krnojelac testified that he was never told about any killings except for two suicides in the facility. Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7677–7678. The Chamber does not consider Krnojelac's evidence to be credible in this regard. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its earlier assessment in fns. 2889, 2900, and 2928 regarding the credibility of Krnojelac. Radojica Mladenović testified that nobody from the military or civilian leadership asked or ordered that any crime be committed and they actually required compliance with international conventions and that it was possible that some paramilitary units did not comply and that any killings in Foča were isolated cases and the authorities tried to prevent them and carried out on-site investigations into specific cases. D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 40; Radojica Mladenović, T. 36612 (4 April 2013). The Chamber does not find this evidence or shifting of responsibility to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that Mladenović's evidence was marked by multiple contradictions and extreme evasiveness. **(#Deadly combination# WHY MR. MLADJENOVIC WOULD BE EVASIVE, SINCE HE COULDN'T BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANYTHING THAT THE POLICE, THE VRS OR PARAMILITARIES COULD HAVE DONE? HE NEVER WAS SUSPECTED OR INVESTIGATED!)** In addition, the Chamber notes that when confronted with evidence of killings at KP Dom Foča, the witness qualified his answer and claimed that he was not a witness to what happened at the KP Dom. Radojica Mladenović, T. 36663–36664 (5 April 2013). **(CERTAINLY, MLADJENOVIC DIDN'T TESTIFY ABOUT ALLEGED KILLINGS IN THE KP DOM, BUT THOSE KILLINGS THAT ARE CHARGED HERE HADN'T EVEN BEEN ALLEGED TO HAPPEN IN THE KP DOM, BUT OUTSIDE. THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF IMPOSSIBLE DEFENCE: THE FACTS ARE INTERPRETED AS IT SUITS THE INDICTMENT!)**

³⁰⁴⁸ See Adjudicated Facts 896, 897, 898. Two of those detainees, Murat Crneta and Halid Konjo were found in a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 82. Other detainees who were identified as having been taken out of the facility on other occasions and never returned included Mensud Pašović, Haso Selimović, Rasim Kajgana, Azim Mezbur. See Adjudicated Facts 892, 894, 890, 891.

917. Four groups, each consisting of nine detainees, were taken to the main building for interrogation.³⁰⁴⁹ The first group of detainees was taken out three or four days after 12 June 1992 and the last group was taken out towards the end of June 1992.³⁰⁵⁰ The detainees of the first group were lined up and taken inside a building one by one. As each detainee was taken in, the sounds of beating and screaming were heard, followed by a single pistol shot.³⁰⁵¹ In a similar manner, the second,³⁰⁵² third³⁰⁵³ and fourth group³⁰⁵⁴ of detainees were taken out with an intervening period of a few days between each group. The sequence of events was the same for these groups as it was for each of the detainees in the first group, viz. nine detainees were taken out, the sound of beatings, followed by a single shot.³⁰⁵⁵ None of those taken away in groups as described above returned or were seen alive again.³⁰⁵⁶ **(#Never seen again# Not seen, by whom? What kind of evidence is this?)**

³⁰⁴⁹ KDZ017, T. 19900 (4 October 2011). See also KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2828–2829.

³⁰⁵⁰ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2831–2832, 2887, 2957, 2972; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1249–1250, 1252. Detainees who were identified as having been taken out and disappeared included Kemo Dželimović and Munib Veiz. See also Adjudicated Fact 886.

³⁰⁵¹ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2837–2839, 2842, 2852, 2866, 2971, 2990; KDZ017, T. 19902 (4 October 2011); P3569 (Series of photographs of Foča), pp. 1, 3; see Adjudicated Facts 886, 899, 887 (which listed Kemo Dželimović, Halim Konjo, Mustafa Kuloglija, Mithat and Zaim Rikalo and Munib Veiz as being in the group of detainees taken out and severely beaten by guards before shots were heard).

³⁰⁵² KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2862, 2864–2865, 2875, 2956–2958; KDZ017, T. 19901–19904 (4 October 2011); KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1251, 1253, 1258. The detainees who were identified as having disappeared in this group included Ševal Šoro, Mate Ivancić (who was a Bosnian Croat), Zulfo Veiz, Ekrem Tulek, Refik Čankusić, and Salem Bičo. See also Adjudicated Fact 895 (referring to the disappearance of Ševal Šoro).

³⁰⁵³ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2793–2796, 2798, 2821–2823, 2830–2833, 2862–2868, 2875–2879, 2883, 2885, 2888–2889, 2895–2896, 2956, 2958–2960; KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1220, 1240–1242, 1249–1250, 1252, 1255–1259, 1262; KDZ239, T. 18920–18921 (15 September 2011), T. 18979–18980 (16 September 2011). The names of individuals who these witnesses identified as having been taken out of KP Dom in groups and who disappeared included Džemal Vahida, Fuad Mandzo, Alija Altoka, Miralem Altoka, Nermin Hadžimusić (only identified by KDZ017), Adil Krajčin, Enes Uzunović, Enko Čedić, Adnan Pasalić (only identified by KDZ017), Adil Granov, Abdurahman Cankušić, Fuad Mandzo, Hamid Ramović, Džemal Vahida, Gordan Huković (a Bosnian Croat only identified by KDZ239), Zaim Rikalo, Husein Rikalo, Mithat Rikalo, Ševal Šoro, Mate Ivancić, Zulfo Veiz, Ekrem Tulek, Kemal Tulek (Rašević also testified that Tulek went missing. Mitar Rašević, T. 46788 (11 February 2014)), Refik Čankušić, Zulfo Veiz, Munib Veiz, Zaim Čedić (only identified by KDZ017), Edhem Bunda, Culum FNU (only identified by KDZ017), Elmedin Džanko, Eldin Džanko, Ismet Deleut (only identified by KDZ017), Gradisic FNU (only identified by KDZ239), Hajdarević FNU (KDZ017 identified him as Hakan Hajdarević), Latif Hasanbegović (only identified by KDZ017), Azid Hasković (only identified by KDZ017), Nail Hodžić (only identified by KDZ017), Abdulah Kamerić (who was exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 80), Omer Mujezinović (only identified by KDZ017), Samir Mujezinović (only identified by KDZ239), Mujo Murguz (only identified by KDZ017), Ibrahim Ovcina (only identified by KDZ017) (the Chamber notes that an Ibro Ovcina is listed in Mašović's table but his name is not listed by Mašović as associated with Scheduled Incident B.8.1 even though the name is listed in Appendix G of the Prosecution Final Brief. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 80), Ismet Pašović (only identified by KDZ017), Halim Seljanci (only identified by KDZ017), Mirsad Subašić (only identified by KDZ239). See also Adjudicated Fact 885 (which lists the names of 26 detainees who were killed by KP Dom guards or members of the military who came from outside of the facility). Of those on the list Mašović identified that Abdurahman Cankušić, Salem Bičo, Halim Konjo were exhumed from an individual graves, while Adil Krajčin, Fuad Mandžo, Ekrem Tulek, Kemal Tulek were exhumed from mass graves. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 81–83, 107.

³⁰⁵⁴ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2864–2866, 2868, 2877, 2883, 2886–2887, 2960; KDZ017, T. 19904 (4 October 2011). KDZ017 could identify Ismet Karahasnović (who was exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 80). The Chamber notes that this name is not listed as a Schedule B.8.1 victim on Mašović's table), Suad Islambasić, Zaim Čedić, Ismet Pačo (who was exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 80), Mehmed Sofradžija (who was exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 83). The Chamber notes that this name is not listed as a Scheduled Incident B.8.1 victim on Mašović's table), Hasan Džano, Ramo Džendušić, Alija Dželić, Rasim Kajgana in this group. The Chamber notes that the Prosecution lists both Ramo Džendusic and Ramo Djendusić as separate victims of Scheduled Incident B.8.1. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix G. However, the Chamber is not satisfied that the evidence cited supports that these are two different victims.

³⁰⁵⁵ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2838, 2883, 2886; KDZ017, T. 19903–19904 (4 October 2011) (testifying that he was told by a detainee that bodies were transferred to banks of the Drina and buried by stones); see Adjudicated Fact 887. Rašević testified that he never saw any bodies being moved from the KP Dom and that to his knowledge nobody was ever killed at the KP Dom but he acknowledged that he was not aware of whether there was mistreatment during interrogations or whether people were killed outside the facility. In light of these qualifications, the Chamber does not attribute any weight to Rašević's evidence on this issue. See D4307 (Witness statement of Mitar Rašević dated 2 February 2014), paras. 31, 35; Mitar Rašević, T. 46783–46785 (11 February 2014)

³⁰⁵⁶ KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2858, 2866, 2886. KDZ017 having contacted the families of Nurko Nišić, Halim Konjo, Ešad Kiselića, Salem Bičo, Adil Granov (from the third group) was told that they were never seen alive again. Mašović identified that Salem Bičo was exhumed from an individual grave, while Ramo Džendušić, Alija Dželić were exhumed from mass graves. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 81–82, 107. See Adjudicated Facts 887, 899. Mašović as a member of the State Commission of BiH received information about prisoners being killed in camps in municipalities including Foča. P4850 (Witness

What could have happened with them? How many of them had been exhumed, and when. If only few of those had been exhumed from a mass grave, how the others had been killed, or it is the most reasonable to infer that all of them had been a combat casualties, including those that some time had been in the Foca prison? Did any of them re-joined their Army, and got killed during combats? Is this kind of deciding acceptable in a criminal law? In what countries it is acceptable?)

918. During and after the beating of detainees, guards of the KP Dom were seen carrying blankets into the administration building and removing what appeared to be bodies in those blankets.³⁰⁵⁷ **(#Extreme adversary testified#! Adjudicated fact! This way the Muslim extremists and combatants continue to wage the war against the Serbs, and this kind of deliberations facilitate this!)** A vehicle also left the facility and returned 10 to 15 minutes later and was cleaned by men in green-grey uniforms.³⁰⁵⁸ Detainees who were sent to clean, saw blood and bloodied instruments in the rooms where the beatings occurred.³⁰⁵⁹

919. The Chamber took judicial notice of the exhumation of 62 male bodies from a mass grave on Maluša Mountain at a site called Jama Piljak.³⁰⁶⁰ However, with the exception of one body which had a name card indicating that the individual was last seen at the KP Dom, the Chamber has insufficient evidence to link these bodies with this scheduled incident.³⁰⁶¹ Mašović's evidence regarding the exhumation of bodies from mass or individual graves corroborates the evidence of witnesses who identified 16 individuals who were taken from the facility and disappeared and whose names also appear on Mašović's list of exhumed bodies.³⁰⁶² **(#Never seen again# It is never sufficient to decide about some deaths if some individuals had been on the detention lists and on the lists of exhumed. This says nothing about the manner of their deaths. And what ascertain us that even those 16, out of so many hundreds of "disappeared" rejoined their Army and participated in combats? At least these 61 that couldn't be connected to the detention in Foca are a corroboration of the Defence standpoint!)**

920. In assessing the overall number of persons killed at KP Dom Foča, the Chamber has considered the (i) witness testimony that between 400 and 450 detainees were taken from KP Dom Foča for purported exchanges but disappeared; **(#Never seen again# How could have they "disappear"? # This was not sufficient to the Chamber to conclude that they had been killed in an unlawful manner#?)** (ii) witness testimony that multiple groups of detainees were taken out of the facility and shot; **(#Heard, not seen# None of the witnesses testified about seeing any killing, but only hearing some shots, which were always present, because of the civil war)** (iii) exhumation records which confirm that some of the identified individuals who went missing from KP Dom Foča were exhumed from mass graves or individuals graves. **(#Never returned# Since it was the case with**

statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), para. 54. See also P3346 (Order of Foča's Crisis Staff, 9 May 1992); KDZ239, T. 18920–18921 (15 September 2011); KDZ239, T. 18979–18981 (16 September 2011).

See Adjudicated Facts 882, 887.

See Adjudicated Fact 887.

See Adjudicated Fact 883; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2858, 2973.

P4876 (Sarajevo Cantonal Court record of exhumation of Piljak mass grave in Foča, 2001). See also Adjudicated Facts 2402, 2403

P4850 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), Annex A, pp. 2–3.

P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 81–82, 107. Mašović identifies the names of 159 individuals who went missing from KP Dom Foča who were exhumed from mass graves or individual graves. However, the Chamber is not satisfied that in the absence of further evidence it can rely on Mašović's evidence to link the exhumed bodies to Scheduled Incident B.8.1.

only several individuals, the Prosecution didn't prove, and the Chamber didn't try to find out who were the majority that had been exhumed, and how they died, and if they were a combat casualties, why those formerly detained couldn't be the same combat casualties, and being buried with those combatants! This kind of deliberation compromises the very same idea of the international justice, of the processing after a public denigration of one side, and in a foreign countries, on a foreign languages, and before judges that are not familiarised with the domestic laws, as well as with the military laws!)

921. The Chamber therefore finds that, over 200 detainees, as alleged were killed at KP Dom Foča by Serb Forces between June and December 1992. **(#Some killed some# In a manner: somebody killed somebody, in a civil war of all against all! None of these allegations had been proven!)**

3. Scheduled Detention Facility C.10.4

922. The Prosecution refers to the use of worker's huts at Buk Bijela as a detention facility in July 1992.³⁰⁶³

923. Some women from the village of Mješaja/Trošanjs were taken by Serb soldiers to a detention centre at Buk Bijela, where Gojko Janković was in charge.³⁰⁶⁴ **(Adjudicated fact! Why it wasn't notified that this procedure of removing civilians from a combat area was a legal obligation? Was there, in Mjesaja/Trosanj any Muslim armed force and was there any fighting? If yes, then everything comes tu a legal framework!#Legal, obligatory#)** There, Serb soldiers repeatedly raped Muslim women and girls.³⁰⁶⁵ **Adjudicated fact!** Girls, women, and some elderly men who were at Buk Bijela were transported by bus to Foča and kept in the Foča High School.³⁰⁶⁶ During this transfer, some Bosnian Muslim women tried to complain to the police, including the police chief Dragan Gagoić, but no action was taken.³⁰⁶⁷ **Adjudicated fact!**

4. Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.5 and C.10.7

924. The Prosecution refers to the use of the Partizan Hall³⁰⁶⁸ and Srednja škola – Foča High School³⁰⁶⁹ as detention facilities during 1992.

925. The Muslim civilians held at the Partizan Sports Hall and Foča High School were kept in unhygienic conditions, without hot water, and were provided with insufficient food.³⁰⁷⁰ Their freedom of movement was curtailed; they were not allowed to go to any other territory or to go back to their houses.³⁰⁷¹ They were guarded and lived in an

³⁰⁶³ The Indictment refers to the use of this detention facility in both June and July 1992, as per the Prosecution's 73 bis Submission, Appendix B, p. 27. However, the Prosecution now limits the allegations with respect to this facility to July 1992. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, fn. 231.

³⁰⁶⁴ Adjudicated Fact 2407.

³⁰⁶⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 787.

³⁰⁶⁶ Adjudicated Fact 788.

³⁰⁶⁷ See Adjudicated Facts 789, 790. A woman who tried to escape and sought refuge with the police was hit by a policeman with a rifle butt.

³⁰⁶⁸ Indictment, Scheduled Detention Facility C.10.5.

³⁰⁶⁹ Indictment, Scheduled Detention Facility C.10.7.

³⁰⁷⁰ See Adjudicated Fact 813. See also KDZ239, T. 18946–18947 (15 September 2011).

³⁰⁷¹ Adjudicated Fact 813.

atmosphere of intimidation.³⁰⁷² All this was done in full view, in complete knowledge and sometimes with the direct involvement of the local authorities, particularly the police forces.³⁰⁷³

(#Deadly combination#! All of it based on adjudicated facts with undermining every testimony that didn't fit to this picture. Why the witness Rasevic wouldn't be trusted since it is evident that there we intense fights? In such a case civilians had to be kept somewhere far from battlefield! Neglecting this fact is a huge error which distorts entire picture. Why the authorities would keep civilians in these facilities, guard and feed them, unless there were armed combats? They all knew each other, and keeping civilians in schools and sport halls would be irrational and unbearable expensive for a poor and isolated municipality!)

926. Mitar Šipčić, a member of the Foča Crisis Staff,³⁰⁷⁴ was in charge of the guards at the Foča High School.³⁰⁷⁵ Guards worked in shifts to prevent the detainees from escaping, but they did not prevent soldiers from entering the facility.³⁰⁷⁶ Soldiers and policemen would come constantly, sometimes several times a day; they would point at women and girls or call them by their names, take them out and rape them.³⁰⁷⁷ The women had no choice but to obey those men and those who tried to resist were beaten in front of the other women.³⁰⁷⁸ **(#Deadly combination#! All based on adjudicated facts, so this Defence couldn't do anything!)** At Foča High School, the girls and women were generally taken for a few hours and returned, sometimes overnight, and some of them were taken away every day.³⁰⁷⁹ After about 10 to 15 days, most of the women from Foča High School were transferred to the Partizan Hall.³⁰⁸⁰

927. The Partizan Hall was guarded by police officers.³⁰⁸¹ At Partizan Hall, some women were taken out of the facility on multiple occasions and raped by soldiers.³⁰⁸² One woman estimated that during the 40 days of detention at both Foča High School and Partizan Hall, she was raped approximately 150 times.³⁰⁸³ The guards at Partizan Hall and Foča High School did not try to prevent soldiers from entering.³⁰⁸⁴ The chief of Foča

³⁰⁷² Adjudicated Fact 813. Mitar Rašević testified that the Partizan Hall was a reception centre from where people could be transported in the direction they wanted to go. Mitar Rašević, T. 46815–46816 (11 February 2014). The Chamber does not consider this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that the witness was evasive and contradicted by reference to his prior testimony.

³⁰⁷³ Adjudicated Fact 813.

³⁰⁷⁴ P3333 (Official Gazette of Serbian Municipality of Foča, 17 September 1992), p. 40.

³⁰⁷⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 2409.

³⁰⁷⁶ See Adjudicated Facts 791, 796.

³⁰⁷⁷ See Adjudicated Facts 792, 787.

³⁰⁷⁸ Adjudicated Fact 792.

³⁰⁷⁹ Adjudicated Fact 793.

³⁰⁸⁰ Adjudicated Fact 793.

³⁰⁸¹ Adjudicated Fact 2408.

³⁰⁸² See Adjudicated Facts 794, 787. See also KDZ239, T. 18946–18947 (16 September 2011); P90 (Witness statement of KDZ216 dated 8 June 1998), p. 14 (under seal); KDZ216, P69 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Kunarac*, T. 3370–3371 (under seal). The witness testified that it was “generally known that soldiers were coming [to Partizan] and taking them away and forcing them to have sexual relations with them”. See also D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 49 who acknowledged that “disgraceful and disgusting things” were committed in this facility. However, the Chamber does not find Mladenović’s unsubstantiated assertion that the perpetrators were processed and punished or that the Bosnian Serb authorities resolved the problem at the facility to be credible. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber also noted that Mladenović’s evidence was marked by multiple contradictions and extreme evasiveness. **(#Deadly combination# BUT AT LEAST THIS FACT COULD HAVE BEEN CHECKED, BECAUSE IT IS WELL KNOWN WHERE THE HEADQUARTERS WERE! HOWEVER, IT IS A MANNER TO #DISREGARD A SERB WITNESSES TESTIMONIES!)**

³⁰⁸³ See Adjudicated Fact 794.

³⁰⁸⁴ See Adjudicated Fact 796.

police, Dragan Gagović, was seen at Foča High School and Partizan Hall.³⁰⁸⁵ Gagović, was one of the men who came to detention facilities, including Partizan Hall and the Foča High School, to take women out and rape them.³⁰⁸⁶ On 23 October 1992, a group of women and children who had been detained for a month at Partizan Hall, were transported by bus to Goražde.³⁰⁸⁷

(#Deadly combination#! All based on adjudicated facts and “established” in other cases, in which defences probably didn’t have any need to rebut it, if it didn’t concern their defendant. But, such a number of sexual assaults would have many, many biological consequences such as pregnancies and so, which was never reported! Anyway, even the Chamber noticed and recognised that the authorities ordered opposite to this conduct, and the guards “didn’t prevent soldiers from entering” – what really indicates that whatever happened and to whatever extent, it was done by non-officials! Also, dismissing so many testimonies is very indicative and unique!#Deadly combination#)

5. Scheduled Detention Facility C.10.2 and other evidence of rape and other acts of sexual violence during and after the take-over of Foča

928. The Indictment refers to the use of Karaman’s house in Miljevina as a detention facility at least between August and October 1992.

929. Dragoljub Kunarac’s unit also known as the Zaga Detachment received orders from the Foča Tactical Group.³⁰⁸⁸ Other members of this group included Dragomir “Gaga” Vuković, and Jagos Kontić.³⁰⁸⁹ Kunarac removed many Bosnian Muslim women and girls from various detention centres, including the Partizan Hall.³⁰⁹⁰

930. The girls and women, who were selected by Kunarac or by his men in August 1992, were systematically taken to the soldiers’ base in a house in Ulica Osmana Đikića where girls and women were repeatedly raped by Kunarac’s men and Kunarac himself during the night.³⁰⁹¹

(Rebutted by a witness, although it was very easy to check it, see

³⁰⁸⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 795. Milutin Vujičić who was engaged as a guard at the Partizan Hall in late April or early May 1992, testified that (i) guards were ordered to strictly guard the facility and to prevent anyone from being taken out of the facility particularly at night; (ii) it was recommended that civilians go to the Partizan Hall for their own safety; (iii) women were allowed to leave facilities during the day and were guarded at night; and (iv) nobody was taken away from the facility while he was at the facility. D2767 (Witness statement of Milutin Vujičić dated 14 January 2013), para. 11; Milutin Vujičić, T. 32095–32096, 32131–32132 (17 January 2013). The Chamber does not find Vujičić’s evidence to be of much significance given that he was only at the facility for four days and he did not know who took over the guarding of the facility or what happened after he left. The Chamber finds that his evidence that those who took over the facility also had to obey the order which he received is pure speculation and has no basis or foundation.

³⁰⁸⁶ See Adjudicated Facts 814, 795. Mladenović expressed his view that he did not believe that Gagović would have acted in this way. Radojica Mladenović, T. 36651 (5 April 2013). The Chamber does not consider this evidence to be of much weight given that it is simply the witness’s opinion but does note that Mladenović did acknowledge that crimes did occur.

³⁰⁸⁷ See Adjudicated Fact 915.

³⁰⁸⁸ P3354 (Order of Foča Tactical Group, 7 July 1992), p. 3. See also Radojica Mladenović, T. 36649 (5 April 2013).

³⁰⁸⁹ See Adjudicated Fact 799.

³⁰⁹⁰ See Adjudicated Facts 800, 797, 808, 811. See also KDZ216, P69 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Kunarac*), T. 3376, 3439–3440 (under seal).

³⁰⁹¹ See Adjudicated Facts 801, 797, 808. Radojica Mladenović testified that this house was never a headquarters or base for any unit of the regular army. D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 53; Radojica Mladenović, T. 36647–36648 (5 April 2013). However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that Mladenović’s evidence was marked by multiple contradictions and extreme evasiveness. **(BUT AT LEAST THIS FACT COULD HAVE BEEN CHECKED, BECAUSE IT IS WELL KNOWN WHERE THE HEADQUARTERS WERE! HOWEVER, IT IS A MANNER TO DISREGARD A SERB WITNESSES TESTIMONIES!)**

marks to fn.3050) Some women were gang-raped in the same house by soldiers while another woman was taken to a separate room by “Gaga” who ordered her to have sex with a 16 year old boy.³⁰⁹² Kunarac was fully aware that the women were raped by other soldiers.³⁰⁹³ Some of the women were taken out and raped in an abandoned house in Trnovače by Kunarac and another soldier.³⁰⁹⁴ Kunarac also took a girl from the Kalinovik High School, and raped her in a house in an area known as Aladža.³⁰⁹⁵ **(Had something like that really happened, it must have been #done clandestinely#, hidden from authorities, this would be an individual responsibility, and that can not be a liability of anyone from the Serb authorities, let alone the President, who issued many orders forbidding such a misdeeds. Not even the chambers which made this findings established any responsibility of the authorities! #Officials vs. criminals#)**

931. Some of the women from Partizan Hall and Kalinovik High School were at some point moved to different houses and apartments where they continued to be raped and mistreated.³⁰⁹⁶ **(Adjudicated fact, without any possibility that this Defence check it!)**

932. Girls under the age of 20 from the village of Partizan were detained in an apartment which was under the control of Zaga and his men.³⁰⁹⁷ Zaga’s men raped the girls and women in the apartment in front of each other.³⁰⁹⁸ Some girls were raped by several of Zaga’s men at the same time and this was watched by Zaga.³⁰⁹⁹ Ranko Radulović, who was from Montenegro under the command of Zaga, also violently raped a 16 year old girl.³¹⁰⁰ One victim was taken to the basement, stripped, threatened with a knife and then raped by one of Zaga’s men.³¹⁰¹ The girls who had been raped heard that they had to be given to Pero Elez and were taken to Karaman’s house in Miljevina.³¹⁰² At Karaman’s house, soldiers had easy access to women and girls whom they raped.³¹⁰³ Radovan Stanković was in charge at the Karaman’s house.³¹⁰⁴ On 3 August 1992, Kunarac went to Ulica Osmana Đikića where he took four women, and drove them to Miljevina.³¹⁰⁵ There, the women and girls were handed over to soldiers who brought them to Karaman’s house where they were

³⁰⁹² See Adjudicated Fact 812.

³⁰⁹³ Adjudicated Fact 811.

³⁰⁹⁴ See Adjudicated Fact 809.

³⁰⁹⁵ See Adjudicated Facts 804, 805, 806.

³⁰⁹⁶ Adjudicated Fact 803; [REDACTED].

³⁰⁹⁷ [REDACTED].

³⁰⁹⁸ [REDACTED].

³⁰⁹⁹ [REDACTED].

³¹⁰⁰ [REDACTED].

³¹⁰¹ [REDACTED].

³¹⁰² [REDACTED].

³¹⁰³ See Adjudicated Fact 803; [REDACTED].

³¹⁰⁴ See Adjudicated Fact 2406. Mladenović testified that while Stanković was convicted by the court of BiH for crimes committed in Karaman’s house, rather than being punished he remained in the VRS as late as April 1995 when the Accused appointed him commander of a special police unit. Radojica Mladenović, T. 36653 (5 April 2013); P6267 (Radovan Karadžić’s Order, 7 April 1995), pp. 1–2. The Chamber does not accept Mladenović’s speculative evidence that the Accused did not know Stanković otherwise he would have “eliminated” him. The Chamber does not rely on the conviction by the BiH court for the purposes of factual findings in this case.

(NONE OF THIS HAD BEEN PROVEN IN THIS TRIAL, BUT IN ANOTHER, AND THUS THE DEFENCE WASN’T IN A POSITION TO DO ANYTHING. HOWEVER, THE CHAMBER ALREADY WAS AWARE HOW PRESIDENTS ARE PROMOTING OR REWORDING SOMEBODY: ALWAYS ON THE BASIS OF PROPOSALS FROM THE TERRAIN. HOW THE PRESIDENT COULD HAVE KNOWN ANYTHING IF HE WASN’T INFORMED, AND THE PROSECUTION DIDN’T SUBMIT ANY EVIDENCE HE WAS INFORMED!)

³¹⁰⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 810.

constantly raped.³¹⁰⁶ Some women were detained at Karaman's house for several months to over a year.³¹⁰⁷ Girls who were brought to Karaman's house were "divided between the men, like property", with Pero Elez deciding which girl went with which soldier.³¹⁰⁸ There were about five or six women in Karaman's house who cooked and cleaned for the soldiers.³¹⁰⁹ The women did not feel free to leave the house due to the presence of many soldiers.³¹¹⁰ Women were also taken to a house in Trnovaca and raped openly by soldiers including Zaga.³¹¹¹

933. Considering the above, the Chamber finds that women and girls were brought to, detained and subjected to acts of sexual violence by members of Serb Forces at multiple locations in Foča, including at Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.2, C.10.4, C.10.5 and C.10.7. **(Even if all of it was true, it still was #responsibility of "members of Serb Forces" and not by the Serb Forces, which would imply a knowledge, awareness, tolerance, approval or even orders from the superiors in the Serb Forces. Nothing from the system facilitated this conduct! #Officials vs. criminals# Neither the Prosecution nor the Chamber ever submitted any evidence that even the most immediate superiors were aware of it, let alone the Accused that was so remote physically and geographically! No president all over the world would be innocent if treated that way!)**

iv. Scheduled Incident D.10

934. The Indictment refers to the destruction of two mosques in Foča at least between April and August 1992.³¹¹²

935. Several mosques in Foča town and municipality were burned or otherwise destroyed.³¹¹³ **(#Heard, not seen# The witness – KDZ379 – was only "told" that the mosques were shelled, particularly mentioning that the minarets had been destroyed. However, it is well known to the Chamber that many mosques served as a storages of the war materials, explosives, mines and armament. Particularly minarets had often been abused by the Muslim snipers, particularly those in Foca! Also, there couldn't be excluded a revengeful conduct, since many Christian churches had been destroyed by the Muslim combatants! #Revengeful conduct#)** Bosnian Serb fire brigades stood by and watched as mosques burned.³¹¹⁴ The Aladža mosque dating from 1555 and under UNESCO protection was blown up and the rubble was removed from the site by the end of the war.³¹¹⁵ In August 1992, KDZ216 heard a huge detonation at night and she was told that this was the

³¹⁰⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 810. See also Adjudicated Facts 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 821.

³¹⁰⁷ [REDACTED]. See Adjudicated Fact 820.

³¹⁰⁸ [REDACTED].

³¹⁰⁹ [REDACTED].

³¹¹⁰ [REDACTED].

³¹¹¹ [REDACTED]. The Chamber notes that Stanić praised a number of commanders who were involved in the war in Foča including Gojko Janković and there was proposal to honour Janković for his contribution to the war. P6081 (Video clips re interview and speech of Miroslav Stanić, with transcript); P6082 (Proposal of Foča Tactical Group, 13 August 1993), p. 1.

³¹¹² These are the Aladža mosque and the Jeleč mosque.

³¹¹³ Adjudicated Fact 908. See also KDZ379, T. 18837 (15 September 2011) (who was told that the mosques in Foča were shelled and that most mosques were either destroyed or had their minarets destroyed).

³¹¹⁴ See Adjudicated Fact 913; P90 (Witness statement of KDZ216 dated 8 June 1998), pp. 6, 12 (under seal); Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7887; KDZ216, P69 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Kunarac*), T. 3368 (under seal).

³¹¹⁵ Adjudicated Fact 911; András Riedlmayer, T. 22541 (9 December 2011).

mosque being destroyed.³¹¹⁶ The blast broke the windows of the house and KDZ216 heard that it was “Zaga again”.³¹¹⁷ KDZ216 later saw that the mosque was demolished.³¹¹⁸ **(No evidence that the local authorities participated or approved it! “Zaga” had been tried before this court, but none of the authorities would ever tolerate such a matter, which ruined the RS credibility and jeopardized the remaining Christian Orthodox churches!)**

936. Riedlmayer reported that the Aladža mosque was completely destroyed.³¹¹⁹ It was destroyed by explosives, and only traces of the foundations remained and the site had been levelled by a bulldozer with all building materials removed but the adjacent buildings were only lightly damaged.³¹²⁰ Since the end of the conflict, the site of the Aladža mosque was used as a parking lot for buses and littered with rubbish. The house adjacent to the mosque site was burned and fragments of the razed mosque were found dumped in the Cehotina river and buried under rubble and refuse at sites near the Drina river.³¹²¹ The mosque in Jeleč was burned and its minaret destroyed and only parts of the perimeter walls and rubble remained at the end of the war.³¹²²

937. Vujičić acknowledged that Serb Forces attacked the mosques but claimed that they were attacked because Bosnian Muslims, including snipers, were fighting from the mosques which were also used to store weapons and for training.³¹²³ **(#Abuses of civil objects#! How about that! And it was a practice throughout Bosnia! Many mosques had been destroyed from inside, when the stored explosives had been activated, and this couldn’t be a “Serb Force” misdeed!)** However, the Chamber notes that when Vujičić was challenged on cross-examination and presented with Riedlmayer’s report which suggested that the Aladža mosque was destroyed in August 1992 and was razed to the ground when there was no fighting, Vujičić’s answers were evasive and unconvincing.³¹²⁴ **(#Time shifting# That is not correct interpretation: if merged, damage and destruction, without distinction of the time, it looks like the mosque had been both damaged and destroyed in August 92. However, the mosque was damaged during the fights, and the material was removed in August 92!)** In addition Vujičić’s evidence was marked by evasiveness and other indicators which undermined his credibility. The Chamber therefore does not consider his evidence to be reliable with respect to the reason why the Serb Forces attacked the mosques in Foča.

³¹¹⁶ P90 (Witness statement of KDZ216 dated 8 June 1998), p. 6 (under seal); KDZ216, P69 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Kunarac*), T. 3344, 3400–3401 (under seal).

³¹¹⁷ P90 (Witness statement of KDZ216 dated 8 June 1998), p. 6 (under seal); KDZ216, P69 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Kunarac*), T. 3344, 3400–3401 (under seal).

³¹¹⁸ KDZ216, P69 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Kunarac*), T. 3422 (under seal).

³¹¹⁹ P4069 (Cultural destruction database), record 133; P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled “Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH” prepared for the Karadžić case, formatted records), pp. 127–134; P4071 (Slide images of damaged religious sites in BiH), p. 12.

³¹²⁰ P4069 (Cultural destruction database), record 133; P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled “Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH” prepared for the Karadžić case, formatted records), pp. 127–131.

³¹²¹ P4069 (Cultural destruction database), record 133; P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled “Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH” prepared for the Karadžić case, formatted records), pp. 127–131.

³¹²² Adjudicated Fact 912; P4069 (Cultural destruction database), record 156; P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled “Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH” prepared for the Karadžić case, formatted records), pp. 132–134. Riedlmayer also reported on damage to other cultural monuments and sacred sites in Foča however, these sites are not charged in Schedule D of the Indictment. P4069 (Cultural destruction database), records 131–165.

³¹²³ D2767 (Witness statement of Milutin Vujičić dated 14 January 2013), paras. 22, 24; Milutin Vujičić, T. 32123 (17 January 2013); Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32296–32297, 32304, 32357 (21 January 2013); D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 37.

³¹²⁴ Milutin Vujičić, T. 32123 (17 January 2013).

938. Considering the above evidence the Chamber finds that Serb Forces destroyed the Aladža mosque and the Jeleč mosque between April and August 1992.

v. Movement of the population from Foča

939. Following the attack on Foča in April 1992, **(#Attack, or skirmish# #Who attacked#!This is an incorrect qualification of an armed conflict of the two extremely antagonised communities, with a centuries long history of animosity, as a unilateral attack of the “Serb Forces”. How could that be defined that way, particularly since the Serbs had been majority in the town itself? Certainly there were settlements predominantly Serbian or Muslim!)** Bosnian Muslims left their homes and made their way through the surrounding woods and neighbouring villages searching for shelter.³¹²⁵ Many left out of fear for their safety after Serb Forces took over parts of Foča where they lived.³¹²⁶ **(Those parts of Foca were militarised!)** In order to leave they had to arrange for certificates from the local police and sign a form transferring their property to the “Bosnian-Serb Republic”.³¹²⁷ **(The Chamber knows very well that there was no a single case of #transferring private property# to anybody, let alone to the “Bosnian-Serb Republic”. There was identification and registration what the families that asked to leave left behind, so that the property could be preserved and temporarily used by authorities, as is envisaged in the domestic law! Had it been as alleged in the Indictment/Judgement, there would be a huge number of litigations, but there was no such a litigations! What is a purpose of this negligence of true facts?)**

940. Following the fall of Foča, a large number of civilians moved from Foča towards Ustikolina and a group of between 300 to 500 people consisting almost exclusively of Bosnian Muslims sought shelter in the JNA depot.³¹²⁸ However, Pero Mihajlović who was the SDS representative in Ustikolina, instructed the personnel at the JNA depot that they should not receive Bosnian Muslims and if they continued to house Bosnian Muslims at the compound “he would send people who were paid to cleanse that area”.³¹²⁹ On the night of 25 April 1992 there were clashes in the vicinity of the depot after which most of the Bosnian Muslims left towards Goražde before Serb Forces captured the depot.³¹³⁰ **(There is**

³¹²⁵ D299 (ABiH Supreme Command Staff Special Report, 17 July 1993), pp. 2–3.

³¹²⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 2410; KDZ017, P3568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 2770, 2773–2774. The Chamber also received evidence of both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs leaving Foča before the outbreak of hostilities, but does not consider this evidence to be relevant to the charges in the Indictment. See Adjudicated Facts 733, 734, 735; Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32286, 32324 (21 January 2013). See also KDZ017, T. 19893 (4 October 2011); Momir Bulatović, T. 34569–34571 (1 March 2013).

³¹²⁷ See Adjudicated Fact 2410. Radojica Mladenović testified that no statements were signed by Bosnian Muslims and that they would leave their property to friends or neighbours for protection. D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 51. See also Radojica Mladenović, T. 36616, 36698 (5 April 2013). However, the Chamber does not consider this to be reliable evidence. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber noted that Mladenović was contradicted and evasive on a number of occasions during his testimony. Similarly the Chamber does not accept the speculative and unsubstantiated evidence that it was Bosnian Muslim propaganda about the threat faced by the Bosnian Muslim population which caused panic and prompted Bosnian Muslims to leave the municipality. D3314 (Witness statement of Radojica Mladenović dated 1 April 2013), para. 34; Radojica Mladenović, T. 36693 (5 April 2013); Veljko Marić, T. 35625 (19 March 2013).

³¹²⁸ KDZ379, P3332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 3103–3104, 3108, 3160–3161 (testifying that there were between 300 and 500 people who sought shelter); KDZ379, T. 18855, 18871–18872, 18874, 18896–18897 (15 September 2011); D3065 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević dated 26 February 2013), para. 189 (referring to 200 “Muslim refugees”); Aleksandar Vasiljević, T. 34703–34704, 34706–34707 (4 March 2013), 34705–34706 (4 March 2013) (private session).

³¹²⁹ KDZ379, P3332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 3107–3108.

³¹³⁰ KDZ379, P3332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 3104, 3109–3111, 3114; KDZ379, T. 18877, 18879–18881 (15 September 2011) (testifying that approximately 50 women, children, and the disabled or sick who could not leave remained when the depot was taken over by Serb Forces). See also Adjudicated Fact 757. The Chamber also received contrasting evidence about whether or not there were armed members of the SDA in this group of Bosnian Muslims and the reason why Serb Forces took control of the depot. However, the Chamber does not consider that this affects the predominantly civilian character of the Bosnian Muslims who had taken

evidence that the Muslim civilians had hidden many combatants, who planned to take the armament from the JNA depot and to return to Foča. The local Serb commanders had to secure their population against such a development. Also, the civilians wanted to go to Gorazde, while their combatants wanted to keep them as a human shield in fighting against the Serbs! #AF# #Military necessity#, as conceived by local commanders#! Namely, an assumption of local commanders may have been “over-cautious” but their intent was not criminal!)

941. In May 1992, buses were organised to take civilians out of Foča.³¹³¹ The Chamber finds that some Bosnian Muslims did request to leave the municipality after which the Bosnian Serb authorities arranged for their transportation out of the municipality.³¹³² (#Lawful and obligatory#! #Movement of population#!) However, the Chamber also finds that even if Bosnian Muslims signed documents which indicated that they wished to leave, this was a product of pressures put on them and the surrounding circumstances in the municipality, including attacks against Bosnian Muslims and their homes.³¹³³ (This is a biased and unilateral finding, and it is an argument against the civil war, not against this Accused! It is worthwhile to mention that the authorities of the Republic of Srpska and the Accused himself repeatedly ordered that all the features as refuge or abandoned property must be considered as a temporary features which must not leave any consequence! This is well documented and proven by the contemporaneous evidence! #Surrounding circumstances#, civil war responsible!)

942. Defence witnesses testified that Bosnian Muslims who left by convoy left voluntarily, that they were not expelled, and did not flee from the Serb Forces. In addition, according to these witnesses, the Bosnian Muslims who remained were given shelter and the civilian authorities treated them fairly, in the same way as Bosnian Serb citizens, and did not confiscate their property.³¹³⁴ (#Population movement# Appropriation of private property# That is the easier to check, since there is 24 years of peace, and every single case of appropriation would be subject to litigations. However, the court is persistent in maintaining this fake finding, done due to an uncritical trust to the Muslim witnesses. The same is with the alleged rapes. These people know each other from the day of birth, and there would be many processes, but that didn't happen! #Rapes#) However, the Chamber does not consider this evidence to be reliable in light of the other evidence received as to the surrounding circumstances in Foča. (These circumstances had been crucially influenced and created by the Muslim SDA party, this is well known to everybody willing to hear the truth!) The Chamber also notes that Pljevaljčić was challenged on cross-examination and it was suggested that his evidence about whether the people left voluntarily was hearsay.³¹³⁵ While Pljevaljčić adhered to the content of his evidence, the Chamber considers his evidence to be purely speculative and does not rely on his assessment as to the voluntariness of these departures. Similarly the Chamber does not

shelter in the depot. See D1683 (Report of JNA 744th Logistics Base, 27 April 1992), pp. 1–2 (under seal); KDZ379, T. 18878, 18883 (15 September 2011).

³¹³¹ See Adjudicated Fact 914. See also Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7889.

³¹³² P2642 (Report of Foča War Commission, 18 June 1992), p. 1; Radojica Mladenović, T. 36697 (5 April 2013).

³¹³³ See also Colm Doyle, T. 2946, 2951–2952 (28 May 2010); Colm Doyle, P918 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 25281–25282.

³¹³⁴ Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32303–32304, 32315–32317, 32319–32320, 32343–32346, 32352–32353 (21 January 2013); D2767 (Witness statement of Milutin Vujičić dated 14 January 2013), paras. 8, 16, 30, 32; Milutin Vujičić, T. 32134–32135, 32142 (17 January 2013). See also P6080 (Report of Foča Military Post, 10 October 1992).

³¹³⁵ Trifko Pljevaljčić, T. 32346 (21 January 2013).

consider Vujičić's evidence pertaining to the voluntariness of the departure of Bosnian Muslims and the treatment of those who remained to be credible. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber noted that Vujičić's evidence was marked by evasiveness and indicators that he was trying to mislead the Chamber and lacked forthrightness. **(#Deadly combination#! What for? Why would he want to mislead the Chamber? He was not suspected let alone indicted? All impressions of the witnesses must be reconsidered, since the witnesses, an ordinary people didn't understand the official languages of the court, nor understood the procedures, and had been so far from their country and their sense of security!)** In addition, there were contradictions in his evidence which on the one hand suggested that Bosnian Muslims left voluntarily and on the other that the municipality became almost exclusively Serb after the break-out of clashes. While the Chamber received evidence which suggested that Bosnian Serb authorities issued a public statement inviting those who had left Foča to return, it does not have sufficient detail as to the circumstances or timing of this invitation for it to be considered of any significance.³¹³⁶ **(This should be considered as significant for the Serb intentions and conduct. But, it was proven that the Muslim propaganda scared their population in Foca more than elsewhere in BiH claiming that a huge forces of the former Foca residents are coming from Serbia and Montenegro to participate in combats.)**

943. At the session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly held from 24 to 26 July 1992, greetings were extended to "liberated Foča".³¹³⁷ At this same session Vojo Kuprešanin spoke about the danger of losing Foča which would allow the establishment of the "green transversal".³¹³⁸ **(So what? A #member of parliament was free to meditate whatever wanted#. But, the Muslim extremists had a plan to connect Bosnia under their Islamic regime through Foca and Sandzak to the Islamist regimes in the Middle East. And those plans are not dead, nor it will be ever! The extreme core of the SDA does not hide that!)** In August 1992, the remaining Bosnian Muslims in Foča, mostly women and children, were taken to Montenegro³¹³⁹ and by mid-August 1992 there were almost no Bosnian Muslims in Foča.³¹⁴⁰ **(#Only Serb parts# That was so in the town of Foca and in the Serb parts of municipality, while the Muslims were in their parts of municipality!)** In April and May 1993, Petko Čančar reported to the Bosnian Serb Assembly that not a single Bosnian Muslim was in Foča, that every part of the municipality was controlled by Bosnian Serbs, and that there was "only one people" living in Foča and "one religion" being practised there.³¹⁴¹

944. Having considered the totality of the evidence and assessed the circumstances in which departures occurred, the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims were forced to leave Foča. **(#Forced by circumstances and development of events#! And intimidated by their own propaganda, aimed to gain the international sympathies! But, whoever read this Judgement can not see what happened in the areas where the Serbs were**

³¹³⁶ KDZ379, T. 18874 (15 September 2011).

³¹³⁷ D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24-26 July 1992), p. 5.

³¹³⁸ D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24-26 July 1992), p. 41.

³¹³⁹ See Adjudicated Fact 914. See also Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7889-7890.

³¹⁴⁰ P90 (Witness statement of KDZ216 dated 8 June 1998), p. 12 (under seal); KDZ216, P69 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Kunarac*), T. 3367-3368 (under seal); P502 (Video clip of a man and destroyed houses); P1480 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 10-30 September 1992), p. 66. See also Milorad Krnojelac, D2716 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 7889-7890; Adjudicated Fact 917 (which suggested that Foča had become an almost purely Serb town by the end of 1995).

³¹⁴¹ P1371 (Transcript of 30th session of RS Assembly, 5-6 May 1993), p. 78; P1367 (Transcript of 26th session of RS Assembly, 2 April 1993), p. 25. See also D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 24 (reporting that no non-Serbs lived in Foča). After the war, Foča was referred to as Srbinje. KDZ379, T. 18831-18832 (15 September 2011).

minority, how many of them had been killed, imprisoned and expelled. This “tactics” secured a unilateral picture of the Serbs as the only villains that attacked unarmed Muslims! But, to see how “unilateral” events in Foca were, see the list of the Serb military casualties, published in “Javnost” magazine 19 Sept. 1992:

Погинули борци на фочанском ратишту

Милан (Јована) Радованић (1962) – Бисротић, Фоча, Радован (Лазара) Радаковић (1948) – Вучино, Фоча, Јован (Јанко) Јовановић (1964) – Фидић, Фоча, Срђан (Велко) Саврић (1968) – Фоча, Ненад (Никола) Бурду (1964) – Фоча, Вито (Милана) Марин, 1937. – Костић, Горан, Слободан (Јанко) Марјановић (1963) – Липница, Тузла, Владе (Жарко) Павловић (1963) – Придаража, Фоча, Јеленко (Војна) Стрковић (1948) – Фоча, Мило (Никола) Ивановић (1962) – Фоча, Драган (Илија) Вукосавић (1963) – Фоча, Милана (Душана) Голубовић – Фоча, Миломир (Марко) Шаровић (1965) – Игљани, Фоча, Јосиф (Душана) Томковић (1948) – Фоча, Ристо (Марко) Дракул (1964) – Копилар, Фоча, Весо (Никола) Дракул (1964) – Брусице, Фоча, Весо (Милоша) Илић (1955) – Марсавић, Фоча, Радмилко (Саво) Вукосавић (1961) – Брусице, Фоча, Милош (Жарко) Вукосавић (1967) – Фоча, Зоран (Драго) Вукосавић (1966) – Брусице, Фоча, Горан, (Симе) Дракул (1967) – Брусице, Фоча, Милош (Никола) Грујић (1962) – Јашеница, Хаџећи, Радмилко (Ристо) Благојевић (1968) – Црнетић, Фоча, Недељко (Момчило) Благојевић – Црнетић, Фоча, Лука (Влад) Вукосавић (1961) – Коста Лука, Вера (Дарија) Војин, 1971 – Мостар, Зоран (Слава) Биланчић (1967) – Милевина, Драган (Рајко) Вукосавић (1963) – Пиревац, Калиновић, Драгољуб (Јанко) Тодоровић (1964) – Фоча, Мирко (Велко) Вукосавић (1968) – Милевина, Милана (Рајко) Голубовић (1972) – Милевина, Алекса Енос (1928) – Срботина, Милорад (Никола) Гагарић (1968) – Фоча, Мирослав (Душана) Матић (1962) – Придаража, Фоча, Лубо (Срете) Филиповић (1966) – Фоча, Ненад (Милоша) Марин (1963) – Белин, Фоча, Воко (Данила) Вукосавић – Придаража, Фоча, Радован (Петко) Бајић (1961) – Трновица, Фоча, Радмилко (Милоша) Милановић (1962) – Трновица, Фоча, Славо (Василија) Ковачевић (1962) – Трновица, Фоча, Радмилко (Василија) Филиповић (1960) – Фоча, Јован (Срете) Филиповић (1968) – Мишарије, Фоча, Миланко (Петко) Јовић (1943) – Белин, Фоча, Радмилко (Видо) Трифковић – Фоча, Драган (Божидар) Николић – Фоча, Весо (Никола) Драгичевић – Доња Брида, Фоча, Душан (Рајко) Давидовић – Доња Брида, Фоча, Илија (Василија) Радован – Јашеница, Фоча, Радмилко (Милоша) Кабара (1966) – Мишарије, Фоча, Вукосавић Ђорђе – Фоча, Мило (Коста) Вукосавић (1960) – Фоча, Мило (Влад) Фузат, 1966 – Јебена Шума – Фоча, Остоја (Влад) Ђорђевић (1969) – Паличић, Фоча, Недељко (Драго) Илић (1960) – Горња Брда – Фоча, Милана (Вукоса) Савић (1941) – Фоча, Драган (Благоја) Трифковић (1964) – Гривац, Фоча, Драган (Радмилко) Бегичевић (1972) – Фоча, Миланко (Тоја) Дикћ (1972) – Борује, Фоча, Дарко (Слава) Фузат (1970) – Фоча, Ненад (Штепа) Вукосавић (1967) – Рајетић, Момчило (Данила) Марковић (1968) – Игљани, Фоча, Лазар (Радована) Кунавац (1961) – Патушчи, Фоча, Јанко (Рајко) Фузат (1963) – Фоча, Душан (Анђелија) Тошковић (1969) – Фоча, Радмилко (Обрета) Вукосавић (1963) – Фоча, Лубо (Војна) Давидовић (1968) – Туловић, Фоча, Данило (Марко) Костовић (1968) – Фоча, Нелица (Божна) Шупета (1969) – Савина, Фоча, Жилко (Влад) Марковић (1960) – Игљани, Фоча, Драгољуб (Милоша) Марковић (1978) – Игљани, Фоча, Момир (Данила) Кулић (1960) – Фоча, Жилко (Василија) Врбић (1960) – Фоча, Жарко (Милутина) Милановић (1960) – Фоча, Саво (Рајко) Милановић (1965) – Злати Бор, Фоча, Стојанко (Милана) Шолац (1963) – Горња Брда, Фоча, Никола (Маринка) Милићковић (1965) – Савина, Марко (Српача) Вурадин – Ошак, Фоча, Светлан (Милана) Каменић (1967) – Горанжа, Слободан Петровић – Г. Милановић, Зоран Белић (1962) – Лазаревић, Милоша (Лазара) Матић (1938) – Геленић, Фоча, Воле (Радмилко) Пашић (1960) – Фоча, Владимир (Мила) Радован (1961) – Заврај, Фоча, Божидар (Обрета) Давидовић (1940) – Фоча, Рајко (Стојана) Секуловић (1969) – Заврај, Фоча, Славоша (Петко) Дракул (1965) – Заврај, Фоча, Дејан (Видо) Малиш (1966) – Врбница, Фоча, Радмилко (Благоја) Станковић (1947) – Милевина, Нелица (Вучко) Радован (1968) – Војновић, Фоча, Милан (Ристо) Крунић (1968) – Срботина, Фоча, Милан (Рајко) Фузат, Веленић, Фоча, Радо (Симе) Матић (1966) – Фоча, Василија (Милана) Пљивањчић (1968) – Златар, Фоча, Миломир (Милана) Ковач (1968) – Фоча, Жарко (Петра) Палица (1941) – Фоча, Митар (Вучића) Бркић (1968) – Фоча, Драгомир (Милоша) Кривош (1969) – Фоча, Славоша (Слободана) Тошковић (1971) – Фоча, Мирослав (Милутина) Тадић (1968) – Брда, Фоча, Недељко (Никола) Дракул (1966) – Брусице, Фоча, Марко (Бранко) Пашић (1944) – Кахан, Момко (Милоша) Ковач (1965) – Славичић, Фоча, Миланко (Радмилко) Матић (1964) – Подлит, Фоча, Милан (Симе) Марковић (1934) – Рајетић, Фоча, Добрило (Божна) Стевановић (1966) – Чалебић, Фоча, Милан (Драгиша) Владичић (1965) – Фоча, Владислав (Милана) Срнцић (1963) – Фоча, Момир (Стојана) Вукосавић (1935) – Правосна, Ђорђе (Радо) Вукосавић (1938) – Месити, Фоча, Радо (Риста) Вукосавић (1933) – Фоча, Милан (Славоша) Вукосавић (1949) – Дражице, Фоча, Радмилко (Петра) Тријун (1934) – Славичић, Фоча, Милош (Никола) Вукосавић (1923) – Милотина, Фоча, Милош (Никола) Тријун (1918) – Славичић, Фоча, Драго (Марко) Стојановић (1938) – Милоша Поља, Фоча, Обран (Саво) Ђосовић, Коларић, Фоча, Бркић (Саво) Ђосовић (1927) – Коларић, Фоча, Милан (Никола) Ђосовић (1927) – Поља, Фоча, Милан (Славоша) Николић (1930) – Славичић, Фоча, Предраг (Никола) Биланчић, Коларић – Фоча, Миланко (Милана) Капуран, (1962) – Фоча, Срето (Стојана) Дражић (1962) – Ђалица, Фоча, Лазар (Славоша) Николић (1913) – Фоча, Мирко (Тадир) Ђосовић (1932) – Коларић, Фоча, Остоја (Коста) Ђосовић (1900) – Коларић, Фоча и Драгољуб (Милана) Шолац.

Ово су имена српских бораца који су погинули на фочанском ратишту од почетка рата до 1. септембра ове године. Списак смо добили од надлежних из Таличине групе Фоча, који воде евиденцију о рањеним, несталим и погинулим.

Т. Б.

Dit the unarmed Muslim civilians kill these 200 Serb soldiers?)

c. *Rogatica*

i. Charges

837. Under Count 3, the Prosecution alleges that persecution, a crime against humanity, was committed in Rogatica as part of the objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats from the Municipalities.³¹⁴² Acts of persecution alleged to have been committed in Rogatica by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include killings related to detention facilities and killings committed during, and deaths resulting from, cruel and inhumane treatment at scheduled detention facilities.³¹⁴³ The Prosecution also characterises these killings as extermination, a crime against humanity, under Count 4; murder, a crime against humanity, under Count 5; and as murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war, under Count 6.³¹⁴⁴

838. Other acts of persecution alleged to have been committed by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include (i) torture, beatings, and physical and psychological abuse, during and after the take-over and in scheduled detention facilities, as cruel or inhumane treatment;³¹⁴⁵ (ii) rape and other acts of sexual violence, during and after the take-over and in scheduled detention facilities, as cruel and inhumane treatment;³¹⁴⁶ (iii) the establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions in detention facilities in Rogatica, including the failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care, or hygienic sanitation facilities, as cruel or inhumane treatment;³¹⁴⁷ (iv) forcible transfer or deportation of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from their homes;³¹⁴⁸ (v) unlawful detention in scheduled detention facilities;³¹⁴⁹ (vi) forced labour at frontlines and the use of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats as human shields;³¹⁵⁰ (vii) the appropriation or plunder of property, during and after the take-over, during arrests and detention and in the course of or following acts of deportation or forcible transfer;³¹⁵¹ (viii) the wanton destruction of private property including homes, business premises, and public property including cultural monuments and sacred sites;³¹⁵² and (ix) the imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures.³¹⁵³

937. Under Counts 7 and 8, the Prosecution alleges deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer), respectively, as crimes against humanity.³¹⁵⁴ In this regard, the Prosecution alleges that, by the end of 1992, Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental

³¹⁴² Indictment, paras. 48–49.

³¹⁴³ Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii). The acts of murder and extermination in Rogatica are restricted to killings related to detention facilities, including those resulting from cruel and inhumane treatment. *See* Scheduled Incidents B.16.1 and B.16.2. The Chamber notes that a scheduled incident pertaining to killings which allegedly occurred during and after the take-over of Rogatica was withdrawn from the Indictment. Rule 73 *bis* Decision, Schedule B, p. 65.

³¹⁴⁴ Indictment, para. 63(b).

³¹⁴⁵ Indictment, para. 60(b). *See* Scheduled Detention Facilities C.21.1, C.21.2, C.21.3.

³¹⁴⁶ Indictment, para. 60(c). *See* Scheduled Detention Facilities C.21.1, C.21.2, C.21.3.

³¹⁴⁷ Indictment, para. 60(d). *See* Scheduled Detention Facilities C.21.1, C.21.2, C.21.3.

³¹⁴⁸ Indictment, para. 60(f).

³¹⁴⁹ Indictment, para. 60(g). *See* Scheduled Detention Facilities C.21.1, C.21.2, C.21.3.

³¹⁵⁰ Indictment, para. 60(h).

³¹⁵¹ Indictment, para. 60(i).

³¹⁵² Indictment, para. 60(j). *See* Scheduled Incident D.18.

³¹⁵³ Indictment, para. 60(k). The restrictive and discriminatory measures alleged include the denial of freedom of movement; the removal from positions of authority; the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of homes; unlawful arrest and/or the denial of the right to judicial process; and/or the denial of equal access to public services.

³¹⁵⁴ Indictment, paras. 68–75.

Organs had forcibly displaced Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Rogatica in which they were lawfully present.³¹⁵⁵ It is alleged that from March 1992 restrictive and discriminatory measures, arbitrary arrest and detention, harassment, torture, rape and other acts of sexual violence, killing, destruction of houses, cultural monuments and sacred sites, as well as the threat of further such acts caused Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to flee in fear while others were physically driven out.³¹⁵⁶

ii. Lead-up

GENERAL REMARKS: Rogatica also had a horrifying past of mutual antagonisms and bestial killings during the WWII. Similarly as Foca, Rogatica is a synonym of cruelty of ethnic conflicts. So, neither in Rogatica the inter-ethnic relations deteriorated suddenly.

938. Rogatica is a municipality in eastern BiH located between the municipalities of Sarajevo to the west, Višegrad to the east, Goražde to the south, and Srebrenica to the northeast.³¹⁵⁷ Main road connections from Serbia to Sarajevo traversed Rogatica.³¹⁵⁸ Prior to the war, the majority of the population in Rogatica was Bosnian Muslim, making up approximately 60% of the population, while Bosnian Serbs accounted for approximately 38% of the population with a few other nationalities making up the remainder.³¹⁵⁹ In Rogatica town Bosnian Muslims constituted 64% of the population while 33% were Bosnian Serbs with very few Bosnian Croats.³¹⁶⁰

939. Inter-ethnic conflict arose in Rogatica following the creation of national parties.³¹⁶¹ In Rogatica, the SDA and the SDS were formed in the first half of 1990 and in early September 1990 respectively.³¹⁶² Sveto Veselinović was elected president of the SDS in Rogatica and was also the president of the SDS Romanija Regional Board.³¹⁶³ The SDA won the most seats in the 1990 elections;³¹⁶⁴ however, an agreement was reached in 1991 between the SDA and SDS as to how specific posts in the municipality should be filled.³¹⁶⁵

³¹⁵⁵ Indictment, paras. 69, 72.

³¹⁵⁶ Indictment, para. 71.

³¹⁵⁷ D484 (Map of BiH).

³¹⁵⁸ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 4 (under seal). *See also* D232 (Directive 1, 6 June 1992), p. 4.

³¹⁵⁹ P4994 (Addendum to Ewa Tabeau's expert report entitled "Ethnic Composition in Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from 27 Municipalities of BiH 1991 to 1997", 3 February 2009), pp. 21, 31, 34, 37, 40; P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 3; D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 5; P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 4 (under seal); P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 5 (under seal); D2351 (Witness statement of Stevan Veljović dated 19 October 2012), para. 6; Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 838. *See also* P3281 (Map of Rogatica showing ethnic composition); P2829 (Map of Rogatica municipality marked by Asim Džambasović); Momčilo Mandić, T. 5299 (16 July 2010).

³¹⁶⁰ D2351 (Witness statement of Stevan Veljović dated 19 October 2012), para. 6. *See also* P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 12; P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 3–4.

³¹⁶¹ D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 3.

³¹⁶² D3038 (Witness statement of Novica Andrić dated 23 February 2013), para. 3; D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 4; D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 3.

³¹⁶³ D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), paras. 3, 9; D2958 (Press statement of SDS Romanija Regional Board, 11 May 1991); P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 5; P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 5 (under seal); P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 8, 10–11 (under seal). Other senior members of the SDS included Veljko Bojović, Rajko Kušić, Tomo Pavlović, Dušan Planojević and Mile Ujčić. P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 5.

³¹⁶⁴ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 5 (under seal). *See also* Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 837–838, 890–891; Momčilo Mandić, T. 5299 (16 July 2010); P2829 (Map of Rogatica municipality marked by Asim Džambasović); P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 3–4.

³¹⁶⁵ D2957 (Minutes of meeting in Rogatica, 4 January 1991); D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 5; Sveto Veselinović, T. 33873–33874 (18 February 2013).

A multi-party government was formed under which Adil Lutvić, a Bosnian Muslim, was elected President of the municipality and the President of the Executive Board was a Bosnian Serb named Mile Ujić.³¹⁶⁶ Tomislav Batinić was elected Vice President of the Municipal Assembly.³¹⁶⁷ Ismet Osmanović, a Bosnian Muslim, became Chief of the SJB, the Commander of the SJB was Ramiz Alajbegović, and the deputy Chief of the SJB was a Bosnian Serb, Mladen Vasiljević.³¹⁶⁸

940. Disagreements arose between the SDS and the SDA about the division of functions and there were protests that the SDA had violated the inter-party agreement on the division of power.³¹⁶⁹ A joint government continued to function until as late as mid-1991; however, co-operation deteriorated after the SDA municipal leadership started supporting the secession of BiH.³¹⁷⁰ **(There must be kept in mind that the last time when BiH was “independent” within the NDH, the Serbs had been exterminated in Rogatica. Also, it must not be forgotten that an independence couldn’t be achieved without a consent of all the three constituent peoples – the Muslims, Serbs and Croats. All other was a drastic violation of the constitutional rights!)** Police, coffee shops, restaurants, bars, businesses, and clubs became divided along ethnic lines.³¹⁷¹

941. In mid-1991, during political rallies that were held and attended by thousands, Bosnian Serbs delivered nationalist speeches.³¹⁷² This sentiment was reflected in the speeches of SDS officials who said that the time had come for the Serbian people to unite and create an “integral state”, that they would not allow the secession of BiH, that Serbs and Muslims could no longer live together, and that they wanted to “create a Serbian state, once and for all”.³¹⁷³ Veselinović stated that the Bosnian Serbs were “ready and [...] 1941 will never be repeated”.³¹⁷⁴ **(Did the Chamber now what was that in 1941?)** These rallies and speeches created insecurity amongst the Bosnian Muslim population.³¹⁷⁵ **(That is ridiculous! The Muslims were majority, and were already organised in the Patriotic League units, and the only side that felt insecure was the Serb side!)** Inflammatory

³¹⁶⁶ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 8; P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 5 (under seal); D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 6; D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 4; P6104 (Record of interview with Mile Ujić, 6 June 2004), p. 2. See also Sveto Veselinović, T. 33874 (18 February 2013).

³¹⁶⁷ D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 6.

³¹⁶⁸ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 8; P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 5 (under seal); D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 12.

³¹⁶⁹ D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 7; Sveto Veselinović, T. 33875 (18 February 2013); D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 12; D2951 (Article entitled “Barricades in Front of the Municipal Assembly”). See also P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 9 (under seal); KDZ606, T. 18292–18293 (5 September 2011) (closed session).

³¹⁷⁰ D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), paras. 8–9; Sveto Veselinović, T. 33875 (18 February 2013).

³¹⁷¹ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 4, 7; KDZ051, T. 19367–19368 (22 September 2011); D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 8. See also D3031 (Witness statement of Milovan Lelek dated 23 February 2013), para. 6; D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 13.

³¹⁷² P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 14, 18–19 (under seal). Sveto Veselinović stated that the rhetoric at the majority of pre-election gatherings was not inflammatory and that the need for maximum co-operation between the SDS, the SDA, and other parties was stressed. D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 3. The Chamber finds that Veselinović’s evidence that the majority of pre-election gatherings were not inflammatory is not inconsistent with inter-ethnic hatred being fueled at some rallies.

³¹⁷³ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 15–16, 18 (under seal); P3409 (Video footage of statement by Serbian Mayor of Rogatica); KDZ051, T. 19360 (22 September 2011). See also P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 2.

³¹⁷⁴ D2953 (Article from Politika entitled “SDA Causing Crisis”), p. 1; D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 9; Sveto Veselinović, T. 33901–33902 (18 February 2013).

³¹⁷⁵ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 17, 19 (under seal).

statements were also made by Bosnian Muslim leaders.³¹⁷⁶ **(Why the Judgement doesn't say #how the Serbs felt about it#?)**

942. Inter-ethnic relations further deteriorated when war broke out in Croatia and Bosnian Muslims refused to fight in the TO but went to Croatia for training.³¹⁷⁷ **(To train killing the Serbs!)** At a gathering at a stadium in Rogatica, JNA officers made an announcement that Bosnian Muslim reservists were no longer needed and that Bosnian Muslims who did not want to fight in Croatia were not to come back.³¹⁷⁸ From January to February 1992, members of the SDS travelled to Bosnian Serb villages and informed the Bosnian Serbs that there was “a Muslim threat” and they should be prepared to protect themselves; this encouraged Serb nationalism.³¹⁷⁹ **(How possibly a #precautionary measures aimed at defence, “protect themselves” could have encouraged Serb nationalism#? In January and February 1992 there was more than 98 municipal headquarters and commands, and at least so many armed units of the Patriotic League, as General Sefer Halilovic confessed in D:298, p.2)**

1. Militarisation of Rogatica

943. As early as 1990 the weapons stored in the TO headquarters in Rogatica were moved to the barracks in Han Pijesak and placed under the control of the JNA.³¹⁸⁰ **(The Serbs in BiH had nothing to do with that move. The #JNA perceived an attack on the JNA, and further an inter-ethnic conflict, and tried to correct the wrong doctrine of “Armed people” established during the Tito’s rule and in fear from the Soviet intervention!#Before the VRS#)** Towards the end of 1991, there was an increased presence of JNA troops in Rogatica.³¹⁸¹ From this time, the 1st Mountain Battalion of the JNA was deployed to Bosnian Serb areas of Rogatica. At night, they armed local Bosnian Serbs with the assistance of the Bosnian Serb political and military officials.³¹⁸² **(#Legal**

³¹⁷⁶ D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), paras. 15–16; D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 9; D2952 (SDS Romanija Regional Board communiqué, 6 May 1991); D2958 (Press statement of SDS Romanija Regional Board, 11 May 1991); Sveto Veselinović, T. 33876 (18 February 2013); Mile Ujić, T. 33440–33441 (12 February 2013). The Chamber also received evidence about increasing Bosnian Muslim nationalism after the referendum on the secession of BiH. D3038 (Witness statement of Novica Andrić dated 23 February 2013), para. 5; D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 4; D2351 (Witness statement of Stevan Veljović dated 19 October 2012), para. 8. *See also* D1374 (Report of JNA 4th Corps command, 30 October 1991).

³¹⁷⁷ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 10; P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 6 (under seal); P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), pp. 2–3; D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 20; D3031 (Witness statement of Milovan Lelek dated 23 February 2013), para. 5. *See also* P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 2 (testifying that relations between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims further deteriorated in March 1992).

³¹⁷⁸ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 10; KDZ051, T. 19375–19376 (22 September 2011).

³¹⁷⁹ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 21 (under seal).

³¹⁸⁰ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 22 (under seal); KDZ606, T. 18302 (5 September 2011) (closed session) (confirming that these weapons were moved by the previous government before the elections); D3038 (Witness statement of Novica Andrić dated 23 February 2013), paras. 7–8.

³¹⁸¹ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 844.

³¹⁸² P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), paras. 39, 43, 46–47, 49, 53; P3404 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 17–18 (under seal); P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 19–22; P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 2; P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 23, 25–28 (under seal); KDZ606, T. 18311–18312 (5 September 2011) (closed session); P3281 (Map of Rogatica showing ethnic composition). Džambasović stated that the removal and distribution of JNA weapons was “very well planned and organised by senior Serb political and military officials” given the normal strict controls on the distribution of JNA weapons and ammunition. P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), paras. 46, 49, 53; P2831 (Diary of Asim Džambasović), pp. 10, 27. In support of the observation that this was organised, Džambasović testified that the JNA had powerful security and military judicial structures which “would not tolerate such weapons diversions” and yet despite the serious transgressions the headquarters, security organs and military prosecutors did nothing. P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 53–54; P2831 (Diary of Asim Džambasović), pp. 10, 18, 27–28; P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999, p. 3; P2830 (Report of 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, 25 February 1993), pp. 1, 3. *See also* P1383 (Transcript of 36th session of RS Assembly, 30-31

and obligatory# The JNA had every right to replenish their troops by any reservists, and since the Muslim and Croat reservists rejected to respond, the JNA relied only on the Serbs! Those who didn't respond to mobilisations, violated the federal law!) Bosnian Serbs also started organising village guards at night in the second half of 1991.³¹⁸³
(A #strictly defensive measure!#)

944. Members of the SDS were also involved in transporting weapons to local communes, where they were distributed to surrounding villages.³¹⁸⁴ This distribution of weapons continued in the spring of 1992,³¹⁸⁵ and local Bosnian Serbs also started wearing military uniforms.³¹⁸⁶ Mladen Vasiljević was involved in these arming operations³¹⁸⁷ as was Rajko Kušić who was a member of the SDS Main Board.³¹⁸⁸ **(#Legal and obligatory# But the main fact is that they had been the reserve army officers, not that they had been in the SDS. Since the JNA mobilised the reserve, they had to wore uniforms and carry out their duties. Not to forget that it was a legal obligation for the Muslims in Rogatica too, but they sabotaged every action of the JNA, which was punishable!)**

945. The SDA was also involved in arming the Bosnian Muslim population and in forming Bosnian Muslim units from late 1990.³¹⁸⁹ **(And this arming was illegal and criminal, because the JNA didn't direct it, and because this arming was aimed to organise an attack on the JNA and the Serbs! #For war#!)** There was also a mobilisation of the police reserve which primarily included Bosnian Muslims.³¹⁹⁰ The Chamber also

December 1993), p. 164; P5844 (Intercept of conversation between Jovan Tintor and Ratko Adžić, 14 October 1991), p. 2; D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 28.

3183 D3038 (Witness statement of Novica Andrić dated 23 February 2013), para. 6. *See also* D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 14; D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 12.

3184 P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 31–32 (under seal).

3185 Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 848–850; Adjudicated Fact 1972; P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 2. Defence witnesses testified that the JNA did not arm Bosnian Serbs in Rogatica and only supplied weapons to those who joined the JNA. D3038 (Witness statement of Novica Andrić dated 23 February 2013), para. 8; D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 17; Sveto Veselinović, T. 33898–33899 (18 February 2013). *See also* D3031 (Witness statement of Milovan Lelek dated 23 February 2013), para. 15. However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber found that the evidence of Andrić was marked by evasiveness and indicators that he was not completely forthright in his testimony in this regard. With respect to Batinić, the Chamber noted that he simply stated that he did not know about the arming of Bosnian Serbs by the JNA and claimed that given his position he “would probably have known if something like that had happened”. D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 17. The Chamber finds this to be purely speculative and is not convinced that it can rely on this evidence. With respect to Veselinović, the Chamber noted conflicting statements which undermined the reliability of his evidence on this issue.

3186 P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 2.

3187 P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 31–33 (under seal). Other members of the SDS identified by KDZ606 as involved in the arming of Bosnian Serbs included Radan Bojović, Miloš Rajak, and Mićo Andrić.

3188 Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 849–850. Kušić was responsible for contact with the JNA and was “heavily involved” in the effort to arm local Bosnian Serbs. P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), paras. 28, 39. *See also* P3408 (List of members of SDS’ Main Board), p. 2 (which confirms that Kušić was a member of the SDS Main Board).

3189 D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), paras. 10–11, 17, 30; D3038 (Witness statement of Novica Andrić dated 23 February 2013), para. 4; D3031 (Witness statement of Milovan Lelek dated 23 February 2013), paras. 6–7; Milovan Lelek, T. 34374 (27 February 2013); D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), paras. 11, 21; P2832 (Article from Srpska Vojska article entitled “They Saved Serbian Land”, 15 July 1993), p. 2; D2351 (Witness statement of Stevan Veljović dated 19 October 2012), paras. 4–5, 35; P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 2 (stating that Bosnian Muslim villages organised night watches but were poorly armed). *But see* Asim Džambasović, T. 15156 (22 June 2011); P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 23; P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 2; KDZ051, T. 19388–19390 (22 September 2011); Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 859–860, 884; P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 57 (under seal).

3190 D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 11–12; Tomislav Batinić, T. 33676 (14 February 2013); D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), paras. 12.

received evidence about actions by Bosnian Muslims, including attacks against Bosnian Serbs.³¹⁹¹

946. There was a close relationship between the Bosnian Serb officers in the 216th Mountain Brigade of the JNA and members of the SDS leadership. The latter would often come to the brigade's barracks and meet its Commander Dragomir Milošević.³¹⁹² As Chief of Staff of the 216th Mountain Brigade, Asim Džambasović discussed these visits and irregularities relating to the control of weapons with Dragomir Milošević and the Commander of the 4th Corps of the JNA, but no action was taken.³¹⁹³ As early as January 1992 Bosnian Serbs started refusing to take orders from non-Serb officers in the JNA.³¹⁹⁴
(Contacts between the local SDS authorities and JNA were #Legal and obligatory#, and all the Muslim and Croat conscripts and reservists did it was illegal ever since 1990 and from beginning of 1991!)

947. In March 1992, volunteers were mobilised but given the Bosnian Muslim boycott of the mobilisation, Bosnian Serbs became predominant in the JNA.³¹⁹⁵ **(So, the Serbs didn't make the JNA predominantly Serbian, that was the Bosnian Muslim's achievement! At the same time, the Muslim able-bodied men were under the command of SDA, while the Serb soldiers were handed over to the JNA, and if the JNA betrayed, there wouldn't be any Serb in BiH!)** Following this mobilisation, two Bosnian Serb battalions of the 216th Mountain Brigade were formed and members of the SDS assisted in this mobilisation.³¹⁹⁶ **(A #legal obligation#, not only for a party in power, but for any party in a political system!)** A Bosnian Serb TO was formed in March 1992 after the Rogatica TO split by agreement into Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb parts.³¹⁹⁷ **(It was a municipal TO, while the RS TO was formed on 18 April 1992, see D3703. There should be a basic knowledge about the local laws!)** The Bosnian Serb TO had access to weapons from the former Rogatica TO³¹⁹⁸ and was subsequently integrated into the Army of the

³¹⁹¹ D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), paras. 17, 30–31; D2351 (Witness statement of Stevan Veljović dated 19 October 2012), para. 9; P2832 (Article from Srpska Vojska entitled “They Saved Serbian Land”, 15 July 1993), p. 3; Milovan Lelek, T. 34429–34430 (27 February 2013). KDZ606 testified that Kušić had feigned attacks against Bosnian Serb villages and used that as pretext to enter these villages and instil fear about attacks by Bosnian Muslim paramilitaries which created support to conduct clearing operations in the area. P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 57 (under seal). However, the Chamber finds this evidence to be too speculative and will not rely on it in this regard.

³¹⁹² P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), paras. 2, 76–78, 80; Asim Džambasović, T. 15156–15157, 15168–15169 (22 June 2011). The SDS leaders who visited Dragomir Milošević between January and March 1992 included Rajko Dukić. Adjudicated Fact 1974.

³¹⁹³ Asim Džambasović, T. 15157 (22 June 2011); P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), paras. 53–54, 90–91; P2831 (Diary of Asim Džambasović), pp. 21, 28.

³¹⁹⁴ P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 91; P2831 (Diary of Asim Džambasović), pp. 4, 8, 21. *See also* Asim Džambasović, T. 15178 (22 June 2011).

³¹⁹⁵ P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), paras. 55–56; P2831 (Diary of Asim Džambasović), p. 22. *See also* D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 7; Tomislav Batinić, T. 33676 (14 February 2013); D2351 (Witness statement of Stevan Veljović dated 19 October 2012), para. 10; D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 10; D2954 (SDS Rogatica Municipal Board information, undated); Sveto Veselinović, T. 33898, 33900 (18 February 2013), T. 45093–45094 (16 December 2013); D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 8; D2953 (Article from Politika entitled “SDA Causing Crisis”); P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 3; Dragomir Milošević, T. 32495–32497 (23 January 2013). The Chamber received evidence about attempts by Bosnian Muslims to move conscript files to prevent disciplinary action against those who failed to respond to the call-up for mobilisation but finds this to be of limited relevance. *See* D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 9–10; D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 37.

³¹⁹⁶ *See* Adjudicated Fact 1971; P3270 (Letter to SRBiH Presidency, Government and Ministry of National Defence re formation of Serb forces in Rogatica, not dated), p. 2; KDZ606, T. 18257–18258 (2 September 2011) (closed session) (indicating that this document reflected the situation in Rogatica). *See also* D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 7; D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 10.

³¹⁹⁷ Milovan Lelek, T. 34373–34374 (27 February 2013).

³¹⁹⁸ D3038 (Witness statement of Novica Andrić dated 23 February 2013), para. 7.

SerBiH pursuant to a decision of the Presidency of SerBiH on 19 May 1992.³¹⁹⁹ In March 1992, volunteers arrived from Serbia in military and civilian vehicles, and were housed, fed, and supplied in the JNA barracks.³²⁰⁰ **(#Before VRS#! Certainly, they had been volunteering in the JNA, and the President and Bosnian Serbs had nothing to do with it. That was regulated by an order of the federal Presidency, SFRY)** In the spring of 1992, there was an increase in JNA equipment such as artillery, canons, tanks, armed vehicles, and columns of infantry passing through Rogatica.³²⁰¹ **(This had nothing to do with the Serbs in Bosnia, nor with president Karadžić). The JNA was withdrawing from Slovenia and Croatia, carrying its equipment! #Before VRS#!)**

948. Kušić was described as the “commander of all military matters in Rogatica”.³²⁰² **(How come, a Kusić’s adversary qualified Kusić, and the Chamber adopted this opinion?)** In late February or early March 1992 a military formation was organised in the predominantly Bosnian Serb village of Borike under the command of Kušić³²⁰³ who had close connections with both the Accused and Krajišnik.³²⁰⁴ Even though Kušić’s unit was not formally listed in the JNA records it operated under the auspices of Dragomir Milošević³²⁰⁵ and was formed within the 1st Battalion, which was commanded by Radomir Furtula.³²⁰⁶ **(#Legal and obligatory!# #Before VRS# This is a sufficient connection with the JNA, since both mobilisation and arming was within the law and in the JNA competences. The Kusić’s unit was a reserve battalion of the 216th JNA Brigade)**

949. In April 1992, Kušić stated that “he and the JNA had to defend Serbian people and Serbian land”.³²⁰⁷ **(#Legal and obligatory#! #Before VRS#! What is wrong with that? This is a humane and legal obligation. Far before the Kusić’s unit was assembled there existed the Patriotic League and Green Berets, a several times more numerous! Ku{i} clearly identified his unit as a part of the JNA, and not as a part of the VRS, since it didn’t exist before 20 May 1992.)** At first Kušić’s unit consisted of approximately 40 to 50

³¹⁹⁹ P2835 (Report of Rogatica Crisis Staff, April–June 1992), pp. 6–7. *See also* D3031 (Witness statement of Milovan Lelek dated 23 February 2013), paras. 9–10.

³²⁰⁰ P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 72; P2831 (Diary of Asim Džambasović), p. 34. Džambasović testified that the term ‘volunteer’ was used to describe groups of people from Serbia and Vojvodina, who came through the municipality. P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 72. *See also* P6104 (Record of interview with Mile Ujić, 6 June 2004), p. 5.

³²⁰¹ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 844–845, 891 (testifying that the soldiers wore the grey olive uniforms). *See also* P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 8 (under seal).

³²⁰² P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 53; P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 7 (under seal). *See also* P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 66.

³²⁰³ P2834 (Report of 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, 18 December 1994), p. 1 (indicating that this military formation was formed on 24 February 1992); Asim Džambasović, T. 15152–15153 (22 June 2011), T. 15296 (23 June 2011); P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 7, 63 (under seal); P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 2; D568 (Speech of Dragomir Milošević, 30 March 1996), p. 2; KDZ606, T. 18255–18258 (2 September 2011) (closed session); KDZ051, T. 19356 (22 September 2011). Džambasović confirmed that this report was generally consistent with his knowledge on the issue, but that he thought the unit had been formed on 4 March 1992. P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), paras. 56, 58, 66, 121; Asim Džambasović, T. 15154 (22 June 2011); Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 846–847. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 1973. Džambasović marked the location of Borike on P2829 (Map of Rogatica municipality marked by Asim Džambasović). The unit also operated in the predominantly Bosnian Serb village of Gučevo. Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 846–847. *See also* P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 63 (under seal).

³²⁰⁴ P1154 (Witness statement of KDZ088 dated 27–29 April 2010), pp. 158–159 (under seal). As mentioned above, Kušić was also a member of the SDS Main Board. P3408 (List of members of the SDS’ Main Board), p. 2.

³²⁰⁵ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 49 (under seal); P2831 (Diary of Asim Džambasović), p. 27; *see* Adjudicated Fact 1973. *See also* Sveto Veselinović, T. 33912 (18 February 2013).

³²⁰⁶ P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), paras. 56, 58. *See also* P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 26; KDZ606, T. 18257–18258 (2 September 2011) (closed session); P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 8 (under seal); D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 28.

³²⁰⁷ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 25.

men, described as “SDS activists”.³²⁰⁸ Members of this unit wore camouflage uniforms and carried automatic weapons, and included members of the reserve police.³²⁰⁹ **(#Legal and obligatory#! Certainly, because it was a legal unit)** Kušić’s unit was initially known as the Rogatica Brigade and, when the VRS was formed, it became part of the SRK.³²¹⁰ On 22 May 1992, the Command of the SRK issued an order which acknowledged the formation of the Rogatica Brigade under the command of Kušić and provided for its restructure.³²¹¹ Kušić was able to arm the Rogatica Brigade from JNA weaponry of the 1st Battalion.³²¹² The Rogatica Brigade consisted of three infantry battalions and smaller support units for communications, logistics, medical care, and MP.³²¹³ Kušić also formed units in Seljani, Mesići and Pešurići, which included SDS supporters and individuals brought from Serbia, including the White Eagles.³²¹⁴ Later, when the Drina Corps was formed in November 1992, the Rogatica Brigade became the 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade of the Drina Corps.³²¹⁵

950. Members of the Rogatica Brigade mistreated and terrorised the Bosnian Muslim population and conducted patrols on roads.³²¹⁶ They also entered villages and fired weapons into the air in order to threaten Bosnian Muslims.³²¹⁷ In addition there were incidents of shooting at Bosnian Muslim houses and mosques which, together with the arming of the Bosnian Serbs, intimidated local Bosnian Muslims.³²¹⁸ Members of the Rogatica Brigade also entered villages, sang nationalist songs, carried out searches of Bosnian Muslims, and seized vehicles.³²¹⁹ Bosnian Serb soldiers also harassed Bosnian Muslims by making derogatory remarks.³²²⁰ Džambasović complained on a number of occasions to higher commanders about these incidents, but no action was taken, and he was actually warned by Furtula that he should not enforce discipline.³²²¹ With time,

³²⁰⁸ P2830 (Report of 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, 25 February 1993), p. 2; *see* Adjudicated Facts 2494, 2500; P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 53 (under seal); P3270 (Letter to SRBiH Presidency, Government and Ministry of National Defence re formation of Serb forces in Rogatica, not dated), p. 2 (indicating that “30 armed Serbs” were brought to Borike); KDZ606, T. 18257–18258 (2 September 2011) (closed session) (indicating that P3270 reflected the situation in Rogatica).

³²⁰⁹ *See* Adjudicated Fact 2500. The insignia of this unit stated “With the trust in God, Freedom or Death” and members had a skull and the word SDS written on their caps. P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 24. *See also* D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 14; Tomislav Batinić, T. 33676 (14 February 2013); D3031 (Witness statement of Milovan Lelek dated 23 February 2013), para. 7; Milovan Lelek, T. 34373–34375 (27 February 2013); D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 13; Sveto Veselinović, T. 33877, 33896 (18 February 2013); P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 119 (referring to P2830 (Report of 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, 25 February 1993), p. 2).

³²¹⁰ P2834 (Report of 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, 18 December 1994), p. 1; P2830 (Report of 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, 25 February 1993), pp. 4, 15; D308 (SRK Order, 22 May 1992), p. 2; P2835 (Report of Rogatica Crisis Staff, April – June 1992), pp. 6–7. *See also* D3031 (Witness statement of Milovan Lelek dated 23 February 2013), para. 15. The Chamber shall thus refer to the Rogatica Brigade up until 1 November 1992.

³²¹¹ P1505 (SRK Order, 22 May 1992), e-court pp. 1–2.

³²¹² P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 65; Sveto Veselinović, T. 33912 (18 February 2013).

³²¹³ D3031 (Witness statement of Milovan Lelek dated 23 February 2013), para. 16. By June 1992, the Rogatica Brigade grew to over 1,400 men who were trained for combat, wore uniforms and carried automatic weapons and had also formed one intervention company. P5485 (Report of Rogatica Brigade, 15 June 1992). By December 1992 the strength of the 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade was reported to be in excess of 2,700. P2955 (Report of the Drina Corps, 17 December 1992), p. 6.

³²¹⁴ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 40, 54, 63 (under seal); KDZ606, T. 18313 (5 September 2011) (closed session).

³²¹⁵ P2834 (Report of 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, 18 December 1994), p. 1.

³²¹⁶ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 14, 24; P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 66. *See also* P2831 (Diary of Asim Džambasović), p. 27.

³²¹⁷ *See* Adjudicated Fact 2500. *See also* P3270 (Letter to SRBiH Presidency, Government and Ministry of National Defence re formation of Serb forces in Rogatica, undated), p. 2.

³²¹⁸ P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 2. Volunteers also showed the three-finger Serb sign and shot in the direction of Bosnian Muslims. P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 72.

³²¹⁹ P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), paras. 67–68.

³²²⁰ P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 43.

³²²¹ P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), paras. 43–45.

Džambasović was progressively stripped of his duties and authority; on 6 April 1992, he was told that his safety could not be guaranteed and he left the JNA.³²²² **(#Before VRS#! Since the war started on 6 April 1992, it is obvious that Dzambasovic didn't have any opportunity to witness anything of what is described in this paragraph. Before the war broke out, there was no any action of the Kusic's unit, there were talks between the Muslim and Serb representatives about how to avoid a war, and all those allegations a nothing but a malice of KDZ051, who was in a good terms with the Serb authorities, accused by the Muslims for treason, and Dzambasovic, who left the JNA the first day of war!)**

951. The presence of the Rogatica Brigade forced the Bosnian Muslim police to withdraw from Borike and caused further anxiety amongst the Bosnian Muslim population.³²²³ **(Since a division of the police into two was already appointed, what would the Muslim police do in Borike, a 93% Serbian settlement?)** The Bosnian Serb police and the Rogatica Brigade also engaged in looting from Bosnian Muslims.³²²⁴ The Accused, as President of the Presidency of the SerBiH, **(#Wrong in fact#! A severe error in fact: the Accused hadn't been even a member of the Presidency before 12 May 1992, and had no competences over the police or any other armed formation. Also, the Rogatica Brigade didn't exist in March 92, there was only a reserve battalion of the JNA! Finally, the reserve police in Rogatica was enlarged by mobilisation of many Muslims, including those who took training in Croatia! This happens because the Chamber had an unlimited trust for the Muslim witnesses!)** was informed in March 1992 that due to the actions of the Rogatica Brigade, Bosnian Muslims sought protection from the Rogatica SJB.³²²⁵

952. On 23 March 1992, a Bosnian Muslim was stopped and maltreated by a group of four armed persons in camouflage uniforms. These men were under the leadership of Kušić.³²²⁶ Following this incident, Bosnian Muslims set up barricades in Rogatica and demanded the withdrawal of the Rogatica Brigade.³²²⁷ **(#Wrong in fact!# Before VRS#! #Cause-consequence confusion#! That was the Muslim opposition to the JNA presence, within the Izetbegovic's order to sabotage the JNA! President Karadzic had nothing to do with that, since he was not in command of the JNA! The Muslim conduct was a highly unlawful!)** On 24 March 1992, the Bosnian Serbs also erected barricades.³²²⁸

³²²² P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), paras. 82, 113.

³²²³ P3270 (Letter to SRBiH Presidency, Government and Ministry of National Defence re formation of Serb forces in Rogatica, not dated), p. 2; KDZ606 testified that this document reflected the situation in Rogatica. KDZ606, T. 18255–18258 (2 September 2011) (closed session); P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 65, 74 (under seal); P3269 (Report of SRBiH MUP re BiH security situation on 6–7 March 1992), p. 3.

³²²⁴ P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 3; P3407 (Report on the work of the Rogatica Municipal Assembly and Executive Board from July 1992 to September 1993), pp. 31–32. See also P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 66 (stating that Dragomir Milošević did not do anything to stop this).

³²²⁵ P3269 (Report of SRBiH MUP re BiH security situation on 6–7 March 1992), p. 3; KDZ606, T. 18255–18256 (2 September 2011) (closed session); P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 65 (under seal).

³²²⁶ P2838 (SerBiH MUP Bulletin on daily events, 24 March 1992), p. 2; P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 118.

³²²⁷ P2838 (SerBiH MUP Bulletin on daily events, 24 March 1992), p. 2; D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 15. See also D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 17.

³²²⁸ P3271 (Report of Rogatica's Executive Board, 24 March 1992), p. 1; KDZ606, T. 18259–18262 (2 September 2011) (closed session); P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 75 (under seal); P128 (Alija Isaković's statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 2; D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 15. See also KDZ607, T. 18495–18497 (6 September 2011). For location of the roadblocks, see D2912 (Map of Rogatica). But see P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 68 (according to whom it is not clear who set up the barricades first). The Chamber also received evidence that roadblocks had already been established by Bosnian Serbs in mid-1991 after the formation of Bosnian Muslim paramilitary units. D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 17.

Serb Forces sealed off the town of Rogatica using armoured vehicles and tanks, blocked all roads, prevented the movement of the Bosnian Muslim population and cut their phone lines and utilities.³²²⁹

(#Before VRS#! #No “Serb Forces existed#! All done by the JNA due to their assumptions on security situation for their soldiers. What president Karadžić has to do with any military event before 20 May 1992???) The Rogatica Brigade manned the check-points at the entrance to most Bosnian Serb villages and Bosnian Muslims who tried to pass through the check-points faced difficulties.³²³⁰ The erection of barricades on both sides and the media in BiH contributed to the instillation of fear and anxiety in the population.³²³¹ **(President Karadžić) didn’t have even a minimal influence on the BH media, and this was an additional reason to demand the three ethnic TV channels. In Serbia itself there was always channels for national minorities, on Hungarian, Albanian, Rumanian, Bulgarian languages, but in BiH there was impossible to obtain a national media for the constituent nations! Even now the Croats are deprived from it!)**

953. From the latter half of May 1992, the citizens of Rogatica could no longer receive BiH television and were thus limited to Serbian-based television and radio broadcasts.³²³²

(#Only the Serb parts#! The then Rogatica was in the Republic of Srpska, while the Muslim municipality of Rogatica could have joined the BH Federation. As well known, up until the end of May the Serb and Muslim members of the municipal Assembly were creating the two municipalities, see D4672) Certain broadcasts emphasised that Bosnian Serbs who were threatened in BiH should join together, mobilise and join the Army of the SerBiH.³²³³ These calls to mobilise were made “in the name of the Serb Republic and the presidency” and the Accused.³²³⁴ **(#Legal and legitimate#, since the decision on forming VRS was made on 12 May 1992, and the VRS started to exist on 20 May 92. In all the agreements there was envisaged that the constituent units in BiH would have the police, and either the army, or the national guard! #Envisaged by the ICFY#!)**

2. Creation of Bosnian Serb Institutions

954. As discussed above,³²³⁵ the SAO Romanija (comprising the municipalities of Pale, Sokolac, Han Pijesak and Rogatica) was unilaterally proclaimed in September 1991 with the assistance of the SDS.³²³⁶ Mile Ujić was nominated as the representative from Rogatica.³²³⁷ Ujić was also the President of the SDS Executive Board in Rogatica.³²³⁸ **(#Only the Serb part#! #Due to laws and Constitution# First, it was a community of**

³²²⁹ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 45 (under seal).

³²³⁰ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 846–848; P2838 (SerBiH MUP Bulletin on daily events, 24 March 1992), p. 2; P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 118 (indicating that the information in the MUP bulletin is consistent with the information he possessed at the time).

³²³¹ D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 15. *See also* KDZ051, T. 19381, 19383 (22 September 2011). The Chamber also received evidence about attacks against Bosnian Serbs. D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), paras. 18–19, 30.

³²³² Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 856.

³²³³ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 856.

³²³⁴ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 856.

³²³⁵ *See* political structures section para. 130.

³²³⁶ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 892, 896 (testifying that Rogatica was included in the SAO Romanija even though it was ethnically mixed); *see* Adjudicated Fact 1923; D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 13.

³²³⁷ D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 13.

³²³⁸ P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 79.

municipalities, and it was entirely legal action. This pertained only to the Serb municipality of Rogatica! But, it is very significant that the Chamber is contesting legal and lawful formation of “community of municipalities” and “SAO” as unilateral, while unlawful and anti-Constitutional unilateral secession of BiH as legal!)

955. The Assembly of the Serb Municipality of Rogatica was established in on December 1991³²³⁹ in accordance with the Variant A/B Instructions.³²⁴⁰ At the inaugural session of the Rogatica Serb Municipal Assembly held on 26 December 1991, Batinić, an SDS leader, was proclaimed President of the municipality.³²⁴¹

956. Towards the end of 1991, following a request of the SDS Main Board, an SDS Crisis Staff was formed in Rogatica to monitor the situation and inform the party leadership “if there was a dramatic turn of events”.³²⁴² **(Exactly! The party Crisis Staffs didn’t have any competence of the authority, but only to monitor and inform the Party seat! However, the Judgement didn’t always differentiate the two kinds of stuffs)** The Rogatica Crisis Staff was established at a session of the SDS Main Board on 8 April 1992 and Milorad Sokolović was appointed its president.³²⁴³ The Rogatica Crisis Staff was composed of Bosnian Serb members of the joint municipal organs and included prominent Bosnian Serbs who were not members of the SDS.³²⁴⁴ As such, it was an expansion of the SDS Crisis Staff.³²⁴⁵ **(This is wrong and unacceptable #distortion of facts.# There were many individuals from the SDS Crisis Staff, but they were in the municipal CS due to their duties. But, the most important difference is that the SDS CS didn’t have any ingerence as authorities, while the municipal CS was a substitute to the regular authorities in an extraordinary circumstances.)**

957. The Rogatica Crisis Staff operated from the beginning of the war and was authorised to adopt decisions falling under the jurisdiction of the Rogatica Serb Municipal

³²³⁹ P3407 (Report on the work of the Rogatica Municipal Assembly and Executive Board from July 1992 to September 1993), e-court p. 5; see Adjudicated Fact 2498; D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 14. See also P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 6 (under seal); KDZ607, T. 18493 (6 September 2011); Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 855. The Rogatica Serb Municipal Assembly was composed of all Serb Council Members who were elected at the multi-party elections and following the instructions of the SDS Main Board, it also included the presidents of the SDS local boards from the municipality. P3407 (Report on the work of the Rogatica Municipal Assembly and Executive Board from July 1992 to September 1993), e-court p. 5.

³²⁴⁰ P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), p. 7; P3407 (Report on the work of the Rogatica Municipal Assembly and Executive Board from July 1992 to September 1993), e-court p. 5; Tomislav Batinić, T. 33669–33670 (14 February 2013).

³²⁴¹ P3407 (Report on the work of the Rogatica Municipal Assembly and Executive Board, from July 1992 to September 1993), e-court p. 8; P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 79; P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 12 (under seal); D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 14, 19. See also KDZ051, T. 19357–19358 (22 September 2011). Batinić testified that while the Serb assembly was formed it never started functioning and only existed on paper and faced difficulties due to the absence of communication with the Presidency and the SDS Main Board. D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 14; Tomislav Batinić, T. 33670–33671–33672, 33712–33713 (14 February 2013). However, the Chamber does not consider this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that Batinić was contradicted on cross-examination about his evidence that there were no assembly sessions but then claimed that it only sat twice. Tomislav Batinić, T. 33671–33673 (14 February 2013).

³²⁴² D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 13; Sveto Veselinović, T. 33877 (18 February 2013).

³²⁴³ Sveto Veselinović, T. 33877 (18 February 2013); P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 122; P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 13 (under seal); Mile Ujić, T. 33450–33451 (12 February 2013); P2835 (Report of Rogatica Crisis Staff, April–June 1992), pp. 1–2; P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 7 (under seal).

³²⁴⁴ D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 13; Sveto Veselinović, T. 33877 (18 February 2013); see Adjudicated Fact 2497. See also Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 855, 894 (testifying that prominent Bosnian Serb citizens were members of the Crisis Staff).

³²⁴⁵ Tomislav Batinić, T. 33673–33674, 33712–33713 (14 February 2013).

Assembly.³²⁴⁶ The Rogatica Crisis Staff was tasked with co-ordinating the work of all municipal administrative organs during a state of war or when under threat of imminent war.³²⁴⁷ The Rogatica Crisis Staff had direct oral and written contact with the Presidency and ministries of the SerBiH, the Bosnian Serb Government, the army, and the police.³²⁴⁸ There was co-operation between the Rogatica Crisis Staff and the Bosnian Serb TO, and later with the VRS.³²⁴⁹ In August 1992, the Executive Board was formed and the Crisis Staff ceased to exist.³²⁵⁰ **(#Legal and obligatory#! All of that was legal, and even obligatory, and does not indicate any crime or violation of any rule, norm or law!)**

958. On 24 March 1992 approximately 3,000 armed Serb soldiers under the leadership of Kušić threatened to open fire on the town of Rogatica unless the municipality and the SJB were divided along ethnic lines that night.³²⁵¹ **(#Time frame# Context# That evening the Muslim side announced the revoke of the Lisbon Agreement, and thus opted for a war! The Serbian population felt extremely insecure if the Muslim police entered their settlements. That is how the war started in Rogatica: the Muslim extremists killed a Serb policemen patrolling on the Serb territory! However, at that time the Kusić's unit was a reserve unit of the 216th Brigade of the JNA, and not under any control or command of President Karadzic! But, Ku{i} demanded that the already reached agreement on reorganisation of the police be implemented, in order to avoid a war!)** These soldiers wore different uniforms, including the uniforms of the JNA, the TO, and included paramilitary formations from Serbia such as the White Eagles.³²⁵² **(#Uniforms and insignias#!#Before VRS#! EXCULPATORY, for this President and the Bosnian Serb authorities. It was well known that the paramilitaries from Serbia, mainly composed of the Serbs whose parents resettled to Serbia, were under the influence of the parties that were opposed to the President and his party, and who appeared as the JNA volunteers, but later some of them became renegades!)** The town was blocked from all

³²⁴⁶ P2835 (Report of Rogatica Crisis Staff, April–June 1992), p. 3–4; P3407 (Report on the work of the Rogatica Municipal Assembly and Executive Board from July 1992 to September 1993), e-court p. 5. See also D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 18, 26–27; D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), paras. 15, 17; Sveto Veselinović, T. 33881, 33892 (18 February 2013) (testifying that the Crisis Staff made all significant decisions during the war).

³²⁴⁷ P2835 (Report of Rogatica Crisis Staff, April–June 1992), p. 3–4. See also D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 18.

³²⁴⁸ P2835 (Report of Rogatica Crisis Staff, April–June 1992), pp. 5–6. Defence witnesses testified that there was no contact with the leadership in Pale between April and June 1992. D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 39. See also Tomislav Batinić, T. 33677 (14 February 2013). However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be of much weight given that the witness's evidence was qualified by what was known to him. In addition when challenged on cross-examination Ujić acknowledged that it would have been the President of the Crisis Staff who had contact if any, and he did not know whether there was such contact. Mile Ujić, T. 33451 (12 February 2013). The Accused also cited to the loss of electricity in Rogatica for five months as a factor which exacerbated the problems with communication. Defence Final Brief, para. 2950, referring to D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 35; D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 25; Sveto Veselinović, T. 33912 (18 February 2013). The Chamber does not consider that the evidence presented supports the conclusion that communication problems were exacerbated by this loss of electricity particularly in light of the other evidence received regarding communication between municipal and higher authorities.

³²⁴⁹ P2835 (Report of Rogatica Crisis Staff, April–June 1992), pp. 6–7.

³²⁵⁰ D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 26–27; D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 15; D2961 (Decision of Rogatica Executive Board, 30 June 1992); Sveto Veselinović, T. 33881 (18 February 2013).

³²⁵¹ P3271 (Report of Rogatica's Executive Board, 24 March 1992); KDZ606, T. 18261 (2 September 2011) (closed session); P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 75 (under seal); P6105 (Notice of resignation, 25 March 1992), p. 1. Mile Ujić testified that both Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim troops threatened to attack the town if it was not divided. Mile Ujić, T. 33451–33452 (12 February 2013). However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that when Ujić was shown a document where he wrote to the Accused only about the threat of the Serb TO to attack the town, he avoided answering the question directly. The Chamber also noted that his evidence was marked by contradictions and evasiveness and could not rely on his testimony in this regard.

³²⁵² KDZ606, T. 18261 (2 September 2011) (closed session); P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 75 (under seal).

sides and there was sporadic firing which continued until morning when it eased.³²⁵³ The Deputy Prime Ministers and the Bosnian Serb MUP were informed about the developments and were immediately requested to come to the municipality in order to reach a negotiated solution to the conflict.³²⁵⁴ Džambasović, along with the commander of the JNA 4th Corps, General Đurđević, and Dragomir Milošević went to Rogatica and after speaking to both sides, secured the removal of most of the barricades.³²⁵⁵ **(Certainly, Džambasovic was a Muslim officer in the JNA, others also in the JNA. What does it have to do with the President, an event from March 9, far #before VRS#?)**

959. In April and May 1992, the Rogatica Crisis Staff was involved in negotiations with the Bosnian Muslim leadership, and formed commissions for the demarcation of territory and division of power within the municipality.³²⁵⁶ In these negotiations even communes with mixed populations were delineated as Serb territories with the agreement from the Bosnian Muslims who sought to avoid conflict.³²⁵⁷ **(#Serb side only#! The decisive issue was who was majority, not whether there was inhabitants from the other community. There were the Serbs in the Muslim Rogatica too! This kind of remarks, obviously done by a low ranking associates of the Chamber, compromises the Judgement and the entire process!)** During negotiations, the SDS representatives said they would report to the Main Board of the SDS in Pale.³²⁵⁸ **(But the main point is missed by the Chamber: had it been accomplished, there would be no population movement, no skirmishes, no war! And the Serb side advised this kind of reorganisation of municipalities, so nobody could dominate over others!)**

960. Some reserve police officers who had been brought into the SJB by the SDS insisted that it was impossible to work together with Bosnian Muslims, that there could be no co-existence and that the Bosnian Serbs would get their own institutions.³²⁵⁹ **(So what? The Serbs didn't accept the secession of BiH, and felt secure only if had their own administration. But, one should notice that this proposal excluded any crime, any domination, any ethnic cleansing, because both communities would have their police which would guarantee them security! #Solution without war#!)** These police officers threatened to join the JNA, which they said would be on their side, and stated that if the Bosnian Muslims offered resistance they would have no chance and would be expelled.³²⁶⁰ SDS representatives sought to divide the SJB and the TO and by March 1992, Bosnian Muslim representatives agreed to this partition.³²⁶¹ The division of the police was

³²⁵³ P3272 (Report of Rogatica Monitoring and Early Warning Center, 25 March 1992), p. 1. [REDACTED].

³²⁵⁴ P3271 (Report of Rogatica's Executive Board, 24 March 1992). See also P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 75 (under seal).

³²⁵⁵ P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 68; Asim Džambasović, T. 15176 (22 June 2011); P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 46–47, 49, 52 (under seal); [REDACTED].

³²⁵⁶ P2835 (Report of Rogatica Crisis Staff, April – June 1992), p. 2; KDZ606, T. 18264–18266 (2 September 2011) (closed session); P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 71 (under seal); D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 14. The Chamber received Defence evidence that the Bosnian Serb authorities wanted to avoid the conflicts which had already broken out in the neighbouring municipalities and continued with negotiations until 22 May 1992. Mile Ujić, T. 33438–33439 (12 February 2013). See also KDZ606, T. 18317 (5 September 2011) (closed session).

³²⁵⁷ KDZ606, T. 18267–18268 (2 September 2011) (closed session) referring to P3273 (Map of Rogatica municipality); P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 81 (under seal).

³²⁵⁸ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 84 (under seal).

³²⁵⁹ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 73 (under seal).

³²⁶⁰ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 73 (under seal). While the witness testified that these police officers claimed that this was the position taken by the Main Board of the SDS, the Chamber is not convinced that they would be in a position to know this information. P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 73 (under seal).

³²⁶¹ (³²¹⁸) See Adjudicated Fact 2495; P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 72, 77 (under seal). See also D3038 (Witness statement of Novica Andrić dated 23 February 2013), para. 6; Milovan Lelek, T. 34373–34374 (27 February 2013).

implemented by Mladen Vasiljević in accordance with orders from the SAO Romanija and with orders issued by the Serb Municipality of Rogatica, and the Rogatica Crisis Staff.³²⁶²

961. The SJB in Rogatica was divided along ethnic lines in April 1992, with the Bosnian Serbs forming their own SJB and moving into a different building.³²⁶³ The Bosnian Muslim police remained in the same premises.³²⁶⁴ The Bosnian Serb police also made changes to their uniform including the use of Cyrillic script and adding a reference to the SDS on their insignia.³²⁶⁵ **(#Wrong in fact!# This is a lie, among many, because it was well known that the Accused himself forbade any political affiliation of the army or police. However, if the Muslim witness saw an amblem with four Cirilic S-s, it was not an SDS, but generally Serbian national amblem! But, since the evidence against this Accused is so empty, adding anything was aimed to make an impression of a substance, which misses!)** Vasiljević became commander of the Bosnian Serb SJB in Rogatica.³²⁶⁶

962. Kušić wanted to attack Rogatica and this brought him into conflict with the Bosnian Serb civilian authorities; as a consequence, as representatives of the civilian authorities, Veselinović, Ujić, and Batinić, tendered their joint resignation to the Accused on 25 March 1992.³²⁶⁷ Bosnian Serbs were alarmed by these resignations and left the city centre out of fear, a new government was formed with the agreement of Kušić and the appointments were confirmed by a Municipal Board meeting of the SDS.³²⁶⁸

Defence witnesses testified that both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims realised that the division of the municipality was the best solution in order to avoid an armed conflict and that this division was consensual. D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 16; Milovan Lelek, T. 34375 (27 February 2013); D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 12. *See also* D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 21; Mile Ujić, T. 33437 (12 February 2013); P6104 (Record of interview with Mile Ujić, 6 June 2004), p. 2; P128 (Alija Isaković's statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 2. However, the Chamber finds that the consensual nature of the division is undermined by credible evidence that during these negotiations, Bosnian Muslim negotiators agreed to the division of the municipality in order to avoid war and to gain time to prevent an attack and that Bosnian Muslims were intimidated and from late 1991, Kušić threatened that if Bosnian Muslims did not agree to the division of the territory they would have no future in the area and would be attacked if they did not leave or pledge loyalty to the Bosnian Serb authorities. [REDACTED]. **(#Cunning strategy# justified by the TC#! So, the Chamber justified the cunning tactics of delaying agreements until they become strong enough! This finding is also contradictory: if both communities had their own municipal authorities, nobody could "expel" anyone. Those Muslims who would stay in the Serb municipality were supposed to accept the authorities and be loyal, while those Serbs and Muslims who would live in the Muslim municipality would be loyal only to the municipality they lived in!)**

³²⁶² Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 852–855, 893. Pašić left duty as police officer on the day the police was divided out of fear of being a Muslim in the regular police force “in a town where there were a number of armed Serbs”. Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 854–855, 881, 893.

³²⁶³ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 853–854; Adjudicated Fact 2496; P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 73 (under seal); P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 9; P2761 (RS MUP report on work for period April to December 1992), p. 7; D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 20; D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 23; P6104 (Record of interview with Mile Ujić, 6 June 2004), pp. 2–3. *See also* KDZ607, T. 18494 (6 September 2011); KDZ051, T. 19373–19374 (22 September 2011).

³²⁶⁴ D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 20. *See also* D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 23.

³²⁶⁵ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 9; Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 853–854.

³²⁶⁶ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011) (under seal), para. 9; KDZ606, T. 18292 (5 September 2011) (closed session).

³²⁶⁷ D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 16; Tomislav Batinić, T. 33674–33678 (14 February 2013); Sveto Veselinović, T. 33878, 33892 (18 February 2013); P6105 (Notice of resignation, 25 March 1992), p. 1; Mile Ujić, T. 33456 (12 February 2013). *See also* P2832 (Article from Srpska Vojska entitled “They Saved Serbian Land”, 15 July 1993), p. 3.

³²⁶⁸ D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 14; Sveto Veselinović, T. 33878 (18 February 2013).

1. In negotiations between Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim representatives at the beginning of May 1992, local SDS leaders, including Batinić and Milorad Sokolović, demanded that control of the whole municipality be handed over to the SDS.³²⁶⁹ Bosnian Muslim representatives objected to this demand.³²⁷⁰ On 2 May 1992, an agreement on the division of Rogatica into Serb and Muslim municipalities was reached and adopted at a joint session of the Municipal Assembly.³²⁷¹ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! #Solution without war#! No confusion about the Serb intents! It was a possibility for coexistence in the same area, but with either own administration. Here is the document D4672: With the aim of finding optimum solutions for the Muslim and Serbian people in the former Rogatica Municipality, boardsmen of the former Rogatica Municipal Assembly, at their meeting on 02 May 1992, passed the following decisions:**
 2. *1.the former Rogatica Municipality is being divided into two municipalities which are the: Municipality of the Serbian people of Rogatica and the Municipality of the Muslim people of Rogatica.*
 3. *The territory of the former Rogatica Municipality is being divided into Muslim and Serbian territories, and the borders of these territories have been reconciled. The territorial separation of the former Rogatica local commune has not been a topic of negotiations to date. Discussions about the division of this territory will be done as soon as possible so that these segments could function without interruption. Discussions about the demarcation will be immediately continued.*
 4. *The decision about territorial demarcation is of temporary character and will be valid until a final agreement is reached between the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina about territorial demarcation.*

Representatives of both peoples in Rogatica Municipality will contribute to peace in this territory in the further talks by being tolerant and keeping good-neighbourly relations as they have done so far.

*Rogatica, 02 May 1992
Number: 09-052-3*

**PRESIDENT OF MUNICIPAL ASSEMBLY
Adil LUTVIJ**

/signed/

**VICE-PRESIDENT OF MUNICIPAL ASSEMBLY
Tomislav BATINIJ**

/signed/

a/a

963. This agreement did not cover Rogatica town and such a decision was never adopted given the events which unfolded in the municipality.³²⁷² On 18 May 1992, the Rogatica Serb Municipal Assembly abrogated the original agreement on the division of the municipality alleging that the Bosnian Muslim side had avoided attempts to implement that

³²⁶⁹ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 79–80 (under seal). *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2502.

³²⁷⁰ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 88 (under seal). *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2502.

³²⁷¹ P2835 (Report of Rogatica Crisis Staff, April – June 1992), p. 2; KDZ606, T. 18264 (2 September 2011) (closed session); D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 16; D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 22; Mile Ujić, T. 33437 (12 February 2013); P6104 (Record of interview with Mile Ujić, 6 June 2004), p. 3. *See also* Sveto Veselinović, T. 45112–45113 (16 December 2013). Ujić testified that the division of the municipality was designed to ensure the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims could live next to one another and they did not have a plan of expelling Bosnian Muslims. Mile Ujić, T. 33439 (12 February 2013). However, the Chamber does not consider that Ujić's evidence to be reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that the witness's testimony was marked by inconsistencies, contradictions, and evasiveness. **(#Solution without a war#! THIS PART OF THE UJIC'S TESTIMONY CAN NOT BE CONTESTED, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE SAME PROCESS WAS OFFERED TO ALL THE MIXED MUNICIPALITIES, WITH THE TWO OR THREE COMMUNITIES IN A SUBSTANTIAL PARTICIPATION IN POPULATION AND SUFFICIENT SETTLEMENTS THAT COULD BE CHARACTERISED TO HAVE EITHER MAJORITY! THIS WAS THE Serb concession for the secession ob BiH!)**

³²⁷² P2835 (Report of Rogatica Crisis Staff, April–June 1992), p. 2; D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 16; D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 22.

agreement.³²⁷³ **(Exactly! As the Chamber found in para 960, fn. 3218 of this Judgement, having an understanding for a Muslim #cunning tactics!#)** This occurred one day after the Accused, Mladić, and Krajišnik held a meeting with representatives of municipalities, including Rogatica, and discussed the creation of a Bosnian Serb state in BiH, stating that the time had come for the demarcation of areas between the national groups.³²⁷⁴ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! #Solution without war#! This approach excluded both the war and the war crimes!)**

964. The Rogatica Crisis Staff, in agreement with the TO command, adopted a decision which provided for inhabitants of Bosnian Muslim settlements to hand over their weapons after which their safety and security would be guaranteed.³²⁷⁵ **#EXCULPATORY!!!** Kušić and the SDS issued ultimatums to Bosnian Muslim villages to hand over any weapons and express loyalty in return for their safety and security.³²⁷⁶ **#EXCULPATORY!!!** Those who did not comply were threatened with expulsion, arrest or the “worst consequences”.³²⁷⁷ Following these ultimatums, people in some villages handed over weapons.³²⁷⁸ **#EXCULPATORY!!!** Batinić observed that “enormous pressure” was being exerted by the SDS Main Board and military command to “get the job done”.³²⁷⁹ The final ultimatum from Bosnian Serb representatives was made after 10 May 1992 and called on all people to pledge loyalty to the SDS and return all weapons or face the possibility of operations in Rogatica municipality.³²⁸⁰ On 19 May 1992, the Bosnian Muslim village of Kukavice was disarmed which led the Bosnian Muslim population to withdraw from the village.³²⁸¹ In some villages, Bosnian Muslims were told that they may come under attack which prompted them to hide in the woods.³²⁸² **(#Disarmed-secured#!But, there were several villages that handed arms over, and lived freely almost until the end of war, taken care by the Serb police and the VRS, since their security was jeopardised by the Muslim extremists unhappy with this agreements! Those willages are mentioned in para 973 of the Judgement! Why the Chamber didn’t draw a conclusion from this example?)**

iii. Take-over of Rogatica

³²⁷³ P2835 (Report of Rogatica Crisis Staff, April–June 1992), p. 3.

³²⁷⁴ P1477 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 14 February–28 May 1992), pp. 349–351; P6254 (Article from TANJUG entitled “Serb Leaders Promote Ethnic Demarcation”, 17 May 1992).

³²⁷⁵ D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), paras. 27, 30; P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 66–68, 70, 80, 88 (under seal) (stating that Milorad Sokolović offered to bring in the Užice Corps to take control of Rogatica and provide security for the Bosnian Muslim population if they handed over power and weapons but this was not accepted). Bosnian Muslim representatives did not believe these assurances as they had been receiving media reports of events which had been unfolding in other areas in BiH and feared that they would face the same fate in Rogatica. P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 77, 80 (under seal). See also KDZ606, T. 18318 (5 September 2011) (closed session).

³²⁷⁶ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 66,–68, 70, 80 (under seal); D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 27.

³²⁷⁷ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 70 (under seal); see Adjudicated Fact 2499. See also P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 55, 85 (under seal).

³²⁷⁸ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 66–68 (under seal). See also D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 32.

³²⁷⁹ [REDACTED].

³²⁸⁰ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 86 (under seal).

³²⁸¹ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 89 (under seal). The Chamber also received evidence that in the lead-up to the attack on Rogatica, several Bosnian Muslims were killed in the nearby villages, which caused panic amongst the Bosnian Muslim population. P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 13; KDZ051, T. 19385–19386 (22 September 2011). The Chamber notes that these that these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.

³²⁸² P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 3.

965. The killing of Dražen Mihajlović in an ambush on 22 May 1992 and the refusal of the Bosnian Muslim forces to return his body resulted in clashes.³²⁸³ **(No wonder! A Serb policemen got killed for nothing!)** Following this incident, both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims moved their families out of the town as did the Bosnian Muslim leadership to areas where they were a majority.³²⁸⁴ **(Those areas were supposed to be the Muslim municipality of Rogatica)** In addition, the Rogatica Crisis Staff was expanded to approximately 15 people and Sokolović was elected President.³²⁸⁵

965. The town of Rogatica was in a valley and was surrounded by artillery positions manned by Bosnian Serbs; a road was built approximately a month before the attack, which encircled the town and allowed for artillery and weapons to be transported.³²⁸⁶ **(#Before VRS#! JNA, #Military reasons#! The JNA secured it's own communications, in accordance with the law and their assumptions. What does it have to do with President Karadzic?)**

966. The town of Rogatica was attacked on or about 22 May 1992 for seven continuous days by artillery, anti-aircraft, and infantry weapons, with the artillery primarily hitting the centre of town and Bosnian Muslim neighbourhoods, while Bosnian Serb areas of the town were not shelled.³²⁸⁷ **(#Who started#! Prior to that, the Muslim extremists killed a Serb policemen Drazen Mihajlovic in an ambush, in a cold blooded manner, and even refused to return his body. There was no one in the world who had any right to deny the Serbs right to respond and secure their lives! Therefore, the #Muslims initiated the war, and not the Serb "attack" as suggested in this paragraph. And this is not fair!)** A large part of the town centre was destroyed in this attack.³²⁸⁸ By the date of the attack, the Bosnian Serb population had left Muslim-majority areas and moved to Serb parts of the town and Bosnian Serb women and children had been evacuated to Serbia.³²⁸⁹

967. The shelling began at noon and came from the direction of surrounding hills and villages.³²⁹⁰ On the first day, the shelling lasted three or four hours, which forced Bosnian Muslims to take shelter in their cellars and in neighbouring houses when their houses were damaged.³²⁹¹ The first attack consisted of mortars, anti-aircraft guns, tanks, artillery and

³²⁸³ D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 23; Tomislav Batinić, T. 33680, 33696–33698 (14 February 2013); D3031 (Witness statement of Milovan Lelek dated 23 February 2013), para. 14; Milovan Lelek, T. 34383 (27 February 2013); D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 24; Mile Ujić, T. 33437–33439, 33459 (12 February 2013). See also D2351 (Witness statement of Stevan Veljović dated 19 October 2012), para. 9; D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 15 (stating that after this attack negotiations between the parties were suspended); Sveto Veselinović, T. 33904, 33910–33911 (18 February 2013), T. 45104 (16 December 2013); D2965 (Rogatica Brigade report, 29 May 1992).

³²⁸⁴ D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 25.

³²⁸⁵ D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 14; D2959 (Decision of Rogatica Crisis Staff, 24 May 1992); Sveto Veselinović, T. 33879 (18 February 2013). Veselinović was also appointed as a member of the Rogatica Crisis Staff. D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 14.

³²⁸⁶ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 27–28. According to KDZ051 the closest artillery position was 50 to 60 metres from his house and he could recognise the people manning the weapons from the closest positions as his Serb neighbours and former classmates. P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 28.

³²⁸⁷ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 857, 887, 889; P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 30, 33–34; KDZ606, T. 18269 (2 September 2011) (closed session); P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 90 (under seal); P128 (Alija Isaković's statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), pp. 2–3.

³²⁸⁸ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 885.

³²⁸⁹ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 889; P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 29; KDZ051, T. 19363 (22 September 2011).

³²⁹⁰ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 30. The Chamber does not consider that the Accused's challenge to KDZ051's evidence about identifying the direction of fire succeeded in casting doubt as to the veracity of his evidence on this point. KDZ051, T. 19393 (22 September 2011).

³²⁹¹ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 32–33; P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 4; P128 (Alija Isaković's statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 3.

heavy machine guns.³²⁹² There were clashes with Bosnian Muslim forces, which put up armed resistance in the town in the days following the first shelling.³²⁹³ As discussed above, the town had been blockaded.³²⁹⁴ Following the clashes on 22 May 1992, Serb Forces took control of some areas of the town while the larger part of the town remained under Bosnian Muslim control.³²⁹⁵ **(#The Serb parts only# Certainly not under the Muslim civilians control! It is not fair to put an accent on the Serb actions as a mere “attacks” since the Muslim forces had been more numerous and well armed, and fired towards the Serb settlements as well as towards the rests of JNA in withdrawal. The Serb shells were directed to the Muslim machine-gun nests and mortar positions. What does it have to do with the President? Or with any Serb responsibility? The Muslim side had chosen to wage a war rather than to negotiate bona fide and preserve the peace! #Chosen a war#))**

968. After Rogatica was shelled, members of the 5th Užice Corps were posted in Mesići and a group of 300 Arkan’s men and White Eagles was posted in Borike, ready to start operations as soon as Kušić so ordered.³²⁹⁶ Šešelj’s men were also involved in the attack on Rogatica and had arrived at the JNA barracks a few weeks before the attack.³²⁹⁷ Members of the active and reserve police were also involved in this operation.³²⁹⁸ All armed groups which arrived in Rogatica were placed under the command of the Rogatica Brigade.³²⁹⁹ **(While the Rogatica Brigade itself was placed in the JNA, which around this time, 20 May 1992 was withdrawing to Yugoslavia, while the Bosnian Serb members remained to defend their homes!)**

969. In the days following the initial attack on Rogatica, Serb Forces entered the town, going from street to street; tanks and APCs would come to the town on a daily basis and fire at the mosques, at Bosnian Muslim houses and into the cellars where Bosnian Muslims were hiding.³³⁰⁰ **(#Abuses of civil objects# the firing was only at those containing the Muslim armed troops!)** Serb Forces also threw hand grenades before making forceful entry into houses, firing automatic weapons as they did so, ordering out groups of Bosnian Muslims who were in hiding, and detaining them.³³⁰¹ Serb Forces also sprayed chemicals

³²⁹² P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 3.

³²⁹³ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 95 (under seal); D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 25; D3037 (Rogatica Brigade report, 9 June 1992), p. 2; Milovan Lelek, T. 34436–34437 (27 February 2013); D2965 (Rogatica Brigade report, 29 May 1992). *See also* Sveto Veselinović, T. 33883, 33885–33886, 33912 (18 February 2013); D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 35; D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 18; D2966 (Rogatica Brigade report, 23 June 1992); P3414 (Report of the Rogatica Brigade, 11 June 1992), pp. 1–2; P5485 (Report of Rogatica Brigade, 15 June 1992) (reporting that there was no significant enemy activity); D2963 (Video footage of Rogatica). *But see* KDZ051, T. 19394–19396 (22 September 2011) (testifying that the population of Rogatica was completely unarmed).

³²⁹⁴ *See* para. 958.

³²⁹⁵ D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 24; D3031 (Witness statement of Milovan Lelek dated 23 February 2013), para. 14; D2912 (Map of Rogatica); Sveto Veselinović, T. 33911 (18 February 2013) (testifying that Rogatica was actually taken over by Bosnian Muslims).

³²⁹⁶ [REDACTED].

³²⁹⁷ P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 5.

³²⁹⁸ P3275 (Report of Rogatica SJB, 14 August 1992), p. 1. [REDACTED].

³²⁹⁹ P3275 (Report of Rogatica SJB, 14 August 1992), p. 1. Batinić testified that paramilitaries did not stay long in Rogatica because “no one accepted them”. D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 31. The Chamber does not consider that Batinić’s evidence is reliable in this regard given that in his own testimony he claimed to have never seen or had contact with paramilitaries.

³³⁰⁰ P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 4; Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 857–858; P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 36; KDZ051, T. 19363–19364 (22 September 2011).

³³⁰¹ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 37–38; Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 860–863. Pašić testified that he could recognise the voices and/or faces of the men who ordered the group of Bosnian Muslims out of the shelter even though some were wearing masks and they were Serbs in olive green and light and dark blue camouflage uniforms. One of the men identified was Vlado Marković who was previously an active duty policeman in Rogatica. Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from

into buildings and fired incendiary rounds which ignited the chemicals; this forced Bosnian Muslims out of the cellars.³³⁰² **(Not corroborated by any objective evidence, all the Muslim allegations accepted by the Chamber uncritically!)** Men were separated from the women and forced to lie down as they were kicked and beaten by the soldiers who demanded that they hand over any weapons.³³⁰³ Serb Forces entered the town and used flame throwers to set houses on fire; this process continued house by house, until large parts of the town were destroyed and Bosnian Muslim houses were burned.³³⁰⁴ This pattern continued until Serb Forces took full control of the town.³³⁰⁵ By the end of July 1992, Rogatica was under the control of the Rogatica Brigade.³³⁰⁶ Many Bosnian Muslims fled and took refuge in the square.³³⁰⁷ **(#Abuse of Serb Forces - #Combats, not attacks# Is there anyone in the world who would believe that the unarmed Muslim civilians prevented the “Serb Forces” for almost three months to the to put the town, long only a couple hundred metres under their control? That was a civil war in the urban area, the Muslim combatants were more numerous, they had chosen the war instead of negotiations and peace, the war started when they decided, they fought fiercely and finally after about ten weeks had lost. All those who had been detained were either the prisoners of war, or civilians who were to be removed from the combat zone. #Legal and obligatory# Some of them hadn’t been treated as combatants, but had to be severed and removed from the combat zone! Any other interpretation would be unfair and untrue!)**

970. The take-over of Rogatica was planned and executed by the SRK and Mladić was informed of it.³³⁰⁸ The Main Staff issued a directive which gave the corps commanders “a broad opportunity for self-initiative” and directed them to “establish lines”, leaving it to the “corps commander, the commanders of brigades, and lower-ranking units, to make corrections in the lines of defence”; Rogatica was taken because it “was deep within the territory that was under the control of the Serbs”.³³⁰⁹ **(So what? The Muslims didn’t accept to have their own municipality, wanting to have the entire municipality under their control, and for that purpose they started the war, six week after the war broke out in Sarajevo! All the consequent action of the VRS were legitimate! #Military necessity#!)**

Prosecutor v. Tadić, T. 862–864; P3291 (List of policemen working at Rogatica SJB in May 1992), p. 1. The Chamber received evidence about the killing of Bosnian Muslims during and after the take-over of Rogatica. P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 35, 42, 79–82; P3410 (List of bodies exhumed in Višegrad during 2000–2001); D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 20; KDZ051, T. 19405–19406 (22 September 2011); P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011) (under seal), paras. 98, 101; P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 3; P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), pp. 3–4; P3283 (List of Bosnian Muslim civilians killed in Rogatica). The Chamber notes that the Prosecution cites to these killings and the bodies found in the streets of Rogatica in its Final Brief. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix A, Rogatica, para. 14. However, the Chamber notes that there are no killings charged in Schedule A of the Indictment with respect to Rogatica.

³³⁰² P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 4.

³³⁰³ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 861, 863 (testifying that during this process one soldier threatened to kill him and held a knife to his throat; the soldiers also threw a grenade into a shelter which injured a man when he refused to leave).

³³⁰⁴ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 37–38; P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 59 (under seal); P3404 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 40 (under seal); P3411 (Photograph of KDZ051’s house) (under seal). See also Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 866 (testifying that he heard that one third of the town consisting of the predominantly Bosnian Muslim areas was burned down).

³³⁰⁵ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 36; KDZ051, T. 19363–19364 (22 September 2011).

³³⁰⁶ P3407 (Report on the work of the Rogatica Municipal Assembly and Executive Board from July 1992 to September 1993), p. 14.

³³⁰⁷ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 42; KDZ051, T. 19405–19406 (22 September 2011).

³³⁰⁸ [REDACTED]. Hurko testified that Furtula commanded the attack on Rogatica. P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 56. However, it is not clear to the Chamber on what basis the witness knew who commanded the attack and therefore the Chamber will not rely on this evidence to make a finding in this regard.

³³⁰⁹ [REDACTED].

(D) Attacks on surrounding villages

972. On or about 22 May 1992 and the following days, many of the Bosnian Muslim villages in Rogatica Municipality were attacked and came under fire.³³¹⁰ For example, the Bosnian Muslim village of Mađer, which is six kilometres from Rogatica,³³¹¹ came under heavy small arms fire from the surrounding hills.³³¹² The surrounding villages of Kovalj, Vragolovi, Kopljevići, Orahovo, Šljedovići, and Čubrići were also attacked.³³¹³ Following these attacks, Bosnian Muslims started leaving their villages out of fear,³³¹⁴ with some escaping to Žepa and Kozići.³³¹⁵ **(#Militarized villages# Enemy strongholds# Did the Chamber establish that those “attacks” were unilateral and unjustified? Were those villages militarised? Should the Serbs allow those Muslim forces from the surroundings to enter the town of Rogatica and participate in the street fights? #Contrary to this example, there were a dozen of villages in Rogatica which disarmed and lived in security, see###)**

973. Two or three days after the shelling of the villages, infantry attacks were also launched against some of these villages.³³¹⁶ (3273) Kušić reported to the “Supreme Command” of the SerBiH that on 22 May 1992 villages in Rogatica which were described as “enemy strongholds” were attacked and that the enemy was “crushed with losses and casualties”.³³¹⁷ **(Have the Chamber learnt that those villages hadn’t been Muslim military strongholds?)** Villages from which weapons had been handed over were not shelled.³³¹⁸ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! This fact deserved more than one single sentence, because it reveals that civilian settlements hadn’t been attacked!)** On 23 May 1992, Kušić ordered units to hold positions and to conduct “čišćenje” or “mopping up” operations in villages with mixed populations,³³¹⁹ **(“Ciscenje” in the Serbian language and in**

³³¹⁰ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 5; Šefik Hurko, T. 18223 (2 September 2011); P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 90–91 (under seal). *See also* D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), pp. 27–28; David Harland, T. 2118 (7 May 2010). The Chamber also received evidence that the village of Živaljevina was shelled as early as 12 or 13 May 1992. *See* Adjudicated Fact 2503. However, the Chamber has no evidence as to who carried out this shelling and is therefore not satisfied that it can make a finding in this regard. Lelek testified that Serb Forces did not fire at a populated area and that they were seeking to liberate the road to retrieve Mihajlović’s body. Milovan Lelek, T. 34384, 34400–34401, 34403, 34433–34435 (27 February 2013). The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber found that Lelek’s evidence was marked by contradictions and indicators that he was misleading the Chamber.

³³¹¹ Šefik Hurko, T. 18223 (2 September 2011).

³³¹² P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 3; Šefik Hurko, T. 18344 (5 September 2011).

³³¹³ Šefik Hurko, T. 18223 (2 September 2011); Šefik Hurko, T. 18344 (5 September 2011).

³³¹⁴ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 11 (under seal).

³³¹⁵ KDZ606, T. 18271 (2 September 2011) (closed session); P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 91–92 (under seal). KDZ606 also testified about the killing of villagers during these attacks. The Chamber notes that these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. *See* fn. 13.

³³¹⁶ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 92 (under seal).

³³¹⁷ P3265 (Report of Rogatica Battalion, 23 May 1992), p. 1. [REDACTED]; D3031 (Witness statement of Milovan Lelek dated 23 February 2013), para. 14. *See also* Mile Ujić, T. 33460 (12 February 2013); Sveto Veselinović, T. 45106–45107 (16 December 2013) (testifying that the army attacked villages with Bosnian Muslim forces); P2832 (Article from Srpska Vojska entitled “They Saved Serbian Land”, 15 July 1993), p. 3. Prosecution witnesses disputed this report and testified that there were no enemy strongholds in these villages but that there were only civilians there; nonetheless, they acknowledged that there were some armed civilians who were defending their homes. P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 4; Šefik Hurko, T. 18224 (2 September 2011), T. 18343–18344, 18358 (5 September 2011); KDZ606, T. 18270 (2 September 2011) (closed session) (testifying that there were also individual members of the reserve police forces in these villages); P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 31, 38–39; P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 59 (under seal). The Chamber, having regard to the totality of the circumstances, in particular the length of time it took for Serb Forces to take over Rogatica, does not consider the evidence that there was no armed resistance to be credible.

³³¹⁸ [REDACTED].

³³¹⁹ [REDACTED].

military sense can not be conceived as “mopping up” because in the military terms it is concerned only with armed forces, not civilians or any other persons, as it was presentet in the court room many times! In Encyclopaedia Britannica “Mop-up” is explained as: : to clear (an area) of remaining pockets of resistance in the wake of a military offensive. **Therefore, a #legal and legitimate# action!**) and for all units “to carry out destruction of personnel without hesitation” and “to open fire from all available weapons”.³³²⁰ **(The said order is not signed, and is translated unprecisely:**

All units are to carry out destruction of personnel without hesitation.
Operations units are to open fire from all available weapons.

(Fake (unsigned) “order”#There is a term “unistavati zivu silu” which means to destroy “live force” meaning combatants!)

974. When Bosnian Muslim representatives asked that the attacks against Bosnian Muslim settlements be stopped, they were told that the only way to stop the attacks was if weapons were surrendered by a set deadline.³³²¹ **(So what? Any army would do the same – stop engaging us with your weaponry, and you will enjoy a truce!)** Following these discussions the attacks intensified and Bosnian Muslim homes were burnt down in villages including Bjelogorci, Pašić Kula, Šljedovići, Ovlagije, Seljani, Živaljevići, Kovanj, Lepenica, Kramer, Tičijak, Mala Žepa, and Biljino Polje.³³²² **(Why it #didn’t happen in the villages that handed over their weaponry and ceased to fight#? See para 973!)**

975. There was a Bosnian Muslim minority in the village of Seljani, where the local recreation hall was converted into barracks used by local Bosnian Serbs and members of the White Eagles.³³²³ **(“White Eagles” -#Not a “Serb Force”# well known that it was a paramilitary sponsored by an oposition political party, distant from SDS@)** Bosnian Muslim houses were targeted by infantry fire.³³²⁴ During the shelling, Armin Baždar and his family took shelter in the woods; his father was told by a Bosnian Serb friend that

³³²⁰ P3274 (Order of Rajko Kušić, 23 May 1992), p. 1. [REDACTED].

³³²¹ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 97 (under seal). Defence witnesses testified that (i) villages were only attacked following provocations and attacks against Bosnian Serb villages; (ii) were considered military targets if there was fire coming from them; (iii) Bosnian Muslim villages were first asked to surrender their weapons, and it was only when they refused that they were attacked and taken over by Serb Forces; (iv) villagers were warned about the possible attack and only a very small number of people remained in specific villages. D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 30; Mile Ujić, T. 33461, 33466–33467 (12 February 2013); D3038 (Witness statement of Novica Andrić dated 23 February 2013), para. 9; D3031 (Witness statement of Milovan Lelek dated 23 February 2013), paras. 6, 14. While the Chamber accepts that there had been requests for villages to disarm prior to attacks by Serb Forces, the Chamber does not consider the remainder of this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber notes that evidence of the relevant witnesses was marked by inconsistencies, contradictions, and evasiveness and indicators that some were not forthright in their testimony in this regard.

³³²² P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 3; P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 97 (under seal); P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 3; Armin Baždar, T. 18381 (5 September 2011); P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 55 (stating that he overheard soldiers saying that the attacks on some villages were led by Mile Ujić). The Chamber also received evidence about the killing of civilians during these attacks but these that these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13. See P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 97 (under seal); P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 11 (under seal); P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 3; P3283 (List of Bosnian Muslim civilians killed in Rogatica). See Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix A, Rogatica, para. 14.

³³²³ P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 3.

³³²⁴ P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 3 (further testifying that a Bosnian Muslim was killed in the attack); Armin Baždar, T. 18381 (5 September 2011). The Chamber notes that these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13. Lelek testified that the village of Seljani was a majority Bosnian Serb village and that it was not attacked. Milovan Lelek, T. 34428 (27 February 2013). While the Chamber accepts that Seljani had a majority Bosnian Serb population, the Chamber is not satisfied that Lelek’s evidence that the village was not attacked is reliable. In reaching this conclusion the Chamber had regard to the credible testimony of Baždar about the attack against the village and also considered that Lelek’s evidence was marked by contradictions and indicators that he was misleading the Chamber.

Bosnian Muslim men and women had been arrested and that Bosnian Muslim men had been taken in the direction of Pješevica.³³²⁵ There were no military facilities in the village.³³²⁶

976. In the few days following the attack on Seljani, Serb Forces wearing camouflage uniforms, red berets, and SDS insignia **(#No SDS insignias existed#. The VRS and MUP wore only a tri-colour flag insignia!)** and carrying automatic weapons went from house to house and ordered Bosnian Muslims to move in together to allow for greater control of the Bosnian Muslim population.³³²⁷ As a result, four or five families numbering about 20 people were living together; Serb Forces patrolled the area and kept them “under control”.³³²⁸ Until August 1992, they were “placed under a sort of house arrest”, were not allowed to go to work or buy food, and could only tend to their animals.³³²⁹ White Eagles were seen in the village and from their accents were identified as being from Serbia.³³³⁰ Some Bosnian Muslim houses were set on fire between May and August 1992.³³³¹

977. The villages of Kramer Selo, Kozarde, Dobrašina and Borovsko were shelled on 2 August 1992 by Serb Forces, which prompted Bosnian Muslims to flee.³³³²

(E) Events after the take-over of Rogatica

978. Veselinović entered Rogatica five or six days after the take-over of the town and headed a commission which was formed by the Rogatica Crisis Staff to accommodate and help refugees and to ensure the safety and security of abandoned properties.³³³³ The commission took measures to regulate unauthorised movement into abandoned homes. However, groups of Serb refugees arrived in August 1992, and after Plavšić arrived in Rogatica and asked refugees to be accommodated in the town, people moved into abandoned homes and took away household items.³³³⁴

979. On 1 August 1992, Kušić as commander of the Rogatica Brigade issued an order to combat the illegal use and destruction of “war booty” and required the submission of criminal reports against individuals who failed to respect the order.³³³⁵ At a Rogatica Serb Municipal Assembly meeting on 19 August 1992, the further distribution of these abandoned homes as temporary accommodation was prohibited.³³³⁶ The Executive Board

³³²⁵ P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 3.

³³²⁶ P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 3.

³³²⁷ P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 3.

³³²⁸ P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 4; Armin Baždar, T. 18392 (5 September 2011).

³³²⁹ P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 4; Armin Baždar, T. 18392–18393 (5 September 2011).

³³³⁰ P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 3; Armin Baždar, T. 18393–18394 (5 September 2011).

³³³¹ P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 4.

³³³² P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 12, 55 (under seal); KDZ607, T. 18493 (6 September 2011); P3292 (SRK Command report, 3 August 1992), p. 1; Mile Ujić, T. 33466–33467 (12 February 2013); D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 30. While the Chamber received evidence about killings at Kramer Selo. P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 55 (under seal); KDZ607, T. 18510 (7 September 2011); P3283 (List of Bosnian Muslim civilians killed in Rogatica), pp. 3–4. The Chamber notes that these that these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.

³³³³ D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), paras. 15–16; D2960 (Decision of Rogatica Crisis Staff, 30 May 1992); D2962 (Decision of Rogatica Executive Board, 11 July 1992); D2956 (Report of Rogatica Executive Board, April 1993); Sveto Veselinović, T. 33880, 33882–33884 (18 February 2013).

³³³⁴ D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 16; D2956 (Report of Rogatica Executive Board, April 1993); Sveto Veselinović, T. 33887–33889 (18 February 2013). See also P3407 (Report on the work of the Rogatica Municipal Assembly and Executive Board, from July 1992 to September 1993), e-court p. 27; D2964 (Video footage of refugees in Rogatica).

³³³⁵ P3282 (Order of SRK, 1 August 1992), pp. 1–2.

³³³⁶ P3407 (Report on the work of the Rogatica Municipal Assembly and Executive Board from July 1992 to September 1993), e-court pp. 28, 31–32. See also P3282 (Order of SRK, 1 August 1992), pp. 1–2.

also took measures to address the unauthorised use of abandoned homes.³³³⁷ **(#Responsible conduct of authorities#! All of that indicates a responsible conduct of the authorities in such a difficult circumstances, and proves that violations of laws and rules had been committed by individuals far from officials, and without tolerance by the authorities!)**

980. On 23 November 1992, Batinić wrote a letter to the SJB in Rogatica requesting their full engagement in ensuring public law and order to create conditions for the normal life and work of the organs of authority, including the prevention of misappropriation of property, unlawful seizure of apartments, and businesses and the personal safety of citizens.³³³⁸ **(#Responsible conduct#! EXCULPATORY!)**

(F) Detention facilities in Rogatica

1. Scheduled Detention Facility C.21.1

981. The Indictment refers to the use of the Veljko Vlahović Secondary School as a detention facility at least between 1 May and 31 September 1992.³³³⁹ **(That could not be from 1 May, because a need to receive civilians appeared only after the conflict broke out, after 22 May!)**

a. Arrival of detainees and control over detention facility

982. The Veljko Vlahović Secondary School was located in the Bosnian Serb part of Rogatica.³³⁴⁰ After the shelling of Rogatica, which started on 22 May 1992, Bosnian Muslims were detained at the school for periods of up to three and a half months.³³⁴¹ In the first month the school held approximately 400 people, and of this group, only 70 to 90 were men.³³⁴² Thereafter, many new detainees arrived at the school and the number of people held grew to 1,100.³³⁴³ All the detainees in the school were Bosnian Muslims except for two Bosnian Serb women who were married to Bosnian Muslims and one Bosnian Serb family whose sons did not want to fight in the army.³³⁴⁴

983. A few days following the attack on Rogatica on 22 May 1992, loudspeakers were used to order the Bosnian Muslim population of the town to gather in the central square, where a group of armed Bosnian Serb soldiers demanded that they sign loyalty oaths or surrender documents to the Bosnian Serb authorities and move to the school for their

³³³⁷ D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 27. *See also* P3407 (Report on the work of the Rogatica Municipal Assembly and Executive Board from July 1992 to September 1993), e-court pp. 11–12, 14, 17–18, 24, 31–32; KDZ051, T. 19357–19358 (22 September 2011).

³³³⁸ D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 27–28; D2931 (Warning of Rogatica Municipal Assembly, 23 November 1992); Tomislav Batinić, T. 33684 (14 February 2013).

³³³⁹ The Indictment originally referred to detention until at least 31 August 1992 but this period was extended to at least September 1992. *See* Prosecution Rule 73 *bis* Submission, Appendix B, p. 65.

³³⁴⁰ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 52–53; P3412 (Two photographs of Veljko Vlahović secondary school); P6157 (Map of Rogatica).

³³⁴¹ *See* Adjudicated Facts 2506, 2508, 2510. *See also* P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 41; P3283 (List of Bosnian Muslim civilians killed in Rogatica), p. 12–20; P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 4; D2914 (Response of 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, 30 November 1992).

³³⁴² P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 65.

³³⁴³ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 65.

³³⁴⁴ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 54, 58.

personal security.³³⁴⁵ **(#Legal and obligatory#! Certainly, it was a legal obligation to remove civilians from a combat zone! As established, the fights lasted to the end of July 1992, see para 970 of this Judgement!)** The group of soldiers included a captain wearing a regular JNA uniform and seven or eight other uniformed persons wearing camouflage uniforms.³³⁴⁶ Following these announcements at least 200 to 300 unarmed Bosnian Muslims gathered in the town square.³³⁴⁷

984. Živojin Novaković, a VRS soldier, was told that the Veljko Vlahović Secondary School was too small to accommodate this large group of people and was asked to release the Bosnian Muslims since the Serb Forces already had control of the town.³³⁴⁸ **(#Legal and obligatory#! As established in this Judgment, the Serbs took control of the town only at the end of July. Also, this request to release the Muslims clearly indicated that the reason for their accommodation in the school was the combat activity in the town!)** After making a radio call, Novaković said that this was not possible and that “the town would be cleansed”, that the Bosnian Muslims would all have to proceed to the school, that “anyone found in the town would be killed”, and that he had received an order that all Bosnian Muslims should be taken to the school.³³⁴⁹ Novaković told the Bosnian Muslims that they would only have to stay a few days in the school until the situation calmed down and that they all had to go to there “to avoid the cleansing”.³³⁵⁰ **(#Legal and obligatory#! This explanation is #EXCULPATORY!!!# Commendable#! Obviously, it was a cleansing of the Muslim combatants and the only reasonable, and legally obligatory action was to separate the non-combatant population from combatants while the fights were going on! For that the local authorities should be commended, not accused! As already established, the Serbs took the control over the town in late July)**

985. Following this, Bosnian Serb police and soldiers in olive-green camouflage uniform entered homes and removed those who did not comply with the orders to go to the school.³³⁵¹ During this process men were beaten³³⁵² and Bosnian Muslims, including women and children who had been captured in shelters, were taken to the school and detained there for a few days.³³⁵³ **(#A military necessity!# What would happen with them if they got stuck in a cross-fire? Who would be responsible? The force in control of this area would be responsible if the civilians hadn’t been removed to a shelter!)** At the beginning of June 1992, 200 to 300 people surrendered at the school when the area they

³³⁴⁵ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*, T. 858–860, 884, 896; P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 43, 50; P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 42 (under seal) (stating that Rajko Kušić himself used a megaphone and called on the people to surrender before they were taken to the Veljko Vlahović Secondary School); P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 4; P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 3 (identifying Žika Novaković as one of the people who used a megaphone to call on the Bosnian Muslims to come out). *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2504.

³³⁴⁶ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*, T. 859–860, 884; P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 43, 46 (stating that Živojin Novaković who represented the VRS called upon the Bosnian Muslims to surrender and proceed to the school). *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2504.

³³⁴⁷ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 64. The Chamber received other evidence that between 2,000 and 3,000 Bosnian Muslims gathered in the town square. *See also* KDZ051, T. 19404 (22 September 2011); Adjudicated Fact 2504; D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 40. However, the Chamber does not find this figure to be consistent with the evidence regarding the initial number of Bosnian Muslims who were gathered and detained at the Veljko Vlahović Secondary School.

³³⁴⁸ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 46; KDZ051, T. 19404 (22 September 2011).

³³⁴⁹ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 46. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2504.

³³⁵⁰ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 46; KDZ051, T. 19404–19405 (22 September 2011).

³³⁵¹ *See* Adjudicated Fact 2505.

³³⁵² *See* Adjudicated Fact 2505.

³³⁵³ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*, T. 864 (testifying that apart from two Muslim families, he also knew one Serb family and “one from a mixed marriage” who were already present at the school).

were in was shelled.³³⁵⁴ **(#Legal and obligatory#!The Serb commanders didn't return them to a battlefields, where they would certainly sustain casualties, and that is a lawful conduct! Certainly, only non-combat population "surrendered" i.e. searched for shelter, which indicates that there were a strong Muslim forces)** Upon their arrival, they discovered that there were already 100 people at the school and that two detainees were drawing up a list of detainees.³³⁵⁵ On 11 June 1992, the command of the Rogatica Brigade reported that large numbers of Bosnian Muslim civilians were arriving every day and were "finding shelter" in the school.³³⁵⁶ **(#Comendable#! Legal and obligatory#! That was their own right, and the Serb Army was obliged to house them far from the line of confrontation, and they did it!)** The Chamber finds that the reference to Bosnian Muslim civilians seeking "shelter" at the school is a mischaracterisation and that those who were at the facility were detained there.³³⁵⁷ In early August 1992, local Bosnian Serb soldiers continued to enter Bosnian Muslim houses and transfer groups of Bosnian Muslims to the school.³³⁵⁸ In mid-August 1992, Serb Forces entered the village of Mader and Bosnian Muslims were arrested and taken to detention facilities, including the school.³³⁵⁹ **("Including the school" means that some of them were directed to the school, while others were conveyed elsewhere. Why? Somebody differentiated non-combatants from combatants. That also mean that even in mid-August the Serbs didn't control the entire municipality!)**

986. The guards at the school included Bosnian Serb police, paramilitaries, and soldiers.³³⁶⁰ The school operated under Kušić's command.³³⁶¹ Kušić visited the school on a

³³⁵⁴ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 48–49.

³³⁵⁵ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 51.

³³⁵⁶ P3414 (Report of the Rogatica Brigade, 11 June 1992), p. 1. The Rogatica Brigade also reported to the command of the SRK on 15 June 1992 that a large number of Bosnian Muslims (mainly women and children) were arriving in the town daily and they were being moved to the secondary school. P5485 (Report of Rogatica Brigade, 15 June 1992).

³³⁵⁷ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 39; KDZ051, T. 19397–19398 (22 September 2011). Defence witnesses testified that (i) no more than 200 to 250 people passed through the school until August 1992; (ii) the people in the school were not treated as detainees; (iii) the people were not brought to the school by force and the Bosnian Muslim population who stayed behind in the town and expressed loyalty and were not willing to fight were asked to move to the school; (iv) the school was a shelter or a safe house used to protect people from murder and mistreatment which could accommodate 1,100 people; (v) the school was used as a collection centre until August 1992 when the people were asked whether they wanted to remain in Rogatica or whether they wanted to change their place of residence after which they were sent to their desired location; (vi) the civilian authorities asked the Brigade to act in accordance with international conventions; (vii) after Rogatica was "liberated" at the end of July 1992, the Bosnian Muslims at the school were able to go to their houses and take things that were left there, but they did not dare to go when there was still fighting because of the Bosnian Muslim forces; and (viii) the civilian police was at the school and would prevent anyone from entering the compound and mistreating the civilian population. Milovan Lelek, T. 34384–34390, 34428–34429 (27 February 2013); D3035 (Rogatica Brigade combat report, 12 June 1992); D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), paras. 25, 27, 41–43; Mile Ujić, T. 33461–33462, 33465, 33468, 33476–33480 (12 February 2013); D2914 (Response of 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, 30 November 1992), p. 1; D3038 (Witness statement of Novica Andrić dated 23 February 2013), para. 16; D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 18; D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 24–25, 31; Tomislav Batinić, T. 33682–33684, 33702–33703 (14 February 2013). However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be credible considering the reliable first-hand accounts of detainees. In reaching this conclusion the Chamber noted that the evidence of the relevant witnesses was marked by inconsistencies, contradictions, evasiveness and indicators that some were not forthright in their testimony. More specifically the Chamber observed that it was not clear how Lelek could testify about these issues given that in his own admission he never entered the facility during the relevant period. Milovan Lelek, T. 34389 (27 February 2013). The Chamber also found that Lelek's evidence was marked by contradictions and indicators that he was misleading the Chamber. The Chamber also noted inconsistencies in the evidence of Ujić with respect to the school and cannot rely on his evidence in this regard. The Chamber also noted that Batinić side-stepped questions with respect to the school and does not find his evidence to be reliable in this regard.

³³⁵⁸ P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 4; Armin Baždar, T. 18394 (5 September 2011).

³³⁵⁹ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), paras. 6–7, 14 (stating that on his arrival he was detained with 35 to 40 Bosnian Muslim men, women and children); Šefik Hurko, T. 18226 (2 September 2011), T. 18347–18350, 18356 (5 September 2011) (testifying that he was not part of any military unit but instead was part of a work platoon that was digging trenches and roads and that on the certificate he received at the end of the war he was categorised as a civilian victim of the war). See also P3266 (Report of 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade, 15 August 1992) (reporting on combat operations in the vicinity of Mader on the day).

³³⁶⁰ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 54, 56; see Adjudicated Fact 2508. This included Bosnian Serb soldiers wearing camouflage uniforms and SDS insignia. P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 4; Armin Baždar, T. 18382, 18393–18394 (5 September 2011).

number of occasions and the detainees had to address him as “Vojvoda”.³³⁶² Kušić taunted some of the young male detainees that he would mobilise them to “defend Serbdom”.³³⁶³ During one of his visits, Kušić addressed approximately 200 detainees and told them they were not co-operating sufficiently, that he was facing a deadline from Pale, and that he was “running late with the cleansing of Rogatica”, which could cause problems when he was required to report to the leadership in Pale.³³⁶⁴ **(#EXCULPATORY#!!! That meant that Rogatica had to be #cleansed from the combatants#, and that these civilians ought to be released and sent to their homes! If there was a word about “cleansing” civilians, those civilians from the school could have been transported out of the municipality, but this was not a case! No #linguistic troubles# should cloud the real meanings of sentences)**

987. The paramilitaries in the school included a man nicknamed “Noka” who was one of Arkan’s men, and others who spoke the Ekavian dialect.³³⁶⁵ The Rogatica SJB reported in August 1992 that there were problems with the treatment of those at the school and that neither the military nor the civilian authorities wanted to take responsibility.³³⁶⁶ **(#Responsible conduct#! Official reports used against officials@! The Rogatica SJB is the Serb police institution! Therefore, there was no intention to violate any law, otherwise the SJB wouldn’t alarm about problems in threatment!)** The detainees were not free to leave, as guards were posted on the perimeter of the school compound and soldiers manned a sniper’s nest near the building.³³⁶⁷ **(#Military necessity#! Why would they maintain a sniper nests, if there was no enemy soldiers in the town?)** The doors of the school were “fastened with a thick chain” and the detainees had been warned that the whole area around the school had been mined in the event that anyone tried to escape through a window.³³⁶⁸ Nobody could enter the school unless the soldiers or paramilitaries brought them in.³³⁶⁹

988. Batinić visited the school once, and when asked by a detainee what would happen to them, he said that it was too late, that everything would be destroyed, and that all the detainees would be killed.³³⁷⁰ **(No evidence, except the testimony of this witness, to corroborate this lie! Batinic was a very moderate, and as this Judgement noticed, he was ready to resign if the military didn’t comply with the authorities. Had it been true, somebody else from those 200 people would remember and say it, but none of them**

³³⁶¹ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 56, 62, 68, 89; P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 42 (under seal).

³³⁶² P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 89; KDZ051, T. 19358, 19402 (22 September 2011).

³³⁶³ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 89; KDZ051, T. 19415–19416 (22 September 2011).

³³⁶⁴ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 90–91; KDZ051, T. 19415 (22 September 2011).

³³⁶⁵ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 56. While KDZ051 also testified that these persons were under the direct control of Kušić and that the regular police and military worked together with the paramilitaries it is not clear on what basis the witness reached this conclusion. P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 56. The Chamber is not satisfied that it can rely on this evidence alone to make a finding in this regard.

³³⁶⁶ P3275 (Report of Rogatica SJB, 14 August 1992), p. 1.

³³⁶⁷ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 54. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2507. Lelek disputed this Adjudicated Fact. Milovan Lelek, T. 34390–34391 (27 February 2013). However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable given that Lelek acknowledged that he had not entered the school and never talked to any Bosnian Muslims who had been at the school even though he gave evidence about conditions in the facility. He was also confronted with a prior statement where he denied any knowledge about the facility. *See* Milovan Lelek, T. 34391, 34405–34409 (27 February 2013); P6151 (Official record of Sarajevo CJB, 17 June 2004), p. 2.

³³⁶⁸ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 54. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2507.

³³⁶⁹ KDZ051, T. 19409 (22 September 2011).

³³⁷⁰ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 93; KDZ051, T. 19358, 19416 (22 September 2011).

said so! This witness was known as a very cooperative and he benefited a lot of abilities to go out, for what he was accused by his fellow Muslims!)

b. Conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

989. People were detained in the classrooms in terrible conditions.³³⁷¹ Some detainees did not have anything to eat for days and when food was provided it was very limited.³³⁷² The food and washing facilities were “grossly inadequate” and the sleeping facilities were non-existent with over 40 people, including women and children sleeping in one room.³³⁷³ Detainees had limited access to water; for example one detainee was only able to wash himself once in the three and a half months he was detained at the school.³³⁷⁴ The jewellery of the detainees was taken.³³⁷⁵ The guards also forced detainees to sign papers stating that they had “voluntarily joined the Serbian Orthodox religion”.³³⁷⁶ **(Had this really happened, that would be on a front pages in every simple media! Not a single case!)** Detainees were subjected to “serious mental and physical abuse” by Bosnian Serb police and armed individuals in uniforms who entered the facility.³³⁷⁷ **(We just had seen that the SJB, i.e. “Bosnian Serb police” required a better treatment of the inmates in the School!)** Detainees were taken to the third floor and the cellar where they were questioned and where pliers were used to mistreat them.³³⁷⁸

990. At night soldiers would bang on the walls and open the doors violently, flash their flashlights onto the faces of detainees, choose women and girls at random, say they were being taken for questioning but they would take them away to be raped.³³⁷⁹ The other detainees could hear the women and girls screaming for help.³³⁸⁰ Women and girls as

³³⁷¹ P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 4. In contrast, Batinić himself testified that after he returned to the town, his priority was to visit the school and that when he visited, he spoke to the people and distributed cigarettes to them and he heard that they were provided food and were safe there. D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 26; Tomislav Batinić, T. 33682 (14 February 2013). The Chamber finds that Batinić’s evidence with respect to the school is marked by contradictions in that he first claimed that he never heard that Bosnian Muslim civilians were taken from their villages by the Brigade Command and taken to the school but when confronted with documents which showed that the Brigade Command did inform him he acknowledged that he remembered these letters but denied that the civilian authorities ordered them to do so. Batinić’s attempt to distance the civilian authorities from these events is contrary to the document which suggests that civilians were separated from “extreme combatants” and gathered at the school with the approval of the Municipal Assembly of Rogatica. Tomislav Batinić, T. 33683–33685 (14 February 2013); D2914 (Response of 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, 30 November 1992). Having regard to these contradictions, the Chamber cannot rely on Batinić’s evidence with respect to events at the school.

³³⁷² P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 59. Ujić testified that detainees received three meals a day which were prepared at a central location for the army, refugees and people at the school. D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), paras. 27–28. The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable given that the witness only visited the school once and that there were inconsistencies in his evidence with respect to the nature of the school.

³³⁷³ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 59.

³³⁷⁴ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 59.

³³⁷⁵ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 57.

³³⁷⁶ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 57.

³³⁷⁷ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 51, 67; *see* Adjudicated Facts 2509, 2510. Ujić testified that when he visited the school and talked to detainees he received no complaints about the conduct of the police or that people were being taken away and killed. D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 28. The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable or of significance given that Ujić visited the school only on one occasion and it is unclear when he went and to how many people he spoke about their treatment. The Chamber also found inconsistencies in his evidence with respect to the school.

³³⁷⁸ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 67, 76 (testifying that one of Arkan’s men beat him); *see* Adjudicated Fact 2509; Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 865 (testifying that the soldiers wore uniforms which were olive green in colour and the “uniforms worn by the Serb police”).

³³⁷⁹ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 70–71 (identifying the soldiers who took women out of the facility). This group included members of the SJB such as Mladen Kojić and Vlado Marković. P3291 (List of policemen working at Rogatica SJB in May 1992); Adjudicated Facts 2509 (identifying the guards as those responsible for the rape of Bosnian Muslim detainees), 2510.

³³⁸⁰ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 70; P3404 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 77 (under seal); P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 4.

young as seven, as well as a 13 year old boy were taken out of the classrooms almost every night for a period of two and a half months and raped by the police and soldiers who guarded the camp.³³⁸¹ Some of the women were also taken from the school to flats and apartments in other parts of town, where they were also raped.³³⁸² **(This is the only witness claiming that kind of accusations. Even if there were any rape, it is obvious that it would be done clandestinely, by night and far from an insight of authorities. But, this witness was accused by his Muslim people for being pro-Serb, and his testimonies are aimed to “wash” his biography. Anyway, what all of this has to do with the President? The President issued many the strictest orders banning any kind of misconduct! This way all and every president would be kept liable for deeds of their criminals, so much remote in the chain of command!)**

991. When one of his female relatives was taken away, a male detainee tried to follow her but could not; he was later taken by two men to the cellar and shown where she had been raped.³³⁸³ This detainee was taken to the cellar almost every day and he could see chains that were for leading cattle, as well as traces of blood and could smell the “stench of sperm and sweat”.³³⁸⁴ He was also raped two and a half weeks after being detained; he was brought to the basement at least 30 times and raped on almost every occasion.³³⁸⁵ He was tied to a desk, he was verbally abused, pliers were used to mistreat him, and he was raped by police truncheons and similar objects.³³⁸⁶ **(#Not corroborated by any!#All unproven lies! He was a favourite, had many benefits and was hated by the rest of Muslims! But, being “protected”, the Defence was helpless!)**

992. Some of the detainees at the school were ordered to work; they dug trenches, collected garbage, carried ammunition, made machine-gun nests, and buried corpses.³³⁸⁷ Detainees who did not work fast enough or do exactly as they were instructed were beaten, insulted, and threatened.³³⁸⁸ When a Bosnian Serb tank was hit by an anti-tank mine which killed the driver and injured other soldiers, Kušić came to the school with soldiers and collected four to five Bosnian Muslim men who “were taken to be a sort of human shield for the Serb soldiers so they could pull out their dead and wounded from the tank”.³³⁸⁹ **(#Not corroborated by any#! Pretly unbelievable, and not corroborated, but just to notice that somebody was firing anti-tank mines, i.e. there were the fights going on in the town itself! That is why the civilians were in the school!)**

993. At the end of June 1992, a group of between 200 and 300 people were taken from the school, placed on buses and trucks, and told that they were being taken to Bosnian

³³⁸¹ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 69–71; P3404 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 73, 77 (under seal); Adjudicated Fact 2509; P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 4. See also Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 865; KDZ051, T. 19364, 19417–19418 (22 September 2011).

³³⁸² P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 69–70. See also Adjudicated Fact 2509.

³³⁸³ [REDACTED].

³³⁸⁴ [REDACTED].

³³⁸⁵ [REDACTED].

³³⁸⁶ [REDACTED].

³³⁸⁷ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 78; KDZ051, T. 19417–19418 (22 September 2011); P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 4; P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 4.

³³⁸⁸ P3404 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 78 (under seal).

³³⁸⁹ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 85; P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 4.

Muslim territory.³³⁹⁰ They were escorted by Bosnian Serb police.³³⁹¹ The convoy was stopped by local Bosnian Serbs and members of the White Eagles who separated men between the ages of 16 and 65 from the women and children.³³⁹² The women and children were transported out of the municipality while the men were eventually taken to other detention facilities in other municipalities including the Sušica camp in Vlasenica,³³⁹³ the Batković camp in Bijeljina,³³⁹⁴ and the Kula Prison in Ilidža.³³⁹⁵ The women and children were loaded onto buses and trucks “like cattle” and taken to Hreša where they were later exchanged.³³⁹⁶ **(Hresa is an entrance in the Muslim part of Sarajevo!)** On 16 August 1992, a person named Kojić from the Bosnian Serb MUP came to the school and ordered that all “loyal” Muslims be released and that everyone else should be taken to the Rasadnik camp after which some families were released.³³⁹⁷ **(#Combatants or civilians#! There was a criterion, and the religion didn’t play any role in the treatment of those able bodied men! The crucial criterion was whether the able bodied fought against the Serbs, or not!)**

c. Conclusion on conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

994. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that non-Serb civilians including women and children from Rogatica were brought to and detained at the Veljko Vlahović Secondary School from at least May 1992 until August 1992. The detainees were held in poor conditions which included inadequate food, overcrowding, and limited access to water. **(However, the Chamber missed to notice the clear evidence that many of these civilians were free to go out and obtain food, or to go to their homes and apartments for bathing, taking shower and changing wearings.)** Detainees were subjected to beatings and mental abuse and were forced to work at the frontlines. Both male and female detainees were also subjected to acts of sexual violence. **(Unproven, and rebutted by the Defence witnesses. The Chamber accepted that KDZ051 lied when witness Veselinovic rebutted his claims!)**

d. Scheduled Incident B.16.1

995. The Indictment refers to the killing of a number of men taken from the Veljko Vlahović Secondary School between June and September 1992.

996. Between June and September 1992, groups of male detainees were taken out of the school to a location behind the school, after which shooting was heard and the detainees did

³³⁹⁰ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 66; Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 867–869.

³³⁹¹ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 868–869.

³³⁹² Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 868–869; P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 4; Armin Baždar, T. 18393–18395 (5 September 2011).

³³⁹³ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 868–869. *See also* P2068 (Witness statement of Jeremy Bowen dated 10 August 2009), para. 53.

³³⁹⁴ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 66; KDZ051, T. 19407 (22 September 2011); *see* Adjudicated Fact 2251.

³³⁹⁵ KDZ239, T. 18922–18923 (15 September 2011).

³³⁹⁶ P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 4; Armin Baždar, T. 18382 (5 September 2011); P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 4. *See also* P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011) (under seal), para. 13.

³³⁹⁷ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 21; Šefik Hurko, T. 18233–18234 (2 September 2011), T. 18368 (5 September 2011). *See also* P3404 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011) (under seal), para. 99.

not return.³³⁹⁸ After many detainees disappeared from the school those who remained were told that they would all be killed and that they would all disappear.³³⁹⁹ **(#Heard, not seen#! Again, all heard only, nothing seen, #“did not return”#... how to return if they had been exchanged? How the Serb Army got their captured soldiers else but through an exchange? And again, only this witness, KDZ051, a proven liar!)**

997. The Chamber therefore finds that a number of men taken from the Veljko Vlahović Secondary School between June and September 1992 were killed by Serb Forces.

2. Scheduled Detention Facility C.21.2

998. The Indictment refers to the use of the garage of Novica Andrić as a detention facility on or about 14 August 1992.

999. The garage of Novica Andrić was located in the village of Kosovo, approximately four kilometres from the village of Mader, and was used as a place of detention.³⁴⁰⁰ On 14 August 1992, Šefik Hurko, his mother, father, and cousin were arrested by four Bosnian Serb soldiers in the village of Mader and brought to the garage of Novica Andrić.³⁴⁰¹ There was a large group of armed men in uniforms who were identified as “Chetniks”.³⁴⁰² **(#Not VRS#! “Chetniks” hadn’t been under the VRS command, nor the President approved any ideological units! However, Rogatica was well known for the Chetniks during the WWII, and those Chetniks fought against the Croatian nazies Ustashas, which comprised almost all the Rogatica Muslims. So, the Chetniks had a great respect in the Serbian people for their survival, and many of them may have returned from Serbia during this war. Soon after, the VRS integrated all the paramilitaries, or arrested them!)** These men wore beards and cockades, as well as skull and cross-bone insignias.³⁴⁰³ Šefik Hurko and his family were ordered by four soldiers to go into the garage.³⁴⁰⁴ These four soldiers behaved in a professional manner and did not beat or mistreat the detainees.³⁴⁰⁵ **(#Responsible conduct of officials#!)** Hurko testified that when he and his family entered the garage they sat on a bench and other soldiers entered, including a man with a moustache who introduced himself as Rajko Kušić.³⁴⁰⁶ Hurko was beaten on arrival in the garage.³⁴⁰⁷

³³⁹⁸ See Adjudicated Fact 2511; P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 87–88 (testifying *inter alia* that he was told that Mujo Bešlija was killed by one of Arkan’s men); KDZ051, T. 19413–19414 (22 September 2011). See also P3283 (List of Bosnian Muslim civilians killed in Rogatica), pp. 4, 10 (which lists the names of five people who were killed on the premises of the school and also identifies that Mujo Bešlija was “detained and killed” but does not specify a date). The Chamber is not satisfied with the provenance of this document and will not rely on it for the purposes of a finding in this regard.

³³⁹⁹ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 93

³⁴⁰⁰ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 8; Šefik Hurko, T. 18226–18227 (2 September 2011); P6157 (Map of Rogatica).

³⁴⁰¹ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), paras. 6, 8; Šefik Hurko, T. 18226–18227 (2 September 2011); Šefik Hurko, T. 18364 (5 September 2011).

³⁴⁰² P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 8.

³⁴⁰³ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 8.

³⁴⁰⁴ Šefik Hurko, T. 18227 (2 September 2011).

³⁴⁰⁵ Šefik Hurko, T. 18364, 18365–18366 (5 September 2011); P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 7.

³⁴⁰⁶ Šefik Hurko, T. 18364–18365 (5 September 2011). The Accused tried to suggest that other people introduced themselves as Rajko Kušić but the witness did not know anything about this and only knew that the person introduced himself as Kušić. Šefik Hurko, T. 18363–18364 (5 September 2011). Given that Andrić himself acknowledged that Kušić was there the Chamber places no weight on the Accused’s suggestion that this could have been a misidentification. Novica Andrić, T. 34454 (28 February 2013).

³⁴⁰⁷ Šefik Hurko, T. 18367 (5 September 2011). Andrić testified that his garage was used as a shelter to protect Bosnian Muslims from acts of revenge by Bosnian Serb soldiers and that the Hurko family only stayed in the garage for a short time, they were not mistreated or abused and were allowed to leave but had nowhere safer to go. D3038 (Witness statement of Novica Andrić dated 23 February 2013), paras. 10–11, 13; Novica Andrić, T. 34447, 34453–34457 (28 February 2013); D3039 (Photograph of a garage); D3040 (Photograph of a garage). See also D3041 (Photograph of a house); D3042 (Photograph of a house). The Chamber does not consider Andrić’s evidence to be

Kušić ordered Stojan Perković and Brane Krsmanović to search them.³⁴⁰⁸ After a packet of bullets and a pistol was found, Perković and Krsmanović beat Hurko and his father.³⁴⁰⁹ **(#Armed#, therefore, not civilian#!)** Krsmanović told Hurko's father to "stick his tongue out", took a knife to cut his tongue off, and then started to cut his ears.³⁴¹⁰ **(#Remember this, since the same man will speak to internationals, "without his tongue and his ears!#)** Perković hit Hurko on the head with the packet of bullets, cursed him, and forced him to eat three or four of the bullets.³⁴¹¹

1000. Hurko was singled out by Kušić and taken out of the garage with a gun pointed at his back; he could still hear them beating his father when he went outside.³⁴¹² Hurko was questioned by Kušić about Bosnian Muslim forces before being taken back into the garage.³⁴¹³ When he was taken back inside Hurko saw his father on the floor, covered in blood with both his ears cut.³⁴¹⁴ Perković stabbed Hurko in the hand with a knife and attempted to slash his throat.³⁴¹⁵ Kušić watched this whole incident³⁴¹⁶ and ordered that Hurko and his family be taken to Rogatica,³⁴¹⁷ after which they were taken to the Veljko Vlahović Secondary School.³⁴¹⁸ Perković received an award during the first anniversary of the "liberation" of Rogatica.³⁴¹⁹ (3376)

1001. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that a Bosnian Muslim family was detained at the garage of Novica Andrić on or about 14 August 1992 and that the male members of the family were beaten, stabbed, and mistreated by Serb Forces.

3. Scheduled Detention Facility C.21.3

1002. The Indictment refers to the use of Rasadnik as a detention facility at least between August 1992 and October 1994.

reliable in this regard. In reaching this conclusion the Chamber noted inconsistencies in Andrić's evidence and found that his evidence was marked by evasiveness as well as indicators that he was not candid with the Chamber. More specifically Andrić denied any knowledge that Perković had pled guilty and was convicted for the crimes committed in the garage; the Chamber also noted an inconsistency between his evidence that the Hurko family members were not detained and his testimony that they were in military detention and prisoners of the army. **(HOW POSSIBLY ANDRIĆ COULD HAVE KNOWN WHAT HAPPENED WITH PERKOVIĆ, OR ANYTHING WHAT HAPPENED IN THE GARAGE, IF HE WAS NOT IN IT? HOWEVER, THE MOST RESPONSIBLE, AND SUPERIOR, RAJKO KUSIC ACTED CORRECTLY. !#RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT#! QUESTIONING HURKO ABOUT THE MUSLIM FORCES INDICATES THAT THE FIGHTS WERE GOING ON, AND THAT IT WAS A WAR ZONE! OTHERWISE, WHY THE HURKOS WOULD HAVE AMMUNITION IN THEIR POCKETS?)**

³⁴⁰⁸ Šefik Hurko, T. 18364 (5 September 2011).

³⁴⁰⁹ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), paras. 9, 12; Šefik Hurko, T. 18228 (2 September 2011), T. 18356 (5 September 2011).

³⁴¹⁰ Šefik Hurko, T. 18228 (2 September 2011).

³⁴¹¹ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 12; Šefik Hurko, T. 18227–18228 (2 September 2011); Šefik Hurko, T. 18364–18365 (5 September 2011).

³⁴¹² P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 11; Šefik Hurko, T. 18366–18367 (5 September 2011).

³⁴¹³ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 11.

³⁴¹⁴ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 10; Šefik Hurko, T. 18228 (2 September 2011), T. 18367 (5 September 2011).

³⁴¹⁵ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), paras. 9, 60; Šefik Hurko, T. 18228 (2 September 2011). The Chamber also received evidence with respect to a killing which occurred at Novica Andrić's garage. The Chamber notes that this killings is not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.

³⁴¹⁶ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), paras. 10, 12; Šefik Hurko, T. 18227–18229 (2 September 2011).

³⁴¹⁷ Šefik Hurko, T. 18229–18230 (2 September 2011); P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 11.

³⁴¹⁸ Šefik Hurko, T. 18230 (2 September 2011).

³⁴¹⁹ P2832 (Article from Srpska Vojska entitled "They Saved Serbian Land", 15 July 1993), p. 4.

a. Arrival of detainees and control over detention facility

1003. The Rasadnik detention facility was located at a factory farm which had been used before the war to house farm animals.³⁴²⁰ The building where people were detained had been previously used for cattle exhibitions.³⁴²¹

1004. On 5 August 1992, approximately 20 Bosnian Muslim men and one boy aged 14 who had been separated from the women and children at the Veljko Vlahović Secondary School were taken to Rasadnik.³⁴²² They were detained in two rooms with boarded up windows.³⁴²³

1005. Other Bosnian Muslims who fled Rogatica in early August 1992 were arrested by Serb Forces and taken to Sokolac before some were brought to Rasadnik.³⁴²⁴ **(Those who #fled Rogatica in early August 1992 obviously were fighting against the Serbs#, since we saw that the Serbs took control of Rogatica by the end of July 1992, while fights in surrounding villages lasted to at least 14 August, see paras: 985 and 999 of this Judgement, as well as the rest of this paragraph!)** On 10 August 1992, Serb Forces separated men from the women; the women and children were taken by mini-bus to Hreša.³⁴²⁵ **(#Responsible conduct#)** 13 of the men were lined up and a Bosnian Serb soldier took down their names before they were put into a van and transported to Rasadnik, where they were all put into one small room.³⁴²⁶ In addition to these 13 men, there were approximately 22 other detainees held in two other rooms and other detainees held in another room.³⁴²⁷

1006. On the evening of 16 August 1992, detainees who had been previously held at the Veljko Vlahović Secondary School were brought to Rasadnik.³⁴²⁸ The men were separated from the women.³⁴²⁹ Some detainees received better treatment because they were friends of Kušić's or because they co-operated with the Bosnian Serbs.³⁴³⁰ Detainees were also brought to the facility in October 1992³⁴³¹ and there were reports that Bosnian Muslims

³⁴²⁰ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 16 (under seal); P3290 (Aerial photograph of Rasadnik farm); P6157 (Map of Rogatica). See also P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 4.

³⁴²¹ P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 4; Armin Baždar, T. 18382–18383 (5 September 2011); P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), pp. 4–5; P128 (Alija Isaković's statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 4. See also P3283 (List of Bosnian Muslim civilians killed in Rogatica), pp. 12–20; P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 41.

³⁴²² P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 4; P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), pp. 4–5; P128 (Alija Isaković's statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 4; Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*, T. 869. See Scheduled Detention Facility C.21.1 where the detention at the Veljko Vlahović Secondary School is described. See also D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 29; P6104 (Record of interview with Mile Ujić, 6 June 2004), p. 5.

³⁴²³ P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 4; Armin Baždar, T. 18382–18383 (5 September 2011).

³⁴²⁴ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 12–13 (under seal). The Chamber received evidence about the mistreatment of this group when detained at other locations. The Chamber notes that these facilities are not charged pursuant to Schedule C of the Indictment. P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 13 (under seal).

³⁴²⁵ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 13 (under seal).

³⁴²⁶ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 14, 16 (under seal).

³⁴²⁷ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 17, 20–21 (under seal). KDZ607 was detained at Rasadnik for a period of six days from 10 to 15 August 1992. P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 23 (under seal).

³⁴²⁸ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 21.

³⁴²⁹ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 22.

³⁴³⁰ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 31. See also P128 (Alija Isaković's statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), pp. 5–6; D3038 (Witness statement of Novica Andrić dated 23 February 2013), paras. 12, 17.

³⁴³¹ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 34.

were still being held at the facility in 1995.³⁴³² However, given that the Indictment only alleges detention until October 1994 at Rasadnik, the Chamber will not make findings with respect to detention after this date.

1007. Rasadnik was guarded by the civilian police of Rogatica and the warden of the facility was Miloš Vojanović.³⁴³³ The guards wore camouflage or olive grey uniforms and automatic weapons of the JNA.³⁴³⁴ After 1 November 1992, the guards at the detention facility were replaced by soldiers who called themselves “Chetniks”, and JNA officers from Serbia would also visit the facility.³⁴³⁵ **(This is rubbish! There was no the JNA officers in the RS after 20 May 1992!)** Kušić visited the camp on several occasions in 1992 and 1993 and gave the impression that he had “100% control” over the facility.³⁴³⁶ The Eastern Bosnia Corps command and the command of the 4th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade were informed about the capture and detention of Bosnian Muslims in Rogatica, including at Rasadnik.³⁴³⁷

1008. Defence witnesses testified that (i) Rasadnik was a military detention facility where both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs were detained and questioned; (ii) the Bosnian Muslims detained at this facility were suspects who had weapons when their villages were searched or had fired at Bosnian Serb villages; (iii) some civilians may have moved to the camp when the Veljko Vlahović Secondary School closed; (iv) there was no mistreatment of detainees; and (v) the facility was a reception centre.³⁴³⁸ The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its discussion above relating to the credibility assessment of the relevant witnesses.³⁴³⁹ **(The #Defence witnesses#, particularly if of the Serb origin, were never credible. Over 230 Defence witnesses had been discredited, and that is a unique example of such a “carnage” of witnesses! There is no acceptable explanation for this!)** More specifically, the Chamber notes that Lelek was shown a list of captured Bosnian Muslims from Rogatica and asked whether they were prisoners, but Lelek maintained that they were placed in Rasadnik because the Veljko Vlahović Secondary School was closed.³⁴⁴⁰ Lelek was confronted with evidence that civilians including elderly women were detained and died at Rasadnik, and Lelek confirmed that there were civilians detained there but insisted that he did not understand why elderly civilians would be killed there.³⁴⁴¹ In light of these inconsistencies the Chamber does not consider Lelek’s evidence to be reliable in this regard.

³⁴³² D2133 (1st Mountain Brigade Report, 30 July 1995); Andrić, T. 34468–34469 (28 February 2013).

³⁴³³ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 23 (stating that two of the guards were nicknamed Šolaja and Buco); P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 19, 22 (under seal). *See also* Milovan Lelek, T. 34386 (27 February 2013).

³⁴³⁴ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 19, 22 (under seal).

³⁴³⁵ P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 5; P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), pp. 4–5.

³⁴³⁶ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 44; Šefik Hurko, T. 18238–18239 (2 September 2011). *See also* P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 5.

³⁴³⁷ P6153 (Drina Corps list of captured persons, 10 April 1993), pp. 1–2; P6155 (List of prisoners in Rogatica Vili camp, 1 February 1993).

³⁴³⁸ D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 32; D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 29; D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 19; D3038 (Witness statement of Novica Andrić dated 23 February 2013), paras. 16–17; Novica Andrić, T. 34457–34458 (28 February 2013); D3031 (Witness statement of Milovan Lelek dated 23 February 2013), para. 19; Milovan Lelek, T. 34413–34419, 34426–34427 (27 February 2013).

³⁴³⁹ *See fns.* 3142, 3208.

³⁴⁴⁰ P6153 (Drina Corps list of captured persons, 10 April 1993).

³⁴⁴¹ Milovan Lelek, T. 34413–34421 (27 February 2013); P6152 (Sarajevo Cantonal Court record of Rogatica exhumation, 4 November 1998), pp. 10–13. *See also* P6155 (List of prisoners in Rogatica Vili camp, 1 February 1993); P6153 (Drina Corps list of captured persons, 10 April 1993) (which suggests that detainees included elderly men, women and children).

b. Conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

1009. While the detainees were held at the facility, the windows were boarded up.³⁴⁴² The detainees had no running water and their access to the water which was kept in containers outside was at the discretion of the guards; they also had no toilet and had to be escorted outside by guards.³⁴⁴³ **(#Necessities#! Was the Chamber of an opinion that this was not necessary and was done because of malice, or that the guards enjoyed escorting the inmates? The facility wasn't built up for the purpose of detaining anyone, and a kind of improvisations was inevitable, and there was no any malice in it. Any detainee was a big burdain to the Army and police, and they had been kept because of a defence necessities and presumed danger, no matter it could be overestimated!)**

1010. All the newly arrived detainees were beaten by a guard called Šolaja.³⁴⁴⁴ Severe beating of detainees was common place at the facility.³⁴⁴⁵ Detainees were interrogated in a small room and in the course of the interrogations were beaten on their heads and stomachs with rifle butts; the room was left bloody from the beatings.³⁴⁴⁶ Dragomir Kanostrevac was among those involved in the interrogations and beatings.³⁴⁴⁷ Later, interrogations were carried out by Novak Džida who was dressed in civilian clothes.³⁴⁴⁸ Kanostrevac and Džida were on the list of active policemen working at the Rogatica SJB in May 1992.³⁴⁴⁹

1011. From 16 August to 1 September 1992, Hurko was not beaten, but around 2 a.m. on 1 September, his father was taken to the warden's office for questioning and he could hear his father being beaten through the wall.³⁴⁵⁰ When Hurko saw his father the next day, he could see that his father's face was swollen from the blows.³⁴⁵¹ **(#Impossible#! #A MIRACLE#! How possibly Hurko's father was questioned, if it was true that his tongue and his ears had been cut off, see para: 999 of this Judgement? It was the easiest court to lie in!)** After half an hour, Hurko was taken to a room and was threatened by Vojinović to answer all questions truthfully if he wanted to keep his "head on his

³⁴⁴² P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 17 (under seal); P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 4; Armin Baždar, T. 18382–18383 (5 September 2011).

³⁴⁴³ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 18 (under seal). In contrast Ujić testified that detainees at Rasadnik had access to toilets and warm water. D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 29. Having reviewed this evidence, the Chamber is not convinced that Ujić was in a position to know about the specific conditions of detention at Rasadnik. The Chamber is therefore not convinced that it can rely on his evidence in this regard. In addition, the Chamber noted contradictions in the evidence of Lelek with respect to the Rasadnik facility and therefore does not accept his evidence with respect to the conditions of detention and treatment of detainees. Milovan Lelek, T. 34386 (27 February 2013). Similarly, on cross-examination, Andrić could not confirm whether or not Bosnian Muslim women, including a 101 year old, was detained at Rasadnik because his job did not involve going into the buildings but he acknowledged that Bosnian Muslim civilians were detained at the facility. Andrić denied knowledge of old women who died after a year of detention at Rasadnik on the basis that he only came there rarely and was not aware of all things that happened there. Novica Andrić, T. 34460–34464, 34479–34481 (28 February 2013); D3038 (Witness statement of Novica Andrić dated 23 February 2013), para. 17 (stating further that the detainees received the same food as the staff and soldiers at the facility). Having regard to the inconsistencies and evasiveness in Andrić's evidence, the Chamber does not consider that Andrić's evidence is of much weight in this regard particularly given his claim when questioned that he was not aware of many things which happened in the facility.

³⁴⁴⁴ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 33.

³⁴⁴⁵ P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 5; P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), paras. 36, 38–40.

³⁴⁴⁶ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 16 (under seal). See also P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 22.

³⁴⁴⁷ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 16 (under seal).

³⁴⁴⁸ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 16 (under seal).

³⁴⁴⁹ P3291 (List of policemen working at Rogatica SJB in May 1992); KDZ607, T. 18483 (6 September 2011) (private session). While the Chamber received evidence that Radisav Ljubinac (a.k.a. "Pjano") was found guilty of kicking and punching detained civilians at the Rasadnik camp the Chamber will not rely on this judgement to support findings in this case. P6106 (Verdict of BiH Court against Ljubinac Radisav, 8 March 2007), pp. 1–2.

³⁴⁵⁰ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 25.

³⁴⁵¹ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 27.

shoulders”.³⁴⁵² When Hurko was questioned about the location of trenches and mines and denied any knowledge about the matter he was beaten as the question was repeated.³⁴⁵³ Hurko was beaten on the back with a baton and when he fell down a guard nicknamed “Bucu” jumped on him. When he lost consciousness, a bucket of water was poured on him and the beating stopped.³⁴⁵⁴

1012. Both Hurko and his father were taken away from the camp by Bosnian Serb police to the Rogatica SJB. Hurko arrived at the Rogatica SJB after his father and saw his father covered in blood.³⁴⁵⁵ At the Rogatica SJB, Hurko was threatened before being forced to sign a statement about his father’s involvement in organising specific meetings in Rogatica.³⁴⁵⁶ Hurko was then returned to Rasadnik where his mother told him that his father had been seriously beaten. As a result of the beating, his father could not move for the next 15 days.³⁴⁵⁷

1013. Although Mile Bojat, who was the warden at Rasadnik for a month,³⁴⁵⁸ told the detainees that there would be no more maltreatment under his command, the mistreatment continued.³⁴⁵⁹ Bojat was replaced by Vinko Bojić in October 1992.³⁴⁶⁰ Bojić, who wore a MP uniform took over command of the facility and was involved in the severe beating of detainees.³⁴⁶¹ During beatings, Bojić would order the detainee to lie on the floor and would jump on him.³⁴⁶² In beating Alija Isaković Bojić broke six of Isaković’s ribs. He also carved a cross on Isaković’s chest with a hunting knife, pushed lit cigarettes into his ears and cursed Isaković and called him a “Turk”.³⁴⁶³ Bojić carved 30 crosses on the body of Bećir Ćutarija, burned him with cigarettes, pulled his teeth, jumped on him, and forced him to swallow two bullets.³⁴⁶⁴ Bojić also allowed other “Chetniks” to beat the detainees; the maltreatment of the detainees worsened when Bosnian Serb soldiers were killed in clashes with Bosnian Muslims.³⁴⁶⁵ **(#Revengeful conduct#! #Personal vendeta#! ! If true, it is a disgrace, no matter was it a sort of revenge, but what the Accused have to do with a solitary crimes committed contrary to all his orders?)**

1014. Isaković was beaten on another occasion for two days and two nights by two men known as Brđanin and Šolaja and on other occasions by Mišo Vojinović, Rajak and Ikonić.³⁴⁶⁶ Other guards who beat the detainees included Bojić’s brother, Branko Planojević, and Sorak.³⁴⁶⁷ In July 1993, Hurko heard the beating of a captured member of

³⁴⁵² P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 26.

³⁴⁵³ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 26.

³⁴⁵⁴ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 26.

³⁴⁵⁵ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), paras. 28–29.

³⁴⁵⁶ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), paras. 28, 30.

³⁴⁵⁷ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), paras. 30–31.

³⁴⁵⁸ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 34.

³⁴⁵⁹ P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 5.

³⁴⁶⁰ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 34. *See also* Šefik Hurko, T. 18236 (2 September 2011) (private session) (testifying that Bojić was appointed by Kušić). It is not clear to the Chamber how Hurko knew that Bojić was appointed by Kušić and therefore the Chamber is not satisfied it can rely on this evidence.

³⁴⁶¹ P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 6.

³⁴⁶² P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 6.

³⁴⁶³ P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 6; P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 5.

³⁴⁶⁴ P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 6.

³⁴⁶⁵ P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 6.

³⁴⁶⁶ P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 5.

³⁴⁶⁷ P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 6; P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 35.

the ABiH; Hurko himself was beaten around 10 July 1993, when the chief of the SJB in Rogatica and his deputy visited the camp.³⁴⁶⁸ Some detainees died following the beatings.³⁴⁶⁹ Other detainees were taken away, after which the sound of beating followed by a gun shot were heard.³⁴⁷⁰

1015. The ICRC visited Rasadnik on 28 July 1993 and after being assured that the detainees could speak frankly and in confidence, Hurko told the representatives that their situation was difficult, that they had been taken to the frontlines, that they did not have enough food, and were being sexually mistreated.³⁴⁷¹ After about three days, Hurko was beaten by Bojić in a manner which he describes as “bestial”, stating: “He put his pistol in my mouth. He pulled hair from my armpits and inserted it in my mouth. He extinguished cigarettes on me and ordered me to eat the extinguished cigarettes. He ordered me to remove my clothes. He then hit me in my ribs with a knife handle.”³⁴⁷² One of Hurko’s ribs was broken while Bojić asked him about everything he had complained about to the ICRC.³⁴⁷³ Bojić then brought in Hurko’s father and asked him if he wanted to go to a third country, which reflected what he had told the ICRC, and then ordered Hurko to beat his father.³⁴⁷⁴ Hurko could only hit his father five or six times as he was out of strength after which Bojić said: “If you don’t want to, I will” and continued to hit his father 15 to 16 times until he fell down.³⁴⁷⁵ Two 65 year old men were also beaten badly.³⁴⁷⁶ **(#Impossible#! So, the Hurko’s father “without his tongue” have spoken not only to the interrogatore, but to the ICRC, and the ICRC didn’t report this “cutting” of tongue? There was no any obstacle to lie!)**

1016. Women were also taken out at night and were forced by Bojić to strip and perform sexual acts with elderly detainees,³⁴⁷⁷ **(#Unbelievable and impossible#! So, an elderly detainees could have been able to perform a sexual act in such a distressed situation!?)** after which Bojić would take the women to another room.³⁴⁷⁸ Several Bosnian Muslim women who had been detained at Rasadnik told Hurko that Bojić had raped them.³⁴⁷⁹

1017. Bojić also forced “male prisoners to perform unnatural sexual acts”.³⁴⁸⁰ This included an incident in or around February 1993 where Bosnian Muslim men and women detainees were ordered to undress, dance and perform sexual acts in front of Bosnian Serb soldiers who wore ammunition belts and “skull insignia”.³⁴⁸¹ **(#Not VRS, #Individuals, not**

³⁴⁶⁸ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 41.

³⁴⁶⁹ P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), pp. 4–5; P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), pp. 4–6. *See also* P3283 (List of Bosnian Muslim civilians killed in Rogatica), p. 8; P6152 (Sarajevo Cantonal Court record of Rogatica exhumation, 4 November 1998), pp. 9–14.

³⁴⁷⁰ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), paras. 38–40. *See also* P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), paras. 33, 47–48; P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 6.

³⁴⁷¹ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 45; Šefik Hurko, T. 18241–18242 (2 September 2011).

³⁴⁷² P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 45.

³⁴⁷³ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 45; Šefik Hurko, T. 18244 (2 September 2011).

³⁴⁷⁴ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 46; Šefik Hurko, T. 18243–18244 (2 September 2011).

³⁴⁷⁵ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 46.

³⁴⁷⁶ Šefik Hurko, T. 18242–18243 (2 September 2011).

³⁴⁷⁷ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 35.

³⁴⁷⁸ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 35.

³⁴⁷⁹ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 35. *See also* Šefik Hurko, T. 18236 (2 September 2011) (private session).

³⁴⁸⁰ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 35.

³⁴⁸¹ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), paras. 36–37; Šefik Hurko, T. 18236 (2 September 2011) (private session).

“Serb Forces”#! These insignias and ammunition belts had been strictly forbidden in the VRS or the Serb police, as well as the communist pentagram! So, even if that happened, those weren’t the VRS soldiers, and the President, so far remoted, can not be liable for such a things!) Over the course of one or two hours, the Bosnian Soldiers took the naked women one by one to another room for a period of approximately 20 minutes.³⁴⁸² Four women were taken away that day while other women were taken away in the following days.³⁴⁸³

1018. Bosnian Muslim detainees were taken to the town of Rogatica each day and forced to clean up broken glass and construction material work in places that had been shelled.³⁴⁸⁴ Detainees were also forced to clean and paint Bosnian Muslim apartments to prepare them for Serbs who would be moving into them, as well as to move furniture and belongings out of Bosnian Muslim homes into “new Serb occupied residences”.³⁴⁸⁵ Some detainees were also taken from the camp to dig trenches³⁴⁸⁶ while others were taken to unload lorries at the Sladara barley factory.³⁴⁸⁷

1019. In mid-July 1993, ten detainees and two captured ABiH soldiers were taken from the camp by truck to the village of Starčići.³⁴⁸⁸ The detainees were instructed to recover the bodies of 17 soldiers in an area which was mined.³⁴⁸⁹ A Bosnian Muslim named Mirsad Omanović who was meant to know the positions of the mines, was told to lead them.³⁴⁹⁰ When one man hit a land mine and lost a leg, Bojić stabbed Omanović, cursed the detainees’ “Balija mothers”, and shot Osmanović.³⁴⁹¹ Hurko and another detainee were ordered to bury the body in a shallow grave.³⁴⁹² After this incident the detainees spent three days in the area and found the 17 bodies and buried them there.³⁴⁹³ **(#Not corroborated by any# document, but even if true, the Accused forbade this kind of violation of the IHL at the very beginning of the war, and repeated this order many times, including different orders enriched with the warnings about meeting the IHL and other provisions! All required evidence is in the file!)**

³⁴⁸² [REDACTED].

³⁴⁸³ [REDACTED]. While the Chamber received a report which listed 12 women who were taken away from the Rasadnik camp and raped, it is not satisfied as to the provenance of this document and the basis on which it reached this conclusion and thus will not rely on it in making a finding. P3283 (List of Bosnian Muslim civilians killed in Rogatica), p. 12.

³⁴⁸⁴ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 18 (under seal). The Chamber notes that the type of forced labour charged in the Indictment is limited to work at the frontlines and the use of human shields.

³⁴⁸⁵ P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 5. The Chamber notes that the type of forced labour charged in the Indictment is limited to work at the frontlines and the use of human shields.

³⁴⁸⁶ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 38. While the Chamber received a report which listed four people who were taken from Rasadnik camp and killed when used as human shields in August 1992, it is not satisfied as to the provenance of this document and the basis on which it reached this conclusion and thus will not rely on it in making a finding. P3283 (List of Bosnian Muslim civilians killed in Rogatica), p. 9.

³⁴⁸⁷ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 25 (under seal). Ujić testified that all detainees who had committed a crime were put on trial and subject to work obligation. Mile Ujić, T. 33470 (12 February 2013). The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 3208 as to why it does not consider Ujić’s evidence in this regard to be reliable.

³⁴⁸⁸ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 42.

³⁴⁸⁹ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 42.

³⁴⁹⁰ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 42.

³⁴⁹¹ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 43.

³⁴⁹² P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 43 (stating that Omanović’s body was covered with blood, his neck had been cut with a knife, and his chest was “riddled with bullets”).

³⁴⁹³ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 43.

1020. Some detainees were exchanged from the facility³⁴⁹⁴ while others were transported to Batković camp.³⁴⁹⁵ In July 1993, 30 detainees were selected for a proposed exchange and taken towards Bijeljina.³⁴⁹⁶ However, this exchange did not occur and the detainees were returned to Rasadnik, after which Kušić came to the facility, cursed the detainees and said “Alija doesn’t want you, I don’t know what to do with you, I’ll invite the International Red Cross to send you where you want, and if they don’t want you, I’ll kill you all.”³⁴⁹⁷ On 30 April 1994, 12 male detainees and a large number of women and children were transported by bus from Rasadnik to Kula by Dragan Bulajić, the president of the Serbian Commission for Prisoner Exchange.³⁴⁹⁸

c. Conclusion on conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

1021. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that non-Serbs from Rogatica, including civilians and some ABiH soldiers, were brought to and detained at Rasadnik from at least August 1992 to October 1994. The detainees were held in poor conditions which included limited access to water. Detainees were subjected to mental abuse and beatings and some detainees died following those beatings.³⁴⁹⁹ Detainees were forced to work on the frontline. Both male and female detainees were also subjected to acts of sexual violence. **(#Mainly uncorroborated# testimonies of the Muslim adversaries of those whom they charge! Anyway, this has nothing to do with the President, who took all the necessary precautionary measures, but in a civil war of neighbours that knew each other well the President from his position couldn’t be either more efficient or liable! If he was liable for a violations which he personally forbade and tasked all the immediate commands to prevent the crimes, then no president or other officials all over the world would be safe! However, the Accused repeatedly ordered the terrain to respect the international humanitarian law and Geneva Conventions. See D2913 of 25 November 1992, sent to Rogatica authorities, and conveyed to the units: Number: Strictly confidential 01-773-1/92 Rogatica, 25th November 1992**

³⁴⁹⁴ P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 5; P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 8.

³⁴⁹⁵ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 44; Šefik Hurko, T. 18239–18241 (2 September 2011). Refer to Scheduled Detention Facility C.2.1 for evidence on detention at Batković camp.

³⁴⁹⁶ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 44.

³⁴⁹⁷ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 44; Šefik Hurko, T. 18239, 18241, 18243–18244 (2 September 2011).

³⁴⁹⁸ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 49.

³⁴⁹⁹ This finding does not include the persons alleged to have been killed in Scheduled Incident B.16.2, which is discussed below.

The Republika Srpska Presidency, in a telex sent to the Rogatica Municipal Assembly on 9th November 1992, reminds of the responsibility for the events on the territory of the municipality pertaining to possible violations of the international humanitarian law with regard to treatment of the prisoners of war.

It is being stressed that civilians who have not committed a crime cannot be held in detention against their will and that they have to be released safely to the territory of their choosing. This pertains not only to women, children and old people, but also to sick members of the enemy army who will not rejoin the enemy after their release and for whom there is no direct evidence for a crime committed.

The prisoners have to be treated in the spirit of the Geneva Convention, they have to be registered and the Red Cross has to be informed so they could inform the International Committee of the Red Cross in Belgrade.

#Orders,strictly confidential#! And that was a strictly confidential, and not aimed to impress anyone!)

d. Scheduled Incident B.16.2

1022. The Indictment refers to the killing of at least 27 men taken from detention facilities at Rasadnik on 15 August 1992.³⁵⁰⁰

1023. On 15 August 1992 Radisav Ljubinac (a.k.a. “Pjano”) **(A nickname “Pjano” means “drunk”, just to be aware of personality of the owner of it!)** went to a work site and told Bosnian Muslim detainees who were working at the site that under the orders of Kušić they were to leave their work and would be taken “to where the action was”.³⁵⁰¹ Pjano drove a mini-bus carrying approximately 27 Bosnian Muslim detainees and was accompanied by other Bosnian Serb soldiers.³⁵⁰² Some of these detainees had been asked to declare their loyalty to a Serb state.³⁵⁰³

1024. The detainees were driven to a meadow and were met by Miša Krsmanović a.k.a “Pipa”.³⁵⁰⁴ When they arrived Pjano swore and asked where Kušić was.³⁵⁰⁵ The detainees were driven to the frontline at Duljevac and stopped at a spot where there was a group of “Chetniks” who had beards, long hair, and were wearing caps with Serb insignia.³⁵⁰⁶ The

³⁵⁰⁰ The Chamber notes however, that the Prosecution only refers to the names of 24 victims with respect to this incident in its final brief. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix G.

³⁵⁰¹ P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 5; Armin Baždar, T. 18414 (6 September 2011).

³⁵⁰² P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 27–28 (under seal). The people KDZ607 identified on the van were Ago Kapo, Armin Baždar, Edis Čatić, Midhat Čatić, Mehmed Delija, Halil Halilović, Eldin Hodžić, Faruk Isaković, Hamdija Jašarević, Huso Jašarević, Suljo Jašarević, Fuad Kazić, Sulejman Kazić, Nedžad Kazić, Besim Kurčehaić, Asim Kapo, Šukrija Omeragić, Derviš Pašić, Mujo Pašić, Zaljko Salihović, Osman Solak, Fuad Šetić, Mustafa Tanković. See also Armin Baždar, T. 18388 (5 September 2011) (testifying that Mustafa Tanković and Hamdija Jasarević were in this group of men).

³⁵⁰³ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 24 (under seal). Money and valuables were taken from them after being ordered to undress.

³⁵⁰⁴ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 28 (under seal). While the Accused on cross-examination tried to show an inconsistency between the witness’s statement and his court testimony on this issue, the Chamber found that the Accused did not accurately quote the witness’s statement and that conflicting statements were not established to any degree. The Chamber is therefore satisfied with the witness’s evidence in this regard. See KDZ607, T. 18517 (7 September 2011) (private session).

³⁵⁰⁵ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 28 (under seal); P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 5; Armin Baždar, T. 18396–18397 (5 September 2011).

³⁵⁰⁶ P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 5; Armin Baždar, T. 18396–18397 (5 September 2011). See also P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 34 (under seal); KDZ607, T. 18482 (6 September 2011) (private

detainees were ordered to get out of the mini-bus one by one.³⁵⁰⁷ As the detainees got off the bus, one of the Bosnian Serbs said: “[T]hese should be immediately slaughtered” and one who was wearing a yellow headband and was named Dragoje Paunović who was called Špiro,³⁵⁰⁸ said that he would decide.³⁵⁰⁹

1025. Špiro was commander of a unit of the Rogatica Brigade.³⁵¹⁰ The 10 to 15 Bosnian Serb soldiers were wearing grey, olive, and camouflage uniforms.³⁵¹¹ Špiro ordered the soldiers to tie the men’s hands behind their backs and to have them walk down a fenced alley towards the frontline.³⁵¹² Špiro ordered the Bosnian Serb soldiers to advance towards the frontlines with the detainees.³⁵¹³ Two or three Bosnian Muslim men were ordered to walk in front of the Bosnian Serb soldiers towards the frontline.³⁵¹⁴ When shooting started two of the Bosnian Muslim detainees were wounded.³⁵¹⁵ Thereafter, the Bosnian Muslim men were led along a dirt road for 50 metres and then towards a field and ordered to stop.³⁵¹⁶ When they crossed a meadow three Bosnian Serb soldiers with automatic rifles faced them; Špiro asked how many were wounded and when he was told that some were wounded, he said “I have a lot more” and then ordered a Bosnian Serb soldier to kill them.³⁵¹⁷ The Bosnian Serb soldier then shot at the front of the line of detainees.³⁵¹⁸ When some of the younger people in the group pleaded for mercy Špiro cocked his automatic rifle and shot bursts of fire at the group of men and three other soldiers also opened fire.³⁵¹⁹

1026. After the shooting, those who survived were moaning, after which Špiro ordered that all those who were still alive should be finished off.³⁵²⁰ The Bosnian Serb soldiers walked

session) (testifying that they were behind the frontline controlled by the VRS); P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), paras. 15–17; Šefik Hurko, T. 18226, 18231–18233 (2 September 2011).

3507 P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 5; Armin Baždar, T. 18396–18397 (5 September 2011).

3508 P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 6; Armin Baždar, T. 18383 (5 September 2011); Armin Baždar, T. 18409 (6 September 2011).

3509 P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 29 (under seal); KDZ607, T. 18520–18521 (7 September 2011) (private session).

3510 Mile Ujić, T. 33471 (12 February 2013).

3511 P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 29–32 (under seal). The witness recognised Zoran Rajak, Duško Štica, Ratko Nešković, Vojo Nešković, Dragan Bojević and Uglješa Pečenica. Vojo Nešković and Zlatko Nešković were on the list of active policemen working at the Rogatica SJB in May 1992. P3291 (List of policemen working at Rogatica SJB in May 1992); KDZ607, T. 18484 (6 September 2011) (private session); P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 6; Armin Baždar, T. 18383 (5 September 2011); Armin Baždar, T. 18409 (6 September 2011).

3512 P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 29–32–34 (under seal); KDZ607, T. 18519, 18521 (7 September 2011) (private session). P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 5. The witness identified some of the soldiers in the group as Mladen LNU, Mitar Ljubinać (a.k.a. Grof), and Boban Planojević; Armin Baždar, T. 18411 (6 September 2011).

3513 P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 6; Armin Baždar, T. 18383 (5 September 2011); Armin Baždar, T. 18409 (6 September 2011).

3514 P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 5–6.

3515 P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 35–36, 38 (under seal); KDZ607, T. 18523 (7 September 2011) (private session).

3516 P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 6; Armin Baždar, T. 18389 (5 September 2011); P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 39 (under seal).

3517 P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 39 (under seal); P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 6; Armin Baždar, T. 18389 (5 September 2011), T. 18411–18412 (6 September 2011). The Chamber notes that Baždar testified that two and not three detainees said that they were injured.

3518 P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 6; Armin Baždar, T. 18389 (5 September 2011).

3519 P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 6; Armin Baždar, T. 18389 (5 September 2011); P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 41 (under seal); KDZ607, T. 18524 (7 September 2011) (private session). Ujić testified that this execution was carried out by Špiro on his own accord, but that nobody approved of this incident at the Brigade Command, Corps Command or Supreme Command levels. He also testified that he did not report the incident to the Accused nor was he aware of whether anyone else reported the incident to the Accused. Mile Ujić, T. 33470, 33473–33477 (12 February 2013). However, the Chamber does not consider Ujić’s evidence to be reliable in this regard. The Chamber noted that Ujić’s evidence was marked by contradictions and inconsistencies and his evidence demonstrated a clear interest in minimising the awareness and involvement of the Bosnian Serb authorities in the incident.

3520 P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 44 (under seal).

around and shot potential survivors.³⁵²¹ After Bosnian Serb soldiers spotted one detainee sitting up, they opened a burst of gunfire and killed him.³⁵²² Baždar, who was among the Bosnian Muslim men who were shot at, survived. While Baždar was laying face down under the body of his dead uncle, he heard a radio conversation where a person who identified himself as Rajko Kušić asked Špiro “who’s shooting?”³⁵²³ Ujić also found out about this incident either on the same day or the day after.³⁵²⁴ **(Right, it was an incident! Neither Ujic, nor Rajko Kusic as a commander knew that it was going to happen. The first one who fired expressed his rage for havin more wounded. This can not be addressed even to the most immediate commander Kusic, let alone to the President! The Chamber was many times notified by the Defence that the armies in this civil war weren’t a professional one, but composed of ordinary people who fought their neighbours when confronted! #No officials liable#!)**

1027. The BiH Research and Document Agency reported on the exhumation of 24 bodies from a mass grave site at Duljevac, Rogatica, in September 1998 which was carried out pursuant to a decision of the Sarajevo Cantonal Court.³⁵²⁵ Bullet cases were retrieved from the mass grave and in the vicinity of the grave.³⁵²⁶ The 24 bodies were identified following a post-mortem examination.³⁵²⁷ KDZ607 confirmed that the names listed in the exhumation report corresponded to the names of the people he identified as the victims of this incident.³⁵²⁸ The bodies were returned to families for burial after they identified the exhumed bodies.³⁵²⁹

1028. The Chamber therefore finds that 24 Bosnian Muslims who had been taken from Rasadnik were killed by Serb Forces on 15 August 1992.³⁵³⁰

³⁵²¹ P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 6; Armin Baždar, T. 18389–18390 (5 September 2011); P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 44 (under seal). When Baždar was shot in the arm he fell down and his uncle who had been shot in the chest fell over him. Baždar lay face down and pretended to be dead, and while he was there the Bosnian Serbs walked towards them to see if anyone was still alive they shot his uncle in the head and the bullet went through his uncle’s head into Baždar’s arm. P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 6

³⁵²² P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 6.

³⁵²³ P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 6; Armin Baždar, T. 18390–18391 (5 September 2011).

³⁵²⁴ Mile Ujić, T. 33472–33476 (12 February 2013); P6107 (Verdict of BiH Court against Dragoje Paunović, 26 May 2006), p. 3.

³⁵²⁵ P3276 (Report of BiH Research and Documentation Agency on Rogatica mass grave, 13 October 1998), pp. 2–3, 5–6, 64. KDZ606 recognised the names of almost everyone on this list. P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 99–100 (under seal); P4850 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), Annex A, p. 10; P4895 (Sarajevo MUP record of Duljevac exhumation and identification, 10 September 1992). See also P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 93–94.

³⁵²⁶ P3276 (Report of BiH Research and Documentation Agency on Rogatica mass grave, 13 October 1998), pp. 3–4.

³⁵²⁷ P3276 (Report of BiH Research and Documentation Agency on Rogatica mass grave, 13 October 1998), p. 7.

³⁵²⁸ KDZ607, T. 18479–18480 (6 September 2011); P3276 (Report of BiH Research and Documentation Agency on Rogatica mass grave, 13 October 1998). KDZ606 also confirmed that the list was an accurate list of the bodies exhumed from the grave. KDZ606, T. 18275–18276 (2 September 2011) (closed session).

³⁵²⁹ P3276 (Report of BiH Research and Documentation Agency on Rogatica mass grave, 13 October 1998), p. 3. The names of the bodies identified by family members were Edis Čatić, Sulejman Kazić, Eldin Hodžić, Asim Kapo, Mujo Pašić, Mesud Pašić, Mevludin Čatić, Faruk Isaković, Šukrija Omeragić, Fuad Šetić, Nedžad Kazić, Hamdija Jašarević, Midhat Čatić, Husein Jašarević, Vahudin Čatić, Mehmed Delija, Mustafa Tanković, Sulejman Jašarević, Osman Solak, Fuad Kazić, Besim Kurčehajić, Halil Halilović, Zajko Salihović, and Derviš Pašić. P3276 (Report of BiH Research and Documentation Agency on Rogatica mass grave, 13 October 1998), pp. 7–62; 64–69. The Chamber notes that it received another report which listed 26 people who were killed in this incident. P3283 (List of Bosnian Muslim civilians killed in Rogatica), p. 7. The Chamber is not satisfied with the provenance of this document and will not rely on it for the purposes of a finding in this regard.

³⁵³⁰ Armin Baždar, T. 18385–18387 (5 September 2011); P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 7; P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 42–43, 45–53 (under seal). Baždar managed to escape into the woods while Bosnian Serb soldiers chased and opened fire on him. See also P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 5; P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), p. 4; D3038 (Witness statement of Novica Andrić dated 23 February 2013), para. 17; P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), paras. 15–17, 23–24; Šefik Hurko, T. 18231–18233 (2 September 2011) (testifying that he heard Bosnian Serb soldiers talking about this incident and that they had “killed all the balijas” and that he had seen the Bosnian Muslims being driven at Duljevac.)

(G) Scheduled Incident D.18

1029. The Indictment refers to the destruction of five mosques in Rogatica at least between June and December 1992.³⁵³¹

1030. In the days following the initial attack on Rogatica on 22 May 1992, tanks and APCs came to the town on a daily basis and fired at targets including the mosques.³⁵³² (3489) While KDZ051 was detained at the Veljko Vlahović Secondary School, he saw Bosnian Serb soldiers go past in a tank carrying a black flag with the skull and bone insignia and the tricolour flag of the RS heading in the direction of a mosque in town.³⁵³³(3490) **(The tricolor flag was not only the RS flag, but all the Serbs national flag. Since the described soldiers had a black flag with a skull, they in no way could have been the VRS soldiers, because this insignias, as were an ideological insignias during WWII, were forbidden in the VRS!)** After some time, KDZ051 heard “a couple of blows or knocks”, and then ten minutes later, the tank returned.³⁵³⁴(3491) That same afternoon, KDZ051 heard that the mosque had been partially destroyed; on the next day, the tank returned with others and destroyed it completely.³⁵³⁵(3492) **(#EXCULPATORY# IN FOOTNOTES! All the rebutting and exculpatory evidence is “squised” in this fnn: 3492 - 3494, instead to be discussed in the main text! See the comment in 3492!)**

1031. By the end of 1992 the two mosques in Rogatica, named Čaršijska and Arnaudija,³⁵³⁶ were completely destroyed.³⁵³⁷ The buildings adjacent to the mosques

³⁵³¹ Arnaudija mosque, Čaršijska mosque (the Chamber notes that the Indictment refers to the Čaršija mosque but considers this to be a reference to the same mosque), three mosques in the area of Vragolovi.

³⁵³² P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 4.

³⁵³³ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 84.

³⁵³⁴ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 84.

³⁵³⁵ (3492) P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 84. Defence witnesses testified that (i) the Green Berets assembled around the mosques; (ii) the mosques were used by Bosnian Muslim forces for the storage of anti-tank mines; (iii) sniper nests were located near the mosques; (iv) the mosques may have been hit during clashes; and (v) Serb Forces were instructed not to destroy any religious facilities. Milovan Lelek, T. 34391–34393 (27 February 2013) (testifying further that there were major enemy concentrations in the area of Vragolovi); D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 18; Sveto Veselinović, T. 33886–33887 (18 February 2013); D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 38; D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 33. *See also* D2963 (Video footage of Rogatica), 16:32:00–17:00:00, 21:34:00–22:10:00 (which shows a machine gun nest and what appears to be a destroyed mosque. The Chamber notes that it is unclear when this video was taken and is not satisfied that it can be used to support a finding that machine gun nests were near mosques but does suggest damage to a mosque in Rogatica). **(WHY IT WAS IMPORTANT WHEN THIS VIDEO WAS TAKEN? IT CERTAINLY WAS BEFORE THE SERBS TOOK CONTROL OVER THE TOWN, i.e. DURING THE FIGHTS, AND CORROBORATES THAT THE MOSQUE HAD BEEN USED FOR THE COMBAT PURPOSES, AS MANY MINARETS WERE!)** The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that the evidence the some of the mosques were completely destroyed while adjacent buildings remained in good condition undermined the testimony of the witnesses that they were destroyed in clashes. In addition the Chamber refers to the credibility assessment of the relevant witnesses in fns. 3142 and 3208 as to why the evidence of these witnesses is unreliable in this regard. **(WHY THE “ADJACEN BUILDINGS” SHOULD BE HIT, IF NOT USED AS A MILITARY FACILITY! TO DISMISS SO MANY TESTIMONIES OF SO DECENT PEOPLE IS NO A FAIR TRIAL!)**

³⁵³⁶ (3493) P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 83; P4069 (Cultural destruction database), record 263; *see* Adjudicated Fact 2513.

³⁵³⁷ (3494) P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 61; Šefik Hurko, T. 18375 (5 September 2011); P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 59–63 (under seal); P3278 (Photograph of Čaršijska mosque in Rogatica); P3294 (Photograph of field in Rogatica); P3277 (Photograph of Arnaudija mosque in Rogatica); P3293 (Photograph of field in Rogatica); KDZ606, T. 18276–18278 (2 September 2011) (closed session); P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 105–109 (under seal); P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 5; P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled “Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH” prepared for the Karadžić case, formatted records), pp. 259–263; P3286 (Witness statement of Armin Baždar dated 23 January 1999), p. 4; P6157 (Map of Rogatica); P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 83. *See also* David Harland, T. 2118 (7 May 2010) (testifying that when he travelled through Rogatica he could see the minarets of mosques lying on the ground).

remained in good condition.³⁵³⁸ Bosnian Muslims were taken to sites and forced to clear the rubble of both mosques which had been “razed to the ground”.³⁵³⁹ The Chamber therefore finds that Serb Forces destroyed the Arnaudija and Čaršijska mosques in the town of Rogatica between June and December 1992. **(#Military necessity#! But the Chamber missed to establish whether it was a military necessity, or a wanton damage of the mosques! At least one video and many testimonies confirmed the military use of those mosques! Anyway, what does it have to do with the Accused? Even if he knew, he couldn’t order the Serbs to sustain casualties from the minarets and not to neutralise the fire!)**

1032. Three mosques in the Vragolovi area were also destroyed.³⁵⁴⁰ While the Chamber relies on Riedlmayer for the purposes of finding that the mosques were destroyed, and the nature and extent of the damage to the mosques and surrounding buildings, it does not rely on his evidence as to when and who was responsible for the destruction of the mosques which fall outside his expertise and are based on informant statements which he received. Therefore, while the Chamber further finds that three mosques in the Vragolovi area were also destroyed, it has insufficient evidence to determine when they were destroyed and who was responsible for their destruction. **(Thanks God, a bit of law!)**

(H) Movement of the population from Rogatica

1033. In the period leading up to the attack on Rogatica, Bosnian Muslims were harassed, searched, and “insulted on religious and ethnic grounds”; **(What does it have to do with the President: how the antagonised neighbours named each other?)** thereafter most of them stopped going to work.³⁵⁴¹ The security situation became more complicated in April 1992.³⁵⁴² The shortages in food and necessities caused panic and prompted people to take refuge outside the municipality, including in Serbia.³⁵⁴³ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! Now, the Chamber was aware of the shortages of food and necessities even for the population. That was the fact in the entire Serb part of Bosnia, because of a double-triple sanctions. Why then it was difficult to understand that detention facilities couldn’t feed the inmates better?#General shortage#!)** Both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs left because of fear, which was exacerbated in May 1992 due to increasing insecurity and shooting incidents.³⁵⁴⁴ Bosnian Serbs left the town *en masse* and found accommodation with relatives on the outskirts of town or in houses in Bosnian Serb villages or hamlets outside town.³⁵⁴⁵ **(Certainly these Serb civilians didn’t escape from the “Serb Forces”**

³⁵³⁸ P4069 (Cultural destruction database), records 263–264.

³⁵³⁹ P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 61; Šefik Hurko, T. 18375 (5 September 2011).

³⁵⁴⁰ See Adjudicated Fact 2513. Riedlmayer’s report, which is based on his visits to the sites in 2002 and on information he received from the Islamic Community of BiH and other sources, identifies the following mosques and the level of damage: Arnaudija mosque (completely destroyed), Čaršijska mosque (completely destroyed), Vragolovi mosque (heavily damaged): P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled “Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH” prepared for the Karadžić case, formatted records), pp. 259–265; P4069 (Cultural destruction database), records 258–262, 265–266, 268–269; P4071 (Slide images of damaged religious sites in BiH), p. 8; András Riedlmayer, T. 22534 (8 December 2011) referring to the Čaršijska mosque. The Chamber also received evidence on damage to other cultural monuments and sacred sites in Rogatica however, these sites are not charged in Schedule D of the Indictment. P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 105 (under seal); P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 59 (under seal); see Adjudicated Fact 2513; P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled “Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH” prepared for the Karadžić case, formatted records), pp. 266–268; P4069 (Cultural destruction database), records 258–262, 266, 268; András Riedlmayer, T. 22527 (8 December 2011).

³⁵⁴¹ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 9 (under seal); KDZ607, T. 18498 (6 September 2011).

³⁵⁴² P3407 (Report on the work of the Rogatica Municipal Assembly and Executive Board from July 1992 to September 1993), p. 14.

³⁵⁴³ P3407 (Report on the work of the Rogatica Municipal Assembly and Executive Board from July 1992 to September 1993), p. 14.

³⁵⁴⁴ KDZ051, T. 19380–19381 (22 September 2011); D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 16.

³⁵⁴⁵ D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 21.

but from a more numerous Muslim forces!) Since the majority of the Bosnian Serb inhabitants had moved out of the town, the organs of the Serb Municipality of Rogatica also relocated.³⁵⁴⁶ When the Bosnian Serb families started moving out of the town, this made the Bosnian Muslim population nervous about what would happen to them.³⁵⁴⁷ A significant number of Bosnian Muslims left the town.³⁵⁴⁸ **(#No, permanent removal possible#! That was a model seen throughout Bosnia, and not the alleged “ethnic cleansing! Since president Karadžić and all the officials committed the Republic of Srpska to facilitate the return of all the refugees and restoration of all the private properties, there can not be even mentioning any “permanent removal” of the non-Serbs from the Serb areas. The Chamber should count the official documents, signed and sometimes proposed by the Accused, instead of paying any attention to gossips or chatting of unofficial individuals! To everyone in the Conference on BiH it was clear that there will not be any ban of return!)**

1034. Prior to the attack on Rogatica, Bosnian Serb men had already taken their military positions outside Rogatica and Bosnian Serb women and children had moved out of the area; as a result the only people remaining were Bosnian Muslims and a few Bosnian Serbs.³⁵⁴⁹ Some Bosnian Muslims who tried to escape their villages were arrested by Serb Forces and taken to Sokolac.³⁵⁵⁰ **(That is why the Muslim civilians and non-combatants had been housed in the school Veljko Vlahović. Those who felt must to escape must have been combatants, not civilians!)**

1035. The shelling of downtown Rogatica, which had a majority Muslim population, prompted Bosnian Muslims to move out from the town centre and columns of people began moving through Kozarde.³⁵⁵¹ **(#Military Necessity#! Was this “town centre” militarised? How many troops was there? Did they engaged the Serb settlements and the Serb soldiers? This is not fair to depict this events so selectively, particularly since the Defence was prevented in depicting the other side’s conduct! Why the fights for control over the town lasted up to ten weeks?)** The Chamber has also described above the number of Bosnian Muslims who gathered in Rogatica town and who were taken to Veljko Vlahović Secondary School.³⁵⁵² A group of between 1,500 and 2,000 Bosnian Muslims left following the shelling of the town and arrived in the Bosnian Muslim village of Vragolovi where there were approximately 5,000 to 6,000 displaced Bosnian Muslims.³⁵⁵³ Bosnian Muslims from the villages around Rogatica also went to Vragolovi while others continued towards Goražde.³⁵⁵⁴ Bosnian Muslims were threatened and warned of forthcoming “cleansing”.³⁵⁵⁵ They were told that they would be allowed to leave the area and that buses to Visoko and Zenica would be provided, as this was where Bosnian Muslims were

³⁵⁴⁶ D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 22. See also D3031 (Witness statement of Milovan Lelek dated 23 February 2013), para. 10.

³⁵⁴⁷ P127 (Witness statement of Alija Isaković dated 22 January 1999), p. 3.

³⁵⁴⁸ D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 22.

³⁵⁴⁹ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 13.

³⁵⁵⁰ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 12–13 (under seal); KDZ607, T. 18508–18509 (7 September 2011).

³⁵⁵¹ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 11 (under seal).

³⁵⁵² See paras. 982–985.

³⁵⁵³ See Adjudicated Fact 2512. In light of other accepted evidence, the Chamber does not attribute weight to an article which suggested that Bosnian Serb authorities arranged for the transport of Bosnian Muslims to Sarajevo upon their request. P2832 (Article from Srpska Vojska entitled “They Saved Serbian Land”, 15 July 1993), p. 4. See also P3404 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), paras. 101–102 (under seal) [REDACTED].

³⁵⁵⁴ Milovan Lelek, T. 34394 (27 February 2013).

³⁵⁵⁵ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 102 (under seal).

“supposed to live”.³⁵⁵⁶ When he visited Rogatica in August 1992, Bowen was told that the expulsion of Bosnian Muslims was led by Kušić.³⁵⁵⁷ **(#Heard, was told#! What expulsion? All the previous paragraphs speak about escape from fights, and now a journalist, kindly accepted by the Serb side, brings out what an adversary said! This, as well as the assertion from the next lines should have been checked, and not spread as if it was a proven fact. This kind of conduct, plus testifyin before the courts really jeopardise even decent journalists in a combat zones!)** Bowen also interviewed Bosnian Muslims who were former residents of Rogatica who spoke to him about killing, forcible evacuation and the rape of young women.³⁵⁵⁸

1036. Some Bosnian Muslims were moved out of Rogatica in an organised way.³⁵⁵⁹ At the end of November 1992 Kušić stated that the Municipal Assembly had lists of “loyal Muslims” in Rogatica and also lists of “the ones who were sent away from Rogatica in the previous months during combat activities”.³⁵⁶⁰ **(#All legal, removing population#)** There was also an increasing number of Serb refugees arriving from other areas of BiH who were accommodated in the abandoned homes of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs.³⁵⁶¹ **(A Serb refugees? How come? Why they arrived at Rogatica? Did the “Serb Forces” expel them? What miracle was needed to have the complete picture, with the conduct of the Muslim side?)** By the end of June 1992, more Bosnian Muslims left Rogatica given that the Bosnian Serbs “were terrorising the people” and creating conditions in which “it was impossible for the Muslims to continue to live in the area.”³⁵⁶² The Bosnian Muslim civilian authorities and police from Rogatica withdrew from the town.³⁵⁶³

1037. On 26 June 1992, Tomislav Šipčić, as Commander of the SRK, issued a written warning to the Rogatica Brigade Command in which he said: “Kušić, I strictly forbid you to take any action on your own unless I personally approve, particularly any form of mopping up of anybody’s villages. For the last time, I am warning you to refrain from massacre,

³⁵⁵⁶ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 102 (under seal).

³⁵⁵⁷ P2068 (Witness statement of Jeremy Bowen dated 10 August 2009), para. 53.

³⁵⁵⁸ Jeremy Bowen, T. 10254–10255 (14 January 2011). *See also* Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15376–15377 (testifying that columns of Bosnian Muslim refugees from Rogatica and Višegrad passed through Sokolac in late May, June and July 1992 and related that “very ugly things were happening” including murders).

³⁵⁵⁹ KDZ051, T. 19380 (22 September 2011). Batinić denied that the Rogatica Crisis Staff or the Bosnian Serb leadership adopted a position, rendered a decision on the forcible moving out of the Bosnian Muslim population, or incited any other institution to do so. D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 18, 35 referring to P2835 (Report of Rogatica Crisis Staff, April – June 1992); Tomislav Batinić, T. 33673 (14 February 2013). However, the Chamber does not find Batinić’s evidence to be reliable in this regard. In reaching this conclusion the Chamber noted Batinić had an interest in minimising his own involvement in events in Rogatica and that the witness was evasive and his evidence was marked by contradictions.

³⁵⁶⁰ D2914 (Response of 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, 30 November 1992), p. 1. Defence witnesses testified that Bosnian Muslim villages which expressed loyalty to the Bosnian Serb authorities and handed over their weapons were protected. D2930 (Witness statement of Tomislav Batinić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 27, 29–30; Tomislav Batinić, T. 33689, 33711 (14 February 2013); D2909 (Witness statement of Mile Ujić dated 9 February 2013), para. 32; Mile Ujić, T. 33462–33463 (12 February 2013); Milovan Lelek, T. 34377–34379 (27 February 2013). The Chamber does not find this evidence that Bosnian Muslim villages were protected to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber noted that Batinić acknowledged on cross-examination that Bosnian Muslims did not remain in these villages throughout the war and that in October 1994 the last remaining Bosnian Muslims left the municipality but he claimed that they left at their own request. When Batinić was confronted with documents which suggested that these last remaining Bosnian Muslims were forcibly expelled by Bosnian Serb soldiers who came to their homes he claimed he did not know that this was happening. The Chamber found a contradiction in Batinić’s evidence that Bosnian Muslims were leaving at their own request and his denial of any knowledge about how they were moved from their homes and his acknowledgement that they lived in fear and the authorities were unable to keep everything under control. Tomislav Batinić, T. 33691–33695 (14 February 2013). The Chamber also refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 3142 and 3208 as to why the evidence of the relevant witnesses are unreliable in this regard.

³⁵⁶¹ D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 16.

³⁵⁶² P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 58 (under seal).

³⁵⁶³ P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 89, 96 (under seal); P128 (Alija Isaković’s statement to BiH authorities, 30 March 1993), pp. 2–3.

rampaging, abusing the innocent population of any nationality.”³⁵⁶⁴ Despite this order, Kušić retained his position in the Rogatica Brigade, but the order did result in some improvement in his conduct.³⁵⁶⁵

(#Rebuted# But, despite the that a very relevant witness rebuted this evidence, stating that General Sipcic trusted the allegations, while after he made an enquiry he found out that Kusic didn't commit any crime, and that the allegations were fake! There was no more relevant witness to say that, and this rebuttal in no way could be dismissed! Likely, the Accused himself got in a dispute with the VRS commanders because he trusted the allegations, which appeared to be fake!)

1038. In July 1992, 1,500 Bosnian Muslims escaped from Vragolovi to Goražde after the former was shelled by Serb Forces.³⁵⁶⁶ In August 1992, almost all Bosnian Muslims who had taken refuge in Vragolovi left the village after they received a warning about another attack.³⁵⁶⁷

1039. The Chamber finds that the Bosnian Muslim population were forced to leave Rogatica following immense pressure put on them, given the surrounding circumstances in the municipality including *inter alia* (i) attacks against their homes; (ii) shelling of villages; (iii) destruction of mosques and other property; (iv) forcible arrest and removal from their homes; (v) detention in multiple detention facilities; as well as (vi) mistreatment and killings. While the Chamber received evidence that orders were issued which called for the protection of members of the population who handed over weapons, this does not undermine the evidence received with respect to lack of voluntariness in the departure of the Bosnian Muslim population.³⁵⁶⁸ **(#Distortion# Forced to leave# by combats, not the Serb Forces”! However, there are evidence that all those who ceased to fight, or handed over their weaponry, or declared them as civilians, were taken care of! To find that “homes were attacked” ro “vilalges shelled” without establishing whether it happened within a fights is not correct and not acceptable. Why would anybody or anything be shelled if there was no a concentration of Muslim combatants and attacks from these villages? Such a trial with a ban on depictiong the conduct of both sides can not be a fair trial, and jeopardizes present and future relations between the two communities!)**

1040. Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly continued to be expelled from Rogatica **(#Distorted, previous paragraf was “forced to leave because of surrounding circumstances, and now it is “expelled!!!)** even until October 1994 when the last remaining Bosnian Muslims left the municipality.³⁵⁶⁹ By the time the Accused delivered a speech at the RS Assembly on 28 August 1995 there were almost no Bosnian Muslims in

³⁵⁶⁴ P1001 (Warning of SRK Commander to Rogatica Brigade, 26 June 1992), pp. 1–2; [REDACTED].

³⁵⁶⁵ [REDACTED].

³⁵⁶⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 2512.

³⁵⁶⁷ See Adjudicated Fact 2512.

³⁵⁶⁸ D2910 (SRK Order, 22 October 1992), p. 1; D2911 (SRK Order, 12 July 1992); D95 (Instructions from RS Presidency to presidents of municipalities in Goražde area, 14 July 1992). The Chamber received evidence that in a UNCHR memorandum dated 17 August 1994, General Soubirou expressed his belief that the “forced eviction of civilians in Rogatica which was covered by the media as ethnic cleansing” was part of an agreement between the parties. D950 (UN report re meeting with General Soubirou, 17 August 1994), p. 2. The Chamber does not consider that the opinion of General Soubirou in this context is of much weight given that he simply states that this was his belief without any indication of the basis of his opinion. It is also not clear whether his observation relates to the whole course of the conflict in Rogatica or a specific incident in 1994. The Chamber also notes that when Bowen was shown this document, he testified that when he interviewed those who left Rogatica, they told him about the difficulties they faced including killing, forced evacuation, and rapes. Jeremy Bowen, T. 10254–10255 (14 January 2011). The Chamber also refers to its finding in paras. 1033–1035 regarding the lack of voluntariness in the departure of the Bosnian Muslim population.

³⁵⁶⁹ P4867 (BiH State Commission for Exchange of POWs report, 15 October 1994), p. 4.

Rogatica.³⁵⁷⁰ (#Distortion# This is not correct interpretation of the Karad`i's words. He was "selling" the Peace plan according several almost 100% Serb municipalities were to belong to the Muslim/Croat Federation, which was opposed by the Serb representatives from those municipalities. In argumenting, the Accused said that the other side could have similar objections, and that the Serb side lost a 100% municipalities for the sake of peace. This was an argumentation why to accept the peace, instead of continuing the war, and the President didn't express either satisfaction, nor he implied that it was his objective; it was well known that the Serbs proposed a solution with the two municipalities, one Serb and the other Muslim, but the Muslims wanted the war!#Two municipalities#!)

d. Sokolac

i. Charges

1041. Under Count 3, the Prosecution alleges that persecution, a crime against humanity, was committed in Sokolac as part of the objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats from the Municipalities.³⁵⁷¹ Acts of persecution alleged to have been committed by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include killings during and after the take-over of Sokolac,³⁵⁷² and killings committed during, and deaths resulting from, cruel and inhumane treatment at scheduled detention facilities.³⁵⁷³ The Prosecution also characterises these killings as extermination, a crime against humanity, under Count 4; murder, a crime against humanity, under Count 5; and murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war, under Count 6.³⁵⁷⁴

1042. Other acts of persecution alleged to have been committed by Bosnian Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs in Sokolac include (i) torture, beatings, and physical and psychological abuse, during and after the take-over and in scheduled detention facilities, as cruel or inhumane treatment;³⁵⁷⁵ (ii) rape and other acts of sexual violence, during and after the take-over and in scheduled detention facilities as cruel and inhumane treatment;³⁵⁷⁶ (iii) the establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions in detention facilities, including the failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care, or hygienic sanitation facilities, as cruel or inhumane treatment;³⁵⁷⁷ (iv) forcible transfer or deportation of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from their homes;³⁵⁷⁸ (v) unlawful detention in scheduled detention facilities;³⁵⁷⁹ (vi) forced labour at the frontline and the use of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats as human shields;³⁵⁸⁰ (vii) the appropriation or plunder of property, during and after the take-over, during arrests and detention and in the course of or following acts of deportation or forcible

³⁵⁷⁰ Sveto Veselinović, T. 45110 (16 December 2013).

³⁵⁷¹ Indictment, paras. 48–49.

³⁵⁷² Indictment, para. 60(a)(i). See Scheduled Incident A.13.1.

³⁵⁷³ Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.23.1, C.23.2.

³⁵⁷⁴ Indictment, paras. 63(a), 63(b).

³⁵⁷⁵ Indictment, para. 60(b). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.23.1, C.23.2.

³⁵⁷⁶ Indictment, para. 60(c). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.23.1, C.23.2.

³⁵⁷⁷ Indictment, para. 60(d). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.23.1, C.23.2.

³⁵⁷⁸ Indictment, para. 60(f).

³⁵⁷⁹ Indictment, para. 60(g). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.23.1, C.23.2.

³⁵⁸⁰ Indictment, para. 60(h).

transfer;³⁵⁸¹ (viii) the wanton destruction of private property including homes and business premises and public property, including cultural monuments and sacred sites;³⁵⁸² and (ix) the imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures.³⁵⁸³

1043. Under Counts 7 and 8, the Prosecution alleges deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer), respectively, as crimes against humanity.³⁵⁸⁴ In this regard, the Prosecution alleges that Bosnian Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs forcibly displaced Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Sokolac in which they were lawfully present by the end of 1992.³⁵⁸⁵ It is alleged that from March 1992, restrictive and discriminatory measures, arbitrary arrest and detention, harassment, torture, rape and other acts of sexual violence, killing, destruction of houses, cultural monuments and sacred sites, as well as the threat of further such acts caused Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to flee in fear while others were physically driven out.³⁵⁸⁶

ii. Lead-up

1044. Sokolac is a municipality in eastern BiH located to the east of Sarajevo and to the west of Rogatica.³⁵⁸⁷ According to the 1991 census, the municipality of Sokolac had approximately 15,000 inhabitants, of whom around 66% were Bosnian Serbs and 33% were Bosnian Muslims.³⁵⁸⁸

1045. Following the multi-party elections in late 1990, the SDS won 29 of the 50 seats in Sokolac and an inter-party agreement was reached with the SDA under which positions of authority were divided between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims.³⁵⁸⁹ The agreement on the distribution of posts in the SJB was confirmed at a meeting of the MUP.³⁵⁹⁰ Multi-ethnic patrols of reserve army and police were also formed at that time.³⁵⁹¹

1046. From the beginning of 1991, there were increasing inter-ethnic tensions and fear amongst Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs.³⁵⁹² In January 1992, a meeting was held between SDS and SDA representatives to discuss the deterioration of the political and security situation.³⁵⁹³ Tensions were further exacerbated at the beginning of 1992.³⁵⁹⁴ (The

³⁵⁸¹ Indictment, para. 60(i).

³⁵⁸² Indictment, para. 60(j). See Destruction of Cultural Monuments and Sacred Sites: Scheduled Incident D.20.

³⁵⁸³ Indictment, para. 60(k). The restrictive and discriminatory measures alleged include the denial of freedom of movement; the removal from positions of authority; the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of homes; unlawful arrest and/or the denial of the right to judicial process; and/or the denial of equal access to public services.

³⁵⁸⁴ Indictment, paras. 68–75.

³⁵⁸⁵ Indictment, paras. 68, 69, 72.

³⁵⁸⁶ Indictment, para. 71.

³⁵⁸⁷ D484 (Map of BiH).

³⁵⁸⁸ D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 20; Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*, T. 15322; D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), para. 2.

³⁵⁸⁹ D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 2–3; D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 20–21.

³⁵⁹⁰ D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 21.

³⁵⁹¹ D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 23.

³⁵⁹² D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), para. 4. See also D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 24.

³⁵⁹³ P5246 (Excerpt from Milan Tupajić's diary, 23 December 1991–20 January 1992), p. 10.

³⁵⁹⁴ D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 31–32, 70; D3226 (Minutes from 4th session of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 4 May 1992), p. 2; P5246 (Excerpt from Milan Tupajić's diary, 23 December 1991–20 January 1992), p. 10. Examples heard by the Chamber included the fact that the inter-party agreements started to fall apart when the Bosnian Serbs in Sokolac refused to agree to the referendum on BiH independence. D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 22; D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), para. 5. The Chamber also heard evidence about increasing fear among Bosnian

only cause for deterioration of ethnic relations was the BH insistence on the unlawful and anti-constitutional independence!)

1047. From 1991 to spring 1992, both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims were being armed in Sokolac.³⁵⁹⁵ The 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade of the Army of SerBiH was established on 21 May 1992 and was made up of local conscripts from Sokolac, Han Pijesak, and the surrounding area and all members of the TO were mobilised into the brigade.³⁵⁹⁶ Radislav Krstić was the commander of this brigade.³⁵⁹⁷ **(#Illegal vs. legal#! The Muslim arming was illegal, since the SFRY existed, and nobody should have any armament out of the system of defence, i.e. JNA and Territorial Defence. The Serb mobilisation in the Territorial Defence and the JNA was legal and obligatory. Once the JNA left BiH, the Territorial Defence units were integrated in a newly formed VRS, but not before 20 May 92. So, one formation, the Muslim one, was illegal, and was formed clandestinely with the aim to fight the JNA and the Serbs, and thus gain independence that couldn't be achieved legally! The same was throughout BiH, in 98 out of 109 municipalities!)**

1048. Around March 1992, check-points were erected in Sokolac on important roads or at locations leading to the direction of Olovo and armed Bosnian Serbs in uniforms were placed at those check-points.³⁵⁹⁸ Bosnian Muslims were stopped, taken away or mistreated at these check-points.³⁵⁹⁹

1049. During April 1992, several paramilitary units were based in Sokolac town and its surrounding villages.³⁶⁰⁰ These units included Arkan's men, the White Eagles, and some local groups.³⁶⁰¹ Other informal groups were also present in the municipality.³⁶⁰² **(There**

Serbs given information that Bosnian Muslims from the region had volunteered to fight in Croatia and were returning with weapons and that Bosnian Muslim paramilitary formations had received training there. D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 24, 39. The Chamber also received evidence about attacks against Bosnian Serb villages by Bosnian Muslims. D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 44; D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), para. 7; Dragomir Obradović, T. 36079–36082 (26 March 2013); D3186 (Photograph of Slavko Batinić's house); D3187 (Photograph of Slavko Batinić's house); D3188 (Photograph of Slavko Batinić's house).

The Chamber heard evidence that (i) the SDS and JNA were involved in the distribution of weapons and uniforms to Bosnian Serbs; (ii) the SDA was involved in the arming of the Bosnian Muslim population; (iii) units of the Patriotic League and the Green Berets were formed in Sokolac; and (iv) the reserve forces of the TO and the 216th Mountain Brigade of the JNA were mobilised and a JNA rocket unit was moved to Sokolac. P131 (Witness statement of Asim Hamzić dated 25 March 1996), pp. 3–6; D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 5–6, 8; D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 23, 38–39; Milovan Bjelica, T. 36411–36414 (3 April 2013); P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 108; D3219 (Report of RS MUP National Security Service, undated). See also P1113 (Interview with Momčilo Mandić in Slobodna Bosna, 10 April 1998), p. 2; D3224 (Article from Oslobođenje entitled “We Knew What to Do”, 24 September 1992).

Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15384; D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), para. 14.

Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15432.

P131 (Witness statement of Asim Hamzić dated 25 March 1996), p. 5; Adjudicated Fact 2673. The Chamber received Defence evidence which suggested that there were no barricades in Sokolac at all and that the only armed formations in March 1992 were members of the TO. D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), para. 27. The Chamber does not accept this evidence and in reaching this conclusion, the Chamber considered that Obradović's evidence was marked by deliberate evasiveness and was contradictory on a number of occasions. Furthermore, the Chamber noted that this point was contradicted by other Defence evidence which suggested that there were reserve police check-points manned by a special purpose unit of the SJB that was removed from the police after complaints were made about its actions, and which therefore corroborates the existence of such check-points. D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 61, 67; D3222 (Minutes from session of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 20 April 1992), p. 8.

P131 (Witness statement of Asim Hamzić dated 25 March 1996), p. 8.

See Adjudicated Fact 2675. The Chamber is not satisfied that there were no paramilitary formations in Sokolac, as suggested by the evidence led by the Defence. D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 53, 63. In reaching this conclusion, the Chamber considered that in this respect, the evidence of Bjelica was marked with partisanship and bias and could not be relied on in relation thereto.

Adjudicated Fact 2675.

shouldn't be forgotten that on 4 April Mr. Izetbegovic called for a general mobilisation of all and everyone, and that the Muslim side fired the Territorial Defence commander (a Serb) and established a new TO (Ter. Defence) without Serbs, and the next day the war started in Sarajevo. If it is not said, there would stay an impression that Sokolac, as a Serb majority municipality got some groups without a visible reason!)

1050. Measures for the creation of a separate Bosnian Serb police in Sokolac started in early 1992. In February 1992, two days after the establishment of a "Serbian collegium" of the MUP to be managed by Momčilo Mandić,³⁶⁰³ Mandić instructed Zoran Cvijetić, Chief of the Sokolac SJB, and other heads of security centres to have a meeting with all senior executives of the MUP in their area of responsibility and report back to him.³⁶⁰⁴ Some time in March or April 1992, Cvijetić dismissed all Bosnian Muslim members of the police force and established a separate Bosnian Serb police.³⁶⁰⁵ By April 1992 only Bosnian Serbs remained on the payroll of the Sokolac SJB.³⁶⁰⁶ **(#Provided for by ICFY# Again, partial and not correct presentation. The division of MUP (Police) was agreed as early as in September 1991 on the Hague Conference on former Yugoslavia (ICFY) where Mr. Izetbegovic personally proposed that the Serbs and Croats have a high degree of autonomy. Later on, and finally on 18 March, the Lisbon Agreement (Cutileiro's Plan) appointed the separate police in the three constituent units in BiH. Beside that, there were a pairs of municipalities, like Sokolas and Stari Grad in Sarajevo, and it was agreed that as many muslims would be in the Sokolac police, as many Serb policemen would be in Stari Grad municipality. Since the Serbs in Stari Grad had been fired, the Muslims in Sokolac lost their right appointed in tge agreement! If it is not said in this Judgement, the impression would be that the Serbs did something illegal and contributed to the crisis full appearance!)**

1051. The Sokolac Crisis Staff was established in April 1992, and its first session was held on 6 April 1992.³⁶⁰⁷ **(Exactly the same day the war broke out in Sarajevo!)** At this first session, Milan Tupajić, an SDS member and president of the municipal assembly, was appointed as its president.³⁶⁰⁸ The Crisis Staff consisted of the President of the Municipality, the President of the SDS Municipal Board, the chief of police, and other members of the SDS and the SDP and was designed to take over the functions of the

³⁶⁰² D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 53, 63. See also D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 10, 29.

³⁶⁰³ P1083 (Minutes of meeting of representatives of SerBiH MUP, 11 February 1992), p. 4. For the establishment, and creation of the Bosnian Serb MUP, see Section II.C.3: Bosnian Serb MUP.

³⁶⁰⁴ Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 8649–8650; P1112 (Order of SRBiH MUP to all CSBs and SJBs, 13 February 1992).

³⁶⁰⁵ P2831 (Diary of Asim Džambasović), p. 34; P6089 (BiH MUP report, 24 March 1992), p. 2; P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), para. 87; P131 (Witness statement of Asim Hamzić dated 25 March 1996), p. 5; Momčilo Mandić, T. 4888–4889 (8 July 2010); P6234 (List of employees of Sokolac Police Station in April 1992). See also Adjudicated Fact 2674. The Chamber does not accept the Defence evidence that Bosnian Muslim police were temporarily removed for their own safety or as a temporary measure pending the resolution of structural issues in the police. D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 42, 62; D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), para. 28; Dragomir Obradović, T. 36088, 36090 (26 March 2013). In this regard, the Chamber notes Bjelica's own admission that the employees of the Sokolac SJB could not return to their jobs until the end of the war and that Obradović's evidence was marked by deliberate evasiveness and was contradictory on a number of occasions.

³⁶⁰⁶ P6234 (List of employees of Sokolac Police Station in April 1992).

³⁶⁰⁷ Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15321, 15323, 15508–15509. See also P5242 (Minutes of meeting of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 15 May 1992), p. 1; P131 (Witness statement of Asim Hamzić dated 25 March 1996), p. 3; D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 28.

³⁶⁰⁸ Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15321, 15323, 15508–15509. See also P5242 (Minutes of meeting of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 15 May 1992), p. 1; P131 (Witness statement of Asim Hamzić dated 25 March 1996), p. 3; D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 28.

municipal assembly when it was unable to convene due to emergency situations.³⁶⁰⁹ **(All the members of the Crisis Staff were there *ex officio*, and the Crisis Staffs were only a form of acting of the legal authorities in an emergency situation! The Chamber got so many evidence on that, but still the Crisis Staffs are as a fetish, something illegal!)** The Crisis Staff was tasked with maintaining the functioning of authority, commercial, and social life at the municipality level, collaborating with the police in Sokolac, the command of the army and the Bosnian Serb government on all vital issues.³⁶¹⁰ All important decisions of the SDS Main Board that needed to be implemented in Sokolac were sent to the SDS Municipal Board of Sokolac³⁶¹¹ and the Crisis Staff was informed of these decisions.³⁶¹² Around June 1992, a War Commission was created in Sokolac consisting of SDS members to communicate developments at the municipality level to the republican level.³⁶¹³ The Sokolac Crisis Staff operated until some time in July 1992 when the Executive Board took over its functions.³⁶¹⁴

1052. From 10 April 1992, the Crisis Staff took measures to preserve or restore public law and order in Sokolac and these measures included restrictions on the entry and movement of armed formations without approval, ordering investigation and taking measures against theft in the municipality regardless of the ethnic background of the victim.³⁶¹⁵ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!)** The presidents of local communes were instructed to inform the relevant authorities and the Sokolac SJB in the event that individuals or organised groups attempted to enter the municipality.³⁶¹⁶ Despite these measures there was evidence that

³⁶⁰⁹ D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 28; Milovan Bjelica, T. 36394 (2 April 2013).

³⁶¹⁰ Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15330; P5243 (Sokolac Crisis Staff decision, 29 May 1992), p. 1; D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 30. For examples of the issues the Crisis Staff was dealing with see P5250 (Minutes of meeting of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 10 April 1992); P5240 (Sokolac Crisis Staff conclusions, 20 April 1992); P5247 (Sokolac Crisis Staff conclusions, 5 May 1992); P5241 (Request of SerBiH Government to the Sokolac Crisis Staff, 9 May 1992); P5239 (Request of SerBiH Government to the Sokolac Crisis Staff, 11 May 1992); P5242 (Minutes of meeting of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 15 May 1992); P5244 (Minutes of meeting of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 22 June 1992).

³⁶¹¹ Milovan Bjelica replaced Mirko Malović at the beginning of 1992 as the president of the SDS Municipal Board. Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15349–15350, 15462–15463; D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 18.

³⁶¹² Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15349. In light of the equivocal answers on cross-examination and the fact that Bjelica's evidence was marked by partisanship and bias, the Chamber does not accept his evidence that the municipal authorities never received nor implemented the Variant A/B Instructions. See D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 18, 28; Milovan Bjelica, T. 36434, 36438–36442 (3 April 2013); P6253 (Letter from OTP to RS liaison officer, 30 July 2001).

³⁶¹³ Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15402–15403, 15492–15495.

³⁶¹⁴ D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 29; Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15493. But see Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15376–15377, 15381–15382, 15384–15385 (claiming that after 21 May 1992 when the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade was established the Crisis Staff lost influence over the security of citizens in the municipality and there were many disagreements between the command of the brigade and the civilian authorities).

³⁶¹⁵ P5250 (Minutes of meeting of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 10 April 1992), p. 5; D3176 (Sokolac Crisis Staff order, 10 April 1992); D3177 (Sokolac Crisis Staff order, 20 April 1992); D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 66; D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), para. 12; P5245 (Order of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 20 April 1992); Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15344–15345. The Crisis Staff also decided to disband the Special Purposes Unit of the SJB and redeploy its members to the TO following reports that it had contravened regulations. D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 33, 67; D3178 (Sokolac Crisis Staff order, 21 April 1992); D3222 (Minutes from session of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 20 April 1992), p. 8; D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), para. 9. The Crisis Staff also imposed restrictions on the service and sale of alcohol. D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 75; D3211 (Sokolac Crisis Staff decision, 18 May 1992); Milovan Bjelica, T. 36394 (2 April 2013); D3181 (Sokolac Crisis Staff order, 10 April 1992); D3225 (Minutes from session of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 27 April 1992), p. 1; D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), para. 11. For investigations on disturbances to public law and order when the victims were Bosnian Muslims, see D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 46, 70; D3226 (Minutes from 4th session of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 4 May 1992), p. 3; D3230 (Sokolac Crisis Staff conclusions, 5 May 1992); D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), para. 22; D3221 (Sokolac SJB criminal report, 17 September 1992); D3180 (Sokolac SJB dispatch, 1 October 1994); D613 (2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade report re looting, 6 August 1992), p. 1. See also Dragomir Obradović, T. 36137 (26 March 2013); D3193 (Investigation report of Sokolac Lower Court, 20 July 1992).

³⁶¹⁶ D3223 (Minutes from meeting between Sokolac Crisis Staff and presidents of local communes, 23 April 1992), p. 6; D3185 (Conclusions of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 23 April 1992), p. 1; D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 10, 29.

orders of the Crisis Staff were not being respected,³⁶¹⁷ and that the SJB was not functioning adequately and was either unable or unwilling to control increasing lawlessness against civilians notably by unofficial groups.³⁶¹⁸

1053. On 20 April 1992, the TO was mobilised.³⁶¹⁹ **(#A legal obligation#! Because the Serb TO was established on 18 April, not earlier! Until that moment the TO-s were only municipal organisations, without a central body!)** On 21 April 1992, the Crisis Staff ordered that measures be taken against individuals who did not respond to the call for mobilisation and for individuals who deserted their TO and JNA units.³⁶²⁰ **(#A legal obligation!)** Around that period, there were discussions between the Sokolac Crisis Staff and Bosnian Muslim representatives on how to resolve important issues with respect to the establishment of authority and order and resolve problems in the municipality.³⁶²¹ The Crisis Staff adopted conclusions which called (i) on individuals who had temporarily left the municipality to return to their homes without fear; (ii) on Bosnian Muslims to return to their jobs; and (iii) for good inter-ethnic relations to be maintained.³⁶²² **(#EXCULPATORY, all of it!)** Apart from conscripts who required approval from the Secretariat of National Defence, other citizens were able to move freely without passes.³⁶²³ On 7 May 1992, the Crisis Staff concluded that Bosnian Muslim workers should be allowed to engage in their regular jobs but that in the event of provocation the workers would be suspended in accordance with the law.³⁶²⁴ The Crisis Staff decided on 15 May 1992 that a public call would be made for citizens who had been “exiled” to return to Sokolac and that those who did not return before 22 May 1992 would be prohibited from returning.³⁶²⁵

1054. By mid-May 1992, there were approximately 4,000 Bosnian Serb refugees in the Sokolac area which added to the atmosphere of “fear and uncertainty” with minor incidents involving Bosnian Serb refugees targeting Bosnian Muslims who remained in Sokolac.³⁶²⁶ Initially, some of the Bosnian Serb refugees moved into abandoned homes without

³⁶¹⁷ D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 78–79; D3229 (Sokolac Crisis Staff conclusions, 4 June 1992). See also Milovan Bjelica, T. 36394 (2 April 2013); D3233 (Decision of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 22 June 1992).

³⁶¹⁸ D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 81; D3234 (Conclusions of Sokolac Executive Board, 24 September 1992); Milovan Bjelica, T. 36396–36398 (2 April 2013). See also Dragomir Obradović, T. 36134 (26 March 2013).

³⁶¹⁹ D3222 (Minutes from session of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 20 April 1992), pp. 4–5.

³⁶²⁰ P5248 (Order of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 21 April 1992); Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15340–15343. See also D3222 (Minutes from session of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 20 April 1992), p. 9.

³⁶²¹ P5240 (Sokolac Crisis Staff conclusions, 20 April 1992), p. 2; D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 33–34; D3179 (Sokolac Municipal Assembly notification, 21 April 1992); D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), para. 11. See also P131 (Witness statement of Asim Hamzić dated 25 March 1996), pp. 5–6.

³⁶²² D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 34; D3223 (Minutes from meeting between Sokolac Crisis Staff and presidents of local communes, 23 April 1992), pp. 4, 6; D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 11, 13; D3185 (Conclusions of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 23 April 1992), p. 1; Dragomir Obradović, T. 36070–36071 (26 March 2013). In addition, the Crisis Staff appealed to Bosnian Muslims to send their children to school until war broke out in surrounding municipalities. D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 68–69, 72–74; D3207 (Sokolac Crisis Staff conclusions, 27 April 1992); D3225 (Minutes from session of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 27 April 1992), p. 2; D3210 (Sokolac Crisis Staff decision, 18 May 1992). See also D3208 (Sokolac Crisis Staff conclusions, 5 May 1992); D3209 (Sokolac Crisis Staff decision, 7 May 1992).

³⁶²³ D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 77. See also D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), para. 22.

³⁶²⁴ D3227 (Minutes from 5th session of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 7 May 1992), pp. 1–3; D3231 (Sokolac Crisis Staff conclusions, 7 May 1992), p. 1; D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 35–36; D3228 (Sokolac Crisis Staff conclusions, 15 May 1992). The Chamber also received evidence that the Municipal Board of the SDS formed a Personnel Commission for the nomination of candidates to managerial positions and decided that Bosnian Muslims workers may work and receive tasks. P5242 (Minutes of meeting of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 15 May 1992), p. 1; Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15363.

³⁶²⁵ P5242 (Minutes of meeting of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 15 May 1992), p. 7. See also Dragomir Obradović, T. 36069 (26 March 2013).

³⁶²⁶ Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15383–15384. See also D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 43, 76; D3212 (Sokolac Crisis Staff conclusions, 22 May 1992); Milovan Bjelica, T. 36401 (2 April 2013). These Bosnian Serb refugees arrived from central BiH, Goražde, Olovo, Kladanj and municipalities in Sarajevo which were under Bosnian Muslim control.

permission and on 22 April 1992, the Crisis Staff prohibited the unlawful and unauthorised occupation of premises, save in the event of “justifiable need” when approval of the use of premises could be granted by the Crisis Staff following an inventory of their contents.³⁶²⁷

(#EXCULPATORY) On 22 May 1992, the Crisis Staff allocated all vacant premises for the temporary use by refugees according to criteria set by the Red Cross of Sokolac after an inventory of the contents carried out by a committee created for this purpose.³⁶²⁸

(#EXCULPATORY)

iii. Attacks against Bosnian Muslim villages

1055. At a meeting of the Sokolac Crisis Staff on 15 May 1992, Drago Mačar, as Chief of Staff of the TO, indicated that plans for disarming certain villages had been made.³⁶²⁹ Following its formation the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade took over all the activities and assignments of the TO Staff and was involved in disarming Bosnian Muslim villages.³⁶³⁰
(#Before VRS#!On 15 May this Brigade still was in the JNA, as well as the Territorial Defence!) There was not a positive response to calls for the voluntary surrender of weapons and there was armed resistance to attempts to disarm Bosnian Muslim villages.³⁶³¹

1056. During the period from the end of July to the end of September 1992, the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade attacked and destroyed several Muslim villages in Sokolac municipality, including Pihlice, Kaljina, Šahbegovići, Mangurići, and Meljine.³⁶³² The village of Meljine was attacked by Serb Forces using tanks and howitzers from the village of Knežina.³⁶³³ **(#Who started armed conflict?# why only some, and not all villages?#)** Attacks began with artillery fire, followed by infantry incursions.³⁶³⁴ As soon as the first actions commenced, the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly started withdrawing from their villages towards Olovo after facing verbal abuse and harassment.³⁶³⁵
(#Population being let pass!# #Distortion# This didn't happen “after facing verbal abuse”, but after an armed skirmishes! It doesn't exclude “verbal abuse”, yhis wasn't very decent, but certainly wasn't either genocide, or expelling of population. The population simply had been let pass through the Serb lines! Their combatants wanted to keep their armament and present a constant jeopardy for the Serb population and the JNA, later the VRS, and no army all over the world would tolerate this. Also, no

³⁶²⁷ D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 43, 67; D3177 (Sokolac Crisis Staff order, 20 April 1992).

³⁶²⁸ D3216 (Sokolac Crisis Staff decision, 22 May 1992); D3215 (Sokolac Crisis Staff decision, 22 May 1992); D3214 (Sokolac Crisis Staff conclusions, 22 May 1992). *See also* D3217 (Sokolac Crisis Staff conclusions, 22 June 1992) for the proposed relocation of these refugees to other municipalities.

³⁶²⁹ Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15373–15374; P5242 (Minutes of meeting of Sokolac Crisis Staff, 15 May 1992), item 16.

³⁶³⁰ Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15374, 15385–15387, 15403.

³⁶³¹ D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 16–17; D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 41, 48. The villages which put up resistance included Šahbegovići, Kaljina, Knežina, Meljine, Šaševci, Žulj, Šahbegovići, Pediše, Išerić Brdo, Rakitnica, Novoseoci, Kut, Mičivode and Kalimanići. *See also* Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15375–15378 (testifying that he advised Bosnian Muslims that, should they be asked to hand over their weapons, they should comply because they could not resist the VRS forces and that he could not offer them protection from events which were occurring in other municipalities). *See also* D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 44, 64; D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 7, 14, 30; Dragomir Obradović, T. 36080–36082, 36111 (26 March 2013).

³⁶³² Adjudicated Fact 2684; Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15403–15404, 15408–15409, 15412–15414, 15416–15417. Tupajić also identified a number of other villages attacked in this manner.

³⁶³³ P131 (Witness statement of Asim Hamzić dated 25 March 1996), p. 9.

³⁶³⁴ Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15403–15404, 15408–15409, 15412–15414; P131 (Witness statement of Asim Hamzić dated 25 March 1996), p. 9; Adjudicated Fact 2684.

³⁶³⁵ Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15414, 15417–15418; D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), para. 17.

president could order that this be neglected, because there would be many casualties when the Muslim soldiers would be ordered by their central SDA command!)

1. Scheduled Incident A 13.1

1057. The Prosecution alleges that at least 40 men were killed in the village of Novoseoci on or about 22 September 1992.

1058. The village of Novoseoci is roughly eight to nine kilometres away from the town of Sokolac and four to five kilometres from the Rogatica-Sokolac cross-road.³⁶³⁶ It consisted of 60 to 70 houses inhabited by Bosnian Muslims.³⁶³⁷

1059. In the spring of 1992, Mačar came to Novoseoci and asked the men in the village to turn in any weapons they might have, whereupon the men handed over hunting rifles and other weapons including pistols.³⁶³⁸ The disarming of villagers continued on 27 July 1992, as Momčilo Pajić, a Bosnian Serb from Sokolac and Velemir Elez, a journalist, came to Novoseoci to request the hand-over of weapons,³⁶³⁹ and told the Bosnian Muslim men of the village that they should go on with their work and should not be concerned about their safety.³⁶⁴⁰ The SRK reported that it did not believe that the villagers had surrendered all of their weapons.³⁶⁴¹ **(#EXCULPATORY. #Responsible conduct of officials!# At the first case a solitary civilian official visited the village, and in the next case, there were one civil authorities official, and a journalist. No force implemented! A peaceful prospectives proposed! And still the Muslims in this village continued to keep their weaponry and wait for an opportunity to attack the Serbs!)**

1060. On 19 September 1992, Krstić reported to the Main Staff that active combat operations would be conducted aimed at liberating Bosnian Serb villages and surrounding areas from Bosnian Muslim “extremists”.³⁶⁴² On 22 September 1992, members of the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade surrounded Novoseoci.³⁶⁴³ Munira Selmanović was among the Bosnian Muslim villagers who were instructed to gather in a nearby valley and told they would be transferred soon to “Metaljka”, which was a meadow above the village.³⁶⁴⁴ Instructions were given by soldiers to some of the gathered Bosnian Muslims to go to the village and inform everyone to go to “Metaljka”.³⁶⁴⁵ When Selmanović was sent back to

³⁶³⁶ Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15429.

³⁶³⁷ P3295 (Witness statement of Munira Selmanović dated 23 January 2009), para. 2.

³⁶³⁸ P3295 (Witness statement of Munira Selmanović dated 23 January 2009), para. 3; P3296 (2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade's Record of confiscation of weapons in Novoseoci, 27 July 1992); Munira Selmanović, T. 18550–18551 (7 September 2011); D1667 (SRK combat report, 27 July 1992).

³⁶³⁹ Munira Selmanović, T. 18552 (7 September 2011); P3295 (Witness statement of Munira Selmanović dated 23 January 2009), para. 4.

³⁶⁴⁰ Munira Selmanović, T. 18537, 18549–18550 (7 September 2011); P3295 (Witness statement of Munira Selmanović dated 23 January 2009), para. 6 (referring to a Bosnian Serb named Rade Dubovina from the village of Kula frequently visiting Novoseoci and assuring the population that it was safe and there was no reason to leave).

³⁶⁴¹ D1667 (SRK combat report, 27 July 1992), para. 1.

³⁶⁴² D3191 (Report of 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade, 19 September 1992), p. 1.

³⁶⁴³ Adjudicated Fact 2676.

³⁶⁴⁴ P3295 (Witness statement of Munira Selmanović dated 23 January 2009), para. 8; Munira Selmanović, T. 18556–18557 (7 September 2011).

³⁶⁴⁵ P3295 (Witness statement of Munira Selmanović dated 23 January 2009), paras. 8, 14-15; Munira Selmanović, T. 18560 (7 September 2011). Munira Selmanović testified that when she fetched her father, he was covered in blood and told her that soldiers had beaten him with a rifle butt after asking him why he was still in the house and where he had put his weapons. P3295 (Witness statement of Munira Selmanović dated 23 January 2009), para. 15; Munira Selmanović, T. 18538, 18542 (7 September 2011).

her house, she saw soldiers looting property including furniture from her home.³⁶⁴⁶ Approximately 100 women and children and about 44 men from Novoseoci ultimately gathered at “Metaljka” and were surrounded by approximately 100 Bosnian Serb soldiers in military uniforms, who pointed their weapons at the villagers.³⁶⁴⁷ The soldiers read out the names of the villagers to identify whether everyone was present.³⁶⁴⁸

1061. Momčilo Pajić appeared to be in charge and asked the villagers whether they still had any weapons and said that the houses of the village were going to be searched.³⁶⁴⁹ Pajić then said he was awaiting orders from Sokolac, and he told the villagers to remain still while he went there.³⁶⁵⁰ Pajić, after returning, read out an order, saying that women and children, as well as the elderly were to be sent to Sarajevo by bus, while able-bodied men were to remain and undertake mandatory work.³⁶⁵¹ **(#Obligatory# A mandatory engagement was obligatory due to the Law, either in the Army, or in the companies of the state interest. Since the Muslims, although being the citizens of the RS, weren’t obliged to join the Army, but only the Serbs, for the Muslims it was obligatory to participate in the work during the war! That was a positive discrimination)** The former were assembled and walked from “Metaljka” to the entrance of Novoseoci where they were ordered to get on a bus parked near the mosque.³⁶⁵² Pajić entered the bus to check if any of the men had also got in, after which the bus was driven to Hreša, where the passengers were ordered to walk to Sarajevo.³⁶⁵³ **(#Legal and obligatory#! Since there was a combat to go on, the civilians had to be removed out of the reach of weapons, but being that, it was the most secure to escort them to Sarajevo, under the Muslim control,. And save their lives! No matter was it overestimated danger, a decision of the local commander wasn’t aimed to hurt any of them!)** After this incident no Bosnian Muslims remained in the village of Novoseoci.³⁶⁵⁴ KDZ607 was told that all the houses in Novoseoci had been destroyed.³⁶⁵⁵

1062. Krstić informed the Main Staff on 22 September 1992 that “[d]uring the day, the village of Novoseoci was cleansed”.³⁶⁵⁶ On the following day, Krstić reported that units were searching for and destroying straggling groups which had escaped the villages that had

³⁶⁴⁶ P3295 (Witness statement of Munira Selmanović dated 23 January 2009), para. 15; Munira Selmanović, T. 18538, 18540, 18542, 18561–18562 (7 September 2011). See also P5480 (Approval to move furniture from Novoseoci to Sokolac signed by Radislav Krstić, 26 September 1992) (wherein Krstić approves that a conscript transport furniture from Novoseoci to Sokolac until the individual moved into a house in Novoseoci which he had chosen).

³⁶⁴⁷ P3295 (Witness statement of Munira Selmanović dated 23 January 2009), paras. 9–10, 13.

³⁶⁴⁸ Munira Selmanović, T. 18557 (7 September 2011).

³⁶⁴⁹ P3295 (Witness statement of Munira Selmanović dated 23 January 2009), paras. 11–13. Besides Pajić, Selmanović also recognised some other soldiers there from Sokolac, including a policeman named Milenko Krsmanović.

³⁶⁵⁰ P3295 (Witness statement of Munira Selmanović dated 23 January 2009), para. 12.

³⁶⁵¹ P3295 (Witness statement of Munira Selmanović dated 23 January 2009), paras. 17–18; Munira Selmanović, T. 18558 (7 September 2011); Adjudicated Fact 2676.

³⁶⁵² P3295 (Witness statement of Munira Selmanović dated 23 January 2009), paras. 18, 20; Munira Selmanović, T. 18542 (7 September 2011).

³⁶⁵³ P3295 (Witness statement of Munira Selmanović dated 23 January 2009), para. 20.

³⁶⁵⁴ Milovan Bjelica, T. 36460 (3 April 2013).

³⁶⁵⁵ P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para. 55(c) (under seal).

³⁶⁵⁶ P5438 (Report of 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade, 22 September 1992), p. 1; Adjudicated Fact 2677. The Chamber notes that P5438 uses the term “čišćenje”, which is translated as either cleansed or mopped up. The Chamber received evidence which suggested there was no police investigation of this incident as it had no jurisdiction over the army. See Dragomir Obradović, T. 36096, 36102–36103 (26 March 2013); D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), para. 20. However, Obradović was unable to adequately explain why the police in this case did not carry out an investigation into this serious incident when it did carry out initial investigations of misdemeanours perpetrated by VRS members. In addition while Obradović testified that the civilian authorities did not inform higher organs about this incident, given that the witness merely expressed his own opinion, the Chamber is not satisfied that the witness would have known whether or not the higher organs had been informed.

been “mopped up”, including Novoseoci.³⁶⁵⁷ **(See: the military reasons! No politics in it. The political bodies proposed a quite reasonable “modus vivendi”, but the Muslim combatants, disseminated throughout the rural area, in many municipalities, didn’t want to accept it! #Military necessities#!)**

1063. Members of the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade killed 40 to 45 Bosnian Muslim civilian men from Novoseoci, as well as a few from Rogatica who happened to be in Novoseoci on or about 22 September 1992.³⁶⁵⁸ **(#Combatants, or civilians#! And what would do those from Rogatica in the middle of war so far from their homes? Certainly, that wasn’t a tourism, they had been combatants, joining other combatants in this area. Wahy it is so difficult to infer as the only reasonable inference? And the “finding” that the 2nd Romanija MB killed civilians is not properly established, since even “strictly confidential” reports to the Main Staff of the VRS said that there were fights and cleansing of the rests of combatants!)**

1064. On the evening of 22 September 1992, Tupajić learned that the bodies of the Bosnian Muslim men from Novoseoci who had been killed, had been found at a land fill garbage dump in Ivan Polje.³⁶⁵⁹ Following exhumation of the Ivan Polje site, 42 male bodies were received for post-mortem examinations and it was estimated that the age of the bodies ranged from 12 to 85, with the majority aged between 30 and 60.³⁶⁶⁰ 36 of the 38 Bosnian Muslim men identified by Selmanović who remained in Novoseoci were found among the remains of 42 bodies exhumed from the gravesite at Ivan Polje.³⁶⁶¹ No military clothing was found.³⁶⁶² Personal belongings were found, **(This is a clear proof that they hadn’t been captured before they died, since it was a rule to take off all personal belongings from captured people!)** and one body carried a miniature Koran.³⁶⁶³ Evidence

³⁶⁵⁷ D3192 (Report of 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade, 23 September 1992), p. 2. The Chamber received evidence to suggest that Krstić issued the order to kill these civilians. D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 57; Milovan Bjelica, T. 36454–36455 (3 April 2013). However, this evidence is based on Bjelica’s assumption following a conversation with a third person. The Chamber does not accept this conclusion given the absence of any further corroborating evidence.

³⁶⁵⁸ P3295 (Witness statement of Munira Selmanović dated 23 January 2009), paras. 19, 21; P131 (Witness statement of Asim Hamzić dated 25 March 1996), p. 7; Munira Selmanović, T. 18509 (7 September 2011); P3289 (Witness statement of KDZ607 dated 1 September 2011), para.55(b) (under seal); Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15428–15429. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2676; D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 57; D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), para. 20; Dragomir Obradović, T. 36094 (26 March 2013).

³⁶⁵⁹ Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15428–15430; Munira Selmanović, T. 18547–18548 (7 September 2011). *See also* D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 57. Following this incident at Novoseoci, Tupajić tendered his resignation as president of the municipality. However, members of the Municipal Board asked him to withdraw his resignation as it could have a detrimental effect or be viewed as condemnation of the policies at the time. After Tupajić’s car was blown up he decided to continue performing his duties. P5249 (Letter from Milan Tupajić to Sokolac SDS Municipal Board, 9 October 1992); Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15432–15435; P5251 (Insurance company report on damage to Milan Tupajić’s car, 13 October 1992). In light of (i) the evidence about Tupajić’s knowledge of events in Novoseoci, and steps taken to prevent his resignation; and (ii) the internal inconsistencies in the evidence of the relevant Defence witnesses, the Chamber does not accept Defence evidence that nobody from the municipal authorities knew about this incident and that when they did find out they all condemned it. *See* D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 57; Milovan Bjelica, T. 36455–36456 (3 April 2013); D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), para. 20; Dragomir Obradović, T. 36074, 36094–36095 (26 March 2013).

³⁶⁶⁰ P4106 (John Clark’s expert report entitled “Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave-Sites (2000)”, 30 July 2002), p. 14; P3297 (Exhumation report of mass grave in Ivan Polje, 4 September 2000).

³⁶⁶¹ P3295 (Witness statement of Munira Selmanović dated 23 January 2009), paras. 21, 23; Munira Selmanović, T. 18544–18545 (7 September 2011). *See also* P3297 (Exhumation report of mass grave in Ivan Polje, 4 September 2000); P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 49. While Selmanović testified in court that she herself saw and recognised her son’s remains, however, in the exhumation report it is recorded that her son’s remains were recognised by her sister, Amra Korman. Munira Selmanović, T. 18545, 18548–18549 (7 September 2011); P3297 (Exhumation report of mass grave in Ivan Polje, 4 September 2000), p. 8. While the Chamber notes this inconsistency, it is not of such significance to affect the credibility of Selmanović’s evidence.

³⁶⁶² P4106 (John Clark’s expert report entitled “Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave-Sites (2000)”, 30 July 2002), p. 14.

³⁶⁶³ P4106 (John Clark’s expert report entitled “Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave-Sites (2000)”, 30 July 2002), p. 14.

of gunshot injuries were found in all of the 42 bodies, 38 having been shot multiple times.³⁶⁶⁴ With the exception of one case where the skull was missing, all of the other 41 men died from gunshot injuries.³⁶⁶⁵ The exhumation report conclusions are consistent with the majority of the bodies being shot from behind with high velocity weapons.³⁶⁶⁶ **(There is nothing to exclude a combat as a reason for these deaths! But, the Chamber didn't notice that it was a #proper conduct of local authorities, i.e. the Serb officials!# while it hadn't been establish who killed these Muslims!)**

1065. The Chamber therefore finds that approximately 40 Bosnian Muslim men were killed by Serb Forces in the village of Novoseoci on or around 22 September 1992.

2. Scheduled Incident D.20

1066. The Indictment refers to the destruction of five mosques in Sokolac at least between August and September 1992.³⁶⁶⁷

1067. All five mosques in Sokolac municipality, namely in Knežina, Kruševci, Kaljina, Novoseoci, and Košutica, were blown up or destroyed during attacks on these villages.³⁶⁶⁸ **(#Attacks or skirmishes?# these villages had been militarised!)** The destruction of the mosques was seen by Bosnian Serbs as a way in which Bosnian Muslims would “lose a motive to return to their villages”.³⁶⁶⁹ **(This is a highly speculative, because there are many more reasonable inferences, such as revege for church a Christian churches destroyed by the Muslims. But, nevertheless, this speculation indicates that a return was not forbidden, and was assumed!#Revengeful conduct#!)**

1068. More specifically, the mosque in Novoseoci was blown up by the 2nd Motorised Romanija Brigade.³⁶⁷⁰ Bogdan Jovanović together with some other Bosnian Serbs was seen placing explosives around the mosque known as ‘Selimija’ in Knežina which was completely destroyed in a large explosion and four other mosques were destroyed at about

³⁶⁶⁴ P4106 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave-Sites (2000)", 30 July 2002), p. 15.

³⁶⁶⁵ P4106 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave-Sites (2000)", 30 July 2002), p. 15.

³⁶⁶⁶ P4106 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave-Sites (2000)", 30 July 2002), p. 16.

³⁶⁶⁷ Specifically, the mosques are the Kruševci mosque, Knežina mosque, Kaljina mosque, Novoseoci mosque, Koštica mosque.

³⁶⁶⁸ Adjudicated Fact 2684. See also Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15431; P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled "Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH" prepared for the Karadžić case, formatted records), pp. 312–322; P4069 (Cultural destruction database), records 332–335. While Asim Hamzić stated that Aleska Krsmanović was among the individuals responsible for the destruction of the mosques, the Chamber considers that it is uncorroborated hearsay evidence and is not satisfied that it can rely on this alone to make a findings that Krsmanović was responsible. P131 (Witness statement of Asim Hamzić dated 25 March 1996), p. 8. The Chamber does not accept Defence evidence that (i) mosques in border villages of Sokolac were used for combat operations; (ii) that members of the Patriotic League hid and distributed weapons from these facilities; (iii) these mosques were destroyed during the war, in an environment of chaos in remote villages by individuals and informal groups; or (iv) that the municipal authorities did not know or approve of their destruction and had no control over the territory where these mosques were located. D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 55, 64; D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 26, 30. In reaching this conclusion, the Chamber considered the evidence of the two relevant defence witnesses was unreliable given their evidence was marked by inconsistencies and indications of partisanship and bias. In addition the evidence received with respect to the attack on Novoseoci contradicts the Defence evidence that mosques were destroyed in an environment of chaos or by individuals or informal groups. Adjudicated Facts 2676, 2684; Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15431.

³⁶⁶⁹ Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15431.

³⁶⁷⁰ Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15431. See also András Riedlmayer, T. 22548 (9 December 2011); P4068 (András Riedlmayer's expert report on Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1992-1995, 7 May 2009), p. 9; P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled "Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH" prepared for the Karadžić case, formatted records), p. 316.

the same time.³⁶⁷¹ Remains of a destroyed mosque were found at the Ivan Polje garbage dump.³⁶⁷²

1069. Therefore the Chamber finds that five mosques were destroyed by Serb Forces between August and September 1992. **(#Individuals, not “Forces”#!This kind of formulation, that repeatedly appears throughout the Indictment and the Judgement, is not correct. The most accurate would be “a members of the VRS, or police, or even the “Serb Forces”, but not the Serb Forces, VRS and Police! Why? Because all the misdeeds had been committed clandestinely, hidden from the superiors, often from the most immediate commanders. Therefore, these acts vere individual or group crimes, not crimes of the “Serb Forces”. It is well known how the VRS or Police act. Forst, there is a decision to be made, and a context or the basic documents on which these decisions are based. Then, there is a planning of action or operation; then there is an asignement addressed to a known unit; then therea a preparatory orders, then an executive orders, then an interim reports, the final report and a control of achievement. In everything that had been done by the forces there are such a documents. Since the armed forces hadn’t been composed of professionals, but of ordinary people, the members of units were free from obligations at the front line usualy two third of time. None of the perpetrators of any felony never reported himself, nor had been commended for a misdeeds!)**

D)Detention Facilities in Sokolac

(1)Scheduled Detention Facility C.23.2

1070. Around 20 July 1992, four Bosnian Serbs dressed in MP uniforms and travelling an APC arrested a Bosnian Muslim teacher named Gagula, and brought him to barracks in Knežina where he was interrogated and beaten by one of the officers.³⁶⁷³ Gagula was then transported to the Slaviša Vajner Čiča Elementary School by local Bosnian Serb soldiers where he was detained with 13 other detainees until 3 October 1992.³⁶⁷⁴ On his arrival at the school, Gagula was again interrogated and beaten by Bosnian Serb soldiers.³⁶⁷⁵ **(#The interrogation# certainly hadn’t been aimed to find out whether he was a Muslim or**

³⁶⁷¹ P131 (Witness statement of Asim Hamzić dated 25 March 1996), p. 8; P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled “Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH” prepared for the Karadžić case, formatted records), pp. 312–314.

³⁶⁷² P3297 (Exhumation report of mass grave in Ivan Polje, 4 September 2000), p. 2.

³⁶⁷³ See Adjudicated Fact 2678.

³⁶⁷⁴ Adjudicated Fact 2679; Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15410. But see D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 54. The Chamber does not accept this evidence that there were no camps or prisons during the war.

³⁶⁷⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 2679. Obradović testified that a military detention unit was set up at the Sokolac primary school at the beginning of October 1992 for approximately 10 days after which it was relocated to Čavarine; however, on cross-examination, he acknowledged that he had not been to the facility, that he simply heard about it and did not know what the conditions were and could not say how long the facility operated. D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), para. 25; Dragomir Obradović, T. 36113–36115 (26 March 2013). Similarly, the Chamber does not accept Bjelica’s evidence that the school was used for the questioning of Bosnian Muslims suspected of involvement in sabotage or terrorist actions, that the detainees were treated humanely, and that conditions were satisfactory. In reaching this conclusion, the Chamber considered that Bjelica’s evidence was unreliable given that it was marked by indications of partisanship and bias. In addition Bjelica acknowledged on cross-examination that he did not know why a 62 year old woman was detained and that he assumed that the facilities did not have the required hygienic and other facilities. The witness was also contradicted on cross-examination and acknowledged that hygiene conditions were not satisfactory. In addition, the witness’s evidence with respect to the conditions in these facilities was qualified and he acknowledged on cross-examination that he never visited these facilities. See D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), paras. 54, 65; Milovan Bjelica, T. 36448–36450, 36452–36454 (3 April 2013); P6255 (Letter from Sokolac POW Exchange Committee to VRS Lukavica Committee for Exchange and Release of POW, 9 November 1992); Milovan Bjelica, P6256 (Excerpt from transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 22721.

not, because that was well known to his Serb neighbours. A repeated interrogation indicates that a reason for his arrest was a suspicion that he committed some crimes!)

(2) Scheduled Detention Facility C.23.1

1071. On 3 October 1992, detainees, including Gagula, were transferred to the former elementary school in Čavarine.³⁶⁷⁶ The facility was under the responsibility of the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade.³⁶⁷⁷ Bosnian Muslims were arrested and detained there by the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade without any charges or legal grounds.³⁶⁷⁸ **(#Combatant, or civilians#! How a civilian official could have been so sure about that? It was well known that the military didn't have a full confidence in civilian authorities, and in any country a military investigation wouldn't be known to civilian authorities! Anyway, this is a 92 bis evidence, without cross examination!)** Conditions were harsh with insufficient food and hygiene facilities.³⁶⁷⁹ Detainees were beaten by Bosnian Serb paramilitaries coming from Ilijaš.³⁶⁸⁰ On 15 March 1993, Gagula was transferred to the Batković camp in Bijeljina.³⁶⁸¹ **(#Combatant, or civilian#! This is a more than sufficient evidence that Gagula was considered as a combatant and a prisoner of war, and was housed in the legal POWs camp under the ICRC supervision! If there was no a sufficient evidence about his criminal conduct, there certainly was enough evidence that he fought against the Serbs, which had to be presented to the ICRC as a reason for detention!)**

(E) Movement of the population from Sokolac

1072. By the end of 1992, the majority of Bosnian Muslims had left the municipality with as few as 30 to 40 families remaining.³⁶⁸² The departure of some Bosnian Muslims in Sokolac followed attacks on Bosnian Muslim villages and verbal abuse and harassment.³⁶⁸³ In some cases Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly were separated and ordered to board buses taking them away from their villages.³⁶⁸⁴ **(#Military necessity#! This is not sufficient for a criminal case: this looks like a removal of civilians out of the combat zone, but neither the Prosecution nor the Chamber established under what circumstances that happened. The Chamber relied only on a witness statement of an aged woman, who by no chance could have known any military fact! But, not for "tu quoque" reasons, the Muslim side never did similar move with the Serb civilians, they killed all and everyone!)** Bosnian Muslim men were not allowed to leave with their families.³⁶⁸⁵ Milan Tupajić also advised a Bosnian Muslim to find a safe place to hide as he was afraid that he might be harmed due to the "ethnic cleansing" which had already begun

³⁶⁷⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 2680; Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15410.

³⁶⁷⁷ D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 65.

³⁶⁷⁸ Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15387–15388.

³⁶⁷⁹ Adjudicated Fact 2681; Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15410–15411; D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 54.

³⁶⁸⁰ See Adjudicated Fact 2682.

³⁶⁸¹ See Adjudicated Fact 2683.

³⁶⁸² Milovan Bjelica, T. 36457–36459 (3 April 2013).

³⁶⁸³ See para. 1056 above referring to Milan Tupajić, P5238 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 15414, 15417–15418; D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), para. 17.

³⁶⁸⁴ See paras. 1060–1061 referring to P3295 (Witness statement of Munira Selmanović dated 23 January 2009), paras. 17–18, 20; Munira Selmanović, T. 18542, 18558 (7 September 2011); Adjudicated Fact 2676.

³⁶⁸⁵ P131 (Witness statement of Asim Hamzić dated 25 March 1996), p. 6.

in many of the surrounding villages; Bosnian Muslims then started to move mainly to the areas of Olovo, Tuzla, Visoko, Vareš, Kladanj, and Kakanj.³⁶⁸⁶

1073. The Chamber does not accept Defence evidence which suggests that Bosnian Muslims voluntarily left the municipality on a temporary basis and returned after the war was over.³⁶⁸⁷ In reaching that conclusion the Chamber notes that by 1997 very few Bosnian Muslims had in fact returned to Sokolac.³⁶⁸⁸ **(#Returned#! Those who wanted to return have returned, but there are other elements that should have been taken into account: Sokolac is a poor mountain place, close to 900 m. above sea. The places where the Sokolac Muslims moved were about 500 m high, and with a very fertile ground and communications. The same happened with the Serbs when escaped a mountain region sheltering in valeys, majority wanted to stay there! Certainly, nobody denied both the Serbs and Muslims to return!)** In addition the Chamber considered that in this respect, the evidence of Bjelica and Obradović was unreliable due to inconsistencies in their evidence and some degree of evasiveness in their testimony; there were also indications of partisanship and bias. The Chamber also finds inconsistencies in Obradović's evidence received about when, why and the circumstances in which Bosnian Muslims from the village of Vrhbarje left and does not accept that this is an example of Bosnian Muslims remaining in their homes until the end of the war and requesting to leave by mutual agreement.³⁶⁸⁹ **(#Deadly combination# 92bis evidence, and disregarding Defense witnesses! The Vrhbarje was a very famous example, it was filmed by a strangers, and was not a solitary case. People of the Serb and Muslim affiliation, a neighbours, separated in a very touchy and emotional atmosphere far after the war. Many villages remained untouched throughout the war, even towns as Janja, Bosanski Koba{, Bosanski Dubo~ac, and many, many villages. On the other hand, not a single Serb settlement in the Muslim/Croat territory survived longer than September 92. These Serb refugees were very angry with the Muslims in the Serb areas, and the authorities had a huge troubles to calm down the atmosphere!)**

1074. Having considered the totality of the evidence and assessed the circumstances in which departures occurred, the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims were forced to leave Sokolac.

e. *Višegrad*

i. Charges

1075. The Chamber notes that although for the purpose of the Indictment, the Prosecution lists Scheduled Incident A.14.2 under Višegrad Municipality, the killing incident charged

³⁶⁸⁶ P131 (Witness statement of Asim Hamzić dated 25 March 1996), pp. 5–6.

³⁶⁸⁷ Milovan Bjelica, T. 36399–36400, 36402, 36405 (2 April 2013), 36464, 36474 (3 April 2013); D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 37; D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 18–19; Dragomir Obradović, T. 36069–36070, 36083 (26 March 2013).

³⁶⁸⁸ P4994 (Addendum to Ewa Tabeau's expert report entitled "Ethnic Composition in Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from 27 Municipalities of BiH 1991 to 1997", 3 February 2009), p. 32.

³⁶⁸⁹ See D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), paras. 18–19; D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 37; Milovan Bjelica, T. 36399–36402, 36405, 36460, 36463–36464 (2 and 3 April 2013); Dragomir Obradović, T. 36069–36070, 36083, 36108–36111 (26 March 2013); D3189 (Sokolac SJB dispatch, 31 October 1994); P6235 (Statement of Avdija Katica, 3 January 1995), p. 3.

therein is alleged to have occurred in the municipality of Sokolac.³⁶⁹⁰ There are no other charges in relation to Višegrad municipality.³⁶⁹¹

1076. With respect to Scheduled Incident A.14.2, the Prosecution alleges that on 15 June 1992, following their expulsion from Višegrad, approximately 48 civilians were killed at a place near Paklenik near the village of Kalimanići, in Sokolac municipality. The Prosecution charges Scheduled Incident A.14.2 as persecution, a crime against humanity, under Count 3; extermination, a crime against humanity, under Count 4; murder, a crime against humanity, under Count 5; and murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war, under Count 6.³⁶⁹²

ii. Lead-up

1077. Višegrad is a municipality in eastern BiH,³⁶⁹³ which had a predominantly Muslim population before the war.³⁶⁹⁴ In the spring of 1992, tensions increased in Višegrad and militarisation of the municipality ensued where both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs organised themselves militarily.³⁶⁹⁵ The security situation in Višegrad on 24 March 1992 was described as “complex and dramatical”.³⁶⁹⁶ At the beginning of April 1992, barricades were set up by both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims.³⁶⁹⁷ **(All before the VRS#, and during JNA and Bosnian Government! No Karadžić's liability!)** At the time, many Bosnian Muslim villagers fled to Višegrad town and later from there to Goražde; Bosnian Muslim men then organised a defence group for Višegrad.³⁶⁹⁸ Around the same time, a paramilitary unit from Serbia arrived in the village of Dobrun.³⁶⁹⁹

1078. By 10 April 1992, it was reported that the situation in the Višegrad sector was “extremely serious” and “[l]awlessness and anarchy reign[ed]”.³⁷⁰⁰ Threats were made by Bosnian Muslims to blow up the hydro-electric dam if the JNA did not prevent attacks by paramilitary formations against Bosnian Muslims.³⁷⁰¹ On 11 April 1992, there was an armed attack allegedly by “Serbian armed formations” on Višegrad with 30 mortar bombs launched at the town; individuals evacuated to surrounding slopes and to the army barracks in Uzamnica.³⁷⁰² **(#Distorted#! #Before VRS#! This is the most drastic example of one-sided presentation of events in Višegrad. The Judgement itself recognised that the Muslims were predominant majority. How the Serb minority would dare to be aggressive towards such a huge majority! However, the evidence was submitted to the Chamber about a real terror of the Muslim majority over the Serbs during entire 1991**

³⁶⁹⁰ See Prosecution Rule 73 bis Submission, fn. 14; Indictment, para. 48, fn. 3; Scheduled Incident A.14.2, fn. 1.

³⁶⁹¹ See Indictment, para. 48, fn. 3; Prosecution Rule 73 bis Submission, fn. 14.

³⁶⁹² Indictment, paras. 60(a), 63(a).

³⁶⁹³ D484 (Map of BiH).

³⁶⁹⁴ Momčilo Mandić, T. 5299 (16 July 2010).

³⁶⁹⁵ D3065 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević dated 26 February 2013), para. 169.

³⁶⁹⁶ P2838 (SerBiH MUP Bulletin on daily events, 24 March 1992), p. 2.

³⁶⁹⁷ Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 351, 353, 405.

³⁶⁹⁸ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 2; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 407.

³⁶⁹⁹ Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 351. See also Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 405.

³⁷⁰⁰ P925 (JNA 2nd Military District combat report, 10 April 1992), p. 5.

³⁷⁰¹ P925 (JNA 2nd Military District combat report, 10 April 1992), p. 5. See also D218 (Green Berets Staff telegraph, 12 April 1992).

³⁷⁰² D1493 (Transcript of broadcast of Sarajevo, Zagreb, and Belgrade Radio, 11 April 1992). See also Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 407.

and first three months of 1992. Beside that, there was a very hostile activity of the Muslim secret Army (the Patriotic League and Green Berets) against the JNA. At the beginning of the war all the Serbs had been expelled, or escaped from Višegrad. The Christian Orthodox priests and pilgrims had been mistreated and forbidden to pass through Višegrad. Only after the Muslim forces engaged the Užice Corps of JNA to a large scale, there were fights between the Serb and Muslim civilians and paramilitaries, and only then the Serbs returned to town. Such a skipping the context and the chain of events deeply compromises the very idea of the International justice!

1079. By 20 April 1992, the Užice Corps of the JNA had entered Višegrad and taken control of all important positions;³⁷⁰³ thereafter the situation started returning to normal for a while and the population which had left began returning to their homes.³⁷⁰⁴ **(This population that had left Višegrad was predominantly Serbian!)** The Užice Corp left Višegrad on or about 18 May 1992. Following the departure of the Užice Corps, paramilitary formations arrived in the municipality, including the unit known as the “White Eagles” led by Milan Lukić, and joined those which had come earlier.³⁷⁰⁵ **(#Before VRS#! Look at the text of this footnote: the JNA brought some volunteers according to the legal regulations. Usually, those were descendants of the Serbs that left Višegrad and surrounding settlements earlier, in WWII or afterwards. The witness Spahić named many of these groups, none of them had any connection with the Accused or with the RS officials!)** The paramilitaries held power in the municipality.³⁷⁰⁶ **(None of those paramilitaries had been in any relation to the local, let alone central authorities. The “White Eagles” had been affiliated with the opposition political parties in Belgrade, and had been equally dangerous to the regime in Serbia as well! All the paramilitaries had been repeatedly banned, from April 1992 by the Prime Minister Djeric, in May 92 by General Mladic, and on 13 June and on, repeatedly many times, by the Accused. But, an attacked population which is not protected by a state has every rights to organise their own defence with those who accept to defend them. It has nothing to do with the President, not even with the local authorities! #All before VRS#!)**

iii. Scheduled Incident A.14.2

1080. After the withdrawal of the Užice Corps, the situation changed and became more dangerous for local Bosnian Muslim men.³⁷⁰⁷ The Chamber heard evidence about attacks against Bosnian Muslim hamlets and the killing of Bosnian Muslims in Višegrad in May

³⁷⁰³ Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 355–356, 409; P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 2; D1694 (Intercept of conversation between Ješirić and Čedo Kljajić, 16 April 1992), p. 4; P2039 (BBC news report re Višegrad, with transcript), 00:00:00–00:00:29.

³⁷⁰⁴ D1694 (Intercept of conversation between Ješirić and Čedo Kljajić, 16 April 1992), p. 3; P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 2; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 353, 356, 406. See also D1694 (Intercept of conversation between Ješirić and Čedo Kljajić, 16 April 1992), p. 4.

³⁷⁰⁵ Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 356–357; P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 3 (testifying that although he did not have contact with these groups, he heard that they included Šešelj’s men, Arkan’s men, the “Black Shirts”, Milan Lukić, and the White Eagles). Those who had come with the Užice Corps and remained in Višegrad after its departure wore black uniforms and the traditional “šubara”. See Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 357; P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić, dated 4 November 1997), pp. 2–3.

³⁷⁰⁶ Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić*), T. 548.

³⁷⁰⁷ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 3.

and June 1992 but since they are not charged in Schedules A or B of the Indictment, the Chamber will not enter findings with respect to these incidents.³⁷⁰⁸

1081. Ferid Spahić attended a meeting on 13 June 1992 in Bosanska Jagodina with local Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims from other villages.³⁷⁰⁹ At that meeting, the Bosnian Muslims were informed that the “ethnic cleansing of the Muslims was already going on” and they were encouraged to leave for their own safety with a convoy departing the next day.³⁷¹⁰ Ljupko Tašić, who wore a camouflage uniform at the meeting, seemed to be in charge of the organisation of the convoy.³⁷¹¹ Tašić stated that the convoy had been announced officially on Radio Višegrad, that the “Red Cross” was also involved, and that the convoy would be escorted by Bosnian Serbs from the region whom the Bosnian Muslims knew and trusted.³⁷¹² This message was subsequently conveyed from hamlet to hamlet in the surrounding area.³⁷¹³ **(#Deadly combination#!This is a unilateral and untested, unchallenged evidence, admitted due to 92bis Rule. However, the local Serbs and Muslims didn’t succeed to maintain the peace, although there is evidence that both, Karadžić and Mr. Alija Izetbegović tried to calm them down. Obviously, the Muslim side got another parallel orders, or acted without it. That would be unreasonable to think that the tiny Serb minority would be against peace!)**

1082. On the morning of 14 June 1992, approximately 100 to 150 Bosnian Muslims from the surrounding area gathered at the bus station in Bosanska Jagodina and left in a convoy of two buses and a truck towards Višegrad where approximately three other buses and two trucks joined the convoy.³⁷¹⁴ Other Bosnian Muslims joined the convoy as it made its way to Višegrad.³⁷¹⁵ They were allowed to take identification documents, clothing, money, and limited personal belongings.³⁷¹⁶

1083. In Višegrad, in front of the Višegrad Hotel by the old bridge, the buses and trucks were parked and those on the convoy were registered and given the option of choosing whether they wanted to head in the direction of Skopje, Olovo or Kladanj, and they all chose Skopje.³⁷¹⁷ Three other buses and two trucks joined the convoy while a number of soldiers in different uniforms were walking around.³⁷¹⁸ Milan Lukić attempted to get Esad

³⁷⁰⁸ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 3; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*) T. 357–360.

³⁷⁰⁹ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 4; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*) T. 361–362, 409.

³⁷¹⁰ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 4; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*) T. 361–362, 409.

³⁷¹¹ Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 362; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić*), T. 540–541, 546, 564–565.

³⁷¹² P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 4; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 362–365.

³⁷¹³ Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*) T. 365.

³⁷¹⁴ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 4; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 366–367, 382.

³⁷¹⁵ Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 366–367, 382.

³⁷¹⁶ Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 375.

³⁷¹⁷ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 4; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 362, 367, 371, 382; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić*), T. 527–528; P501 (Addendum to witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 24 August 2008), para. 4 (specifying that he was in charge of drawing up the list of those on his bus).

³⁷¹⁸ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 4; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*) T. 367–368; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić*), T. 527–528.

Kustura, also known as “Zenga”,³⁷¹⁹ off one of the buses, but Ljupko Tašić talked Lukić out of it.³⁷²⁰ **(“Zenga” meant that this individual fought in the Croatian force called “ZNG” against the Croatian Serbs!)**

1084. The convoy of buses and trucks left Višegrad before 11.00 a.m. on 14 June 1992 and there were escorts armed with automatic weapons on each bus.³⁷²¹ Željko Tašić, a policeman who served in the Višegrad SJB in June and July 1992, followed the convoy in his car.³⁷²² The convoy did not head in the requested direction of Skopje and the Bosnian Muslims were told by guards at a check-point and by the driver of the bus that they had to bypass Rogatica and were going to Olovo through Sokolac.³⁷²³ A journalist who stopped the convoy was told by the drivers that there were about 700 to 800 Bosnian Muslims in the convoy.³⁷²⁴

1085. The convoy drove through Seljane, near Rogatica, and Sokolac before arriving in Išarića Brdo in the municipality of Olovo.³⁷²⁵ At Išarića Brdo, the convoy was surrounded by armed soldiers dressed in camouflage uniforms who said that the younger men could not continue and had to return.³⁷²⁶ Željko Tašić told those in the convoy not to worry and that their return was only for the purpose of a prisoner exchange.³⁷²⁷ Approximately 49 Bosnian Muslim males were thus separated and left on the buses, while the women, children and some of the older men in the convoy were asked to leave the buses and go to Olovo on foot.³⁷²⁸ The separated Bosnian Muslim men were then driven back to Sokolac, where they were gathered in one bus parked outside the police station and spent the night on the bus watched by two guards.³⁷²⁹

1086. On the morning of 15 June 1992, the Bosnian Muslim men were driven in the direction of Rogatica.³⁷³⁰ On the way, a soldier wearing a Montenegrin Serbian Guard cap entered the bus, called the Bosnian Muslim men “Ustaša”, asked which of them was

³⁷¹⁹ Ferid Spahić, P60 (witness statement dated 4 November 1997), p. 4; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 368–369. The Accused submits that Spahić’s identification of Milan Lukić is speculative and groundless. See Defence Final Brief, para. 1809. However the Chamber is satisfied that Milan Lukić was positively identified by a person who passed this information on to Spahić.

³⁷²⁰ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 4; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 368–369; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić*), T. 529–530, 542, 544–545; P501 (Addendum to witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 24 August 2008); paras. 6, 17.

³⁷²¹ Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 367, 373, 411; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić*), T. 527–528.

³⁷²² P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 5; P5508 (Report of Višegrad SJB, 1 August 1992).

³⁷²³ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 5; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 371, 373–374; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić*), T. 527–528.

³⁷²⁴ P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 374, 411; P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 5; P501 (Addendum to witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 24 August 2008), para. 8.

³⁷²⁵ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 5; P501 (Addendum to witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 24 August 2008), para. 22; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 374 (specifying that it was still daytime on 14 June 1992 when they arrived in Išarića Brdo); Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić*), T. 531–532; P80 (Map marked by Ferid Spahić). The map shows the route taken by the convoy from Višegrad.

³⁷²⁶ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 5; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 375.

³⁷²⁷ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 5; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 377–378.

³⁷²⁸ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 5. Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 375–376. See also Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić*), T. 532.

³⁷²⁹ P60 Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 5. Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 375–376; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić*), T. 532.

³⁷³⁰ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 5. Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 376.

“Zenga”, and cursed him.³⁷³¹ He told the driver of the bus to leave “Zenga” to him, but left.³⁷³²

1087. The bus stopped in front of a factory in Rogatica, two soldiers entered and ordered those on the bus to hand over their documents, valuables, and money.³⁷³³ Another bus was parked close by.³⁷³⁴ An APC stopped in front of the bus holding the Bosnian Muslim men and there were approximately 10 soldiers standing around.³⁷³⁵ Slaviša Vukojičić, a blonde man in civilian clothes, arrived in a small car, followed by the soldier in the Montenegrin Serbian Guard cap mentioned earlier.³⁷³⁶ A young blindfolded man whose hands were tied behind his back was pulled out of the car, hit in the stomach, and pushed onto another bus.³⁷³⁷ When “Zenga” was identified, the soldiers took him off the bus, kicked, and beat him.³⁷³⁸ Other Bosnian Muslim men were ordered off the bus and beaten by Vukojičić,³⁷³⁹ All this was done in the presence of Željko Tašić.³⁷⁴⁰ After asking who the Bosnian Muslims were, Vukojičić shouted: “You cattle come out” and ordered them to run onto the bus where the young man had been taken.³⁷⁴¹ The detainees were taken off the bus one by one and their hands were tied behind their backs with “half steel wire” so tightly that every movement caused pain.³⁷⁴² Some of the Bosnian Muslims were randomly beaten by Vukojičić during this process.³⁷⁴³ After each Bosnian Muslim was tied they were returned to the bus; the bus then headed back in the direction of Sokolac with three Bosnian Serb soldiers onboard and an additional car driven by Vukojičić escorting the bus.³⁷⁴⁴ One of the soldiers said they were going to exchange 50 Muslim men for 10 Serb men.³⁷⁴⁵ There were approximately 50 to 52 men on the bus at that time.³⁷⁴⁶

³⁷³¹ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 5.

³⁷³² P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 5.

³⁷³³ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), pp. 5–7; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 377.

³⁷³⁴ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 6.

³⁷³⁵ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 6; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 384–385.

³⁷³⁶ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 6; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 384–385. Slaviša Vukojičić was a member of the Rogatica SJB. P3291 (List of policemen working at Rogatica SJB in May 1992)s, p.1. The Chamber notes a minor discrepancy in the spelling of his name but is satisfied that it is the same person.

³⁷³⁷ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 6; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 384.

³⁷³⁸ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 6; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 386–387.

³⁷³⁹ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 6; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 386–387; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić*), T. 568.

³⁷⁴⁰ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 6; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 386.

³⁷⁴¹ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 6; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 384–386.

³⁷⁴² Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 386.

³⁷⁴³ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 6; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 385.

³⁷⁴⁴ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 6; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 385.

³⁷⁴⁵ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 6; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 388.

³⁷⁴⁶ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 7. See also Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 387–388 (identifying 23 names which correspond to the list of named victims for this incident, see Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief, Confidential Appendix B. 19 of those names correspond to the bodies identified during the exhumation of the site, see P4902 (Sarajevo Cantonal Court record of Jama Paklenik exhumation, 15 August 2000), pp. 7–42).

1088. The bus reached a forest location called Paklenik, in Sokolac municipality, on the border with Rogatica.³⁷⁴⁷ It stopped near a hill close to a small clearing and Vukojičić drove away in his car for a while before returning.³⁷⁴⁸ The Bosnian Muslims were forced to sing a “Chetnik” song and were told that “thanks to Alija” they could not live together any longer.³⁷⁴⁹ After Vukojičić returned and talked with the soldiers, the bus drove off again with approximately 11 soldiers walking in two columns next to the bus.³⁷⁵⁰ The bus stopped after about 100 metres, and the Bosnian Muslim men were ordered to get out of the bus, line up two-by-two, and walk on a forest path leading up to a hill.³⁷⁵¹ One soldier asked “Zenga” and Spahić how many “Serb soldiers” they had killed and beat “Zenga”.³⁷⁵² When other soldiers told him not to beat “Zenga” that hard, he said that they would discuss this after seeing what conditions those Serbs waiting to be exchanged were in.³⁷⁵³

1089. After being ordered to walk in a line with their heads bent down for approximately 100 to 200 metres, the Bosnian Muslims were ordered to stop as they reached a clearing.³⁷⁵⁴ About nine soldiers lined up in two half circles around a bush.³⁷⁵⁵ In addition to Predrag Milisavljević, Spahić also identified Boriša Čeho, who was wearing a blue reserve police uniform, standing close to the site.³⁷⁵⁶ The first 10 Bosnian Muslim men from the column were ordered to step up “towards” the soldiers standing around the bush and Predrag Milisavljević started shooting at the first two Bosnian Muslims in the column with an automatic rifle.³⁷⁵⁷ The Bosnian Muslim men fell into a pit after being shot.³⁷⁵⁸ After the first 10 Bosnian Muslims from the column were shot, the two soldiers at the end of the column were called over by Vukojičić to join the other soldiers in the front.³⁷⁵⁹ When the second group of ten men was being lined up to be shot, Spahić managed to escape and was

³⁷⁴⁷ Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić*), T. 529; P78 (Sketch drawn by Ferid Spahić). See also D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 58. Dragomir Obradović identified the location as Arbinjska Propast located seven kilometres from the village of Kalimanići in Sokolac. D3175 (Witness statement of Dragomir Obradović dated 24 March 2013), para. 21.

³⁷⁴⁸ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 7; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 388–389.

³⁷⁴⁹ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 7; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 388–389.

³⁷⁵⁰ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), pp. 7–8. The soldiers were in different clothes, including olive green and camouflage uniforms, civilian clothes, and one in “blue working suit”.

³⁷⁵¹ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 8; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 389, 391–392; P78 (Sketch drawn by Ferid Spahić).

³⁷⁵² P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 8; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 391–392; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić*), T. 529; Spahić had seen this soldier before in his hamlet when the Užice Corps was still there.

³⁷⁵³ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 8; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 392.

³⁷⁵⁴ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 8; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 392–393.

³⁷⁵⁵ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 8; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 393–394; P79 (Sketch drawn by Ferid Spahić).

³⁷⁵⁶ Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić*), T. 553; P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 8.

³⁷⁵⁷ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 8; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 393–394; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić*), p. 553; P79 (Sketch drawn by Ferid Spahić).

³⁷⁵⁸ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), pp. 8–9; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 394, 397–398 (noting that he could not actually see the pit at the time but saw it when he returned at a later date).

³⁷⁵⁹ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), pp. 8–9; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić*), T. 553; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 395–396; P79 (Sketch drawn by Ferid Spahić).

shot at before taking shelter in the Bosnian Muslim village of Mrči.³⁷⁶⁰ As he was escaping, Spahić could hear the shooting continuing.³⁷⁶¹

1. Forensic and documentary evidence regarding Scheduled Incident A.14.2

1090. John Clark reported on the exhumations carried out with respect to the Paklenik Cave.³⁷⁶² The Chamber finds that the Paklenik cave site was located in a forest in the area near the village of Kalimanići in Sokolac municipality and is the same location referred to by Ferid Spahić as the pit into which the Bosnian Muslim men fell after being shot.³⁷⁶³ The post-mortem examination team received 73 whole male bodies.³⁷⁶⁴ They estimated that the ages of the bodies exhumed ranged from 15 to 75, with 74% aged between 30 and 55.³⁷⁶⁵ Of the 73 whole bodies found at Paklenik, 66 were identified, and 19 of the 66 identified bodies matched with the names of the 23 Bosnian Muslims on the bus who were identified by Ferid Spahić.³⁷⁶⁶ In addition to the 23 Bosnian Muslims who Spahić named, he also identified without naming them, the two sons of Musa Omerović and the two sons of Ismet Kustura and two of these bodies were also identified in the exhumation.³⁷⁶⁷ At least 21 of the bodies exhumed from the Paklenik cave site are not linked to Scheduled Incident A.14.2.³⁷⁶⁸

1091. Clothing that was not military was still present on all of the exhumed bodies.³⁷⁶⁹ Personal items were found on many of the victims, including watches, spectacles, combs, keys, money, cigarette lighters, and four miniature Korans.³⁷⁷⁰ A large number of the bodies exhumed from the cave were found with their hands tied behind their backs with

³⁷⁶⁰ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 9; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 403–404.

³⁷⁶¹ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 9; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 395–396, 398; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić*), T. 529.

³⁷⁶² P4106 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave–Sites (2000)", 30 July 2002), p. 5, Figure 1; P4107 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Supplementary Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave–Sites (2000)", 30 September 2002).

³⁷⁶³ P4902 (Sarajevo Cantonal Court record of Jama Paklenik exhumation, 15 August 2000), p. 3; P4850 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), Annex A, p. 13; P4106 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave–Sites (2000)", 30 July 2002), p. 5, Figure 1; P78 (Sketch drawn by Ferid Spahić); P79 (Sketch drawn by Ferid Spahić).

³⁷⁶⁴ P4106 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave–Sites (2000)", 30 July 2002), pp. 5–6. Clark noted in his report that among the 75 bodies they received from the exhumation team, only 73 were whole bodies, while the remaining two turned out to be large body parts. See also P3410 (List of bodies exhumed in Višegrad during 2000–2001), p. 5.

³⁷⁶⁵ P4106 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave–Sites (2000)", 30 July 2002), p. 6.

³⁷⁶⁶ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 7; P3410 (List of bodies exhumed in Višegrad during 2000–2001); P4902 (Sarajevo Cantonal Court record of Jama Paklenik exhumation, 15 August 2000), pp. 7–42; P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 49–51. Of the identified bodies exhumed, 39 names correspond to the list of named victims attached to the Prosecution's pre-trial brief. Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief, Confidential Appendix B. These 39 identified bodies include 19 of the 23 individuals named by Ferid Spahić.

³⁷⁶⁷ P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 7; P4902 (Sarajevo Cantonal Court record of Jama Paklenik exhumation, 15 August 2000), pp. 10, 33.

³⁷⁶⁸ P4106 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave–Sites (2000)", 30 July 2002), p. 5.

³⁷⁶⁹ P4106 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave–Sites (2000)", 30 July 2002), p. 6.

³⁷⁷⁰ P4106 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave–Sites (2000)", 30 July 2002), p. 6.

wire.³⁷⁷¹ None of the bodies were blindfolded and there were no other obvious objects of restraint.³⁷⁷²

1092. Gunshot injuries were found in 57 out of the 73 bodies.³⁷⁷³ Bullet casings were found and other injuries resulted from shotguns and shrapnel.³⁷⁷⁴ Evidence of blunt trauma was found in some of the bodies which had probably occurred before death.³⁷⁷⁵ There was also evidence that some of the men were still alive when thrown in the cave and died from the resulting injuries.³⁷⁷⁶ For 11 of the 73 bodies, it was not possible to determine the cause of death.³⁷⁷⁷ The Chamber is satisfied based on the large percentage of the shots fired which struck the trunk or head of the bodies that the shots were not random.³⁷⁷⁸ The Chamber is also satisfied that the pathological evidence suggests that many of the victims had been shot from behind which is consistent with Ferid Spahić's evidence about this incident and the way in which the victims were lined up before being shot.³⁷⁷⁹

2. Conclusion

1093. Considering (i) Spahić's evidence that the number of Bosnian Muslims taken to the execution site was between 50 to 52; (ii) that Spahić survived the execution; (iii) that 66 of the whole bodies exhumed from the mass grave were identified but that at least 21 of those identified bodies are not linked to Scheduled Incident A14.2; and (iv) that there were seven bodies exhumed from the mass grave which were not identified, the Chamber finds that approximately 45 Bosnian Muslim civilians were killed near Paklenik, close to the village of Kalimanići, in Sokolac municipality by Serb Forces on 15 June 1992. **(#Against presidential orders#! Whatever happened, and for whatever reasons, it was against all the presidential orders and instructions, through which President Karadzic forbade this conduct and made every commander responsible and obliged to prevent and punish every single incident! There is sufficient evidence on that! How anyone so much remote from those events could be liable for it?# No officials liable#!)**

³⁷⁷¹ P4902 (Sarajevo Cantonal Court record of Jama Paklenik exhumation, 15 August 2000), p. 6; P4106 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave-Sites (2000)", 30 July 2002), p. 6.

³⁷⁷² P4106 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave-Sites (2000)", 30 July 2002), p. 6.

³⁷⁷³ P4106 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave-Sites (2000)", 30 July 2002), p. 7. Among the 57 bodies where "convincing gunshots injuries" were found, 45 were shot only once or twice (29 of them were only shot once), while the other 12 were shot three to five times.

³⁷⁷⁴ P4106 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave-Sites (2000)", 30 July 2002), pp. 8–9; P4902 (Sarajevo Cantonal Court record of Jama Paklenik exhumation, 15 August 2000), p. 3.

³⁷⁷⁵ P4106 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave-Sites (2000)", 30 July 2002), p. 7.

³⁷⁷⁶ P4106 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave-Sites (2000)", 30 July 2002), pp. 9–10.

³⁷⁷⁷ P4106 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave-Sites (2000)", 30 July 2002), p. 7; P4107 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Supplementary Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave-Sites (2000)", 30 September 2002), p. 2. In the original Report, it was stated that it was not possible to determine the cause of death for 15 men. In the Supplementary Report, however, 4 originally unascertained cases were also determined to have died from gunshot to the head (3 of the 4) or to the chest (1 of the 4). Note that during his testimony Clark also indicated that the cause of death of 15 people was unascertained. John Clark, T. 22702–22704 (10 January 2012).

³⁷⁷⁸ P4106 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave-Sites (2000)", 30 July 2002), pp. 5–10; P4107 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Supplementary Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave-Sites (2000)", 30 September 2002), p. 2. The Chamber notes that due to the badly decomposed state of the bodies an estimate of the distance of fire was not possible but that it was estimated that 85 % of identifiable shots struck the trunk or the head of the bodies.

³⁷⁷⁹ P4106 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Report of the Chief Pathologist, Paklenik Cave and Ivan Polje Grave-Sites (2000)", 30 July 2002), p. 8. According to the report 42 were shot from behind, 9 from the side, 8 from the front, and 28 from an unknown direction. See P60 (Witness statement of Ferid Spahić dated 4 November 1997), p. 8; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*), T. 393–394; Ferid Spahić, P61 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić*), p. 553; P79 (Sketch drawn by Ferid Spahić).

vii. Vlasenica

(A) Charges

1094. Under Count 3, the Prosecution alleges that persecution, a crime against humanity was committed in Vlasenica as part of the objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats from the Municipalities.³⁷⁸⁰ Under Count 1, the Prosecution further alleges that in certain municipalities, including Vlasenica, this persecutory campaign included or escalated to include conduct that manifested an intent to destroy in part the national, ethnical and/or religious groups of Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats as such.³⁷⁸¹

1095. Acts alleged to have been committed by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs in Vlasenica include killings during and after the take-over,³⁷⁸² killings related to detention facilities and killings committed during, and deaths resulting from, cruel and inhumane treatment at scheduled detention facilities.³⁷⁸³ The Prosecution characterises these acts as killing, an underlying act of genocide, under Count 1; persecution, a crime against humanity, under Count 3; extermination, a crime against humanity, under Count 4; murder, a crime against humanity, under Count 5; and murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war, under Count 6.³⁷⁸⁴

1096. Other acts alleged to have been committed in Vlasenica by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include torture, beatings, and physical and psychological abuse, rape and other acts of sexual violence, during and after the take-over and in scheduled detention facilities, as well as the establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions in detention facilities, as cruel or inhumane treatment, an act of persecution under Count 3.³⁷⁸⁵ In relation to Count 1, the Prosecution alleges that in scheduled detention facilities in Vlasenica thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were subjected to cruel and inhumane treatment, including torture, physical and psychological abuse, rape, other acts of sexual violence, and beatings by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs; the Prosecution characterises this inhumane treatment as causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups, an underlying act of genocide.³⁷⁸⁶ In addition, under Count 1, the Prosecution alleges that members of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups were detained under conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, namely through cruel and inhumane treatment, including torture, physical and psychological abuse, rape, other acts of sexual violence, inhumane living conditions, forced labour, and the failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care or hygienic sanitation facilities.³⁷⁸⁷

³⁷⁸⁰ Indictment, paras. 48–49.

³⁷⁸¹ Indictment, paras. 37–38.

³⁷⁸² Indictment, para. 60(a)(i). *See* Scheduled Incidents A.15.1, A.15.2.

³⁷⁸³ Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii). *See* Scheduled Incidents B.18.1, B.18.2, B.18.3, B.18.4.

³⁷⁸⁴ Indictment, paras. 40(a)(i), 40(a)(ii), 63(a), 63(b).

³⁷⁸⁵ Indictment, para. 60(b), 60(c). *See* Scheduled Detention Facilities C.25.1, C.25.2, C.25.3. With respect to C.25.4, on 22 August 2014, the Prosecution filed the Notice of Withdrawal of Incident C.25.4 on the basis that it had not led evidence in relation to this detention facility.

³⁷⁸⁶ Indictment, para. 40(b).

³⁷⁸⁷ Indictment, paras. 40(c), 60(d), 60(h). *See* Scheduled Detention Facilities C.25.1, C.25.2, C.25.3.

1097. Under Count 3, other acts of persecution alleged to have been committed in Vlasenica by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include (i) forcible transfer or deportation of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from their homes;³⁷⁸⁸ (ii) unlawful detention in scheduled detention facilities;³⁷⁸⁹ (iii) forced labour at the frontline and the use of human shields; (iv) the appropriation or plunder of property, during and after the take-over, during arrests and detention and in the course of or following acts of deportation or forcible transfer;³⁷⁹⁰ (v) the wanton destruction of private property including homes and business premises and public property;³⁷⁹¹ and (vi) the imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures.³⁷⁹²

1098. Under Counts 7 and 8, the Prosecution alleges deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer, respectively, as crimes against humanity.³⁷⁹³ The Prosecution alleges that, by the end of 1992, Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs had forcibly displaced Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Vlasenica in which they had been lawfully present.³⁷⁹⁴ It is alleged that from March 1992, restrictive and discriminatory measures, arbitrary arrest and detention, harassment, torture, rape and other acts of sexual violence, killing, destruction of houses, as well as the threat of further such acts caused Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to flee in fear while others were physically driven out.³⁷⁹⁵ It is further alleged that acts of forcible displacement continued in Vlasenica between January and March 1993 when Serb Forces attacked the Cerska area of the Vlasenica municipality.³⁷⁹⁶

iv. Lead-up

1099. Vlasenica is a municipality in eastern BiH located to the south of Zvornik and to the west of Bratunac and Srebrenica.³⁷⁹⁷ Prior to the war the population of Vlasenica was approximately 34,000 and consisted of about 55% Bosnian Muslims, 42% Bosnian Serbs, and 0.1% Bosnian Croats.³⁷⁹⁸ The town of Vlasenica itself had a population of between 6,000 and 7,000.³⁷⁹⁹ Vlasenica formed part of the geographic link to Serbia,³⁸⁰⁰ which was part of the third Strategic Goal.³⁸⁰¹

³⁷⁸⁸ Indictment, paras. 56, 60(f).

³⁷⁸⁹ Indictment, para. 60(g). *See* Scheduled Detention Facilities C.25, C.25.2, C.25.3.

³⁷⁹⁰ Indictment, para. 60(i).

³⁷⁹¹ Indictment, para. 60(j). The Chamber notes that there are no cultural monuments and sacred sites with respect to Vlasenica in Schedule D of the Indictment.

³⁷⁹² Indictment, para. 60(k). The restrictive and discriminatory measures alleged include the denial of freedom of movement; the removal from positions of authority; the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of homes; unlawful arrest and/or the denial of the right to judicial process; and/or the denial of equal access to public services.

³⁷⁹³ Indictment, paras. 68–75.

³⁷⁹⁴ Indictment, paras. 69, 72.

³⁷⁹⁵ Indictment, para. 71.

³⁷⁹⁶ Indictment, para. 72.

³⁷⁹⁷ D484 (Map of BiH); Izet Redžić, T. 17677 (23 August 2011).

³⁷⁹⁸ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5005; Izet Redžić, T. 17674 (23 August 2011); D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 4; D3098 (Vlasenica Executive Board request, 17 January 1992), p. 3; P6200 (Excerpt from census records of 1991), p. 4; P6199 (Excerpt from censuses records of 1971, 1981 and 1991), p. 2; P4994 (Addendum to Ewa Tabeau's expert report entitled "Ethnic Composition in Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from 27 Municipalities of BiH 1991 to 1997", 3 February 2009), pp. 31, 34, 40. For differing testimony as to the ethnic composition of the municipality, *see* D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), para. 4; Zoran Jovanović, T. 34204–34205 (21 February 2013); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 6.

³⁷⁹⁹ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 7.

1100. In the multi-party elections in 1990, for the Vlasenica Municipal Assembly, the SDS won 27 seats, the SDA won 26 seats, and seven seats were won by other parties.³⁸⁰² **(And this difference appeared because many of the inhabitants between 55% of Muslims and 42% of Serbs were the Serbs calling themselves mainly as Yugoslavs, or Montenegrins, and they voted for Yugoslavia, i.e. for the SDS.)** After this election, the SDS and SDA divided leadership posts between them.³⁸⁰³ For example, the SDS selected Milenko Stanić as President of the Assembly³⁸⁰⁴ and Izet Redžić was selected by the SDA as President of the Executive Board.³⁸⁰⁵ The chief of the SJB was a Serb named Rade Bjelanović while the second in command was a Bosnian Muslim, Fadil Turković.³⁸⁰⁶ With time, there was increasing disagreement between Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim representatives in the Assembly.^{3807 (3764)}

1101. Inter-ethnic relations in Vlasenica deteriorated after conflict broke out in Croatia.³⁸⁰⁸ Tomislav Savkić, the president of the Vlasenica SDS,³⁸⁰⁹ delivered speeches which emphasised that Serbs were under threat as they would be killed and eliminated from BiH when an Islamic state was formed. These speeches instilled fear amongst the Bosnian Serb population.³⁸¹⁰ **(#Distortion#! This is far from any truth that these speeches instilled fear amongst the Bosnian Serbs. What kind of authority would be Mr. Savkić to be trusted so much. This was a manner in which the Chamber neglected a famous and undisputed historic fact about the genocide committed over the Serbs during WWII, while Bosnia was a part of the Croatian Nazi state NDH. And once again, the Bosnian Muslims followed the Croats and tried to achieve an independence on an unlawful and anti-constitutional way, threatening the Serbs to be either subjugated to them, or chased out of BiH. Just see: para 852 of the Judgement and D2768! There is**

³⁸⁰⁰ P921 (Transcript of 24th session of RS Assembly, 8 January 1993), p. 46; D115 (Transcript of 25th session of RS Assembly, 19-20 January 1993), p. 42; P972 (Robert Donia's expert report entitled "Thematic Excerpts from the Assembly or Republika Srpska, 1991-1996", 17 March 2008), p. 131.

³⁸⁰¹ P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 9; P781 (Decision on six strategic goals for Bosnian Serb people, 12 May 1992); P1478 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 27 May-31 July 1992), pp. 102-103.

³⁸⁰² Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5006; Izet Redžić, T. 17685 (23 August 2011); D1645 (Report of Vlasenica Municipal Electoral Commission, 27 November 1990); Milenko Stanić, T. 33989 (19 February 2013); D4661 (Letter from the SDS Vlasenica Municipal Council to Radovan Karadžić, 6 November 1991) (informing the Accused of the election results).

³⁸⁰³ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5006; Izet Redžić, T. 17695-17696 (23 August 2011); D1645 (Report of Vlasenica Municipal Electoral Commission, 27 November 1990). See also D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 5; D4661 (Letter from the SDS Vlasenica Municipal Council to Radovan Karadžić, 6 November 1991); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 11.

³⁸⁰⁴ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5006; Izet Redžić, T. 17688 (23 August 2011); D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 5. See also D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 9.

³⁸⁰⁵ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5007; Izet Redžić, T. 17688 (23 August 2011); D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 5. See also D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 9.

³⁸⁰⁶ Izet Redžić, T. 17694-17695 (23 August 2011); D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 5. See also D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 8; D4661 (Letter from the SDS Vlasenica Municipal Council to Radovan Karadžić, 6 November 1991); D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), para. 5. Other parties including the SDP shared power with the SDA and SDS. D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), para. 5.

³⁸⁰⁷ D2922 (Witness statement of Savo Čeliković dated 10 February 2013), para. 6; D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 6; D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), para. 5. See also D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 10-11, 32.

³⁸⁰⁸ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5008; Izet Redžić, T. 17698-17699 (23 August 2011); D2967 (Witness statement of Momir Đurić dated 16 February 2013), paras. 7-8, 10; D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 6; D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 4; D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), para. 7; D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 4. See also P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), paras. 5, 10; Sead Hodžić, T. 18438-18439 (6 September 2011); D3048 (Witness statement of Božidar Trišić dated 24 February 2013), paras. 4-5.

³⁸⁰⁹ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5048; Tomislav Savkić, T. 33751 (15 February 2013).

³⁸¹⁰ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5049.

no way to neglect this evidence without violation of procedure and distortion of facts!)

Redžić attended a meeting with Milenko Stanić where Stanić declared: “The moment [BiH] is proclaimed a sovereign state, we will draw up our borders in blood”.³⁸¹¹ Inflammatory speeches were also delivered at SDA rallies.³⁸¹²

1. Militarisation of Vlasenica

1102. In 1991 Bosnian Muslims started leaving the JNA and boycotted the mobilisation upon instructions of the SDA leadership.³⁸¹³ After this boycott, there was a mobilisation of local Bosnian Serbs.³⁸¹⁴ **(#Before VRS#! #Legal and obligatory#! At the same time when the Serb conscripts and reservists went under the JNA command, the Muslim able bodied men organised their own secret army! Why? Who was a presupposed enemy, if not the Serbs?)** In the spring of 1991, military units were formed in Bosnian Serb villages and there was an increased presence of uniformed men, including those wearing cockades and carrying automatic weapons.³⁸¹⁵ For example, after the outbreak of war in Croatia in 1991, units were formed by the SDS in Vlasenica with between 1,200 and 1,500 troops located at a garrison formed in the Bosnian Serb settlement of Milići.³⁸¹⁶ These units erected barricades, wore “Chetnik insignia” and cockades, maltreated people, and “instilled fear among the Muslim population”.³⁸¹⁷

1103. In the autumn of 1991, both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims were arming themselves.³⁸¹⁸ In the second half of 1991, night watches were organised in villages and while they were initially mixed, they separated with time due to growing distrust between

³⁸¹¹ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5040–5041.

³⁸¹² D2967 (Witness statement of Momir Deurić dated 16 February 2013), para. 9. See also D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), para. 7; D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 5–7.

³⁸¹³ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5112–5113, 5151; Izet Redžić, T. 17732 (23 August 2011); D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 12–14; D2922 (Witness statement of Savo Čeliković dated 10 February 2013), paras. 8–11; KDZ033, T. 18042–18043 (29 August 2011) (closed session). See also D2967 (Witness statement of Momir Deurić dated 16 February 2013), para. 13; Mane Đurić, T. 35076 (7 March 2013); D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), paras. 9–13; D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), paras. 7–10; D1373 (Report of Vlasenica Municipal Assembly to SRBiH Presidency, 8 July 1991), p. 1.

³⁸¹⁴ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 12–13; Ibro Osmanović, T. 17971 (29 August 2011).

³⁸¹⁵ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 12–13; Ibro Osmanović, T. 17971 (29 August 2011); Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5017–5019, 5029–5030.

³⁸¹⁶ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5008, 5140; Izet Redžić, T. 17727 (23 August 2011); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 14. See also P2828 (Witness statement of Asim Džambasović dated 18 June 2011), paras. 55–56. Stanić testified that the SDS was not involved in the formation of these units. Milenko Stanić, T. 34021 (19 February 2013). However, the Chamber does not find Stanić’s evidence to be reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber found that Stanić’s evidence was marked by evasiveness and indicators that he was withholding information from the Chamber.

³⁸¹⁷ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5008, 5010.

³⁸¹⁸ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 18 (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18026 (29 August 2011) (closed session). The Chamber finds that there were Bosnian Muslim armed formations in Vlasenica and that the SDA and TO Chief were involved in the arming of Bosnian Muslims. D2967 (Witness statement of Momir Deurić dated 16 February 2013), paras. 13; D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), paras. 15–16; Mane Đurić, T. 35058–35059 (7 March 2013) (private session); D1646 (Report of Vlasenica SJB, 8 May 1992), pp. 1–3; D1648 (Official note of Vlasenica SJB, 17 June 1991), pp. 1–2; D1649 (Basic plan of engagement of Vlasenica SJB, 24 June 1991), pp. 1–2; D1651 (Order of ABiH Tuzla Main Staff, 9 August 1992), p. 2; D2922 (Witness statement of Savo Čeliković dated 10 February 2013), paras. 28, 31; D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 11; D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), paras. 14–16, 20; D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 15–20, 22–24. See also D3008 (Video still of four armed men); D3012 (Video still of a letter “U”); Zoran Jovanović, T. 34176–34177 (21 February 2013); D1657 (Excerpt from book entitled “The Truth about Bratunac”), p. 2; D2944 (Witness statement of Zoran Durmić dated 12 February 2013), para. 19. Other witnesses testified that they were not aware of the existence or formation of the Patriotic League in Vlasenica. Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5113; Izet Redžić, T. 17702–17703, 17705, 17715, 17722–17723 (23 August 2011); Ibro Osmanović, T. 17958 (29 August 2011). However, the Chamber notes that Redžić’s evidence on this issue was equivocal and he could not comment on the content of documents which related to Bosnian Muslim military formations in the municipality. Similarly, Osmanović simply testified that he was not aware of Bosnian Muslim military formations but did not rule out the possibility that they existed. The Chamber therefore does not rely on their evidence in this regard.

Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs.³⁸¹⁹ **(#Legal and obligatory#! The Serbs joined the JNA as a federal Yugoslav army, and were conservative, decisive to defend the *status quo*, and their lives and homes. On the other hand, the Muslims were arming themselves not for a purpose to defend, but for a purpose to achieve independence forcefully, against the federal state institutions, and the Serbs. How thisu could be equalised in this Court?)**

1104. Weapons were brought to and stored in the Bosnian Serb village of Tišća and then taken by SDS members to Vlasenica town and secretly distributed to the local Bosnian Serb population to ensure that every Bosnian Serb home had a weapon.³⁸²⁰ Milenko Stanić was informed of which villages had to be provided with weapons and SDS members in Bosnian Serb villages were provided with weapons by Bjelanović.³⁸²¹ **(Far #before VRS#! Not to forget a several important facts: The JNA didn't dare to rest in the Muslim villages, or to store the army equipment withdrawn from Slovenija and Croatia in the Muslim areas; the only community that remained faithful to the Law of Defence and consequently to the JNA was the Serb community; only the Serbs joined the JNA and replenished the shortage in manpower; only the Serbs wouldn't turn the weapons given by the JNA against the same JNA. So, there is no any place for an allusion that the Serbs committed a crime by being faithful to the JNA! And finally, the SDS was a party in power, and acted as any party in power would have to!#Legal and obligatory# No Karad'i's liability!#)**

1105. Starting in the summer of 1991, Redžić made contact with Dragomir Milošević, Commander of the JNA barracks in Han Pijesak. He discussed the situation in Vlasenica and the possibility of mobilising the TO, composed of both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs, which could protect all citizens.³⁸²² Dragomir Milošević in response said that “a Muslim cannot be given a rifle, because that rifle would be turned against the Serbs”.³⁸²³ **(!#Military necessity#! Since the Muslims had already formed their secret army, it would be irresponsible to give them weaponry whyle they wouldn't be under the JNA command. Neither the Serbs were given any weaponry unless accepted the JNA command! At the same time, the chief of Staf of Gen. Milosevic was a Muslim, Asim Dzambasovic, who testified in this case! Therefore the issue of concern wasn't ethnic or religion affiliation, but a political intentions! #Before VRS#! #No Karad'i's liability#)** In the first days of April 1992, a large number of soldiers and reservists were present in Vlasenica. Tanks, artillery, and armed vehicles from Milići, Han Pijesak, and Šekovići, were deployed, which created concern among the Bosnian Muslim population.³⁸²⁴ There was also shooting during the day and night.³⁸²⁵ **(That could upset**

³⁸¹⁹ D2922 (Witness statement of Savo Čeliković dated 10 February 2013), para. 7. *See also* D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 26. In July 1991 the Executive Board instructed the TO to place a guard outside the Municipal Assembly. D1654 (Conclusions from session of Vlasenica's Executive Board, 10 July 1991), p. 1.

³⁸²⁰ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 18 (under seal). *See also* Mane Đurić, T. 35058 (7 March 2013) (private session).

³⁸²¹ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5020–5021, 5141; Izet Redžić, T. 17702 (23 August 2011).

³⁸²² Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5010–5013; Izet Redžić, T. 17678 (23 August 2011). Redžić contacted Dragomir Milošević because the JNA had taken all weapons that should have been available to the TO, and in the event of war, while the civilian authorities could mobilise the TO it would be subordinated to the military. *See also* P3201 (Order of SFRY Federal Secretariat for National Defence, 14 May 1990) (in which General Adžić issued an order for the JNA to take-over TO weapons depots in May 1990).

³⁸²³ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5014.

³⁸²⁴ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5039–5040; *see* Adjudicated Fact 2687.

³⁸²⁵ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5040. There were also Bosnian Muslim attacks against Bosnian Serb villages. D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), paras. 30–35; D3014 (Video clip of Nedeljišta village); Zoran Jovanović, T. 34177–34189 (21 February 2013); D3009 (Excerpt from a notebook found in Nedeljišta village).

only those who were decisive to achieve their independence by the armed conflict. Otherwise, why an ordinary Muslim would be upset because his army and army of his state of Yugoslavia was there, mainly on it's way to withdraw to Yugoslavia?)

1106. On 21 April 1992, the Bosnian Serb authorities mobilised the Bosnian Serb population of Vlasenica through the Vlasenica TO. Additional JNA units also arrived in the municipality from Šekovići, and volunteers were also deployed.³⁸²⁶ Dragomir Milošević visited the units deployed in Milići. He explained the presence of this unit, by saying that the “Serbs should have the military that would protect them”.³⁸²⁷ Other leaders, including the Accused, Biljana Plavšić, Nikola Koljević and other high level SDS leaders visited the units located in Milići.³⁸²⁸ **(There was no such a visit, although it was appointed. However, this would be quite normal, and nothing criminal would be in this visit. On 21 April there was full two weeks of war in some areas of BiH, particularly in Sarajevo, and the nearby municipalities of Foca, Zvornik, Visegrad. That was an obligation of the JNA to mobilise and deploy its own reserve forces, but it is treated in this Judgement as a crime!)**

1107. The reserve police force in Vlasenica consisted of 70 to 80% Bosnian Serbs.³⁸²⁹ An order of the Presidency of SRBiH which directed police chiefs to ensure ethnic balance in the reserve police force at the municipal level was not respected by Bjelanović in Vlasenica.³⁸³⁰ **(#Distorted#! Prior to that, the Muslim Minister of the common police enlarged the reserve police 100%, mainly with the Muslims. There is evidence about that in the file of this case! Why the Chamber afforded itself to be deceived so easily by the Muslim/western propaganda?)**

1. Division of municipal structures

1108. On 26 December 1991, despite the opposition of Bosnian Muslim representatives,³⁸³¹ the Vlasenica Municipal Assembly issued a decision to join the SAO Birač.³⁸³² **(#Serb municipality only#! The Muslims didn't have any right to object the Serb orientation on their areas, communities of municipalities or SAOs, because the Muslims crushed the Constitution down, and particularly because the Muslims accepted to form their own municipality of Vlasenica. An Agreement had been reached, and even territories of the two municipalities defined, see D:1286:**

³⁸²⁶ D2922 (Witness statement of Savo Čeliković dated 10 February 2013), para. 22. See also D2967 (Witness statement of Momir Deurić dated 16 February 2013), para. 15; D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 14.

³⁸²⁷ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5014–5015.

³⁸²⁸ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5016–5017; Izet Redžić, T. 17679, 17727 (23 August 2011). Redžić further testified that the purpose of these visits was for the Accused, in co-operation with SDS officials, to prepare the Bosnian Serb people to fight their neighbours. However, it is not clear on what basis Redžić knew this information and the Chamber will not rely on Redžić's assessment in this regard.

³⁸²⁹ Izet Redžić, T. 17709 (23 August 2011). The Accused tendered a document which suggested that less than 10% of police candidates nominated for a training course in March 1992 were Serb. D1647 (Order of SerBiH MUP, 12 March 1992). The Chamber notes that the document only refers to two names which relate to Vlasenica and does not consider that this undermines the credible evidence of Redžić regarding the composition of the reserve police force.

³⁸³⁰ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5023–5025.

³⁸³¹ The Chamber notes that some Bosnian Muslims did vote in favour of this decision. D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 28.

³⁸³² D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 28; D2922 (Witness statement of Savo Čeliković dated 10 February 2013), paras. 18–19. Izet Redžić as President of the Executive Board of Vlasenica objected to the implementation of the decision on Vlasenica joining the SAO Birač. Mane Đurić, T. 35008–35010 (7 March 2013); D3098 (Vlasenica Executive Board request, 17 January 1992); D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), para. 17.

3. The Muslim Municipality of Vlasenica will be made up of the following territories and inhabited places: Turalići, Pustoše, the Muslim part of Drum, Duraković, Kuljančići, Džemat, Gradina, Pijuke, Kuselj, Mršići, Đurići, Donji /illegible/, Peševina, Gobelje, Nedjeljišta Muslim part, Carska /?Saševo/ Muslim part, Rovaši, Mačesi, Ražišta, Skugrići, Nova Kasaba, Sabiočina, Pomol, Bukovica – the Muslim part of Mušići, Bežići, Murići, Stedra, /hand-written brackets and underlining:/ (Nazda.) /hand-written:/ Bašča

The urban part of the Muslim Municipality of Vlasenica will be determined vis-à-vis the borders of the Serbian Municipality of Vlasenica.

This model of reorganisation of municipalities was pursued by the Serb side in all the mixed municipalities. Had it been accepted and carried out, there would not be any war, or any war crimes, or any “ethnic cleansing”. The Muslim Municipality of Vlasenica would be free as much as the Serb Municipality to join any association of municipalities and regions, this municipality would have all the state organs, including police, and nobody would be able to jeopardize the other side! The Chamber didn’t pay any attention to this crucial element! #Two municipalities – peace!# On

18 February 1992, the Executive Council of the SAO Birač reached a conclusion that “[i]n order to take over power in the area of the Birač SAO as efficiently as possible” it was necessary to take stock of the situation, including with respect to infrastructure and the economic situation in the region.³⁸³³ After the formation of the SAO Birač, the municipalities in the region, including Vlasenica, established their own crisis staffs.³⁸³⁴

1109. On 4 April 1992, following the instructions of the SDS Main Board, the Municipal Board of the SDS in Vlasenica passed a decision establishing a crisis staff of the Serb Municipality of Vlasenica (“Vlasenica Crisis Staff”) and Milenko Stanić was appointed President.³⁸³⁵ **(#Distorted#! What else should be done since the Muslim/Croat part of**

³⁸³³ P6113 (Minutes from 1st session of Executive Council of SAO Birač, 18 February 1992), p. 3. Savkić acknowledged that in his position within the SAO he worked on political and ethnic issues. Tomislav Savkić, T. 33756 (15 February 2013). Milenko Stanić was the President of the Executive Council of the SAO Birač. D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 28–29; D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), para. 17.

³⁸³⁴ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 19 (under seal). Defence witnesses testified that while the SAO was constituted it never became operational and had no influence on the municipalities. D2922 (Witness statement of Savo Čeliković dated 10 February 2013), para. 18; Savo Čeliković, T. 33560–33561 (13 February 2013); D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), paras. 7–8; D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 13; Milenko Stanić, T. 33996, 34000–34002, 34041 (19 February 2013); P6112 (Excerpt from Naser Orić’s book entitled “Srebrenica”), pp. 2, 5. The Chamber does not find the evidence of these witnesses as to whether the SAO was operational to be reliable and considers that it is contradicted by reliable evidence to the contrary. In addition the Chamber notes that the evidence of the relevant witnesses was marked by inconsistencies, evasiveness, and other indicators that the witnesses were not forthright in this regard.

³⁸³⁵ P6121 (Decision of Vlasenica’s SDS Municipal Board, 4 April 1992), p. 1; P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 40. See also P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 19 (under seal); D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), paras. 9–10. The SJB Chief of Vlasenica and the Commander of the TO were also members of the Vlasenica Crisis Staff. But see D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 34; Tomislav Savkić, T. 33777–33779 (15 February 2013). The Chamber notes that Savkić disputed the date on which the Vlasenica Crisis Staff was created. However, the Chamber finds his evidence in this regard to be equivocal and marked by contradictions. Similarly Stanić did not recall that the Vlasenica Crisis Staff met before 21 April 1992 and testified that it did not function in its full capacity as some members moved to the newly formed Milići municipality. Stanić was confronted with documents which suggested that the Vlasenica Crisis Staff was functioning and issued decisions before that date but he maintained it only started sitting after 21 April 1992 and that some of the documents produced by the Crisis Staff were drafted in the secretariat of the Municipal Assembly. He also drew into question the authenticity of the stamps used on the documents. D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), paras. 29–30; Milenko Stanić, T. 34007–34011, 34047–34048 (19 February 2013); P6137 (Decision of Vlasenica Crisis Staff, 19 April 1992); P6138 (Decision of Vlasenica Crisis Staff, 19 April 1992); P3214 (Decision of Vlasenica Crisis Staff, 19 April 1992). Having regard to the weight of evidence received, and the equivocal nature of Stanić’s evidence, the Chamber is satisfied that the documents issued by the Vlasenica Crisis Staff are authentic. Defence witnesses also testified that the Vlasenica Crisis Staff only operated for a short period of time. D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), paras. 12–13; D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), paras. 30, 32. However, considering credible evidence about the actions of the Vlasenica Crisis Staff, and considering the credibility assessment of the relevant witnesses in fn. 3791, the Chamber does not find their evidence to be reliable with respect to the

Presidency of BiH proclaimed a total mobilisation of all and everybody on 4 April 1992, and marked the Serbs, JNA and SAOs as the enemies? This transformation of the municipal organs into a more efficient Crisis Staff was a #legal and obligatory# move, but the “international justice” didn’t pay any attention to the domestic laws! And just mentioning this #context and a chain of events# – and everything looks different!)

1110. Negotiations between Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim representatives took place from 30 March until 11 April 1992.³⁸³⁶ The SDS representatives prepared a proposal and placed pressure on Bosnian Muslims to agree to a division of Vlasenica into three parts: Serbian Vlasenica, Muslim Vlasenica, and Milići municipality.³⁸³⁷ Redžić was instructed by Alija Izetbegović to prolong the negotiations to allow as many Bosnian Muslims as possible to evacuate from Vlasenica to Bosnian Muslim majority areas.³⁸³⁸ **(#Evacuation, not cleansing#! When the Muslim leaders orer a removal, it is “evacuation”, but it happened almost always, see:## for Krajina! If that was an ethnic cleansing of the Vlasenica Muslims, who committed it? How the President, or any other Serb official could be kept #liable# for this events?!?)** Savkić threatened that, if the Bosnian Muslims refused the partition or stalled the negotiations, armed intervention would follow and that there were “tanks ready to shed blood”.³⁸³⁹ **(#Deadly combination#! The witness Redzic claimed that in another case, while the Chamber had heard several Defence witnesses who rebutted this. Redzic, an SDA Muslim, was accused by his party for this agreement, and lied! If there was any pressure, the media would be full of information of that, but there was no any pressure!)** Bosnian Muslims were also asked to return their weapons.³⁸⁴⁰ During these negotiations, Milenko Stanić told Redžić that there “were no

dissolution of the Vlasenica Crisis Staff. The Chamber does find however, that by 17 June 1992 a War Commission for Vlasenica was established. P5486 (RS Presidency Confirmation of Appointment of Members of the War Commission in Vlasenica, 17 June 1992).

³⁸³⁶ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5042–5043, 5084. See also D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 34.

³⁸³⁷ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5040, 5042–5043, 5050–5051. See also D2922 (Witness statement of Savo Čeliković dated 10 February 2013), para. 20; D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 34; D1286 (Agreement on division of Vlasenica, 11 April 1992).

³⁸³⁸ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5043–5044, 5051–5052; Izet Redžić, T. 17739 (23 August 2011). See also Mane Đurić, T. 35062 (7 March 2013); D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 20; D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 35; Tomislav Savkić, T. 33749 (15 February 2013). Savkić testified that this demonstrated that the SDA leadership was probably planning to attack Vlasenica. D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 36; Tomislav Savkić, T. 33749–33750 (15 February 2013). However, the Chamber finds that Savkić’s evidence in this regard is purely speculative and does not rely on his evidence in this regard. The Chamber also received a note handwritten by Redžić, which referred to organising Bosnian Muslim defence. The document also included a typewritten addition which suggested that the note confirmed that the SDA “had a plan ready for taking over power in nearly all segments of life”. D1656 (Handwritten document by Izet Redžić), p. 1. See also Decision on Accused’s Motion to Admit Documents Previously Marked for Identification, 4 November 2011, para. 14. While Redžić acknowledged that the handwriting on the document was his, he testified that the type written addition was used to create a “false picture” and that the date was a forgery. Izet Redžić, T. 17742–17743 (23 August 2011). Having regard to Redžić’s evidence in this regard and the uncertain provenance of the type-written additions, the Chamber does not rely on the typewritten additions to support the suggestion that the SDA had a plan to take-over power in Vlasenica but finds that there were preparations for Bosnian Muslim defence in Vlasenica. The Chamber further finds that there were rumours about the possibility of a forceful take-over of Vlasenica by Bosnian Muslims. KDZ033, T. 18031 (29 August 2011) (closed session).

³⁸³⁹ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5047. See also Adjudicated Fact 2689. Defence witnesses testified that (i) there was no such threat; (ii) the decision to divide the municipality was adopted without any pressure; (iii) the division did not form part of a goal to establish Serb control over territory; and (iv) the proposed division was to avoid war given increasing tensions. D2922 (Witness statement of Savo Čeliković dated 10 February 2013), para. 21; Savo Čeliković, T. 33559–33560 (13 February 2013); D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 14. The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that the testimony of Čeliković was marked by inconsistencies and the testimony of Stanić was marked by evasiveness and other indicators that the witness was not forthright nor candid in this regard.

³⁸⁴⁰ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5050–5051; Izet Redžić, T. 17702 (23 August 2011).

more possibilities” and that he had orders which had come from “higher up”, which he was simply obeying.^{3841 (3798)}

1111. In an attempt to protect the Bosnian Muslim population from possible attacks, the Bosnian Muslim representatives eventually agreed to the proposed division of the municipality.³⁸⁴² **(#Distorted#! This certainly was not true. The Bratunac Municipality reached an agreement of the same kind, but this was spoiled by the Central SDA, remember the letter of Ms. Rabiya Subic, a secular, pro-European Muslim lady, accusing Izetbegovic for interrupting a peaceful events in Bratunac and Vlasenica!)** The agreement on the division of the municipality was signed on 11 April 1992.³⁸⁴³ Notwithstanding this agreement, Bosnian Muslim leaders, including Redžić, left the municipality a few days later.³⁸⁴⁴ **(Is this, together with the Izetbegovic’s order to buy some time until as many Muslims as possible leave Vlasenica, also an ethnic cleansing by the Serbs? #Before VRS#! #No Karad`ić’s liability#!)**

1112. On 13 April 1992, Milenko Stanić reported to the Bosnian Serb Assembly that the Vlasenica Municipal Assembly would adopt the protocol on the agreement for the territorial delineation of the municipality and urged all citizens who had fled Vlasenica to return to their homes; negotiating teams were urged to pay special attention to the balance of urban settlement and to “enable each member of a particular nation to become part of his or her ethnic community”.³⁸⁴⁵ (While the decision on the division of the municipality was adopted, only the decision on the establishment of the Milići municipality was verified as Bosnian Muslim representatives did not want to implement the agreement.³⁸⁴⁶ In a briefing attended by Mladić in June 1992, Milenko Stanić reported there were still problems with the delineation of the municipalities of Vlasenica and Milići.³⁸⁴⁷ **(#All EXCULPATORY#!)**

Take-over of Vlasenica

1113. On 19 April 1992 the Vlasenica Crisis Staff adopted a decision to take-over power in the territory of the Serb Municipality of Vlasenica.³⁸⁴⁸ **(Nota bene! Not in the territory of the Muslim Municipality of Vlasenica!!!#Serb municipality only#!)** On the same day, the Vlasenica Crisis Staff proclaimed that there was an imminent threat of war and that it

³⁸⁴¹ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5057, 5070.

³⁸⁴² Izet Redžić, T. 17736–17737 (23 August 2011).

³⁸⁴³ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5053, 5084; Izet Redžić, T. 17739 (23 August 2011); *see* Adjudicated Fact 2688. *See also* D2967 (Witness statement of Momir Deurić dated 16 February 2013), para. 14; Mane Đurić, T. 35014–35015 (7 March 2013); D1286 (Agreement on division of Vlasenica, 11 April 1992).

³⁸⁴⁴ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5053. *See also* D2967 (Witness statement of Momir Deurić dated 16 February 2013), para. 14. D1655 (Conclusions from extraordinary session of Vlasenica Municipal Assembly, 13 April 1992), p. 1.

³⁸⁴⁵ D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 15; Milenko Stanić, T. 34042 (19 February 2013); P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), pp. 23–24. *See also* D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), para. 25; D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 34; Tomislav Savkić, T. 33751, 33760 (15 February 2013).

³⁸⁴⁷ P1478 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), p. 233.

³⁸⁴⁸ P3214 (Decision of Vlasenica Crisis Staff, 19 April 1992); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 26. Đurić testified that these decisions were adopted by the Vlasenica Crisis Staff because of (i) the departure of Bosnian Muslims from the municipality; (ii) poor inter-ethnic relations and the large quantity of weapons which were held by citizens; and (iii) the fact that the joint assembly could not function. D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), paras. 18–21. Stanić also testified that the creation of the Serb Municipality of Vlasenica was not intended to mean an ethnically pure municipality. Milenko Stanić, T. 34041–34042 (19 February 2013). The Chamber does not consider this evidence, so far as it relates to the motivation or reasons behind these decisions, to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that evidence of the relevant witnesses was marked by contradictions, evasiveness and indicators that they were withholding information from the Chamber. For the Chamber’s analysis and conclusion with respect to the reason for the take-over of Vlasenica, *see* Section IV.A.3: Overarching JCE and the Accused’s responsibility.

would assume the functions of the Municipal Assembly.³⁸⁴⁹ It also passed a decision establishing the TO Staff³⁸⁵⁰ and a Serbian Assembly.³⁸⁵¹ **(On the previous day there was formed the TO of the RS!)** Milenko Stanić was appointed president of the Serb Municipality of Vlasenica.³⁸⁵²

1114. On or about 21 April 1992, the Bosnian Serb police, the TO³⁸⁵³ and 200 JNA soldiers from the Novi Sad Corps with the assistance of armed local Serbs took control of Vlasenica.³⁸⁵⁴ **(#Before VRS!# Before that day all the Muslim leadership and many others left Vlasenica for no reason. Instead to consolidate their own authorities in the Muslim Municipality of Vlasenica, they moved to Tuzla, the mos probably after an order from Sarajevo. Only several days after their leaving the town, the JNA passé through Vlasenica! The JNA, Novi Sad Corps, secured it's own withdrawal towards Yugoslavia. It is important to notice that the Corps didn't arrive from Yugoslavia for the purpose of taking control of Vlasenica. On the contrary, the Novi Sad Corps came from the Central Bosnia on it's way to SFRY. Since the Muslim extremists have taken a hostile activities towards the JNA, and the war was going on in Sarajevo, Foca, Zvornika..., it was the most natural that an Army secure it's troops! #No Karad'i's liability!#)** The White Eagles also came to Vlasenica at the beginning of the conflict but their operations were limited to the vicinity of the bauxite mine in Milići.³⁸⁵⁵ **(A Serb area!)** The Serb Forces took control of the municipality premises, the police station, the post office, the bank, the court, factories, and the medical centre.³⁸⁵⁶ Serb flags were “hoisted around town, and very loud Serbian nationalist music was playing through the public address system”.³⁸⁵⁷ The Vlasenica Crisis Staff was involved in the co-ordination of the take-over with the JNA and continued to command and control units in the field until 28 June 1992 when units became part of the 1st Birčani Brigade which later became part of the Vlasenica Brigade.³⁸⁵⁸

³⁸⁴⁹ P6137 (Decision of Vlasenica Crisis Staff, 19 April 1992); D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), paras. 18–19. The SAO Birač on 29 April 1992 proclaimed a state of war in the entire SAO. P2615 (Decision of Birač Crisis Staff, 29 April 1992).

³⁸⁵⁰ P6140 (Decision of Vlasenica Crisis Staff, 19 April 1992).

³⁸⁵¹ P3214 (Decision of Vlasenica Crisis Staff, 19 April 1992). *But see* Milenko Stanić, T. 34010 (19 February 2013). The Chamber refers to its assessment in fn. 3792 relating to Stanić's evidence about the date when the Vlasenica Crisis Staff was established.

³⁸⁵² P6139 (Decision of Vlasenica Municipal Assembly, 30 March 1992). *But see* Milenko Stanić, T. 34014 (19 February 2013) (disputing the veracity of this document).

³⁸⁵³ The TO included Bosnian Serb reservists from Vlasenica, Milići and Šekovići, and later became part of the Vlasenica Brigade of the VRS. P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 20 (under seal).

³⁸⁵⁴ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 20 (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18029 (29 August 2011) (closed session); P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), para. 13; P2761 (RS MUP report on work for period April to December 1992), p. 7. *See also* D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), paras. 27–28; D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 22; D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), paras. 21–22; D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 37; D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 34; P1478 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), p. 232 (Stanić reported that they launched an operation in Vlasenica on 21 April 1992). P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), p. 3. Before the take-over some Bosnian Serb locals had already been mobilised into the police and on the day of the take-over were standing outside of and took control of the enterprises and institutions in the town of Vlasenica. P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 20–21 (under seal).

³⁸⁵⁵ KDZ033, T. 18033, 18038 (29 August 2011) (closed session).

³⁸⁵⁶ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibko Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 18–19, 23–25. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2690; D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 37; Ibko Osmanović, T. 17961 (29 August 2011). Defence witnesses also testified that the role of the JNA was to separate “warring sides in case of an armed clash” and that Serb Forces entered Vlasenica to pre-empt a Bosnian Muslim operation to attack Vlasenica. D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), para. 22; D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 37. However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber noted that the testimony of the relevant witnesses was marked by evasiveness, bias, insincerity and indicators that they were withholding information from the Chamber.

³⁸⁵⁷ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 21 (under seal).

³⁸⁵⁸ P2636 (Report of 1st Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade, 19 December 1994), p. 1. Defence witnesses disputed the veracity of this report and testified that the Vlasenica Crisis Staff did not co-ordinate the take-over and that the author of this report was not in Vlasenica at the

1115. There was no armed Bosnian Muslim resistance to the take-over of Vlasenica and no casualties.³⁸⁵⁹ Members of the Novi Sad Corps came to Vlasenica following reports that Bosnian Serbs had been killed but found these reports to be false and treated the Bosnian Muslim population fairly.³⁸⁶⁰ The “liberation” of the town of Vlasenica on 21 April 1992 marked the start of combat operations in the area and; a number of villages in the municipality were also “liberated”.³⁸⁶¹

1116. Members of the SDA leadership had already left Vlasenica before the take-over,³⁸⁶² but after the take-over SDA members were brought into custody and asked for weapons; other Bosnian Muslims were also arrested.³⁸⁶³

ii. Developments in Vlasenica after take-over

1117. After the take-over, the seat of the Serb Municipality of Vlasenica was moved to the Boskit office building in Vlasenica town.³⁸⁶⁴ Thereafter, the Vlasenica Crisis Staff took control of life in Vlasenica.³⁸⁶⁵ **(#Serb municipality only#! This moving was a part of the Agreement, and the Muslim Municipality of Vlasenica was supposed to keep the seat of the common municipality, which was more favourable! There was no obstacle for the organisation of the Muslim Municipality!)**

1. Control of movement and other restrictions

1118. From April 1992, Bosnian Serb police, acting under the authorisation of an SDS member,³⁸⁶⁶⁽³⁸²³⁾ **(#Distorted#! #Deadly combination#! And this assertion and a way to distort the truth is something that wouldn't fly in any country that supports this court. Under the fn. 3823 there is a clear explanation that it wasn't a party action, but a legal action of municipal authorities, no matter whether the Crisis Staff, or the Executive Board, because the same persons were in both, ex officio! There is no reason to**

time. Tomislav Savkić, T. 33774–33777 (15 February 2013); Milenko Stanić, T. 34017–34019 (19 February 2013). However, the Chamber does not consider the testimony of the witnesses to be reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that their testimony was marked by contradictions, evasiveness, and indicators that they were not completely forthright in their evidence. The Chamber thus has no reason to doubt the veracity of this report.

³⁸⁵⁹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 20 (under seal); Sead Hodžić, T. 18431–18432 (6 September 2011); D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 22; D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), para. 21; D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 37; Tomislav Savkić, T. 33774 (15 February 2013) (testifying that this operation was not co-ordinated by the SDS Crisis Staff); D2922 (Witness statement of Savo Čeliković dated 10 February 2013), para. 22; P3212 (Witness statement of Ibko Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 28, 59. *See also* D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 14; D1652 (Report of ABiH's Vlasenica municipal staff, 19 July 1992), p. 1.

³⁸⁶⁰ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibko Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 17, 21; Ibko Osmanović, T. 17960, 17962 (29 August 2011); Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5060–5062; Izet Redžić, T. 17679 (23 August 2011); Sead Hodžić, T. 18432 (6 September 2011).

³⁸⁶¹ P6458 (Report of 1st Birač Infantry Brigade, 30 October 1993), pp. 3, 7. The report names over 15 villages and other strategic points.

³⁸⁶² KDZ033, T. 18030 (29 August 2011) (closed session). *See also* D1652 (Report of ABiH's Vlasenica municipal staff, 19 July 1992), p. 1.

³⁸⁶³ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibko Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 35–36; P3216 (Vlasenica SJB crime register, April–December 1992), p. 3. No Bosnian Serbs were prosecuted for the illegal possession of weapons. Mane Đurić, T. 35059–35060 (7 March 2013).

³⁸⁶⁴ D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 63. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2690. The Chamber notes that the Adjudicated Fact also refers to the setting up of a “Serb Crisis Staff” after the take-over. However, the Chamber notes that this is not consistent with evidence cited in para. 1109 about the formation of the Vlasenica Crisis Staff before this date.

³⁸⁶⁵ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 44 (under seal). *See also* P3212 (Witness statement of Ibko Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 48.

³⁸⁶⁶ *See* Adjudicated Fact 2692. Đurić testified that check-points were not erected by the SDS but by the TO and were later taken over by the police. D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 65. The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 3791 in concluding that it does not find his evidence with respect to the lack of involvement of the SDS in this regard to be reliable.

discredit these testimonies for the sake of an Adjudicated fact, which must not survive if rebutted! As any responsible and parliamentary party, particularly if on power, the SDS had to support all the defence actions!) established check-points on all access roads towards Vlasenica and on local roads to villages.³⁸⁶⁷ The Vlasenica Crisis Staff issued passes for people to move around town and introduced a curfew.³⁸⁶⁸ In order for Bosnian Muslims to pass check-points, move around or leave the municipality they had to be issued a travel pass by the Bosnian Serb municipal authorities.³⁸⁶⁹ Even if they did have such passes, they were often arrested and detained. On the other hand, Bosnian Serb citizens did not have to obtain movement passes.³⁸⁷⁰ Bosnian Muslims who were involved with the SDA or other Muslim organisations were not issued such passes.³⁸⁷¹ **(#Legal#! #Defense reasons#! #Before the VRS#! That was a war, and nobody could order to the people of Vlasenica what measures of security they were to implement! For heaven's sake, there was a secret Army of minimum 260,000 Muslim soldiers throughout Bosnia, mobilised exclusively against the Serbs, the neighbouring municipalities such as Zvornik and Foca had a huge number of casualties, and this court is discussing a precautionary measures, as if it was unnecessary, or malicious!)** Transit passes were usually only issued to women, children and the elderly with able bodied men only able to secure such passes if they had connections or had substantial amounts of money to pay for such passes, particularly if they wanted to leave the municipality.³⁸⁷²

1119. Graffiti appeared on the houses of eminent Muslims with the words “Ustasha”, “Muslims out”, “We will slaughter”, “Out”, and “This is Serb, this is Serbia”.³⁸⁷³ Following the take-over, three houses belonging to Bosnian Muslims, including the commander of the police, were torched in broad daylight and the fire brigade was prevented from taking action.³⁸⁷⁴ Bosnian Muslims unlike Bosnian Serbs had limitations on the amount of money they could withdraw from the bank.³⁸⁷⁵ **(#Distortion#! This is a lie, and it was clarified in the courtroom. There is evidence that in the entire Republic of Srpska there was a shortage of cash, because the cash had been produced in Belgrade!)** Bosnian Serbs started boycotting Bosnian Muslim cafés and shops, there was gun fire at night and increasing intimidation; altogether this created fear among the Bosnian Muslim population.³⁸⁷⁶ **(Nobody could have ordered either way, to visit or to avoid the**

³⁸⁶⁷ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 22 (under seal).

³⁸⁶⁸ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibri Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 33, 48; Ibri Osmanović, T. 17977 (29 August 2011). *See also* P3217 (Travel pass issued by Vlasenica Crisis Staff, undated).

³⁸⁶⁹ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibri Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 43–44, 46–48; Ibri Osmanović, T. 17972 (29 August 2011); P3217 (Travel pass issued by Vlasenica Crisis Staff, undated); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 22 (under seal). *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2691.

³⁸⁷⁰ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 22 (under seal). The Chamber does find however, that Bosnian Serb conscripts also needed a military pass in order to leave the municipality. KDZ033, T. 18062–18064 (31 August 2011) (closed session). The Chamber notes that Stanić himself was issued passes. D2984 (Travel passes issued to Milenko Stanić). One of the passes issued to Stanić was in his capacity as a military conscript. The Chamber finds that the issuance of passes to Bosnian Serb military conscripts does not undermine the evidence that there were additional restrictions faced by Bosnian Muslim civilians which did not apply to Bosnian Serbs. Defence witnesses testified that passes were issued on request to everyone regardless of ethnicity to allow them to move around freely due to war operations. D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 64; D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 33; D2983 (Vlasenica Crisis Staff travel pass); Milenko Stanić, T. 33990–33991 (19 February 2013). The Chamber does not find the evidence to be reliable in this regard and refers to its credibility assessment of the relevant witnesses in fn. 3791 in reaching that conclusion.

³⁸⁷¹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 22 (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18064 (31 August 2011) (closed session).

³⁸⁷² P3212 (Witness statement of Ibri Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 45; P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 11, 22, 55 (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18064, 18095 (31 August 2011) (closed session).

³⁸⁷³ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibri Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 39.

³⁸⁷⁴ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibri Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 37.

³⁸⁷⁵ Ibri Osmanović, T. 18006 (29 August 2011).

³⁸⁷⁶ P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), paras. 7–12. There were also incidents of shooting in Bosnian Serb villages. D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 25. *See also* P3212 (Witness statement of Ibri

cafés, but it should be notified that in the war circumstance the Muslim cafés worked freely, unlike a Serb in the Muslim areas of control!) The intimidation included the beating, arrest and questioning of Bosnian Muslim men, including Bosnian Muslim intellectuals and people of influence. In addition, television broadcasts from Sarajevo were cut and Bosnian Muslims were threatened that they should not go to work.³⁸⁷⁷ **(No company was working at that time anyway! But, any Muslim witness could have said anything against the Serbs, and it would be admitted!)** Members of the Bosnian Serb police selected the houses of wealthy Bosnian Muslims and took away their property.³⁸⁷⁸ **(There certainly may have been looting, but it is out of question that the police did it! #No liability#!)** The cars of some Bosnian Muslim detainees were also confiscated by the Bosnian Serb police.³⁸⁷⁹ Non-Serb intellectuals, political leaders and the wealthy who had not fled before the conflict began were the first to be “forcibly removed” from Vlasenica.³⁸⁸⁰

1120. Muslims working in state-owned companies and other public services in Vlasenica municipality were dismissed from their jobs.³⁸⁸¹ Muslim shop-keepers feared keeping their businesses open, and the salaries of the Bosnian Muslim workers of the local bauxite mine were stopped. Their Serb colleagues on the other hand, continued to receive salaries.³⁸⁸² On 14 May 1992, the local bauxite mine announced that “not a single Muslim should return to work”.³⁸⁸³ In August 1992, at one company, an announcement was made that the Vlasenica Crisis Staff had ordered Bosnian Muslims to return to work and that those who were absent would lose their jobs and property.³⁸⁸⁴

Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 38 (stating that immediately following the take-over of Vlasenica, Bosnian Serb businesses reopened while Bosnian Muslim shops remained closed).

³⁸⁷⁷ P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), paras. 14–15, 19, 21; Sead Hodžić, T. 18446–18447 (6 September 2011); P418 (Witness statement of Mersudina Saim-Hodžić dated 24 May 2002), p. 4. The Chamber received evidence of killings by Serb Forces of Bosnian Muslims after the take-over of Vlasenica between May and October 1992 but these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13. P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 61–64, 66, 79 (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18098–18099 (31 August 2011) (closed session); P3242 (Map of Vlasenica showing locations of exhumation sites); P3260 (List of missing civilians in Vlasenica in 1992), pp. 3, 12 (under seal); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 193; Ibro Osmanović, T. 17948 (25 August 2011). The Chamber received evidence from Mašović and Tabeau about a large number of other individuals who went missing from Vlasenica and who were later exhumed. However, in the absence of other evidence linking these to scheduled incidents, the Chamber has not relied on this evidence in this regard. P4854 (Updated Table 1 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 2; P4852 (Report of Amor Mašović, 20–21 October 2009), p. 3; P4856 (Appendix B to the Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief filed on 18 May 2009 marked by Amor Mašović), pp. 29–30; P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 51–55; D2250 (Ewa Tabeau’s report entitled “Deaths and Disappearance of BiH Muslims 1992–1995,” 25 April 2012); Ewa Tabeau, T. 28411–28412 (2 May 2012). The Chamber also received evidence about the destruction of the Vlasenica mosque but Schedule D of the Indictment does not charge the destruction of cultural monuments and sacred sites in Vlasenica. P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 57 (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18095–18096 (31 August 2011) (closed session). See also Mane Đurić, T. 35055–35056 (7 March 2013); Zoran Jovanović, T. 34195–34196, 34212–34213 (21 February 2013); D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 99; Tomislav Savkić, T. 33719–33720 (14 February 2013), T. 33744 (15 February 2013).

P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 51 (under seal).

³⁸⁷⁸ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 81 (under seal).

³⁸⁷⁹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 53 (under seal).

³⁸⁸⁰ See Adjudicated Fact 2686; P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 24 (under seal). Defence witnesses testified that (i) Bosnian Muslim were not dismissed from their jobs; (ii) some workers no longer reported for work; and (iii) companies started operating at reduced capacity and cancelled work arrangements for workers who did not show up at work and such notices were also given to Bosnian Serbs. D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 18; D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 62; D2922 (Witness statement of Savo Čeliković dated 10 February 2013), para. 4; Savo Čeliković, T. 33550–33551 (13 February 2013). However, the Chamber does not consider this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment of the relevant witnesses in fns. 3791 and 3796.

³⁸⁸¹ See Adjudicated Fact 2686.

³⁸⁸² Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5028–5029; Izet Redžić, T. 17681 (23 August 2011). Redžić further testified that not a single Bosnian Muslim was working in any company or institution in Vlasenica by mid-May 1992. Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5028. However, the Chamber accepted the evidence of KDZ033 that even in June 1992, some Bosnian Muslims continued to work in the municipality and thus does not accept Redžić’s contrary evidence in this regard. KDZ033, T. 18061 (31 August 2011) (closed session).

³⁸⁸³ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 41. See also Adjudicated Fact 2693.

2. Confiscation of weapons and interrogations

1121. The Vlasenica Crisis Staff issued an ultimatum for the surrender of weapons by 21 April 1992 and guaranteed the security of citizens who complied with this deadline.³⁸⁸⁵ Bosnian Muslims were ordered to surrender their weapons to the Serb authorities or face arrest.³⁸⁸⁶ The Bosnian Serb police went through town and called for the surrender of all weapons and stated that while the army was there for protection, force would be used against those who did not comply.³⁸⁸⁷ Following this announcement, groups of Bosnian Muslims handed over their hunting and personal weapons to the SJB.³⁸⁸⁸ Following this hand over, the Bosnian Serb police began arresting Bosnian Muslims who were suspected of still possessing weapons.³⁸⁸⁹ From 27 to 30 April 1992, orders were issued by the TO which noted that Bosnian Muslims still possessed illegal firearms in a number of villages and the Vlasenica TO decided in co-operation with the SJB to “mop up the terrain” to seize these weapons. The Vlasenica TO commander ordered that in carrying out this operation, measures should be taken to “prevent unnecessary casualties and wounding”.³⁸⁹⁰ **(All #legal, legitimate# and necessary! It is exculpatory that there was an order to “prevent unnecessary casualties”! Responsible conduct of Serb officials#!)**

1122. On 19 May 1992, the Vlasenica Crisis Staff issued an instruction to the Commander of the TO and the Chief of the SJB to control the entry of armed persons into the town.³⁸⁹¹ All Bosnian Serb members of the Vlasenica TO Staff moved to the Serb Municipality of Vlasenica.³⁸⁹² **(#Serb municipality only#! That was what the Muslim officials were supposed to do with the Muslim Municipality, had they kept the Agreement! A control of an entry of armed persons is legal and necessary even during a peace times!)**

1123. By mid May 1992, the JNA had withdrawn but left behind its equipment, armoured vehicles, tanks and weapons, which were given to local Bosnian Serbs.³⁸⁹³ **(#Distorted#! The same as the JNA left it's officers, soldiers, armament and facilities in the Muslim/Croat areas to these communities. This armament was bought by common money of all three communities, from the taxes paid by the Serbs too, and when the former state had fallen apart, all the common property was allocated to the peoples and republics. Taking into account the fact that the federal state located majority of**

³⁸⁸⁵ P3215 (Decision of Vlasenica Crisis Staff, 19 April 1992), p. 1; P3212 (Witness statement of Ibri Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 30–32; Ibri Osmanović, T. 17962 (29 August 2011); D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 22. *See also* D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 22 (stating that the decision applied to all citizens regardless of nationality).

³⁸⁸⁶ *See* Adjudicated Fact 2693; P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 20 (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18039–18040 (29 August 2011) (closed session). Bosnian Serbs were not expected to hand over their weapons. *See also* D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), para. 21 (stating that it was the Bosnian Serb TO which called for the surrender of weapons and that many Bosnian Muslims complied); D3010 (Photograph of weapons); D3011 (Photograph of weapons). *See also* Ibri Osmanović, T. 17988 (29 August 2011).

³⁸⁸⁷ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibri Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 27, 31; Ibri Osmanović, T. 17964, 17968, 17999 (29 August 2011).

³⁸⁸⁸ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibri Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 28–29; P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 20–21 (under seal).

³⁸⁸⁹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 20 (under seal). KDZ033 also stated that many of these arrests were a pretext for gaining information including where money had been hidden. However, the Chamber does not know on what basis KDZ033 formed this conclusion and does not rely on his evidence in this regard.

³⁸⁹⁰ D3100 (Reports of Vlasenica TO, 27–30 April 1992); Mane Đurić, T. 35012–35015 (7 March 2013).

³⁸⁹¹ P3218 (Letter from Vlasenica Crisis Staff to TO commander and SJB chief, 19 May 1992).

³⁸⁹² D1652 (Report of ABiH's Vlasenica municipal staff, 19 July 1992), p. 1.

³⁸⁹³ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibri Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 52, 59; Ibri Osmanović, T. 17962–17963, 17982 (29 August 2011). *See also* P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 25 (under seal); Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5114.

the military industry in the Muslim/Croat areas, these communities got much more of the common properties. Such a unilateral presentation in this Judgement looks like it was a felony, or a Serb crime! #Before VRS#, No Karad'i's liability#! While the JNA was in Vlasenica, the focus was in forcing the Bosnian Muslims to surrender their weapons, but when the JNA left there was a shift towards rounding up, detaining and interrogating Bosnian Muslims.³⁸⁹⁴ **(#Interrogating# meant establishing a possible criminal conduct!#)** Bosnian Muslims were arrested in their homes and taken for interrogation.³⁸⁹⁵ At first those taken for interrogation were on lists which identified people suspected of being involved in the arming of Bosnian Muslims or owning weapons.³⁸⁹⁶ Over time however, “for all practical purposes almost every single Muslim was brought in for interrogation”; some were released while others were not.³⁸⁹⁷ **(#Interrogation#! Therefore, the decisive element was their involvement in the conflict, either as combatants, or supporters, armament suppliers, propagandists, or so... and not their religion! This completely was up to the local authorities and their esteem of danger and risks. No president or other authorities could order anything to the local officials, but to respect the law, and this President did it many times, even more times than it was necessary, since he trusted many unfounded allegations!#Legal, necessary#! #No Karad'i's liability#!)**

3. Establishment of Bosnian Serb SJB

1124. The Vlasenica Crisis Staff decided to disarm the active duty and reserve members of the joint police force, the reserve police was mobilised, and a new Bosnian Serb SJB was formed.³⁸⁹⁸ In May 1992, Mane Đurić replaced Bjelanović as the Chief of the Vlasenica SJB, and Bjelanović became the SJB Chief in Milići municipality.³⁸⁹⁹ Radenko Stanić was the Commander of the SJB and the Assistant Commander was Dragomir Šargić.³⁹⁰⁰ While the Vlasenica Crisis Staff informed Bosnian Muslims that they could continue their employment, in practice, Bosnian Muslims were dismissed from their positions in the municipal authorities and the police.³⁹⁰¹ After these dismissals the police became a “Serb

³⁸⁹⁴ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 25 (under seal).

³⁸⁹⁵ KDZ033, T. 18062 (31 August 2011) (closed session).

³⁸⁹⁶ KDZ033, T. 18064–18065 (31 August 2011) (closed session); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 34, 51; Ibro Osmanović, T. 17989–17990, 17994 (29 August 2011).

³⁸⁹⁷ KDZ033, T. 18065 (31 August 2011) (closed session).

³⁸⁹⁸ D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), paras. 23–25, 30. While Đurić also refers to an attempt by a paramilitary formation to take-over the SJB, the evidence on this point is equivocal and it is unclear whether this refers to a Bosnian Serb or Bosnian Muslim paramilitary formation and the Chamber does not rely on his evidence in this regard. *See also* P2761 (RS MUP report on work for period April to December 1992), p. 7; P6138 (Decision of Vlasenica Crisis Staff, 19 April 1992).

³⁸⁹⁹ Rade Bjelanović was identified as the “right-hand man” of the SDS Main Board member, Rajko Đukić. P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 15 (under seal).

³⁹⁰⁰ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 15 (under seal); P3226 (List of Vlasenica SJB active workers in May 1992); Zoran Durmić, T. 33857 (18 February 2013). *See also* D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 29.

³⁹⁰¹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 15, 24 (under seal); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 49, 69; P3226 (List of Vlasenica SJB active workers in May 1992). *See also* P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), para. 13. Đurić stated that people continued to work until mid-April 1992 but then Bosnian Muslims stopped coming to work at the TO out of fear. D2967 (Witness statement of Momir Đurić dated 16 February 2013), para. 11. The Chamber does not consider that evidence that some Bosnian Muslims stopped coming to work out of fear is inconsistent with others being dismissed from their jobs. Đurić testified that Bosnian Muslim police decided of their own accord not to return to work and were not given decisions on termination of employment or sent on forced leave. However, he was confronted and contradicted by reference to his prior testimony where he testified that all Bosnian Serb police officers were re-employed while Bosnian Muslims were laid off or told to take annual leave and it was done to change the ethnic composition of the police. D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 25; Mane Đurić, T. 35063–35065 (7 March 2013) (private session). In light of these contradictions, the Chamber does not consider Đurić’s evidence to be reliable in this regard. *See also* KDZ033, T. 18044 (29 August 2011) (closed session). While KDZ033 testified that to his knowledge Bosnian Muslims left the MUP of their own accord, the Chamber finds his answers in this regard to be equivocal.

only body” with police officers wearing a white patch with an eagle and a white ribbon on their sleeves.³⁹⁰² **(#Distorted#! A “white ribbon was an element of identification with the purpose to avoid a friendly fire, which means that there was another armed group around. The same white ribbons implemented in Prijedor had been denigrated as being adequate to the yellow ribbons marking Jews in the Nazi times. No limits to manipulations!)** Joint police or joint security organs were no longer organised.³⁹⁰³ Đurić, in a briefing attended by Mladić in June 1992, reported that an SJB had been set up and was involved in confiscating weapons.³⁹⁰⁴ **(#Legal, legitimate and necessary#!!!)**

4. Formation of Special Platoon

1125. Bosnian Serbs received summons for mobilisation and a platoon was formed, which was named the Special Police Platoon.³⁹⁰⁵ This platoon, which consisted of between 20 to 30 men who had no previous police experience; they had criminal records³⁹⁰⁶ and refused to place themselves under the command of the Vlasenica TO.³⁹⁰⁷ The Special Police Platoon was commanded by Miroslav Kraljević and was within the organisational structure of the SJB.³⁹⁰⁸ Members of the Special Police Platoon received payment from the SJB and reported daily to Kraljević at the SJB.³⁹⁰⁹ They were under the command of the Vlasenica Crisis Staff.³⁹¹⁰ (3867)

1126. The Special Police Platoon engaged in illegal activities and mistreated Bosnian Muslims.³⁹¹¹ For example, members of the Special Police Platoon would beat Bosnian Muslims during interrogations.³⁹¹² In mid-June 1992, they looted goods from Bosnian Muslim homes while conducting searches and in one case moved into an abandoned Bosnian Muslim house.³⁹¹³ Bosnian Muslims who remained in their homes were interrogated to identify people considered to be Muslim leaders in the municipality³⁹¹⁴ and were also harassed by members of the police who came to their homes at night and demanded money.³⁹¹⁵ The Special Police Platoon conducted these operations on a daily basis and sometimes at night.³⁹¹⁶ Đurić and Radenko Stanić initially permitted members of

³⁹⁰² P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), para. 13; Sead Hodžić, T. 18444 (6 September 2011).

³⁹⁰³ Ibro Osmanović, T. 17977 (29 August 2011).

³⁹⁰⁴ P1478 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), p. 233.

³⁹⁰⁵ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 6–8 (under seal); P3234 (Mobilisation order, 26 April 1992) (under seal); P3235 (Mobilisation order) (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18041 (29 August 2011) (closed session).

³⁹⁰⁶ KDZ033, T. 18045 (29 August 2011) (closed session); KDZ033, T. 18047–18048 (31 August 2011) (closed session); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 64 (under seal).

³⁹⁰⁷ D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), paras. 31–33, 35; Mane Đurić, T. 35065–35066, 35067 (7 March 2013) (private session); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 64 (under seal).

³⁹⁰⁸ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 8, 14, 16–17 (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18050 (31 August 2011) (closed session); P3225 (List of Vlasenica SJB reserve workers in September 1992); P3244 (Payroll list of reserve police force in Vlasenica).

³⁹⁰⁹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 10, 13 (under seal).

³⁹¹⁰ See Adjudicated Fact 2694.

³⁹¹¹ Mane Đurić, T. 35066 (7 March 2013), 35067 (7 March 2013) (private session); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 64 (under seal). Đurić testified that whenever the SJB received reports about the illegal behaviour of members of the Special Police Platoon, the commander was called, reports were made against the individuals who were removed from the unit but the SJB did not have the time to control this unit. D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), paras. 34–36. However, having noted the contradictions and evasiveness in Đurić’s testimony, the Chamber does not consider his evidence in this regard is reliable.

³⁹¹² KDZ033, T. 18065 (31 August 2011) (closed session).

³⁹¹³ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 26 (under seal).

³⁹¹⁴ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 26 (under seal).

³⁹¹⁵ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 27 (under seal).

³⁹¹⁶ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 25 (under seal).

the Special Police Platoon and reserve police to loot non-Serb property and misappropriate non-Serb houses.³⁹¹⁷ The Special Police Platoon was disbanded in August 1992.³⁹¹⁸

5. Take-over of surrounding villages

1127. After the take-over of Vlasenica, representatives of the Bosnian Serb authorities drove from village to village and used megaphones to call on all Bosnian Muslims to hand over their weapons.³⁹¹⁹ **(#A legal, legitimate and necessary action!# The tone in which such a legal actions of authorities are presented as a criminal conduct!)**

1128. The Special Police Platoon first took-over “several villages” on the road from Vlasenica to Milići.³⁹²⁰ Kraljević received orders for operations against Bosnian Muslim villages from Radenko Stanić.³⁹²¹ The aim was to “cleansing” the area of Bosnian Muslims and Kraljević instructed the Special Police Platoon that the “territory had to be 100 percent clean and that none of the Muslims should remain in the area”.³⁹²² **(#Guilt plea lies# Again, a dubious finding based only on one source, a “guilt plea” witness, uncorroborated by any document. This is an abuse of the #linguistic# differences: “cleansing” had never been meant to pertain to civilians, but only to a combat groups. It must not be forgotten that there was the agreement on forming two municipalities, with the two responsible police stations, which would guaranty law and order, which was abandoned by the Muslims, who have chosen to fight instead. No authority would leave this opportunity of armed civilians deep in the territory, able to attack and kill many vicilians while the Army is far on a front line! All of it was legal, but when distorted by a wrong interpretation of a military term “cleansing”, everything look criminal! Why would the Serb authorities expel Mulsim civilians, while president Milenko Stanic went to Tuzla to ask them to return to the town, which is corroborated and undisputed? #Responsible conduct of officials#!)**

1129. In May and June 1992, the Special Police Platoon, led by Kraljević, conducted two operations, one in Sušica, and another in Gradina and other Muslim hamlets in the municipality, occasionally encountering armed resistance.³⁹²³ In accordance with Kraljević’s instruction, the Special Police Platoon set Bosnian Muslim houses on fire.³⁹²⁴ In the village of Piskavice only the homes belonging to Bosnian Muslims were torched while the Bosnian Serbs continued to live in their houses.³⁹²⁵ **(#Abuse of civilian settlements#! This certainly looks bad, but why the Serb homes would be set on fire, if there was no**

³⁹¹⁷ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 51 (under seal).

³⁹¹⁸ The Special Police Platoon was disbanded following an order of the MUP Minister, which disbanded all special units attached to the SJB and placed them under the command of the VRS. P6192 (Vlasenica SJB report, 10 August 1992); D3094 (Romanija-Birač CSB instructions, 28 July 1992); Mane Đurić, T. 35068–35071 (7 March 2013); D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 38; P6193 (List of reserve police force of Vlasenica SJB). While this platoon was disbanded, its commander and his deputy remained employed by the MUP. This order also required that individuals who committed crimes be dismissed from the MUP and be put at the disposal of the VRS. The Vlasenica SJB did dismiss members of the reserve police for crimes they had committed. D3094 (Romanija-Birač CSB instructions, 28 July 1992), pp. 1–2; D3095 (Romanija-Birač CSB instructions, 25 July 1992); D3096 (Vlasenica SJB report, 6 August 1992); D3097 (Vlasenica SJB report, 25 September 1992).

³⁹¹⁹ P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), para. 17; Sead Hodžić, T. 18449 (6 September 2011); D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), para. 21.

³⁹²⁰ [REDACTED].

³⁹²¹ [REDACTED].

³⁹²² [REDACTED].

³⁹²³ See Adjudicated Fact 2694.

³⁹²⁴ [REDACTED]; see Adjudicated Fact 2694.

³⁹²⁵ [REDACTED].

firing at the police from those homes? The same concerns the Muslim homes: if these homes had been turned into a military objects, it was understandable why there was fire against them, as well as if not, that would be a crime, forbidden by the #President multiple orders#, and therefore can not be used against him! So, presented in such a selective and inadequate presentation is detrimental to the President's interests!)

1130. In early May 1992, Kraljević ordered the Special Police Platoon to conduct an operation in Turalići, during which the village was “burnt almost entirely to the ground”.³⁹²⁶ In late May 1992, Kraljević ordered the Special Police Platoon to take-over the village of Gradina and the surrounding area.³⁹²⁷ The Gradina operation was discussed in an informal meeting at the SJB building attended by officials, including Đurić and Radenko Stanić.³⁹²⁸ On the morning of the operation, inhabitants were instructed by loudspeaker to surrender their weapons and warned that if they failed to do so, military action would be taken.³⁹²⁹ The Special Police Platoon was supported by police officers from the Vlasenica SJB and a VRS unit with a tank and two APCs.³⁹³⁰ **(#Abuses of civilian objects, settlements#! Why it was so difficult to understand that some Muslim villages had been a real strongholds, which the armed forces couldn't tolerate deep in the territory under it's control? Is there any evidence that those villages hadn't been armed and militarised?)**

1131. The members of the Special Police Platoon were ordered by Kraljević to search for weapons, detain men who surrendered for questioning, kill those men who tried to escape, and send women and children to Vlasenica town.³⁹³¹ After the escape of a Bosnian Muslim man, Kraljević instructed the Special Police Platoon not to take any more male Muslim prisoners alive.³⁹³² There were armed clashes with Bosnian Muslims during the take-over of Gradina.³⁹³³ **(#Abuses of civilian settlements#! How come, if the Muslim settlements hadn't been armed and militarised?)** After Bosnian Muslims fled, Serb Forces torched many Bosnian Muslim homes in Gradina and surrounding villages.³⁹³⁴ Some men were arrested, detained and then transferred to Sušica camp.³⁹³⁵ Following the attack on Gradina, Serb Forces took part in operations in the villages of Borići, Barice and Hrastovac.³⁹³⁶

1132. On 7 June 1992, the Command of the Eastern Bosnia Corps issued an order to secure Milići, protect the Milići–Vlasenica route, and “mop up” the Birač territory of remaining enemy forces.³⁹³⁷ **(#Legal and obligatory#! So what? That was his duty and obligation, particularly since these “enemy forces” used to kill the Boxite workers and drivers. The entire year, until april 1993, the Birac area had over 30,000 of the Muslim combatants, which acted on every single order from Sarajevo, attacking the Serb**

³⁹²⁶ [REDACTED].

³⁹²⁷ [REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 2694; [REDACTED].

³⁹²⁸ [REDACTED]. Some of these individuals were listed as employees of the SJB in August 1992. P6382 (Public Auditing Service confirmation of debit; Payroll of Vlasenica SJB, August 1992).

³⁹²⁹ [REDACTED].

³⁹³⁰ [REDACTED]. The Chamber places no weight on Svetozar Andrić's testimony that he did not believe that the army participated in this operation given that he himself had not heard of the operation. Svetozar Andrić, T. 41673–41674 (22 July 2013).

³⁹³¹ [REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 2694.

³⁹³² [REDACTED].

³⁹³³ [REDACTED]; D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 60–61.

³⁹³⁴ [REDACTED].

³⁹³⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 2694. [REDACTED].

³⁹³⁶ [REDACTED].

³⁹³⁷ P5400 (Order of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 7 June 1992), pp. 1–2. But see Svetozar Andrić, T. 41669–41670 (22 July 2013) (testifying that “cleansing” involved dealing with both Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb paramilitaries). The Chamber notes that Andrić's evidence was marked by contradictions and indicators of insincerity which undermine the reliability of his evidence in this regard.

forces, but also Serb companies and civilians. See, for instance, D1621, of 16 Dec. 1992, an order for the responsibility of villages in the zone of Zvornik-Vlasenica:



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Date: 16 December 1992
Z V O R N I K

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To: ALL UNITS

Order on the zones of responsibility
of the battalions of the armed forces
of Zvornik municipality

In order to carry out combat assignments without interruption and to delineate the zones of responsibility of the units, I hereby issue the following

ORDER:

1.- The zones of responsibility of the units are to be arranged as specified below. The unit commanders are personally accountable to me for carrying this out.

The 1st Battalion is accountable to me for the following parts of the free territory:

Kovačevići – Kiseljak – Jasenice – Pađine – Šepak;

Sapna – Donja Sapna – Šetići – Petkovci – Karakaj.

Battalion KM /Command Post/: Gornja Sapna village – Kruškovac.

The Battalion Commander is to issue an order specifying the responsibilities of the company commanders.

The 2nd Battalion is accountable to me for the following part of the free territory:

To the left: Zaseok – Jeftina Kuća /Jefta's house/;

To the right: Mededa – 621 – Pandurice.

The Battalion Commander is to issue an order regulating the responsibilities of the company commanders. The platoon in Baljkovica is to be resubordinated to the commander

KM: Mededa village

/of/ the 2nd Battalion and the platoon is to be /established/ as a reconnaissance platoon of the 2nd Battalion.

The zone of responsibility of the 3rd Battalion is as follows:

Šarci – M/ala/ Jelica – Goduš - Skakovica.

KM: Goduš village. The Commander is to issue an order specifying the responsibilities of the companies.

The zone of responsibility of the 4th Battalion is as follows:

To the left: Mlin – Stražba; to the right: Kosa – Jeftina Kuća.

Battalion KM: Kraljevići village.

clearly indicating that the village of commander Kraljević – Kraljevići, was under the permanent surveillance and control of the Muslim forces. Or D1621, p.2:

The zone of responsibility of the 5th Battalion is as follows:

To the left: Zečija Kosa – Mirkova Kuća /Mirko's house/; to the right: Džakići – Stražba.

The zone of responsibility of the Sapna Independent Company is as follows:

To the left: Gornja Sapna – Kruškovac – Stražba; to the right: Mlin – Sapna – Stražba.

2.- In coordinated action with the intervention platoon from Sapna, the *Hap* Intervention Platoon is to conduct continuous reconnaissance along the Sapna – Stražba – Tabla axis.

- The *Sultan Fatih* Company and the Kraljevići Intervention Platoon are to conduct reconnaissance along the Kraljevići – Jeftina Kuća – Zecovi (Vrla Strana) axis.

- Until its transfer to the 1st Battalion, the *Džamijski Golubovi* /Mosque Doves/ Company is to conduct reconnaissance along the Šarci – Brda (Ketuša) Rožanj – Spasojevići (Brdo in front of the relay station) axis; after its transfer to the 1st Battalion, it is to conduct reconnaissance/ along the Đulići – Boškovići – Džakići – Klisa, Džakići – Jusići axis together with the *Kobre* /Cobras/ and the *Zmaj od Bosne* /Dragon of Bosnia/.

- The Križevići Company 1, 2 /? platoons/ and the Nežuk manoeuvre platoon are to conduct reconnaissance along the axis in the direction of Križevići – Hajvaze – Potočani, Delići – Parlog – Kamenica.

- The manoeuvre company of the 3rd Battalion is to conduct continuous reconnaissance along the Goduš - the relay station Savići – Šarci – Brda – M. Jelica axis.

3.- The battalion and company commanders are personally accountable to me for the implementation of this Order.

COMMANDER OF THE ZVORNIK ARMED FORCES

Šemsudin M/Illegible/NOVIĆ

/stamped/

/signed/

(#Abuse of civilian settlements#! There is no mistake, the area was full of the Muslim armed units, and the Serb population was extremely jeopardized, and was entitled to defend. And Zvornik, allegedly under the Serb control as of 8 April 92, had its “Zvornik armed forces, commanded by “[Šemsudin], covering majority of the Zvornik and Vlasenica territory, while the Serbs controlled only about 40%, mainly the Serb settlements! Or see D#

1133. In early June 1992, the Special Police Platoon was ordered to return to Gradina where they burnt down the remaining non-Serb houses and then almost all Bosnian Muslim houses in the area were destroyed.³⁹³⁸ This second operation covered a larger area, including the Bosnian Muslim villages from Drum to the north.³⁹³⁹ The Special Police Platoon, members of the TO, SJB Milići, members of the VRS and local Bosnian Serbs took part in the operation.³⁹⁴⁰ Kraljević explicitly ordered the units to torch all Bosnian Muslim houses because “you can see for yourselves that if we don’t set fire to these houses, they’ll return later on”.³⁹⁴¹ **(#Abuse of civilian objects#! The houses had been used as a military objects, a fortice, and there was a military necessity to quit this stronghold of the Muslim army...see the list of their armed units in the region!)** After this operation, the area of Gradina was “ethnically pure” with nobody living in the Bosnian Muslim

³⁹³⁸ [REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 2694.

³⁹³⁹ [REDACTED]. See also P6458 (Report of 1st Birač Infantry Brigade, 30 October 1993), pp. 3. For evidence specific to the village of Drum, see Scheduled Incident A.15.1.

³⁹⁴⁰ [REDACTED].

³⁹⁴¹ [REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 2694.

villages.³⁹⁴² Thereafter, approximately 500 Bosnian Muslims, including many women and children, were captured and transported to Sušica camp or sent to the bus station or football field in Vlasenica for transportation to Kladanj.³⁹⁴³ **(#Legal and obligatory#! The removing civilians from the combat zone was an obligation. Later, the civilians decided to go on the Muslim controlled territory. Remember, Mr. Izetbegovic ordered to Redzic, the President of Executive Board, to procrastinate negotiations so long as needed to have as many Muslims to leave Vlasenica as possible. And Susica was a reception center, which doesn't mean that there was no abuses and criminal conduct, but certainly out of any knowledge, let alone tolerance of the authorities. However, any chamber would have to establish whether there were combats going on, whether the removal of civilians was justified and necessary, or was it a criminal act! Without that fact established, this matter is not properly "adjudicated"!)**

1134. The Special Police Platoon proceeded to "cleansing" the villages of Drum, Piškavica, Alihodžići and Pustoše.³⁹⁴⁴ **(#Abuse of civilian settlements#! Why we don't see whether it was a "cleansing" of civilians, or those villages were militarised and the "cleansing" meant what it always meant in the military sense?)** Local Bosnian Serbs were involved in the looting of Bosnian Muslim villages.³⁹⁴⁵ **(#Individuals, not units#! An "opportunity" to loot is always used by a certain kind of persons, as we can see it during hurricanes and other natural disasters, but certainly not with a knowledge of authorities.)** During these operations, Serb Forces, including the Special Police Platoon, took-over the Bosnian Muslim villages of Dragaši, Dzemat, Drum, Alihadžić, Piskavice, Pijuć, Gradina, Turalići, Zaklopača, Kašaha, Nedeljište, Peševina, Hodžići, Mršići, Smajići, and Kuljančić.³⁹⁴⁶ **(#Abuses of civilian settlements#! Still, there is no a word about from whom the Serbs "took-over" those villages, whether there was fights and casualties, have those villages handed over their weapons or not! This is not a "whole truth", this is an ambiguous "finding" tended to be understood on the President's account! What the President has to do with the way the embattled communities dealt with their mutual skirmishes? The President issued all the necessary orders, but no one can prevent a jeopardized population not to defend, and not to secure against an enemy attacks!)** Following these take-overs the non-Serb inhabitants escaped to Kladanj, Cerska and other villages while the others were captured and taken to Sušica camp.³⁹⁴⁷ Some Bosnian Muslim men who were captured were interrogated and beaten.³⁹⁴⁸ **(#Interrogation#! The mere fact that they had been interrogated confirms that there was problem with their conduct, not with their religion. Either they had been combatant, or a combatants with criminal doings, or there was a need to disclose whereabouts of other armed units... Certainly, if there was beating during interrogations, it was contrary to all that the Accused ordered, but not to forget that these people knew each other very well, and had their private "accounts" which doesn't justify incidents, but helps us to understand whether a beatings came from the**

³⁹⁴² [REDACTED].

³⁹⁴³ [REDACTED]. For evidence on detention at Sušica camp, see Scheduled Detention Facility C.25.3.

³⁹⁴⁴ [REDACTED].

³⁹⁴⁵ [REDACTED].

³⁹⁴⁶ [REDACTED]. See also P6459 (Map of Vlasenica); P6458 (Report of 1st Birač Infantry Brigade, 30 October 1993), p. 7.

³⁹⁴⁷ [REDACTED].

³⁹⁴⁸ [REDACTED]. While the Chamber also received evidence that Bosnian Muslims were killed during the attacks on Bosnian Muslim villages, with the exception of the alleged killings in the villages of Drum and Zaklopača, it notes that these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13. [REDACTED]; P3242 (Map of Vlasenica showing locations of exhumation sites); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibko Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 54–55; [REDACTED].

system, or not. Not a single act or document, or law provision, or order facilitated an opportunity for beatings!)

a. Scheduled Incident A.15.2

1135. The Prosecution alleges that at least 60 people were killed in the village of Zaklopača on 16 May 1992.

1136. Zaklopača was a Bosnian Muslim village located approximately six kilometres from Vlasenica.³⁹⁴⁹ The village was the only Bosnian Muslim village in the area and was surrounded by Bosnian Serb villages.³⁹⁵⁰

1137. In the lead-up to the attack on the village, reserve soldiers gathered and there was a large number of soldiers in the area; they initially wore the regular JNA uniforms but later added “Četnik insignias” and cockades.³⁹⁵¹ Out of fear, Bosnian Muslims left their homes and started hiding in the woods at night.³⁹⁵²

1138. Approximately 10 to 15 days before the attack on Zaklopača, the village was visited by a delegation of Bosnian Serb leaders who demanded the surrender of weapons and assured the population of their security if the weapons were surrendered.³⁹⁵³ The licensed weapons held by Bosnian Muslims in the village were also confiscated by Bosnian Serb police.³⁹⁵⁴ (#Distorted#! Why it is skipped that the illegal weapons hadne been reported and handed over? A licenced weapon couldn't been hidden, because the authorities have a register of it, but the illegal weapons were much more dangerous, and if kept, it was not for a hunting, but to attack the JNA and later the Serbs. On 16 May 1992 there sill was the JNA in the area, and this communication-road was a route for the withdrawal of the JNA. Remember that until this moment there had been a carnage of the JNA soldiers in Sarajevo on 2 and 3 May, on 3 May in Hranca, a suburb of Bratunac, and in Tuzla on 15 May. What army in these circumstances would afford itself to have ambushes and attacks massacring it's soldiers in a withdrawal? And what the President has to do with that? #All before VRS#!)

1139. On 3 May 1992, the nearby Bosnian Muslim village of Žutica was burned down and a bus full of people who had been expelled from the village following the attack by Serb Forces was brought to Zaklopača.³⁹⁵⁵ Many of the men from Žutica had been severely

³⁹⁴⁹ P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), para. 2; P418 (Witness statement of Mersudina Saim-Hodžić dated 24 May 2002), p. 2; P6459 (Map of Vlasenica). See also D3048 (Witness statement of Božidar Trišić dated 24 February 2013), para. 3; D3050 (Map of Zaklopača marked by Božidar Trišić). There were a few Bosnian Serb houses on the outskirts of the village and overlooking hills.

³⁹⁵⁰ P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), para. 3; P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 56; P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 50 (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18088 (31 August 2011) (closed session); P418 (Witness statement of Mersudina Saim-Hodžić dated 24 May 2002), p. 2; Zoran Jovanović, T. 34206 (21 February 2013).

³⁹⁵¹ P418 (Witness statement of Mersudina Saim-Hodžić dated 24 May 2002), p. 2. See also D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), para. 22; P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), para. 26; Sead Hodžić, T. 18428 (6 September 2011).

³⁹⁵² Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*, T. 5062; P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), para. 23.

³⁹⁵³ P418 (Witness statement of Mersudina Saim-Hodžić dated 24 May 2002), pp. 2–3; see Adjudicated Fact 2697. See also P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 50 (under seal).

³⁹⁵⁴ P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), paras. 16–18. But see D3048 (Witness statement of Božidar Trišić dated 24 February 2013), para. 30 (stating that both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims were asked for their weapons).

³⁹⁵⁵ P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), para. 24; Sead Hodžić, T. 18433, 18450 (6 September 2011). But see D3048 (Witness statement of Božidar Trišić dated 24 February 2013), paras. 6–7 (stating that the Bosnian Muslims from Žutica were

beaten. They described how Serb Forces had attacked the village, arrested men, and raped women, which caused fear.³⁹⁵⁶

1140. On 15 May 1992, the Birač Brigade issued an order for its units to take co-ordinated action with the Birač TO to “restore control over the territory”.³⁹⁵⁷ **(A #legal and obligatory# move. The TO was still under the JNA control! This also indicates that till that moment, the JNA didn’t have control over the territory, while on a same day there was an attack on the JNA column in Tuzla, and 10 days earlier in Hranca, Bratunac!)** On 16 May 1992, Serb Forces entered in four or five army vehicles and one police car and attacked the village.³⁹⁵⁸ Some of the soldiers had long beards and wore cockades on their uniforms; others covered their faces with masks.³⁹⁵⁹ **(#Masks, insignias# #Before VRS#! Those were neither the JNA soldiers, because this both, beards and masks were forbidden, while at that moment there still was no the VRS, which also forbade cocardes and pentagram stars as the ideological insignias!)** After a soldier fired a signal flare, the attack on the village commenced with extensive automatic gunfire.³⁹⁶⁰ There was no organised defence in the village to this attack.³⁹⁶¹ **(This is a matter of surprise, but the main question is: whether the village was militarised and armed, or not?)**

1141. Sead Hodžić passed the house of Murat Hreljić and saw a body with multiple bullet wounds lying in a pool of blood and another body in the garden.³⁹⁶² Hodžić saw five other Bosnian Muslims being shot and killed.³⁹⁶³ Hodžić saw other bodies as he passed through the village and was warned by Elvira Hreljić to run away because the Serb Forces were

fleeing from Bosnian Muslim forces, who were attempting to mobilise them). The Chamber notes that Trišić was contradicted during his cross-examination on this issue and does not rely on his evidence in this regard. Božidar Trišić, T. 34494–34496, 34509 (28 February 2013).

³⁹⁵⁶ P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), para. 24; Sead Hodžić, T. 18433 (6 September 2011). While the witness also testified about reports of killings in this village, these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. *See* fn. 13.

³⁹⁵⁷ D3890 (Order of Birač Brigade, 15 May 1992), pp. 1, 3; D3886 (Witness statement of Svetozar Andrić dated 16 July 2013), para. 2.

³⁹⁵⁸ P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), paras. 27–28; P418 (Witness statement of Mersudina Saim-Hodžić dated 24 May 2002), p. 3; *see* Adjudicated Fact 2698. *See also* P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 49 (under seal). The Serb Forces included members of the police, men wearing JNA uniforms, camouflage uniforms and civilian clothes. Defence witnesses testified that this incident was not a planned operation and was an example of both sides taking revenge, that it must have been an attack by “outsiders”, and that both Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim houses were shot at. D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 63–65, 99. *See also* D2944 (Witness statement of Zoran Durmić dated 12 February 2013), paras. 30–32. The Chamber does not find the evidence of these witnesses to be of any weight in this regard given that it is based on unfounded speculation. For example Durmić acknowledged that he did not see the incident himself and he heard rumours. Zoran Durmić, T. 33863 (18 February 2013). Savkić refused to explain how no Bosnian Serbs were killed in Zaklopača if it was an attack on both ethnicities, *see* Tomislav Savkić, T. 33787–33791 (15 February 2013). **(No matter who was engaged, this all was under the JNA auspice, because there was no the VRS yet. A surprise in action is a probable reason why the Serb casualties missed! #Before VRS#!)**

³⁹⁵⁹ P418 (Witness statement of Mersudina Saim-Hodžić dated 24 May 2002), p. 3.

³⁹⁶⁰ P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), paras. 28–30.

³⁹⁶¹ Sead Hodžić, T. 18435 (6 September 2011). Trišić testified that there was confusion as to who was attacking the village and he saw Bosnian Serbs firing into the woods from their houses. He also stated that it was a spontaneous attack. He testified that the police did not participate in the attack, the authorities did not know about the incident, and he heard that there was an investigation into the incident. D3048 (Witness statement of Božidar Trišić dated 24 February 2013), paras. 12, 14–15, 23, 26; Božidar Trišić, T. 34511 (28 February 2013). However, the Chamber does not find his evidence to be reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that Trišić’s evidence was marked by inconsistencies, which undermined his evidence in this respect. For example on cross-examination, he acknowledged that this was his guess and did not know who the attackers were and acknowledged that while he did not see police participating in the attack it could have happened. Božidar Trišić, T. 34505–34508 (28 February 2013).

³⁹⁶² P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), para. 36. Hodžić stated that he learned that the body was Salim Avdić’s. However, there is no indication of how the witness found out and the Chamber does not place any weight on this aspect of his evidence.

³⁹⁶³ P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), para. 22. The people identified as having been shot were Rifet Hodžić, Mujo Hodžić, Salko Salihović, Bajro Salihović, and Becir Hodžić; Sead Hodžić, T. 18462 (6 September 2011). *See also* P418 (Witness statement of Mersudina Saim-Hodžić dated 24 May 2002), p. 3.

going through the village and killing all the men.³⁹⁶⁴ Sead Hodžić was shot at as he ran away.³⁹⁶⁵ Haso Hodžić was caught by two soldiers and brought back to his home, questioned about whether he had any weapons, and when he denied having any weapons he was shot and killed by a soldier.³⁹⁶⁶ (92bis!) Sporadic gunfire continued from different places in the village. Serb Forces then stole some cars and withdrew.³⁹⁶⁷

1142. Mersudina Saim-Hodžić saw many bodies lying around the village and estimated that approximately 80 people were killed that day.³⁹⁶⁸ When the survivors returned they saw the bodies of at least 58 men and those of some women and children; they were all from Zaklopača.³⁹⁶⁹ Scattered in groups around the village, most of the bodies bore gunshot wounds through the mouth.³⁹⁷⁰ The Chamber notes at least two of those killed were members of an ABiH unit.³⁹⁷¹ **(#Combatants, or civilians#! A clear proof! How many others were the same, we don't know, but should be remembered that the ABiH soldiers fought without uniforms the entire 1992. Therefore, that wasn't an attack on a civil village! #Before the VRS!# Still, the President has nothing to do with it!# No Karadžić's liability!#)**

1143. After the incident, men wearing gas masks and protective equipment arrived in the village and used a mechanical digger, tractor, and trailer to dig a mass grave; they then

³⁹⁶⁴ P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), para. 36; Sead Hodžić, T. 18453 (6 September 2011). Trišić testified that (i) no Bosnian Muslims who stayed in their homes were killed and that only those who were outside or tried to flee were killed; (ii) he did not see police cars during the attack. D3048 (Witness statement of Božidar Trišić dated 24 February 2013), para. 29; Božidar Trišić, T. 34505–34507, 34513 (28 February 2013). The Chamber does not consider that Trišić's evidence pertaining to whether he saw police cars to be significant. However, the Chamber does note his admission that Bosnian Muslims who were outside or tried to flee were killed. Savkić also testified that this incident was not a planned operation but acknowledged on cross-examination that this was his guess and did not know who the attackers were.

³⁹⁶⁵ P3284 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), paras. 37, 39 (under seal); P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), para. 38; Sead Hodžić, T. 18453 (6 September 2011) (private session).

³⁹⁶⁶ P418 (Witness statement of Mersudina Saim-Hodžić dated 24 May 2002), p. 3; Sead Hodžić, T. 18454 (6 September 2011).

³⁹⁶⁷ P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), para. 41; Sead Hodžić, T. 18454 (6 September 2011). See also D3048 (Witness statement of Božidar Trišić dated 24 February 2013), para. 18.

³⁹⁶⁸ P418 (Witness statement of Mersudina Saim-Hodžić dated 24 May 2002), p. 4; see Adjudicated Fact 2698. See also Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5062, 5104; Izet Redžić, T. 17681 (23 August 2011) (testifying that 83 civilians were killed); P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), para. 43; Božidar Trišić, T. 34496 (28 February 2013) (testifying that over 60 of his Bosnian Muslim neighbours in the village were killed by gun-fire). [REDACTED]. Osmanović was told that approximately 80 people were killed in Zaklopača and that four houses had been burned. P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 55; Ibro Osmanović, T. 17995 (29 August 2011).

³⁹⁶⁹ P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), paras. 43, 45 (stating that 28 members of his family were killed in this attack). The bodies Sead Hodžić saw and identified included Ibrahim Hodžić, Huso Hodžić, Mersudin Hodžić (16 years old), Hamdija Hodžić, Haso Hodžić, Bećir Hodžić, Ibri Hodžić, Safet Hodžić, Muhamed Hodžić, Ibiš Hodžić, Đulsuma Hodžić (a woman), Behadil Hodžić, Fadil Hodžić, Ismeta Hodžić (a woman), Sedin Hodžić (16 years old), Sadmir Hodžić (12 years old), Admir Hodžić (9 years old), Admira Hodžić (4 or 5 years old), Fail Hodžić's wife, Mujo Hodžić, Salih Hodžić (10 years old), Enisa Hodžić (a woman), Ismet Hodžić, Rifet Hodžić, Meho Hodžić, Admira Hodžić (12 years old), Asim Hodžić (3 years old), Anesa Hodžić (7 years old), Alija Hamidović, Osman Hamidović, Bego Hamidović, Hašim Hamidović, Asim Hamidović, Senaid Hamidović, Hamed Hamidović, Fata Hamidović (a woman), Zada Hamidović (a woman), Murat Hreljić, Muradif Hreljić, Salko Salihović, Bajro Salihović, Mujaga Salihović, Osman Salihović, Fatima Salihović, Edin Salihović (13 years old), Edina Salihović (10 years old), Nedžad Salihović (13 years old), Mustafa Mahmutović, Šaban Avdić, Mustafa Avdić, Salim Avdić, Raif Dugalić, Šaha Dugalić, Mustafa Berbić, Fatima Berbić, Junuz Selimović, Adem Selimović, and Salih Selimović. Mersudina Saim-Hodžić also identified 59 people who were killed. P418 (Witness statement of Mersudina Saim-Hodžić dated 24 May 2002), pp. 5–6. In addition to some of those listed above she also identified the following individuals: Makbula Hodžić, Velida Hodžić, Ades Hodžić, Adesa Hodžić, Sajma Hodžić, Senahid Hamidović, Asko Hamidović, Edina Hamidović, and a female named Hamidović. Of these named individuals, 50 were identified by Mašović as having been exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 55–57. See also P4856 (Appendix B to the Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief filed on 18 May 2009 marked by Amor Mašović), pp. 8–9.

³⁹⁷⁰ P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), para. 44.

³⁹⁷¹ D2942 (Request of ABiH 1st Žepa Brigade, 13 February 1995). The Chamber notes that Savkić's evidence with respect to whether those who were killed in the village were members of an armed Bosnian Muslim group is equivocal and thus not of much weight. See also Tomislav Savkić, T. 33823–33831 (15 February 2013); D2943 (Recommendation sent to Alija Izetbegović, 23 June 1995), p. 6.

wrapped the bodies in sheets and threw them into the grave.³⁹⁷² The bodies were moved from the first grave to another location after Bosnian Serbs moved into the village.³⁹⁷³

1144. Very few males from the village survived the attack.³⁹⁷⁴ The villagers who had survived gathered together and left in trucks to Gradina **(#Abuse of civilian settlements#! Gradina was mentioned as a village that had been under attack, but obviously it was a stronghold, so fortified and secure to shelter others!)** with two of the wounded women taken to Vlasenica hospital.³⁹⁷⁵ **(Under the Serb control!!!)** One of the trucks was stopped at a Bosnian Serb check-point where three Bosnian Muslims were arrested, taken away, and never seen again while the women were allowed to head to Gradina.³⁹⁷⁶ The Chamber has insufficient evidence to conclude whether or not Serb Forces killed the three Bosnian Muslims who disappeared during the transportation.

1145. Bosnian Muslim survivors from Zaklopača stayed in Gradina until it was also attacked by Serb Forces.³⁹⁷⁷ They then took shelter for a few days in the woods; a large number of women and children surrendered to Bosnian Serbs and were taken to Sušica camp before being transferred to Cerska and Kladanj.³⁹⁷⁸

1146. Considering the above, the Chamber finds that at least 60 people, including women and children, were killed in the village of Zaklopača by Serb Forces on or about 16 May 1992. While at least two of those killed were ABiH soldiers, the Chamber found that (i) many of the victims were women and young children; (ii) some of the victims were shot while trying to escape or after they had been captured by Serb Forces; and (iii) most of those killed had gun shot wounds through the mouth. The Chamber therefore finds beyond reasonable doubt that those killed by Serb Forces were civilians or had been rendered *hors de combat*.

b. Scheduled Incident A.15.1

1147. The Prosecution alleges that at least 20 men were killed in the village of Drum on or about 2 June 1992.

1148. Drum was a Bosnian Muslim village in the commune of Piskavica³⁹⁷⁹ and was surrounded by a number of Bosnian Serb villages.³⁹⁸⁰ Armed Bosnian Muslims had established a check-point in the village at the beginning of 1992 and there was shooting

³⁹⁷² P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), paras. 51–54.

³⁹⁷³ Sead Hodžić, T. 18435 (6 September 2011). [REDACTED].

³⁹⁷⁴ P418 (Witness statement of Mersudina Saim-Hodžić dated 24 May 2002), p. 4.

³⁹⁷⁵ P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), para. 46; P418 (Witness statement of Mersudina Saim-Hodžić dated 24 May 2002), p. 6.

³⁹⁷⁶ P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), para. 47. The people who were taken away were identified as Meho Hamidović, Edin Hamidović (10 years old), and Pašan Selimović. See also P418 (Witness statement of Mersudina Saim-Hodžić dated 24 May 2002), p. 5 (stating that Meho Hamidović and Edin Hamidović were killed).

³⁹⁷⁷ For evidence relating to the attack on Gradina, see paras. 1129–1130.

³⁹⁷⁸ P3285 (Witness statement of Sead Hodžić dated 24 May 2000), paras. 53–55; Sead Hodžić, T. 18433–18434 (6 September 2011); P418 (Witness statement of Mersudina Saim-Hodžić dated 24 May 2002), p. 4.

³⁹⁷⁹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 34 (under seal); P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), para. 2 (under seal); KDZ603, T. 18136 (1 September 2011); P6459 (Map of Vlasenica); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibri Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 93; Ibri Osmanović, T. 17994–17995 (29 August 2011). There were only two Bosnian Serb houses on the outskirts of the village.

³⁹⁸⁰ P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), para. 2 (under seal); KDZ603, T. 18136 (1 September 2011). See also Zoran Jovanović, T. 34206 (21 February 2013).

from the village.³⁹⁸¹ **(#Abuse of the civilian settlement#! Shooting against the JNA Command and Serb civilians!!!)**

1149. In late May 1992, Bosnian Serb police confiscated a few hunting weapons held by Bosnian Muslims in the village.³⁹⁸² Houses of Bosnian Muslims were searched multiple times by Bosnian Serbs who claimed to be searching for weapons, but the searches had the effect of intimidating the population.³⁹⁸³ Bosnian Serb police went through the village and used a megaphone to tell the Bosnian Muslims that they had to hand over all their weapons or else their homes would be burned down and the men would be arrested.³⁹⁸⁴

1150. On 2 June 1992, Serb Forces attacked Drum.³⁹⁸⁵ Serb Forces first entered the village and, at approximately 7 a.m., when an APC with a heavy calibre machine gun opened fire, the soldiers attacked the village.³⁹⁸⁶ While some Bosnian Muslim villagers may have had weapons, there was no armed resistance to the attack by Serb Forces on Drum.³⁹⁸⁷ **(#Legal and obligatory#! Because of surprise, not because there wouldn't be resistance. Why the Muslim combatants from Drum would fire against the town of Vlasenica when they decided, and why wouldn't fire when attacked, if it wasn't a surprise. But, anyway, what does it do with the President? This is a civil war in one part of Vlasenica, because one community rested armed and provoked by firing, and the other community demanded disarmament, and the two communities resolved the dispute the worst way, but nobody forced them to it. Who was the President to deny the population their right to defend themselves? According to the Law of All-people's Defence, if the state didn't protect them, they were entitled to defend themselves!)** The Special Police Platoon patrolled the village in search of Bosnian Muslim men who may have hidden in houses and shot at them whether or not they were armed.^{3988 (3945)}

1151. Soldiers dragged people out of their homes and killed them in plain sight with machine guns.³⁹⁸⁹ More than 20 Bosnian Muslim males were killed in a few minutes with

³⁹⁸¹ Ibro Osmanović, T. 17994–17996 (29 August 2011). See also Mane Đurić, T. 35005–35007 (7 March 2013); D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 58–59; D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 43; Milenko Stanić, T. 34020 (19 February 2013); KDZ033, T. 18083 (31 August 2011) (closed session); Svetozar Andrić, T. 41671–41672 (22 July 2013). In the Accused's submission, the village of Drum was a legitimate military target. Defence Final Brief, para. 1436. While the Chamber finds that there were armed Bosnian Muslims in Drum, the evidence accepted by the Chamber does not support the conclusion that the whole village was a legitimate military target or justifies the manner in which the attack against the village was carried out. In this regard the Chamber does not find the evidence of witnesses Đurić, Savkić, Stanić, and Andrić about the extent to which Bosnian Muslims were armed to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 3791, 3813, and 3894 with respect to the relevant witnesses.

³⁹⁸² P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), para. 6 (under seal); KDZ603, T. 18135, 18145 (1 September 2011).

³⁹⁸³ P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), para. 6 (under seal).

³⁹⁸⁴ P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), para. 6 (under seal).

³⁹⁸⁵ P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), para. 7 (under seal); KDZ603, T. 18145 (1 September 2011); see Adjudicated Fact 2695.

³⁹⁸⁶ P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), paras. 8–10 (under seal); see Adjudicated Fact 2695.

³⁹⁸⁷ KDZ603, T. 18135, 18137–18138, 18157 (1 September 2011). The Chamber notes that KDZ603 when questioned further stated that he did not know about or see the distribution of weapons in Drum. KDZ603's testimony is qualified based on what he knew, and does not rule out that there were weapons held by Bosnian Muslims in Drum at some point before the attack on the village which he was not aware about. The Accused submits that the credibility of KDZ603 is questionable given his inconsistent testimony with respect to the incident. Defence Final Brief, confidential, para. 1436 citing to P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), para. 5 (under seal); KDZ603, T. 18143, 18145 (1 September 2011). The Chamber does not see any merit in the Accused's submission. The Chamber has had regard to the totality of KDZ603's evidence, including the references cited by the Accused, and does not consider that there are any inconsistencies which would affect the credibility of this witness with respect to his evidence pertaining to this incident.

³⁹⁸⁸ [REDACTED].

³⁹⁸⁹ P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), paras. 10–13, 15 (under seal); KDZ603, T. 18147–18148, 18152–18153 (1 September 2011). Those taken out and killed in this manner included Hadžo Malešević, Fadil Salihović, Meho Jahić and his son Ekrem Jahić.

only three male residents surviving the attack.³⁹⁹⁰ The women and children were gathered and held at gunpoint before being sent by bus to Sušica.³⁹⁹¹ As the villagers were ordered onto the bus they faced a “barrage of insults” as to their “Muslim ethnicity”.³⁹⁹² The villagers were taken to Sušica under the guard of the reserve police.³⁹⁹³ After this date there were no Bosnian Muslims left in Drum.³⁹⁹⁴

1152. While Osmanović was detained at the prison building in Vlasenica he was taken with three other Bosnian Muslim detainees to Drum to bury 22 bodies.³⁹⁹⁵ Osmanović knew four of the deceased men personally³⁹⁹⁶ and observed that all but one of the bodies had a single gunshot wound between the eyes.³⁹⁹⁷ Osmo Hodžić had been shot in the chest.³⁹⁹⁸ All the victims were Bosnian Muslims between the ages of 18 to 65 and were wearing civilian clothes.³⁹⁹⁹ The bodies had been arranged next to each other in front of the local bar, which was owned by a Bosnian Muslim.⁴⁰⁰⁰ The guards instructed Osmanović to search the bodies for valuables and documents before they were loaded onto a tractor and taken to the Muslim cemetery near the Boksit stadium and buried in a hole.⁴⁰⁰¹ Lime was poured over the bodies before they were covered.⁴⁰⁰²

1153. Considering the above, the Chamber finds that at least 20 Bosnian Muslim men in the village of Drum were killed by Serb Forces on or about 2 June 1992.

6. Scheduled Incident B.18.4

³⁹⁹⁰ See Adjudicated Facts 2695, 2696; P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011) (under seal), para. 17; KDZ603, T. 18151 (1 September 2011). [REDACTED]. Defence witnesses testified *inter alia* (i) that they were not aware of the incident; (ii) that those who carried out the attack acted independently; and (iii) that even if they had heard about the incident they were unsure whether the Bosnian Muslims were armed or had provoked the attack. Svetozar Andrić, T. 41672 (22 July 2013); D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 37; Mane Đurić, T. 35082 (7 March 2013); D3853 (Witness statement of Zvonko Bajagić dated 5 July 2013), para. 26. The Chamber does not find the evidence of these witnesses to be reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its credibility assessments for the relevant witnesses in fns. 3791 and 3894. In addition the Chamber notes that the evidence of Bajagić was also marked by contradictions, evasiveness and indicators that he was not forthright in his testimony in this regard.

³⁹⁹¹ See Adjudicated Fact 2696. The surviving three male villagers were also transferred to Sušica. See also P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), paras. 12, 14–16 (under seal); KDZ603, T. 18148 (1 September 2011).

³⁹⁹² P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), para. 21 (under seal); KDZ603, T. 18147 (1 September 2011).

³⁹⁹³ P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), paras. 19–21 (under seal); P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), para. 24 (under seal); KDZ603, T. 18159 (1 September 2011).

³⁹⁹⁴ KDZ603, T. 18158 (1 September 2011).

³⁹⁹⁵ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 93–95. For evidence on detention at the Vlasenica prison building, see Scheduled Detention Facility C.25.2.

³⁹⁹⁶ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 93.

³⁹⁹⁷ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 93. KDZ603 saw approximately 20 bodies in Drum and was able to positively identify the bodies of Goro Salihović, Braco Salihović, Osmo Hodžić, Nedžad Hodžić, Jasmin Kičić, the brother of Jasmin Kičić, Huso Aličević, Meho Jahić, Ekrem Jahić, Hadžo Malešević, Fadil Salihović. P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), paras. 22–23 (under seal); KDZ603, T. 18132, 18138, 18152 (1 September 2011). The bodies of Osmo Hodžić, Huso Aličević, Meho Jahić, Ekrem Jahić and Fadil Salihović were identified by Mašović as having been exhumed from a mass grave, while Nedžad Hodžić was exhumed from an individual grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 51, 53–55. See also P4856 (Appendix B to the Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief filed on 18 May 2009 marked by Amor Mašović), p. 8.

³⁹⁹⁸ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 93.

³⁹⁹⁹ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 96.

⁴⁰⁰⁰ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 93.

⁴⁰⁰¹ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 93. The Chamber does not accept Đurić’s evidence that the Bosnian Serb police were requested to provide protection and ensured the proper burial of Bosnian Muslims killed in Drum. The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 3791 as to why Đurić’s evidence is not reliable in this regard. D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 44; Mane Đurić, T. 35006, 35030–35031 (7 March 2013). The Chamber does note however, that Đurić himself acknowledged that some of the victims were Bosnian Muslim civilians.

⁴⁰⁰² P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 93.

1154. The Prosecution alleges that at least 29 men were taken away from the Civil Defence Building and killed on the side of the road near the village of Nova Kasaba between May and June 1992.⁴⁰⁰³

1155. On 17 May 1992, Bosnian Muslims were taken from villages surrounding Bratunac and, in three full buses, were brought to Bratunac town. They were then transferred to Vlasenica.⁴⁰⁰⁴ They were loaded onto buses by Bosnian Serb police and accompanied by an armed guard in each bus and a police car.⁴⁰⁰⁵ After their arrival in Vlasenica, a group of Bosnian Serb soldiers approached the buses; they wore camouflage uniforms with balaclavas or stockings over their faces,⁴⁰⁰⁶ **(#Masks and insignias#! On 17 May this wasn't the VRS, nor the JNA, because this kind of disguise was not allowed!)** they also wore patches, including those of Arkan's men and of the White Eagles. The soldiers ordered all the men to line up in front of the buses.⁴⁰⁰⁷ The men were made to sing "Serbian nationalist songs" and to give the three-fingered Serbian salute and those who refused were beaten.⁴⁰⁰⁸ One of the detainees was kicked and beaten when questioned about a military backpack he was wearing.⁴⁰⁰⁹

1156. The elderly men in the group were sent back to the buses while approximately 34 men of military age and five minors were taken to the MUP prison and detained for several days.⁴⁰¹⁰ On arrival, the group was held in a small room and severely beaten.⁴⁰¹¹ Two of the men were taken back to the buses with the women, children and elderly who were taken to Kladanj.⁴⁰¹² **(These two men weren't found suspected on any crime, which means that there was differentiation, and not random detention)** The remaining Bosnian Muslims were beaten during the day and night with batons, tubes, and rifle butts by Bosnian Serb soldiers.⁴⁰¹³ **(#Masks and insignias#! The previous paragraph indicated a diversity of insignias, and now we see how weak is the formulation "Bosnian Serb Forces" and "Bosnian Serb soldiers")** They were not provided with any food or water until the second day.⁴⁰¹⁴

1157. On 21 May 1992, this group of Bosnian Muslims, with the exception of the five minors, was taken out by two policemen and told they would be exchanged.⁴⁰¹⁵ The detainees were asked to hand over all their personal belongings before being loaded onto a bus to be taken towards Nova Kasaba.⁴⁰¹⁶ One detainee was cursed and beaten "wildly" by

⁴⁰⁰³ The Prosecution submits that the evidence shows that these individuals were taken from the Vlasenica SJB building. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, fn. 807.

⁴⁰⁰⁴ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), paras. 15, 19–21, 24. For evidence on the transfer from Bratunac, see para. 763.

⁴⁰⁰⁵ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), paras. 19, 24.

⁴⁰⁰⁶ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 26.

⁴⁰⁰⁷ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 26.

⁴⁰⁰⁸ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 29, 160 (under seal).

⁴⁰⁰⁹ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 26; Suad Džafić, T. 18197 (1 September 2011).

⁴⁰¹⁰ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), paras. 27–28. See also P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 29 (under seal).

⁴⁰¹¹ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 29; Suad Džafić, T. 18197–18198 (1 September 2011).

⁴⁰¹² P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 29.

⁴⁰¹³ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), paras. 31, 68.

⁴⁰¹⁴ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 31.

⁴⁰¹⁵ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), paras. 33–34. One of the guards recognised by Suad Džafić was a Bosnian Serb from Bratunac named Nešo Zivanović. Suad Džafić, T. 18173, 18202 (1 September 2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 2701.

⁴⁰¹⁶ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), paras. 35–36. See also Adjudicated Fact 2701.

a soldier called “Makedonac” when he was found to have not handed over a wristwatch.⁴⁰¹⁷ **(“Makedonac” means that there still was a rests of the JNA)** As the Bosnian Muslims were waiting to leave, four cars with the insignia of a skull on their doors arrived and uniformed men, including a man named Pero Mitrović, got out.⁴⁰¹⁸ **(No skull was allowed either in the JNA, or in the VRS!)** There was also an armoured vehicle with soldiers parked near the bus, the soldiers entered the bus and made the Bosnian Muslims sing “Chetnik” songs.⁴⁰¹⁹ The bus was then led by the armoured vehicle and followed by the cars towards Bratunac.⁴⁰²⁰

1158. The column of vehicles stopped at the entrance to Nova Kasaba, and the soldiers got out of their vehicles; Makedonac told the detainees to get off the bus in groups of four or five.⁴⁰²¹ The detainees in the first group were killed on the spot as they got off the bus.⁴⁰²² The other groups of detainees were ordered to get off the bus and run across the fields where they were then shot with automatic rifles and a machine gun mounted on the armoured vehicle.⁴⁰²³ Suad Džafić was in the last group; he was hit by gunfire and wounded in four different parts of his body but survived.⁴⁰²⁴ Mitrović and Makedonac shot any survivors they found in the head.⁴⁰²⁵ As Mitrović and Makedonac got closer to Suad Džafić he could hear an argument which suggested that the execution should not have taken place on the main road. The soldiers were then ordered to leave immediately; this allowed Suad Džafić to escape.⁴⁰²⁶ Of the 29 Bosnian Muslim men who were killed, Suad Džafić was able to identify 21 relatives and neighbours.⁴⁰²⁷ The Milići SJB reported to CSB Sarajevo on 3 August 1992 about this incident and stated that the summary execution was carried out by the Vukovar Detachment, which was a paramilitary group.⁴⁰²⁸ **(Therefore, no official #“Serb Force”# participated, and the #official police reported properly#!)**

1159. The Chamber therefore finds that approximately 29 Bosnian Muslim men were taken from Vlasenica, on or about 21 May 1992 and killed by Serb Forces. **(#Abuse of the “Serb Forces” term#! This is a deeply unfair manner that the Chamber accepted the Prosecution’s formula that every Serb, no matter from Vukovar in Croatia, or Macedonian, was a “Serb Force”!)**

⁴⁰¹⁷ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 38; Suad Džafić, T. 18173, 18202–18203 (1 September 2011).

⁴⁰¹⁸ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), paras. 39–40.

⁴⁰¹⁹ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), paras. 41–42.

⁴⁰²⁰ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 43. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2701.

⁴⁰²¹ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), paras. 47–48; Suad Džafić, T. 18174–18175 (1 September 2011). *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2702.

⁴⁰²² P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), paras. 48–50. [REDACTED].

⁴⁰²³ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), paras. 49–51. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2702.

⁴⁰²⁴ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 50, 52.

⁴⁰²⁵ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 53. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2702.

⁴⁰²⁶ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), paras. 55–58, 66 (stating that Rahman Karić and Sado Muhić also survived).

⁴⁰²⁷ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), paras. 60–63, 65; Suad Džafić, T. 18204 (1 September 2011) (testifying that of the 32 men taken for execution, 29 were killed). The identified individuals are Mehmed Džafić, Ibro Džafić, Hamed Džafić, Osman Džafić, Fahrudin Džafić, Fejo Džafić, Mirsad Džafić, Huso Džafić, Samir Džafić, Šahin Suljić, Himzo Suljić, Izo Suljić, Suljo Suljić, Ramiz Karić, Arif Karić, Ismet Salihović, Ragib Salihović, Galib Ahmetović, Hidajet Alic, Ibro Suljagić, Alija Suljagić. Each of these 21 named individuals was identified as having been exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 95–96. *See also* P4856 (Appendix B to the Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief filed on 18 May 2009 marked by Amor Mašović), pp. 29–30; P3264 (Report of Milići SJB, 3 August 1992), pp. 1–2.

⁴⁰²⁸ P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 67; P3264 (Report of Milići SJB, 3 August 1992), pp. 1–2. While the report also suggested that the Milići SJB was unable to protect these people from the execution as the Vukovar Detachment was heavily armed, the Chamber places no weight on this attempt by the SJB to distance itself from the incident. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted the testimony of Džafić that he saw no attempts by the police to protect the detainees and in fact one policeman had said “[l]et me kill them all now.”

iii. Detention Facilities in Vlasenica

1. Scheduled Detention Facility C.25.1

1160. The Indictment refers to the use of SJB building in Vlasenica as a detention facility at least between May and July 1992.⁴⁰²⁹

a. Arrival of detainees and control over the detention facility

1161. The SJB building was located in the centre of Vlasenica.⁴⁰³⁰ The police officers who worked at the SJB building went from door to door, interrogating non-Serbs, bringing them to the SJB building and demanding money.⁴⁰³¹ Bosnian Muslims were arrested in their homes by reserve police officers and taken to the SJB building with no explanation as to the reason for their arrest.⁴⁰³²

1162. The first non-Serbs who were detained and interrogated at the SJB building were intellectuals, SDA members, and wealthy individuals. While some were detained for a couple of days, others were detained longer. **(#Interrogation#! #Lawful#! There must have been a reason to arrest, interrogate, release and some re-arrests. Unusually, after the first interrogatin and release the new interrogations gave a new evidence, which required a new arrest! The official police was doing it's job, and the Chamber even didn't indicate that those arrests and interrogations were unlawful. Such a way "opened" allegation suggests that all of it was unlawful!)** Some were released and re-arrested.⁴⁰³³ Members of the Vlasenica SJB were involved in interrogations including members of the Special Police Platoon.⁴⁰³⁴

1163. In May 1992, members of the Special Police Platoon were ordered by Kraljević to take all able-bodied men from the predominantly Bosnian Muslim suburb of Sušica to the SJB building to be questioned about weapons.⁴⁰³⁵ A total of 50 Bosnian Muslim men, including some elderly and underage boys were rounded up in this operation.⁴⁰³⁶

b. Conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

1164. Bosnian Muslims were detained and mistreated in a small cell of the SJB building by the Bosnian Serb police for several days.⁴⁰³⁷ **(#Deadly combination#: 92bis evidence,**

⁴⁰²⁹ The Prosecution submits that the evidence shows that the facility operated in May and June 1992. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B.

⁴⁰³⁰ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 99; P3219 (Aerial photograph of Vlasenica marked by Ibro Osmanović); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 163 (under seal); P3258 (Photograph of Vlasenica SJB); P6459 (Map of Vlasenica).

⁴⁰³¹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 166 (under seal); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 189.

⁴⁰³² P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 60–64, 189, 191; Ibro Osmanović, T. 17984, 17992 (29 August 2011); P3225 (List of Vlasenica SJB reserve workers in September 1992).

⁴⁰³³ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 165 (under seal).

⁴⁰³⁴ [REDACTED]. See also P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), para. 33 (under seal).

⁴⁰³⁵ [REDACTED].

⁴⁰³⁶ [REDACTED].

⁴⁰³⁷ **(3994)** P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 20, 163 (under seal); P3255 (Photograph inside of Vlasenica SJB); see Adjudicated Fact 2699. With respect to Adjudicated Fact 2699, Đurić testified that it was only in mid-May 1992 that effective control was established over the SJB building and that before then the SJB was unable to prevent paramilitary groups from entering the building. D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 67. The Chamber does not consider Đurić's evidence to be reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 3791.

Defense witnesses disregarded!# The Chamber dismissed the testimony of the high police official, see this fn. 3994, when stated that the police established full control over the SJB building only by mid-May. This is so logical, and so well-known that there was no reason to disbelieve him!) When Osmanović was detained in this cell, there were over 20 Bosnian Muslims, including some children, who were locked in these cramped conditions for three to four hours. 10 men were then taken to another room.⁴⁰³⁸ None of these individuals had taken part in military activities.⁴⁰³⁹ **(But, it had to be established through an interrogation. A possible mistreatment could have appear because of many non-professionals that had an access to the JSB before established full control!)**

1165. A number of reserve police officers were also involved in the mistreatment of Bosnian Muslim detainees at the SJB building.⁴⁰⁴⁰ Members of the Special Police Platoon were also allowed to enter the SJB building and were involved in the beating of the detainees.⁴⁰⁴¹ **(Who allowed anyone to beat the detainees? No other side of the story! All unilateral and biased! An evident presence of chaos and paramilitaries at the beginning of war! What does it have to do with the Accused! As the vast majority of charges are evidence and arguments against a civil war, and not against this President, who did everything to avoid the war!)** Detainees were taken out either in groups or individually for interrogations during which time they were beaten.⁴⁰⁴² They had their arms and legs tied and were beaten over the course of about 10 days with police batons, metal pipes, grips of guns, and metal chains.⁴⁰⁴³ Detainees were also cut on multiple places of their body with knives and in one case a detainee had salt rubbed into those wounds.⁴⁰⁴⁴

1166. While occasionally, the detainees were allowed to have food from their homes, they were frequently hungry.⁴⁰⁴⁵ On one occasion the detainees were given food and it was spoiled.⁴⁰⁴⁶ The detainees did not have any access to any medical care and the conditions of detention were poor.⁴⁰⁴⁷ While the detainees had access to water in the basement of the building, they were beaten en route.⁴⁰⁴⁸ The detainees did not have beds and slept on concrete tiles.⁴⁰⁴⁹ Osmanović described the atmosphere as one of “suffering, misery, of pain”.⁴⁰⁵⁰

c. Conclusion on conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

⁴⁰³⁸ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 65–68 (naming the other detainees as including Hasan Kuljančić and Dževad Topalović); Ibro Osmanović, T. 17986–17987 (29 August 2011).

⁴⁰³⁹ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 67.

⁴⁰⁴⁰ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 184–186, 189–191; P3224 (List of members of Vlasenica SJB reserve forces, 25 June 1992); P3225 (List of Vlasenica SJB reserve workers in September 1992); P3226 (List of Vlasenica SJB active workers in May 1992); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 164 (under seal).

⁴⁰⁴¹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 28 (under seal); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 71.

⁴⁰⁴² P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 68, 70.

⁴⁰⁴³ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 70, 78; *see* Adjudicated Fact 2699. The Chamber places no weight on Đurić’s evidence that some detainees assaulted inspectors during interviews and thus had to be “physically overpowered”. D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), paras. 45–47. The Chamber does not find this evidence to be plausible. The Chamber also refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 3791 in concluding that Đurić’s evidence in this regard was unreliable.

⁴⁰⁴⁴ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 77–78.

⁴⁰⁴⁵ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 79.

⁴⁰⁴⁶ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 79.

⁴⁰⁴⁷ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 79; *see* Adjudicated Fact 2699.

⁴⁰⁴⁸ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 79.

⁴⁰⁴⁹ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 79.

⁴⁰⁵⁰ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 79.

1167. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslim civilian men (#Combatants, or civilians# #Interrogation#! That wasn't established that these were a "civilian men", since there happened interrogations, after which some of them had been released. As far as it is concerned with the children and elderlies, it wasn't established whether they had been arrested, or moved to the SJB because couldn't stay at home, since the civilians were intended to move to Susica as a reception facility. Anyway, all of that has nothing to do with the President, or any other higher official, since the locals were doing due to their capabilities, professionalism and esteem of jeopardy. There must be kept in mind that throughout BiH there were a horrible examples of atrocities, mainly against the Serbs, and all of it was in media, which scared everyone in the vicinity of combats!) as well as some children and elderly, were arrested in their homes and detained at the Vlasenica SJB building in May 1992 by Serb Forces. The detainees were held in poor conditions which included lack of food, bedding, no medical care, and over-crowding. Detainees were subjected to beatings with batons, metal pipes, chains and other objects. Some detainees were cut with knives during their detention.

d. Scheduled Incident B.18.3

1168. The Indictment refers to the killing of one man in SJB building on or about 22 May 1992.

1169. On or about 22 May 1992, Džemal Ambešković, an ex-policeman who had helped organise the referendum for an independent BiH in Vlasenica,⁴⁰⁵¹ was pushed into a room, and other detainees saw his face and stomach were bruised.⁴⁰⁵² After some time, Stevan Mumović, who wore a "war police" patch, told Ambešković to get out of the room. As Ambešković stepped out of the room he was struck on the back of his head, he fell to the floor, and then a single pistol shot was heard.⁴⁰⁵³ After he was killed three of the detainees were ordered by a member of the reserve police force to "get out and load this shit", given a plastic bag, and ordered to load the body onto a van.⁴⁰⁵⁴ After the body was loaded onto the van, the detainees were beaten as they went up the stairs.⁴⁰⁵⁵

1170. The Chamber therefore finds that on or about 22 May 1992 a Bosnian Muslim man was killed by a member of the Serb Forces at the Vlasenica SJB building.

2. Scheduled Detention Facility C.25.2

⁴⁰⁵¹ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 72. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2700; P4856 (Appendix B to the Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief filed on 18 May 2009 marked by Amor Mašović), p. 29; P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 95 (identifying Džemal Ambešković as having been exhumed from an individual grave).

⁴⁰⁵² P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 72.

⁴⁰⁵³ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 73–74. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2700; [REDACTED]; P3260 (List of missing civilians in Vlasenica in 1992) (under seal). *But see* D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 68 (stating that nobody was killed at the SJB building). The Accused himself acknowledges that the evidence presented confirms that a man was killed at this facility on or about 22 May 1992 but asserts that no evidence was introduced to link this killing with anyone at the Republican level. Defence Final Brief, para. 1439.

⁴⁰⁵⁴ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 75–76; P3226 (List of Vlasenica SJB active workers in May 1992).

⁴⁰⁵⁵ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 76. The Chamber received evidence of other killings of individuals who had been detained at the facility. P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 164, 166 (under seal). The Chamber notes that these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. *See* fn. 13.

1171. The Indictment refers to the use of the Prison building in Vlasenica as a detention facility at least between June and July 1992.⁴⁰⁵⁶

a. Arrival of detainees and control over detention facility

1172. The prison in Vlasenica was close to the SJB building and the commander of the prison was a man named Branislav Sokanović; he was a police officer of the Vlasenica SJB.⁴⁰⁵⁷ The guards at the prison were Bosnian Serb police and included reserve police officers.⁴⁰⁵⁸

1173. Beginning in May 1992, Bosnian Muslims were arrested and detained for several days at the Vlasenica prison by Bosnian Serb police.⁴⁰⁵⁹ **(#Legal#! For “several days” could have been an entirely legal detention in accordance with the law. Even during peace there is provision that police could detain a suspect 72 hours before bringing him to a judge. In a war circumstances it was necessary, and depended on the capabilities of police, and their assumption of jeopardy! This is not sufficient to find that there were some detained, unless proven that it was unlawful! This has nothing to do with the President! Those policemen would die if made a mistake, and their families would die if they missed to bring in a potential killer! Even if the President or any other high official demanded, the police was entitled to rely on own assumptions!)** These included a group of approximately 30 non-Serb men from Bratunac and a significant number of other non-Serbs from Vlasenica.⁴⁰⁶⁰

b. Conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

1174. The Vlasenica prison was designed to hold approximately 20 to 50 detainees.⁴⁰⁶¹ Despite this capacity, about 150 Bosnian Muslim men were held in very poor conditions in five rooms of the Vlasenica prison.⁴⁰⁶² Osmanović was transferred to the Vlasenica prison on 2 June 1992 and was detained there until 18 June 1992.⁴⁰⁶³ On his arrival Osmanović was searched, stripped of his valuables, and placed in a cell with other Bosnian Muslim men.⁴⁰⁶⁴ **(A #usual procedure!#)**

⁴⁰⁵⁶ The Prosecution submits that the evidence shows that the facility operated in May and June 1992. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, p. 56.

⁴⁰⁵⁷ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibko Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 81–82, 99, 191; P3226 (List of Vlasenica SJB active workers in May 1992); P3219 (Aerial photograph of Vlasenica marked by Ibko Osmanović); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 85, 158 (under seal).

⁴⁰⁵⁸ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibko Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 190; P3225 (List of Vlasenica SJB reserve workers in September 1992); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 159 (under seal). *See also* D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 49.

⁴⁰⁵⁹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 20, 28–29, 159 (under seal).

⁴⁰⁶⁰ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 160 (under seal). For evidence on the arrest of these detainees in Bratunac, *see* para. 763. Đurić testified that the facility was used because there were people under investigation who had to be imprisoned. D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 49. The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 3791 as to why Đurić’s evidence is not reliable in this regard.

⁴⁰⁶¹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 90, 158 (under seal); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibko Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 83.

⁴⁰⁶² P3212 (Witness statement of Ibko Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 83. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2703.

⁴⁰⁶³ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibko Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 80.

⁴⁰⁶⁴ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibko Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 83.

1175. The Bosnian Muslim detainees had to sleep on wooden pallets on the floor or on shelves as there were no beds.⁴⁰⁶⁵ They received food from their homes and from acquaintances and once received left-over food in the prison.⁴⁰⁶⁶ While at the Vlasenica prison the detainees did not have access to medical care or medication.⁴⁰⁶⁷
1176. Detainees were taken out of the Vlasenica prison by Bosnian Serbs in camouflage uniforms to loot valuables from Bosnian Muslim homes.⁴⁰⁶⁸ The detainees were also taken out to bury bodies and dig trenches on the frontline between Vlasenica and Kladanj⁴⁰⁶⁹ and also to carry out other work such as chopping wood.⁴⁰⁷⁰
1177. Detainees were either interrogated at the prison or taken to the nearby SJB building.⁴⁰⁷¹ Some detainees in the prison were subjected to prolonged and severe beatings. They were also threatened and subjected to intimidation.⁴⁰⁷² When the commander of the Vlasenica prison, Sokanović, was present, the detainees were treated fairly but when he was not there conditions worsened and the detainees were beaten.⁴⁰⁷³ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! #Next level rectify#! The most immediate superior and his mere presence was sufficient to establish a regular treatment!)** When Sokanović was absent, the detainees were only allowed to use the toilet once or twice a day and were beaten en route.⁴⁰⁷⁴ Detainees were kicked and beaten with batons, rifle butts, machine guns, metal bars, sticks, and thick plastic pipes.⁴⁰⁷⁵
1178. After the death of Kraljević's brother, uniformed individuals came to the prison and proceeded to take revenge on the detainees and subjected them to further mistreatment.⁴⁰⁷⁶ In addition civilians and uniformed individuals, were brought to or allowed to enter, the facility to beat the detainees and the guards did not provide the detainees with any protection.⁴⁰⁷⁷

c. Conclusion

⁴⁰⁶⁵ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 162 (under seal); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 84.

⁴⁰⁶⁶ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 84.

⁴⁰⁶⁷ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 84.

⁴⁰⁶⁸ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 91–92. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2704.

⁴⁰⁶⁹ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 89, 93–98. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2704. Detainees were taken away in JNA military trucks by Bosnian Serbs in olive grey uniforms. The Chamber notes that there was no fighting at the time when detainees were taken to dig trenches. P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 61 (under seal).

⁴⁰⁷⁰ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 162 (under seal). The Chamber notes that this type of forced labour is not charged in the Indictment, which only covers forced labour at the frontlines.

⁴⁰⁷¹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 163 (under seal). For evidence on treatment at the Vlasenica SJB building, *see* Scheduled Detention Facility C.25.1.

⁴⁰⁷² P84 (Witness statement of Mirsad Kuralić dated 27 June 1996), p. 7 (stating that he was not beaten after the intervention by an individual who knew his family).

⁴⁰⁷³ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 83, 89, 191 (stating that he lost five teeth during these beatings). *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2705.

⁴⁰⁷⁴ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 84.

⁴⁰⁷⁵ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 88.

⁴⁰⁷⁶ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 89–90.

⁴⁰⁷⁷ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 90. The Chamber also received evidence about the killing and disappearance of detainees taken from the Vlasenica prison. P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 44, 159–160 (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18090–18091 (31 August 2011) (closed session); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 55, 85–89, 185; Ibro Osmanović, T. 17943–17945 (25 August 2011). The Chamber notes that the above killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. *See* fn. 13.

1179. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslim men were arrested and detained at the Vlasenica prison from May to June 1992 by Serb Forces. The detainees were held in poor conditions which included over-crowding, inadequate medical care and bedding. Detainees were forced to work at a number of locations and, for example, were used to bury bodies, and dig trenches. Detainees were subjected to beatings with batons, metal bars, guns, pipes, and other objects. **(#Interrogation#! Since the Chamber have known that unsuspected civilians had been housed in Susica TO facilities, those who had been interrogated certainly had been suspected for a crime. Otherwise, why would the authorities exhaust it's limited resources for detaining people?)**

3. Scheduled Detention Facility C.25.3

1180. The Indictment refers to the use of the Sušica camp as a detention facility at least between May and about 30 September 1992.

a. Arrival of detainees and control over the detention facility

1181. Sušica camp was close to the town of Vlasenica on the road from Sarajevo to Belgrade and consisted of sheds owned by a forestry company prior to the war.⁴⁰⁷⁸ The facility was taken over and used for the storage of TO weapons and a hangar was then used to detain persons brought to the camp.⁴⁰⁷⁹ The camp was established on 31 May 1992 by an order issued by the VRS 1st Infantry Brigade Commander, acting pursuant to a decision of the SAO Birač on regulating the “moving out of the Muslim population”.⁴⁰⁸⁰ **(#Evacuation, Reception centre#! Here would be fair to say that it happened after a Muslim demand to have a secured place while they waited for transport to Kladanj. Later on the VRS kept for a limited time some of the Prisoners of War, before transporting them to Batkovic, a legal POW-s camp under the surveillance of the ICRC!)**

1182. Both the VRS and the Vlasenica SJB brought Bosnian Muslims to the camp and had responsibility over the facility, and the SJB determined in practice how the camp functioned.⁴⁰⁸¹ The camp warden was Veljko Bašić and the facility was guarded by

⁴⁰⁷⁸ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 104–105, 144; P3223 (Aerial photograph of Sušica camp marked by Ibro Osmanović); KDZ033, T. 18071 (31 August 2011) (closed session); P6459 (Map of Vlasenica); P6130 (Photographs of Sušica camp); Momir Deurić, T. 33922–33923 (18 February 2013); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 70 (under seal); P3231 (Aerial photograph of Vlasenica marked by KDZ033) (under seal).

⁴⁰⁷⁹ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 105, 144; P3223 (Aerial photograph of Sušica camp marked by Ibro Osmanović); KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 465 (under seal). The facility was first used to house Serb refugees who arrived in the municipality and was then taken over by the army. See D2967 (Witness statement of Momir Deurić dated 16 February 2013), para. 17; Momir Deurić, T. 33919–33920 (18 February 2013); P3245 (Assessment report on Sušica camp), pp. 2–3.

⁴⁰⁸⁰ P3240 (Order of Birač Brigade, 31 May 1992); [REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 2706; D3886 (Witness statement of Svetozar Andrić dated 16 July 2013), para. 7. Defence witnesses testified that this order related to the organisation of the camp and the maintenance of law and order rather than to its establishment and that the SAO Birač was not involved in the moving out of the non-Serb population and there was no such decision. Svetozar Andrić, T. 41681–41684 (22 July 2013); Milenko Stanić, T. 34022–34024 (19 February 2013). Stanić maintained this position even when confronted with a magazine article which referred to the Government of the SAO Birač passing a decision on the movement of Bosnian Muslims from the area, see P6030 (Article from Javnost entitled “Serbian Region of Birač: Borders Determined”, 6 June 1992). See also Tomislav Savkić, T. 33786–33787 (15 February 2013) (testifying that the author of the article was not properly informed). The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 3796, 3813, and 3894 in concluding that the evidence of the relevant witnesses is not reliable in this regard.

⁴⁰⁸¹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 69 (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18071 (31 August 2011) (closed session). Defence witnesses testified that (i) it was only the army which brought Bosnian Muslims to the camp; (ii) the police only occasionally visited the facility; and (iii) the municipal authorities did not receive any information nor could they influence what happened at the facility. D2967 (Witness statement of Momir Deurić dated 16 February 2013), para. 19; Momir Deurić, T. 33921–33922 (18 February 2013).

members of the police, the Special Police Platoon, and the VRS.⁴⁰⁸² Bašić and his deputy would visit the camp almost every morning and update a list which recorded the personal details of any new detainees who had arrived at the camp and would then deliver those updated lists to the Vlasenica SJB.⁴⁰⁸³ The Sušica camp was equipped with a telephone and radio used for communicating with the Vlasenica Crisis Staff, the Vlasenica Battalion command, and the Vlasenica SJB.⁴⁰⁸⁴ The SJB and the Vlasenica Crisis Staff received regular reports on the situation at the Sušica camp.⁴⁰⁸⁵ The Vlasenica Crisis Staff also made decisions concerning the camp and detainees, such as decisions on release, visits by international representatives, and exchanges.⁴⁰⁸⁶

1183. In June 1992, Dragan Nikolić was put in charge of Sušica camp; he introduced himself to the detainees as the camp commander and said that he was “god and the law”.⁴⁰⁸⁷ Dragan Nikolić was a member of the Special Police Platoon and reported to Kraljević.⁴⁰⁸⁸ Other members of the Special Police Platoon would also come to the camp and were involved in questioning the detainees.⁴⁰⁸⁹

1184. The Chamber took judicial notice that the camp operated for four months until September 1992.⁴⁰⁹⁰ The first group of detainees which was brought to the facility included 300 male and female Bosnian Muslims from Šekovići municipality who had been detained by members of the MP and brought to Sušica in late May or early June 1992.⁴⁰⁹¹ The VRS and Bosnian Serb police, including members of the Special Police Platoon, then brought other Bosnian Muslims from Vlasenica to the camp.⁴⁰⁹² These included large numbers of

2013); D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 28. The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 3791 and 3858 as to why it does not find the evidence of the relevant witnesses to be reliable in this regard.

4082 P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 71–72, 75–76 (under seal); P3245 (Assessment report on Sušica camp), pp. 7, 9. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2707; D2967 (Witness statement of Momir Deurić dated 16 February 2013), para. 17; P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 110 (stating that the guards wore JNA uniforms and were mostly Bosnian Serbs from Vlasenica and nearby villages).

4083 P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 75, 92 (under seal). The Chamber places no weight on KDZ033’s speculation that the detainee list would most probably have been provided to the Vlasenica Crisis Staff.

4084 P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 83 (under seal).

4085 *See* Adjudicated Fact 2708; P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 17, 75, 83–84 (under seal). *But see* D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 70 (stating that if reports were submitted they would have been submitted to the TO command and the brigade command after the VRS was established). Members of the Vlasenica Crisis Staff only infrequently visited the camp and thus relied on the reports received. P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 86 (under seal).

4086 P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 84 (under seal). *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2709. *But see* D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 71 (stating that the Vlasenica Crisis Staff had been disbanded by 31 May 1992). The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 3858 as to why it considers the evidence of Đurić to be unreliable in this regard. **BUT THIS IS THE FACT THAT THE CRISIS STAFF CEASED TO EXIST BY THE END OF MAY, AND THIS IS WELL KNOWN. SO, TO THIS REGADT THERE IS NOT NEEDED ANY SUSPICION IN RELIABILITY OF DJURIC!**

4087 P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 106–107, 111; Ibro Osmanović, T. 17998 (29 August 2011); P84 (Witness statement of Mirsad Kuralić dated 27 June 1996), p. 6; KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044’s testimony), T. 465 (under seal); KDZ044, P109 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Nikolić*), T. 267–269 (under seal); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 2 (under seal); *see* Adjudicated Fact 2715. *See also* D2967 (Witness statement of Momir Deurić dated 16 February 2013), para. 18.

4088 [REDACTED]; P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 108–109, 112–113, 142, 183.

4089 P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 183, 192; P3225 (List of Vlasenica SJB reserve workers in September 1992). *See also* P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 10, 12, 82 (under seal); P3257 (Annotated photograph of members of Vlasenica special police platoon) (under seal)

4090 *See* Adjudicated Fact 2711.

4091 P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 67, 112 (under seal). *See also* P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 114; P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 88 (under seal). The military police were formed by a decision of the Vlasenica Crisis Staff. P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 7 (under seal).

4092 P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 67, 80 (under seal). Defence witnesses testified that (i) the municipal authorities decided to convert the TO facilities into a reception centre where Bosnian Muslims who had not left the municipality could be housed for their own protection; (ii) most Bosnian Muslims accepted the offer made by the municipal authorities for their temporary

Bosnian Muslims who were arrested in their homes in Vlasenica and taken to the camp with their families and who had been told they would be exchanged for Bosnian Serbs who had been taken prisoner in Tuzla.⁴⁰⁹³ In addition, inhabitants of villages who were captured after their villages were encircled and attacked by Serb Forces were also brought to Sušica.⁴⁰⁹⁴ Other detainees were transferred from the Vlasenica prison and SJB building to the camp.⁴⁰⁹⁵ Finally, people were also transported by Serb Forces to the Sušica camp from Rogatica⁴⁰⁹⁶ and Kalesija.⁴⁰⁹⁷ **(#Combatants, or civilians#! Kalesija was under the Muslim control all the time! However, the Chamber didn't make any difference between those who wanted to go to Kladanj and other territories under the Muslim control, and those who were combatants in the villages. There is a sufficient evidence that a vast majority of those were civilians who demanded to be transferred to their territories! Whoever was transferred elsewhere than to Batkovic, was on his own will on the way to Kladanj!)**

1185. Approximately 1,000 Bosnian Muslims were brought to the Sušica camp in the space of a few days.⁴⁰⁹⁸ During their transportation to the camp, Bosnian Muslims were threatened and subjected to racial slurs.⁴⁰⁹⁹ On arrival at the camp, the details of the detainees were recorded in a notebook.⁴¹⁰⁰

accommodation in the Sušica camp, until they could be transported to their location of choice; (iii) Sušica was not a camp but a reception centre which also housed Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats; (iv) some Bosnian Muslim families would go to Sušica at night and return to their homes during the day. D2922 (Witness statement of Savo Čeliković dated 10 February 2013), paras. 26–27; Savo Čeliković, T. 33565 (13 February 2013); D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), paras. 50–54; Mane Đurić, T. 35023–35028 (7 March 2013); D2967 (Witness statement of Momir Deurić dated 16 February 2013), para. 18; D3101 (Vlasenica SJB report, 6 August 1992); D3102 (Vlasenica SJB report, 1 September 1992); D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), para. 29; D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 42–44. *See also* Svetozar Andrić, T. 41684 (22 July 2013); D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), paras. 26, 28. Having regard to the weight of evidence, including the surrounding circumstances in the municipality and considering the credibility assessments of the relevant witnesses in fn. 3791, 3813, 3858, and 3894, the Chamber does not consider this evidence to be reliable. The Chamber also received a report which described Sušica camp as a “holding centre” to receive both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs who had voluntarily expressed a desire to leave the municipality and stated that the camp met the basic conditions for their temporary accommodation. P3250 (Report of Vlasenica SJB, 1 September 1992). In light of the weight of evidence and also considering KDZ033’s testimony as to the accuracy of P3250, the Chamber does not rely on this report’s characterisation of the nature, purpose of, and conditions at the Sušica camp. P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 91 (under seal). However, the Chamber finds that there were some people who came voluntarily to the camp as they expected faster transport from there out of Vlasenica to Bosnian Muslim controlled territory. KDZ033, T. 18074–18076 (31 August 2011) (closed session).

⁴⁰⁹³ KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044’s testimony), T. 461–463 (under seal); KDZ044, P109 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Nikolić*), T. 263–266 (under seal); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 2 (under seal).

⁴⁰⁹⁴ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5146; P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 59 (under seal). *See also* KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044’s testimony), T. 464 (under seal); KDZ044, P109 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Nikolić*), T. 266 (under seal). These detainees include Bosnian Muslim women, children and the elderly who were brought to the camp following the attack on the village of Drum on or about 2 June 1992. P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), paras. 21, 24 (under seal); KDZ603, T. 18159 (1 September 2011). On the arrival of this group from Drum, soldiers discussed and confirmed that Vlasenica “had been cleaned”. P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), paras. 25–26 (under seal).

⁴⁰⁹⁵ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 100–101; Ibro Osmanović, T. 17999 (29 August 2011); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 80 (under seal).

⁴⁰⁹⁶ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 870–872; KDZ033, T. 18073 (31 August 2011) (closed session).

⁴⁰⁹⁷ P84 (Witness statement of Mirsad Kuralić dated 27 June 1996), pp. 2, 6; Mirsad Kuralić, P63 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 12562–12564. *See also* D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 28; P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 114.

⁴⁰⁹⁸ P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), para. 28 (under seal); KDZ603, T. 18159 (1 September 2011); *see* Adjudicated Fact 2712. *See also* P84 (Witness statement of Mirsad Kuralić dated 27 June 1996), p. 6; Mirsad Kuralić, P63 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 12563–12564.

⁴⁰⁹⁹ Elvir Pašić, P59 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Tadić*), T. 870–872.

⁴¹⁰⁰ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 92–95 (under seal); P3251 (Handwritten document related to detainees) (under seal); P3252 (Handwritten document related to detainees) (under seal); P3253 (Handwritten list of non-Serbs brought to Sušica camp, 18 July 1992) (under seal).

1186. The vast majority of the detainees were civilians.⁴¹⁰¹ **(#Vast majority released#! And the vast majority was released too, from 80% to 86%, which clearly shows that the civilians hadn't been a target!)** The women, children and elderly men were separated from the men and transported towards Kladanj while the men were detained in a hangar after being searched.⁴¹⁰² **(#Combatants, or civilians# Not all the men were separated, only those who were suspects of crimes, or the combatants without crime, aimed for an exchange!)** The identification papers and valuables of the detainees were confiscated.⁴¹⁰³ **(#Deadly combination#! This is founded on a 92bis evidence, without cross examination, while Djuric, see the same foot note, rebutted it. The rules envisaged appropriation of personal belongings only from Prisoners of War, and suspected criminals, not from civilians, and it didn't happen!)** The women were asked to sign a document saying that they were leaving Vlasenica of their own free will and those who refused to sign were threatened with being beaten or killed.⁴¹⁰⁴ Thereafter, only approximately 20 women remained at the camp, with approximately 800 women and children transported in buses, trucks and lorries from the camp over two days.⁴¹⁰⁵ Women were detained in a separate building near the hangar and with time there were fewer and fewer women detained there.⁴¹⁰⁶ **(#Distorted#, drastically. All #deadly combination#! In this paragraph there is fn. 4060 and on, which clearly indicate an error in concluding and undermining the Defence Final Brief, let us see what was in the para 1437 of DFB: *Susica Camp was a holding centre for people of all ethnicities who were awaiting transportation to safe areas. (D3093, paras 50-2) Witnesses testified that those who wished to leave were given the opportunity; (The Chamber found in this paragraph that the witness didn't say what the DFB quoted, let us see: (People were only involuntarily detained if they were found to have been involved in activities against the Bosnian Serbs; P3262, para 31; KDZ033, T.18103) Everyone can check it both in the testimony***

⁴¹⁰¹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 53, 88 (under seal). See also P84 (Witness statement of Mirsad Kuralić dated 27 June 1996), p. 6; Mirsad Kuralić, P63 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*, T. 12563–12564; P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 116–117. Contrary to this finding that the vast majority of the detainees were civilians, the Accused submits that only those who had been “involved in activities against the Bosnian Serbs” were involuntarily detained at the camp. Defence Final Brief, confidential, para. 1437, [REDACTED]. However, the evidence cited by the Accused does not support this proposition. For example [REDACTED] testified that some men were released “after it was probably established that they had not been involved in any activities against the Serb authorities”; **(THAT COULD NOT BE A SPECCULATION, SINCE THE VERY SAME WITNESS TESTIFIED, AND THE CHAMBER ACCEPTED THAT 80% TO 86% OF ALL THE DETAINED HAD BEEN RELEASED AND TRANSPORTED TO THE MUSLIM CONTROLLED TERRITORY, SE PARA. 1186)** the Chamber finds this to be pure speculation. With respect to the evidence of [REDACTED] cited by the Accused, there is no reference to this issue in the witness’s evidence. **(ONLY IN A CASE THE CHAMBER WAS NOT INTERESTED IN TRUTH! THERE IS NO ANY DETENTION FACILITY WITHOUT RELEASES AFTER INTERROGATIONS, WHICH IS A DIRECT EVIDENCE THAT A SUSPICION WAS A REASON FOR DETENTION AND INTERROGATION, NOT THE RELIGION OR ETHNICITY!)**

⁴¹⁰² Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*, T. 5067–5069, 5145–5146; P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 74 (under seal); KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044’s testimony), T. 463–464 (under seal); KDZ044, P109 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Nikolić*, T. 266 (under seal); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 2 (under seal); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 115.

⁴¹⁰³ KDZ044, P109 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Nikolić*, T. 266 (under seal); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 2 (under seal); KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044’s testimony), T. 467–468 (under seal); see Adjudicated Fact 2712.

⁴¹⁰⁴ KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044’s testimony), T. 466–467 (under seal); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 2 (under seal); see Adjudicated Fact 2712. But see D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 72 (stating that the Bosnian Serb authorities did not force anyone to leave the municipality and did not confiscate valuables from Bosnian Muslims).

⁴¹⁰⁵ P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), paras. 31–32 (under seal); see Adjudicated Fact 2712; KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044’s testimony), T. 467, 497 (under seal); KDZ603, T. 18164–18165 (1 September 2011). KDZ044 also testified that detainees died during transportation, but the Chamber notes that these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.

⁴¹⁰⁶ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 144; P3223 (Aerial photograph of Sušica camp marked by Ibro Osmanović); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 88, 96 (under seal).

of Djuric,! Further, the rest of para 1437 of DFB: while others voluntarily sought protection in the centre in the evenings, returning home in the morning. (see: D3093, para 50) The civilians in the centre were not forced to work, but were provided with better quality and quantity of food if they did. (see: KDZ603, T.18167) The ICRC visited Susica on several occasions, but no RS officials ever entered the Camp. Originally, the police provided security at Susica, until they were later replaced by the army. Although on 31 May 1992, Commander Andric forbade the arbitrary killing of civilians; (see P3227, para 68) Miroslav Kraljevic informed certain guards that they could take whatever measures they felt to be necessary. (see: P3227, para 73)

1187. On 7 June 1992, the Command of the Eastern Bosnia Corps reported to the Main Staff of the VRS, that in the area of Vlasenica they held around 800 prisoners.⁴¹⁰⁷ In mid June 1992, the Birač Brigade Command reported to the Command of the Eastern Bosnia Corps that it was “necessary to urgently resolve the issue of prisoner camps” given the large number of detainees which endangered the safety situation in the town.⁴¹⁰⁸ By mid June 1992 there were between 500 and 600 detainees at the camp.⁴¹⁰⁹ The number of detainees fluctuated with detainees brought in and others taken away, with on average between 150 and 200 detainees at the camp, reaching a peak towards the end of June and the beginning of July 1992. Approximately 400 detainees were then transferred to the Batković camp in Bijeljina.⁴¹¹⁰ In total, approximately 2,000 to 2,500 Bosnian Muslim men, women, children and the elderly passed through the camp.⁴¹¹¹ (#Majority released#! #Reception centre#! Therefore, only about 400 detainees, if at all, were prisoners, while others had been “released”, but in the fact they hadn’t been detained, but housed in Susica, while waiting for transport. That means that only 16% to 20% of al inmates were prisoners. Taking into account that the Muslim forces in the region of Birac had around 30,000 combatants, which were neutralised only in April 1993, this wasn’t an impressive number of prissoners of war! What else evidence is needed?)

a. Conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

1188. While Bašić and his deputy delivered updated lists of detainees to the company which prepared the food for camp detainees,⁴¹¹² detainees at the camp were insufficiently fed. (#General shortage#! The VRS and the entire population was insufficiently fed! Remember sanctions!) Water was very scarce, sanitary conditions were poor, and medical care was not provided.⁴¹¹³ In the first two or three days after his arrival, Osmanović and the

⁴¹⁰⁷ P3237 (Report of the Eastern Bosnian Corps, 7 June 1992), p. 2; P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 90 (under seal). See also Svetozar Andrić, T. 41668 (22 July 2013).

⁴¹⁰⁸ P3220 (Report of Birač Brigade, 14 June 1992); P3221 (Request of Birač Brigade, 17 June 1992). Ibro Osmanović observed that while these figures were not exactly the same as his estimates, they were overall the same given that detainees would come and go from the facility. P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 115; P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 90 (under seal).

⁴¹⁰⁹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 87 (under seal). See also P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), para. 27 (under seal).

⁴¹¹⁰ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 87, 143 (under seal); P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), para. 35 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 2251; P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 115; KDZ044, P109 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Nikolić*, T. 266 (under seal). For evidence on detention at Batković, see Scheduled Detention Facility C.2.1.

⁴¹¹¹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 87–88 (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18073–18074 (31 August 2011) (closed session). See also Adjudicated Fact 2710.

⁴¹¹² [REDACTED].

⁴¹¹³ See Adjudicated Fact 2714; P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), para. 30 (under seal); KDZ603, T. 18163 (1 September 2011). See also P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 74 (under seal); P3228 (Excerpt from CSCE's report on Sušica camp), e-court pp. 1–2.

detainees were brought food from their homes but this depended on the good will of the guards and the warden; if Nikolić was not in a good mood they would not get any food.⁴¹¹⁴ The detainees were provided with one meal a day which was served on 10 plates and the over 500 detainees had to eat from these plates which were not washed.⁴¹¹⁵ The food was left-over from what the soldiers had eaten,⁴¹¹⁶ which was sour.⁴¹¹⁷ One cup of drinking water was distributed twice a day to the detainees.⁴¹¹⁸ **(#Deadly combination#! All of it based on the 92bis evidence, without cross examination, or solitarily on some statements of the Muslim combatants detained there. In the entire country there was a severe shortage of everything, nobody prepared any facility to house so many civilians who wanted to cross to the Muslim territories and prisoners of war. Looking how long the Susica camp existed and how many inmates circulated through it, it is obvious that many of the inmates didn't spend to much of time in Susica)**

1189. The detainees were held in a big hangar and slept on the concrete with planks⁴¹¹⁹ with no heating in the camp.⁴¹²⁰ There were no beds in the camp⁴¹²¹ and the detainees were forced to sit on the concrete floor.⁴¹²² Some of the detainees had a blanket on which they slept.⁴¹²³ In mid-June there was a terrible stench due to the inadequate toilet facilities.⁴¹²⁴ In the morning the detainees were taken in groups, ordered by the guards to line up and run to urinate in the Sušica river and to defecate behind an improvised shelter of two blankets.⁴¹²⁵ Detainees were sometimes beaten so they could not relieve themselves.⁴¹²⁶ If detainees wanted to relieve themselves during the night they had to use a pot, which quickly filled which meant that the detainees simply relieved themselves in their pants and had no place to clean themselves.⁴¹²⁷ Over time the detainees were engaged in the construction of toilets, were given sponges and blankets and provided with food supplies.⁴¹²⁸ **(#Inadequacy, not wanton#! All of it were a sad consequences of a civil war for which the Serb side hadn't been prepared. Almost none of the facilities had been aimed to house prisoners of war, except Manjaca, Batkovic and Foca KP Dom, and as seen in this paragraph, the conditions had been improved only later. But, at the beginning there was everything "inadequate" – not willingly, but couldn't be otherwise! The argument is against civil wars, not against the President!)**

⁴¹¹⁴ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 119, 137. See also KDZ603, T. 18163 (1 September 2011); P3228 (Excerpt from CSCE's report on Sušica camp), pp. 1–2. [REDACTED].

⁴¹¹⁵ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 119. See also KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 487 (under seal); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 5 (under seal).

⁴¹¹⁶ KDZ603, T. 18163 (1 September 2011).

⁴¹¹⁷ KDZ044, P109 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Nikolić*), T. 267, 273 (under seal).

⁴¹¹⁸ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 120

⁴¹¹⁹ P74 (Supplemental information sheet for Mirsad Kuralić), p. 2.

⁴¹²⁰ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 120 (under seal).

⁴¹²¹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 74 (under seal).

⁴¹²² KDZ603, T. 18159–18160 (1 September 2011); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 118.

⁴¹²³ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 123.

⁴¹²⁴ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 71 (under seal). See also P3228 (Excerpt from CSCE's report on Sušica camp), pp. 1–2.

⁴¹²⁵ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 122; P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), para. 30 (under seal).

⁴¹²⁶ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 122. See also P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 6 (under seal).

⁴¹²⁷ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 122.

⁴¹²⁸ KDZ033, T. 18073 (31 August 2011) (closed session).

1900. Dragan Nikolić subjected the detainees to all kinds of mistreatment, including frequent beatings.⁴¹²⁹ **(#Deadly combination!!!! In an already established manner, the Chamber discredited the testimony of Z. Jovanovic, see under this fn. who testified contrary to all of those allegations, stating that he didn't receive any information or objection when visiting the Susica camp. How possibly president Karadžić could have known anything?)** Some detainees would be beaten every day by Dragan Nikolić because they were accused of being members of the SDA and having weapons. Dragan Nikolić also threatened to kill them if they did not reveal the location of weapons.⁴¹³⁰ He would beat the detainees with a truncheon, a pistol butt or kick them with his army boots. In one case he broke the ribs of a detainee.⁴¹³¹ On other occasions, Nikolić would force detainees to kneel on the floor and put his knife or a bayonet into their mouths to scare them during interrogations.⁴¹³² **Nikolic lied to the most immediate superiors, and wrote a false reports about his and other's misdeeds. Therefore, the responsible officials were deceived by the perpetrators of a personal misdeeds! What some individuals did was in a sharp contradiction with all the Accused's orders!**

1901. Galib Smajlović and Dževad Šarić were taken out on several occasions from the hangar and beaten.⁴¹³³ On or about 25 June 1992, Smajlović and Šarić were taken out by multiple guards including Dragan Nikolić, and then screaming was heard.⁴¹³⁴ Smajlović was dragged back into the hangar unconscious after being beaten outside.⁴¹³⁵ There were dark bruises on Smajlović's body and Šarić was very pale and was holding his stomach.⁴¹³⁶ On another occasion in June 1992, Reuf Rasidagić was questioned by Nikolić and told "you will piss blood if you don't talk".⁴¹³⁷ Rasidagić was beaten by Nikolić over four of five days and began to urinate blood and he begged Nikolić to kill him, but was told that one bullet cost money.⁴¹³⁸ **All such a misdoings and violations of Nikolic were falsly reported to the superiors.)**

1902. Some detainees were also tied to a drain outside the hangar and had to kneel on sharp stones with their hands tied above their heads until they fainted.⁴¹³⁹ Some were

⁴¹²⁹ See Adjudicated Fact 2715; P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011) (under seal), para. 34; KDZ603, T. 18165–18166 (1 September 2011) (private session); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 2 (under seal). Jovanović testified that he visited the facility on one occasion to give supplies to some friends and was told that the conditions were not bad and nobody was "disturbing" the detainees. D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), para. 29; Zoran Jovanović, T. 34207–34209 (21 February 2013). Jovanović on cross-examination maintained that he was not told about the murder, torture and sexual assault of detainees and that he did not witness the rape of a woman contrary to the statement of a victim who identified a Zoran Jovanović at the scene. In light of this cross-examination and considering its credibility assessment in fn. 3813, the Chamber does not find Jovanović's evidence to be reliable in this regard.

⁴¹³⁰ KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 485 (under seal); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 5 (under seal).

⁴¹³¹ KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 485 (under seal); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 5 (under seal); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibko Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 100, 130; P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 108 (under seal).

⁴¹³² P3212 (Witness statement of Ibko Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 130; KDZ044, P109 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Nikolić*), T. 272 (under seal); KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 485–486 (under seal); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 5 (under seal).

⁴¹³³ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibko Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 135.

⁴¹³⁴ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibko Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 135; KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 475 (under seal).

⁴¹³⁵ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibko Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 135.

⁴¹³⁶ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibko Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 136.

⁴¹³⁷ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibko Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 125.

⁴¹³⁸ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibko Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 125; Ibko Osmanović, T. 17945–17946 (25 August 2011). Rasidagić and Osmanović were transferred to Batković on 30 June 1992. For evidence on detention at Batković, see Scheduled Detention Facility C.2.1.

⁴¹³⁹ KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 486 (under seal); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 5 (under seal).

ordered by Nikolić to sit for 40 hours in a puddle of water with their hands behind their heads and legs spread on the ground as they were kicked and beaten.⁴¹⁴⁰ On other occasions, Nikolić would cock an empty pistol, point the gun at detainees or put it into their mouths and pull the trigger; he once shot an automatic weapon at the wall above the heads of the detainees.⁴¹⁴¹ **(#Not even the immediate superiors of Nikolic could have been liable for the conduct of Nikolic#, having in mind the fact that he falsely reported events to their superiors!)**

1903. Some detainees were interrogated at the camp itself while others were taken for interrogation to the Vlasenica SJB or other locations and some returned severely bruised after being beaten.⁴¹⁴² The interrogations were for the most part conducted by members of the Special Police Platoon⁴¹⁴³ while members of the Vlasenica SJB would take notes.⁴¹⁴⁴ Some detainees were questioned about military operations and security issues while others were simply subjected to mistreatment for the purpose of obtaining their money.⁴¹⁴⁵ The group of detainees from the area of Šekovići were frequently interrogated and physically abused by members of the Šekovići unit.⁴¹⁴⁶ **(#Revengeful conduct#! A neighbours, they knew each other, and had many personal reasons, which must not be justified, but that is the nature of a civil war!)**

1904. Between June and September 1992, Bosnian Serb guards, soldiers, and other men who had been given access to the camp raped and committed other acts of sexual violence against non-Serb women.⁴¹⁴⁷ Young women would be taken out in the evening and brought back in the morning in tears, with “their hair tousled and their clothes torn”.⁴¹⁴⁸ **The women didn’t stay so long to have these allegations to be true, see para 1186! Also, had that happened there would be many criminal reports once the insulted women reached Kladanj and Tuzla, which didn’t happen!)**

1905. The Vlasenica SJB issued orders for detainees at the camp to be taken out to perform work or to be released,⁴¹⁴⁹ which then required the approval of Dragan Nikolić.⁴¹⁵⁰ By the

⁴¹⁴⁰ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 131–132.

⁴¹⁴¹ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 138; KDZ044, P109 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Nikolić*), T. 273–274 (under seal). Deurić denied seeing Nikolić mistreating a detainee despite being confronted with the statements of detainees who saw Deurić at the scene. Momir Deurić, T. 33926–33929 (18 February 2013). In light of Deurić’s credibility assessment in fn. 3858, the Chamber does not find Deurić’s denial and attempt to distance himself from the mistreatment to be reliable.

⁴¹⁴² P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 80, 111 (under seal); P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), para. 33 (under seal). See also P84 (Witness statement of Mirsad Kuralić dated 27 June 1996), p. 6. The Chamber also received evidence about detainees who were taken from the camp for interrogation or for purported exchanges but disappeared or were killed. P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 97, 110, 113, 119, 145–147 (under seal); P3260 (List of missing civilians in Vlasenica in 1992) (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18086 (31 August 2011) (closed session); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 6 (under seal); KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044’s testimony), T. 484–485 (under seal); P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), paras. 27, 29 (under seal); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 143, 148, 193; Ibro Osmanović, T. 17948–17950 (25 August 2011); Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5069. The Chamber notes that the above killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.

⁴¹⁴³ [REDACTED]. See also P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 71.

⁴¹⁴⁴ P3251 (Handwritten document related to detainees) (under seal); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 93 (under seal).

⁴¹⁴⁵ [REDACTED].

⁴¹⁴⁶ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 82, 112 (under seal).

⁴¹⁴⁷ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 108 (under seal). See also P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 114.

⁴¹⁴⁸ KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044’s testimony), T. 498 (under seal); KDZ044, P109 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Nikolić*), T. 273 (under seal).

⁴¹⁴⁹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 85 (under seal); P3249 (Handwritten order, 18 August 1992) (under seal).

second half of July 1992 most of the detainees were engaged in physical labour.⁴¹⁵¹ The detainees who were taken for work left the camp at 7 a.m. and returned at about 5 p.m. or 6 p.m. in the evening.⁴¹⁵² They performed several types of labour, including burial of bodies, digging of trenches, and carrying of munitions at frontlines.⁴¹⁵³

1906. Further, each day a group of detainees was taken to the VRS barracks to work on renovations⁴¹⁵⁴ while others were sent for physical labour at factories, businesses and roads or were engaged in agricultural work while others were used to clean the houses abandoned by non-Serbs.⁴¹⁵⁵ These houses were looted and cleaned before Bosnian Serb refugees moved into them.⁴¹⁵⁶ On one occasion detainees were ordered to set fire to the goods which had been looted from a Bosnian Muslim house⁴¹⁵⁷ and on another occasion were forced to load onto a truck the rubble from the Vlasenica mosque which had been destroyed.⁴¹⁵⁸ The detainees were afraid for their lives and of being beaten if they refused to work.⁴¹⁵⁹ Some detainees taken for work assignments were insulted and called “Balijs mother” and some were beaten with tree branches.⁴¹⁶⁰

1907. Every day a list was drawn up indicating the number of detainees needed on a given day for work.⁴¹⁶¹ When the detainees returned, the detainees list would be checked to confirm that all the detainees had returned; if a detainee was missing, the camp would

⁴¹⁵⁰ KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044’s testimony), T. 488 (under seal); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 73, 92 (under seal); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 107; P3251 (Handwritten document related to detainees) (under seal).

⁴¹⁵¹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 99 (under seal).

⁴¹⁵² KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044’s testimony), T. 487 (under seal).

⁴¹⁵³ See Adjudicated Fact 2713.

⁴¹⁵⁴ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 99, 103 (under seal); P3259 (Aerial photograph of Vlasenica). See also P3247 (Handwritten list of men working at Sušica camp, 8-12 September 1992) (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18080 (31 August 2011) (closed session); KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044’s testimony), T. 487 (under seal).

⁴¹⁵⁵ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 79, 93, 99, 103, 105–106 (under seal); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 124; P3247 (Handwritten list of men working at Sušica camp, 8-12 September 1992) (under seal); P3253 (Handwritten list of non-Serbs brought to Sušica camp, 18 July 1992), pp. 2–3 (under seal); P3248 (Handwritten list of people who worked or visited Sušica camp) (under seal); P3251 (Handwritten document related to detainees) (under seal), p. 5; P3254 (Handwritten list of men 10-11 August 1992) (under seal); KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044’s testimony), T. 486–487 (under seal); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), pp. 2, 6 (under seal). The detainees were taken away by police and military commanders and members of the reserve police. P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 79, 93, 100, 107 (under seal); P3248 (Handwritten list of people who worked or visited Sušica camp) (under seal); P3251 (Handwritten document related to detainees), p. 5 (under seal). The Chamber notes that this type of forced labour is not charged in the Indictment, which only covers forced labour at the frontlines.

⁴¹⁵⁶ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 99 (under seal).

⁴¹⁵⁷ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 124.

⁴¹⁵⁸ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 57 (under seal). The Chamber notes that the destruction of the mosque is not charged in Schedule D of the Indictment.

⁴¹⁵⁹ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 124. See also P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 2 (under seal). But see KDZ033, T. 18081–18082, 18101 (31 August 2011) (closed session); KDZ603, T. 18166–18167 (1 September 2011), who testified that (i) detainees were asked to volunteer for work assignments; (ii) those who could not work for example for health reasons were not subject to any punishment or penalty; and (iii) detainees would often receive better food and provisions when taken for work assignments and were treated fairly. While the Chamber finds that detainees may have received better provisions while on work assignment, in light of the circumstances of detention including the beating and mistreatment, and the direct evidence of Osmanović that detainees were afraid to refuse work, the Chamber does not consider that the detainees from the camp voluntarily performed the work assignments. KDZ033 himself was equivocal and could not confirm whether or not the labour was forced or not.

⁴¹⁶⁰ P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 6 (under seal).

⁴¹⁶¹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 101–104 (under seal). See also P3247 (Handwritten list of men working at Sušica camp, 8-12 September 1992) (under seal). Deurić denied being involved in making a list of detainees who would be forced to be taken for work. Momir Deurić, T. 33928–33932 (18 February 2013). Having considered its credibility assessment in fn. 3858, and given Deurić’s attempts to distance himself from the mistreatment of detainees, the Chamber does not find his evidence in this regard to be reliable.

inform the Vlasenica SJB and the person who took the detainees away would then explain whether the detainee had been released, taken to the SJB or killed.⁴¹⁶²

b. Transfer of detainees and inspection of camp

1908. In June 1992 the VRS prepared a strictly confidential report on the security at Sušica camp.⁴¹⁶³ This report also indicated that it was “impossible to apply any disinformation or cover-up measures because it is a public place” and that everyone was practically informed about the “number and structure of prisoners”.⁴¹⁶⁴ In this regard, the report suggested that in order to “prevent informing the public about the prisoners’ appearance and the conditions they live in”, any attempts to take in recording devices or conduct interviews must be prevented and “extensive movement must be prohibited”.⁴¹⁶⁵ In addition, the report indicated that visits of any type and the bringing of food and other material to the prisoners “must be prohibited” and recommended relocation of the camp.⁴¹⁶⁶ **(#Usual#! Not a bit different now in the Scheweningen UN Detention Unit!)**

1909. Detainees were only released after receipt of written orders from officials, including the VRS security officer, the SJB chief, the Special Police Platoon commander.⁴¹⁶⁷ Despite being told they would be exchanged,⁴¹⁶⁸ able-bodied men were transferred to the Batković camp in three groups at the end of June 1992.⁴¹⁶⁹ **(#Usual#! But the exchange could have been achieved only from the Batkovic camp. So, if they had been told about the exchange, it had to be from Batkovic, and it could have been successful only if the Muslim side exchanged the captured Serbs!)** while women, children and elderly were taken to the frontlines at Kladanj or Cerska and released or taken to the Pelemaš camp in Šekovići.⁴¹⁷⁰

1200. When representatives of an international organisation were scheduled to visit the Sušica camp, the Vlasenica SJB instructed those responsible for the camp that the detainees should be moved to another location urgently.⁴¹⁷¹ **(Where they could have been moved? If there was such a facility, it would be used to house the surplus of detainees!)** In July 1992, representatives of international organisations visited Sušica camp.⁴¹⁷² During these two visits, Nikolić managed to conceal many detainees and the true state of the conditions of detention.⁴¹⁷³ **(#Deadly combination#! How this Defence could defend against so**

⁴¹⁶² P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 101 (under seal).

⁴¹⁶³ [REDACTED]; P3245 (Assessment report on Sušica camp).

⁴¹⁶⁴ P3245 (Assessment report on Sušica camp), p. 4.

⁴¹⁶⁵ P3245 (Assessment report on Sušica camp), p. 4.

⁴¹⁶⁶ P3245 (Assessment report on Sušica camp), pp. 4–5.

⁴¹⁶⁷ [REDACTED].

⁴¹⁶⁸ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 142 (under seal); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 145–146, 149; Ibro Osmanović, T. 17999 (29 August 2011); KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044’s testimony), T. 491 (under seal).

⁴¹⁶⁹ For evidence of detention at Batković, see Scheduled Detention Facility C.2.1.

⁴¹⁷⁰ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 140–144 (under seal); P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), para. 35 (under seal); KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044’s testimony), T. 488–489 (under seal) (testifying that he was told by a guard that being transferred to Batković was their only hope as they would all be killed if they remained at Sušica); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 145–146, 148–149, 193; Ibro Osmanović, T. 17948–17949 (25 August 2001), 17999 (29 August 2011). See also P3241 (Report of Šekovići Military Post, 3 July 1992); P3213 (List of persons detained at Batković camp) where KDZ033 was able to identify a number of detainees at the Batković camp who had previously been detained at Sušica but who were transported on 30 June 1992. D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 55.

⁴¹⁷¹ [REDACTED].

⁴¹⁷² P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 151 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 2716.

⁴¹⁷³ See Adjudicated Fact 2716.

mant Adjudicated facts, such as this one?) Before the arrival of international representatives, the detainees who remained in the camp were instructed to hide their belongings and were hidden in the forest.⁴¹⁷⁴ A similar visit was carried out on 2 September 1992 by the CSCE, but the guards at the camp did not have enough time to hide the detainees before the international representatives accompanied by a Bosnian Serb delegation arrived.⁴¹⁷⁵ However, there were only 30 or 40 detainees in the camp at the time and when questioned by the international representatives the detainees stated that they were just waiting for transport and had received fine treatment at the camp.⁴¹⁷⁶ However, the CSCE reported, *inter alia*, that the detainees had been held for more than two months, that they were fearful and reluctant to speak openly in front of the guards and seemed “haggard, pale and thin” but their state of nourishment could not be assessed as they were dressed in heavier clothing.⁴¹⁷⁷ **(The September 2 didn’t require heavier clothing whatsoever! But, why the OSCE would differ from the entire “international community”, i.e. western part of it?)** After the visit Velibor Ostojić said that they would no longer have to hide evidence of the camp, and that it would soon be closed down.⁴¹⁷⁸ The camp was shut down by the end of September 1992.⁴¹⁷⁹ (4136)

(d) Conclusion on conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

1201. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that from late May until the end of September 1992, large numbers of Bosnian Muslim civilians, including women, children and the elderly, were brought to and detained at Sušica camp by Serb Forces. At one point, women, children and the elderly were transported out of the municipality while the men continued to be detained. **(#Combatants, or civilians#! No civilians, women, children or elderies had been “detained”, but only the combatants, that had been conveyed to Batkovi} camp. The interrogations served for selection of combatants from civilians, and civilians had been enabled to continue to the Muslim territories. Havign in mind how many passed through Sušica, and that only around 400 had been conveyed to Batkovi}!)** Their identification papers, money, and valuables were confiscated. The detainees were held in poor conditions which included lack of food, limited access to water, no bedding, poor sanitary and hygienic facilities, and no medical care. Detainees were subjected to frequent beatings with truncheons, guns, knives and were also subjected to other mistreatment and threats. Women at the camp were raped. Detainees were also forced to dig trenches and to carry munitions at the frontlines. **(The closest trenches and the front line was more than dozen of kilometres far from Susica, and this is all founded on a solitary statements of the Muslim oponents or the one or two guards whose #misdoings had been hidden by fake reports)**

⁴¹⁷⁴ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 151 (under seal). *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2716. *But see* D2967 (Witness statement of Momir Deurić dated 16 February 2013), para. 21; Momir Deurić, T. 33924 (18 February 2013).

⁴¹⁷⁵ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 154 (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18020 (29 August 2011) (closed session)

⁴¹⁷⁶ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 155 (under seal). *See also* P3239 (Two photographs of a man) (under seal); P3243 (Photograph of man at hangar in Sušica camp); KDZ033, T. 18020 (29 August 2011) (closed session); P3228 (Excerpt from CSCE's report on Sušica camp), p. 1.

⁴¹⁷⁷ P3228 (Excerpt from CSCE's report on Sušica camp), pp. 1–2; P6131 (Photographs of CSCE visit to Sušica camp).

⁴¹⁷⁸ [REDACTED]. *But see* Velibor Ostojić, D2361 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*, T. 26682–26683, 26726–26728; D2362 (Witness statement of Velibor Ostojić dated 6 June 2006), para. 43. Ostojić denied that he ever visited the facility. P1607 (RS Ministry of Justice report on prisons and camps on the RS territory, 22 October 1992), pp. 2; Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35174, 35196 (11 March 2013); D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 26 (stating that by the time of his inspection in October 1992 the detainees had already been exchanged or transferred).

⁴¹⁷⁹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 136, 138 (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18108–18109 (31 August 2011) (closed session). *See also* D1660 (Annex B, “Admitted, undisputed and contested facts”), (under seal), p. 2.

(e)Scheduled Incident B.18.1

1202. The Prosecution alleges that approximately nine men from Sušica camp were killed between June and August 1992.⁴¹⁸⁰

1203. The Chamber took judicial notice that nine detainees in the Sušica camp were killed by camp guards or died from mistreatment and that these deaths were reported to warden Bašić with no consequences.⁴¹⁸¹ After these killings, the detainees were simply removed from the list of detainees and recorded as deceased with no report.⁴¹⁸² The nine detainees who were killed were buried in the Vlasenica town cemetery.⁴¹⁸³

1204. During one of the nights on or about of 21 June 1992, Dragan Nikolić and Goran Tešić entered the hangar and took out a pensioner named Durmo Handžić and another detainee named Asim Zildžić, and then screaming was heard.⁴¹⁸⁴ Handžić was questioned about the location of his son. The two detainees were then beaten with a spade and a pipe and kicked while they were lying on the ground.⁴¹⁸⁵ Detainees were ordered to pour water over Handžić and Zildžić for them to regain consciousness. They were then carried back to the hangar.⁴¹⁸⁶ Zildžić's face was severely beaten, his eye was coming out of the socket, and he was spitting blood.⁴¹⁸⁷ Other detainees helped to wipe blood from Handžić's body as he moaned and sobbed.⁴¹⁸⁸ Zildžić and Handžić died shortly after being brought back to the hangar and other detainees were ordered to bury their bodies in unmarked graves.⁴¹⁸⁹

⁴¹⁸⁰ The Prosecution submits that the evidence shows that these killings occurred in June and July 1992. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B.

⁴¹⁸¹ See Adjudicated Fact 2717. See also P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 115 (under seal); P4856 (Appendix B to the Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief filed on 18 May 2009 marked by Amor Mašović), p. 29. The order which established the Sušica camp forbade the arbitrary "liquidation" of detainees. P3240 (Order of Birač Brigade, 31 May 1992); D3886 (Witness statement of Svetozar Andrić dated 16 July 2013), para. 7; Svetozar Andrić, T. 41684–41685 (22 July 2013). See also D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 53. However, this order was not followed in practice. P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 68 (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18100 (31 August 2011) (closed session).

⁴¹⁸² P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 115 (under seal). But see D2967 (Witness statement of Momir Deurić dated 16 February 2013), paras. 19–20; Momir Deurić, T. 33926–33927, 33931–33932 (18 February 2013). See P6132 (Verdict of BiH Court against Predrag Bastah and Goran Višković, 4 February 2010). Deurić testified that he was not aware of any killings, but then admitted he would go home at night, and that even when he was there during the day he tried to avoid seeing the detainees. He then acknowledged that he heard stories about crimes against detainees in the camp but that some were convicted for those crimes. The Chamber does not find Deurić's evidence in this regard to be consistent or reliable.

⁴¹⁸³ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 114 (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18106 (31 August 2011) (closed session).

⁴¹⁸⁴ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 126; KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 469 (under seal); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 3 (under seal).

⁴¹⁸⁵ KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 469–470 (under seal); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 3 (under seal); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010) (under seal), paras. 108, 114.

⁴¹⁸⁶ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 127; KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 470–471 (under seal); KDZ044, P109 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Nikolić*), T. 270 (under seal).

⁴¹⁸⁷ KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 471 (under seal).

⁴¹⁸⁸ KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 471 (under seal); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 3 (under seal).

⁴¹⁸⁹ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 127; KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 471–472, 474 (under seal); KDZ044, P109 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Nikolić*), T. 269–270 (under seal); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), pp. 3–4 (under seal). Both Zildžić and Handžić were exhumed from individual graves. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 94–95. Detainees were also ordered to tell Zildžić's wife that he had died of a heart attack. A false report was also drawn up to suggest that both Handžić and Zildžić had died of heart attacks. **(WHAT THE SUPERIORS COULD HAVE DONE AFTER THIS FALSE REPORT ON THESE TWO DEATHS? NOT TO ASK WHAT THE ACCUSED COULD HAVE DONE! THE MERE FACT THAT EMPLOYEES REPORTED TO THEIR SUPERIORS FALSELY PROVES THAT THE SUPERIORS WOULDN'T TOLERATE THIS KIND OF CONDUCT! EXCULPATORY!)**

P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 128; P3222 (Report of Sušica Military Prison, 22 June 1992); [REDACTED]. The Accused cites to this evidence to suggest that [REDACTED] was concealing the truth about the deaths from his superiors. Defence Final Brief, confidential, para. 1437.

(All followed by a false report, which indicates that the superiors wouldn't tolerate this conduct! #EXCULPATORY#!)

1205. On or about 25 June 1992, Dževad Šarić was taken out and killed with a sub-machine gun⁴¹⁹⁰ and detainees were ordered to take away his body and wash and cover the traces of blood.⁴¹⁹¹ Muharem Kolarević was also taken out of the hangar and badly beaten but was still alive when the detainees moved his body.⁴¹⁹² Kolarević's body was later discovered entangled on a wire fence.⁴¹⁹³ Tešić then took a sub machine gun and shot him.⁴¹⁹⁴ On or about 26 June 1992, "Musa" Zekić, who was accused of killing a Bosnian Serb, was taken out of the hangar and interrogated in a chair before Goran Tešić shot him with a machine gun.⁴¹⁹⁵ Rašid Ferhatbegović who was about 60 years old was accused of attempting to escape; he was taken out of the hangar and shot.⁴¹⁹⁶ Detainees were ordered to bury the bodies of Šarić, Kolarević and Ferhatbegović in a forest.⁴¹⁹⁷ **(It seems that their detention was lawful, because they had been suspected for some crimes, but their killing certainly was not. However, the authorities knew only about their detention, while the facts about their deaths were concealed!#No superior's liability#!)**

1206. In June 1992, Ismet Dedić was repeatedly beaten over a number of days before he died and his body was taken by a car sent by the Vlasenica SJB and buried at the Muslim cemetery.⁴¹⁹⁸ In the first half of July 1992, Mevludin Hatunić was taken out of the hangar, beaten, and kicked by Dragan Nikolić and fell to the ground.⁴¹⁹⁹ Hatunić was carried back to the hangar as he could not walk on his own and later died. Nikolić then ordered that the body be removed from the hangar, the SJB was informed and the body was buried at the Muslim cemetery.⁴²⁰⁰ **(#Distorted#! What Nikolic informed SJB about? This paragraph is altered in interpretation of evidence, so to damage the Defence.: (The SJB was not "informed" the SJB was misinformed by Nikolic that the detainee "had died and that they should pick up the body to bury it". How possibly these officials in Vlasenica could be liable, and how possibly the #misdoings of an individual, hidden from**

⁴¹⁹⁰ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 108, 114 (under seal); KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 475 (under seal); P113 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 7 October 1997), p. 2 (under seal); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 108, 114 (under seal); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 139; Ibro Osmanović, T. 17945 (25 August 2011).

⁴¹⁹¹ KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 476 (under seal); P113 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 7 October 1997), p. 2 (under seal).

⁴¹⁹² P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 139; Ibro Osmanović, T. 17945 (25 August 2011); KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 475–476 (under seal); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 4 (under seal); P113 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 7 October 1997), p. 2 (under seal).

⁴¹⁹³ KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 480–481 (under seal); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 5 (under seal).

⁴¹⁹⁴ KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 481 (under seal); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 5 (under seal); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010) (under seal), para. 108.

⁴¹⁹⁵ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 139; Ibro Osmanović, T. 17998 (29 August 2011); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 5 (under seal); KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 476–477 (under seal); KDZ044, P109 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Nikolić*), T. 271 (under seal); P113 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 7 October 1997), p. 2 (under seal); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010) (under seal), para. 108.

⁴¹⁹⁶ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 140; KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 479–481 (under seal); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 5 (under seal); P113 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 7 October 1997), p. 3 (under seal); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 108, 114 (under seal). The three bodies were exhumed from individual graves. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 94–95; P4109 (John Clark's expert report entitled "Report of the Chief Pathologist, Vlasenica Grave-Site (2000)", 30 September 2002), pp. 1–5.

⁴¹⁹⁷ KDZ044, P107 (Transcript from KDZ044's testimony), T. 482–483 (under seal); P111 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 28 September 1994), p. 5 (under seal); P113 (Witness statement of KDZ044 dated 7 October 1997), p. 3 (under seal).

⁴¹⁹⁸ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 117 (under seal).

⁴¹⁹⁹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 108, 118 (under seal).

⁴²⁰⁰ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 118 (under seal).

superiors# could be allocated to the President as his responsibility???) Galib Musić was also beaten to death in the first half of July 1992.⁴²⁰¹

1207. Based on the above, the Chamber therefore finds that nine men from Sušica camp were killed by Serb Forces in June and July 1992. **(Now we can see the #abuse of the term “Serb Forces”# once again! That was not “Serb Force”, but an individual who committed crimes and concealed it from the “Serb Forces” and his superiors!)**

c. Scheduled Incident B.18.2

1208. The Prosecution alleges that up to 140 detainees were killed in Sušica camp on or about 30 September 1992.

1209. By way of background to this incident, the Chamber notes that on 29 September 1992, the funeral for 29 Bosnian Serb soldiers killed by ABiH forces, **(#The Serb civilians not important#! Not only soldiers, but civilians too. Anyway, that was during an appointed ceasefire, which makes it a double crime!)** was held at the Orthodox church in Vlasenica.⁴²⁰² Over 1,000 people attended the funeral, including the Bosnian Serb leadership from the municipality and from Pale, namely the Accused, Velibor Ostojić, Nikola Koljević and Svetozar Andrić, amongst others.⁴²⁰³ Speeches were given at the funeral; the speakers and the crowd “were very agitated and embittered” by the death of the Bosnian Serb soldiers.⁴²⁰⁴ The Accused in his speech said: “Nor must we forget their executioners and attackers. I do not know if I am allowed to say that we must not forgive either. Who knows how many times this century our brothers, who are no brothers at all, have been at our throats. They assault our good men. But the Lords sees that and has given us strength to resist [...]”.⁴²⁰⁵ **(The entire speech of President Karadžić had been played in the courtroom, and everyone could have seen that it was neither “agitated”, nor aggressive, but rather depressive and sad speech. The only who could forgive this crime were the families of the killed and mutilated Serb, not the President. Also, neither families could or should forgive unless the perpetrator remorse and ask for forgiveness.)**

1210. The Accused gave an interview on the day of the funeral and said “We are concerned about Muslims, we want them to have their own territory. Since we wanted to separate from them, since we see that we can’t live together any longer. But, if they do not proclaim a realistic objective concerning territories, they may lose everything.”⁴²⁰⁶ **(So what?)**

⁴²⁰¹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 108 (under seal).

⁴²⁰² P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 121 (under seal); D1662 (Article from SRNA entitled “Vlasenica: Serbs-victims of muslim terrorists vandal crime buried today”, 29 September 1992); KDZ033, T. 18121 (29 August 2011) (closed session); P810 (Sky news report re Vlasenica, with transcript). See Adjudicated Fact 2718.

⁴²⁰³ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 121, 125–126 (under seal); P810 (Sky news report re Vlasenica, with transcript). See also D2967 (Witness statement of Momir Deurić dated 16 February 2013), paras. 24, 27.

⁴²⁰⁴ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 122–124, 126 (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18124, 18134 (31 August 2011) (closed session).

⁴²⁰⁵ P3261 (Excerpt of video footage of Radovan Karadžić’s speech, with transcript); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 123 (under seal).

⁴²⁰⁶ P3230 (Video footage re excerpt of interview with Radovan Karadžić, with transcript); KDZ033, T. 18024 (29 August 2011) (closed session)

1211. After the funeral at around 9 or 10 p.m., Bosnian Serb police officers carrying automatic rifles arrived at the Sušica camp with a truck.⁴²⁰⁷ At that time, approximately 140 to 150 non-Serb detainees remained at Sušica camp.⁴²⁰⁸ The police officers said that they had been instructed by Mane Đurić to remove the detainees as soon as possible, that they should pack their belongings and that they would probably be transported to the frontline where they would be released.⁴²⁰⁹ The police officers also presented a written order from the SJB Chief to the guards instructing them to hand over the detainees.⁴²¹⁰ The detainees were hurried to gather their belongings as quickly as possible and were loaded onto the truck in groups of 30 to 40 persons and taken towards Vlasenica town.⁴²¹¹ The detainees who were taken in the first group were called out from a list of names.⁴²¹² Approximately one and a half or two hours later the police officers returned with the empty truck and called out the names of the next group of detainees who were also loaded onto the truck.⁴²¹³ This process repeated itself with three or four groups of detainees taken away in the truck in this manner with the last group taken away in a small bus accompanied by a group of Bosnian Serbs wearing police and military uniforms.⁴²¹⁴

1212. The Chamber took judicial notice that three MUP officers arrived at the Sušica camp, removed all 140 to 150 inmates in four loads, and killed them.⁴²¹⁵ This included 41 non-Serb detainees who were taken away and killed by the Bosnian Serb police at Debelo Brdo.⁴²¹⁶ This incident was reported to members of the Vlasenica Crisis Staff, who took no action except to order the dismantling of the camp, the destruction of any documents, and the concealment of any traces of the existence of the camp.⁴²¹⁷

⁴²⁰⁷ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 129 (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18122 (29 August 2011) (closed session).

⁴²⁰⁸ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 120 (under seal).

⁴²⁰⁹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 128 (under seal).

⁴²¹⁰ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 128 (under seal). *But see* D2967 (Witness statement of Momir Deurić dated 16 February 2013), para. 25; Momir Deurić, T. 33933–33934 (18 February 2013) who denied knowledge of what happened to the detainees. *See also* D3886 (Witness statement of Svetozar Andrić dated 16 July 2013), para. 7, who also denied knowledge about the incident but then testified that the Brigade did not have the responsibility or strength to protect the detainees. The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 3858 and 3894 as to why the evidence of the relevant witnesses is not reliable in this regard.

⁴²¹¹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 129 (under seal).

⁴²¹² P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 129 (under seal).

⁴²¹³ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 130 (under seal).

⁴²¹⁴ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 130–132 (under seal).

⁴²¹⁵ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 135, 137 (under seal). *See* Adjudicated Fact 2719 (the Chamber notes that the Adjudicated Fact refers to the night of 30 September 1992 while the evidence received in this case indicates that they were taken away on the night of 29 September 1992). *But see* D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 73 (stating that to his knowledge no police officer was involved in the murder of detainees). The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 3858 as to why Đurić's evidence in this regard is found to be unreliable. The Accused acknowledged that 140 to 150 people were taken from Sušica and killed but submitted that this was an impulsive act of revenge which was not the result of his visit or speech. Defence Final Brief, confidential, para. 1438.

⁴²¹⁶ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 97, 103–104, 106, 134, 137, 157 (under seal); P3260 (List of missing civilians in Vlasenica in 1992) (under seal). *See also* P3253 (Handwritten list of non-Serbs brought to Sušica camp, 18 July 1992) (under seal). The individuals identified by KDZ033 as having been removed by the police from the Sušica camp that night were Nedžmin Aganović, Amir Alihodžić, Jakub Alihodžić, Salko Arijhodžić, Naser Atalov, Šaban Durmanović, Osmo Efendić, Salko Efendić, Jasmin Ferhatbegović, Ragib Ferhatbegović, Jusuf Gruhonjić, Bernes Hadžić, Enes Hadžić, Namko Hadžić, Suljo Handžić, Armin Hasanbegović, Mensur Hasanbegović, Mevludin Hasanbegović, Šemsudin Hasanbegović, Mevludin Hodžić, Sead Mehanović, Seid Mehanović, Sejfo Mehanović, Mehmed Mlačo, Hasan Parić, Osman Saračević, Alija Smajlović, Hazim Smajlović, Mujo Smajlović, Edhem Šahbegović, Esad Šahinpašić, Mersudin Šahinpašić, Nedim Šahinpašić, Senahid Šahinpašić, Ahmet Taljić, Muhamed Telalović, Sejfo Telalović, Bego Topčić, Enver Topčić, Mensur Tutić, Ibrahim Zlatić, and Suljo Hajdarević (this name was added by the witness during direct examination). KDZ033, T. 18016 (29 August 2011) (closed session). Of these named individuals, 18 were identified as having been exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 52–55, 95. *See also* P4856 (Appendix B to the Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief filed on 18 May 2009 marked by Amor Mašović), p. 29.

⁴²¹⁷ [REDACTED]. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2720. *But see* D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 74 (stating that the municipal authorities were not involved in hiding this incident and that the Vlasenica Crisis Staff has already ceased to exist). The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 3858 as to why Đurić's evidence in this regard is found to be unreliable.

1213. The Chamber therefore finds that approximately 140 detainees were taken from Sušica camp on or about 30 September 1992 and killed by Serb Forces. **(#Not “Serb Forces” but a renegade#! Again, an abuse of the “Serb Forces”, but by the same renegade who committed all the crimes in the camp Susica itself, while reporting falsely to superiors! The responsibility can not be spread further from the very immediate perpetrator, not even to the most immediate superior, let alone to the President!)**

ii. Movement of the population from Vlasenica and appropriation of property

1214. A large number of both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs left Vlasenica in the lead-up to 21 April 1992.⁴²¹⁸ The departure of both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims increased when conflict began in Bijeljina and Zvornik.⁴²¹⁹ The mass departure of the Bosnian Muslim population from Vlasenica started at the beginning of April 1992 with most people leaving for Kladanj, Tuzla, and Živinice.⁴²²⁰ **(#Before VRS enacted#! This ethnic cleansing was “ordered” by the events and the civil war, and by the SDA (Muslim party) Headquarters, not by the “Serb Forces” or authorities, and that goes with the vast majority of cases throughout Bosnia!)** Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim representatives went to Tuzla and appealed to the population to return, but when this failed the Bosnian Muslim leadership also left Vlasenica.⁴²²¹ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! There was no too much of chance that the Muslims who left to Tuzla and elsewhere would accept this appeal, since Mr. Izetbegovic ordered Redzic to “buy some time” by procrastinating the talks for the Agreement with the Serbs, in order to enable the Muslim population to leave Vlasenica, see para 1110 and the next para of this Judgement!)**

1215. Redžić had contact with Izetbegović about allowing Bosnian Muslims a chance to flee Vlasenica.⁴²²² After the Bosnian Serb TO entered Vlasenica on 21 April 1992, some of

⁴²¹⁸ Ibro Osmanović, T. 17959 (29 August 2011); D2922 (Witness statement of Savo Čeliković dated 10 February 2013), paras. 4, 23; Savo Čeliković, T. 33550 (13 February 2013); D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), paras. 19, 41; Mane Đurić, T. 35023–35024 (7 March 2013); D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), paras. 16–17; D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), para. 27; D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 26, 45.

⁴²¹⁹ D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 17; Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5111–5112; Izet Redžić, T. 17739–17740 (23 August 2011); KDZ033, T. 18031 (29 August 2011) (closed session); P3262 (Witness statement of KDZ603 dated 30 August 2011), para. 5 (under seal); KDZ603, T. 18142 (1 September 2011). See also P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 16; D2967 (Witness statement of Momir Deurić dated 16 February 2013), para. 12.

⁴²²⁰ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5105. See also D2967 (Witness statement of Momir Deurić dated 16 February 2013), para. 14; D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 19; D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 17. Defence witnesses testified that Bosnian Muslims took their families to areas where there was a Bosnian Muslim majority and then military aged men returned to the villages around Vlasenica. D2922 (Witness statement of Savo Čeliković dated 10 February 2013), para. 32. See also D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), para. 19. The Chamber does not consider this to be inconsistent with the evidence regarding the movement of the population. Similarly the Chamber places no weight on the assessment that Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim populations relocated of their own initiative to villages where they were a majority and that this demonstrated that war in Vlasenica was defensive. D2922 (Witness statement of Savo Čeliković dated 10 February 2013), para. 29. **(“DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE EVIDENCE REGARDING THE MOVEMENT OF THE POPULATION...” WHAT DOES IT MEAN, WITH THIS DOUBLE NEGATION? THERE IS NO MORE PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE THAN THIS, CONFIRMED BY THE MUSLIMS WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS MOVEMENT OF THE POPULATION. NO SPACE FOR ANY DOUBTS!)**

⁴²²¹ D2922 (Witness statement of Savo Čeliković dated 10 February 2013), para. 33; D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), paras. 19, 21, 36. See also D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 29, 39.

⁴²²² Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5107–5111.

the Bosnian Muslim population left for Kladanj and Tuzla.⁴²²³ The Bosnian Serb authorities were asked for help in providing transport for people who were requesting to leave the municipality. Many inhabitants were then transported in the direction of Kladanj while others left in their own vehicles or by bus.⁴²²⁴

1216. The day after the JNA left Vlasenica in May 1992, local Bosnian Serbs fired mortar shells at the Bosnian Muslim villages of Pijuci, Džamdžići and Bare.⁴²²⁵ **(#Not established#! The Chamber didn't establish, and even didn't want to hear, whether these villages were militarised, or not, disarmed, or not, because the Defence was prevented to depict the context and conduct of the other side, justifying this as a "Tu quoque" reason. But, in any criminal case it is essential to establish whether an accused side could do different, or not!)** Following these attacks the Bosnian Muslims from these villages headed in the direction of Kladanj, Živinice and Cerska.⁴²²⁶ **(#Abuse of civilian settlement# Cerska was the Muslim part of Vlasenica, an armed stronghold and a springboard for the attacks on the Serb settlements until it had fallen in April 1993. How come it was not of any significance for this case?)** Paramilitaries also used force which placed pressure on Bosnian Muslims to leave the municipality.⁴²²⁷ Before being transferred from Vlasenica in May 1992, women from Zaklopača were made to sign statements that they would give their houses and property to the Bosnian Serbs.⁴²²⁸ **(#Property, never appropriated#! The Chamber knew that this didn't happen. There was no a single case of change of ownership in the Republic of Srpska. What was collected was a list of property left behind for which the municipality had to take care, and could have used it on a temporary basis, as ever in a war times! A serious court should not miss to establish such a kind of facts, and to accept the fake allegations of a malicious witnesses, who continue to wage the war through their false testimonies! The caution that the Chamber exercised towards the Serb witnesses was unreasonable, particularly when compared with the credit given to the Muslim adversaries of the Serbs, or to the "guilt plea agreement" witnesses!)**

1217. On 19 May 1992, the Vlasenica Crisis Staff instructed the Commander of the TO and the Chief of the SJB that those who wanted to leave Vlasenica and who are "of no interest" to the SJB could do so after obtaining a permit.⁴²²⁹ **(“of no interest” to the SJB meant – no investigations or suspicions for criminal conduct! A well known term: “of no security interest”! the Chamber is leaving it as ambivalent, so to be damaging the Serb image!)** In order to be issued a pass to leave an individual had to sign a statement saying that they were leaving of their own free will.⁴²³⁰ In accordance with this instruction,

⁴²²³ D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 40 (testifying that by this date at least 50% of the Bosnian Muslim population had already left Vlasenica).

⁴²²⁴ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5058, 5060, 5148; D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), paras. 23, 27; D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 40; P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 57 (stating that the Bosnian Muslim population left after they heard about the attack on the village of Zaklopača). For evidence on the attack on Zaklopača, see Scheduled Incident A.15.2.

⁴²²⁵ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), paras. 53, 56. The Chamber places no weight on Osmanović's speculation that the shells possibly contained "white phosphorous type compound".

⁴²²⁶ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 56.

⁴²²⁷ Izet Redžić, P3189 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 5043. Stanić testified that the Bosnian Muslim population left because of the tense situation and not because they were expelled. D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), para. 19. The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 3791 above as to why it does not consider Stanić's evidence to be reliable in this regard.

⁴²²⁸ P418 (Witness statement of Mersudina Saim-Hodžić dated 24 May 2002), p. 6. For further evidence on events in Zaklopača, see Scheduled Incident A.15.2.

⁴²²⁹ P3218 (Letter from Vlasenica Crisis Staff to TO commander and SJB chief, 19 May 1992).

⁴²³⁰ P3218 (Letter from Vlasenica Crisis Staff to TO commander and SJB chief, 19 May 1992).

Bosnian Muslims queued outside the municipality building and before being issued a pass to leave the municipality had to sign a statement saying they were leaving of their own free will and that they were voluntarily surrendering their rights to their property.⁴²³¹ **(A perpetual lie, easy to check!)** Osmanović's mother, who refused to sign this document, was denied permission to leave the municipality, was forcibly moved out of her house, and taken to Sušica.⁴²³² **(Such a witnesses were able to say whatever they wanted!)**

1218. From May to October 1992, non-Serbs moved from Vlasenica and this movement related mainly to the town of Vlasenica and the central and central-northern parts of the municipality which had a majority Bosnian Muslim population.⁴²³³

1219. Bosnian Muslims from villages that were taken over Serb Forces in May 1992 gathered at the Vlasenica bus station or football stadium with their belongings waiting for an opportunity to leave the municipality.⁴²³⁴ While the Bosnian Serb authorities referred to this as "voluntary departure", these people were fleeing the municipality out of fear for their lives.⁴²³⁵ **(#No ethnic cleansing!# #Linguistic trouble#! This is the same: they hadn't been happy for that, but certainly that was their decision. A formulation in Serbian "bio sam prisiljen" which meant "I was forced" to leave was wrongly interpreted that some subject "forced" them, while it was a situation, not the authorities. With such a past participle there should be established "by whom" or "by what" forced!)** At some point the Bosnian Serb authorities did allow some Bosnian Muslims to return to their villages, but their homes had already been burnt down and almost destroyed.⁴²³⁶ **(#Right to return#! If taking that fact into consideration, the Chamber should establish whether these homes suffered during the combats, or were ruined deliberately and without a military necessity!)**

1220. In October 1992 there were very few non-Serbs,⁴²³⁷ who had married Bosnian Serbs, who remained in Vlasenica town and by the end of 1992 there were approximately 150

⁴²³¹ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 23 (under seal); P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 58. Đurić acknowledged that Bosnian Muslims left fearing for their safety but they did so voluntarily and did not have any pressure put on them and that both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims had to sign documents saying they were leaving voluntarily. D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), paras. 40–41. The Chamber does not find Đurić's evidence in this regard to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 3858. Defence witnesses testified that (i) a commission was formed which sealed and subsequently assigned abandoned Bosnian Muslim homes for the temporary accommodation of Serb refugees to prevent property from being stolen; (ii) citizens could request that their houses be exchanged and the municipal authorities would approve such exchanges after checking to see that such contracts were done properly and not under coercion; and (iii) when the conditions were right, properties were returned to their original occupants. D2982 (Witness statement of Milenko Stanić dated 16 February 2013), paras. 23–25; Milenko Stanić, T. 33992–33993 (19 February 2013); D2985 (List of persons for the exchange of houses and apartments); D2922 (Witness statement of Savo Čeliković dated 10 February 2013), paras. 24–25; Savo Čeliković, T. 33563–33564, 33569–33570 (13 February 2013); D3007 (Witness statement of Zoran Jovanović dated 18 February 2013), para. 28. The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 3791 and 3813 as to why it does not find the evidence of these witnesses to be reliable to the extent that this suggests that these measures were taken to prevent property from being stolen, to prevent coercion, and to facilitate the return of property.

⁴²³² P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 58. She only managed to leave for Tuzla in February 1993.

⁴²³³ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 52 (under seal). [REDACTED] testified about the involvement of Savo Bačić in "cleansing" operations against Bosnian Muslim villages. However, the Chamber finds that the evidence about his involvement is somewhat equivocal and does not consider this evidence to be of sufficient specificity to make findings in this regard. [REDACTED].

⁴²³⁴ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 54 (under seal); KDZ033, T. 18077, 18094–18095 (31 August 2011) (closed session).

⁴²³⁵ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 54 (under seal).

⁴²³⁶ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 54 (under seal).

⁴²³⁷ For evidence on the mass departure of the Bosnian Muslim population, see para. 1214.

Bosnian Muslims left in Vlasenica⁴²³⁸ who had not been taken into detention.⁴²³⁹ The Chamber has discussed above the detention of Bosnian Muslims in Vlasenica.⁴²⁴⁰

1221. As discussed in more detail in Section IV.C.1.a, while Serb Forces were successful in taking over and holding town centres in municipalities including Vlasenica, pockets in the surrounding countryside, which had a Bosnian Muslim majority population, remained under the control of Bosnian Muslim forces.⁴²⁴¹ Bosnian Muslim forces in the second half of 1992 and early 1993 launched an offensive in which they took control of territory in Vlasenica and tried to link with Bosnian Muslim forces in Cerska.⁴²⁴² The counter-offensive by the VRS in spring 1993, prompted the movement of the vast majority of the Bosnian Muslim civilians who remained in Cerska and thousands fled towards Srebrenica.⁴²⁴³ **(#Abuse of civilian settlement#! Cerska was a part of Vlasenica, and hadn't been attacked until the Muslim offensives in the fall of 1992, and early 1993! . But the presence of a 30,000 strong Muslim armed forces in Cerska and other villages in Vlasenica, Bratunac, Zvornik, Srebrenica, was a permanent jeopardy for the JNA and later for the Serb civilians and soldiers. The Chamber already knows what was the crucial difference between the Serb and Muslim intentions. The Serbs agreed and proposed that every community keep their own territories and organise their own responsible authorities, while the Muslim side wanted the entire Bosnia under their control, as the Chamber had heard from Dzambasovic and other witnesses! If there was the same attitude of the Muslim as the Serb side, there wouldn't be a war whatsoever, or there wouldn't be a war in many municipalities with a clear-cut distribution of territories!)**

1222. The Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims were forced to leave the municipality, albeit in some cases, they may have left out of fear following the arrival of Bosnian Serb refugees or even requested to leave the municipality.⁴²⁴⁴ **(Not to forget the Mr. #Izetbegovic's recommendation to Redzic, to initiate the leaving of population#! There was no a single evidence that there was a forceful displacement, but "out of fear" left both the Serbs and Muslims!)** Even if the Bosnian Muslims requested to leave the municipality the Chamber finds that this was still involuntary considering the surrounding circumstances in which they left the municipality. **(#Population movement, out of fear#! But, this is not to object to the Serbs, because the Serbs didn't want the war, and did everything to avoid it. So, as many other, this argument is not against the Serb conduct, but against a civil war, and everyone would agree on that!)**

b. Zvornik

i. Charges

⁴²³⁸ P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 56, 58 (under seal). *See also* P4994 (Addendum to Ewa Tabeau's expert report entitled "Ethnic Composition in Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from 27 Municipalities of BiH 1991 to 1997", 3 February 2009), p. 31 (reporting that by 1997 the Bosnian Muslim population in Vlasenica had dropped to 0.2% of the total population); D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 34 (referring to the expulsion of 15,000 non-Serbs from Vlasenica and surrounding villages).

⁴²³⁹ P3212 (Witness statement of Ibro Osmanović dated 23 August 2011), para. 181. *See also* P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 56 (under seal).

⁴²⁴⁰ *See* Section IV.A.1.a.viii.E: Detention facilities in Vlasenica.

⁴²⁴¹ *See* para. 4946.

⁴²⁴² *See* para. 4946.

⁴²⁴³ *See* paras. 4947–4949, 4954–4956, 4962.

⁴²⁴⁴ D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), paras. 42–43; D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 32–42, 45.

1223. Under Count 3, the Prosecution alleges that persecution, a crime against humanity, was committed in Zvornik as part of the objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats from the Municipalities.⁴²⁴⁵ Under Count 1, the Prosecution further alleges that in certain municipalities, including Zvornik, this persecutory campaign included or escalated to include conduct that manifested an intent to destroy in part the national, ethnical and/or religious groups of Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats as such.⁴²⁴⁶

1224. Acts alleged to have been committed in Zvornik by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include killings during and after the take-over;⁴²⁴⁷ killings related to detention facilities; and killings committed during, and deaths resulting from, cruel and inhumane treatment at scheduled detention facilities.⁴²⁴⁸ The Prosecution characterises these acts as killing, an underlying act of genocide, under Count 1; persecution, a crime against humanity, under Count 3; extermination, a crime against humanity, under Count 4, murder, a crime against humanity, under Count 5; and murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war, under Count 6.⁴²⁴⁹

1225. Other acts alleged to have been committed in Zvornik by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include torture, beatings, and physical and psychological abuse, rape and other acts of sexual violence, during and after the take-over and in scheduled detention facilities, as well as the establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions in detention facilities, as cruel or inhumane treatment, an act of persecution under Count 3.⁴²⁵⁰ In relation to Count 1, the Prosecution alleges that in scheduled detention facilities in Zvornik thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were subjected to cruel or inhumane treatment, including torture, physical and psychological abuse, rape, other acts of sexual violence, and beatings by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs; the Prosecution characterises this inhumane treatment as causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups, an underlying act of genocide.⁴²⁵¹ In addition, under Count 1, the Prosecution alleges that members of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups were detained under conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, namely through cruel and inhumane treatment, including torture, physical and psychological abuse, rape, other acts of sexual violence, inhumane living conditions, forced labour and the failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care or hygienic sanitation facilities.⁴²⁵²

1226. Under Count 3, other acts of persecution alleged to have been committed in Zvornik by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs, include (i) forcible transfer or deportation of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from their homes;⁴²⁵³ (ii) unlawful detention in scheduled detention facilities;⁴²⁵⁴ (iii) appropriation or plunder of property, during and after the take-over, during arrests and detention and in the course of or

⁴²⁴⁵ Indictment, paras. 48–49.

⁴²⁴⁶ Indictment, paras. 37–38.

⁴²⁴⁷ Indictment, para. 60(a)(i). *See* Scheduled Incidents A.16.1, A.16.3.

⁴²⁴⁸ Indictment, para. 60(b). *See* Scheduled Detention Facilities C.27.1, C.27.2, C.27.3, C.27.4, C.27.5, C.27.6, C.27.7.

⁴²⁴⁹ Indictment, paras. 40(a)(i), 40(a)(ii), 63(a), 63(b).

⁴²⁵⁰ Indictment, para. 60(b), 60(c). *See* Scheduled Detention Facilities C.27.1, C.27.2, C.27.3, C.27.4, C.27.5, C.27.6, C.27.7.

⁴²⁵¹ Indictment, para. 40(b).

⁴²⁵² Indictment, paras. 40(c), 60(d), 60(h). *See* Scheduled Detention Facilities C.27.1, C.27.2, C.27.3, C.27.4, C.27.5, C.27.6, C.27.7.

⁴²⁵³ Indictment, para. 60(f).

⁴²⁵⁴ Indictment, para. 60(g). *See* Scheduled Detention Facilities C.27.1, C.27.2, C.27.3, C.27.4, C.27.5, C.27.6, C.27.7.

following acts of deportation or forcible transfer;⁴²⁵⁵ (iv) the wanton destruction of private property including homes and business premises and public property including cultural monuments and sacred sites;⁴²⁵⁶ and (v) the imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures.⁴²⁵⁷

1227. Under Counts 7 and 8, the Prosecution alleges deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer), respectively, as crimes against humanity.⁴²⁵⁸ The Prosecution alleges that, by the end of 1992, Serb Forces as well as Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs forcibly displaced Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Zvornik in which they were lawfully present.⁴²⁵⁹ It is alleged that from March 1992, restrictive and discriminatory measures, arbitrary arrest and detention, harassment, torture, rape and other acts of sexual violence, killing, destruction of houses, cultural monuments and sacred sites, as well as the threat of further such acts caused Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to flee in fear while others were physically driven out.⁴²⁶⁰

ii. Lead-up

1228. Zvornik is a municipality in eastern BiH.⁴²⁶¹ It is located on the Drina river, which marks the boundary between BiH and Serbia.⁴²⁶² Prior to the war approximately 60% of the population in the municipality were Bosnian Muslims and approximately 38% were Bosnian Serbs.⁴²⁶³

1229. Prior to the formation of national parties in mid-1990 inter-ethnic relations in Zvornik were good.⁴²⁶⁴ The SDS in Zvornik was formed in September 1990 and Branko Grujić was elected president.⁴²⁶⁵ Following the multi-party elections, in November 1990, the SDA won an absolute majority of the votes in Zvornik but a coalition government was

⁴²⁵⁵ Indictment, para. 60(i).

⁴²⁵⁶ Indictment, para. 60(j). See Scheduled Incident D.22.

⁴²⁵⁷ Indictment, para. 60(k). The restrictive and discriminatory measures alleged include the denial of freedom of movement; the removal from positions of authority; the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of homes; unlawful arrest and/or the denial of the right to judicial process; and/or the denial of equal access to public services.

⁴²⁵⁸ Indictment, paras. 68–75.

⁴²⁵⁹ Indictment, paras. 69, 72.

⁴²⁶⁰ Indictment, para. 71.

⁴²⁶¹ D484 (Map of BiH); P3175 (Map of Zvornik).

⁴²⁶² P2919 (Witness statement of KDZ023 dated 29 September 1996), p. 2; P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), p. 2. (under seal); D1627 (Video footage re view of Zvornik from Kula); P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), p. 51 (under seal); P3175 (Map of Zvornik).

⁴²⁶³ P6199 (Excerpt from censuses records of 1971, 1981 and 1991), p. 2; P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), p. 2; Momčilo Mandić, T. 5299 (16 July 2010); KDZ555, T. 17221 (16 August 2011); D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), para. 5; Marinko Vasilčić, T. 39923 (13 June 2013); D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), para. 3; D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 5; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 8; P6370 (Excerpt from 1991 census re Zvornik). See also P4994 (Addendum to Ewa Tabeau's expert report entitled "Ethnic Composition, Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from 27 Municipalities of BiH 1991 to 1997", 3 February 2009), pp. 32. Similarly, approximately 64% of the population in the town of Zvornik were Bosnian Muslims with the remainder Bosnian Serbs. Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2869.

⁴²⁶⁴ P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), p. 2; KDZ555, T. 17222 (16 August 2011); D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), para. 6; D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), para. 5; D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 4; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 7; KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelj*), T. 8691–8692.

⁴²⁶⁵ D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 3, 6; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 4; P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), p. 3 (under seal); KDZ228, P324 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 14935; D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), paras. 5–8 (under seal). The Chamber notes that Branko Grujić is also referred to as Brano Grujić.

formed between the SDA and the SDS.⁴²⁶⁶ Official positions were divided between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs in accordance with the election results. For example, Abdulah Pašić was appointed president of the municipality, Jovan Ivanović was appointed chairman of the Executive Board of the Municipal Assembly, Osman Mustafić was appointed chief of the SJB while Dragan Spasojević was appointed commander of the SJB.⁴²⁶⁷

1230. In the summer of 1991, the Accused attended an SDS rally in Zvornik,⁴²⁶⁸ after which the SDS and SDA issued a joint declaration which expressed the need to maintain peace in the municipality and called for greater tolerance between ethnic groups there.⁴²⁶⁹ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!)** However, tensions in Zvornik increased from then on, caused by a number of factors including (i) SDA political rallies calling for the secession of BiH;⁴²⁷⁰ (ii) disputes about the SDA outvoting the SDS and personnel changes in enterprises and organisations;⁴²⁷¹ (iii) the outbreak of war in Slovenia and Croatia and the Bosnian Muslim boycott of JNA mobilisation;⁴²⁷² (iv) acts of violence against Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Serb villages;⁴²⁷³ and (v) sporadic shooting in the centre of town and around Zvornik.⁴²⁷⁴ This led to violent incidents and greater divisions and ill-feeling between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs.⁴²⁷⁵ Some Bosnian Serb women and children chose to cross-over the Drina to Serbia to sleep at night.⁴²⁷⁶ **(#None due to Karad'i's, or any other Serb liability#! Undoubtedly, the Serb side was subjugated, scared, deprived and humiliated, and finally many of the Serbs left to Serbia!)**

⁴²⁶⁶ D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), para. 5; D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 5, 7; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), paras. 3, 9; D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 12 (under seal); D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), para. 4.

⁴²⁶⁷ D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 9; D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 7–8; KDZ059, P67 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 29094; D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), para. 6; D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 20 (under seal); D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), para. 7; P34 (Structure of Serbian SDB and Zvornik/Bijeljina MUP) (under seal).

⁴²⁶⁸ D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), paras. 17–18; D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), para. 18; KDZ320, T. 28092 (25 April 2012).

⁴²⁶⁹ D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 15; D3725 (Joint declaration of Zvornik SDS and SDA, undated).

⁴²⁷⁰ D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), para. 7; D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 6, 22; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), paras. 4–6, 11. *See also* D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), paras. 6, 8–9, 16–17; D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 6 (under seal); D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), paras. 8–10.

⁴²⁷¹ D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), para. 11. *See also* D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), paras. 6, 8–9; D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 8–9; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), paras. 10–11; D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), paras. 21–22 (under seal).

⁴²⁷² D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), para. 10; D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 10, 13; D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 13 (under seal); KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelj*), T. 8692. *See also* D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), para. 20; D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), paras. 11–12; P925 (JNA 2nd Military District combat report, 10 April 1992), p. 2.

⁴²⁷³ D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 27 (under seal); D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), paras. 12, 19. *See also* D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), para. 15; D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 13–14, 45 referring for example to D48 (Zvornik Lower Court's on-site investigation report); Branko Grujić, T. 40378 (25 June 2013); D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 15; D2944 (Witness statement of Zoran Durmić dated 12 February 2013), paras. 7–9, 12–17, 25–26.

⁴²⁷⁴ KDZ059, P67 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 29085–29087.

⁴²⁷⁵ P133 (Witness statement of Matija Bošković dated 20 November 2003), para. 10; P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), p. 3 (under seal); KDZ059, P67 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 29085–29086. *See also* Petko Panić, T. 19160 (20 September 2011).

⁴²⁷⁶ P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 4 (under seal); P4838 (Map of ethnic composition of Zvornik); KDZ610, T. 27180, 27184 (29 March 2012); D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), para. 17; KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 6755–6756, 6913 (under seal); KDZ240, T. 16083–16084 (5 July 2011) (closed session).

1. Division of municipal structures

1231. In December 1991 at an SDS meeting in Sarajevo attended by SDS officials including the Accused, representatives of municipal authorities, including Zvornik, received the Variant A/B Instructions.⁴²⁷⁷ These instructions were also discussed by the Accused at a meeting of the SDS Deputies Club, which was also attended by representatives from Zvornik.⁴²⁷⁸ Given that Zvornik had a majority Muslim population, the Variant B instructions were to be implemented.⁴²⁷⁹

1232. On 22 December 1991, a crisis staff was formed in Zvornik and Branko Grujić was appointed as its President.⁴²⁸⁰ **(#Context# missed! As for the other events, it is essential to see the context: a couple of days before Zvornik formed it's Crisis Staff, there was an illegal and unti-constitutional request of the Government of BiH for the independence. This could be done only in accordance with the Constitution of Yugoslavia and the one of BiH. No government could apply for independence. That was a dramatic time, with no respect for any law or constitution, and the western part of the international community allowed this kind of development! A crisis Staffs are to be formed in a crisis situation, and that was one!)** The Zvornik Crisis Staff consisted of leading SDS officials from the municipality and the municipal command staff of the JNA.⁴²⁸¹ **(#Legal and constitutional# #Serb part only#! But, prior to that moment, the Serb side announced that it will form the Serb Municipality of Zvornik and invited the Muslim side to do the same, in order to avoid the war! #Two municipalities – a peace!#)**

1233. The Variant A/B Instructions were implemented by the Zvornik Crisis Staff.⁴²⁸² On 26 December 1991, the Zvornik SDS issued a statement that a decision would be adopted

⁴²⁷⁷ KDZ555, T. 17223, 17227 (16 August 2011); P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991); Branko Grujić, T. 40448–40449 (26 June 2013); Jovan Ivanović, T. 39844–39845 (12 June 2013); P6402 (Excerpt from Jovan Ivanović's statement to OTP, 27 March 2002), p. 2; P6403 (Excerpt from Jovan Ivanović's testimony before Belgrade District Court, 29 September 2006), p. 3. See also KW317, T. 39329 (5 June 2013); P6369 (Excerpts from KW317's statement to OTP, 14 June 2002), e-court p. 2 (under seal).

⁴²⁷⁸ P6369 (Excerpts from KW317's statement to OTP, 14 June 2002), p. 2 (under seal); KW317, T. 39337 (5 June 2013).

⁴²⁷⁹ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 30 March 2002), paras. 10–11.

⁴²⁸⁰ D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 25 (under seal); P2590 (Conclusions of Zvornik's SDS Municipal Board, 22 December 1991); P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated) (under seal), p. 35. Bosnian Muslims also created a crisis staff in Zvornik. D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 20; KW317, T. 39411 (6 June 2013). Defence witnesses disputed the date when the Zvornik Crisis Staff was created and testified that the purpose of its creation was to find a peaceful solution and to normalise relations through political discussions and to prepare for the danger that elected bodies could be blocked from discharging their functions. D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 18, 20, 28; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 15; D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), paras. 26, 33 (under seal); D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), para. 13; Čedomir Zelenović, T. 40317–40321 (24 June 2013). Having analysed this evidence, the Chamber does not find it to be reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber noted that the evidence of Grujić, Ivanović and Zelenović was marked by indicators of bias, evasiveness, insincerity and extensive contradictions.

⁴²⁸¹ See Adjudicated Fact 2210; D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012) (under seal), para. 25; P2590 (Conclusions of Zvornik's SDS Municipal Board, 22 December 1991).

⁴²⁸² KDZ555, T. 17227 (16 August 2011); KW317, T. 39333–39334 (5 June 2013). However, witnesses also testified that there was no monitoring of the implementation of these instructions from a higher level, and that it was only selectively implemented in Zvornik after identifying elements which suited the municipality and excluding those aspects which could not be implemented in the municipality. KDZ555, T. 17234–17235 (16 August 2011) (private session), T. 17280 (16 August 2011), T. 17339 (17 August 2011); D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 18; Branko Grujić, T. 40367 (25 June 2013); KW317, T. 39333–39334 (5 June 2013). The Chamber does not find the evidence of these witnesses to be reliable with respect to the manner in which the Variant A/B Instructions were implemented in Zvornik. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that the testimony of the relevant witnesses was marked by extreme evasiveness, attempts to distance themselves from prior statements, and indicators of bias. For example Grujić was contradicted on cross-examination by reference to his prior testimony and interview where he suggested that the Variant A/B Instructions were mandatory and that the Zvornik Crisis Staff reported back, received, and implemented additional instructions from the republic level. Grujić ultimately acknowledged that Jovo Mijatović was tasked with conveying all conclusions and decisions of the Zvornik Crisis Staff to the appropriate levels and would convey all instructions from the republic level. Branko Grujić, T. 40371–40373

the following day to form the Serb Municipality of Zvornik and that a team of negotiators should be formed to decide on partitions.⁴²⁸³ The decision to form the Serb Municipality of Zvornik directly cited to the Variant A/B Instructions and included the separation of certain parts of the municipality.⁴²⁸⁴ On 27 December 1991, the Serb Assembly of Zvornik was formed along with all organs and it identified the territory that would belong to the Serb Municipality of Zvornik.⁴²⁸⁵ Jovo Mijatović was elected President of the Serb Municipality of Zvornik⁴²⁸⁶ and appointed co-ordinator for discussions with the SDA.⁴²⁸⁷ **(#Two municipalities – peace#! It is understood that the Muslims would have their own municipality, while there was no sufficient Croatian settlements to form their municipality!)**

1234. From early January 1992, employees of the SJB were in regular contact with the Steering Committee of the SDS and were instructed to gather support and prepare for the formation of a Serb SJB.⁴²⁸⁸

1235. The SDS took the position that the municipality and town should be divided geographically between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims but could not reach an agreement with the SDA.⁴²⁸⁹ On 15 March 1992, the Assembly of the Serb Municipality of Zvornik proclaimed the Serb Municipality of Zvornik, consisting of parts of the town, villages and communes where Bosnian Serbs were in the majority.⁴²⁹⁰ On the same date the

(25 June 2013); P6415 (Excerpt from Branko Grujić's testimony before Belgrade District Court, 30 November 2005), pp. 2–3. **(BUT, WHAT IS PROBLEM WITH FORMATION OF A NEW MUNICIPALITY? THIS WAS A CONSTITUTIONAL POSSIBILITY AND THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE. THERE COULD BE NOTHING WRONG FROM THAT, EXCEPT IF THE OTHER SIDE WANTED TO PREVENT IT, FOR THE SAKE OF DOMINATION!)**

⁴²⁸³ D3726 (Letter from Zvornik SDS, 26 December 1991); D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 19. *See also* P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 30 March 2002), paras. 10–11.

⁴²⁸⁴ P2591 (Decision regarding the formation of the Serbian Municipality of Zvornik, 27 December 1991), pp. 1–2. Witnesses testified the establishment of the Serbian Municipality of Zvornik and its Assembly was not for the purpose of creating a Serbian state or to take-over Bosnian Muslim territory, but to assist with negotiations, to allow the municipality to function in a crisis situation, and to ensure the protection of Bosnian Serbs. They also testified that while preparations were made, individuals were appointed to their positions and Serb institutions were created, they were not activated until 1992 when the conflict broke out. D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 19, 21; KDZ555, T. 17344 (17 August 2011); D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), paras. 23–24, 26 (under seal); KW317, T. 39409–39410 (6 June 2013); Jovan Ivanović, T. 39844–39845 (12 June 2013); D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 15; P6402 (Excerpt from Jovan Ivanović's statement to OTP, 27 March 2002), p. 2; P6403 (Excerpt from Jovan Ivanović's testimony before Belgrade District Court, 29 September 2006), p. 3. The Chamber refers to its assessment in fns. 4237 and 4239 as to why it cannot rely on the evidence of these witnesses with respect to the purpose of creating the Serb Municipality of Zvornik and when the Serb institutions were activated. Similarly the evidence of KW317 in this respect was also marked by attempts to distance himself from prior statements and contradictions which undermined his evidence in this regard.

⁴²⁸⁵ D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 19.

⁴²⁸⁶ Branko Grujić, T. 40367, 40370, 40372 (25 June 2013); P2590 (Conclusions of Zvornik's SDS Municipal Board, 22 December 1991), p. 1–2; KDZ555, T. 17228–17230 (16 August 2011) (private session).

⁴²⁸⁷ D3655 (Decision of Zvornik Municipal Assembly, 27 December 1991); D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 24 (under seal).

⁴²⁸⁸ P3390 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB for 1993), p. 20; P3183 (Excerpt from Report on the work of the Zvornik SJB for the year 1992), p. 2; P2761 (RS MUP report on work for period April to December 1992), p. 5. *See also* P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 30 March 2002), paras. 10–11.

⁴²⁸⁹ KDZ320, T. 28093 (25 April 2012). *See also* D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), para. 19. The Chamber notes that when Vasilčić was cross-examined about the percentage of the territory of Zvornik which was identified as being Serb he distanced himself from his prior interview where he estimated that it was 80%. Marinko Vasilčić, T. 39920–39924 (13 June 2013); P6405 (Excerpt from Marinko Vasilčić's interview with OTP, 21 October 2002), p. 2. The Chamber notes that Vasilčić was extremely evasive when questioned and claimed he was not aware of the decision to form the Serb Municipality of Zvornik which listed the territories which it would comprise even though he had previously stated that he heard about the decision. In light of these contradictions and evasiveness the Chamber does not find Vasilčić's evidence to be reliable in this regard.

⁴²⁹⁰ D1693 (Decision of Zvornik Assembly, 15 March 1992), p. 1. *See also* Marinko Vasilčić, T. 39920–39922 (13 June 2013); D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 28 (under seal).

Serb Assembly of Zvornik decided to join the SAO Majevisa-Semberija.⁴²⁹¹ These decisions were made in accordance with the second level of the Variant A/B Instructions, which had been activated by the Accused at a meeting attended by a representative from Zvornik.⁴²⁹²

(Again, there is a #context missing#! At that time, mid-March, the conference of Yugoslavia and the sub-conference on Bosnia had finalised the general arrangements for the former Yugoslavia and BiH. There was a full accord of the sides that Bosnia was going to have three member states. Every community had the right to organise its own “high autonomy” to which Mr. Izetbegovic committed himself even in September 1993 and later on. But, the opposition to the Serb proposals that had been in accord with the results of Conference indicated that there would be a deception of the Serb community by the SDA, while other Muslim (secular) parties made an agreement with the Serbs!)

1236. Also on 15 March 1992, the Assembly of the Serb Municipality of Zvornik passed a decision banning the sale or trade of real estate within the municipality unless it was between “ethnic Serbs”.⁴²⁹³ In late March 1992, local youth were given assignments by Bosnian Serb police to erect barricades at specific locations, secure important facilities in Karakaj, and seize bridges.⁴²⁹⁴ **(#Before VRS#! The bridges on Drina River were a concern of the JNA, and that was the JNA order to secure the bridges between Bosnia and the rest of Yugoslavia, because of the war in Croatia. The Chamber didn’t count on a surrounding and a fierce fighting in Croatia, that affected the BiH too. Many shells had fallen in the Serb cities in Bosnia along the Sava River and the border with Croatia. In the interpretation of the Prosecution, unfortunately accepted by the Chamber, there looks like an idyll which had been spoiled by the Serbs! The context should be brought back in the case! See: D218:**

Green Berets Staff
Sarajevo BH
Telegram: strictly confidential
12.04.1992

Police Station
Višegrad

Please convey the message to Murat ŠABANOVIĆ, the Green Berets’ Commander for the region of Višegrad and its surroundings, to blow up the Višegrad dam as soon as possible.

Commander
Green Berets BH
AHMETOVIĆ Sead

Note: This is a copy of the original telegram under the above number (50/96) which is enclosed to this document.

The command line of the Green Berets was functioning, and the orders were very destructive! Nota Bene, it was 12 April 1992, the same day when an agreement on a cessation of hostilities was signed, with the highest international representatives!)

⁴²⁹¹ D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 29 (under seal); D3656 (Decision of Zvornik Municipal Assembly, 15 March 1992).

⁴²⁹² KW317, T. 39334–39337 (5 June 2013).

⁴²⁹³ P3151 (Decision of Zvornik’s Assembly, 15 March 1992), pp. 1–2. KDZ555 testified that this was a local measure that was not connected with the Variant B instructions. KDZ555, T. 17237–17239 (16 August 2011); KDZ555, T. 17344 (17 August 2011). However, the Chamber does not find KDZ555’s evidence to be reliable with respect to this issue. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that the evidence of KDZ555 was marked by indicators of extreme evasiveness, bias and contradictions.

⁴²⁹⁴ P3390 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB for 1993), p. 21.

1237. At the end of March 1992, a decision was adopted by the Bosnian Serb Assembly, calling on the Bosnian Serb police to separate by 1 April 1992.⁴²⁹⁵ **(#Legal, and agreed in ICFY#! That also had been agreed by all the ethnic components of the common MUP (police) and beside that, it had been already agreed in 1991 in the Hague (ICFY) and finally, in the Lisbon Agreement and the Cutileiro Plan, there was explicitly provided that the constituent units, states, would have their own legislative and executive bodies, and explicitly the police too. How possibly this can be threatened as a felony? If the international community agreed with the SDA leadership to deceive the Serbs, the Serbs didn't agree, but implemented those provisions that had been finalised!)** On 4 April 1992, Bosnian Muslim forces attacked a column of JNA soldiers in Sapna, Zvornik municipality.⁴²⁹⁶ **(Not to forget the #context#: on 26 and 27 March there had happened the massacre of the Serbian civilians in Bosanski Brod and a nearby Serb village Sijekovac, with close to 60 civilian casualties even before the war started. Further, in the neighbouring municipality of Bijeljina the Muslim forces led by the Capt. Tiric attacket Bijeljina and within the tree following days there was more than 40 casualties.)** Following this incident, the Bosnian Serb authorities decided barricades would be erected in Karakaj and active and reserve SJB personnel who were Bosnian Serbs would be called up.⁴²⁹⁷ On 5 April 1992, Mandić sent a dispatch to Zvornik, noting that the MUP was being divided into Serb and Muslim components and ordered the movement of the Bosnian Serb institutions to Karakaj.⁴²⁹⁸ Karakaj was an industrial settlement located to the northeast of Zvornik.⁴²⁹⁹ Following this instruction, the police stations in the municipality, were divided into Serb and Muslim parts.⁴³⁰⁰ **(Not to forget the #context#: the Muslim side had reneged the Lisbon agreement on 25 March, which resulted in the Massacre in Brod and Sijekovac, and on 4 April the Muslim/Croat component in the Presidency of BiH had called for a general mobilisation, with no other enemies than the Serbs!)**

⁴²⁹⁵ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2869–2870; P1116 (Letter from Momčilo Mandić to SRBiH MUP re division of MUP, 31 March 1992); see Adjudicated Fact 2729. See also KDZ555, T. 17263–17264 (16 August 2011) (private session); KDZ555, T. 17346–17347 (17 August 2011).

⁴²⁹⁶ P3390 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB for 1993), pp. 21–22; KDZ555, T. 17266 (16 August 2011) (private session); D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), paras. 19–20; D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 35 (under seal); D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), para. 21; D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 24; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 15.

⁴²⁹⁷ P3390 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB for 1993), p. 22.

⁴²⁹⁸ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 30 March 2002), para. 11. Grujić testified that he did not know about the dispatch from Mandić about the division of the police but was presented with his prior testimony where he said that the dispatch is what caused the police to separate and move. Branko Grujić, T. 40381–40383 (25 June 2013); P6415 (Excerpt from Branko Grujić's testimony before Belgrade District Court, 30 November 2005), p. 6. The Chamber finds that Grujić was contradicted with respect to his evidence pertaining to this dispatch and does not find his evidence with respect to this issue to be credible. The Chamber finds however, that in the lead-up to the split of the police force, there had been increasing divisions and disputes between Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim police including on issues relating to training in Croatia and mobilisation of reserve police stations. Petko Panić, T. 19151–19155 (20 September 2011); Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2971–2974; P3390 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB for 1993), pp. 20–21; P2761 (RS MUP report on work for period April to December 1992), p. 5. See also D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 12; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 12; D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), paras. 13, 18; D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), para. 19; P1154 (Witness statement of KDZ088 dated 27–29 April 2010), pp. 152–153 (under seal); P4848 (Map of Zvornik marked by KDZ610); P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 81 (under seal).

⁴²⁹⁹ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2871; D1613 (Map of Zvornik marked by KDZ555); KDZ555, T. 17418 (18 August 2011).

⁴³⁰⁰ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 9 February 1998), paras. 2–13, 2–14; Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 20675; see Adjudicated Facts 2729, 2738. KDZ555 testified that before the conflict there was agreement within the MUP on the division of assets and premises to transform the MUP. KDZ555, T. 17347 (17 August 2011). However, in light of its credibility assessment in fn. 4239, the Chamber does not consider that it can rely on KDZ555's evidence in this regard.

1238. At a meeting of the SDS on 5 April 1992, Mile Mijić was appointed as chief of the SJB and Spasojević as its commander.⁴³⁰¹ By 6 April 1992, following the orders of Spasojević who ordered the withdrawal of all Bosnian Serb police with their vehicles and equipment,⁴³⁰² the Bosnian Serb MUP, the TO and the Zvornik Crisis Staff relocated to the Alhos building in Karakaj.⁴³⁰³ The Zvornik Crisis Staff met every day starting from 4 or 5 April 1992 and discussed how to take control of Zvornik, how to restore organs and authorities and how to organise armed formations.⁴³⁰⁴ **(#The Serb municipality only#! Once again, the Chamber is not sufficiently precise: the Serb side never meditated “taking control over the entire Zvornik, but only over the Serb Municipality of Zvornik. Since the common administration had been divided, there had to be restored the Serb Municipality administration, since the Muslims, as a majority people, inherited all the facilities in the urban center of Zvornik. Why this Defence has to clarify so obvious facts? Because the process was prepared by the Prosecution which either didn’t know enough about the crisis, nor wanted to know, or both of that, and because the process went on in a differend system, on a foreign languages, and without a sufficient knowledge of the domestic laws, constitutions and good habits!)**

1239. On 10 April 1992, following the suggestion of Marko Pavlović,⁴³⁰⁵ the Zvornik Crisis Staff formed the Interim Government of the Serb Municipality of Zvornik, after which the Zvornik Crisis Staff ceased operating and the other bodies of government were disbanded.⁴³⁰⁶ Grujić was chosen as acting chairman of the Interim Government which consisted of members of the SDS.⁴³⁰⁷ **(#All legal and regular,# no matter who suggested it!)**

2. Militarisation of Zvornik

⁴³⁰¹ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2872–2875, 2930, 2978, 2998–2999. Mijić was replaced by Miloš Pantelić and Spasojević was replaced by Marinko Vasilčić. In mid-June 1992, Pantelić was replaced by Vasilčić and Momčilo Marić became the new commander. In turn, Vasilčić was replaced by Milorad Lokančević at the end of July 1992.

⁴³⁰² Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2870, 2977; P2764 (Bijeljina CSB report), p. 2; P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 9 February 1998), para. 2–14; Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 20675; P3390 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB for 1993), p. 22. Defence witnesses testified, *inter alia*, that the Bosnian Serb police only moved to Alhos after they had been disarmed by the Bosnian Muslim police and the Bosnian Serb police only withdrew their personal weapons, communications equipment and two or three cars while the Bosnian Muslims retained the arms depot. D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012) (under seal), para. 40; D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), para. 22; KDZ555, T. 17349–17350 (17 August 2011). The Chamber refers to its assessment in fn. 4237 and 4239 as to why it cannot rely on the evidence of these witnesses in this regard. Vasilčić’s evidence was also marked by contradictions and inconsistencies which undermined the reliability of his evidence in this regard.

⁴³⁰³ P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), p. 3 (under seal); *see* Adjudicated Fact 2729; P2761 (RS MUP report on work for period April to December 1992), p. 5. *See also* KDZ555, T. 17235, 17264 (16 August 2011) (private session); D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 16; KDZ446, P28 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21020–21021 (under seal).

⁴³⁰⁴ KDZ555, T. 17234 (16 August 2011) (private session).

⁴³⁰⁵ KW317, T. 39343–39344 (5 June 2013). Marko Pavlović’s real name was Branko Popović; he was a security official of the federal organs of the SFRY and came to Zvornik from Serbia. Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2887–2888; KW317, T. 39342 (5 June 2013); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 128. *See also* KDZ446, P28 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 23620, 23626, 23634 (under seal); D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 48, 51; Branko Grujić, T. 40361 (25 June 2013).

⁴³⁰⁶ P3381 (Decision of the Zvornik Crisis Staff, 10 April 1992), pp. 2–3; D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), paras. 13–14; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 24; D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012) (under seal), para. 47; KW317, T. 39402 (6 June 2013). *See also* KDZ555, T. 17219, 17233, 17235–17236 (16 August 2011) (private session). For more detail on the actions taken by the Interim Government, *see* P3381 (Decision of the Zvornik Crisis Staff, 10 April 1992), pp. 2–3; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 24; D1714 (Conclusion of Zvornik Interim Government, 25 June 1992), p. 1; Petko Panić, T. 19208–19209 (20 September 2011); D1709 (Decision of Zvornik Interim Government, 18 May 1992), pp. 3–4; P314 (Decision of interim Zvornik government, 20 May 1992); Milorad Davidović, T. 15650 (29 June 2011); P3393 (Decision of Zvornik Interim Government, 14 April 1992), p. 1. The Accused acknowledged that a Bosnian Serb Crisis Staff was formed but that it was only operational from 6 to 10 April 1992 until the Interim Government was formed. Defence Final Brief, confidential, para. 1444.

⁴³⁰⁷ D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 36; KW317, T. 39343 (5 June 2013); KDZ555, T. 17282–17283 (16 August 2011).

1240. From early 1992, both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims were arming themselves, but the Bosnian Serbs were better armed as they received support from the JNA.⁴³⁰⁸ **(It should be said that the Serbs didn't have their secret army, like the Muslims did. Instead, the Serbs remained faithful to the federal army, JNA, responding to mobilisations of conscripts and reservists. So, the JNA didn't support the Serbs, but vice versa, the Serbs supported the JNA. Thus, the Serbs had a legal access to the state's reserve of armament. Of course, many Serbs like Muslims, in accordance with their sense for security of them and their families, found a way to obtain a weapons for themselves, but always responded to the calls of the Territorial Defence and the JNA, while the Muslims didn't. In no way the Serbs jeopardised the common state, Yugoslavia, while the Muslims did everything to dismantle this country!)** The Bosnian Serb police also enabled the transport of weapons, ammunition and other material.⁴³⁰⁹ Towards the end of February 1992, at a meeting chaired by Grujić and attended by JNA officers and the military commander for Zvornik, Zoran Jovanović, there was a discussion about the formation of a military unit for the area of Zvornik.⁴³¹⁰ **(#All legal, legitimate and obligatory# for all the citizens of Yugoslavia!)** Grujić also discussed the possibility of a Bosnian Serb attack on the town.⁴³¹¹ After this meeting, weapons were distributed by Jovanović to the homes of Bosnian Serb managers of businesses, factories, and municipal organs.⁴³¹² In early spring 1992, Bosnian Serb officials from Zvornik received weapons from Croatia and Serbia, which were distributed to the villages around Zvornik.⁴³¹³

1241. On 4 April 1992, the Command of the 17th Corps of the JNA reported that in municipalities, including Zvornik, there was a real danger of deterioration in the security situation and there was a threat of inter-ethnic conflict.⁴³¹⁴

1242. Following the attack against the JNA column on 4 April 1992,⁴³¹⁵ Arkan's men were asked to come urgently to the municipality.⁴³¹⁶ **(By whom? And if the Muslim secret**

⁴³⁰⁸ KDZ059, P67 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 29088–29089, 29101; P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 4 (under seal); KDZ610, T. 27179 (29 March 2012). See also Marinko Vasić, T. 39918–39919 (13 June 2013); KDZ555, T. 17238, 17246–17247 (16 August 2011). The Chamber finds that the level of military organisation by Bosnian Muslims in Zvornik was limited. KDZ610, T. 27179 (29 March 2012). See also P1996 (Witness statement of Martin Bell dated 8 March 2010), para. 24 (testifying that Bosnian Muslims in Zvornik had no defence). However, it finds that there were armed Bosnian Muslim formations and that the SDA was involved in arming of the Bosnian Muslim population. Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2974–2976; Petko Panić, T. 19156–19157 (20 September 2011); KDZ555, T. 17246 (16 August 2011), T. 17331–17332, 17334–17335, 17363 (17 August 2011), T. 17402 (18 August 2011); D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasić dated 9 June 2013), paras. 13–15, 20; D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 11–12, 26; Branko Grujić, T. 40352–40354 (25 June 2013); D2944 (Witness statement of Zoran Durmić dated 12 February 2013), para. 10; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 13; KDZ059, P67 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 29089–29090. See also D1657 (Excerpt from book entitled “The Truth about Bratunac”); D3729 (Photograph of a board); D38 (ABiH Report on units in Zvornik, 5 November 1992), pp. 3, 5–6; D1607 (List of paramilitary groups operating in support of BiH), p. 11; KDZ320, T. 28093 (25 April 2012); KDZ340, T. 17500–17501 (19 August 2011) (private session).

⁴³⁰⁹ P3390 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB for 1993), p. 20; P3183 (Excerpt from Report on the work of the Zvornik SJB for the year 1992), p. 2.

⁴³¹⁰ P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), pp. 3–4 (under seal); KDZ059, P67 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 29107–29108.

⁴³¹¹ P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), p. 4 (under seal).

⁴³¹² P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), p. 4 (under seal).

⁴³¹³ KDZ555, T. 17248–17250, 17254–17255, 17257, 17259, 17261–17262 (16 August 2011) (private session) (testifying that Pavlović provided logistical support in bringing arms into BiH from Serbia); KDZ555, T. 17375–17377 (17 August 2011); KDZ555, T. 17397 (18 August 2011); KDZ555, T. 17248–17250, 17254–17255, 17257 (16 August 2011) (private session); KDZ446, P28 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21007, 21025–21026 (under seal). See also Jovan Ivanović, T. 39854–39855 (12 June 2013). The Chamber notes evasiveness and contradictions in Grujić's testimony about the extent to which the SDS and he were involved in the arming of Bosnian Serbs and does not consider his evidence to be reliable in this regard. P6414 (Excerpt from Branko Grujić's interview with OTP, 15 July 2002), pp. 1–3; Branko Grujić, T. 40356–40360 (25 June 2013).

⁴³¹⁴ P5474 (Report of JNA 17th Corps, 4 April 1992), p. 2.

⁴³¹⁵ See para. 1237.

army dared to attack the JNA, what the Serbs could have presumed?#Before VRS#!) On the night between 5 and 6 April 1992, Arkan's men, other paramilitaries, soldiers from Serbia, and local Bosnian Serb police constructed barricades and check-points.⁴³¹⁷ These check-points were manned by Serbs wearing camouflage uniforms⁴³¹⁸ and some Bosnian Muslims were stopped at check-points, searched, and beaten.⁴³¹⁹ Bosnian Muslims also erected barricades on the bridge from Zvornik to Serbia.⁴³²⁰ Bosnian Serbs also formed village guards in areas where they lived and set up barricades around their villages.⁴³²¹ **(A barricades, no matter whose, are predominantly a defensive action!)**

1243. On 5 April 1992, the Zvornik Crisis Staff ordered that all TO units in the Serb Municipality of Zvornik be mobilised.⁴³²² **(#Context# #order of events#!Not to forget that the previous day Mr. Izetbegović ordered a total mobilisation in the entire Bosnia. So, we do not know whether the Zvornik TO mobilisation was in this framework, or opposed to this (Muslim/Croat) total mobilisation, which is more likely. However, there is no president or any official all over the world who was entitled to prevent this population from organizing their defence!)** On 10 April 1992, the Interim Government decided to form the Zvornik TO with Pavlović as its commander.⁴³²³ Pavlović worked

⁴³¹⁶ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2878–2879; KDZ555, T. 17266, 17269 (16 August 2011) (private session); KDZ446, P28 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 23675–23676 (under seal); D1612 (Video footage of Arkan in “My Guest, His Truth”, July/August 1994), transcript, p. 13. On or about 5 April 1992, Arkan appointed his deputy Marko Pejić (a.k.a “Peja”) as the person in charge of the municipality. KDZ446, P28 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21006 (under seal). See also KDZ555, T. 17266–17267, 17269 (16 August 2011) (private session). Peja went to the Alhos factory on 6 April 1992 and met with the Bosnian Serb leadership. **(What “Bosnian Serb leadership”? #Certainly the local, not central leadership, but it should be clear!)** D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), para. 25; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 19. See also D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), paras. 38–39 (under seal); D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), para. 24; Čedomir Zelenović, T. 40315 (24 June 2013).

⁴³¹⁷ P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), p. 5 (under seal); KDZ059, P67 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 29112; P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), p. 2; see Adjudicated Fact 2729; Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2870–2871. See also P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), p. 2; D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), para. 42.

⁴³¹⁸ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 3; P133 (Witness statement of Matija Bošković dated 20 November 2003), para. 11.

⁴³¹⁹ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 3.

⁴³²⁰ See Adjudicated Fact 2730. The Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims also erected barricades. D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 23, 56–57; D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), paras. 20–24; Čedomir Zelenović, T. 40340–40341 (25 June 2013); D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), paras. 19, 21; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), paras. 15–16, 18.

⁴³²¹ D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), para. 21. See also Jovan Ivanović, T. 39854–39855 (12 June 2013); P6404 (Excerpt from Jovan Ivanović's statement to OTP, 23 October 2002), p. 2; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 15.

⁴³²² P5505 (Order of the Zvornik Municipality Crisis Staff, 5 April 1992); see Adjudicated Fact 2728. See also D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 41 (under seal). Grujić testified that he issued this decision on his own without waiting for a decision of the Crisis Staff. Branko Grujić, T. 40379 (25 June 2013); P6415 (Excerpt from Branko Grujić's testimony before Belgrade District Court, 30 November 2005), pp. 4–5. Having regard to the extensive contradictions and indications of bias, the Chamber does not find that Grujić's evidence to be reliable in this regard.

⁴³²³ P3155 (Decision of Zvornik Interim Government, 10 April 1992), p. 1; KDZ446, P28 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21004 (under seal); KDZ228, P323 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 14934, 14940 (under seal); Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2887–2888; P2860 (Zvornik TO's payroll, May 1992), p. 3; P1478 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), p. 250; Petko Panić, T. 19136 (19 September 2011); KDZ555, T. 17244, 17259 (16 August 2011) (private session), T. 17284 (16 August 2011); P2955 (Report of the Drina Corps, 17 December 1992), p. 2; P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated) (under seal), pp. 11–12, 16; P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 17 (under seal); KW317, T. 39341–39342 (5 June 2013); P6434 (Excerpt from Dragomir Andan's interview with OTP), p. 2. See also P34 (Structure of Serbian SDB and Zvornik/Bijeljina MUP) (under seal); D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 48, 51; Branko Grujić, T. 40361 (25 June 2013).

closely with Grujić, had close ties with Arkan,⁴³²⁴ and implemented the policies of the Zvornik Crisis Staff.⁴³²⁵

1244. Grujić and Spasojević were among the Bosnian Serb officials who invited and paid for paramilitaries to come to Zvornik.⁴³²⁶ **(#Volunteers, not paramilitaries#! None of them had been invited and payed as a “paramilitaries”, but as a volunteers in accordance with the Order of the Presidency of SFRY. If later on some of them reneged and became paramilitaries, as happened in Zvornik, the local authorities opposed to them and got in a conflict with them, which resulted with the massive arrest of many of the paratroopers and their groups, in an action of the Serb MUP and VRS, with the participation of Davidovic from Serbia!)** Between 5 and 8 April 1992, paramilitary units from Serbia arrived in Zvornik. These included the White Eagles led by Aždaja;⁴³²⁷ the unit led by Vojin Vučković, known as Žučo, and his brother Dušan Vučković (a.k.a. Repić);⁴³²⁸ the Red Berets led by Captain Dragan;⁴³²⁹ Niški’s group and Pivarski’s group;⁴³³⁰ as well as the “Simo Chetnik” group.⁴³³¹ Other groups which arrived or operated in Zvornik included Mauzer’s unit,⁴³³² Šešelj’s men,⁴³³³ Bošković’s unit,⁴³³⁴ the

⁴³²⁴ KW317, T. 39341–39343, 39350–39351 (5 June 2013); D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 48, 51; Branko Grujić, T. 40361 (25 June 2013).

⁴³²⁵ Milorad Davidović, T. 15536 (28 June 2011).

⁴³²⁶ KDZ320, T. 28106–28107 (25 April 2012); KDZ446, P28 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*, T. 21016 (under seal); P31 (List of names referred to during testimony of KDZ446) (under seal); KDZ555, T. 17266, 17269 (16 August 2011) (private session); P6414 (Excerpt from Branko Grujić’s interview with OTP, 15 July 2002), p. 5; Petko Panić, T. 19130, 19147 (19 September 2011); Vojislav Šešelj, T. 39576 (10 June 2013); P3178 (Indictment from Bijeljina Lower Court, 13 September 1999), p. 7 (under seal); see Adjudicated Fact 2728. See also Jovan Ivanović, T. 39865 (12 June 2013) (testifying that while officially the local leaders did not call the paramilitaries, they were probably aware or unofficially involved in the operation and it was unlikely that they came uninvited). Defence witnesses testified that (i) they had never heard about such an invitation by the Crisis Staff; (ii) Grujić did not invite the paramilitary formations into Zvornik; and (iii) they did not know who called these units. D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 55; Branko Grujić, T. 40363–406364, 40383–40384 (25 June 2013); P6414 (Excerpt from Branko Grujić’s interview with OTP, 15 July 2002), pp. 4–5; D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), para. 35; Čedomir Zelenović, T. 40321–40325 (24 June 2013), T. 40338 (25 June 2013). The Chamber does not find the evidence of Grujić and Zelenović to be reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that Grujić had an interest in downplaying his own role and involvement with the paramilitaries and his testimony in this regard was marked by inconsistencies and contradictions. Zelenović simply stated that he had not heard of such an invitation and when cross-examined on the issue of support to paramilitaries by local authorities he was evasive.

(#Volunteers, not paramilitaries# AS USUALLY, THE CHAMBER DISCREDITED THE SERB WITNESSES. HOWEVER, THE “PARAMILITARIES” HAD BEEN “INVITED” BY THE ORDER OF THE SFRY PRESIDENCY TO ADMIT THE VOLUNTEERS! REMEMBER, THE JNA HAD BEEN ATTACKED ON 4 APRIL NEAR ZVORNIK!)

⁴³²⁷ Milorad Davidović, T. 15494 (28 June 2011); P2865 (White Eagles’ payroll, June 1992); P133 (Witness statement of Matija Bošković dated 20 November 2003), para. 17; P2880 (Official Note of Valjevo State Security Centre, 2 July 1992). The White Eagles (Beli Orlovi) were transferred in October 1992 from the Zvornik to the Birač Brigade. P5404 (Order of Dragan Petković, 13 October 1992); KDZ340, T. 17490 (19 August 2011).

⁴³²⁸ As discussed in para. 1280, this unit was initially known as the special TO unit, then the Igor Marković unit and later the Yellow Wasps. This unit was organised in Zvornik in April 1992 and controlled by Žučo who was from Belgrade, his brother Repić, and a journalist named Milan Timotić. Bosnian Serb locals including those with criminal backgrounds joined this unit. KDZ446, P28 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*, T. 21006–21007 (under seal); Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2888, 3007; P2880 (Official Note of Valjevo State Security Centre, 2 July 1992); P2855 (VRS Main Staff report on paramilitary formations, 28 July 1992), p. 3; P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), pp. 18, 28–33, 36, 41, 69, 72 (under seal); P3173 (Statement of Nenad Simić to Bijeljina SJB, 6 August 1992), p. 1 (under seal); KDZ340, T. 17525 (19 August 2011); KDZ340, T. 17535, 17560–17561 (19 August 2011) (private session); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 126, 141; P2904 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 4 August 1992), p. 1; D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), p. 9; D1417 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 6 November 1993), p. 3. Žučo often visited Stevo Radić who a member of the Zvornik Crisis Staff. Branko Grujić, T. 40391 (25 June 2013); P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), p. 5 (under seal).

⁴³²⁹ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2923 (testifying that this unit arrived in Zvornik some time after 25 May 1992).

⁴³³⁰ D1632 (Report of Bijeljina SJB, 23 July 1992), p. 1; Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2876, 2925; D3789 (Dragomir Andan’s notes), p. 1; P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), pp. 17–18 (under seal); P36 (Report by CSB Bijeljina re security situation in the Zvornik Municipality, 20 July 1992) (under seal). These two groups were independent and later joined the TO. Pivarski’s Group was later placed under the command of the Yellow Wasps. Milorad Davidović, T. 15493 (28 June 2011); P2864 (Pivarski unit’s payroll, June 1992); KDZ340, T. 17523 (19 August 2011).

⁴³³¹ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2888.

⁴³³² P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), pp. 43–44.

Birčani Brigade under the command of Svetozar Andrić,⁴³³⁵ Mile Petrović's unit,⁴³³⁶ Gogić's unit,⁴³³⁷ and Crni's unit.⁴³³⁸ **(#Volunteers, not paramilitaries# Some of those units were a regular JNA units, and all the others were supposed to be subordinated to the JNA! Anyway, what the Accused had to do with all of it?)**

1245. A meeting was arranged in Mali Zvornik on 7 April 1992 between SDS, SDA, and JNA representatives to discuss how to "avoid an attack on the city" and divide the municipality into Serb and Muslim parts.⁴³³⁹ When Arkan heard these negotiations were taking place without his knowledge or approval he arrived at the meeting with his men, took the Bosnian Serb representatives to the municipal assembly building, called them traitors, and beat them.⁴³⁴⁰ Arkan told the Bosnian Serb representatives that instead of negotiating with the Bosnian Muslims, they should give them an ultimatum.⁴³⁴¹ He asked who had authorised them "to sell the Serbian land".⁴³⁴² **(#Ethnic municipalities meant peace#! It was well known that the entire Serb leadership in Bosnia advocated the formation of the ethnic municipalities, in order to avoid any conflict and preserve peace. In many municipalities there had been reached agreements, but the SDA, the Muslim party, didn't negotiate "bona fide", wanting only to buy some time and attack the Serbs in all of those municipalities!)**

1246. Arkan resumed the meeting but prevented negotiations from proceeding any further.⁴³⁴³ He gave the Bosnian Muslim negotiators an ultimatum that if they did not surrender all their weapons by the next morning, there would be a military attack and he

⁴³³³ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2879; P2238 (Intercept of conversation between Radomir Pejičić and unknown, June 1992), p. 2; P4849 (Excerpt from video entitled "The Death of Yugoslavia"), 01:27-01:37.

⁴³³⁴ P133 (Witness statement of Matija Bošković dated 20 November 2003), paras. 13–14; P158 (Payroll list of reserve soldiers); P159 (Payroll list of volunteers). Bošković was an SRS member from Zvornik and the rest of his unit were from Mali Zvornik and were supporters of Šešelj.

⁴³³⁵ P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), p. 25 (under seal).

⁴³³⁶ P2855 (VRS Main Staff report on paramilitary formations, 28 July 1992), p. 5. This unit was based in the village of Rastošnica.

⁴³³⁷ P133 (Witness statement of Matija Bošković dated 20 November 2003), para. 20; Marinko Vasilčić, T. 39945–39947 (13 June 2013). Members of this unit came from Serbia, wore police uniforms, and were paid by the municipality and included individuals who had been released from prison and consisted of members of the SRS. Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2906, 2984–2986; Petko Panić, T. 19130–19131 (19 September 2011); P3382 (List of members of Loznica TO in April 1992), pp. 1–2. This unit was tasked with trying to control the other paramilitary groups. KDZ555, T. 17289–17290 (16 August 2011), T. 17291 (16 August 2011) (private session).

⁴³³⁸ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2908–2909 (testifying that Crni's unit operated as an independent group in Zvornik even though they were given police uniforms and received the same salary); Petko Panić, T. 19135 (19 September 2011).

⁴³³⁹ D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 31–32; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 20; D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 41 (under seal); P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 4; Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2877–2878; KDZ555, T. 17232, 17268–17269, 17271–17272 (16 August 2011) (private session); D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), para. 27.

⁴³⁴⁰ D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 34. See also P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 30 March 2002), para. 15; P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 4; Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2877–2878; KDZ555, T. 17267 (16 August 2011) (private session); D1612 (Video footage of Arkan in "My Guest, His Truth", July/August 1994), transcript, p. 13; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), paras. 21–22; Jovan Ivanović, T. 39864 (12 June 2013); D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 42 (under seal); Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2877; Petko Panić, T. 19163 (20 September 2011); D1605 (Telegram of Izet Mehinagić to JNA Tuzla Corps Commander, 8 April 1992).

⁴³⁴¹ D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 43 (under seal). See also Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2877; Petko Panić, T. 19163 (20 September 2011); D1605 (Telegram of Izet Mehinagić to JNA Tuzla Corps Commander, 8 April 1992), p. 1. After this incident Jovo Mijatović and Jovan Ivanović resigned from the Zvornik Crisis Staff. KDZ555, T. 17285 (16 August 2011); D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 24.

⁴³⁴² KDZ555, T. 17269, 17272 (16 August 2011) (private session); KDZ555, T. 17355, 17387 (17 August 2011); D1611 (Video footage depicting Arkan's pre-election campaign in Zvornik, 8 September 1996), transcript p. 1; D1612 (Video footage of Arkan in "My Guest, His Truth", July/August 1994), transcript, p. 13; D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), paras. 25–26; Branko Grujić, T. 40460 (26 June 2013); D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 22.

⁴³⁴³ D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), para. 26.

would destroy the town.⁴³⁴⁴ On 8 April 1992, after this meeting, an urgent telegram was sent to the Commander of the JNA Tuzla Corps appealing for the JNA to deploy their units to protect the population of Zvornik.⁴³⁴⁵ **(Now, a Muslim official invited the same JNA that had been attacked four days prior to that in the same Municipality!)** Arkan and his men subsequently took command of military operations in Zvornik.⁴³⁴⁶

1247. In the days leading up to the attack on Zvornik in April 1992, most of the Bosnian Serbs, especially the women and children left Zvornik for Serbia or predominantly Bosnian Serb villages.⁴³⁴⁷ **(#Who started#! #Cause amd consequence#! This is not the whole truth! Until April 9 the Muslim paramilitaries, supported by the Muslim police, Green Berets and Patriotic League, took an absolute control over the city, and that was why the Serb civilians escaped to Serbia.)**

iii. Events in early April 1992

1. Take-over

1248. On 6 April 1992, the Zvornik Crisis Staff issued a decision declaring a state of war in the territory of the Serb Municipality of Zvornik, temporarily taking over the responsibilities of the municipal organs, and assigning defence duties to the Zvornik TO and parts of the reserve SJB.⁴³⁴⁸

1249. The attack on Zvornik began on or about 8 April 1992.⁴³⁴⁹ The units which took part in the attack included Arkan's men, SRS volunteers,⁴³⁵⁰ members of the police, Zvornik TO and the JNA, and men from groups belonging to Niški, Pivarski, Žučo, Gogić, as well

⁴³⁴⁴ D1612 (Video footage of Arkan in "My Guest, His Truth", July/August 1994), transcript, p. 13; KDZ555, T. 17269, 17272 (16 August 2011) (private session); KDZ555, T. 17355, 17387 (17 August 2011); D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 44 (under seal). See also D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 22; D1605 (Telegram of Izet Mehinagić to JNA Tuzla Corps Commander, 8 April 1992), p. 1; P2919 (Witness statement of KDZ023 dated 29 September 1996), p. 3; KDZ023, P65 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 26125; P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 30 March 2002), pp. 3–4; D1611 (Video footage depicting Arkan's pre-election campaign in Zvornik, 8 September 1996), transcript p. 1; D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), para. 25; Branko Grujić, T. 40460 (26 June 2013).

⁴³⁴⁵ D1605 (Telegram of Izet Mehinagić to JNA Tuzla Corps Commander, 8 April 1992), p. 1; KDZ555, T. 17355 (17 August 2011).

⁴³⁴⁶ D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), para. 28. See also D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), para. 26; D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 33–34; Branko Grujić, T. 40363 (25 June 2013); D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), paras. 23–24.

⁴³⁴⁷ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 4; D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), paras. 21, 24. See also Adjudicated Fact 2727; D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 30, 54; KDZ555, T. 17267 (16 August 2011) (private session), T. 17349, 17386 (17 August 2011); KDZ340, T. 17498–17500, 17503–17504 (19 August 2011) (private session); D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 18; D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), para. 22.

⁴³⁴⁸ P3154 (Decision of Zvornik's Crisis Staff, 6 April 1992); Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2875; D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 37 (under seal). The Chamber does not consider the evidence of KDZ555 and Ivanović with respect to manner and reason why this decision was made to be reliable. KDZ555, T. 17273–17274 (16 August 2011) (private session); D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 17. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that the evidence of Ivanović and KDZ555 was marked by contradictions, evasiveness and indicators of insincerity and bias. [REDACTED].

⁴³⁴⁹ Marinko Vasilčić, T. 39928–39929 (13 June 2013); P3390 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB for 1993), p. 22; Petko Panić, T. 19164 (20 September 2011); Čedomir Zelenović, T. 40326–40327 (24 June 2013); KDZ228, P324 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 14934–14935. See also P3263 (Witness statement of Suad Džafić dated 31 August 2011), para. 5; Branko Grujić, T. 40400–40403 (25 June 2013); D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), paras. 23, 25; KDZ555, T. 17275–17276 (16 August 2011).

⁴³⁵⁰ Šešelj in an interview said that he was asked for volunteers by Slobodan Milošević, that the Zvornik operation was planned in Belgrade, and that special units were sent from the Serbian State Security Service. Vojislav Šešelj, T. 39575 (10 June 2013); P6388 (Excerpt from video of interview with Vojislav Šešelj for "Death of Yugoslavia" documentary, with transcript), pp. 3–4. However, the Chamber does not consider that it can rely on this evidence given that on cross-examination Šešelj acknowledged that he could have made this statement in the interview in order to annoy Milošević. Vojislav Šešelj, T. 39571–39572 (10 June 2013).

as the White Eagles.⁴³⁵¹ Pavlović and Peja were involved in planning and commanding the attack.⁴³⁵² The Bosnian Serb police were ordered by Spasojević to follow Arkan's men during the attack and to patrol, occupy, and secure important facilities in the town.⁴³⁵³ Arkan's men entered the SUP building, took all documents and equipment and destroyed everything else.⁴³⁵⁴ After the initial attack, about half of Zvornik was under the control of Serb Forces and over the following 20 odd days, almost all of the remaining territory of the town also came under their control.⁴³⁵⁵ A Bosnian Muslim part of the municipality remained around Sapna.⁴³⁵⁶

1250. There were clashes between Serb Forces and Bosnian Muslim forces on 8 April 1992 and Serb Forces launched an artillery attack; they shelled the town, including with heavy mortars.⁴³⁵⁷ The town of Zvornik fell quickly following the attack by Serb Forces.⁴³⁵⁸ Bosnian Muslims who were hiding in their homes heard on radio that the Patriotic League defence lines had been broken but initially were unable to leave Zvornik because of shelling.⁴³⁵⁹ **(#Muslim lines#! See, the Patriotic League was in control of the city until that moment, not the Serb Forces. Taking into account that the same Patriotic League, as a secret army, attacked the JNA on 4 April, and have chasen all the Serb civilians from the territory under the PL control, the "attack" of the "Serb Forces" looks quite different, not as an attack, but as a liberation of the city illegally occupied by a secret Muslim army!)** However, on the evening of 8 April 1992, when there was a lull in the shooting, approximately 10,000 people, the majority of whom were Bosnian Muslims, managed to leave Zvornik with most crossing to Mali Zvornik.⁴³⁶⁰ (4317)

⁴³⁵¹ KDZ228, P323 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 14934 (under seal); P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 7 (under seal); P133 (Witness statement of Matija Bošković dated 20 November 2003), paras. 12, 21, 34; D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013), paras. 50, 70–71; P6388 (Excerpt from video of interview with Vojislav Šešelj for "Death of Yugoslavia" documentary, with transcript), p. 3; Vojislav Šešelj, T. 39575–39577 (10 June 2013); see Adjudicated Fact 2741; KDZ555, T. 17276 (16 August 2011); P2882 (Report of Bijeljina SJB, 8 August 1992), p. 3; P3178 (Indictment from Bijeljina Lower Court, 13 September 1999), p. 7 (under seal). Witnesses testified that only a small number of Karakaj TO members helped in the lifting of the blockade, that the JNA was not involved at all, that Arkan's men launched the attack to lift the blockade of Zvornik but nobody in the municipal government, including the Zvornik Crisis Staff, had requested or authorised the attack. D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 58; D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012) (under seal), para. 46. The Chamber finds the evidence of Grujić and KW317 about who was involved in authorising or conducting the attack on Zvornik to be unreliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 4237 and 4239. The Chamber also notes that it is contradicted by other credible evidence about the involvement of Pavlović and Spasojević in the operation as well as the participation of the Bosnian Serb police and the Zvornik TO in the attack. It is also not consistent with measures taken by the Zvornik Crisis Staff in the lead-up to the attack.

⁴³⁵² P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 30 March 2002), paras. 15, 17. See also P133 (Witness statement of Matija Bošković dated 20 November 2003), para. 21; Petko Panić, T. 19130 (19 September 2011).

⁴³⁵³ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2876, 2879–2881, 2979; D1631 (Report of Zvornik SJB, 29 June 1992), pp. 2–3; Petko Panić, T. 19129 (19 September 2011); P2001 (BBC news report re Zvornik, with transcript), 00:00:00–00:00:21, 00:00:38–00:00:42; P3390 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB for 1993), p. 22; P2761 (RS MUP report on work for period April to December 1992), p. 5; D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), paras. 31–32; Marinko Vasilčić, T. 39948 (13 June 2013). See also D1625 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB, July–September 1992), p. 5.

⁴³⁵⁴ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2881.

⁴³⁵⁵ KDZ555, T. 17276 (16 August 2011). See also P2886 (Interview with Marko Pavlović, 30 June 1992), p. 1.

⁴³⁵⁶ KW317, T. 39407 (6 June 2013).

⁴³⁵⁷ P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), pp. 6–7 (under seal) (stating that the shelling started from an elevated area above Mali Zvornik and that shells were "falling in Zvornik like rain. The targeting was not precise"); P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), pp. 4–5; P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), pp. 2–3; P2919 (Witness statement of KDZ023 dated 29 September 1996), p. 3; KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 6759, 6910 (under seal); KDZ240, T. 16081–16082 (5 July 2011) (closed session); P2936 (Excerpt of video "The Death of Yugoslavia", with transcript) (under seal).

⁴³⁵⁸ Petko Panić, T. 19164 (20 September 2011); Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2885; D1617 (Report of Zvornik Municipal Staff, 5 November 1992), p. 2; D1614 (Report of the Armed Forces of Tuzla District, 10 July 1992), p. 2; D1611 (Video footage depicting Arkan's pre-election campaign in Zvornik, 8 September 1996), transcript, pp. 1–2; D1612 (Video footage of Arkan in "My Guest, His Truth", July/August 1994), transcript, p. 13; D38 (ABiH Report on units in Zvornik, 5 November 1992), p. 2.

⁴³⁵⁹ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 5.

⁴³⁶⁰ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 5.

(Another word, they escaped to Serbia. Nobody had chasen or expelled them, since the Serbs didn't control the city yet, but the civilians wanted to escape the fights, and were not scared to move to Serbia!)

1251. Buildings in the town of Zvornik were burnt, windows were broken and there were traces of shooting on the walls.⁴³⁶¹ Armed soldiers wearing black uniforms were seen entering buildings; houses were either hit with mortars or set on fire.⁴³⁶² During the attack, paramilitaries, including Arkan's men, were involved in looting.⁴³⁶³ By the morning of 9 April 1992, Zvornik was under the control of Serb Forces; a Serbian flag was flying over the main mosque and Serbian music was played through the loudspeakers on the minarets.⁴³⁶⁴ In the following days, the Chief of the CSB in Bijeljina,⁴³⁶⁵ and the Bosnian Serb municipal leadership and military commanders⁴³⁶⁶ were informed that Zvornik was under the control of Serb Forces and "had been liberated". Grujić reported on the situation in the municipality to the SDS Main Board.⁴³⁶⁷ Milorad Davidović was told by Mićo Stanišić that Arkan's forces were in Zvornik and Bijeljina and "helping to liberate territory [that] they believed should become part of [the RS]".⁴³⁶⁸

1252. After the take-over of Zvornik, Arkan's men, members of the JNA, and SRS volunteers withdrew⁴³⁶⁹ but other groups lead by Žučo, Pivarski, Niški, and Crni remained in town.⁴³⁷⁰ After Arkan's departure Pavlović took on a commanding role with the paramilitaries.⁴³⁷¹

1253. In mid April 1992, Biljana Plavšić visited the Alhos factory and met with Bosnian Serb leaders including the Zvornik Crisis Staff.⁴³⁷² Mićo Stanišić in a daily report on 22 April 1992, reported that life in Zvornik was returning to normal and that the town was being cleared of Green Berets.⁴³⁷³ **(#Clearing, cleansing,# - #combatants, not civilians#)**

⁴³⁶¹ KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 6759 (under seal).

⁴³⁶² P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), p. 8 (under seal).

⁴³⁶³ KDZ059, P67 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 29117; P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 65 (under seal). See also P3338 (TANJUG news report, 14 April 1992); Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2907.

⁴³⁶⁴ P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), pp. 7–8 (under seal); P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 5; P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), pp. 2–3 (under seal); P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 11 (under seal); see Adjudicated Fact 2742.

⁴³⁶⁵ P5490 (Report of Bijeljina CSB, 16 April 1992), p. 2; P3392 (Report of Bijeljina SJB, 21 April 1992), p. 1. See also P2849 (Intercept of conversation between Goran Sarić and Mićo Davidović, 21 April 1992), p. 4; Milorad Davidović, T. 15459 (24 June 2011). In the 21 April 1992 report, the Bijeljina CSB was also informed that the town was "being cleaned".

⁴³⁶⁶ KDZ446, P28 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21029–21031 (under seal).

⁴³⁶⁷ KW513, T. 39328 (5 June 2013). The Bosnian Serb authorities in Zvornik were also in contact with the Bosnian Serb MUP in Sarajevo. P5717 (Intercept of conversation between Radmila LNU and an unidentified male, 18 April 1992).

⁴³⁶⁸ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 66. See also D1611 (Video footage depicting Arkan's pre-election campaign in Zvornik, 8 September 1996), transcript, p. 2; KDZ555, T. 17383–17384 (17 August 2011); D1612 (Video footage of Arkan in "My Guest, His Truth", July/August 1994), transcript, p. 13.

⁴³⁶⁹ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2881–2882; P1478 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 251–252; P1109 (Intercept of conversation between Arkan and Radmila Kalaban, 16 April 1992), p. 6; Vojislav Šešeljić, T. 39593–39594 (10 June 2013); D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešeljić dated 1 June 2013), para. 50; KDZ320, T. 28105–28107 (25 April 2012).

⁴³⁷⁰ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 30 March 2002), paras. 19, 21, 24; KDZ555, T. 17276 (16 August 2011) (private session); P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 38 (under seal); KDZ610, T. 27197 (29 March 2012) (private session). See also D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 37 (stating that while Arkan left some of his men remained).

⁴³⁷¹ Jovan Ivanović, T. 39866–39867 (12 June 2013).

⁴³⁷² P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), pp. 6–7 (under seal); KDZ555, T. 17277–17279 (16 August 2011) (private session).

⁴³⁷³ P2748 (SerBiH MUP daily report, 22 and 23 April 1992), pp. 3–4; P5490 (Report of Bijeljina CSB, 16 April 1992), p. 2. See also D1711 (Decision of Zvornik Interim Government, 22 April 1992); Petko Panić, T. 19205–19206 (20 September 2011); P6170 (Transcript of conversation between Branko Kostić, Alija Izetbegović, and Blagoje Adžić, 26 April 1992), p. 9. For evidence on sporadic clashes in the

mopping up, it was always meant cleared from combatants, no matter these combatants had been mentioned or not. These trials in a foreign languages contribute to confusions, and yet confuse witnesses, so it was easier to proclaim them as unreliable!)

On 29 April 1992, the Chief of the Bijeljina CSB visited the Zvornik SJB and discussed steps to return the situation in Zvornik back to normal.⁴³⁷⁴ Between April and December 1992 police from the Zvornik SJB participated in combat and mopping up operations and the SJB acknowledged that there were “cases of individuals whose method of operation was unskilled, unprofessional and illegal”.⁴³⁷⁵

2. Scheduled Incident A.16.1

1254. The Prosecution alleges that at least 15 people were killed in the town of Zvornik between 9 and 10 April 1992.

1255. During the attack on Zvornik, Arkan’s men “piled dozens of dead bodies”, including the bodies of children, women, and elderly persons onto four or five trucks while other bodies remained in the streets and outside houses.⁴³⁷⁶ Among those killed was Fehim Kujundžić, the director of the Karakaj Technical School,⁴³⁷⁷ Muhamed Zaimović, a municipal judge,⁴³⁷⁸ and the three sons of Rasim Karaosmanović.⁴³⁷⁹

1256. On the morning of 9 April 1992, approximately 10 Serb soldiers in camouflage uniforms, masks and fingerless black gloves detonated the door leading to a basement in a building on Filipa Kljajića street.⁴³⁸⁰ A group of over 30 men, women and children were sheltering at this location, and the soldiers ordered them to surrender any weapons and then forced them out to the street at gun point.⁴³⁸¹ During this process, men and women were

area until May 1992, *see* P5489 (Report of Bijeljina SJB, 19 May 1992), p. 1; P2753 (SerBiH MUP daily report, 22 May 1992), p. 2; D3886 (Witness statement of Svetozar Andrić dated 16 July 2013), para. 3.

⁴³⁷⁴ P2850 (Fax of Bijeljina CSB, 29 April 1992). Measures included prohibiting or restricting the service and sale of alcohol. D1698 (Order of Zvornik Interim Government, 12 May 1992), p. 1; D1699 (Order of Zvornik Interim Government, 1 June 1992), p. 1; Petko Panić, T. 19195–19196 (20 September 2011).

⁴³⁷⁵ D1631 (Report of Zvornik SJB, 29 June 1992), p. 4; D1625 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB, July–September 1992), p. 1; P3390 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB for 1993), pp. 22, 35, 38, 40, 47.

⁴³⁷⁶ *See* Adjudicated Facts 2742, 2743; P4849 (Excerpt from video entitled “The Death of Yugoslavia”), 01:37-02:23, 01:49-02:17; P2936 (Excerpt of video “The Death of Yugoslavia”, with transcript) (under seal); P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), paras. 65, 82 (under seal); KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*, T. 6758–6759, 6910 (under seal); KDZ240, T. 15966–15967 (4 July 2011) (closed session). *See also* Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*, T. 2880–2881; KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*, T. 6759, 6990–6991 (under seal); KDZ059, P67 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*, T. 2911; P3338 (TANJUG news report, 14 April 1992); Martin Bell, T. 9783, 9803 (14 December 2010); P1996 (Witness statement of Martin Bell dated 8 March 2010), paras. 23–24; Jovan Ivanović, T. 39866 (12 June 2013) (testifying that the people killed were not killed in combat as there was no fighting and the people were killed to “sow fear, to create chaos”); P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), p. 8 (under seal); Martin Bell, T. 9783–9786, 9803 (14 December 2010); P2001 (BBC news report re Zvornik, with transcript), 00:01.50–00:02.20; P2002 (BBC news report re Zvornik, with transcript), 00:00.21–00:00.31, 00:00.43–00:01.10, 00:01.51–00:02.09, 00:02.24–00:02.37; P2003 (BBC news report re Zvornik, with transcript), 00:00.29–00:00.38. Grujić in his testimony acknowledged that he did not personally take part in the take-over and was in Mali Zvornik at the time. Branko Grujić, T. 40400–40401 (25 June 2013); D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 35, 46, 59, 61. Given this qualification, the Chamber does not consider Grujić’s evidence with respect to the nature and number of casualties in Zvornik to be of much weight. In addition considering that Grujić’s evidence was marked by multiple contradictions and evasiveness, the Chamber does not consider Grujić’s evidence to be reliable in this regard.

⁴³⁷⁷ P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 65 (under seal); KDZ023, P65 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*, T. 26131; P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 65 (under seal). The body of Fehim Kujundžić was exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 57.

⁴³⁷⁸ P4849 (Excerpt from video entitled “The Death of Yugoslavia”), 00:52-01:26, 01:22-01:26; P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 82(c) (under seal).

⁴³⁷⁹ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 6. The Chamber notes that the bodies of the sons of Rasim Karaosmanović were exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 58.

⁴³⁸⁰ P2919 (Witness statement of KDZ023 dated 29 September 1996), pp. 2–3.

⁴³⁸¹ P2919 (Witness statement of KDZ023 dated 29 September 1996), p. 3; KDZ023, P65 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*, T. 26130, 26141–26142.

separated and 15 men were lined up against the wall of the apartment building after which a burst of gunfire was heard.⁴³⁸² The women were forced to walk away from the scene by the soldiers.⁴³⁸³ KDZ023 was later told by other women that they had seen the dead bodies of the men who had been taken out of the cellar in front of the apartment building.⁴³⁸⁴ KDZ059 also heard that many men had been killed on Filipa Kljajića street, including Taib Futović and his son.⁴³⁸⁵

1257. When KDZ023 sought information from Branko Grujić about the men who had been separated, she was told that there was no longer a place for them in Zvornik.⁴³⁸⁶ When she returned to the scene a week later she found her husband's hat and son's sports shoes, which were covered in blood, and saw that there was blood on the wall, which was also "peppered with bullet holes".⁴³⁸⁷ Bosnian Serb authorities were involved in organising the collection of civilian bodies for burial.⁴³⁸⁸

1258. The Chamber therefore finds that at least 15 people were killed by Serb Forces on or about 9 April 1992 in the town of Zvornik.

iv. Events in other villages in Zvornik municipality

1259. As mentioned above,⁴³⁸⁹ after the attack on Zvornik, many Bosnian Muslims left Zvornik and headed to other villages in the municipality. From then on, paramilitary units were involved in operations against Bosnian Muslims in these villages in which they arrested individuals and detained them in facilities, which were then taken over by the police.⁴³⁹⁰

1. Kula Grad

⁴³⁸² P2919 (Witness statement of KDZ023 dated 29 September 1996), pp. 3–4. The witness identified 15 men as part of this group (including one Bosnian Croat) and named 12 of them (Hajrudin Delić, Sead Hidić, Senad Hidić, Šemsudin Ahmetović, Nusret Ahmetović, a man known as "Dedo", Samir Bilalić, Senad Bilalić, Sabit Bilalić, Ivo Kojić, Fahrudin Alajbegović, Edhem Hadžić. Of these named individuals, 10 were identified by Mašović as having been exhumed from mass graves. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 57–58.

⁴³⁸³ P2919 (Witness statement of KDZ023 dated 29 September 1996), p. 3 (under seal).

⁴³⁸⁴ P2919 (Witness statement of KDZ023 dated 29 September 1996), pp. 4–5. The Chamber notes the Accused's acknowledgement that men were separated from women and children and killed by Arkan's men and Šešelj's men. Defence Final Brief, confidential, para. 1450.

⁴³⁸⁵ P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), p. 8 (under seal); KDZ059, P67 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 29092. The Chamber notes that the Prosecution connects these two individuals to Taib Hudović and Asim Hudović whose bodies were exhumed from a mass grave according to Mašović. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix G referring to P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 57. The Chamber is not satisfied that these bodies can be linked to the evidence of KDZ059.

⁴³⁸⁶ P2919 (Witness statement of KDZ023 dated 29 September 1996), p. 5.

⁴³⁸⁷ P2919 (Witness statement of KDZ023 dated 29 September 1996), pp. 4–5.

⁴³⁸⁸ P4839 (Decision of the Serb Municipality of Zvornik, 28 April 1992); P4840 (Order of the Zvornik TO Staff, 19 May 1992); P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), paras. 18–19, 21 (under seal); KDZ610, T. 27194–27195 (29 March 2012) (private session). The Chamber also received evidence that approximately 120 bodies of those killed between 8 and 23 April 1992, were stored in a warehouse at the Alhos building until they were buried in a mass grave. KDZ610, T. 27190 (29 March 2012) (private session); P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), paras. 22–27, 31 (under seal); P4841 (Letter from FBiH Commission for Missing Persons, 30 July 2007). However, the Chamber notes that this period extends beyond the allegations in the Indictment for the purposes of this scheduled incident and that it has insufficient evidence to link these bodies with this incident. The Chamber also received evidence about the disappearance and killing of non-Serbs and the exhumation of mass graves in Zvornik. P4841 (Letter from FBiH Commission for Missing Persons, 30 July 2007); P4903 (Crni Vrh Exhumation Report by Derek Congram, 14 November 2003); D2250 (Ewa Tabeau's report entitled "Deaths and Disappearance of BiH Muslims 1992 – 1995," 25 April 2012), p. 1; Ewa Tabeau, T. 28411–28412 (2 May 2012); P4841 (Letter from FBiH Commission for Missing Persons, 30 July 2007); P4850 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), para. 54; P4852 (Report of Amor Mašović, 20–21 October 2009), p. 13; P4854 (Updated Table 1 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 2. The Chamber will not rely on this evidence in the absence of a positive connection with a scheduled killing incident charged in the Indictment.

⁴³⁸⁹ See paras. 1250, 1261, 1269.

⁴³⁹⁰ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2896; P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 9 February 1998), paras. 2–18; D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), paras. 49–50 (under seal).

1260. Kula Grad is a town located to the southwest of Zvornik.⁴³⁹¹ On 8 April 1992, there were between 5,000 and 6,000 Bosnian Muslims from Zvornik town in Kula Grad when an attack was launched.⁴³⁹² Kula Grad was shelled from a JNA tank unit causing casualties in the town which prompted some of the Bosnian Muslims to flee towards Tuzla.⁴³⁹³ Bosnian Muslim forces in Kula Grad resisted a number of attacks by Arkan's men on the village.⁴³⁹⁴ On 26 April 1992, Serb Forces, including paramilitaries, and local police, launched an early morning attack on Kula Grad and took control of the village.⁴³⁹⁵ Some houses were set on fire during the attack.⁴³⁹⁶ This attack forced the remaining Bosnian Muslims in the village to flee towards Tuzla and Kamenica.⁴³⁹⁷ **(#Cause and consequence# This is very far from a "whole truth. Kula Grad was on a ridge overlooking the town of Zvornik and all surrounding, right to Serbia on the other side of the Drina River. The Muslim Green Berets and other paramilitaries fired every now and then to the bridges, to the JNA troops and armament, but the most vicious was sniper action against the civilians in the town. See what the Prosecution witness KDZ340 said in his testimony, T.17500: Since a soldier was killed in Zvornik near the department store, and he was fired at from Kula, I suppose, an action was launched to seize Kula because it dominates over Zvornik and there's forest there. So that was a very convenient place for them to hide. It was tolerated until the end of April 1992, and thi is well known and documented! #Abuse of civilian settlement#! Therefore, Kula Grad was not a settlement, it was a stronghold whit the Green Berets and other Muslim combatants! The Chamber had a sufficient evidence on the militarisation of the entire area, but in accordance with the Prosecution's needs, accepted this approach, depicting the whole case as a unilateral Serb attacks on a civilian settlements. See what the Muslim report said on that matter, D38, p.1**

The defense of Kula Grad, from April 9th to April 26th, was carried out while the JNA was still the legal armed force in the region of Tuzla, when the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina had still not named an aggressor, and was not yet organized or ready to conduct a defensive and liberating war. At that time, Kula Grad was the symbol of the BiH resistance to aggression. The Kula Grad situation had indicated that resistance was possible even while being surrounded, and that the Aggressor is vulnerable, regardless of the fact that it is armed to the teeth and exceptionally well equipped.

The defense of Zvornik, carried out on April 8th and 9th, 1992, indicate that the preparations were brief, that the technical equipment was limited, and the quick defeat due to the surprise and cunning attack of JNA formations, the Territorial Defense of the Republic of Serbia, and the Serb military and paramilitary formations of the SDS.

The Aggressor, in the attack on Zvornik just as in the defense of the Tower, had suffered large casualties, despite the fact that the defense was poorly armed and prepared, divided into half by the psychological propaganda activities, and poorly commanded and organized in the military sense.

the# Serb "large casualties" mentioned in this report were not indicative to the

⁴³⁹¹ P4838 (Map of ethnic composition of Zvornik); P4848 (Map of Zvornik marked by KDZ610); P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 81 (under seal) (marking the location of Kula Grad in relation to Zvornik with number 1).

⁴³⁹² P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 8 (under seal).

⁴³⁹³ P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), paras. 9–10 (under seal); KDZ610, T. 27198 (29 March 2012).

⁴³⁹⁴ P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 10 (under seal); P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), p. 3. See also KDZ610, T. 27199 (29 March 2012); D38 (ABiH Report on units in Zvornik, 5 November 1992), p. 2; KDZ555, T. 17452–17454 (18 August 2011); D1627 (Video footage re view of Zvornik from Kula); D1628 (Video footage re view of Zvornik and Mali Zvornik from Kula); D1629 (Video footage re view of Divič from Kula); D1630 (Video footage re view of Kula from Zvornik); D1617 (Report of Zvornik Municipal Staff, 5 November 1992), p. 2.

⁴³⁹⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 2732; P133 (Witness statement of Matija Bošković dated 20 November 2003), para. 26; P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), p. 3. See also KDZ555, T. 17276 (16 August 2011).

⁴³⁹⁶ P133 (Witness statement of Matija Bošković dated 20 November 2003), para. 26.

⁴³⁹⁷ P133 (Witness statement of Matija Bošković dated 20 November 2003), para. 26; P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), p. 3. Some members of this group were apprehended in Orahovac, taken to the local Crisis Staff Headquarters, had their money and valuables confiscated, and were taken back to the SUP in Zvornik. KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelj*), T. 8697.

Chamber that there were a fierce fighting going on, and not unilateral Serb attack#. Also, it is evident that the Muslim forces confronted the JNA at the first place! Let us see what this Report said about the villages allegedly attacked by the “Serb Forces”, p.3, 4

Under those conditions, combat was carried out independently in co-operation with the staffs and units of the armed forces of Vlasenica, Bratunac, Srebrenica, in the triangle of Kamenica – Cerksa - Srebrenica. The inhabited areas were independently held in that region, the roads of M. Zvornik – Ljubovija and Zvornik Drinjaca were controlled, and a spectacular action was undertaken for the freeing of hostages in Liplje.

In extended cooperation, Magija's group, Kibe's group, Himzin's group, Nazif's unit were placed on that terrain on July 9th, 1992, along with other small groups with ammunition and sanitary materials, as well as the executed withdrawal of 7,500 civilians, from the first half of July to the first half of August.

(#Not cleansing, evacuation#! Had those 7,500 civilians, withdrawn by the Muslim forces been counted in a charge as a Serb “ethnic cleansing”?)

In this period, many combat activities took place, from which we distinguish a few: the liberation of Sapna and Gaj on May 6th, 1992, the battle for Zaseok on May 10th, 1992, the taking of Brdjane on May 14th, 1992, Odzacin on June 11th, 1992, the battle for Boskovice on June 22nd, 1992, the forming of the First Zvornik Squad on June 22nd, 1992, the forming of the Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Squads of those two independent companies, the heavy artillery shelling of the entire region by the Graduates of the Artillery Academy of the aggressor on July 15th, 1992, the annexing of the liberated territories of Zvornik and Ugljenik, the operation of deploying fighters of Nurif's group across Zvornik – Sekovici on July 27th, 1992, the liberating of Rastosnica on August 19th, 1992, the operation in the direction of Parlog – Govedarica – Pandurica on August 27th and 28th, 1992, the liberating of Roznje and Skakovica on September 1st, 1992, the executed diversion operation in the extended region of Klisa on October 8th, 1992, as well as the attempt to infiltrate Kamenica on October 20th and 30th, 1992.

The armed forces in Zvornik had, from the beginning, acted as part of the forces and units of the County Staff for the Defense of Tuzla, its Operational Group 1. In the preceding period, the background security of the Armed Forces of Zvornik was exerted by the Presidency of the Municipal Assembly, and the gathering of materials and technical equipment was conducted by the County Staff and the Presidency of the Municipal Assembly, as much as they were able to do.

In the up-to-date progress of combat activity of the Armed Forces in Zvornik, 220 soldiers were killed and 860 were wounded, without complete data on the Kamenica region.

The combat activities, based on the improvement of material and technical equipment stock readiness, the building of combat morale, and the military preparedness, had shown that the Armed Forces of high combat quality in Zvornik were capable of carrying out further offensives and liberating operations.

(#Combatants, or civilians#! Only killed and wounded numbered 1,080 Muslim combatants, here presented and depicted on the lists as a civilian casualties. However, none of this evidence about the strength and intentions of the Muslim forces hadn't been even mentioned in the Judgement. see further, p.4:

Units of the Municipal Staff of the Armed Forces of Zvornik are comprised of a manoeuvring squad, five area structure squads, as well as three independent manoeuvring squads and six manoeuvring intervention platoons, as part of background units and squads of the Military Police.

Area units are primarily intended for the defense of the frontal area and are partially capable for executing offensive operations. The basic characteristic of these units is the territorial connection for the regions of local communities, in which they are active. The state of preparedness of these units is smaller in comparison to the units of manoeuvring structure. The central tasks of strengthening the organizational and

(#Extremely militarised Muslim villages#! But, the most impressive is the deployment of the armed forces of the Bosnian Muslims throughout villages allegedly attacked by the Serb Forces, as suggested and alluded as a civilian settlements! Let us see the Muslim report, D38 on that subject:

OVERVIEW OF UNITS

UNIT	NUMBER OF SOLDIERS		
	INTERVENTION	POSITION	BACKGROUND
1. MOCA GODUS COMPANY	23	74	12 (109)
2. ZUJE SARCI COMPANY	20	49	4 (73)
3. SELIMOVICI PLATOON		45	8
4. KOVACEVICI COMPANY		89	6
5. KRSTAC PLATOON		30	3
6. SVRAKE PLATOON		30	4
7. MAHMUTOVICI PLATOON		29	5
8. VITINICA KOLONJA PLATOON		30	4
9. DZAKICI PLATOON		28	2
10. MARNICI PLATOON		53	5
11. RAMICI PLATOON		50	5
12. ZECIJA KOSA DIVISION		7	-
13. ZASEOK COMPANY		126	12
14. NEZUK COMPANY	21	162	13
15. SAPNA COMPANY	14	113	10
16. KRALJEVICI CETA		102	6
17. KRALJEVICI INTERVENTION PLATOON	11		
18. KOBILICI COMPANY		79	6
19. BAJINA COMPANY	77		7
20. DZAMIJSKI GOLUBOVI	50		5
21. KRIZEVICI II COMPANY	17	34	
22. MEDJEDJA COMPANY		119	17
23. HAP PLATOON		16	2
24. GAJ COMPANY		55	8
25. GRABOVKA PLATOON		42	4
26. I ZVORNIK SQUAD	39	97	32
27. MILITARY POLICE	47		
28. MEDICAL CORPS			20
29. BACKGROUND BASE			63
30. PROTECTIONAL STAFF COMPANY		16	39
31. STAFF		26	
32. SULTAN FATIH	44		

And this makes 2,169 (plus 1080 wounded and killed) soldiers deployed in these villages, always ready to defend, or to participate in the offensives against the Serb villages and settlements. Se also D1621, quoted above, how the Zvornik armed forces had been numerous and powerful all the times, on the territory of Muslim municipality of Zvornika! How come this wasn't of any significance in this case? Instead, every military action of the Serb Army against these military forces are presented as an attack on civilian settlements!)

(2) Kozluk

1261. Kozluk is a town approximately 20 kilometres from Zvornik⁴³⁹⁸ which had a majority Bosnian Muslim population before the war.⁴³⁹⁹ Bosnian Muslims from the neighbouring Bosnian Muslim villages of Šepak and Skočić had fled to Kozluk on account of their fear of Serb Forces who had been demanding the surrender of weapons.⁴⁴⁰⁰ Following the take-over of Zvornik, Kozluk was completely surrounded by Serb Forces, who set up barricades in surrounding villages and cut off exit routes.⁴⁴⁰¹

1262. The Bosnian Muslim population of Kozluk handed over their hunting weapons and hand guns.⁴⁴⁰² Bosnian Serb municipal leaders visited Kozluk and reassured the Bosnian Muslims that they would not be harmed or arrested and that they should return to their villages.⁴⁴⁰³ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! #Disarmed and safe#! That was an essence of handing over the armament, to strengthen the civil peace, law and order! There were many examples of villages that handed over their weaponry and enjoyed a full security! However, this examples made the SDA Centre in Sarajevo furious and they spoiled some of these accords!)** From April to mid-June 1992, the citizens of Kozluk were subjected to acts of intimidation, which included shooting and throwing of grenades.⁴⁴⁰⁴

1263. The Bosnian Serb authorities tried to prevent the Bosnian Muslim population from leaving towards Tuzla;⁴⁴⁰⁵ **(#Responsible conduct of Serb officials!# The Serb**

⁴³⁹⁸ Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20615; D1613 (Map of Zvornik marked by KDZ555); P4838 (Map of ethnic composition of Zvornik).

⁴³⁹⁹ Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20615, 20668; KDZ555, T. 17308–17309 (17 August 2011).

⁴⁴⁰⁰ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 9 February 1998), paras. 2-3, 2-24. As a result, at the time, there were 10,000 to 12,000 people in Kozluk. See Adjudicated Fact 2736; D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 60 (under seal). Grujić testified that Peja insisted that Bosnian Muslims remain in their homes and he guaranteed them security. D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 66. Having regard to the extensive contradictions and indications of bias, the Chamber does not find that Grujić's evidence to be reliable in this regard. For the same reasons the Chamber does not consider Grujić's evidence reliable with respect to other events in Kozluk, including the treatment of the Bosnian Muslim population, the voluntariness of their departure from Kozluk, and the attack on Kozluk. D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 48, 64–68. See also Branko Grujić, T. 40404–40405, 40412–40416, 40452 (25 June 2013). For further contradictions in Grujić's evidence on this point and his attempt to minimise his own involvement in events in Kozluk, see Branko Grujić, T. 40410–40412 (25 June 2013); P6416 (Excerpt from Serbia Appeals Court judgement against Branko Grujić, 3 October 2011), pp. 5, 9–16; P6417 (Article from New York Times entitled "Serbian Mayor Displays the Wares of 'Ethnic Cleansing', 7 March 1994").

⁴⁴⁰¹ Kozluk was surrounded by the Serb villages of Ugljar, Malešići, Tabanci, Riči, Kiseljak and Tršić, see P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 9 February 1998), paras. 2-4, 2-14, 2-18, 2-40; Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20619, 20693, 20672; see Adjudicated Fact 2737.

⁴⁴⁰² P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 9 February 1998), para. 2-15; Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20617, 20665, 20677–20678; D1695 (List of Kozluk residents who surrendered weapons, 16 April 1992)

⁴⁴⁰³ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 9 February 1998), para. 2-29; Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20676–20677; KDZ555, T. 17402 (18 August 2011). See also D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 51 (under seal). Pejić also made similar assurances. P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 9 February 1998), para. 2-38; Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20692–20693, 20695.

⁴⁴⁰⁴ Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20618; KDZ555, T. 17407–17408 (18 August 2011). But see P2886 (Interview with Marko Pavlović, 30 June 1992), p. 1.

⁴⁴⁰⁵ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 9 February 1998), paras. 2-26, 2-40; Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20693.

authorities asked the Christian Orthodox bishop and a Muslim priest to join them in dissuading the Muslim population from leaving, and they succeeded! EXCULPATORY!!! however, by the end of May 1992 a large number of Bosnian Muslims had managed to leave Kozluk, including 5,000 to 6,000 people who returned to their homes in Šepak and Skočić and approximately 3,000 people who left for foreign countries.⁴⁴⁰⁶

1264. In June 1992, Bosnian Muslim police officers in Kozluk were forced to surrender their weapons and uniforms,⁴⁴⁰⁷ after which there was extensive shooting near the town.⁴⁴⁰⁸ In the lead-up to the attack on Kozluk, Bosnian Serb paramilitary units started training local Serbs.⁴⁴⁰⁹ The local Serbs were told by Pavlović to mark all Serb houses so they would not be shot at.⁴⁴¹⁰ **(#Abuse of civil objects#! But also, and much more important, not to fear that from those houses they would be shot at!)** Pavlović organised and ordered an attack on Kozluk on the morning of 21 June 1992.⁴⁴¹¹ Between 20 and 25 June 1992, a large number of Bosnian Serb soldiers, TO and paramilitary units entered Kozluk in military vehicles; during this period some Bosnian Muslims were beaten and their goods were looted.⁴⁴¹² The strong military presence including tanks, the attacks on local citizens, and the burning of property, increased the pressure on the Bosnian Muslim population to leave.⁴⁴¹³

1265. **Fadil Banjanović was summoned to meet with Grujić and Jovo Mijatović on or about 26 June 1992 at the Kozluk police station.**⁴⁴¹⁴ He was informed that the authorities could no longer guarantee the safety of the Bosnian Muslim population. He was told that the Bosnian Muslims had to leave the town within an hour and that everything, including transportation, had been organised.⁴⁴¹⁵ Mijatović told Banjanović that “an all-out attack was being prepared on Kozluk”, that there “could be a massacre”, and all Muslims would be killed if they did not move out.⁴⁴¹⁶ **(#Serb officials vs. criminals#! At the same time, Mijatovic and other local Serb leaders and the authority officials had been arrested, beaten, humiliated and suspended from their posts by the same paramilitaries, and couldn’t guarantee their own safety! Therefore, the “Serb soldiers mentioned in this paragraph may have been Serbs by ethnicity, but certainly hadn’t been a soldiers of the Republic of Srpska, nor under any influence of the Serb officials. Some objections**

⁴⁴⁰⁶ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 9 February 1998), para. 2-45; Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20678, 20706; Milorad Davidović, T. 15534–15535 (28 June 2011); KDZ555, T. 17309 (17 August 2011). *See also* D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 61 (under seal).

⁴⁴⁰⁷ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 9 February 1998), para. 2-47; *see* Adjudicated Fact 2739.

⁴⁴⁰⁸ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 9 February 1998), para. 2-47.

⁴⁴⁰⁹ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 9 February 1998), para. 2-7; Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20673.

⁴⁴¹⁰ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 30 March 2002), para. 2-23.

⁴⁴¹¹ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 30 March 2002), para. 2-23; Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20618. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2740.

⁴⁴¹² P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 30 March 2002), paras. 24–25; P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 9 February 1998), para. 2-48; Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20621–20622, 20655. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2774.

⁴⁴¹³ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 9 February 1998), para. 48; Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20620, 20624, 20655, 20664.

⁴⁴¹⁴ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 9 February 1998), para. 2-48; Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20621–20622, 20628, 20655.

⁴⁴¹⁵ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 30 March 2002), para. 33; P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 9 February 1998), para. 2-48; Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20621–20622, 20628, 20655; Milorad Davidović, T. 15538 (28 June 2011).

⁴⁴¹⁶ Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20627–20628, 20696.

that the local Serb authorities turned against paramilitaries because paramilitaries mistreated officials. But, it is all the way around: the paramilitaries would never turn against the local authorities, had these authorities welcomed them and tolerated their crimes!)

1266. The operation to move out the Bosnian Muslim population was ordered by Pavlović⁴⁴¹⁷ and carried out by the commander of the MP known as “Studen”.⁴⁴¹⁸ Soldiers forced Bosnian Muslims to gather in the centre of town, while beating and opening fire at them.⁴⁴¹⁹ People from the nearby locality of Skočić were also ordered to assemble in the centre of Kozluk.⁴⁴²⁰ Bosnian Serb soldiers registered the names of the Bosnian Muslims who had gathered, told them that they could not take any personal belongings, and forced them to sign statements that they gave up their property.⁴⁴²¹

1267. After this, a convoy⁴⁴²² of buses, trucks, trailers and cars took almost 2,000 villagers from over 500 households from Kozluk to Šabac in Serbia, where they were transferred to trains to the Serbian-Hungarian border. From then on, Serbs who had fled other locations were settled in Kozluk.⁴⁴²³

1268. Documents and statements were provided which stated that Bosnian Muslims from Kozluk had explicitly, and without any duress, requested resettlement.⁴⁴²⁴ However, Banjanović stated that these documents did not reflect the actual situation and that while “[t]hey wrote this letter saying that we were doing everything voluntarily, but in fact, they expelled us. We left in trucks, in buses. The stoning, the beating, the killings [were] not an act of benevolence but an act of expulsion. Why would 5,000 people leave their homes?”⁴⁴²⁵ Having reviewed the evidence, the Chamber finds that the Bosnian Muslims did not leave voluntarily, and even if some had provided statements which indicated that they left voluntarily, these statements were given in intimidating and violent circumstances, which negated the voluntariness of these departures. **(#Controversy#! If it was the Serb authority, then why would the same authorities do everything to #dissuade the same Muslim population from leaving only a month earlier#. If the Chamber only paid**

⁴⁴¹⁷ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 30 March 2002), para. 33. *See also* D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 48. *But see* P2886 (Interview with Marko Pavlović, 30 June 1992), p. 1.

⁴⁴¹⁸ Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20666.

⁴⁴¹⁹ Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20629, 20655.

⁴⁴²⁰ Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20630.

⁴⁴²¹ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 9 February 1998), para. 2–49; Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20705. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2774; Milorad Davidović, T. 15535–15536 (28 June 2011).

⁴⁴²² During transportation, those on the convoy, which was under police escort, were not free to leave. Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20643, 20651, 20709–20710. The Chamber received evidence about the killing of people who remained in Kozluk. Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20694. The Chamber notes that these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. *See* fn. 13.

⁴⁴²³ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 9 February 1998), para. 50; Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20632–20633, 20641, 20660, 20662–20663, 20667; P72 (Letter regarding people leaving Kozluk, 26 June 1992); P162 (List of persons leaving Kozluk, 26 June 1992); P73 (List of persons leaving Skočić, 26 June 1992); P2887 (Article from The Independent entitled “Refugees board a nightmare train”, 19 July 1992), pp. 1–2; Petko Panić, T. 19137 (19 September 2011); P76 (Map marked by Fadil Banjanović). *See* Adjudicated Fact 2775. *But see* D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012) (under seal), paras. 57–59; P6369 (Excerpts from KW317’s statement to OTP, 14 June 2002) (under seal), pp. 3–4. The Chamber refers to fns. 4237 and 4239 as to why it does not consider KW317’s evidence as to the circumstances in which the Bosnian Muslim population left Kozluk to be reliable. Further, the Chamber notes specific contradictions, attempts to minimise his own involvement and his acknowledgement on cross-examination that Bosnian Muslims did not move of their own free will. KW317, T. 39362–39365 (6 June 2013).

⁴⁴²⁴ Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20632, 20657, 20704. *See also* P106 (Document of Serbian Commission for Refugees, 26 June 1992).

⁴⁴²⁵ Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v S. Milošević*), T. 20650, 20698; P72 (Letter regarding people leaving Kozluk, 26 June 1992); P73 (List of persons leaving Skočić, 26 June 1992. *See also* P2887 (Article from The Independent entitled “Refugees board a nightmare train”, 19 July 1992), p. 2; KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 6761–6763 (under seal).

any attention to the circumstances which changed and deteriorated from an hour to an hour, the conclusion and finding would be quite opposite, and the only correct. Had the Muslim population remained in Kozluk in a deteriorating atmosphere and fights in the entire surrounding, some of those paramilitaries could have enter Kozluk and take revenge on the innocent population, the same authorities would be responsible for not securing or removing civilians out of the combat zone! IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AND NOTIFIED THAT THE FRONTLINE WAS ONLY A FEW KILOMETRES WESTERN FROM KOZLUK. This front line remained a hot confrontation line until the end of war. Presented as it is in the Judgement, isolated of surrounding and a fierce fighting all around, it looks like the Serbs “expelled” the Muslim civilians in a peace time and without any troubles in the region!) (If it was the Serb authority, then why would the same authorities do everything to dissuade the same Muslim population from leaving only a month earlier. If the Chamber only payed any attention to the circumstances which changed and deteriorated from an hour to an hour, the conclusion and finding would be quite opposite, and the only correct. Had the Muslim population remained in Kozluk in a deteriorating atmosphere and fights in the entire surrounding, some of those paramilitaries could have enter Kozluk and take revenge on the innocent population, the same authorities would be responsible for not securing or removing civilians out of the combat zone! IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AND NOTIFIED THAT THE FRONTLINE WAS ONLY A FEW KILOMETRES WESTERN FROM KOZLUK. This front line remained a hot confrontation line until the end of war. Presented as it is in the Judgement, isolated of surrounding and a fierce fighting all around, it looks like the Serbs “expelled” the Muslim civilians in a peace time and without any reason and trouble in the region! Skipping the context, it was possible to accuse and sentence an entire people, although this people was the only one which only defended itself, while it’s adversaries attacked with the aim the nature of state and destinies of the entire ethnic communities! The UN must not allowed that ever!)

(3) Other villages

1269. From April 1992, Serb Forces attacked or took over a number of villages including Dugi Dio,⁴⁴²⁶ Snagovo,⁴⁴²⁷ Divič,⁴⁴²⁸ Đulići which was also known as Bijeli Potok,⁴⁴²⁹ and Liplje.⁴⁴³⁰ Women and girls from the village of Liplje were raped by Serb Forces.⁴⁴³¹

⁴⁴²⁶ P133 (Witness statement of Matija Bošković dated 20 November 2003), para. 27 (identifying Bošković’s unit as taking over the village with the presence of JNA units). *See also* P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 13 (under seal).

⁴⁴²⁷ P64 (Witness statement of Osman Krupinac dated 29 May 2000), pp. 2–3.

⁴⁴²⁸ The attack on Divič was carried out by forces including Arkan’s men, the White Eagles, and the reserve police. In late April or early May 1992, Serb Forces demanded that the villagers of Divič surrender but attacked the village before the deadline for surrender had expired. *See* Adjudicated Fact 2735.

⁴⁴²⁹ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2898. *See* Adjudicated Fact 2733; P4838 (Map of ethnic composition of Zvornik).

⁴⁴³⁰ P71 (Witness statement of Safeta Hamzić dated 17 July 1996), p. 2. *See also* KDZ064, T. 1316, 1318–1319 (21 April 2010), T. 1404 (22 April 2010) (testifying about attacks against Kamenica). Gornja Kamenica and Donja Kamenica are located to the south west of Zvornik. P4838 (Map of ethnic composition of Zvornik).

⁴⁴³¹ P71 (Witness statement of Safeta Hamzić dated 17 July 1996), pp. 2–7. The Chamber also received evidence about the detention and killing of Bosnian Muslims in Liplje. The Chamber notes that these killings and detention facilities are not charged pursuant to Schedules A, B or C of the Indictment. *See* fn. 13.

(#Adversaries testified, to denigrate Serbs# Unacceptable use of a statement from the Serb adversary, interested in denigrating the Serbs, while this witness couldn't be cross examined! It was so easy to place a charges and allegations against the Serbs, first by putting all the Serbs under the term "the Serb Forces", particularly the paramilitaries that had been arrested by the genuine Serb Forces, and admitting so many adjudicated facts, so many untested statements (Rule 92bis, without cross examination) further, by preventing a presentation of contexts and conduct of the other sides to the conflict, as if it was of no significance and influence on the Serb conduct!!!) During some of these attacks Serb Forces set fire to houses, destroyed mosques and cut the electricity supply.⁴⁴³² These attacks prompted the Bosnian Muslim population to flee their villages,⁴⁴³³ after which Bosnian Serbs moved into Bosnian Muslim homes.⁴⁴³⁴ When some Bosnian Muslims who had fled Divič tried to return they were turned away by Serb Forces.⁴⁴³⁵

1270. In late April 1992, Bosnian Muslims of Kostijerevo, following a demand by Serb Forces handed over weapons.⁴⁴³⁶ Similarly, in the second half of May 1992, the Zvornik Crisis Staff called for the surrender of weapons which was complied with by villages, including Đulići, Šetići, Klisa, Kaldrane, Sjenokos, Drina, Kučić-Kula, Mrakonci, Durakovići, Lupe, Tršić, and Petkovci.⁴⁴³⁷

1271. Some villages were attacked multiple times until they fell to Serb Forces.⁴⁴³⁸ **(#Not correct presentation#: just after the list of villages that surrendered weapons, here is this assertion: "Some villages were attacked multiple times..." this certainly didn't happen with any disarmed and de-militarised village, obviously – because why some disarmed village would be attacked "multiple times" since such a village would "fell to Serb Forces" in an hour? It would be the only correct to establish what villages, and what kind of fights were going on there!)** In late May 1992, between 400 and 500 Bosnian Muslims from Divič, including women, children and the elderly, were forced onto buses by Yellow Wasps and taken to Crni Vrh where they were allowed to leave for Bosnian Muslim territory on foot.⁴⁴³⁹ **(#Not "Serb Forces", but renegades#! The "Yellow Wasps" weren't a "Serb Force" but a renegades and paramilitaries reneged from the status of volunteers to JNA, and terrorised the legal authorities, for opposing their conduct. The arrest of the "Yellow Wasps" that happened soon after the**

⁴⁴³² KDZ064, T. 1316, 1318–1319 (21 April 2010), T. 1404 (22 April 2010) (testifying that Serb Forces destroyed the four mosques in Kamenica); P133 (Witness statement of Matija Bošković dated 20 November 2003), para. 27. For the Chamber's findings with respect to the destruction of mosques, see Scheduled Incident D.22. See also P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 13 (under seal). The Chamber also received evidence about the killing of Bosnian Muslims from Kamenica and Snagovo. KDZ064, T. 1311 (21 April 2010); KDZ064, T. 1404 (22 April 2010); P64 (Witness statement of Osman Krupinac dated 29 May 2000), p. 2–3; P6372 (Excerpt from SFRY Federal Secretariat for National Defence information, 26 May 1992), p. 2. The Chamber notes that these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.

⁴⁴³³ KDZ064, T. 1316, 1318–1319, 1334 (21 April 2010), T. 1404 (22 April 2010); P64 (Witness statement of Osman Krupinac dated 29 May 2000), pp. 2–3; see Adjudicated Fact 2735 (1,000 Bosnian Muslims fled from Divič to Jošanica). The Chamber also received evidence about the burning of six Bosnian Muslims from Kamenica. KDZ064, T. 1311 (21 April 2010), T. 1404 (22 April 2010). The Chamber notes that these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.

⁴⁴³⁴ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 13 (under seal).

⁴⁴³⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 2735.

⁴⁴³⁶ KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelji*), T. 8696–8697.

⁴⁴³⁷ D1639 (Statement of KDZ029 to Tuzla SDB, 17 June 1992), p. 1 (under seal); KDZ029, T. 17588 (22 August 2011) (closed session).

⁴⁴³⁸ P64 (Witness statement of Osman Krupinac dated 29 May 2000), p. 5.

⁴⁴³⁹ See Adjudicated Fact 2771. But see D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 49, 63. The Chamber refers to fns. 4237 and 4239 as to why it does not find Grujić's evidence with respect to the departure of Bosnian Muslims from Divič to be reliable.

mentioned times, demanded a huge police-military operation, already mentioned in the Judgement!)

1272. On or about 28 May 1992, the Bosnian Serb Crisis Staff in Sapna, announced that all residents of Šetići and 13 other hamlets should gather in Klisa to be moved to Živinice.⁴⁴⁴⁰ After this announcement Serbs warned their Bosnian Muslim neighbours, that they would be killed and that they should flee towards Klisa.⁴⁴⁴¹ As a result more than 4,000 people, including women and children, gathered at Klisa and some headed towards Mededa and Tuzla.⁴⁴⁴² **(#Not correct presentation#: just after the list of villages that surrendered weapons, here is tris assertion: “Some villages were attacked multiple times...” this certainly didn’t happen with any disarmed and de-militarised village, obviously – because why some disarmed village would be attacked “multiple times” since such a village would “fell to Serb Forces” in an hour? It would be the only correct to establish what villages, and what kind of fights were going on there!)**

1273. On the morning of 1 June 1992, Klisa was surrounded by Serb soldiers wearing the uniform of the JNA and heavily armed paramilitaries.⁴⁴⁴³ **(4400)** Bosnian Muslims were instructed by the Bosnian Serb soldiers that they could only take their bags and leave for Đulići.⁴⁴⁴⁴ **(#Not “Serb Forces”, but paramilitaries#! How the Chamber differentiated “the Bosnian Serb soldiers” from the “heavily armed paramilitaries”? there was no any differentiation, although the Serb soldiers had, by that time, their army (VRS) and units known and declared by name and commander, a unique insignias, without any décor, cocardes or so. There were all the precondition to identify which unit and which commander was in charge, if it was a legitimate “Serb Force”! but no such an evidence was ever submitted, and the “Serb Forces” floscula was approved by the Chamber, which the Prosecution abused to the maximum, without any effort to identify perpetrators!)** After this, 4,000 people walked towards Đulići under the escort of armed Bosnian Serbs;⁴⁴⁴⁵ they were intimidated and searched at a check-point for weapons, and had their vehicles confiscated.⁴⁴⁴⁶ On arrival in Đulići, Bosnian Serbs, in regular police uniforms, camouflage uniforms and JNA uniforms, with some wearing masks **(#No masks and insignias#! This “masks” are exactly a proof that there was no legal Serb forces there!)** ordered the separation of the men from the women and children.⁴⁴⁴⁷ Between 5,000 and 6,000 women and children were moved out from Bijeli Potok and Đulići.⁴⁴⁴⁸ Approximately 700 men from 13 Bosnian Muslims villages were separated, had their hands

⁴⁴⁴⁰ D1639 (Statement of KDZ029 to Tuzla SDB, 17 June 1992), p. 1 (under seal).

⁴⁴⁴¹ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 6 (under seal); KDZ029, T. 17598–17599, 17608–17609 (22 August 2011) (closed session).

⁴⁴⁴² P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 7 (under seal); KDZ029, T. 17614 (22 August 2011) (closed session).

⁴⁴⁴³ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), paras. 8–9 (under seal); KDZ029, T. 17609 (22 August 2011) (closed session).

⁴⁴⁴⁴ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 10 (under seal); P3184 (Record of Belgrade’s District Court, War Crime Chamber Investigating Judge, 14 February 2007), p. 4 (under seal); KDZ029, T. 17616 (22 August 2011) (closed session).

⁴⁴⁴⁵ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 10 (under seal); KDZ029, T. 17620 (22 August 2011) (closed session).

⁴⁴⁴⁶ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 11 (under seal).

⁴⁴⁴⁷ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 12 (under seal); KDZ029, T. 17618–17619 (22 August 2011) (closed session); P64 (Witness statement of Osman Krupinac dated 29 May 2000), pp. 2–3. The Chamber also received evidence about the killing of Bosnian Muslim men in this incident. Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2899–2901. The Chamber notes that the above killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.

⁴⁴⁴⁸ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2896, 2900, 2989–2990. See also D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), paras. 53–55 (under seal); Petko Panić, T. 19188 (20 September 2011).

tied behind their backs, and were transported to the Karakaj Technical School.⁴⁴⁴⁹ The police assisted in loading people onto buses while VRS units were responsible for the transportation.⁴⁴⁵⁰ **(#Paramilitaries#! It already had been established that the Karakaj Technical School was entirely an action of paramilitaries, and the same had been processed in Serbia for that crime, after the real “Serb Forces” arrested them!)**

1274. On 30 May 1992, Serbian Radio Zvornik, informed all citizens of the Drinjača-Kostijerevo commune to stay in their homes and co-operate with the “army” which would arrive.⁴⁴⁵¹ Then, soldiers dressed in the JNA reserve uniform arrived, firing shots.⁴⁴⁵² About 150 people, including women and children, were gathered and ordered to form a column before being escorted to the cultural centre in Drinjača.⁴⁴⁵³

v. Developments in Zvornik after take-over

1. Measures imposed in Zvornik

1275. On 8 April 1992, the Zvornik Crisis Staff imposed a curfew on all civilians⁴⁴⁵⁴ (4411) and issued an order for the general mobilisation of all adults in the Serb Municipality of Zvornik.⁴⁴⁵⁵ (4412) Both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs were issued with passes by the military authorities allowing free movement and all citizens were required to have these passes.⁴⁴⁵⁶ (4413) **(#Not “Serb Forces”, but paramilitaries#! How the Chamber differentiated “the Bosnian Serb soldiers” from the “heavily armed paramilitaries”? there was no any differentiation, although the Serb soldiers had, by that time, their army (VRS) and units known and declared by name and commander, a unique insignias, without any décor, cocardes or so. There were all the precondition to identify which unit and which commander was in charge, if it was a legitimate “Serb Force”! but no such an evidence was ever submitted, and the “Serb Forces” floscula was approved by the Chamber, which the prosecution abused to the maximum, without any effort to identify perpetrators!)**

1276. Some Bosnian Muslims were prevented from going to work, and those who attempted to do so, were stopped at a barricade in Karakaj, slapped, insulted, and sent home.⁴⁴⁵⁷ After the conflict broke out, some Bosnian Muslims were fired from their jobs⁴⁴⁵⁸ and Bosnian Muslim judges were expelled from the municipality.⁴⁴⁵⁹ **(It happened that only in this foot**

⁴⁴⁴⁹ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 13 (under seal); P3184 (Record of Belgrade’s District Court, War Crime Chamber Investigating Judge, 14 February 2007) (under seal), pp. 4–5; KDZ029, T. 17620–17621 (22 August 2011) (closed session); Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2896, 2899–2901, 2989–2990.

⁴⁴⁵⁰ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2898, 2900–2902; KDZ555, T. 17304–17305 (17 August 2011) (private session).

⁴⁴⁵¹ KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelji*), T. 8698.

⁴⁴⁵² KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelji*), T. 8699.

⁴⁴⁵³ KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelji*), T. 8699–8701.

⁴⁴⁵⁴ P3381 (Decision of the Zvornik Crisis Staff, 8 April 1992), pp. 1–2; Petko Panić, T. 19127 (19 September 2010).

⁴⁴⁵⁵ P3381 (Decision of the Zvornik Crisis Staff, 8 April 1992), p. 5; KDZ555, T. 17351 (17 August 2011). *See also* Marinko Vasilčić, T. 39926–39927 (13 June 2013); Petko Panić, T. 19127 (19 September 2011), T. 19174 (20 September 2011) (testifying that the municipality did not have the authority to declare mobilisation or to declare a state of war unless it was cut off from the state).

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⁴⁴⁵⁷ KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelji*), T. 8697.

⁴⁴⁵⁸ KDZ610, T. 27188 (29 March 2012) (private session).

⁴⁴⁵⁹ D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), pp. 71–72. The Chamber finds that some Bosnian Serbs were also relieved from their duties in the Zvornik lower Court by the Interim Government. D1712 (Decision of Zvornik Interim Government, 27 April 1992); Petko Panić, T. 19207 (20 September 2011).

note is registered that the Serbs were fired too. That was not a malicious move, but there was no courts functioning, and fights went through the streets!) In April 1992, Bosnian Serb authorities called on both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims to return to work and live in Zvornik, declaring it was safe to do so.⁴⁴⁶⁰ **(This sentence explains the prior one: it had to be safe and secure to live in Zvornik, before that the authorities couldn't guarantee safety!)** However, Bosnian Muslims who did return were taken in for interviewing,⁴⁴⁶¹ had to register,⁴⁴⁶² and in order to remain employed, had to sign a pledge of loyalty to the Bosnian Serb authorities.⁴⁴⁶³ Some Bosnian Muslims after being questioned by the police were kept effectively under house arrest, and in one case in May 1992, Serb Forces called out the names of Bosnian Muslims who were still living in a building in Zvornik.⁴⁴⁶⁴ White Eagles also searched Bosnian Muslim apartments, at times using violence.⁴⁴⁶⁵ **(#No Serb liability#! The White Eagles had nothing to do with the President! But every serious chamber would mention a defence exhibit D1622, a public proclamation of the Muslim Municipality of Zvornik, adopted on 8 May in Sapna, forbidding the Muslims to return to the town and going to work, see: D1622:**

Muslims, raise to arms, go to the woods or free territory, join the Territorial Defence of the municipality. Do not go back to the town or villages, do not go to work, exercise civil disobedience and paralyze economic and other activities which would give the legitimacy and the material basics for warfare to the newly establish occupying authority.

Any Chamber's deliberation about events in Zvornik must have had this evidence in mind!)

1277. In May 1992, an agency was established which was authorised to execute exchanges of real estate between residents of Zvornik and other municipalities.⁴⁴⁶⁶ Through this commission the abandoned property of Bosnian Muslims was seized and distributed to Bosnian Serbs who had moved to Zvornik.⁴⁴⁶⁷ By August 1992, Bosnian Serb authorities in Zvornik did take measures to move out individuals who unlawfully moved into property and to investigate cases of plunder of property.⁴⁴⁶⁸ **(#Contradicted#! This finding contradicts the former one: it was an "unlawful moving in", not "distributing abandoned property", while the exchange of property was not a matter of the**

⁴⁴⁶⁰ KDZ555, T. 17441 (18 August 2011); P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 6.

⁴⁴⁶¹ KDZ555, T. 17242–17243 (16 August 2011) (private session).

⁴⁴⁶² P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 7; KDZ023, P65 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 26138–26139. KDZ023 testified that the registration was only a pretext and those who returned and registered were killed. However, the Chamber considers KDZ023's evidence in this regard to be speculative. KDZ023, P65 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 26138–26139.

⁴⁴⁶³ See Adjudicated Fact 2734. But see D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 62; KDZ555, T. 17354 (17 August 2011). The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 4237 and 4239 as to why it does not find the evidence of Grujić and KDZ555 to be reliable with respect to the pledge of loyalty and the issue of discrimination against Bosnian Muslims.

⁴⁴⁶⁴ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), pp. 3, 8–9. The Serb Forces included those wearing the insignia of Šešelji's men.

⁴⁴⁶⁵ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 14.

⁴⁴⁶⁶ Adjudicated Fact 2770; P2734 (Decision of Zvornik municipality on establishment of Agency for Exchange of Real Estate Properties, 11 May 1992). See also D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 70.

⁴⁴⁶⁷ Petko Panić, T. 19139 (19 September 2011), T. 19151, 19200–19201 (20 September 2011); P3385 (Decision of Zvornik's Temporary Government, 15 May 1992), p. 1; D1705 (Order of Zvornik Interim Government, 21 May 1992), p. 1; see Adjudicated Fact 2773. See also D1710 (Decision of Zvornik Interim Government, 22 June 1992), p. 1; Branko Grujić, T. 40456 (26 June 2013); D3732 (Decision of Zvornik Interim Government, 30 May 1992). But see D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 72; Branko Grujić, T. 40454–40456 (26 June 2013). The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 4237 and 4239 as to why it does not find the evidence of Grujić to be reliable with respect to the occupation of Bosnian Muslim homes by Serb refugees.

⁴⁴⁶⁸ D1624 (Minutes of 2nd meeting of Zvornik Assembly, 19 August 1992), pp. 4–5. See also D1708 (Order of Zvornik Interim Government, 2 July 1992), p. 3; D1709 (Decision of Zvornik Provisional Government, 18 May 1992), p. 1; Petko Panić, T. 19201, 19203–19204 (20 September 2011).

authorities. To repeat: there was no a single case of an unlawful change of ownership in the entire Republic of Srpska!)

1278. On 6 June 1992, Mladić issued an urgent directive to secure communications from Sarajevo to Zvornik and mop up or cleanse the zone of “remaining enemy groups”.⁴⁴⁶⁹ **(Exactly, “enemy groups” not civilians! #EXCULPATORY!!!)** More specifically the Eastern Bosnia Corps was directed to secure road access and to mop up or cleanse Birač of remaining “enemy forces”.⁴⁴⁷⁰ This directive also stated that “maltreating of civilian unarmed population is strictly forbidden and prisoners must be treated pursuant to [the] Geneva Convention[s]”.⁴⁴⁷¹ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!)** The Command of the Eastern Bosnia Corps issued an order to the Zvornik Brigade on 7 June 1992, which reflected this directive and also strictly prohibited the maltreatment of the unarmed civilian population.⁴⁴⁷² **#EXCULPATORY!!!)**

1279. On 17 June 1992, the Accused confirmed the appointment of five members of the War Commission of the Serb Municipality of Zvornik, which was to disband the Interim Government and restore the Municipal Assembly.⁴⁴⁷³ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!)** On the same day, the Serb Municipality of Zvornik ordered the back pay of pensions for Serbs.⁴⁴⁷⁴

2. Actions of paramilitaries

1280. On 18 April 1992, the Interim Government issued an order to form a special unit tasked with securing the territory of the Serb Municipality of Zvornik.⁴⁴⁷⁵ This special unit was referred to as the Igor Marković unit and was later known as the Yellow Wasps.⁴⁴⁷⁶ **(Not entirely correct: the “special unit” was composed of the domestic reserve policemen and volunteers from Serbia. Later on, the unit partly altered and reneged, and tortured even the local authorities for not being supported or tolerated in their misdoings! Let us see what M. Davidovic, as a trustful Prosecutor’s witness testified, T.15778: .** *Q: Is it true that in Zvornik once again you concluded that the civilian authorities had no real power or ability to confront these people? A. Yes. That’s what I said at the beginning. When we arrived, they were completely sidelined, and this group of Yellow Wasps had placed those authorities, leadership, under their command and did whatever they wanted. There is no confusion: the local authorities didn’t exist as such, and were “sidelined” by the paramilitaries, certainly because they didn’t approve what the paramilitaries had been doing! #No Serb liability#! See further: You say at all entry points in Zvornik they had their check-points. They had their own men. They had full control over everything going on in Zvornik. And you say the authorities had no power. They were able to beat up policemen and anyone else; correct?*

⁴⁴⁶⁹ D232 (Directive 1, 6 June 1992), pp. 1–2.

⁴⁴⁷⁰ D232 (Directive 1, 6 June 1992), p. 4. Birač was one of the SAOs which included the municipality of Zvornik. Momčilo Mandić, T. 5088 (14 July 2010)

⁴⁴⁷¹ D232 (Directive 1, 6 June 1992), p. 5.

⁴⁴⁷² P5400 (Order of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 7 June 1992), pp. 1–2, 5–6.

⁴⁴⁷³ P5479 (RS Presidency confirmation of appointment of Zvornik War Commission members, 17 June 1992); D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), paras. 67–68, 73 (under seal) [REDACTED]. See also D1716 (Decision of Zvornik Interim Government, 28 July 1992); Petko Panić, T. 19210 (20 September 2011); D4694 (Zvornik Wartime Commission Decisions, 1 July 1992). P3152 (Request of Investbank to Zvornik’s temporary Government, 17 June 1992) p. 2; KDZ555, T. 17241 (16 August 2011).

⁴⁴⁷⁴ D1719 (Order of Zvornik Interim Government, 18 April 1992), p. 1; Petko Panić, T. 19216 (20 September 2011). Branko Grujić delayed the implementation of this decision. D1720 (Conclusion of Zvornik Interim Government, 9 May 1992), pp. 1–2; Petko Panić, T. 19217 (20 September 2011).

⁴⁴⁷⁶ P2867 (Decision of Zvornik Interim Government, 27 April 1992); Milorad Davidović, 15497 (28 June 2011).

Yes. T.15794: A. Yes. That was a significant armed group, and when we entered Zvornik that implied combat activities. That is to say, we fired shots, they were shooting at us. Someone could have gotten killed on either side, but fortunately, no one got wounded. And I must say we used more chemical weapons to chase them out of apartments and houses and in this way we arrested them. So we prevented any killings in the shoot-out between us. The action of arrest of those who weren't "Serb Forces" but had been arrested by the real Serb Forces was a huge and very risky, in the middle of war, but it was accomplished on the basis of the #Presidential orders!# Members of the Yellow Wasps would regularly report to the Zvornik Crisis Staff.⁴⁴⁷⁷ The Yellow Wasps had close co-operation with, and were issued arms by, the TO⁴⁴⁷⁸ and were subsequently under the command of the Zvornik Brigade.⁴⁴⁷⁹ In May 1992, the Zvornik TO was transformed into the Zvornik Brigade, which formed part of the Eastern Bosnia Corps.⁴⁴⁸⁰ Žučo reported to, and received orders from, the Brigade command.⁴⁴⁸¹ Pivarski's Group received orders from Pavlović although it was under the command of the Zvornik Brigade as was Niški's Group.⁴⁴⁸² When volunteers and paramilitaries arrived in Zvornik they reported to the Zvornik Crisis Staff and were sent to the TO to be deployed.⁴⁴⁸³ Members of paramilitary and volunteer units were on the payroll of the Zvornik TO or Zvornik Brigade and were paid by municipal bodies, including the TO Staff and Zvornik Crisis Staff, which also paid for their transportation to Zvornik.⁴⁴⁸⁴ **(It is sufficient to say that all the volunteers were equalised in rights and obligations with all other members of the JNA and TO, by the**

⁴⁴⁷⁷ KDZ340, T. 17479 (18 August 2011).

⁴⁴⁷⁸ See Adjudicated Fact 2108; P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), pp. 17, 19, 49 (under seal). See also Reynaud Theunens, T. 17090–17092 (21 July 2011); Milorad Davidović, T. 15491 (28 June 2011).

⁴⁴⁷⁹ P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), pp. 16, 19, 22–23, 26–27 (under seal); P3169 (Letter from Zvornik Brigade, 17 June 1992), p. 1; P3170 (Duty book of Zvornik Brigade, 9 June – 9 July 1992).

⁴⁴⁸⁰ P3167 (Order of the Eastern Bosnia Corps, 30 May 1992); D1457 (Order of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 6 June 1992), p. 1.

⁴⁴⁸¹ P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), pp. 25–31 (under seal); P3171 (Combat Report of the Eastern Bosnia Corps, 6 July 1992), p. 2; P3170 (Duty book of Zvornik Brigade, 9 June – 9 July 1992), p. 7.

⁴⁴⁸² P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), pp. 17, 23–24 (under seal) (stating that Niški's full name was Svetožar Mitrović and first came to Zvornik under Arkan's command and returned on 26 April 1992 under the command of Žučo and then Pavlović). See also P3169 (Letter from Zvornik Brigade, 17 June 1992), p. 1.

⁴⁴⁸³ Branko Grujić, T. 40384–40385 (25 June 2013), T. 40444–40445 (26 June 2013); D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 26; D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 39 (under seal); KDZ340, T. 17518–17519 (19 August 2011); KDZ555, T. 17293 (16 August 2011).

⁴⁴⁸⁴ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2893–2894, 2906, 2984–2985; Petko Panić, T. 19130–19131 (19 September 2011); P2866 (Declaration of Milorad Davidović, 22 June 2011), pp. 2–3; Milorad Davidović, T. 15489, 15491–15495, 15497 (28 June 2011); P2867 (Decision of Zvornik Interim Government, 27 April 1992); P2862 (Yellow Wasps payroll, 1 May 1992); P2863 (Yellow Wasps' payroll, June 1992); P2869 (Zvornik Brigade's payroll, June 1992); P2871 (Zvornik TO's payroll, April 1992); P2865 (White Eagles' payroll, June 1992); P2872 (Zvornik TO's payroll, May 1992); P2873 (List of volunteers in Zvornik Municipality, 7 May 1992); P2634 (Order of Zvornik's interim government, 4 May 1992), p. 1; P3156 (Approval for payment of Zvornik Municipal Assembly, 30 April 1992); P3157 (Payroll of unemployed reservists, May 1992), p. 4 (referring to entry 41 which is a payment made to Žuča); P3159 (Zvornik Brigade's payroll for June 1992) (under seal); P158 (Payroll list of reserve soldiers); P159 (Payroll list of volunteers); P3382 (List of members of Loznica TO in April 1992), pp. 1–2; P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), pp. 7–9, 16–17, 19–20, 31, 84–86 (under seal); P2870 (TO's payroll of reserve soldiers, May 1992); KDZ340, T. 17526–17527 (19 August 2011) (private session); KDZ555, T. 17270–17271, (16 August 2011) (private session), T. 17287–17289, 17293 (16 August 2011); KW317, T. 39357–39358 (6 June 2013); P3173 (Statement of Nenad Simić to Bijeljina SJB, 6 August 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P133 (Witness statement of Matija Bošković dated 20 November 2003), paras. 13, 31, 56; P160 (Receipts of confiscated vehicles, 23 June 1992); P5434 (Payroll sheet for members of the Zvornik TO, May 1992); P5435 (List of soldiers in the White Eagles Unit, 16 June 1992); P5542 (Permission of the Zvornik Municipality, 10 June 1992); Marinko Vasilčić, T. 39945–39947 (13 June 2013); P3383 (Payment list for Zoran Aleksić's unit), pp. 1–5; P2859 (Zvornik TO's payroll, April 1992), pp. 6–7; see Adjudicated Fact 2108. Defence witnesses testified that the local authorities did not dare enter into a more detailed analysis of who was on payment lists because of fear and that they were forced to provide logistical support by the paramilitaries. Branko Grujić, T. 40390 (25 June 2013); P6415 (Excerpt from Branko Grujić's testimony before Belgrade District Court, 30 November 2005), pp. 9–10; Čedomir Zelenović, T. 40329–40332 (24 June 2013). However, the Chamber notes that on cross-examination Grujić was challenged about this testimony and did not adequately explain why he had not previously mentioned this theory that payments were made under coercion. Branko Grujić, T. 40390 (25 June 2013); P6415 (Excerpt from Branko Grujić's testimony before Belgrade District Court, 30 November 2005), pp. 9–10. The Chamber further notes that Grujić's evidence was marked by multiple contradictions and evasiveness and does not consider it to be reliable in this regard. Zelenović was shown P2913, which showed Grujić requesting payment from the republican authorities for members of the TO without mentioning any coercion. The Chamber does not consider Zelenović's evidence to be reliable in this regard considering that his testimony was marked by evasiveness.

Yugoslav federal Presidency! But, since the Yellow Wasps and other paramilitaries were violent and hostile towards the municipal authorities, nobody dared to remove them from the payroll. It is well known to the Chamber and other participant in the process!) Pavlović had a major role in arming Serb paramilitary units in the region.⁴⁴⁸⁵

Some of the paramilitary groups which came from Serbia later joined the TO or the VRS but mostly worked independently.⁴⁴⁸⁶ There were difficulties in attempts to place them under a unified command.⁴⁴⁸⁷ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! That was why they had been arrested!)**

1281. Before being integrated into the Eastern Bosnia Corps, the Zvornik TO worked in parallel and in co-operation with the Zvornik Brigade, which allowed both Pavlović and the Zvornik Brigade commander to issue orders to military units in Zvornik.⁴⁴⁸⁸ In June 1992, Pavlović was appointed commander of “the single military and territorial command” of the Serb Municipality of Zvornik.⁴⁴⁸⁹

1282. Paramilitaries were involved in looting goods and vehicles, which were then smuggled to Serbia.⁴⁴⁹⁰ The actions of paramilitaries created fear among the Bosnian Muslim population.⁴⁴⁹¹ These actions included the formation of check-points around town, the seizure of cars, buildings and apartments, the looting of private houses and factories, maltreatment, killings, and rape.⁴⁴⁹²

1283. The local authorities faced difficulties in controlling the actions of the paramilitaries.⁴⁴⁹³ However, in some cases the paramilitary formations “carried out their illegal activities with the knowledge and consent” of members of the Bosnian Serb authorities in Zvornik.⁴⁴⁹⁴ More specifically, paramilitaries such as Žučo had close contact with Pavlović.⁴⁴⁹⁵ With respect to one incident, in which two Bosnian Muslim men were killed and two Bosnian Muslim women were raped by members of the Zvornik TO under the command of Žučo, the SFRY Secretariat for National Defence reported that that the leadership of Zvornik did not want to uncover the identity of the perpetrators.⁴⁴⁹⁶ The SJB protested against the Interim Government which had engaged paramilitary formations and was aware of and consented to their illegal activities.⁴⁴⁹⁷

1284. At the end of May 1992, Bosnian Serb leaders from Zvornik informed Mandić and Mićo Stanišić about the situation in the municipality, including the actions of the paramilitaries.⁴⁴⁹⁸ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! And a proof that the paramilitaries and other perpetrators of crimes didn't enjoy any support and tolerance from the local Serb officials!)** In response, they were told that the local police should attempt to control these groups given that the SerBiH government and the VRS were still in the process of being established and did not have the resources to assist the municipalities in controlling the paramilitaries at the time.⁴⁴⁹⁹ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! Corroborates all the Defence arguments!#)**

1285. When paramilitaries felt that their activities, including looting, were interfered with and their presence was not supported, they also threatened and mistreated Bosnian Serb officials, threatened to attack the Zvornik SJB, blocked government buildings, and issued

⁴⁴⁸⁵ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 30 March 2002), paras. 5–6, 9; P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), p. 17 (under seal).

⁴⁴⁸⁶ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2888; Petko Panić, T. 19166–19167 (20 September 2011). See also Marinko Vasić, T. 39947, 39970 (13 June 2013); D3663 (Witness statement of Goran Mačar dated 3 May 2013), para. 28.

⁴⁴⁸⁷ D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 37.

demands.⁴⁵⁰⁰ It was only following these incidents that the local authorities took some steps to get rid of them.⁴⁵⁰¹ **#EXCULPATORY!!!**

- 4488 P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), pp. 12–15 (under seal); KDZ340, T. 17519–17521 (19 August 2011).
- 4489 P313 (Decision of interim Zvornik government, 16 June 1992), p. 1.
- 4490 KDZ446, P28 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*, T. 23634–23636 (under seal).
- 4491 D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), paras. 49–50 (under seal); P2764 (Bijeljina CSB report), pp. 2–3.
- 4492 D1436 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 17 June 1992), p. 5; D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilic dated 9 June 2013), para. 37; P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), pp. 50–51 (under seal); P3181 (Statement of KDZ340 to Bijeljina SJB, 6 August 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3173 (Statement of Nenad Simić to Bijeljina SJB, 6 August 1992), pp. 1, 3 (under seal); KDZ340, T. 17535–17536, 17538, 17543 (19 August 2011) (private session); P3176 (Map of area around Zvornik marked by KDZ340) (under seal); P3178 (Indictment from Bijeljina Lower Court, 13 September 1999) (under seal), p. 7. *See also* P6372 (Excerpt from SFRY Federal Secretariat for National Defence information, 26 May 1992), p. 2; P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 3; KDZ555, T. 17286–17287 (16 August 2011) (private session); D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), pp. 5, 31; P2764 (Bijeljina CSB report), pp. 2–3. The Chamber will not enter a finding with respect to killings which are not connected to scheduled killing incidents.
- 4493 Dragan Vidović, T. 17762 (23 August 2011); D1696 (List of active policemen in Zvornik SJB, 21 April 1992), pp. 1–2; Petko Panić, T. 19172–19173 (20 September 2011); D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), paras. 49–50 (under seal); P3390 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB for 1993), p. 23, 38; D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), pp. 5, 31; D1436 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 17 June 1992), p. 5; D1631 (Report of Zvornik SJB, 29 June 1992), p. 3; D1625 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB, July–September 1992), p. 1; P2764 (Bijeljina CSB report), pp. 2–3; Dragomir Andan, T. 40836 (5 July 2013); P2880 (Official Note of Valjevo State Security Centre, 2 July 1992), p. 4. *See also* P1478 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 264–265; P2743 (Witness statement of Dragan Kezunović dated 14 June 2011), pp. 62–63; D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 37, 53; D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilic dated 9 June 2013), para. 35; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 27; D3960 (Witness Statement of Tomislav Kovač dated 28 October 2013), para. 79; D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), para. 28; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 27; Petko Panić, T. 19188–19190 (20 September 2011); Mićo Stanišić, T. 46553–46554 (5 February 2014).
- 4494 P3390 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB for 1993), p. 23; P36 (Report by CSB Bijeljina re security situation in the Zvornik Municipality, 20 July 1992), p. 5 (under seal); D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), p. 8. As a result of dissatisfaction with the legalisation of the stay of “criminally inclined persons” and the actions of the military authorities, the Chief of the Zvornik SJB requested to be released from his duties. D1436 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 17 June 1992), p. 5; Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2923. *But see* KDZ555, T. 17286–17287 (16 August 2011) (private session); D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilic dated 9 June 2013), paras. 32–34, 36; Marinko Vasilic, T. 39945–39946, 39950, 39962–39963 (13 June 2013); D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), paras. 28–30; Čedomir Zelenović, T. 40329, 40332 (24 June 2013), T. 40337 (25 June 2013); D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), paras. 25–27; Jovan Ivanović, T. 39866–39867 (12 June 2013), T. 39873–39874, 39897 (13 June 2013); D3663 (Witness statement of Goran Mačar dated 3 May 2013), para. 29; D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012) (under seal), para. 71; KW317, T. 39402 (6 June 2013); D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 37–39. The Chamber does not find the evidence of these witnesses that local authorities could not control or punish paramilitaries to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 4237 and 4239. Vasilic, for example, qualified his evidence and acknowledged that he did not know if the military authorities were supporting paramilitaries. Similarly the Chamber notes that the evidence of Mačar was also marked by contradictions and extreme evasiveness which undermined his credibility in this regard.
- 4495 Dragomir Andan, T. 40893–40895 (5 July 2013). There were attempts to hide the contacts and connections between members of the local government and paramilitary groups. KDZ446, P28 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*, T. 23634–23636, 23661 (under seal).
- 4496 P6372 (Excerpt from SFRY Federal Secretariat for National Defence information, 26 May 1992), p. 2.
- 4497 P3389 (Report of Zvornik SJB, 28 July 1992), p. 1; P3390 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB for 1993), p. 23.
- 4498 D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 65 (under seal).
- 4499 D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), paras. 66, 70 (under seal).
- 4500 P2880 (Official Note of Valjevo State Security Centre, 2 July 1992), pp. 1–4; D1436 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 17 June 1992), p. 5; D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), paras. 28–29; Čedomir Zelenović, T. 40329 (24 June 2013), T. 40337 (25 June 2013); P1478 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), p. 250. *See also* D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 37–38; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 27; D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilic dated 9 June 2013), para. 38; Vojislav Šešelji, T. 39577 (10 June 2013); KDZ555, T. 17289–17290 (16 August 2011); Marinko Vasilic, T. 39948, 39967–39968 (13 June 2013).
- 4501 P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), p. 28; D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), p. 68; Milorad Davidović, T. 15778 (30 June 2011). *See also* P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), pp. 53–54 (under seal); D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), p. 6; Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21799; P6434 (Excerpt from Dragomir Andan's interview with OTP), p. 1. When cross-examined, Andan maintained that the mistreatment of Ostojić was not the direct cause of the operation but this incident could have accelerated the process and that approval for the operation was received a day or two after the incident. Dragomir Andan, T. 40885–40887, 40905–40907 (5 July 2013); P6435 (Article entitled “The Sting of the ‘Yellow Wasp’”, 10 December 2002), p. 2; P6434 (Excerpt from Dragomir Andan's interview with OTP), p. 1. *See also* KW317, T. 39415–39416 (6 June 2013). *But see* Mićo Stanišić, T. 46653–46654 (5 February 2014). The Chamber does not consider Stanišić's evidence that this was already planned to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that his testimony was marked by contradictions, evasiveness and indicators that the witness was not being forthright in his evidence to the Chamber.

1286. In another incident in June 1992, the Government and Zvornik Crisis Staff building was encircled by paramilitary formations and a member of Captain Dragan's unit threatened the President of the Municipality.⁴⁵⁰² **(#EXCULPATORY!!!** The Accused and Mladić visited Zvornik the following day.⁴⁵⁰³ Grujić reported to the Accused and Mladić that in addition to "major accomplishments" there were also many problems from paramilitary formations which broke free after Arkan's withdrawal and called for their removal.⁴⁵⁰⁴ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!** At this meeting, the Accused stated that it would be a shame to abolish Captain Dragan's training centre at Divič and that it would be easiest to "put the incident behind us".⁴⁵⁰⁵ **(If Captain Dragan only trained, as it was the case, it could have been "put behind us" what he got in a dispute with the municipal authorities, but when General Mladic disagreed even with the training activities, the President accepted his opinion, and Capt. Dragan was removed!)** Mladić said he had not approved the establishment of the training centre and that Captain Dragan was "no more than an ordinary mobster" and insisted that Captain Dragan leave the municipality.⁴⁵⁰⁶ Mladić also expressed strong disapproval of the paramilitaries and threatened to arrest anyone who did not place themselves under the command of the Army.⁴⁵⁰⁷ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!**

1287. After June 1992, the Yellow Wasps did not place themselves under the joint military command of the VRS.⁴⁵⁰⁸ In July 1992, members of the Yellow Wasps went to Pale and received weapons from the Pale SJB after which Žučo met with Biljana Plavšić.⁴⁵⁰⁹ Žučo also spoke to the Minister of Defence about the status of his group and Bogdan Subotić confirmed that all those who received orders from VRS officers were part of the VRS whether they were reservists, volunteers or paramilitaries.⁴⁵¹⁰ Subotić alerted these units that they needed to fully comply with the rules and regulations of the VRS, including those relating to uniforms, insignia and command structures.⁴⁵¹¹ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! #Insignias, not Serb Forces#! This is an additional proof that all individuals with a diverse insignias had nothing to do with the legal "Serb Forces" and couldn't be called the Serb Forces!)**

⁴⁵⁰² D1436 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 17 June 1992), p. 5; P1478 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 250, 264; KDZ555, T. 17289–17290 (16 August 2011); Marinko Vasilčić, T. 39967–39968 (13 June 2013). See also P2880 (Official Note of Valjevo State Security Centre, 2 July 1992), pp. 3–4.

⁴⁵⁰³ P2880 (Official Note of Valjevo State Security Centre, 2 July 1992), p. 3; Marinko Vasilčić, T. 39960 (13 June 2013). See also Petko Panić, T. 19187–19188 (20 September 2011).

⁴⁵⁰⁴ P1478 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 249–250, 252, 266.

⁴⁵⁰⁵ P1478 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 250, 270.

⁴⁵⁰⁶ P2880 (Official Note of Valjevo State Security Centre, 2 July 1992), pp. 1, 3; Marinko Vasilčić, T. 39960 (13 June 2013); D1436 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 17 June 1992), p. 5; Petko Panić, T. 19133, 19135 (19 September 2011), T. 19187–19188 (20 September 2011); P3384 (Report of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 7 June 1992), p. 1; P1478 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 266–269. See also Marinko Vasilčić, T. 39951–39952 (13 June 2013).

⁴⁵⁰⁷ D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 69 (under seal).

⁴⁵⁰⁸ P2882 (Report of Bijeljina SJB, 8 August 1992), p. 3; D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), p. 9; D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 53. The Chamber refers to para. 1281 above explaining that Pavlović was in June 1992 appointed commander of the single military command in Zvornik.

⁴⁵⁰⁹ Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21712–21713; P3174 (Certificate of Pale SJB, 11 July 1992); see Adjudicated Fact 2109; Mićo Stanišić, T. 46524 (5 February 2014); [REDACTED]. The Chamber has considered the Accused's submissions with respect to P3174 and the issuance of weapons. Defence Final Brief, paras. 1108–1109. The Chamber does not consider that these submissions affect the conclusion that the Yellow Wasps received weapons through the Pale SJB.

⁴⁵¹⁰ See Adjudicated Fact 2109; [REDACTED]; D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 205–206. See also D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 293; D3705 (Letter from RS Ministry of Defence to Zvornik Municipality Executive Board, 16 October 1992); Adjudicated Fact 2110.

⁴⁵¹¹ D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 293; D3705 (Letter from RS Ministry of Defence to Zvornik Municipality Executive Board, 16 October 1992).

1288. Reports submitted to the MUP in June and July 1992, indicated that the situation with respect to paramilitary forces in Zvornik had yet to be resolved⁴⁵¹² and that the Yellow Wasps had attempted to influence the municipal authorities to appoint Žučo's men to certain positions and had taken control of check-points.⁴⁵¹³ Measures taken from June to July 1992 to control paramilitaries included controlling the issuance of VRS uniforms,⁴⁵¹⁴ placing controls on weapons,⁴⁵¹⁵ and restricting the presence of armed individuals in the town.⁴⁵¹⁶ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!)** The local authorities also took steps to expel police employees who had engaged "in inappropriate conduct" or had joined paramilitary units; a large number of police were then sent to the VRS.⁴⁵¹⁷ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!)** Vasilić and Grujić went to Pale in mid-June or July 1992 to inform the Bosnian Serb leadership about the situation in Zvornik and to ask for help in dealing with paramilitaries.⁴⁵¹⁸ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!)** Two days after Grujić and Vasilić returned from Pale they were taken prisoner by the Yellow Wasps and threatened.⁴⁵¹⁹ They were released the next day but Grujić and Vasilić resigned from their positions.⁴⁵²⁰

1289. On 25 July 1992, Milorad Davidović reported on the threat to the security situation posed by Žučo and the killings perpetrated by Repić at Čelopek after which steps were taken to arrest him.⁴⁵²¹ The Bijeljina CSB chief in a report delivered, *inter alios*, to the Minister of Internal Affairs recommended that a special unit of the MUP be sent to Zvornik to eliminate the paramilitary formations to improve the security situation in the region, **(#EXCULPATORY!!!)** and noted that Žučo was operating with the assistance of members of the local governmental authorities.⁴⁵²² **(#Individuals#! It could have been only some individuals insignificant in the authorities. As we have seen in the previous para, the main members of authorities (Grujić and Vasilic) had been in conflict with the paramilitaries!)** The MUP concluded that paramilitary formations from Serbia should be banned in Zvornik and that members of Captain Dragan's unit should return to regular units of the VRS.⁴⁵²³ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! There was no evidence that Captain Dragan's educators committed any crime! But, it is necessary to mention that prior to the President's invitation of help from FRY, a high official of the Republika Srpska MUP**

⁴⁵¹² D3810 (Bijeljina CSB dispatch to SerBiH MUP, 23 July 1992); D1632 (Report of Bijeljina SJB, 23 July 1992), pp. 1–2; P36 (Report by CSB Bijeljina re security situation in the Zvornik Municipality, 20 July 1992), p. 1 (under seal); Dragomir Andan, T. 40819–40820 (5 July 2013); Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21402, 21439 21465, 21629.

⁴⁵¹³ D1632 (Report of Bijeljina SJB, 23 July 1992), p. 2; Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2925; P36 (Report by CSB Bijeljina re security situation in the Zvornik Municipality, 20 July 1992), p. 3 (under seal); Milorad Davidović, T. 15491 (28 June 2011). *See also* D1436 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 17 June 1992), p. 5.

⁴⁵¹⁴ D1703 (Conclusion of Zvornik Interim Government, 29 June 1992); Petko Panić, T. 19199 (20 September 2011).

⁴⁵¹⁵ D1700 (Order of Zvornik Interim Government, 2 July 1992); D1701 (Order of Zvornik Interim Government, 2 July 1992); Petko Panić, T. 19197–19198 (20 September 2011). A similar order was issued by the Executive Board on 24 September 1992. D1702 (Order of Zvornik Executive Board, 24 September 1992).

⁴⁵¹⁶ D1623 (Order of Zvornik's War Commission, 1 July 1992); KDZ555, T. 17443 (18 August 2011)

⁴⁵¹⁷ D1704 (Recommendation of Zvornik Executive Board, 12 November 1992), p. 1; Petko Panić, T. 19200 (20 September 2011).

⁴⁵¹⁸ D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilić dated 9 June 2013), para. 40; Marinko Vasilić, T. 39948, 39953–39955, 39970–39971 (13 June 2013); D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 39, 41. *See also* P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 126; Milorad Davidović, T. 15777–15778 (30 June 2011); D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), p. 4; P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 30 March 2002), paras. 21–22.

⁴⁵¹⁹ D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 42.

⁴⁵²⁰ D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 42.

⁴⁵²¹ D3789 (Dragomir Andan's notes), pp. 5–6; Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21489–21490, 21683; D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 39; P2879 (Official Note of Valjevo State Security Centre, 2 July 1992), p. 5 (under seal); P2880 (Official Note of Valjevo State Security Centre, 2 July 1992); Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2903–2905, 3013. For evidence on these killings, *see* Scheduled Incident B.20.2.

⁴⁵²² P36 (Report by CSB Bijeljina re security situation in the Zvornik Municipality, 20 July 1992), p. 5 (under seal).

⁴⁵²³ D1436 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 17 June 1992), p. 5.

Dragan Andan was sent to assess the situation, and he reported back to the Serb Ministry for Interior, on 20 July, see P36:

Security situation in the region of Serb municipality Zvornik has been extremely aggravated, besides the already encountered military problems on the frontlines towards Kalesija, Sapna region (Mededa, Zaseok, Nezuk, Vitinica), and on the frontline towards Milići (Kamenica, Novo Selo, Glodi and Cerska), by the activities of a certain number of paramilitary formations which still have not been put under a joint command of the Army of Serb Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina.

According to the information available to the Service, there are three active paramilitary units organised in the region of Serb municipality Zvornik:

- The unit commanded by certain “Žučo”,
- The unit commanded by certain “Pivarski”,
- The unit commanded by certain “Niški”.

The largest, the best equipped with weapons and best organised is the unit commanded by the mentioned “Žučo”. Allegedly, it is a person who was a member of the Serb Radical Party, and whose membership in the mentioned party was cancelled due to conflicts between the parties. His unit has approximately 100 men who are armed with infantry weapons, and also have a certain number of heavy machine-guns and three anti-aircraft cannons fitted on trucks. The unit is located in Caparde where it

This was an action of the Serb authorities, whose President was Dr. Karadzic, and those were the only “Serb Forces”, and not the renegades that the “Serb Forces” arrested! However, the Chamber accepted the OTP manoeuvre, that the crimes had been committed by some “serb forces” and the Police and army that persecuted them due to the President orders, were understood not to be the “Serb Forces”!)

1290. As instructed, Davidović planned the operation to arrest the paramilitary groups in Zvornik in co-operation with Andan and special units of the MUP.⁴⁵²⁴ **(#Presidential ordesr#! Instructed, by whom? Why the Chamber is skipping to register that Davidovic was invited by the President, through his communication with the FRY Prime Minister Milan Panic, to send him the most trained group of policemen to resolve what the domestic police couldn’t do! But, it is interesting how the Judgement skipped to confirm that the President personally demanded that Davidovic and his dosen of special policemen come to help these arrests in Brcko, in Bijeljina and in Zvornik. Let us see what M. Davidovic responded to the Accused in the cross examination, T15581-82: Q: So didn’t you clearly confirm to them here that you were aware that the leadership of Republika Srpska requested you to make these arrests and to disarm the paramilitaries?)**

A. I never said anything else. You and Mico Stanisic and his deputy, they are the leaders. They are the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior. (It can not be understood how this Accused could be charged with anything that paramilitaries had been doing, taking into account that the President disowned all the paramilitaries on 13 June 1992, and repeatedly banned all the independent groups, under the threat of arrest, and ordered many arrests, including those in Brcko, Bijeljina, Zvornik, and all other municipalities!) On 27 July 1992, the police expelled Gojić’s group to Mali Zvornik and

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P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 126, 130–132; Milorad Davidović, T. 15766, 15779 (30 June 2011); D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), pp. 6–7; D1450 (Milorad Davidović’s statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), pp. 6–7; D3918 (Witness statement of Milomir Savčić dated 21 July 2013), para. 33. See also Mićo Stanišić, T. 46380 (3 February 2014); Momčilo Mandić, T. 5289–5290 (16 July 2010); Dragomir Andan, T. 40827–40828, 40891–40893, 40906–40907 (5 July 2013); Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21473–21474, 21478–21479, 21489–21490, 21678, 21680, 21693.

took back control of check-points.⁴⁵²⁵ On 29 July 1992, Žučo was arrested and brought to Bijeljina.⁴⁵²⁶ During this operation, other leaders and members of the Yellow Wasps were arrested⁴⁵²⁷ as were municipal leaders, who had links with or collaborated with the Yellow Wasps, including Pavlović.⁴⁵²⁸ (#EXCULPATORY!!!) During this operation a large quantity of gold, jewellery, cars, weapons, ammunition, alcohol, and other goods were found at the premises of those arrested.⁴⁵²⁹ All items found during the arrests were confiscated,⁴⁵³⁰ and Andan instructed the Zvornik SJB to return the personal belongings of those who resided in the municipality.⁴⁵³¹ (#EXCULPATORY!!!)

⁴⁵²⁵ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2907–2908, 2925–2926; P3389 (Report of Zvornik SJB, 28 July 1992), p.1; Petko Panić, T. 19144 (19 September 2011), T. 19191, 19211 (20 September 2011); P3390 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB for 1993), p. 23.

⁴⁵²⁶ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 134; D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), p. 17; Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21506–21510, 21693; P6435 (Article entitled "The Sting of the 'Yellow Wasp'", 10 December 2002), p. 3. See also Mićo Stanišić, T. 46380 (3 February 2014).

⁴⁵²⁷ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 126, 136–137, 139–141; Milorad Davidović, T. 15493 (28 June 2011) (testifying that Pivarski who had joined the Yellow Wasps was also arrested), T. 15794 (30 June 2011); Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2908, 2926–2928, 2937, 3006, 3008; D1625 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB, July–September 1992), p. 2; Petko Panić, T. 19144–19145 (19 September 2011), T. 19191–19193, 19211 (20 September 2011); P3390 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB for 1993), pp. 23, 38; P2904 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 4 August 1992), p. 1; KDZ555, T. 17311–17312 (17 August 2011); D1612 (Video footage of Arkan in "My Guest, His Truth", July/August 1994), transcript, p. 13; P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), p. 63 (under seal); P133 (Witness statement of Matija Bošković dated 20 November 2003), para. 33; D1633 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 29 July 1992), p. 1; P2903 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 31 July 1992), p. 1; D1635 (Report of SerBiH MUP Pale's Crime Prevention Department, 10 August 1992), p.1; KDZ340, T. 17535 (19 August 2011) (private session); D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), para. 44; D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 42; Jovan Ivanović, T. 39899 (13 June 2013). See also Dragomir Ljubojević, T. 35913 (22 March 2013).

⁴⁵²⁸ KDZ555, T. 17311–17312 (17 August 2011); Dragomir Andan, T. 40894 (5 July 2013); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 140–141; D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), p. 3; D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), p. 69. The Chamber received differing evidence about the number of paramilitaries arrested in this operation, ranging from 30 to 180. D3694 (Bijeljina CSB report, 29 July 1992); KDZ340, T. 17567 (19 August 2011) (private session); P2904 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 4 August 1992), p. 1; D480 (SerBiH MUP information on paramilitaries in Zvornik, 31 July 1992); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 140–141; D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), p. 3; D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), p. 69; D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), para. 44; Marinko Vasilčić, T. 39971 (13 June 2013); D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 42; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 28. See also Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21461, 21680.

⁴⁵²⁹ P2904 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 4 August 1992), pp. 2–3; D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), p. 9; D1417 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 6 November 1993), pp. 4–5; P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 136; P2903 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 31 July 1992), p. 1; D1634 (Official record of Zvornik SJB re search of KDZ340's apartment, 31 July 1992) (under seal); KDZ340, T. 17564 (19 August 2011) (private session); P3179 (Certificate on entering KDZ340's apartment, 3 August 1992) (under seal). See also P3181 (Statement of KDZ340 to Bijeljina SJB, 6 August 1992), p. 6 (under seal); KDZ340, T. 17533–17535 (19 August 2011) (private session); P3180 (Letter from Milisav Simić, 21 August 1992), pp. 1–2.

⁴⁵³⁰ Dragomir Andan, T. 40828, 40858–40860 (5 July 2013).

⁴⁵³¹ Dragomir Andan, T. 40828–40830 (5 July 2013); D3793 (Letter from Bijeljina SJB to Zvornik SJB, 13 August 1992); D3816 (Letter from Bijeljina SJB to Zvornik SJB, 13 August 1992); P6435 (Article entitled "The Sting of the 'Yellow Wasp'", 10 December 2002), p. 3.

1291. On the day of the arrests, Davidović met with the Zvornik Crisis Staff and the municipal leadership and informed them that they had arrested and disarmed the paramilitaries; this was met with relief and gratitude by Grujić.⁴⁵³² **(#EXCULPATORY!!!)** However, imprecise: at that moment there was no any Crisis Staffs any longer. This was a legal, regular, elected authorities. Mićo Stanišić and the MUP were informed about the successful operation in Zvornik to arrest the paramilitaries after which Stanišić paid tribute to their efforts.⁴⁵³³ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!)** Stanišić was also informed that some of the leading officers, including the police station commander, had taken part in criminal activities, after which Stanišić said that everyone involved in any criminal activity that could be documented should be processed and criminal reports submitted for prosecution.⁴⁵³⁴ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!)**

1292. Davidović prepared the documentation and submitted a criminal report to the Military Prosecutor in Bijeljina but, after his men withdrew, the proceedings were suspended and all the men were released by August 1992;⁴⁵³⁵ some returned to Serbia.⁴⁵³⁶ A number of paramilitaries were banned from entering RS while locals returned to regular units after the paramilitaries were disbanded.⁴⁵³⁷ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!)** The MUP special

⁴⁵³² D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), pp. 12–13, 33.

⁴⁵³³ Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21493, 21512; D3791 (Bijeljina CSB dispatch to SerBiH MUP, 1 August 1992); P6386 (Letter from Goran Mačar to SerBiH MUP forwarding a report, 4 August 1992); Goran Mačar, T. 39499 (7 June 2013). See also Mićo Stanišić, T. 46382 (3 February 2014); D4275 (Order of RS MUP, 27 October 1992).

⁴⁵³⁴ Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21494–21495. See also Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21498, 21513–21514, 21525, 21711; D3792 (Bijeljina SJB dispatch to SerBiH MUP, 31 July 1992); Dragomir Andan, T. 40828 (5 July 2013); D3663 (Witness statement of Goran Mačar dated 3 May 2013), para. 29; Goran Mačar, T. 39493, 39507–39509 (7 June 2013). Mićo Stanišić testified that criminal reports with respect to Serbians were handed over to the authorities of the FRY because the RS judicial system did not have adequate courts to try them. Mićo Stanišić, T. 46380–46381 (3 February 2014). The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 4458 as to why it cannot rely on Mićo Stanišić's evidence with respect to the submission of criminal reports and processing of cases.

⁴⁵³⁵ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 142, 168; Milorad Davidović, T. 15523 (28 June 2011), 15652, 15655–15656 (29 June 2011); D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), pp. 7, 11, 52; P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), pp. 55–56, 59 (under seal); KDZ340, T. 17490–17491, 17556 (19 August 2011) (private session); Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21524–21525, 21688; Dragomir Andan, T. 40859 (5 July 2013); P2882 (Report of Bijeljina SJB, 8 August 1992); P3178 (Indictment from Bijeljina Lower Court, 13 September 1999), pp. 1–3 (under seal); P2904 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 4 August 1992); D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), p. 9; D1625 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB, July–September 1992), pp. 1–2; P2905 (Decision of Bijeljina Lower Court, 28 August 1992); D1413 (Request of Prosecutor in Bijeljina, 14 September 1992); D1626 (Official Note of SerBiH MUP's Crime Prevention Administration, 4 August 1992); D3790 (Decision of Bijeljina SJB, 29 July 1992). See also P3177 (Bijeljina SJB's Ruling on detention of KDZ340, 29 July 1992) (under seal); P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), p. 55 (under seal); D3794 (Report of Zvornik SJB, 11 August 1992). The Chamber does not place any weight on Andan's opinion as to why these cases were not processed. Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21688; Dragomir Andan, T. 40887–40888 (5 July 2013). KDZ446, P28 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 23634–23636 (under seal); Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2923, 3052; D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), p. 8; D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 39.

⁴⁵³⁶ Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21686–21688. But see D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), para. 45; Marinko Vasilčić, T. 39971 (13 June 2013); D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), para. 34; D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), paras. 42, 52; Branko Grujić, T. 40443–40444 (26 June 2013); D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 28; Momčilo Mandić, T. 5292 (16 July 2010); D2269 (Šabac District Court Indictment against Duško Vučković, 28 April 1994), pp. 1–2, 4–7; D3727 (Letter from Bijeljina SJB to Republic of Serbia MUP, 9 August 1992); D1415 (Request of Bijeljina Lower Court, 24 December 1993); D3728 (Letter from Bijeljina SJB to Republic of Serbia MUP, 9 August 1992); D482 (Belgrade Supreme Court Judgement against Duško Vučković and others). The Accused points to D481 and D482 to support his proposition that when the authorities learned about the crimes at Čelopek Dom Culture, the perpetrators were arrested, prosecuted and punished. See Defence Final Brief, para. 1455. See also D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013), para. 70. However, the Chamber does not consider the evidence of the relevant witnesses as to the proceedings initiated against those arrested to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that the testimony of the relevant witnesses was marked by evasiveness, contradictions, and inconsistencies. For example, Zelenović testified that he was not aware that the paramilitaries were released shortly after their arrest or whether people were convicted or not. Čedomir Zelenović, T. 40336–40337 (25 June 2013). Grujić also acknowledged that the paramilitaries were released soon after their arrest and acknowledged that this did happen and that he himself was afraid because he thought "serious proceedings should be initiated against them but that did not happen". Branko Grujić, T. 40391–40392 (25 June 2013). In light of these contradictions the Chamber does not consider their evidence in this regard to be reliable.

⁴⁵³⁷ KDZ555, T. 17313 (17 August 2011); D1418 (List of persons banned from entering RS), p. 1; KDZ340, T. 17528 (19 August 2011).

unit returned intermittently to try and prevent paramilitaries from returning to Zvornik.⁴⁵³⁸ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!** In September 1992, after being released from detention, Žučo attempted to return to Zvornik and threatened to take revenge.⁴⁵³⁹ **(#But was prevented by the real Serb Forces!#Responsible Serb conduct#!)**

1293. The Chamber also notes that the paramilitaries were primarily detained for petty theft of property and vehicles at check-points and not for serious crimes committed against Bosnian Muslims.⁴⁵⁴⁰ **(This is a matter of Davidovic's criminal report, and the RS judges couldn't detain them on any other basis than this one from the criminal report!)** While a criminal report was filed against Repić and Žučo on the basis of suspicions that they had committed war crimes, the proceedings were never completed in BiH and proceedings were instituted much later in Serbia.⁴⁵⁴¹ **(So what? They had been citizens of Serbia, i.e. FRY, as Davidovic was too, and it was more proper to try them there. Certainly, the judicial system in Serbia was more capable than the one in RS at the beginning of the war!)** In contrast the Zvornik SJB was instructed by Goran Mačar in November 1995 to intensify their activities and file criminal reports against perpetrators of war crimes against "the Serbian people" in municipalities including Zvornik.⁴⁵⁴² **(It was understandable, since the crimes against the Muslim population had been already reported in the case of Yellow Wasps!)**

1294. Overall conditions did improve somewhat after the arrest of paramilitaries and the local authorities were able to exercise more control over the functioning of the municipality.⁴⁵⁴³ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!**

vi. Detention Facilities in Zvornik

1295. On 7 June 1992, the Eastern Bosnia Corps reported that in the area of Zvornik, approximately "500 prisoners" were being held.⁴⁵⁴⁴ The Birač Brigade reported on 17 June 1992 that it had close to "600 prisoners" and the Eastern Bosnia Corps had failed to establish a camp for prisoners of war at the corps level.⁴⁵⁴⁵ Accordingly Mladić ordered the

⁴⁵³⁸ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 3013–3014. See also D3664 (Report of Zvornik SJB, 22 November 1992); Goran Mačar, T. 39530–39531 (7 June 2013).

⁴⁵³⁹ P3387 (Report of Birač SNB, 5 September 1992), p. 1; Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2935; Petko Panić, T. 19145 (19 September 2011); D1638 (Report of RS MUP National Security Service, Sarajevo, 22 September 1992), p. 1; D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), p. 46; Milorad Davidović, T. 15612–15613 (29 June 2011); Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 21526–21527; D1637 (Report of RS MUP National Security Service, Sarajevo, 10 September 1992).

⁴⁵⁴⁰ P2882 (Report of Bijeljina SJB, 8 August 1992); P3178 (Indictment from Bijeljina Lower Court, 13 September 1999), pp. 1–3 (under seal); P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), pp. 55–56 (under seal); KDZ340, T. 17490–17491 (19 August 2011) (private session). P2904 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 4 August 1992); D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), p. 9; D1625 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB, July–September 1992), pp. 1–2. See also Dragomir Andan, T. 40857–40860 (5 July 2013).

⁴⁵⁴¹ Milorad Davidović, T. 15661–15662 (29 June 2011), T. 15790–15791 (30 June 2011); D1416 (Official note of Valjevo RDB, 14 December 1992) (under seal); D1414 (Subpoenas from Bijeljina's Lower Court), p. 3; D1415 (Request of Bijeljina Lower Court, 24 December 1993); Milorad Davidović, T. 15657 (29 June 2011); KDZ446, P28 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 23662 (under seal); D1417 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 6 November 1993), pp. 1–2. See also Momčilo Mandić, T. 5289–5291 (16 July 2010), T. 5147–5148 (14 July 2010).

⁴⁵⁴² P6385 (Letter from Bijeljina SJB to Zvornik CJB, 17 November 1995); Goran Mačar, T. 39489–39490 (7 June 2013).

⁴⁵⁴³ D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), para. 34; D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 43; D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 30; D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), paras. 71–72 (under seal); KW317, T. 39414 (6 June 2013). See also Petko Panić, T. 19211 (20 September 2011); D1717 (Decision of Zvornik Assembly, 19 August 1992), p. 3; D1718 (Decision of Zvornik Executive Board, 10 September 1992), p. 1; D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 72 (under seal).

⁴⁵⁴⁴ P3237 (Report of the Eastern Bosnia Corps, 7 June 1992), p. 2.

⁴⁵⁴⁵ P3238 (Order of the VRS Main Staff, 17 June 1992), p. 1.

Eastern Bosnia Corps to set up a camp for prisoners of war and for the Birač brigade to be relieved of guarding those prisoners.⁴⁵⁴⁶ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!)**

1. Scheduled Detention Facility C.27.1 and Scheduled Incident B.20.2

1296. The Indictment refers to the use of the Čelopek Dom Kulture as a detention facility at least between May and June 1992.⁴⁵⁴⁷ The Prosecution alleges that a number of men were killed there between 10 and 28 June 1992.

a. Events

1297. The Čelopek Dom Kulture was located in the industrial area of Karakaj.⁴⁵⁴⁸ Bosnian Muslims were detained at this facility from late May 1992 onwards.⁴⁵⁴⁹ Bosnian Muslims were taken to the Čelopek Dom on buses under the orders of either the TO Staff or the Interim Government and were escorted there by Miko Miljanović who was a police official.⁴⁵⁵⁰ The Yellow Wasps also took Bosnian Muslims from settlements and brought them to Čelopek Dom where they were detained.⁴⁵⁵¹ Reserve police officers were involved in guarding the facility.⁴⁵⁵² The non-Serbs detained in Zvornik were not arrested following normal police procedure and were detained without being informed of the allegations against them or handed over for prosecution.⁴⁵⁵³ **(#Three kinds of detainees#! It was explained many times in the court room that during a war there were different detainees: 1) those captured in combats, didn't need any explanation, and didn't go to any trial, and were kept only till exchanged; 2) those captured in combats, who in addition to participation in fights committed crimes, and were aimed to trial and only after serving sentence to be exchanged; 3) criminals that were not in the jurisdiction of militaries, and had been investigated by the civil police, and were not for an exchange in any case. So, the last sentence in this para is senseless!)**

1298. On or about 10 June 1992, detainees were forced to sing songs and then forced to beat each other with the promise that the winner would be spared from being killed.⁴⁵⁵⁴ After this, Repić shot and killed 17 detainees, he also cut off the body parts of some

⁴⁵⁴⁶ P3238 (Order of the VRS Main Staff, 17 June 1992), p. 2.

⁴⁵⁴⁷ The Prosecution submits that the evidence presented shows that the facility was operational between May and July 1992. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, p. 61.

⁴⁵⁴⁸ P4847 (Map of Karakaj marked by KDZ610); P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 80 (under seal); P4845 (Photograph of Čelopek Dom Kulture); KDZ228, P323 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 14942 (under seal); P3187 (Map of Zvornik municipality).

⁴⁵⁴⁹ See Adjudicated Fact 2745. See also KDZ555, T. 17299 (17 August 2011); Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2897, 3057–3058.

⁴⁵⁵⁰ Marinko Vasilčić, T. 39944–39945, 39969 (13 June 2013). See also P3390 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB for 1993), pp. 24, 35.

⁴⁵⁵¹ Milorad Davidović, T. 15518 (28 June 2011). See also Svetozar Andrić, T. 41682 (22 July 2013).

⁴⁵⁵² Marinko Vasilčić, T. 39944 (13 June 2013); P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 62 (under seal). See also Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2897, 2933, 2953, 3004, 3016–3018; Petko Panić, T. 19152–19153, 19175 (20 September 2011). While Panić also testified that the police were not strong enough to prevent the entry of paramilitaries into detention facilities, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be of much weight given that Panić makes this observation without further context as to whether it applies to a specific facility or particularly period of time. See also P3388 (Payroll of men working at Zvornik's prison, August 1992), p. 2; Petko Panić, T. 19143 (19 September 2011).

⁴⁵⁵³ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 3057. However, the Zvornik SJB did conduct a number of interviews to identify "Muslim extremists". D1631 (Report of Zvornik SJB, 29 June 1992), pp. 1–2; Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2939; P3390 (Report on activities of Zvornik SJB for 1993), p. 41–42, 50.

⁴⁵⁵⁴ D1417 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 6 November 1993), p. 2; see Adjudicated Facts 2745, 2747. KDZ340 testified that Vučković was against the killing or mistreatment of detainees. P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), p. 74 (under seal). However, the Chamber does not consider that KDZ340's evidence is reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that his evidence was marked by indicators that he was testifying with a lack of candour and frankness [REDACTED].

detainees and stabbed others in the chest.⁴⁵⁵⁵ Detainees were forced to eat the severed body parts and Repić's men killed two detainees who could not bring themselves to do so.⁴⁵⁵⁶ Four detainees were forced to unload the dead bodies in a gravel pit after which they were also killed by Repić.⁴⁵⁵⁷ **(#No Karad'i's liability#! It has nothing to do with President Karad'i! Not only the President banned all paramilitaries, but disowned all the independent elements and ordered their arrest, see: D434 of 13 June 1992. And Repić was arrested and deported to Serbia, sued and he died in prison. What is a purpose of including this case in this judgement, since it could only be exculpatory, but not treated as such?)**

1299. On 10 and 14 June 1992, Repić took away two groups of people for questioning and they never returned to the facility. There were 19 detainees in the first group and four detainees in the second group.⁴⁵⁵⁸ Having regard to the manner in which Repić treated the detainees in the facility and the threats he made to kill detainees, the Chamber is satisfied that these 23 detainees were also killed. Repić returned on a few other occasions, beat the detainees with batons, punched and kicked them, and forced them to sing. On or about 27 June 1992, he lined up a group of detainees and opened fire with an automatic rifle and pistol, killing approximately 19 and wounding approximately 13 detainees.⁴⁵⁵⁹ After these killings, surviving detainees were moved to Novi Izvor.⁴⁵⁶⁰

1300. One of the detainees was told by Kosta Erić about the killing and maltreatment of detainees at Čelopek. He was instructed to clean the facility and found traces of human blood; he was also involved in transporting bodies and burying them in mass graves.⁴⁵⁶¹ In mid-July 1992, the detainees who remained at Čelopek were transferred with the assistance

⁴⁵⁵⁵ D1417 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 6 November 1993), p. 2; Adjudicated Fact 2749. *See also* P4417 (Death certificate for Zaim Pezerović); P3173 (Statement of Nenad Simić to Bijeljina SJB, 6 August 1992), p. 4 (under seal); P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), pp. 34–36, 45–46, 73–78, 80 (under seal); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 133; Milorad Davidović, T. 15535 (28 June 2011).

⁴⁵⁵⁶ *See* Adjudicated Fact 2749.

⁴⁵⁵⁷ D1417 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 6 November 1993), p. 2.

⁴⁵⁵⁸ D1417 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 6 November 1993), p. 2; P2880 (Official Note of Valjevo State Security Centre, 2 July 1992). This same report indicated that Repić was prone to taking drugs. Panić testified that even though the guards had a written order not to allow anyone into the facility they did not dare confront Repić and did not report any incidents. Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2903–2904, 3015–3016, 3056; Petko Panić, T. 19184–19186 (20 September 2011). However, the Chamber notes that Panić's evidence with respect to shifting blame for actions to paramilitaries lacked balance and was marked by indicators of partiality. Considering inconsistencies and indicators of bias the Chamber does not find his evidence with respect to the specific issue of the inability to prevent the abuses of paramilitaries to be credible.

⁴⁵⁵⁹ D1417 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 6 November 1993), pp. 2–3; *see* Adjudicated Fact 2750. According to the Adjudicated Fact, Repić returned to the detention facility on 27 June 1992 and killed 20 detainees and wounded 22. Davidović was informed by Jekić about this incident where around 20 Bosnian Muslim civilians were killed in Čelopek. D1450 (Milorad Davidović's statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), pp. 8, 21, 30. *See also* P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 62 (under seal); Jovan Ivanović, T. 39877–39878 (13 June 2013); KDZ340, T. 17475–17476 (18 August 2011) (private session). The Serbian State Security Department was also informed about these incidents. P2880 (Official Note of Valjevo State Security Centre, 2 July 1992).

⁴⁵⁶⁰ P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 63 (under seal). *See also* Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 3033–3034; Petko Panić, T. 19187 (20 September 2011) (wherein Panić testified that the remaining detainees were transferred to Novi Izvor in order to be protected and to receive medical treatment). While the Chamber considers that Panić's evidence corroborates the movement of the remaining detainees to Novi Izvor, his evidence was marked by indicators that he lacked balance and in addition he sought to shift the blame for events in Zvornik.

⁴⁵⁶¹ [REDACTED]. The Chamber received evidence that 15 men were identified after exhumation of the mass graves at Crni Vrh and Grbavci-Hajdarev as people who had disappeared in Čelopek in May or June 1992. However, the Chamber notes that there is insufficient evidence to link these individuals to this scheduled incident, which is limited to killings between 10 and 28 June 1992. In addition [REDACTED] simply states that he knew some of these individuals but does not clarify whether he knew they went missing from Čelopek or when they disappeared. [REDACTED]; P4841 (Letter from FBiH Commission for Missing Persons, 30 July 2007). These 15 individuals are also named by Mašović as having been exhumed from mass graves. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 61–73, 105, 107. The Chamber notes that Mašović identifies additional individuals who were exhumed from mass graves but there is no other evidence to link them to this incident. The Chamber will therefore not rely on Mašović's evidence in that regard.

of the Bosnian Serb municipal authorities to the Batković camp in Bijeljina.⁴⁵⁶² (4519)
(#EXCULPATORY!!! There was the only legal prison for POWs. The fact that the detainees had been transferred to Batkovic confirms that they had been combatants. The Batkovic camp was under the surveillance of the ICRC, and a place from which all exchanges had been relised!)

b. Conclusion

1301. The Chamber therefore finds that Bosnian Muslim men were detained at Čelopek Dom Kulture from late May until July 1992. The detainees were forced to beat each, some were stabbed and mistreated, and at least 60 men were killed by Serb Forces. **(#Not “Serb Forces#! All of it could be true, but the last qualification, that “60 men were killed by Serb Forces”! Repic and paramilitaries could in no way be a “Serb Forces” and everyone would conclude that way if known the facts! The Chamber neglected a genuine contemporaneous evidence: once arrested and deported to their country, Serbia, the paramilitaries had been prevented to return to the Republic of Srpska. Had they been a “Serb Forces” they wouldn’t be chasen when appeared on the boarder, and had their conduct was favoured by the authorities of the Republic of Srpska, they would be welcome, see D3664: !**

Date: 22 November 1992

MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ of Republika Srpska

- Criminal Investigation Administration
- National Security
- Bijeljina CSB /Security Services Centre/

At approximately 2330 hours on 21 November 1992, a group of organised volunteers arrived at the Šepak border crossing from the direction of Loznica and tried to cross over to Republika Srpska. They were mostly members of the paramilitary formation known as the *Žute Ose* /Yellow Wasps/ or *Žučini*. In agreement with Yugoslav police employees, they were returned to the FRY /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ by the Yugoslav police.

2. Scheduled Detention Facility C.27.2

1302. The Indictment refers to the use of the Karakaj Technical School as a detention facility at least between May and June 1992.⁴⁵⁶³

a. Arrival of detainees and control of facility

1303. The Karakaj Technical School was located in the Karakaj industrial area, close to the Alhos factory.⁴⁵⁶⁴ The Karakaj Technical School was guarded by Bosnian Serb soldiers,⁴⁵⁶⁵

⁴⁵⁶² See Adjudicated Fact 2748. The Chamber also received evidence about the inspection of detention facilities in Zvornik in October 1992 but is not satisfied that this evidence pertains to any of the scheduled detention facilities. P1607 (RS Ministry of Justice report on prisons and camps on the RS territory, 22 October 1992), pp. 3, 7; D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 26. The Accused’s refers to this report and submits that it does not identify the Čelopek Dom as a detention facility. Defence Final Brief, para. 1455. The Chamber does not consider this submission or the absence of a reference to this facility in this report to be of any significance.

⁴⁵⁶³ The Prosecution submits that the evidence presented shows that the facility was operational from 1 June 1992. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, fn. 902.

⁴⁵⁶⁴ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2883; P3187 (Map of Zvornik municipality); P4847 (Map of Karakaj marked by KDZ610) (marking the location of Karakaj Technical School with a number 4); P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 80 (under seal); P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 18 (under seal); P3185 (Photograph of Karakaj Technical School); P3184 (Record of Belgrade’s District Court, War Crime Chamber Investigating Judge, 14 February 2007), p. 5 (under seal).

which included the Karakaj TO (a.k.a Karakaj Company) that later became part of the VRS.⁴⁵⁶⁶ Dragan Ristanović, the commander of the Karakaj TO, and paramilitaries including Topola, Mrski, Crni and Pivarski were present at the facility.⁴⁵⁶⁷ The guards worked in shifts and were under the command of Pivarski.⁴⁵⁶⁸ **(#Not “Serb Forces#! Pivarski was not a “Bosnian Serb soldier”, but volunteer that should be subordinated to the JNA. At the beginning nobody was a “Bosnian Serb soldier” in a strict sense, because there was no the Bosnian Serb Army, until 22 May 1992. The TO units were a municipal armies and acted independently, in accordance with their own assessment of jeopardy and required actions. Only when the state army, in this case the JNA arrived, the TOs were subordinated to it, as well as all the volunteers.)**

1304. When people from 13 Bosnian Muslim villages arrived in Đulići on 1 June 1992, approximately 750 men were separated from women and children and taken to the Karakaj Technical School.⁴⁵⁶⁹ Before being loaded onto trucks organised by the Zvornik TO,⁴⁵⁷⁰ Bosnian Serb soldiers took away money and ID papers from the men⁴⁵⁷¹ who were packed on three trucks “like sardines” and beaten.⁴⁵⁷² Bosnian Serb soldiers accompanied the detainees.⁴⁵⁷³ Apart from Đulići, the detainees were also from Lupe and Klisa.⁴⁵⁷⁴ **(#Not established#! This paragraph said that “Bosnian Serb soldiers accompanied the detainees, but nobody established that the Bosnian Serb soldiers have beaten them, because there were other armed groups escorting the detainees. But, it is sufficient for the reader of this Judgement to see D38 pertaining to the villages mentioned in this paragraph, to see how armed and militarised were those villages! Without that element, it was easy to conclude that the Serbs took an action against civilians!)**

b. Conditions of detention

1305. Approximately 750 men were brought to the workshop building and kept in a room which was too small. However, the detainees were able to break down the iron sheet which separated it from another room.⁴⁵⁷⁵ The only water available was in this second room.⁴⁵⁷⁶

⁴⁵⁶⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 2753.

⁴⁵⁶⁶ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2897–2898; P3192 (Dragan Vidović's interview with Prosecution), pp. 4–5, 18, 20; Guards identified were Ljubiša Pejić, Zdravko Blagojević, Mile Savić, Dušan Stevanović, Ivan Arapović, Mile Blagojević, Kosta Pejić, Dragan Pejić, Željko Pejić, Steva Vasiljević (a.k.a. Koružnjak), Dušan Mitrović, Božo Radić, Milan Arapović, Branko Pejić. See also P3194 (Payroll of the Karakaj unit of the Zvornik Brigade, undated); P3192 (Dragan Vidović's interview with Prosecution), pp. 5–6.

⁴⁵⁶⁷ P3192 (Dragan Vidović's interview with Prosecution), p. 6. While Vidović also testified that the facility was under the control of the paramilitaries despite the presence of the Karakaj TO, the Chamber has treated this conclusion with caution. In making that assessment the Chamber noted that Vidović's evidence was marked by indicators that he was trying to remove himself from any responsibility and to place all blame on Pivarski. His evidence in this regard was marked by indicators of insincerity and partiality and the Chamber cannot rely on it for this purpose.

⁴⁵⁶⁸ P3192 (Dragan Vidović's interview with Prosecution), pp. 6–7, 23; Dragan Vidović, T. 17759, 17761, 17763 (23 August 2011) (testifying that guards who did not comply with orders from Pivarski to beat detainees were threatened). Panić testified that the guards were unable to stop the paramilitaries from entering the facility as they pleased. Petko Panić, T. 19183 (20 September 2011). However, the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 4517 as to why it cannot rely on Panić's evidence with respect to this issue.

⁴⁵⁶⁹ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 13 (under seal); KDZ029, T. 17620 (22 August 2011) (closed session); see Adjudicated Fact 2752; Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2896. See also KDZ555, T. 17302–17304 (17 August 2011) (private session). The Accused acknowledged that detainees were held at the Karakaj Technical School between May and June 1992. Defence Final Brief, para. 1453.

⁴⁵⁷⁰ KDZ555, T. 17302 (17 August 2011) (private session).

⁴⁵⁷¹ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 14 (under seal); KDZ029, T. 17619 (22 August 2011) (closed session).

⁴⁵⁷² P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 15 (under seal); KDZ029, T. 17621 (22 August 2011) (closed session).

⁴⁵⁷³ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 16 (under seal).

⁴⁵⁷⁴ P3192 (Dragan Vidović's interview with Prosecution), pp. 8, 24–25.

⁴⁵⁷⁵ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), paras. 13, 18, Sketch B (under seal). KDZ029 was able to identify 38 men [REDACTED] who were detained with him in the workshop building. KDZ029 stated that the bodies of 14 of these 38 men were

Approximately 20 detainees died from suffocation during this first night.⁴⁵⁷⁷ Only a few loaves of bread were thrown into the building where detainees were held and those who could not get a piece remained without food.⁴⁵⁷⁸

c. Treatment of detainees

1306. On arrival at the Karakaj Technical School, the men were ordered to jump from the truck and run past a large number of Bosnian Serb soldiers⁴⁵⁷⁹ who hit them with rifle butts, punched, kicked, swore, and cursed at them.⁴⁵⁸⁰ As the men ran into the building, Bosnian Serb women were on the other side of the road and could be heard screaming and telling the soldiers to “kill the Balijas”.⁴⁵⁸¹ On the morning after their arrival, the detainees were ordered to hand over all money, watches and documentation, which were collected by Pivarski. They were then made to walk to another area and were beaten severely by soldiers upon Pivarski’s orders.⁴⁵⁸² **(#No Serb officials liable#! Nothing of it could be connected with the President or any other Serb official whatsoever. Neither he knew about it, nor he tolerated any such a kind of misdoings, and finally, when he learned about it, asked the FRY Prime Minister to help his police to arrest all the criminals and paramilitaries!)**

d. Conclusion on conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

1307. The Chamber therefore finds that from June 1992, Bosnian Muslim men were brought to and detained at the Karakaj Technical School by Serb Forces. The detainees were held in poor conditions characterised by lack of space on the first night, which resulted in the suffocation of approximately 20 men. The detainees were also beaten. They received inadequate food and had their valuables taken away from them.

e. Scheduled Incident B.20.3

1308. The Prosecution alleges that approximately 160 men were killed at the Karakaj Technical School between 1 and 5 June 1992.

1309. Bosnian Serb soldiers would select “rich or prominent people” and take them to another room; thereafter the other detainees would hear, moaning, screaming and gun

recovered mostly in the Crni Vrh area and buried [REDACTED]; KDZ029 stated that he only approximated the size of the room. KDZ029, T. 17622–17623 (22 August 2011) (closed session); P3192 (Dragan Vidović’s interview with Prosecution), pp. 8–9, 24–25. *See also* P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), p. 12.

⁴⁵⁷⁶ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 18 (under seal).

⁴⁵⁷⁷ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 20 (under seal). KDZ029 was told that two of the detainees who died of suffocation were Hrustan Avdić and Nešad Hamzić. These two individuals were later exhumed from mass graves. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 105–106; *see* Adjudicated Fact 2754.

⁴⁵⁷⁸ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 24 (under seal). *See also* P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), p. 12.

⁴⁵⁷⁹ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 16 and sketch A (under seal); P3184 (Record of Belgrade’s District Court, War Crime Chamber Investigating Judge, 14 February 2007), p. 6 (under seal); *see* Adjudicated Fact 2752. *See also* KDZ555, T. 17304 (17 August 2011) (private session).

⁴⁵⁸⁰ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 17 (under seal).

⁴⁵⁸¹ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 17 (under seal).

⁴⁵⁸² P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 21 and sketch B (under seal); *see* Adjudicated Fact 2755; P3192 (Dragan Vidović’s interview with Prosecution), pp. 10, 12. *See also* Petko Panić, T. 19142 (19 September 2011); P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), p. 12.

bursts.⁴⁵⁸³ Captain Mijo, who wore a cockade, **(#Insignias, not Serb soldier#)** called out detainees from Tršić, and those who were taken away were never seen again.⁴⁵⁸⁴ **(#Never seen again#)** Other detainees were then selected to carry out the bodies and would often not come back themselves.⁴⁵⁸⁵ Approximately 160 people were selected, taken out and killed in this manner by the guards in the facility.⁴⁵⁸⁶ Vasilčić acknowledged that nothing was done to investigate the killings at the Karakaj Technical School.⁴⁵⁸⁷ **(#Handed over to Serbia#! Why would it be? Once the suspects had been handed over to the investigating judge, no action could be undertaken except on an order of the investigating judge. Since there was a confusion about competence, in terms of military – civilian system, and the Republic of Srpska – Serbia competence, the suspects had been handed over to Serbia. If there was any request from Serbia, there would be investigation, but it seems that Serbia had a sufficient evidence! In any case, the President could not be connected to this affair. No president of any country interferes in a judicial details!# No Karadžić's liability#!)**

1310. The Chamber also received evidence about the disappearance of detainees who were taken away for prisoner exchange and who remain unaccounted for.⁴⁵⁸⁸ However, the Chamber will not make findings in this regard given that it is not satisfied that these

⁴⁵⁸³ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), paras. 22–23 (under seal). *But see* Dragan Vidović, T. 17752–17754, 17759–17762 (23 August 2011); P3192 (Dragan Vidović's interview with Prosecution), pp. 9, 11–12, 14, 24–25. The Chamber notes its credibility assessment in fn. 4524 in concluding that Vidović's evidence that there was no mistreatment or killing of detainees at the facility, was not reliable. The Chamber further notes that when specifically questioned about the killings at the facility, Vidović attempted to avoid the question and then distanced himself from a previous inconsistent statement. Similarly, there was a major inconsistency in Vasilčić's evidence who also sought to distance himself from his previous interview in which he stated that he heard rumours about the killings at the Karakaj Technical School. Marinko Vasilčić, T. 39940–39943 (13 June 2013); P6405 (Excerpt from Marinko Vasilčić's interview with OTP, 21 October 2002), pp. 4–5. In light of these inconsistencies, the Chamber does not rely on Vasilčić's denial of contemporaneous knowledge of the killings.

⁴⁵⁸⁴ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 26 (under seal); KDZ029, T. 17623–17625 (22 August 2011) (closed session). [REDACTED].

⁴⁵⁸⁵ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 22 (under seal).

⁴⁵⁸⁶ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), paras. 23, 26 (under seal) (identifying the names of five of the detainees who were killed in this way: Ramiz Sinanović, Soman Smajlović, Hasan Avdić, Nuriya Jašarević and Avdo Jašarević); *see* Adjudicated Fact 2756. *See* P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 60, 63–65, 67, 71, 105–106 for list of victims exhumed from mass graves linked to this scheduled incident (of the named individuals identified by KDZ029, Hasan Avdić, Nuriya Jašarević and Avdo Jašarević were exhumed from mass graves as per Mašović's table). *See also* Jovan Ivanović, T. 39875–39877 (13 June 2013); P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 66 (under seal); KDZ446, P29 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21036–21037. Mašović identified a number of individuals who were exhumed from mass graves which he linked to Scheduled Incident B.20.3, however, there is no other evidence which links these specific individuals to the scheduled incident. *See* P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 63–64, 71, Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix G. Similarly the Chamber received the death certificates of nine people who are reported to have died on 1 June 1992 at Bijeli Potok which are referred to in the Prosecution's Final Brief as being linked to this scheduled incident. *See* P4418 (Death certificates for Himzo Dedić, Zijad Gojkić and Nijaz Gojkić); P4419 (Death certificates for individuals killed in Zvornik); P4420 (Death certificate for Ibro Gojkić). However, in the absence of further evidence linking these named individuals the Chamber will not rely on this evidence in this regard. The Chamber therefore does not rely on these death certificates or the forensic evidence of Mašović (with the exception of the three named individuals mentioned above) for the purposes of making a finding with respect to this scheduled incident.

⁴⁵⁸⁷ Marinko Vasilčić, T. 39944 (13 June 2013). *See also* D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 56 (under seal); KW317, T. 39367 (6 June 2013) (testifying that he was informed by Pavlović that he had ordered the separation of approximately 170 men and their detention at Karakaj for the purposes of exchange but that the paramilitaries later killed many of the men who had been detained there). The Chamber also received hearsay evidence that Grujić was aware of what happened to the detainees but claimed that it was done without his knowledge. KDZ446, P28 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21087–21088 (under seal). The Chamber places no weight on this hearsay denial by Grujić who also sought to distance himself from this incident. **(#NO SERB OFFICIAL'S LIABILITY#! BUT, BOTH, GRUJIC AND VASILIC HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND MISTREATED BY THE SAME PARAMILITARIES, AND SHOULD BE TRUSTED, BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T DO ANYTHING UNLAWFUL AND DIDN'T COVER THE PARAMILITARIES. THIS MANNER OF "PLACING NO WEIGHT" ON THE SERB TESTIMONIES IS UNBELIEVABLE!)**

⁴⁵⁸⁸ P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 24 (under seal). Ismet Ahmetović was exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 60. *See also* P3191 (Dragan Vidović's interview with Prosecution), p. 7 (under seal).

disappearances are linked to Scheduled Killing Incident B.20.3, which relates to a very specific date range in June 1992.

1311. The Chamber therefore finds that approximately 160 men were killed by Serb Forces at the Karakaj Technical School in early June 1992. **(#Abuse of “Serb Forces#! Again this “magic” term “the Serb Forces” which released the Prosecution from all the obligations and burden of proving. The members of paramilitaries in question even weren’t all of the Serb nationality, but certainly weren’t either under control of the local officials, nor the central Serb leadership. Finally, the real “Serb Forces” planed and carried out a complex operation and arrested all of members of the paramilitaries!)**

f. Scheduled Incident A.16.3

1312. The Prosecution alleges that approximately 190 men were killed at Gero’s Slaughterhouse between 5 and 8 June 1992.

1313. On 5 June 1992, the 550 detainees who remained at the Karakaj Technical School were placed on buses and told they were being taken for exchange; however, they were taken to Pilica.⁴⁵⁸⁹ The convoy consisted of five or six buses each carrying between 50 and 60 people.⁴⁵⁹⁰ Dragan Spasojević ordered the police to escort the convoy of buses to the Pilica Cultural Centre⁴⁵⁹¹ where many soldiers in JNA uniforms were waiting for them.⁴⁵⁹² The guards shot above the detainees’ heads and ordered them to hand over money and gold.⁴⁵⁹³ **(How many times the same detainees had to hand over their “money and gold”? there was a prescribed procedure that after being captured, the POWs were supposed to hand over all their personal belongings, which is so common for all arrested people, even it the UN Detention Unit in the Hague?)** After three days, the men who were being held at Pilica were told they were being taken to Živinice for prisoner exchange.⁴⁵⁹⁴

1314. [REDACTED] was in a group of 64 detainees who were taken and forced onto a truck; Bosnian Serb soldiers then pulled down a tarpaulin.⁴⁵⁹⁵ The truck was led by a police car and was taken to Gero’s slaughterhouse located in the Karakaj industrial area near the Drina River.⁴⁵⁹⁶ The detainees were taken off the truck, placed in separate rooms, and told

⁴⁵⁸⁹ [REDACTED]. The transport of prisoners on 5 June 1992 is noted in a Drinatrans document which observes that the orders for transport came from the Interim Government and the Zvornik TO. P3186 (Drina Trans invoice re transport of refugees from Zvornik municipality, 8 June 1992), pp. 1–2; [REDACTED]; P3192 (Dragan Vidović’s interview with Prosecution), pp. 8, 14–15; Dragan Vidović, T. 17761 (23 August 2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 2744.

⁴⁵⁹⁰ Dragan Vidović, T. 17761 (23 August 2011).

⁴⁵⁹¹ The Chamber notes that this location has been referred to by witnesses as either the “Cultural Center”, the “Pilica Dom”, the “*Dom Kultur(e)*”, the “Dom of Culture”, a house or hall of culture, and a cinema hall. See *inter alia* Dražen Erdemović, P332 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 10982; D3993 (Witness Statement of Vujadin Popović dated 2 November 2013), para. 71; Milenko Tomić, P390 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 21001; P3192 (Dragan Vidović’s interview with Prosecution), pp. 16, 26; P3195 (Witness statement of KDZ029 dated 28 June 2011), para. 29 (under seal); D3927 (Witness statement of Franc Kos dated 26 July 2013), pp. 26–27; Jevto Bogdanović, P385 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 11323; Jean-René Ruez, T. 23850, 23852 (30 January 2012). The Chamber finds that all of these witnesses refer to the same building and, for sake of consistency, will refer to it as the “Pilica Cultural Centre” throughout this Judgement.

P3192 (Dragan Vidović’s interview with Prosecution), pp. 15–16, 26–27, 30.

⁴⁵⁹³ [REDACTED].

⁴⁵⁹⁴ [REDACTED].

⁴⁵⁹⁵ [REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 2744. [REDACTED]; Sejdo Hasanović, Muradif Hasanović, Smajo Smailović, and Asim Hamzić. These four bodies were exhumed from a mass grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 66, 72. See also P4903 (Crni Vrh Exhumation Report by Derek Congram, 14 November 2003).

⁴⁵⁹⁶ [REDACTED]; P3193 (Photograph of Gero’s slaughterhouse).

to face the wall.⁴⁵⁹⁷ There were two guards wearing JNA uniforms and who were carrying machine guns.⁴⁵⁹⁸ When the detainees had their backs turned, the guards started shooting at them; [REDACTED].⁴⁵⁹⁹ Once the shooting ended in the first room, the guards moved to the second room and also fired at the detainees.⁴⁶⁰⁰ When one detainee who had been injured begged to be killed, the guards said that since he was a “Balija” they would let him suffer.⁴⁶⁰¹ After the guards left, [REDACTED] was able to escape to the Drina river, which was close to the building, and observed that trucks returned to the site on two additional occasions; after their return he could hear gun bursts.⁴⁶⁰² While [REDACTED] estimated that about 190 people were brought there and executed in three groups, the Chamber is not satisfied that it can rely on his estimation in this regard given the evidence is unclear as to whether or not he could have seen the people getting off the trucks.⁴⁶⁰³ **(#Deadly combination#! Had the Chamber had known about other lies of this witness, it wouldn’t accept none of what he said. Unfortunately, the Prosecution disclosed this document only after the trial in the first instance had been ended, which “enriched” the issue of unfairness of the trial!)**

1315. The Chamber therefore finds that a large number of Bosnian Muslim men were brought to and killed at Gero’s slaughterhouse between 5 and 8 June 1992 by Serb Forces.⁴⁶⁰⁴ **(#Abuse of the “Serb Forces#! Repeatedly, a “Serb Forces” is inaccurate, wrong and unacceptable! But, without several “inventions” of this Prosecution and the Tribunal, such as this “Serb Forces” and the “Joint Criminal Enterprises” – there would be no any indictment against this and many other accused. Is this an objective of the international community to establish an international justice that way? This is rather a way not to have any such a court ever!)**

3. Scheduled Detention Facility C.27.3

1316. The Indictment refers to the use of the Alhos Factory as a detention facility on or about 9 April 1992.

a. Arrival of detainees and control of facility

1317. The Alhos Factory was a former textile manufacturing facility located in Karakaj.⁴⁶⁰⁵ The police, Arkan’s men and the White Eagles detained Bosnian Muslims at

⁴⁵⁹⁷ [REDACTED].

⁴⁵⁹⁸ [REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 2744.

⁴⁵⁹⁹ [REDACTED]. See also Jovan Ivanović, T. 39878 (13 June 2013).

⁴⁶⁰⁰ [REDACTED].

⁴⁶⁰¹ [REDACTED]. The Accused acknowledged that 50 to 70 Bosnian Muslim men were brought to Gero’s slaughterhouse in June 1992 and that they were killed by paramilitaries. Defence Final Brief, confidential, para. 1458. The Accused further submits that there was no evidence that high level municipal officers were present and that the evidence does not disclose the origin of any orders with respect to the burials.

⁴⁶⁰² [REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 2744.

⁴⁶⁰³ [REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 2744.

⁴⁶⁰⁴ The Chamber received evidence that in May 1992, hundreds of bodies were unloaded at Gero’s slaughterhouse and subsequently buried in mass graves. The Chamber also received evidence of other killings committed at, and burial of bodies taken from, Gero’s slaughterhouse but these events fall outside the period charged in the Indictment with respect to this scheduled incident. P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012) (under seal), paras. 32, 34–47, 53, 67–74; KDZ610, T. 27196 (29 March 2012) (private session); P4842 (Photograph of Gero’s slaughterhouse marked by KDZ610); P4846 (Map drawn by KDZ610) (under seal); Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2902–2903, 2991; KDZ555, T. 17307 (17 August 2011) (private session). See also KW317, T. 39365–39366 (6 June 2013).

⁴⁶⁰⁵ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 2; Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2871, 2940; P3187 (Map of Zvornik municipality); P3166 (Map of Karakaj industrial area).

this facility.⁴⁶⁰⁶ Other paramilitaries including those affiliated with Žuće, Pivarski, Crni and Niski were present at the Alhos Factory.⁴⁶⁰⁷ One of Arkan's men said that they would bring in every Bosnian Muslim found in town.⁴⁶⁰⁸

b. Treatment of detainees

1318. 20 Bosnian Muslims from Zvornik and a few people from Buković, a settlement just outside Zvornik, were held in the men's cloakroom at the Alhos factory.⁴⁶⁰⁹ Each person was taken one at a time for interrogation to another room, from where the sound of dull blows and loud screams could be heard.⁴⁶¹⁰ When they were brought back, they were thrown to the floor and some were "unconscious in a pool of blood, some had obviously broken arms or broken jaw or an eye knocked out. Some younger, fitter men were lying on the floor seemingly unconscious with their limbs twitching".⁴⁶¹¹ There were 15 men lying on the floor and occasionally the guards would open the door, throw some tear gas into the room and stand outside laughing.⁴⁶¹²

1319. The men were taken out for interrogation by the guards but the interrogations themselves were conducted by Arkan's men.⁴⁶¹³ The white tiles in the interrogation room had blood splattered all over them and the floor was covered in broken glass which KDZ059 had heard the detainees had been forced to swallow.⁴⁶¹⁴ On or about 9 April 1992, Branko Grujić interrogated and beat a detainee.⁴⁶¹⁵ After speaking to Pejić over the phone, Banjanović was allowed to come to the Alhos factory and managed to secure the release of people from Kozluk who had been detained there and observed that these "people were beaten black and blue".⁴⁶¹⁶

c. Conclusion

1320. The Chamber therefore finds that Bosnian Muslims were detained at the Alhos factory in April 1992. The detainees were subjected to severe beatings and mistreatment by Serb Forces.

⁴⁶⁰⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 2757. See also P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), pp. 8, 10 (under seal). But see KDZ555, T. 17309–17310 (17 August 2011) (private session) (testifying that Arkan's men controlled the facility and did not give access to anyone else). Some Bosnian Serbs were also arrested for issues relating to military discipline and detained at the facility. P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), p. 8 (under seal); KDZ059, P67 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 29115.

⁴⁶⁰⁷ P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 33 (under seal).

⁴⁶⁰⁸ P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), p. 9 (under seal).

⁴⁶⁰⁹ P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), pp. 9–10 (under seal).

⁴⁶¹⁰ P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), p. 10 (under seal).

⁴⁶¹¹ P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), p. 10 (under seal).

⁴⁶¹² P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), p. 10 (under seal).

⁴⁶¹³ P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), p. 10 (under seal). [REDACTED].

⁴⁶¹⁴ P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), p. 10 (under seal). The Chamber also received evidence about the maltreatment of a Bosnian Serb at the facility who was to be used as an example to other Serbs. P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), pp. 8–9 (under seal). The Chamber does not find Grujić's evidence and speculation as to who was responsible for the abuses in the Alhos factory to be reliable. D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 50. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber also refers to its credibility assessment in fns. 4237 and 4239.

⁴⁶¹⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 2758. But see D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 60; Branko Grujić, T. 40401–40402 (25 June 2013). The Chamber notes specific inconsistencies in Grujić's testimony in this regard and clear indicators that he was seeking to minimise his own involvement. The Chamber does not consider his evidence to be reliable in this regard. Adjudicated Fact 2758 also refers to the killing of 18 Bosnian Muslim detainees by Arkan's men on or soon after 9 April 1992, however there are no Schedule B killing incidents charged in the Indictment with respect to this facility.

⁴⁶¹⁶ P104 (Witness statement of Fadil Banjanović dated 9 February 1998), para. 2–41; Fadil Banjanović, P57 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 20695.

4. Scheduled Detention Facility C.27.4

1321. The Indictment refers to the use of the Novi Izvor company also known as Ciglana as a detention facility at least between 29 May 1992 and 30 July 1992.⁴⁶¹⁷

a. Arrival of detainees and control of facility

1322. The Ciglana factory was located in the area of Karakaj.⁴⁶¹⁸ On or about 18 May 1992, the Ciglana factory was taken over by Major Toro and his group, known as the Kobras, including men known as Pufta and Zoks.⁴⁶¹⁹ Five or six guards, including Žučo,⁴⁶²⁰ guarded the Ciglana factory.⁴⁶²¹ The reserve police also guarded this detention facility.⁴⁶²²

1323. On 27 May 1992, 186 Bosnian Muslims from Divič were detained at the facility.⁴⁶²³ In addition, approximately 20 detainees from Ekonomija farm were transported to Ciglana factory where they were all detained in a small room that had boarded up windows.⁴⁶²⁴ The detainees included 12 men who had been identified in a Belgrade television broadcast as Green Berets.⁴⁶²⁵ On 15 July 1992, with the exception of one detainee who was taken to the Zvornik SUP, the detainees at Ciglana were taken to Batković camp before being exchanged in January 1993.⁴⁶²⁶ **(#Combatants, not civilians#! A clear-cut evidence that they had been combatants, because the Batković camp was aimed to admit the POWs and keep them until they are exchanged, and the ICRC was entitled to inspect, interview and register all of them!)**

b. Treatment of detainees

1324. Detainees were made to work, loading and unloading blocks onto trucks and cleaning the yard; other groups were taken daily to help with looting abandoned homes in Zvornik, Kozluk, and Kula Grad.⁴⁶²⁷ The detainees were woken at 5 a.m. and taken to

⁴⁶¹⁷ The Prosecution submits that the evidence led shows that Ciglana operated as a detention facility from 27 May to 15 July 1992. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, fn. 914.

⁴⁶¹⁸ Petko Panić, T. 19139–19141 (19 September 2011). See also KDZ228, P323 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Popović et al.*), T. 14942 (under seal); P3187 (Map of Zvornik municipality).

⁴⁶¹⁹ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), pp. 13, 19. See also Petko Panić, T. 19139–19141 (19 September 2011). The Accused's acknowledges this take-over. Defence Final Brief, para. 1457.

⁴⁶²⁰ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 19.

⁴⁶²¹ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 18.

⁴⁶²² See Adjudicated Fact 2759. See also Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2897, 2953, 2933, 3004, 3016–3018; Petko Panić, T. 19152–19153, 19175 (20 September 2011).

⁴⁶²³ See Adjudicated Fact 2760. See also Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2897, 3057–3058.

⁴⁶²⁴ P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), pp. 9–10; P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 17. See P75 (Sketches made by Nedžad Hadžiefendić), Sketch C for the witness's evidence as to the location of the Novi Izvor factory. See also P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 11.

⁴⁶²⁵ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), pp. 6, 18. The men identified by the witness included Ismet Ćirka, Fikret LNU, Nedžad Hadžiefendić, Muhamed Redžić, Bego LNU, Besim LNU, Safet LNU, Kemal Korkutović, Sead Feriz, Smajo LNU, a barber from Zvornik nicknamed Brico and Ciciban, Nermin LNU, Ibrahim Subašić, Admir Hadžiavić, Sejfidin Džihić, Edib Omerović, Senaid Avdić, Mirsad Salihović.

⁴⁶²⁶ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 23. The Prosecution refers to P2916 to support the proposition that the buses were paid for by the Interim Government. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, fn. 922. However, the Chamber notes that P2916 was only admitted as a source document for reference purposes and does not rely on it in this regard.

⁴⁶²⁷ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), pp. 11, 20–21; P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), p. 13. The Chamber notes that the only type of forced labour charged in the Indictment is forced labour at the frontlines.

work.⁴⁶²⁸ Given the amount of work that had to be done, another group of detainees from Čelopek and other detention camps, including ten people who had been detained by Captain Dragan's unit were brought to the Ciglana factory.⁴⁶²⁹

1325. Paramilitaries from Serbia frequently visited the facility and "severely mistreated" the detainees.⁴⁶³⁰ A group of five White Eagles from Loznica entered the building and beat the detainees for one or two hours and ordered them to sing "Chetnik" songs.⁴⁶³¹ Detainees were beaten with a thick wooden stick and some were also ordered to beat other detainees.⁴⁶³² Men from Niški's group also brought detainees to the facility from Ekonomija farm and beat them.⁴⁶³³ Members of the White Eagles, a man addressed as "Vojvoda" and Žučo took detainees out and beat them; on one occasion with a cable.⁴⁶³⁴ One detainee, who was identified as an SDA leader was beaten until he passed out.⁴⁶³⁵ During this mistreatment detainees were also humiliated by being forced to make the sign of the cross, to use the greeting "God help your hero" and to eat carbonised bread without dropping anything.⁴⁶³⁶

(#Contrary to Presidential orders#! All of that which is described in these two paragraphs had been strictly forbidden by the Accused and by Gen. Mladic, other militaries, and by Prime Minister Djeric, as far as it is concerned with the police, repeatedly banned by the Minister of Interior Mico Stanisic. Therefore, this could have been committed only by the paramilitaries, as the Judgement itself pointed out! It should be remembered that many of those personal belongings and goods (a large quantity of gold, jewellery, cars, weapons, ammunition, alcohol, and other goods were found at the premises of those arrested.) had been found after the paramilitaries had been arrested, and it was ordered to the Serb police to return it to the real owners, see: para 1290 of this Judgement! Do we need any additional evidence who were those "Serb Forces" and who were the forces that arrested them and returned the plundered stuff to their owners? How it is possible to indict and sentence this Accused for misdoings of this renegades, and not to recognize the real "Serb Forces" that acted under the President's orders arrested them? This is an extremely wrong and erroneous implementation of law and justice!)

1326. In June 1992, Pufta and his group started searching the detainees for money and he used a knife to carve out a detainee's tattoo which depicted a crescent and star.⁴⁶³⁷ The White Eagles came to the facility on another occasion and beat the detainees but, that night, the guards told the detainees that they had received instructions not to allow any other outsiders in without permission after which the detainees were not mistreated for several days.⁴⁶³⁸ Similarly, after another incident in which detainees were beaten, Niški slapped

⁴⁶²⁸ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 18.

⁴⁶²⁹ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 22.

⁴⁶³⁰ See Adjudicated Fact 2761. See also P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), p. 12–15.

⁴⁶³¹ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), pp. 17–19.

⁴⁶³² P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 19.

⁴⁶³³ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), pp. 17–18; P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), pp. 9, 11–12. The witness testified that Niški himself never beat them.

⁴⁶³⁴ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), pp. 19–20.

⁴⁶³⁵ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 20.

⁴⁶³⁶ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), pp. 19–20. The Accused acknowledged that paramilitary groups beat detainees at the facility but submitted that this was arbitrary action by paramilitaries without any co-ordination or communication from the legal authorities. Defence Final Brief, para. 1457. The Chamber will address the Accused's submissions in this regard in Section IV.A.3.a.iii.D: Paramilitary units.

⁴⁶³⁷ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 22.

⁴⁶³⁸ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 21.

Žučo; thereafter the detainees were not beaten for five or six days.⁴⁶³⁹
(#EXCULPATORY!!! Even some paramilitaries opposed the abuse of detainees, and the guards could have received instructions only from the legal police!)

1327. After three detainees hit one of the guards and escaped from the facility, Kobra and Žučo said that all the detainees should be killed.⁴⁶⁴⁰ That evening, detainees were questioned and suffered injuries including a cut ear, a fractured head, and a cut cheek.⁴⁶⁴¹ The next morning the detainees were lined up outside the building and made to stand for three hours.⁴⁶⁴² After that day Pufta was never seen again and the detainees were not mistreated.⁴⁶⁴³ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! The whole affair depended on this one “volunteer”! If his (mis)conduct was favorised by the official Serbs, he would be kept further in the zone! Therefore, the criminal conduct was not a part of the system, but rather an aberration. However, the Chamber even didn’t register a genuine evidence about)**

c. Conclusion

1328. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims were detained at Ciglana by Serb Forces from late May 1992 until July 1992. The detainees were subjected to beatings, humiliation and were forced to work at the facility and in other locations in Zvornik.⁴⁶⁴⁴

5. Scheduled Detention Facility C.27.5

1329. The Indictment refers to the use of the Drinjača building (Dom Kulture) as a detention facility at least between May and June 1992.

a. Arrival of detainees and control of facility

1330. Drinjača is located south of Zvornik.⁴⁶⁴⁵ On 30 May 1992, about 150 Bosnian Muslim men, women, and children from Kostijerevo were taken to and detained in the Drinjača cultural centre,⁴⁶⁴⁶ which was very close to the Drinjača School playground.⁴⁶⁴⁷ Other detainees arrived from another part of Kostijerevo, as well as from Drinjača, Sopotnik and Đevanje.⁴⁶⁴⁸ In total, approximately 300 Muslim men, women and children, were detained at the Drinjača cultural centre.⁴⁶⁴⁹

⁴⁶³⁹ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 20.

⁴⁶⁴⁰ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 22.

⁴⁶⁴¹ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), pp. 22–23.

⁴⁶⁴² P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), pp. 22–23.

⁴⁶⁴³ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), pp. 22–23.

⁴⁶⁴⁴ The Chamber also received evidence about the killing or disappearance of detainees at the facility. P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), pp. 12, 21–22. However, the Chamber notes that there are no scheduled killing incidents charged in Schedule B of the Indictment with respect to this facility.

⁴⁶⁴⁵ P3187 (Map of Zvornik municipality); D1613 (Map of Zvornik marked by KDZ555).

⁴⁶⁴⁶ KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelj*), T. 8699–8701; P99 (Photograph showing Dom Kulture Drinjača).

⁴⁶⁴⁷ P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), paras. 55, 59 (under seal); P99 (Photograph showing Dom Kulture Drinjača).

⁴⁶⁴⁸ KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelj*), T. 8702.

⁴⁶⁴⁹ KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelj*), T. 8702. The Accused acknowledges that between May and June 1992 a number of people were detained at Drinjača. Defence Final Brief, para. 1452.

1331. The detainees were guarded by Bosnian Serb soldiers wearing the JNA reserve uniform.⁴⁶⁵⁰ The detainees were informed by one of the soldiers that there was nothing to fear and that they would be transferred to some villages near Zenica while Bosnian Serbs would come to live in their villages.⁴⁶⁵¹ The women and children were separated from the men, “crammed” into a bus, driven to Čelopek, and held in barns and sheds for three days before being allowed to go to Bosnian Muslim held territory.⁴⁶⁵²

b. Treatment of detainees

1332. A group of men wearing camouflage uniforms entered the Drinjača cultural centre, and verbally abused the male detainees and forced them to sing “Chetnik” songs.⁴⁶⁵³ **(#Insignias#! Not a regular Serb soldiers or policemen! The President had banned all the ideological manifestations that were established during the WWII)** These soldiers took individual detainees from the group onto a stage and severely beat them.⁴⁶⁵⁴ In one case, a man was beaten until he was unconscious and then stabbed three times.⁴⁶⁵⁵ Between 25 and 30 detainees were beaten and threatened.⁴⁶⁵⁶ The Bosnian Serb soldiers present in the cultural centre observed what was happening but did nothing to prevent or stop the beatings which continued till around 9 p.m. when the group of men left.⁴⁶⁵⁷ **(#Inconsistent#! Not Serb soldiers#! Now, it is clear that the Serb soldiers didn’t do these crimes, but there should be established whether the Serb soldiers were powerful enough to prevent such a conduct! In any way, this can not be addressed to the President! What would happen with the other presidents, if a crimes of renegades and criminal psychopats would be allocated to them?)**

c. Conclusion on conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

1333. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims, including women and children, were detained at the Drinjača cultural centre from the end of May 1992 by Serb Forces. The women and children were separated from the men before being transferred to Bosnian Muslim held territory. The male detainees were subjected to threats, severe beatings, and were stabbed by Serb Forces.

d. Scheduled Incident B.20.1

1334. The Prosecution alleges that approximately 88 men were killed at Drinjača on or about 30 May 1992.

⁴⁶⁵⁰ KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelj*), T. 8701; P99 (Photograph showing Dom Kulture Drinjača).

⁴⁶⁵¹ KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelj*), T. 8702–8703.

⁴⁶⁵² KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelj*), T. 8703, 8726.

⁴⁶⁵³ KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelj*), T. 8704, 8708–8709.

⁴⁶⁵⁴ KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelj*), T. 8705.

⁴⁶⁵⁵ KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelj*), T. 8705–8706. The Accused acknowledged that detainees were severely beaten and forced to sing by soldiers identified as Arkan’s men but that no official reports were submitted regarding this incident. Defence Final Brief, confidential, para. 1452.

⁴⁶⁵⁶ KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelj*), T. 8706–8708 (testifying that detainees were beaten with wooden batons, pieces of iron, police batons and electrical wire).

⁴⁶⁵⁷ KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelj*), T. 8708–8709.

1335. On the night of 30 May 1992, a group of men wearing olive-green uniforms, and some wearing cockades, entered the Drinjača cultural centre.⁴⁶⁵⁸ **(#Insignias#! Not a regular Serb soldiers, because the cockardes were not allowed! This is also not clear whether that was the same group as described above, but it seems so!)** This group of men ordered the detainees to put their heads down and asked for ten volunteers to step forward.⁴⁶⁵⁹ When none of the detainees volunteered, ten people were selected and taken outside, which was followed by the sound of a burst of gunfire.⁴⁶⁶⁰ This process was repeated every five minutes.⁴⁶⁶¹

1336. The fifth group of detainees taken out. One of the detainees was shot at by the soldiers who were lined up in a row but; managed to escape.⁴⁶⁶² **(a 92bis evidence, not cross examined!)** When he fled the scene, he saw a large group of people dead on the concrete.⁴⁶⁶³ **(92bis Rule)** This detainee provided a list of 88 people from the villages of Kostijerevo, Drinjača, Sopotnik and Đevanje who were captured, detained at the Drinjača Cultural Centre and shot on the evening of 30 May 1992. He identified five other people who were killed while trying to escape arrest during the course of the day.⁴⁶⁶⁴ The Chamber took judicial notice that White Eagles took out groups of ten detainees from the Drinjača cultural centre and shot and killed 88 people.⁴⁶⁶⁵ **(#Not Serb Forces#! The White Eagles was in the category of armed groups which the Accused disowned, and before him, in the category that had been banned by the Prime Minister Djerić and the Minister Stanisic, both in April 92, and by General Mladic in May 1992!)**

1337. On the morning of 31 May 1992, members of the Zvornik Public Utility Service were ordered to pick up bodies at Drinjača; they saw that the women and children had boarded three buses.⁴⁶⁶⁶ At the Drinjača School playground, which was 50 metres away from the Drinjača cultural centre, there were “dead bodies and blood everywhere”.⁴⁶⁶⁷ The men had been shot in the back of the head and the bodies which were of Bosnian Muslim civilians were scattered at the location.⁴⁶⁶⁸ Given the volume of blood, those who were

⁴⁶⁵⁸ KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelji*), T. 8710–8711, 8717, 8736–8740.

⁴⁶⁵⁹ KDZ072, P425 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Šešelji*), T. 8711 (under seal).

⁴⁶⁶⁰ [REDACTED].

⁴⁶⁶¹ [REDACTED].

⁴⁶⁶² [REDACTED].

⁴⁶⁶³ [REDACTED]. The Accused acknowledged that 83 Bosnian Muslim men were executed in this incident but that the police were afraid of the paramilitaries who were responsible and no official reports were made about this incident. Defence Final Brief, confidential, para. 1451. The Accused also cites to the evidence of Panić to suggest that it was impossible to reach Drinjača because the tunnels were laid with explosives. Petko Panić, T. 19182–19183 (20 September 2011). The Chamber does not consider that this evidence supports a conclusion that it was impossible to reach Drinjača.

⁴⁶⁶⁴ P95 (List of persons captured or killed on 30 May 1992) (under seal); [REDACTED]. The witness also participated in the identification process and identified his father and brothers following the exhumation of the bodies in September 1998. P101 (Exhumation report from “Ramin Grob” – Glumina) (under seal). Of the 88 individuals named by [REDACTED], 73 were exhumed from mass graves. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 98–107. In addition 52 of the 88 individuals named by KDZ072 were listed in P101 (Exhumation report from “Ramin Grob” – Glumina) (under seal).

⁴⁶⁶⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 2762. The Chamber finds that Vasilčić was informed about the execution of detainees in this incident by a TO unit commanded by Lieutenant Matić. Marinko Vasilčić, T. 39930–39933 (13 June 2013). Vasilčić testified however, that the reserve police could not prevent this incident. The Chamber notes that Vasilčić, when confronted with his prior statement, testified that the police would most probably have seen what happened. Vasilčić was also confronted with his prior statement that he spoke to leading politicians and members of the TO Staff about this incident and nothing was done which was contrary to his testimony that he discussed the issue with TO Staff Chief Marko Pavlović who promised to investigate the case. Marinko Vasilčić, T. 39933–39938 (13 June 2013); P6405 (Excerpt from Marinko Vasilčić’s interview with OTP, 21 October 2002), pp. 6–7. In light of these contradictions, the Chamber does not consider Vasilčić’s assessment that the reserve police could not prevent this incident to be reliable. The Chamber also refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 4259 in reaching that conclusion.

⁴⁶⁶⁶ [REDACTED].

⁴⁶⁶⁷ [REDACTED] (stating that he saw that approximately 83 Bosnian Muslim men were killed, with some as young as 17); P99 (Photograph showing Dom Kulture Drinjača).

⁴⁶⁶⁸ [REDACTED].

transporting the bodies had to return twice to the Drinjača playground to wash the location.⁴⁶⁶⁹ The bodies were loaded onto a truck, covered with a tarpaulin and taken towards Gero's slaughterhouse; the bodies were then moved from this location and buried at Ramin Grob Muslim cemetery.⁴⁶⁷⁰ Of the 155 bodies exhumed from this mass grave KDZ610 was able to recognise some people who he had seen killed in Drinjača.⁴⁶⁷¹

1338. The Chamber therefore finds that approximately 88 men were killed by Serb Forces at Drinjača on or about 30 May 1992.

6. Scheduled Detention Facility C.27.6

1339. The Indictment refers to the use of the Ekonomija farm as a detention facility between April and December 1992.⁴⁶⁷²

a. Arrival of detainees and control of facility

1340. Ekonomija farm is located four kilometres from Zvornik in the industrial area of Karakaj.⁴⁶⁷³ Detainees were held in a building in the centre of the farm.⁴⁶⁷⁴ The detainees at this facility included Bosnian Muslims from the villages of Divič and Đulići.⁴⁶⁷⁵ On or about 11 May 1992, eight men detained at Karakaj were transported to this facility by Bosnian Serb police.⁴⁶⁷⁶ Other detainees were taken to the facility from their apartments by soldiers, including a group from Loznica in Serbia and men with White Eagle patches and bearing MP inscriptions. **(#Contrary to Presidential orders#! All irregulars, banned by the Serb officials!)** These detainees were hit and searched before their transportation to the Ekonomija farm.⁴⁶⁷⁷ A unit of the Zvornik TO commanded by Miladin Mijatović was stationed at the Ekonomija farm.⁴⁶⁷⁸

b. Treatment of detainees

1341. 15 men were detained in a room previously used for the storage of fertiliser and were beaten.⁴⁶⁷⁹ An old man who was detained at the Ekonomija farm died after a series of beatings.⁴⁶⁸⁰ A police inspector from Zvornik asked the detainees to give statements that

⁴⁶⁶⁹ [REDACTED].

⁴⁶⁷⁰ [REDACTED].

⁴⁶⁷¹ [REDACTED]; P101 (Exhumation report from "Ramin Grob" – Glumina) (under seal).

⁴⁶⁷² The Prosecution submits that the evidence led demonstrates that it operated as a detention facility during May 1992. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, fn. 927.

⁴⁶⁷³ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 11; P3187 (Map of Zvornik municipality); P4847 (Map of Karakaj marked by KDZ610) (showing the location of Ekonomija Farm with number 2); P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 80 (under seal).

⁴⁶⁷⁴ P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 51 (under seal); P4843 (Photograph of Ekonomija Farm marked by KDZ610). See also Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2897, 3057–3058.

⁴⁶⁷⁵ KW317, T. 39366 (6 June 2013).

⁴⁶⁷⁶ P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), pp. 7, 9–10; see P75 (Sketches made by Nedžad Hadžiefendić). See also Adjudicated Fact 2763.

⁴⁶⁷⁷ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), pp. 10–11.

⁴⁶⁷⁸ Petko Panić, T. 19136 (19 September 2011); P3386 (List of men working at the Ekonomija Farm, 15 May 1992), pp. 1–4. The members of the Zvornik TO being paid for their work at the Ekonomija Farm included Branko Mičić, Pero Mičić, Petko Nikolić, Branko Đokić, Dobrinko Đokić, Mirko Jokić, Mile Mičić, Slobodan Stevanović, Milan Filipović, and Zdravko Simić.

⁴⁶⁷⁹ P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), p. 8.

⁴⁶⁸⁰ P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), pp. 9–10; P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 12 (who identified the old man as the father of Fehim Dautović). See also Adjudicated Fact 2765. The Accused

the old man had died of natural causes.⁴⁶⁸¹ Bosnian Muslims were also taken from Ekonomija farm and forced to work.⁴⁶⁸²

1342. The belongings of detainees were taken away and soldiers threatened that they would all be killed if they did not provide statements about the location of weapons.⁴⁶⁸³ **(Rule 92bis!)** At least ten detainees were severely beaten.⁴⁶⁸⁴ **(Rule 92bis!)** Avdispahić for example was told that his statement did not match the statement of another detainee; five or six soldiers then came into the room, beat him for almost half an hour, made him stand against the wall and make the three fingered Serbian sign.⁴⁶⁸⁵ **(Rule 92bis!)** As they beat Avdispahić the soldiers swore at him.⁴⁶⁸⁶ **(Rule 92bis!)** After one or two hours, a group of four or five soldiers arrived, threatened Avdispahić and beat him for two hours with a stake, a thick electric cable, and a rubber hose.⁴⁶⁸⁷ **(Rule 92bis!)** Approximately every two hours this group of soldiers would enter and beat the detainees for as long as they could and this lasted the whole day.⁴⁶⁸⁸ **(Rule 92bis!)**

1343. On 12 or 13 May 1992, Bego Bukvić was taken outside, beaten, and when he was brought back inside he was “half dead”.⁴⁶⁸⁹ The arms of some detainees were broken during these beatings.⁴⁶⁹⁰ That same night, another group of soldiers, entered and told all men who did not vote for a sovereign BiH to sit down.⁴⁶⁹¹ When Avdispahić did not sit as his legs were too swollen, he was ordered to turn towards the wall and was beaten.⁴⁶⁹² Avdispahić then hit the wall and fainted before waking up “on the floor in blood and water”.⁴⁶⁹³ **(All on Rule 92bis!)**

1344. On the morning of 13 May 1992, a man in JNA uniform, with a Serbian accent, by the name of Učo, questioned the detainees, and beat one of them who he accused of smuggling weapons.⁴⁶⁹⁴ After Učo left, another group of soldiers came in and immediately started beating the detainees.⁴⁶⁹⁵ Two men were ordered to get down on all fours after which a pointed stake was pushed into their anuses up to 30 centimetres during which the detainees screamed and howled.⁴⁶⁹⁶ Once the beating and abuse ended the detainees were

acknowledged that detainees were beaten by soldiers wearing White Eagle and Kobra insignia and that an old man died as a result of injuries sustained during beatings but that the death was not reported to the Bosnian Serb authorities. Defence Final Brief, para. 1456.

⁴⁶⁸¹ P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), pp. 9–10. Avdispahić also testified that he was ordered to sit on an old man and he could not tell if he was already dead. P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 11. It is not clear to the Chamber if this refers to the same man.

⁴⁶⁸² P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 49 (under seal). The Chamber notes that only forced labour at the frontlines is charged in the Indictment.

⁴⁶⁸³ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), pp. 11–12.

⁴⁶⁸⁴ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), pp. 12–13.

⁴⁶⁸⁵ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), pp. 12–13.

⁴⁶⁸⁶ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 13.

⁴⁶⁸⁷ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 13.

⁴⁶⁸⁸ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 13.

⁴⁶⁸⁹ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), pp. 13–14.

⁴⁶⁹⁰ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 14.

⁴⁶⁹¹ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 14.

⁴⁶⁹² P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 14.

⁴⁶⁹³ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 14.

⁴⁶⁹⁴ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 15.

⁴⁶⁹⁵ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 15.

⁴⁶⁹⁶ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 15.

ordered to wipe the blood with their clothes.⁴⁶⁹⁷ **(Obviously, not the Bosnian Serb regular soldiers!)**

1345. During this incident the soldiers shouted at the detainees.⁴⁶⁹⁸ Zoran Jovanović came in and was told by Brko “here are your birds from Glinica”; Jovanović laughed and left.⁴⁶⁹⁹ After Jovanović left, Brko hit Avdispahić on the head and the other detainees were ordered to beat each other, remove their underwear and bite each others penises while the soldiers stood by and laughed.⁴⁷⁰⁰

c. Conclusion on conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

1346. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims were transferred to and detained at Ekonomija by Serb Forces in May 1992. The detainees were subjected to severe beatings and sexual violence. The Chamber finds that one detainee died following a severe beating.⁴⁷⁰¹

d. Scheduled Incident B.20.4

1347. The Prosecution alleges that one man was killed at Ekonomija Farm between April and May 1992.⁴⁷⁰²

1348. A soldier ordered Bego Bukvić to come out of the room where he was detained and after he left there was the sound of two short machine gun bursts.⁴⁷⁰³ **(Rule 92bis!)** Avdispahić was also ordered out and told to put Bukvić’s body into a bag and noticed that there were gun shots in the shape of a cross on Bukvić’s back.⁴⁷⁰⁴ **(Rule 92bis!)** After one or two hours another group entered the room, beat everyone, and took Sead Omerović out.⁴⁷⁰⁵ **(Rule 92bis!)** Once Sead was taken out, detainees could hear screaming and blows followed by the sound of two short machine gun bursts; they were then called out to put Sead’s body in a body bag.⁴⁷⁰⁶ **(Rule 92bis!)**

1349. The Chamber therefore finds that at least two men were killed at Ekonomija Farm by Serb Forces in May 1992.⁴⁷⁰⁷

7. Scheduled Detention Facility C.27.7

1350. The Indictment refers to the use of the Standard Factory as a detention facility at least between April and the end of June 1992.⁴⁷⁰⁸

⁴⁶⁹⁷ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 15.

⁴⁶⁹⁸ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 15. The Chamber refers to para. 1240 as to Jovanović’s position.

⁴⁶⁹⁹ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 15.

⁴⁷⁰⁰ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), pp. 15–16.

⁴⁷⁰¹ This finding does not include the persons alleged to have been killed in Scheduled Incident B.20.4, which is discussed below.

⁴⁷⁰² While the Indictment refers to the killing of one man, the Prosecution Final Brief lists five individuals linked to this incident. The Chamber notes that the death of one of these individuals is addressed in para. 1341, which addresses the death of a detainee after he was beaten. The Prosecution also limits the period of the killings to May 1992. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B.

⁴⁷⁰³ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 16.

⁴⁷⁰⁴ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 16.

⁴⁷⁰⁵ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 16.

⁴⁷⁰⁶ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), pp. 16–17.

⁴⁷⁰⁷ The Chamber also received evidence about the disappearance of a detainee but has insufficient evidence to make a finding in this regard or to link it to this scheduled incident. P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 50 (under seal).

1351. The Standard Factory was located in Karakaj on the road from Zvornik to Bijeljina.⁴⁷⁰⁹ It was a building constructed for the Standard Company and was then used as a barracks.⁴⁷¹⁰ It was used to detain Bosnian Muslim men from April 1992 and was guarded by local Bosnian Serbs.⁴⁷¹¹ The facility was also used by the TO, the Zvornik Brigade, the MUP, the police, and by the Interim Government.⁴⁷¹² On or about 3 or 4 May 1992, following interrogations at the SUP in Zvornik, groups of Bosnian Muslim men were transported by policemen to the Standard Factory.⁴⁷¹³ The guards at the Standard Factory wore JNA uniforms and were men from Čelopek.⁴⁷¹⁴ While the Bosnian Muslim men were detained at the facility, separate groups of men wearing camouflage uniforms with cockades would arrive and ask them questions.⁴⁷¹⁵ **(#Irregulars!)**

1352. Armed groups, including paramilitaries from Serbia, frequently visited the detention facility and “severely mistreated the detainees”.⁴⁷¹⁶ One of these groups from Loznica, entered and started punching and kicking the detainees and beating them with sticks, bent cables, and wires.⁴⁷¹⁷ **(#Irregulars!)**

1353. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslim men were transported to and detained at Standard Factory by Serb Forces in April and May 1992. **(#Before VRS# In April and May the President didn’t command to any armed force! But, whoever detained them, it was not arbitrary! Since the detainees had been interrogated and then detained, it is obvious that it was not an arbitrary detention, but a result of interrogation! The irregulars unfortunately had an access to them and committed some crimes, we do not know what, because all the evidence was admitted without any cross examination, but still there were some crimes. However, all that had happened was in contrast to all the #Presidential orders,# and at that time out of his reach and control!)** The detainees were subjected to severe beatings during their detention at this facility.⁴⁷¹⁸

vii. Scheduled Incident D.22

⁴⁷⁰⁸ The Prosecution submits that the evidence presented shows that the facility was operational in April and May 1992. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, fn. 936. **(#BEFORE VRS#! NEITHER IN APRIL NOR IN MAY THE ACCUSED HAD ANY ARMED FORCE UNDER HIS CONTROL! THE FORMAL COMMAND OVER THE VRS THE ACCUSED TOOK ON 15 JUNE, WHEN ISSUED THE DECISION OF FORMATION OF VRS, BUT AFTER THAT ALL THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL COMAND HAD BEEN HANDED OVER TO THE PROFESIONALS IN THE MAIN STAFF!)**

⁴⁷⁰⁹ P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), pp. 4–5; Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2883; P3187 (Map of Zvornik municipality); P3166 (Map of Karakaj industrial area).

⁴⁷¹⁰ Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2883.

⁴⁷¹¹ See Adjudicated Fact 2766.

⁴⁷¹² KDZ555, T. 17235–17236 (16 August 2011) (private session); P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), paras. 42, 69 (under seal); KDZ610, T. 27175 (29 March 2012); P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), pp. 9–10 (under seal). The Accused submits that with respect to this scheduled detention facility, the “presence of several armed soldiers” indicated that there was no cohesion or co-operation and that there was an unclear chain of command. Defence Final Brief, para. 1459. The Chamber will address the Accused’s submissions in this regard in Section IV.A.3.a.iii: Authority over military and police forces acting in BiH.

⁴⁷¹³ P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), pp. 4–5; P75 (Sketches made by Nedžad Hadžiefendić), Sketch D.

⁴⁷¹⁴ P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), p. 5.

⁴⁷¹⁵ P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), p. 6.

⁴⁷¹⁶ See Adjudicated Fact 2767.

⁴⁷¹⁷ P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), pp. 6–7.

⁴⁷¹⁸ The Chamber also received evidence about the killing of Bosnian Muslims at the Standard Factory and their burial but there are no killing incidents charged in Schedule B of the Indictment with respect to this facility. KDZ555, T. 17310–17311 (17 August 2011) (private session); Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin*), T. 2940; Petko Panić, T. 19178–19179 (20 September 2011); P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 69 (under seal).

1354. The Indictment refers to the destruction of at least 28 mosques in Zvornik between April and November 1992.⁴⁷¹⁹ By the morning of 9 April 1992, a Serbian flag was flying “over the main Mosque at the market place in Zvornik” and Serbian music was played through the loudspeakers on the minarets.⁴⁷²⁰ The minarets from two other mosques were destroyed in the shelling of the previous day.⁴⁷²¹ In April 1992, Serb Forces also entered Kamenica and destroyed four mosques.⁴⁷²²
1355. On or about 18 July 1992, some of the mosques in the surrounding area of Zvornik and the mosque in the centre of Zvornik were demolished by a group of men described as “saboteurs” from Pančevo; they loaded the copper from the demolished mosques and took it in vehicles to Serbia under the escort of army commandos.⁴⁷²³
1356. According to Riedlmayer’s report, a total of 29 mosques and two Muslim shrines were damaged in Zvornik during the course of the war.⁴⁷²⁴ The Chamber notes that with respect to three of these mosques, Riedlmayer describes

⁴⁷¹⁹ Indictment, Schedule D.22. The Indictment refers to the destruction of at least 28 mosques but only names 16 mosques.

⁴⁷²⁰ P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), p. 7 (under seal); P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 5; P3165 (Witness statement of KDZ340 undated), pp. 2–3 (under seal); P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 11 (under seal).

⁴⁷²¹ P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 5.

⁴⁷²² KDZ064, T. 1316 (21 April 2010). See also P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled “Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH” prepared for the Karadžić case, formatted records), pp. 352–354, 378–380 (identifying the damage to the Donja Kamenica mosque, Gornja Kamenica mosque, Donja Kamenica –Redžići mosque).

⁴⁷²³ P3173 (Statement of Nenad Simić to Bijeljina SJB, 6 August 1992), pp. 4–5 (under seal); KDZ340, T. 17496, 17532 (19 August 2011) (private session); P3181 (Statement of KDZ340 to Bijeljina SJB, 6 August 1992), p. 6 (under seal). Grujić testified that the Bosnian Muslim monuments were damaged by the paramilitaries. However, on cross-examination Grujić was challenged about this evidence and referred to his prior interview where he had stated that the mosques in Zvornik had been destroyed by a military unit since they were in possession of the explosives and materials necessary to carry this out and he acknowledged that he could not be sure whether it was the regular army or the volunteers who had done this. **(IF HE “COULD NOT BE SURE” THEN IT IS WITHIN THE #“IN DUBIO PRO REO”#, BUT CERTAINLY THE LOCAL SERB AUTHORITIES WEREN’T RESPONSIBLE, AND THE VRS DIDN’T EXIST YET!)** D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 71; Branko Grujić, T. 40392–40393 (25 June 2013). See also KDZ555, T. 17319–17320 (17 August 2011) (testifying that all mosques were destroyed after Zvornik was taken over by Bosnian Serbs and this did not happen during the war operations). KDZ555 also testified that [REDACTED]. KDZ555, T. 17359, 17361 (17 August 2011) (private session). However, the Chamber does not consider KDZ555’s evidence to be reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that KDZ555’s evidence was marked by indicators of extreme evasiveness, bias and contradictions.

⁴⁷²⁴ P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled “Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH” prepared for the Karadžić case, formatted records), pp. 328–400. Riedlmayer identifies the level of damage with respect to each of the mosques listed by name in the Indictment: Đulići mosque (completely destroyed), Kula Grad mosque (completely destroyed), Kozluk mosque (completely destroyed), Divič mosque (completely destroyed), Snagovo mosque (heavily damaged), Novo Selo mosque (almost destroyed), Skočić mosque (almost destroyed), Svrake mosque (lightly damaged), Drinjača mosque (heavily damaged), Glumina mosque (completely destroyed), Donja Kamenica mosque (almost destroyed), Gornja Kamenica mosque (heavily damaged), Klisa mosque (heavily damaged), Kovačevići mosque (heavily damaged), Rijeka mosque (completely destroyed), Selimovići mosque (heavily damaged); P4071 (Slide images of damaged religious sites in BiH), pp. 1, 10, 13–15, 18, 20–23. Riedlmayer identified that the buildings adjacent to the Divič mosque, Drinjača mosque, Kozluk mosque, Rijeka mosque were in good condition, while the buildings adjacent to the Kovačevići mosque, Kula Grad mosque were also heavily damaged. In addition to these 16 mosques, Riedlmayer identified the level of damage with respect to another 13 mosques as follows: Beksuja mosque (completely destroyed), Zamlaz mosque (completely destroyed), Kušlat mosque (almost destroyed), Donja Kamenica –Redžići mosque (heavily damaged), Gornja Sapna mosque (heavily damaged), Jošanica mosque (completely destroyed), Hasići mosque (completely destroyed), Vitinica mosque (lightly damaged), Gornji Šepak mosque (completely destroyed), Donji Križevići mosque (lightly damaged), Glodi mosque (heavily damaged), Seferovići mosque (almost destroyed), Avdo Tucić mosque – Kula Grad (completely destroyed). Riedlmayer also refers to the damage to two other Islamic sites (Turbe of Hasan Kaimija – Kula Grad, Dervish lodge and shrine – Divič), which are not mosques and thus not charged in the Indictment. See also P4518 (Excerpts from Robert Đurđević’s diary, 7–25 September 1993), p. 2. See also P4068 (András Riedlmayer’s expert report on Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1992–1995, 7 May 2009), paras. 15–16, 24; András Riedlmayer, T. 22530–22531, 22536–22537 (8 December 2011), 22541–22547 (9 December 2011); P4069 (Cultural destruction database), records 337, 339, 340, 345, 346, 359, 360, 362, 363, 366, 369, 370, 372, 374, 378, 380; Adjudicated Fact 2768.

them as “lightly damaged”.⁴⁷²⁵

1357. The Chamber therefore finds that at least 26 mosques in Zvornik were heavily damaged, almost destroyed, or completely destroyed. Riedlmayer identified a number of mosques in Zvornik municipality which have now been razed and used as dumping sites for garbage or other constructions.⁴⁷²⁶ With respect to the Divič mosque, a Serbian Orthodox church was built on the site of the destroyed mosque.⁴⁷²⁷

1358. The Chamber has considered the evidence it has received which identified Serb Forces as responsible for the destruction of specific mosques in Zvornik town and surrounding villages.⁴⁷²⁸ **(#Not the Serb Forces#! What Serb Forces? So far even the Judgement depicted only irregulars, and none of the forces under the Accused’s responsibility, or the responsibility of the local Serbs!)** It has also had regard to the fact that with very few exceptions, almost all mosques in the municipality sustained serious damage or were completely destroyed after Serb Forces took over power. **(No matter the Serb Forces took power, there was no lulls since the front line was almost at the edge of the town!)** Finally, the Chamber has assessed the evidence received with respect to the surrounding circumstances in Zvornik, including the attacks on and take-over of multiple Bosnian Muslim villages by Serb Forces in the relevant time frame. **(#Abuse of civilian settlements#! A degree of militarisation of those villages could be seen in the Muslim report D38, see p.3)**

As the time passed from the beginning of war, the situation in that territory was becoming more complex by inability to pass material-technical assets and ammunition. In the last few months, the aggressor conducted a large offensive in that territory which dramatically worsened the position of the combat groups.

(#Combatants, nor civilians#! What else do we need to conclude that it was not a Serb action aimed to disturb the civilian villagers, but to chase the combatants that exercised offensives on a daily basis?) Having weighed these factors, the Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Serb Forces were responsible for the attacks on and destruction of mosques in Zvornik. **(#Not established#! However, the Chamber didn’t establish whether those mosques had been abused for a military purposes. #Abuse of religious objects#! It is well known, and proven by an evidence, that the Islamic community (an organisation) participated in arming, smuggling and storing the armament and explosives. But, the most evident was the abuse of minarets as a sniper nests in every single municipality which had the armed skirmishes! Let us look at the Muslim report on the combat activities in those villages: D38, p. 3:**

⁴⁷²⁵ Svake mosque, Vitinica mosque, and Donji Križevici mosque. See also P4068 (András Riedlmayer's expert report on Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1992-1995, 7 May 2009), paras. 24–25 (stating that of the 30 mosques which were in the part of Zvornik municipality controlled by Serb Forces during the war only one survived without significant damage).

⁴⁷²⁶ P4068 (András Riedlmayer's expert report on Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1992-1995, 7 May 2009), paras. 42–43.

⁴⁷²⁷ P4068 (András Riedlmayer's expert report on Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1992-1995, 7 May 2009), para. 43.

⁴⁷²⁸ See P70 (Witness statement of Jusuf Avdispahić dated 22 October 1997), p. 5; KDZ064, T. 1316 (21 April 2010); P3173 (Statement of Nenad Simić to Bijeljina SJB, 6 August 1992), pp. 4–5 (under seal); KDZ340, T. 17496, 17532 (19 August 2011) (private session); P3181 (Statement of KDZ340 to Bijeljina SJB, 6 August 1992), p. 6 (under seal).

In this period, many combat activities took place, from which we distinguish a few: the liberation of Sapna and Gaj on May 6th, 1992, the battle for Zaseok on May 10th, 1992, the taking of Brdjane on May 14th, 1992, Odzacin on June 11th, 1992, the battle for Boskovic on June 22nd, 1992, the forming of the First Zvornik Squad on June 22nd, 1992, the forming of the Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Squads of those two independent companies, the heavy artillery shelling of the entire region by the Graduates of the Artillery Academy of the aggressor on July 15th, 1992, the annexing of the liberated territories of Zvornik and Ugljenik, the operation of deploying fighters of Nurif's group across Zvornik – Sekovici on July 27th, 1992, the liberating of Rastosnica on August 19th, 1992, the operation in the direction of Parlog – Govedarica – Pandurica on August 27th and 28th, 1992, the liberating of Roznje and Skakovica on September 1st, 1992, the executed diversion operation in the extended region of Klisa on October 8th, 1992, as well as the attempt to infiltrate Kamenica on October 20th and 30th, 1992.

Obviously, there was no any break of fighting, and the Muslim forces advanced every now and then, being decisive to take the entire territory. "...[l]iberating of Rastosnica" meant that the Muslims occupied a very large Serb village of Rastocnica with three Croats, six Muslims and 2,334 Serbs and "liberated" it from it's Serb inhabitants! None of the Serbs remained in Rastosnica)

1359. Therefore, the Chamber finds that at least 26 mosques were heavily damaged, almost destroyed or completely destroyed by Serb Forces from April 1992. **(However, the Chamber had heard a testimony of a member of Yellow Wasps, a prosecutor's witness KDZ340, that the main interest of the Serb police interrogating him on the circumstances – who and why destroyed the mosque in Zvornik, see T.17496! Q:...You indicated that -- in addition to being asked about cars, did you provide information to the investigators in August of 1992 about mosques in Zvornik being destroyed and copper from the destroyed mosques being removed and taken to Serbia? A. When they asked who destroyed the mosque in Zvornik, in my statement I said that I only heard, I didn't know about that, So, the real "Serb Forces didn't know who and why destroyed the mosque, and investigated the Prosecutor's "Serb Forces" about that! #No Serb officials liable#!)**

viii. Movement of the population from Zvornik

1360. As discussed above⁴⁷²⁹ following the attack on Zvornik approximately 10,000 people, the majority of whom were Bosnian Muslims, left Zvornik with most crossing to Mali Zvornik.⁴⁷³⁰ **(Not to forget, Mali Zvornik is in Serbia! Therefore, the Muslim civilians didn't escape as an enemy, but just as a civilians, to find a shelter in the Serb territory!)** Other people took shelter in the municipality of Kalesija,⁴⁷³¹ the town of Snagovo,⁴⁷³² and Kula Grad.⁴⁷³³ Bosnian Muslims who headed in the direction of Tuzla tried to cross into Bosnian Muslim controlled territory and those who managed to cross into Serbia travelled to third countries from there.⁴⁷³⁴

1361. Bosnian Muslim women who had been separated from men were verbally abused by the soldiers who identified themselves as "Šešelj's men".⁴⁷³⁵ **(All on the basis of Rule 92bis, and irrelevant for the case against this Accused!)** After being addressed by Arkan, these women were put on buses and taken to Serbia, and "saw many more dead bodies lying in the gardens of houses" as they were driven through Zvornik.⁴⁷³⁶

1362. On 10 April 1992, the Interim Government instructed residents to return to Zvornik and lay claim to their properties by 15 May 1992 or face loss of title.⁴⁷³⁷ On 20 April 1992, the Interim Government appointed a commission to negotiate with the SDA. Items to

⁴⁷²⁹ See para. 1250.

⁴⁷³⁰ P96 (Witness statement of KDZ059 dated 5 December 1998), p. 7 (under seal); KDZ059, P67 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 29113–29114; see Adjudicated Fact 2730; KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 6760 (under seal); KDZ240, T. 15967 (4 July 2011) (closed session), T. 16078–16079 (5 July 2011) (closed session); KDZ446, P28 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21019 (under seal). See also P62 (Witness statement of Nedžad Hadžiefendić dated 3 October 1997), p. 3; Martin Bell, T. 9783, 9803 (14 December 2010); P1996 (Witness statement of Martin Bell dated 8 March 2010), paras. 23–24; Colm Doyle, T. 2932–2933 (28 May 2010); Colm Doyle, P918 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 25275; D1694 (Intercept of conversation between Ješirić and Čedo Kljajić, 16 April 1992), p. 3 (which suggests that the figure was between 15,000 to 25,000 people). But see Čedomir Kljajić, T. 42208–42210 (30 July 2013) (testifying that the figure of 15,000 was blown out of proportion).

⁴⁷³¹ P84 (Witness statement of Mirsad Kuralić dated 27 June 1996), p. 2; Mirsad Kuralić, P63 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 12560.

⁴⁷³² P64 (Witness statement of Osman Krupinac dated 29 May 2000), pp. 1–2.

⁴⁷³³ See Adjudicated Fact 2732; P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), paras. 7–8 (under seal). See also KDZ059, P67 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 29115–29116.

⁴⁷³⁴ P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 82 (under seal); P4849 (Excerpt from video entitled "The Death of Yugoslavia"), 02:47-03:02.

⁴⁷³⁵ P89 (Witness statement of KDZ023 dated 29 September 1996), pp. 4–5 (under seal); KDZ023, P65 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 26136; P92 (Addendum to witness statement of KDZ023), pp. 1–2, 4 (under seal).

⁴⁷³⁶ P89 (Witness statement of KDZ023 dated 29 September 1996), p. 4 (under seal).

⁴⁷³⁷ See Adjudicated Fact 2769.

negotiate included the situation of a large group of Bosnian Muslims who wanted to move.⁴⁷³⁸ **(#Wanted to move#! #Evacuation, or cleansing#! But regularly referred to as the “expelled civilians”. The civilians of all the three ethnic communities wanted to leave temporarily those areas with combats! Remember, the Muslim “Zvornik Forces” bragged that they evacuated 7,500 civilians, see D38:**

Under those conditions, combat was carried out independently in co-operation with the staffs and units of the armed forces of Vlasenica, Bratunac, Srebrenica, in the triangle of Kamenica – Cerksa - Srebrenica. The inhabited areas were independently held in that region, the roads of M. Zvornik – Ljubovija and Zvornik Drinjaca were controlled, and a spectacular action was undertaken for the freeing of hostages in Liplje.

In extended cooperation, Magija's group, Kibe's group, Himzin's group, Nazif's unit were placed on that terrain on July 9th, 1992, along with other small groups with ammunition and sanitary materials, as well as the executed withdrawal of 7,500 civilians, from the first half of July to the first half of August.

Miće Stanišić reported that “inhabitants of the Muslim villages around Zvornik are being evacuated”.⁴⁷³⁹ **(#EXCULPATORY!!! This is the most accurate term, and it is provided in the domestic Law of Defence that all civilians must be evacuated far from a combat zones!)** The SUP issued permits for Bosnian Muslims to cross into Serbia⁴⁷⁴⁰ and Grujić was involved in transporting Bosnian Muslims from Zvornik to Serbia.⁴⁷⁴¹ **(#EXCULPATORY!!!** Peja instructed Bošković to take all the women, children and men over the age of 50 and allow them to cross to Mali Zvornik.⁴⁷⁴² **(#EXCULPATORY!!!** Bošković then took groups of 200 to 300 people across the bridge on several occasions, but men of combat age were not allowed to cross.⁴⁷⁴³ The money and gold of Bosnian Muslims were taken away before they crossed the bridge to Serbia.⁴⁷⁴⁴

1363. In late May 1992, Bosnian Muslim representatives met with local Serbs, including a member of the Interim Government to discuss the removal of Bosnian Muslims from the municipality.⁴⁷⁴⁵ On or about 28 May 1992, the commander of the VRS 1st Birač Brigade, Svetozar Andrić, ordered the Zvornik TO to organise and co-ordinate the movement out of the Bosnian Muslim population, with only women and children to be moved out and men fit for military service placed in camps for exchange.⁴⁷⁴⁶

1364. Having considered the totality of the evidence and assessed the circumstances in which departures occurred, the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims were forced to leave Zvornik. **(#Forced by the war circumstances#, otherwise on their own decision! The civilian authorities in Zvornik did many efforts to keep the Muslim population safe**

⁴⁷³⁸ P2883 (Conclusions of Zvornik Municipality's Interim Government, 20 April 1992); Milorad Davidović, T. 15525–15526 (28 June 2011).

⁴⁷³⁹ P2749 (SerBiH MUP daily report, 25 April 1992), p. 4.

⁴⁷⁴⁰ Petko Panić, T. 19166 (20 September 2011).

⁴⁷⁴¹ P3173 (Statement of Nenad Simić to Bijeljina SJB, 6 August 1992), p. 5 (under seal).

⁴⁷⁴² P133 (Witness statement of Matija Bošković dated 20 November 2003), para. 21.

⁴⁷⁴³ P133 (Witness statement of Matija Bošković dated 20 November 2003), para. 21.

⁴⁷⁴⁴ P4849 (Excerpt from video entitled “The Death of Yugoslavia”), 00:00-00:22; P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 82 (under seal). Members of the Zvornik MUP were identified as being involved in this search process.

⁴⁷⁴⁵ See Adjudicated Fact 2751. But see KW317, T. 39405–39406 (6 June 2013).

⁴⁷⁴⁶ P3055 (Order of Birač Brigade, 28 May 1992), p. 1; see Adjudicated Fact 2772. But see D3886 (Witness statement of Svetozar Andrić dated 16 July 2013), para. 5; Svetozar Andrić, T. 41666–41667 (22 July 2013). The Chamber does not consider that Andrić's evidence as to the reason why the Bosnian Muslim population was moved out and that their departure was voluntary to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that during his testimony he had an interest in minimising his own involvement in events in Zvornik and that his evidence was marked by contradictions and evasiveness and indicators of lack of sincerity in this regard.

and in the Municipality, but these authorities had lost control over paramilitaries, which even this Judgement recognised! According to the Presidential orders, all and every moving of population had to be considered as a #temporary#, and he proposed and signed several agreements about obligation to facilitate return of moved population once situation become calm and safe!)

1365. The Drina Corps Command reported that with “the arrival of paramilitary organisations to the Zvornik municipality, particularly the arrival of Arkan and his people, this territory was liberated from the Turks. Turks made up 60% of the municipality’s population and it has now been cleansed and replaced with an ethnically pure Serb population”.⁴⁷⁴⁷ **(#Serb municipality only#! This bragging was not accurate. The Serbs never controlled more than 45-50% of the Zvornik municipal territory, which remained to be the Muslim Municipality of Zvornik, where the majority of this 60% of population lived. The town itself had decreased number of the Muslims, but those who didn’t want to fight could have stayed, and they did!)** The ECMM also reported that “people were being forcibly removed” from where they lived in Zvornik.⁴⁷⁴⁸ Towards the end of June 1992 very few Bosnian Muslims remained in the town.⁴⁷⁴⁹

Hyperlinked documents:

⁴⁷⁴⁷ (⁴⁷⁰⁴) P2955 (Report of the Drina Corps, 17 December 1992), p. 1. *See also* KDZ240, T. 16224–16225 (6 July 2011) (closed session). *But see* P2886 (Interview with Marko Pavlović, 30 June 1992), p.1 (stating that the movement of populations was a voluntary and temporary measure). The Chamber does not consider this interview where Pavlović had a clear interest in presenting the actions of the Bosnian Serb authorities in a positive light to be reliable. Davidović also testified that Pavlović in this interview was simply stating what the Zvornik Crisis Staff and politicians expected him to say. Milorad Davidović, T. 15536 (28 June 2011).

⁴⁷⁴⁸ Colm Doyle, T. 2932 (28 May 2010). *See also* P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), paras. 36, 94, 99. *See also* Milan Babić, P741 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 13081.

⁴⁷⁴⁹ Petko Panić, T. 19139 (19 September 2011); P4837 (Witness statement of KDZ610 dated 27 March 2012), para. 79 (under seal). Pašalić challenged the evidence on the change in the Bosnian Muslim population in Zvornik. D3125 (Stevo Pašalić's expert report entitled “Ethnic Composition, Displaced Persons and Refugees from 27 Municipalities in the Territory of BiH, 1991-1997”, August 2012), p. 35; Stevo Pašalić, T. 35379–35380 (13 March 2013). However, the Chamber does not consider Pašalić’s evidence to be reliable in this regard. In reaching this conclusion the Chamber noted that his evidence was marked by extreme evasiveness and indicators of partiality and bias which undermined the credibility of his evidence in this regard. *But see* Branko Grujić, T. 40453 (26 June 2013) (testifying that after the war there was a general call for all citizens of Zvornik, both Muslim and Serb, who had left their homes to return to the municipality and that these people returned and were treated fairly by all organs of the municipality). The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 4237 as to why it does not find Grujić’s evidence about the return of citizens to Zvornik to be reliable. The Chamber does find, however, that in Kozluk, one or two years after the end of the war most of the Bosnian Muslims returned and moved back into their homes with the co-operation of Banjanović. Petko Panić, T. 19170 (20 September 2011); KDZ555, T. 17410 (18 August 2011); Dragan Vidović, T. 17771 (23 August 2011).

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R0414787 - R0414790 para 55, 4.5.3.

9. President Izetbegovic emphasised that the EC Ministerial decision of 16 December had obliged him to ask for the recognition of the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina; he had no other choice. He was confident that this decision would be supported by his parliament (both the Presidency and parliament endorsed the decision on 20 December with only the 2 Serbian members of the 7 strong Presidency and all Serbian representatives of the parliament opposing the move). However, President Izetbegovic was evasive when asked to explain, in view of the opposition of one of the three nations forming Bosnia-Hercegovina, whether the act was constitutional, although he claimed that it was. Representatives of the Serbian community in Bosnia-Hercegovina met Lord Carrington and stressed that Izetbegovic's act was unconstitutional and that the Serbs in the republic wished to continue to be associated with the "rump" Yugoslavia and not an independent Bosnia-Hercegovina. Izetbegovic said that he very much wanted UN peace keeping forces deployed in Bosnia-Hercegovina as soon as possible. All of Lord Carrington's interlocutors feared that Bosnia-Hercegovina's request for recognition would lead to armed conflict in the republic.

6.8.1, 120.09.91 R0414824-R0414832

Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Bosnia-Hercegovina suggested that the Conference should devote itself to the principle of self-determination of republics and not self-determination of peoples or nations. Bosnia-Hercegovina was nevertheless ready to give a large autonomy to components of its population. Bosnia-Hercegovina proposes a five-year arrangement which could be reconsidered after this period. If there is no agreement on a minimum of common functions, Bosnia-Hercegovina will hold another referendum.

Bosnia-Hercegovina is in favour of a union of sovereign states in which sovereignty would proceed from the republics.

